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Editor’s Note
T
he history of Japan’s involvement in the Second World War is still a matter of great
controversy, not least in Japan itself. There, scholars, the public and politicians cannot
even agree on what to call the war, the Pacific War, the Greater East Asia War, the Fif-
teen Years War, the Asia-Pacific War, to name just a few examples, each with its dedicated
partisan following. Successive Japanese governments have avoided the use of any of these
names out of context, and the war is usually referred to as “The Late War” (Saki/Konji no
Sensō/Taisen). Even though the Imperial Household Agency denies any specific intent, in
practice the late Emperor, too, only referred to the war as “the late war,” or used expressions
such as “that unfortunate war” and “that unfortunate period,” unless he was speaking in an
international context about the “Second World War.”1
Not surprisingly, the same controversy affected the 102-volume War History Series (Senshi
Sōsho), of which The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies forms volume three. Here, a compromise
was finally found by allowing the use of the term “Greater East Asia War” in the main text,
but avoiding it in titles, forewords and explanatory notes, although this did not prevent the
publisher, Asagumo Newspaper Inc., from prominently putting the term on its flyers.2 The
foreign reader, who is mostly unaware of the enormous controversy still surrounding Japan’s
involvement in the Second World War and the vigorous, if not acrimonious, debate within
Japan, is often left nonplussed by the vague official expressions used in Japan to refer to the
war to paper over fundamental differences that all sides seem unable or unwilling to resolve.
Moreover, to foreign readers, used to official war histories, as for example in the case of
Britain and Australia, that are commissioned and endorsed by the government, or at least
commissioned, even if  the contents are left to the responsibility of the author, as in the case
of the Netherlands, the Japanese example of a war history that is neither commissioned nor
endorsed, but nevertheless compiled by a government agency, seems an anomaly and raises
the question of whose view it represents. 
The foreword to the present book is clear about it: the contents are the sole responsibility
of the author and the head of the War History Office. But, as Professor Tobe shows in his in-
troduction, it is not that simple. The text went through a great many study sessions and nu-
merous revisions, and although great care was taken to present the facts and the oral
testimonies as objectively as possible, the resulting text does to a large extent represent a
view shared by Imperial Army veterans. But even here we should be careful. In the flyer sup-
plied by the publisher, Major Okamura, a former staff officer of Imperial General Headquar-
ters sent out to Singapore to join the invasion of the Dutch East Indies, explicitly denies the
claim made in the present book that the war was all about oil. For such a vulgar materialistic
1 Shōji Jun’ichiro, ‘What Should the ‘Pacific War’ be Named? A Study of the Debate in Japan,’ NIDS Security Studies,
Vol.13, No.3, Mar. 2011, pp. 70-72.
2 Idem, pp. 75-76.
matter, the Imperial Army did not go to war. It went to war with the idealistic idea of estab-
lishing a new order in Asia and freeing the Western colonies of the Western colonizers. This,
incidentally, is an argument often heard in Japan to justify Japan’s entry into the war. In its
most minimal form, it asserts that something good came out of something bad, after all.
When even the name of your subject is a matter of controversy, it becomes very hard to
write an authoritative, let alone academically sound, historical narrative. Not being academ-
ically trained historians, the authors of the Senshi Sōsho may not be expected to handle their
material with all the conventions of the historian’s craft regarding primary sources, secondary
sources, the literature, references, etc. But in these respects, the Senshi Sōsho do not differ
much from most of the older Western military histories. In the official histories compiled by
the Allied powers after the war almost simultaneously with the compilation of the Senshi
Sōsho, the role of the home side is typically emphasized, and they serve to give an account
of, if not to account for, the actions of their own forces. A certain bias and one-sidedness is
inherent; the Senshi Sōsho are no exception.3 The professionalization of the field of military
history is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Also the Dutch counterpart, Nederlands-Indië
contra Japan,4 compiled by the War History Section of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army
(KNIL) and completed by the Military History Section of the Royal Netherlands Army, is a
case in point. However, there is an interesting difference. The Dutch narrative spends no less
than two of its seven volumes on the events leading up to the war. The author of The Invasion
of the Dutch East Indies only needs a few pages to hop, step and jump to the opening of hos-
tilities. Regardless of the validity of his argument of why Japan went “inevitably” to war, an
argument already disputed in the publisher’s flyer, the quick dispatch of this controversial
subject is illustrative. It represents a general tendency to skirt controversy and jump as
quickly as possible into the nitty-gritty details of the planning and execution of the opera-
tion.
It has been remarked that the Senshi Sōsho “… provide a great treasure of data and fact.
Yet they often omit discussion of questions of primary interest to the Western historian.”5
That the Senshi Sōsho and many other Japanese sources are often “maddeningly silent”6 on
such matters, however, does not take away their immense value as a treasure trove of data
and fact. As Professor Tobe remarks in his introduction: “It is virtually impossible to examine
how Japanese forces fought in the Pacific War without referring to the Senshi Sōsho series.”
For the student of the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, the present translation
will fill a large gap in his knowledge, even though he may not find answers to some of his
most fundamental questions. There is another limitation. Despite its title, The Invasion of the
Dutch East Indies deals mainly with the operations of the Japanese Sixteenth Army until the
beginning of March 1942 when the Royal Netherlands Indies Army surrendered. This means
that the events in central and northern Sumatra are not dealt with at all, for they mainly took
place after that date and, moreover, fell under the responsibility of the Japanese Twenty-fifth
xiv
3 See also: P.J. Dennis, ‘Military History in Australia,’ Mededelingen Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis (Vol. 14, 1991) 9-18,
pp. 9-10; A.R. Millett, ‘The Study of Military History in the United States Since World War II’, Idem, 109-129, pp.
122-123.
4 Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis, Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, 7 Vols., ‘s-Gravenhage, Staatsdrukkerij, 1949-1961.
5 David C. Evans, Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941,
Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1997, p. xxiii.
6 Idem, p. xxiv.
Army; and events in other areas that fell under the responsibility of the Japanese Navy, e.g.
Celebes, are dealt with only very summarily. However, despite these limitations, The Invasion
of the Dutch East Indies provides an unparalleled insight into the Japanese military campaign
and the men who executed it. Moreover, we hope it will answer some of the questions of
those who still wonder how it all could have happened, and who often still bear the scars of
defeat and the subsequent years in prison or internment camps. A look over the hill to see
what was done and thought in the camp of the former enemy, may not excuse anything, but
it may explain many things.
The translation of military terms: Although the organization of the Imperial Japanese Army
(IJA) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was similar to those of Western armies and navies,
there is often no one-to-one correspondence in the names and functions of their constituent
parts. Some translators have chosen to emphasize the differences by not translating specific
military terms, while others prefer literal translations in some form or another. For example,
we might find hikō sentai (飛行戦隊) simply as “sentai” or translated more literally as “air
regiment.” Others again try to find designations in Western armies and navies that most
closely resemble their Japanese counterpart in function, resulting in translations such as
“group,” “air group,” “air combat group,” or even “wing.” In this book, we have generally
followed the third option without being too dogmatic. “Gun” (軍) as in “daijūroku gun” (第
十六軍 [Sixteenth Army]) remains “army,” even though “army corps” would be more correct
in terms of size and function. At the same time, we have tried to avoid British or Common-
wealth terminology and generally followed American usage common in the U.S. Army and
Navy during World War II. This limitation precludes the use of terms such as “wing” in the
example above because a comparable “wing” did not come into existence in the U.S. (Army)
Air Force until after the war. We also tried not to reinvent the wheel and based our transla-
tions mainly on the 1944 U.S. Army manual “A Handbook on Japanese Military Forces”
[https://archive.org/details/TME30-480] for the IJA, and Japanese Monograph No. 116 for
the IJN [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/JM-116/index.html]. As not
everyone may agree with our choices, we have made them explicit in the glossary at the end
of the book.
Japanese names: The characters used in Japanese names can often be read in more than one
way. In the text we have used the readings from the name lists of the IJA and IJN, if given
and unless pointed out otherwise by later research. If no reading is given in these lists, we
have used readings found in bibliographical dictionaries and other sources. In all other cases,
we have adopted the most common reading. In the Index of Personal Names, we have added
a question mark behind the family and/or personal name whenever the reading remains
open to interpretation. In the translated text, Japanese names are given in Japanese order, i.e.
the family name first, followed by the personal name without a comma in between.
Place names: In the Japanese text, foreign place names are either written in characters, as in
the case of Chinese place names, or in the Japanese phonetic katakana script. Especially in the
latter case, this has led to a great number of hard to identify place names. We think that we
managed to identify most of them. With the exception of Hong Kong and Saigon, all place
names are given in their modern, local readings, e.g. Guangdong instead of Canton, and
xv
Gaoxiong instead of Takao. In the case of the Dutch East Indies, colonial era names such as
Batavia and Buitenzorg have been preserved, but their modern names, Jakarta and Bogor,
have been added in the Index of Place Names. The spelling of Indonesian place names is
rather inconsistent and differs from atlas to atlas. We have followed what seems to be the
most commonly accepted spelling.
Editorial notes and emendations: Respecting the wishes of the copyright holder, the National
Institute for Defense Studies of Japan (NIDS), the translation is full and unabridged. Although
the text invites comparison with foreign sources, we have refrained from adding any external
material. The editorial emendations and notes within brackets are only meant to make the
text more readable, to indicate misprints, contradictory descriptions within the text itself, or
occasionally differences with the descriptions in other volumes of the Senshi Sōsho series. Ob-
vious misprints and errata pointed out in the list of errata compiled by NIDS in 2005 have
been silently corrected. Parentheses are as used in the Japanese text.
The translation process: Tim Wolput and Satoko Fujino made draft translations of parts of
the text, which then were checked against the original text and rewritten by Willem Rem-
melink and Yumi Miyazaki. The latter also conducted almost all the background research in
Japanese sources. We wish that more time could have been given to the solution of remaining
problems. However, in the interest of making this translation quickly available to the public,
we had to limit ourselves to the most obvious problems. We hope that other researchers will
pick up the threads where we left off.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the National Institute for Defense Studies for grant-
ing us the copyright to publish this translation. Many other institutions and persons helped
us with the background research. I would especially like to thank the Military Archives of
the National Institute for Defense Studies and the Yasukuni Kaiko Bunko (Yasukuni Archives).
The advisory board read and commented upon the translation. I am grateful to the mem-
bers of the board for their many helpful comments and suggestions. The final responsibility
for the translation, however, rests solely with the editor.
March 2015
Willem G.J. Remmelink 
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About the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series)
TOBE Ryōichi
T
he Senshi Sōsho is a series of 102 volumes (to which two supplementary volumes were
later added) on the military history of the Pacific War (including the Sino-Japanese
War). These volumes contain the results of research conducted at the then War History
Office (renamed the Military History Department, and later reorganized into the Center for
Military History) of the National Defense College (later renamed the National Institute for
Defense Studies) of the Defense Agency, or the Ministry of Defense as we know it today. The
series was published by Asagumo Shimbunsha [Asagumo Newspaper Inc.] between 1966
and 1980. Although the series is usually called an “official” war history, the fact that it was
published by a private publisher and not the government shows the official stance of the
government that, although the series contains the results of research conducted by a branch
of a governmental institution (i.e. the War History Office of the National Defense College), it
does not express the official view of the Japanese government on the Pacific War. As men-
tioned in the foreword, “the main purpose of the publication of this series is to serve as ed-
ucational and research material for the Self-Defense Forces,” but that “its public use has been
taken into consideration as well.”
A study of the history of the Pacific War and a compilation of the results by a Japanese
governmental institution had been planned since the days of the occupation right after the
defeat. However, it was not until 1955, after the end of the occupation, when the War History
Office was established within the Defense Agency, that the plan was put into effect in earnest.
At the War History Office, dozens of veterans were appointed to compile the materials. They
held meeting after meeting to write materials for educational and research purposes, revised
these materials based on the discussions in these study meetings, and prepared manuscripts.
For the research, the War History Office gathered about 70,000 documents, which were scat-
tered and lost after the defeat, interviewed more than 15,000 veterans, and collected about
10,000 documents transferred from the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which had taken over
the demobilization of the Army and the Navy, and about 30,000 documents that had been
collected by the occupation forces and were subsequently returned from the United States.
In 1965, the Defense Agency set forth a plan to publish the research results of the War
History Office as the Senshi Sōsho series. Publication was started the next year; the study
meetings at the War History Office, as many as 3,500 in ten years, and the results of some
240,000 pages of prepared manuscripts provided the basis for the series. The number of au-
thors and researchers who participated in the compilation was 134. The entire 102-volume
series can be subdivided in various ways. In one way, they can be divided into seven volumes
on the circumstances which led to the opening of hostilities, ten volumes on the Army De-
partment of IGHQ, seven volumes on the Navy Department of IGHQ and the Combined
Fleet, ten volumes on the military preparations, nine volumes on the invasion operations,
ten volumes on the operations in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, five volumes on the
operations in the central Pacific theater, three volumes on the defensive operations in the
southwestern theater, four volumes on the operations in Burma, three volumes on the oper-
ations in the northeastern theater, three volumes on the operations in Manchuria, fifteen vol-
umes on the operations in China, five volumes on the decisive battles in the Philippines,
three volumes on the decisive battles on Okinawa, four volumes on the operations in the
homeland, three volumes on the history of special operations (vessel escorting, submarine
warfare, etc.) and one volume with a chronological table and a glossary of technical terms.
The series can also be subdivided in a different way, e.g. twenty-four volumes on the general
conduct of the war, ten volumes on military preparations, sixty-seven volumes on the oper-
ations themselves, and one volume on other matters. Finally, the series could be divided into
sixty-nine volumes on the Army and thirty-two volumes on the Navy, and one volume com-
mon to both (the chronological table). This book, volume 3, is part of the invasion operations
of the Army. 
The published Senshi Sōsho series was on the whole favorably received by historians of
modern and contemporary Japan. It was because the series filled a gap at a time when objec-
tive data on the history of the Pacific War were scarce. Also the attitude of the authors who
strove to be objective and ideologically unbiased was well thought of.
Needless to say, there was harsh criticism as well. For example, from a historiographical
point of view, the series was criticized that its academic level was not necessarily high, which
was only natural, for it was written not by academically trained researchers but by veterans.
However, at this point I doubt whether there were more suitable persons to write the war
history series than these veterans. Even if it had been possible to commission university-level
professional researchers to do the writing, without sufficient military knowledge they would
not have had the competence to do the work. I should also add that even though there were
more than 120,000 historical documents available at the time of publication, their number
was limited compared to the current number of available documents.
The authors of the Senshi Sōsho series were consistent in their attitude that they should
just convey as faithfully as possible the facts, based on the documents and the oral evidence
from the interviews, and leave analyses and interpretation to the reader or the specialist,
rather than on the basis of their research results publish their own analyses or interpretations.
This is even reflected in the title of the series. By choosing the title “War History Series,” they
consciously tried to steer clear of the political and ideological controversies that surrounded
such titles as “History of the Greater East Asia War,” or “History of the Pacific War.” As a re-
sult, many researchers regarded the series as a kind of primary historical source and tried to
utilize the information extracted from the series in their own research. In that sense, even if
indices and notes were insufficient, it can be said that the authors successfully achieved in
their own way their intention to just convey the facts and the evidence. Moreover, not all of
the 102 volumes did necessarily fall short of the required academic level. Of the 102 volumes,
quite a few did attain a considerably high research level.
Another criticism was that the authors, as veterans, might be biased towards the organi-
zation to which they once belonged and in their evaluation might have become lenient with
it or its members. As I mentioned above, the texts of each author were discussed at the study
meetings, attended by the whole group, and revised. We cannot tell whether in the reviews
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at the study meetings, any criticism of their fellow soldiers was toned down or actually re-
inforced. But at least it is clear that the reviews at the study meetings must have put as much
restraint as possible on prejudices or feelings of favor or disapproval. In that sense, we may
say that objectivity and impartiality were to a large extent guaranteed in the series.
The criticism that the series was written by a group of insiders was also leveled at the fact
that the inter-service rivalry between the Army and the Navy sometimes resurfaced in this
series. A typical example is the fact that different Army and Navy versions were written,
with considerable differences in interpretation, about the circumstances that led to the open-
ing of hostilities. The Senshi Sōsho series can be divided into those volumes of which the Army
was in charge and those of which the Navy was in charge. In other words, the parallel tracks
that the Army and the Navy had pursued from the time of their foundation in the early Meiji
period onwards extended to the issue of who would take charge of certain volumes. How-
ever, the difference in interpretation and views between the Army and the Navy mainly oc-
curred in the descriptions of the general conduct of the war; only a few cases show traces of
this rivalry in the description of operations. Volume 3, of which the Army was in charge,
mainly deals with the history of operations and engagements with a focus on land engage-
ments, and we may say that the influence of the Army-Navy rivalry is almost non-existent.
Another criticism of the Senshi Sōsho series was that it focused on operations, and that the
analysis and description of subjects such as the line of communication (logistics), intelligence,
and medical matters were extremely few. Other criticism was that the descriptions were too
flat and often offered nothing but a list of facts. Many parts of Volume 3 may fall under the
latter criticism in particular. However, as I mentioned, this could be the result of the author’s
effort to just convey the facts or the oral evidence, obtained in the process of his research and
writing, while leaving out his subjective judgments as much as possible.
After the publication, a considerable number of misprints and factual mistakes were
found. Apart from the misprints, misunderstandings of the facts have been clarified by newly
found material and through progress in the research. The Military History Department (or
the Center for Military History) is said to be working on an updated list of errata. I am happy
to note that these lists of errata have been taken into account in the present translation and
that the editors have spent considerable effort to clarify remaining problems and errors in
the text.
Despite the above criticisms and shortcomings, there is no doubt that the Senshi Sōsho se-
ries is the first basic reference work to turn to when studying the history of the Pacific War;
it is a rich and indispensible source for all future research. It is virtually impossible to examine
how Japanese forces fought in the Pacific War without referring to the Senshi Sōsho series.
Compared to the rudimentary Japanese Monograph series, collected and translated by the
Military History Section of General Headquarters, Far East Command, which formed the
start of the collection of Japanese war materials and with which foreign researchers generally
have to make do, the Senshi Sōsho series represents a quantum leap forward. I do hope that
this first full and unabridged translation of a volume of the Senshi Sōsho will be followed by
others.
March 2015
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Foreword
T
en years after the establishment of the War History Office, we are finally ready to pub-
lish some of the results of our research one after another. Following The Invasion of
Malaya and The Invasion of the Philippines, we now publish The Invasion of the Dutch East
Indies. Although the main purpose of the publication [of this series] is to serve as educational
and research material for the Self-Defense Forces, its public use has been taken into consid-
eration as well.
As an enormous quantity of historical documents were destroyed, scattered or lost at the
end of the war and, moreover, there was a gap of ten years before the establishment of the
War History Office, the difficulties of compiling a history of the war were, compared to past
war history compilations, beyond description. Yet fortunately, the understanding of all con-
cerned and the enthusiastic support by a great many veterans helped realize the publication
of this work. Here, once again, we would like to express our deep gratitude.
Due to space limitations, not a few parts have been omitted in the account. It is also ex-
pected that some parts will need further revision in the future because of newly added col-
lections of historical materials. We earnestly solicit the cooperation and comments of all of
you, in or outside the War History Office.
This volume was written by war historiographer Matsuki Hidemitsu.
Further, we would especially like to add that the head of the War History Office and the
author are solely responsible for the contents of this volume.
January 1967
National Defense College
Head of the War History Office
Nishiura Susumu

Preface
1. This volume focuses on the conduct of the operation by the Sixteenth Army in charge of
the Dutch East Indies invasion and on the combat operations of each unit that was based
on it. It also deals to a considerable extent with the conduct of the operation by both the
Southern Army and [those parts of] the Navy that cooperated in it.
2. The acquisition of oil resources was the primary objective of [Japan’s] offensive operations
into the South. The operations were executed in such a way that the Fourteenth and the
Twenty-fifth Armies, operating respectively in the Philippines and Malaya, should first
establish firm footholds, and then, using these as stepping stones, the Sixteenth Army
should occupy the vital areas of the Dutch East Indies that contained oil resources. These
offensive operations into the South had not [yet] been planned as of the end of July 1941
(about four months before the opening of hostilities), when [on 1 August] the United
States, Great Britain and the Netherlands put into effect a total [oil] embargo against Japan.
This volume gives an outline of the transition from the beginnings of the southern ques-
tion to the start of the southern advance. 
3. The Dutch East Indies invasion was connected to the surprise attack on Hawaii and the
operations in the Philippines, Malaya, British Borneo, Hong Kong, Guam and Rabaul.
This volume also touches on its connections with these operations, in addition to the
supreme command of Imperial General Headquarters [IGHQ] and that of the Southern
Army.
4. The Dutch East Indies invasion was a transoceanic landing operation, unprecedented in
its scale in the military history of the world at that time. Moreover, it also included the
[Imperial] Japanese Army’s first-ever paratroop operation. Accordingly, close cooperation
between the Army, the Navy and [their] Air Forces was absolutely necessary. These joint
operations are considered to be critically important and are described in considerable de-
tail.
5. As soon as the initial stages of the war produced great military gains, the Southern Army
seized the momentum and, ready to push ahead to further military gains, decided to carry
out the invasion of the Dutch East Indies about one month ahead of schedule. After re-
ceiving the approval of IGHQ and the Navy Southern Task Force, it determinedly strove
to realize this. As a result, the allied forces did not succeed in transporting in time two di-
visions of reinforcements for Java that had been announced, and they had to call off their
sailing. Even so, the operations of the Japanese invasion units involved a great deal of
strain. These circumstances are also recounted in detail in this volume.
6. On executing the paratroop operation in southern Sumatra, it turned out that the occu-
pation of the Palembang airfield had to be given priority over that of the Palembang oil
refineries. Moreover, at the time of the invasion of Java, some confusion was caused when
the Shōji Detachment decided to act on its own initiative, although this led to the unex-
pectedly quick surrender of the enemy. This background is also described in considerable
detail.
Explanatory Notes
1. In general, date and time are indicated in Japan Standard Time [JST].
2. Time of day is expressed using the two following notations: 2:35 p.m. or 1435.
3. [Concerns the original Japanese text. Not relevant to the translation. Omitted by the edi-
tor.]
4. [Concerns the original Japanese text. Not relevant to the translation. Omitted by the edi-
tor.]
5. The numbers within parentheses refer to the historical source materials. These are shown
together at the end of this volume.
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Chapter I Outline of the Operation
(See Illustration No. 1)
A
s a result of World War I, Japan, the United States and Great Britain came to be re-
ferred to as the three great powers. The [former German] equatorial Pacific Islands
lying between the U.S. territories of the Philippines and Guam and the U.S. mainland
became mandated territories of Japan. From way back, Britain had acquired various rights
and interests in China with Singapore and Hong Kong serving as its footholds. Seeking
Anglo-American support, China subsequently tried to reduce Japan’s vested rights in China.
Intensification of the confrontation between Japan and the United States and Britain was in-
evitable. In 1922, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was annulled and in the same year Japan dis-
contentedly signed the Washington Naval Treaty, followed by the London Naval Treaty of
1930. In 1931, the Manchurian Incident occurred, which led to Japan’s withdrawal from the
League of Nations in 1933.
These developments were followed by the North China Incident in 1937 (later renamed
the China Incident). In the meantime, the Soviet Union and Germany had been building up
their national strength and, in November 1936, Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact
with Germany. The China Incident steadily assumed more serious proportions, at first par-
ticularly through British interference. However, when Germany annexed Austria and occu-
pied Czechoslovakia in 1938, tensions rose in Europe and it now became the United States
rather than Britain, which gave active support to China. American anti-Japanese pressure
first began with economic measures. In July 1939, the United States gave notice to Japan that
it would abrogate the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Economic pressure
dealt a heavy blow, as Japan, poor in resources, had to replenish its resources exhausted in
the China Incident. Moreover, it was desperate about its military preparedness to cope with
U.S. and Soviet threats. Especially with regard to oil, Japan was almost entirely dependent
upon overseas supply. If the United States decided to put an embargo on oil exports, Japan’s
military preparedness, in particular its sea and air war potential, would simply end up sitting
idly, waiting to be rendered powerless. So with the China Incident developing and diplomatic
tensions with the Americans and the British rising, the idea of obtaining oil from the nearest
and richest oil producing location, i.e. the Dutch East Indies, and securing Japan’s national
defense became all the more seriously considered. In September 1939, after having concluded
the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in the previous month, Germany started its invasion
of Poland, which triggered both Britain and France to declare war on Germany, and thus
World War II began. During this period, the Netherlands, which held possession of the Dutch
East Indies, had become increasingly more on its guard against Japan, but did not display
an adverse attitude. In 1934, Japan dispatched a delegation headed by Ambassador Nagaoka
Harukazu to Batavia (Jakarta) to promote friendship between [Japan and] the Dutch East In-
dies. In November 1939, Japan expressed its earnest hope that the European war would not
spread to the Netherlands. The Dutch replied that they would be able to avoid that.(12, 13)
On 2 February 1940, Japan made requests to the Dutch government on matters concerning
reciprocal trade, the relaxation or abolition of immigration restrictions, and the granting of
facilities for business investment or their enlargement.(12, 13) The amount of oil which Japan
was importing from the Dutch East Indies at the time had been diminishing year by year from
about 870,000 tons in 1937 to about 670,000 tons in 1938 and about 570,000 tons in 1939.(12)
On 10 April 1940, Germany started a Blitzkrieg operation against Denmark and Norway,
and occupied them at a single stroke. Without delay this led to tensions at the Dutch-German
border. On 15 April, Foreign Minister Arita proclaimed that it would not be desirable for the
stability of East Asia should the war spread to the Dutch East Indies, expressing that Japan
was quite concerned about the region.(12, 13) In response, the United States immediately made
an announcement to check Japan, and then, on 7 May, it announced that it would station its
fleet in Honolulu for an indefinite period of time.(13)
On 10 May, the Germans launched a major offensive towards the west. The Netherlands
immediately declared war on Germany, but were instantly defeated, and on 13 May, the
Dutch Queen and her government fled to London.(13) In the meantime, on 11 May, Japan once
more formally requested all involved countries to ensure the status quo of the Dutch East
Indies.(12, 13) On the same day, the [Japanese] Navy unofficially informed the Fourth Fleet that
it would be dispatched to Palau. The Dutch East Indies, on the other hand, notified Japan on
12 May of an import licensing system for chemical products, textile yarn, cotton fabrics, etc.(13)
Finally on 16 May, in reply to Japan’s aforementioned requests of 2 February, the Dutch
government-in-exile stated that it had no intention to restrict exports to Japan. [In return] on
20 May, Japan demanded a firm commitment to the export of 1,000,000 tons of oil, 200,000
tons of bauxite and other [items] to Japan.(12) The Netherlands replied on 6 June, but its answer
was rather equivocal.(12, 13)
In June, Italy entered the war and in the same month France surrendered to Germany and
Italy.
Along with its support of Britain, the United States adopted a posture of actively contain-
ing Japan, which had signed an Anti-Comintern Pact with both Germany and Italy. In June,
the United States proclaimed an embargo on the export of machine tools to Japan.(13) In July,
it announced a plan to establish a fleet for the Atlantic as well as one for the Pacific.(13) In the
same month, the United States designated oil and scrap iron for export to Japan as items re-
quiring an export license.(13)
Having forced the British retreat at Dunkirk on 29 May, Germany advanced its best troops
to the English Channel and intensified air strikes on Britain, making the collapse of the British
Empire seem imminent.(13) Confronted with this sudden change of the [military] situation,
on 27 July, the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government decided upon an
Outline of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation. In this outline, it
was decided to “facilitate the settlement of the China Incident and seize a favorable oppor-
tunity to settle the southern question,” and “with respect to the Dutch East Indies, for the
time being to strive to secure its essential resources by diplomatic means.”(3)
At that time, the Dutch East Indies position was that it would agree to exporting bauxite,
rubber and tin as requested, but concerning oil it wished to have the actual exports of the
past three years serve as a basis. Moreover, it specifically wanted to let the oil companies,
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most of which were American or British, handle the agreements. Also, if Japan would not
agree to a package-deal import of materials besides the thirteen items Japan had asked for,
an increase in oil export would be very difficult.(12) Basing itself on the decisions in the Outline
of the Main Principles, the government [of Japan] decided on 24 August to dispatch Minister
of Commerce and Industry Kobayashi Ichizō to the Dutch East Indies.(12, 13)
On 23 September, Japan’s armed forces advanced into northern French Indochina, and
on the 27th of the same month, Japan, Germany and Italy signed the Tripartite Pact.(13) In re-
action to these developments, the United States announced an embargo on [the export of]
scrap iron to Japan on the 26th of this month.(13)
Fearing that an American oil embargo was not far away, Special Envoy Kobayashi, who
had arrived in Java on 12 September, started negotiations and did his best to secure the import
of the desired amount of oil, but nonetheless it was as if beating the air.(13) As the China Inci-
dent developed, the Netherlands (the Dutch East Indies) had gradually increased its depend-
ence on Britain, but about this time it came more and more to rely on the United States.(13)
In October, a meeting was held in Singapore by the United States, Great Britain and the
Netherlands.(13)
Special Envoy Kobayashi negotiated with the aim of importing 3,150,000 tons or, if pos-
sible, 3,800,000 tons of oil.(12) However, with the Netherlands (the Dutch East Indies) caught
in a dilemma between the United States and Britain on one side and Japan on the other, an
agreement to allow Japan to import its desired quantity remained far from likely. Thus on 17
October, Special Envoy Kobayashi was recalled home.(12)
On 11 December, a new ambassador, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, headed from Tokyo to Java.(13)
Ambassador Yoshizawa arrived in Batavia (Jakarta) on the 28th of the same month(13) and
began negotiations. But as these negotiations were not substantially different from those with
the Americans and the British, no progress was made.(13)
In April 1941, Japan concluded the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact.(13) The following
month, the United States applied the Lend-lease Act to China.(13)
Following the outbreak of the Russo-German War in June, Japan began a large-scale mo-
bilization, disguised as an exercise (KANTOKUEN or Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwan-
tung Army) in July, in order to secretly concentrate its military force in Manchuria and Korea.
In addition, Japan advanced into southern French Indochina. On 26 July, the day after the
convoy carrying the occupation units left the harbor of Sanya on Hainan Island, the United
States announced a firm policy of freezing all Japanese assets in the United States.(13) Britain
and the Netherlands immediately followed suit.(13) On 14 June, Ambassador Yoshizawa re-
ceived an instruction from Tokyo to break off the negotiations and headed home on the 27th
of the same month.(13)
Japan had already committed large forces to the prosecution of the China Incident and it
had to cope with the newly developed Russo-German War. Since April of that year, it had
been making every effort to negotiate with the United States in order to avoid war against
the latter, but now it found itself at the mercy of a total oil embargo. While renewing its efforts
to negotiate with America, it now had to prepare a plan to obtain oil resource areas should
the negotiations fail. At that time, a general plan for the southern operation had not yet been
drawn up.(10, 17)
Despite Japan’s efforts to steer clear of war with the United States, there was no prospect
of successfully completing negotiations with the United States. Finally on 1 December, there
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was no option left but to decide upon war.(10) On 8 December, Japan’s armed forces carried
out a surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii and at the same time sudden attacks
on Malaya, the Philippines and other locations, thus launching the southern operation.(13)
The Southern Operation Plan
The number of divisions which the Army was able to commit to the southern operation was
eleven out of a total of fifty-one divisions.(10)
The principal aim of the southern operation lay in getting hold of the Dutch East Indian
oil resources.(10, 17) The idea of the southern operation was, in short, to make a sudden attack
against British Malaya and the U.S.-ruled Philippines in order to set up footholds for a quick
conquest of the Dutch East Indies, and while occupying the latter and securing its resources,
to establish a defense line along the Sunda Islands.
In Southeast Asia, oil was produced in Miri in British Borneo, Tarakan and Balikpapan in
Dutch Borneo, northern and southern Sumatra and eastern Java, of which the largest oil fields
were those of Palembang in southern Sumatra, and the nearer locations were the oil fields of
Miri and Tarakan.(21)
In British Malaya, the British had maintained the stronghold of Singapore as the basis for
their rule in East Asia for over a hundred years. Manila was the capital of the U.S.-ruled
Philippines. Davao [in southern Mindanao] and Jolo [in the Sulu Islands] were strategic lo-
cations dividing the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, and could serve to launch an at-
tack on the Dutch East Indies. The strategic center of the Dutch East Indies was Java, with
the Dutch East Indies Government-General located in Batavia (Jakarta). Kuching in British
Borneo was a most suitable location for conducting air operations into southern Sumatra and
western Java. In order to occupy the Palembang oil fields, it was preferable to have air sup-
port from Malaya and Kuching. Air support from southern Sumatra, Kuching, Banjarmasin
(in the south-eastern part of Dutch Borneo), Makassar and Kendari (both on southern
Celebes) was required for the conquest of Java. Ambon and Kupang (on Timor Island) in the
eastern Dutch East Indies were key locations for covering the left wing of the advance to-
wards Java, and for cutting off reinforcement from Australia. In order to set up air bases in
southern Celebes and Banjarmasin, it was necessary to occupy those in Menado, Tarakan
and Balikpapan, and get them ready for use as relay fields.
The [Imperial Japanese] Army formed the Southern Army to carry out the southern op-
eration. The Southern Army’s operations were planned to be executed roughly as follows:
The Southern Army
Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of the Imperial Guard Division, the 5th Division and the main
force of the 18th and the 56th Divisions as its core): First, the 5th Division will land on the
northeast coast of Malaya; then the Imperial Guard Division (under the command of the
Fifteenth Army in the initial stage of the operation), starting from French Indochina will
pass through Thailand and attack the British forces in Malaya. After breaking through
the border, they will dash to Singapore via good roads along the west coast. The main
force of the 18th Division (from southern China) will be transported to southern Thailand,
and the main force of the 56th Division (from Kyūshū) will be transported to the southeast
coast of Malaya to conduct a landing operation at an opportune moment.
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Kawaguchi Detachment (an element of the 18th Division): Starting from French Indochina,
it will occupy Miri and then Kuching in British Borneo.
Fourteenth Army (consisting of the 16th and the 48th Divisions, the 65th Brigade, and the
5th Air Force as its core): In the initial stage of the war, advance units will land at northern
Luzon, Legaspi and Davao. By about day fifteen, the main force of the army (consisting
of the 48th Division’s main force as its core) will land at Lingayen Gulf and a part [of the
army] (the main force of the 16th Division) will land at Lamon Bay and first will swiftly
seize Manila. The 65th Brigade (standing-by in Taiwan) will be in the second transport.
After the capture of Manila, the 48th Division will be diverted to the Java invasion, while
the Fifth Air Force will be diverted to the Thailand (Burma) area.
Fifteenth Army (consisting of the 33d and the 55th Divisions as its core): It will stabilize Thai-
land and then head for Burma. In the initial stage, the army will command the Imperial
Guard Division. The main force of the 55th Division (standing-by in northern French In-
dochina) and the 33d Division (from northern China) will be successively transported.
Sixteenth Army: After seizing Jolo Island and vital areas of the Dutch East Indies outside
Java, it will capture Java.
One detachment (an element of the 38th Division or the 55th Division was envisioned)
will occupy Ambon and then Kupang.
The Sakaguchi Detachment (an element of the 56th Division) will successively seize Jolo
Island, Tarakan Island, Balikpapan, and Banjarmasin.
The 38th Division will operate, after the capture of Hong Kong, under the command of
the Sixteenth Army, and will capture southern Sumatra with its main force.
The 2d Division will proceed from mainland Japan and land on western Java as the divi-
sion constituting the army’s main force.
The 48th Division, after capturing Manila, will operate under the command of the Six-
teenth Army and land on eastern Java.
1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group: It will raid and occupy the oil refinery at Palembang. After
the drop, it will operate under the command of the Sixteenth Army.
Third Air Force: It will give assistance mainly to the operation of the Twenty-fifth Army;
this will be followed by assistance to the Sixteenth Army’s operations in southern Sumatra
and western Java.
As for the Navy, a Southern Task Force was formed for the southern operation. The Com-
bined Fleet (mainly consisting of the First Fleet through the Sixth Fleet, the Southern Expe-
ditionary Fleet, and the First and the Eleventh Air Fleets), deployed the First Air Fleet (a fleet
mainly consisting of aircraft carriers) and the Sixth Fleet (a fleet mainly consisting of sub-
marines) to Hawaii, the Fourth Fleet to the [Japanese] Pacific Islands, the Fifth to the east of
mainland Japan and the First to the Inland Sea [of Japan]. Most of the remaining units formed
the Southern Task Force. The strength of the Southern Task Force was composed of the Sec-
ond and the Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and the Eleventh Air Fleet (land-
based [naval] air units) as the core, while the commander of the Southern Task Force was the
commander in chief of the Second Fleet. The Southern Task Force’s operations were planned
to be executed roughly as follows:
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Main Force of the Southern Task Force (Second Fleet): Its main unit, in the initial stage de-
ployed in the South China Sea, will support overall operations. Afterwards, it will be di-
verted to Palau, and support the conquest of the Dutch East Indies.
Malaya Unit (Southern Expeditionary Fleet, joined by an element of the Eleventh Air Fleet):
It will support the Army operations in Malaya, British Borneo and Sumatra.
Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit (Third Fleet): As the unit for the Philippines in the ini-
tial stage, it will assist the Fourteenth Army in its operations. During this period, the main
unit will operate with Magong as its base. When the Philippines operation is by and large
over, it will become the Dutch East Indies Unit. The Navy will capture Menado, Kendari,
and Makassar with its own naval forces, while assisting the Sixteenth Army in its opera-
tions (except for the Sumatra operation). The main unit, after proceeding from Magong
toward Davao, will move south along Celebes.
Air Unit (main force of the Eleventh Air Fleet): After destroying the enemy air power from
Taiwan to the Philippines, it will follow the route of the Dutch East Indies Unit, ready to
destroy the air power [of the enemy] on Java from the east, while supporting the Sixteenth
Army and the Dutch East Indies Unit in their operations.
Characteristics of the Dutch East Indies Operation
The operation to capture the Dutch East Indies had the following characteristics:
1. It depended on the success or failure of the surprise attack on Hawaii by the Carrier Task
Force (the First Air Fleet as its core).
That is to say, the Malaya operation and the Philippines operation were to be pushed
through regardless of the result of the Hawaii attack, but the execution of the Dutch East
Indies operation largely depended on the success or failure of the Hawaii attack.
2. The operation was designed to strategically use the Philippines, British Borneo and
Malaya as stepping stones. Therefore, the progress of operations in these areas, those of
the Fourteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies in particular, would be decisive.
3. As this was a big transoceanic operation over a wide area with long distances to be cov-
ered, coordination between different corps and detachments carrying out subdivided op-
erations was imperative.
4. The entire operation required close cooperation between ground, sea and air units.
That is to say, it was necessary to conduct repeated offensive operations to destroy the
enemy air power, followed by moving forward a convoy, escorted by navy war vessels
under friendly air cover, after which ground units, upon landing ashore, immediately
should occupy and equip air bases, then upon the air bases being made ready, the air
force units should advance to these bases and engage in their [next] air operations.
Moreover, even though ships and war vessels had been allotted to the southern operation
to the fullest extent possible, the ships and escort war vessels were required to be diverted
back and forth (north and south), left and right (east and west), because the operation
was planned to transport, in a short period of time, an extremely large force of military
units, too large compared to the number of available vessels. Therefore the units con-
cerned had to move as an elaborate clockwork of gears and cogwheels.
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5. The Malaya operation and the Philippines operation were to be carried out by means of
surprise attacks (or at least sudden attacks). However, the Dutch East Indies operation
was to be carried out after a considerable number of days had elapsed. Therefore, the op-
eration had to launch an assault on well-prepared allied forces. Furthermore, it was ex-
pected that during that period Java would be provided with U.S. and British
reinforcements (from Australia and India), and also be reinforced with forces falling back
from the Philippines and Malaya, whereas it was also expected that the Japanese forces
would have sustained an accumulated loss of aircraft, ships, etc.
6. The operation would be executed depending on the progress of the Malaya and Philip-
pines operations. Therefore it was an operation that followed the strategic guiding prin-
ciple of enhancing war achievements, requiring a well-matched momentum of speed and
strength.
7. Two out of the three divisions of the Sixteenth Army were divisions that were to join the
operation only after the capture of the strongholds of Hong Kong and Manila. There were
many other units which were used in two different operations.
8. Attached to the operation was the task of safely occupying oil fields and securing them
before their destruction by the allied forces.
Scheduling Issues, the Defining Feature of the Execution of the Operation
The surprise attack on Hawaii had succeeded. The sudden attacks on Malaya and the Philip-
pines had been successful as well. Great Britain had brought two of its largest battleships,
HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, to Singapore right before the opening of hostilities.
For the Southern Task Force, being equipped with only two outdated battleships, the Kongō
and the Haruna, and cruisers and less powerful war vessels, these [battleships] meant a seri-
ous threat. However, on day three after the opening of hostilities, the Japanese forces suc-
ceeded in sinking these two British battleships by means of an air attack. The southern
operation thus progressed with unexpected speed. The operation was carried out by and
large as planned before the opening of hostilities. There had been minor changes of the plan,
but they were due to the unexpectedly favorable development of the military situation. A
comparison of the actual performance of the southern operation and the planned schedule
would be as follows:
Forecast of IGHQ Actual result
Capture of Manila
around day 35 after the opening of hostilities day 25 after the opening of hostilities
Capture of Singapore
around day 100 day 69
Landing at Java
around day 103 day 84
Surrender of the Dutch East Indies
around day 120 day 92
If a specific remark were to be made on the execution of the operation, it would be about
[the changes in] the invasion schedule. Prior to the opening of hostilities, the Southern Army
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had proposed to the Navy’s Southern Task Force to shorten the invasion schedule and made
an agreement with it on 10 November. However, as the initial stages of the operation devel-
oped smoothly, the Army quickly proposed a further shortening of the invasion schedule.
Upon obtaining approval from IGHQ, the Army made the Navy’s Southern Task Force con-
form to this, and on 1 January 1942, they agreed on a new schedule, which afterwards the
Army obstinately tried to fulfil. The outline of changes in the schedule of the landings on
Java, including the initial plan and the actual consequences, was as follows (x represents the
date of the opening of hostilities):
[1941]
5 November IGHQ’s plan
around day x + 103
10 November Internal agreement between the Southern Army and the Southern
Task Force 
approx. around day x + 80
8 December Opening of hostilities (surprise attack accomplished)
10 December Sinking of two large British battleships
[1942]
1 January Agreement between the Southern Army and the Southern Task
Force (approved by IGHQ) 
approx. day x + 70
28 January At the request of the Navy, a postponement with the smallest of
margins was decided after consultation [between both forces]
day x + 77 for eastern Java
day x + 75 for western Java
4 February The Navy requested the Southern Army for a two-day postpone-
ment of the day for the invasion of southern Sumatra
6 February The Navy requested the Southern Army for a further four-day post-
ponement of the invasion of southern Sumatra
8 February The Southern Army unwillingly agreed to the request and post-
poned the date for the invasion of western Java, but advanced the
date for the invasion of eastern Java
day x + 76 for eastern Java
day x + 81 for western Java
9 February One-day advance of the invasion of southern Sumatra
10 February Reaching a new agreement, setting the date for the invasion of both
eastern and western Java at
day x + 80 
23 February Two-day postponement of the date of the operation due to the ap-
pearance of an allied fleet under sail
day x + 82 
27 February Another one-day postponement due to the appearance of an allied
fleet under sail
day x + 83
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1 March Simultaneous landing operations on both eastern and western Java
day x + 83
The original idea of IGHQ was to render Malaya, the Philippines and British Borneo power-
less and to use these locations as bases for successive captures of air bases on territories out-
side Java, then to move air units forward, and focus their air attacks on Java from [the bases
in] southeastern Sumatra, southern Borneo and southern Celebes. When the air attacks
showed results, the troops were to cross the sea to Java and carry out the landings. The South-
ern Army, on the other hand, synchronized the departure time of the convoys with the time
of air deployment, and on this basis directed the operation.
The details of each development will be explained one by one.
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Illustration No. 1—Overview of the Operation Until March 1942
Chapter II Situation of the Dutch East Indies
(See Illustrations No. 2 and No. 3)
The situation of the Dutch East Indies was in outline as follows:(21)
Topography
R
anging from latitude 6° north to 11° south, and from longitude 95° to 141° east, the
Dutch East Indies consisted of many islands extending into both the northern and the
southern hemispheres with the equator virtually in the middle. The northwestern part
of Borneo, however, was British territory and the eastern part and a small enclave on the
northern coast of [western] Timor were Portuguese.
The total area of the Dutch East Indies covered 1.9 million km² and its total population
amounted to over sixty million. The size of the area was about fifty-eight times that of the
Dutch homeland, and about three times that of the total area of Japan at the time, including
Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin. Its length stretching from east to west was approximately 2,700
miles, which was about the same as the distance from Taiwan to Sakhalin.
The population density per square kilometer was 316 for Java (including Madura), 175
for the islands of Bali and Lombok, 26 for the island of Timor, 22 for Celebes, 17 for Sumatra,
4 for Borneo and 2 for the Moluccas. New Guinea was such a primitive place that no survey
had [yet] been possible.
The general situation of each island was as follows:(21)
1. Sumatra and Java
Sumatra and Java respectively take up about 470,000 km² and 130,000 km². From west to
east and close to the south coast [of both islands], a mountain range runs like a spinal col-
umn as far as the Lesser Sunda Islands. This mountain range is a volcanic chain with
many cone-shaped mountains. Whereas the southern coastal areas are steeply inclined,
the northern coasts are gently sloped, and have many plains and plateaus. The rivers of
Java generally flow along the bottom of V-shaped valleys; their water levels vary greatly
depending on the rainfall. The rivers of Sumatra are generally big; some even allow
steamship navigation. The lower reaches of the rivers are large wetlands. Entire areas of
Palembang and Medan on Sumatra are made up of oil fields.
Although Java occupies no more than one-fourteenth of the total area of the Dutch
East Indies, it was crowded with approximately forty million people, two-thirds of the
total Dutch East Indies population. Including Batavia (Jakarta), which was the seat of the
Dutch East Indies Government-General, with a population of about 600,000 and Surabaya
with about 400,000, Java had up to seven cities with a population of 100,000 or more. In
Java, the mountains and fields had been developed, as had been the transport facilities
(both railways and motor roads). Batavia and Surabaya, along with Cilacap on the south
coast, constituted strategic military ports as well as commercial ports. Surabaya served
as the base of the Dutch East Indies fleet, and had been provided with a stronghold. West
of Surabaya were the oil fields of Cepu.
2. Celebes
Celebes is 190,000 km² in area (more than twice the size of Hokkaidō) with many moun-
tain ranges and gorges. Celebes produced nickel and also had large reserves of iron ore.
Key locations on this island were Menado, Makassar and Kendari.
3. Borneo
The island of Borneo is the third largest island in the world with an area of more than
750,000 km², of which the Dutch territory occupied approximately 540,000 km². Its border
with British Borneo consists of a mountain system. From its centre, mountain ranges
branch out to the east, the southeast and the southwest. In between these ranges there are
plains and large rivers. With an exceedingly sparse population and many regions yet un-
trodden by man, most of the island consisted of thick jungle and swamp. The island of
Tarakan and the Sanga-Sanga area in Dutch Borneo, along with the area of Miri in British
Borneo, were oil-producing locations. The oil gained at Tarakan, being of particularly
good quality, was highly valued by the Japanese Navy. The oil of the Sanga-Sanga area
was transported by an oil pipeline to Balikpapan, where it was shipped off.
4. Timor
The island of Timor is about the same size as Kyūshū. The eastern part and a small enclave
on the northern coast of western Timor were Portuguese territory. It was about the same
size as Shikoku. In Dutch Timor was the city of Kupang.
Note: Portuguese Timor had a Portuguese colonial government with a civilian governor-
general residing in Dili.
5. The Moluccas
Also called the Spice Islands. The city of Ambon on Ambon Island, which had developed
of old as a spice trade center, served as the region’s center. In the area of Bula in eastern
Ceram there was an oil field. The Moluccas had many unexploited places. 
6. New Guinea
Being the world’s second largest island, it covered an area a little over 800,000 km², of
which the Dutch territory extended from longitude 141° east onward to the west, occu-
pying an area of a little more than 390,000 km², which was almost equal to the total area
of the main islands of Japan. A central (snow-capped) mountain range like a spinal column
linked a series of mountains of 4,000 meters or higher and covered in snow the whole
year round. The island had many areas never set foot on by man and consisted of many
vast wetlands and dense jungles.
Resources and Industry were in outline as follows:(21)
1. The annual production of oil for 1939 was approximately eight million tons (about twenty
times that of Japan). The annual quantity needed by Japan at the time was about five mil-
lion tons, but Japan was not self-sufficient as regards even 10 percent of that amount. The
quantities that the Dutch East Indies had been exporting to Japan as well as the quantities
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requested by the Japanese were as previously described. Below is an overview of the pro-
duction at each location in the Dutch East Indies.
Sumatra Palembang and surrounding area 3 million tons
North Aceh area 1 million tons
Borneo Sanga-Sanga area 1 million tons
Tarakan 0.7 million tons
Java Cepu area 1 million tons
Ceram Bula area 0.1 million tons
New Guinea and others some amount
The Dutch East Indies oil business was for the most part controlled by American or British
capital and there also lay the primary cause which complicated the oil issues.
2. Iron ore was undeveloped [at that time] however, it was said that there were deposits of
approximately one billion tons in southeastern Borneo and Celebes.
3. Tin was produced on Bangka, Belitung and Singkep, three islands off the coast of Sumatra.
Their annual production was between 30,000 and 40,000 tons. This put them into third
place in the world.
4. Bauxite was produced on the island of Bintan with an annual production of approximately
400,000 tons.
5. Nickel was mainly produced in Celebes.
6. Manganese was produced in the neighborhoods of Cilacap and Semarang on Java, in
Bengkulu on Sumatra, and the islands of Bintan, Bangka and Belitung. The annual pro-
duction of these areas together reached 12,000 tons.
7. Other than that, coal (with an annual production of 1.5 million tons), sulfur and tungsten
were produced.
8. With an annual production of about 450,000 tons, rubber accounted for about one-third
of the total annual world production, making the Dutch East Indies the world number
two [rubber producer] after Malaya.
9. The production of quinine, a specific medicine for malaria, accounted for 93 percent of
the total world production, and the production of kapok amounted to 78 percent of the
total world production. It was also said that the Dutch East Indies was one of the world’s
three biggest producers of sugar.
As many of these resources were indispensible for the self-sufficiency of Japan, in May 1940,
Japan requested from the Dutch a firm commitment to the export to Japan of thirteen items,
which consisted of the following products (and their quantities):(12)
- oil (1 million tons or more) - bauxite (200,000 tons or more)
- rubber (20,000 tons or more) - tin (ore as well, 3,000 tons or more)
- manganese ore - nickel ore
- wolfram ore - scrap iron
- chromium pig iron - industrial salt
- castor oil - cinchona bark 
- molybdenum
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Administration and Inhabitants
After the Japanese troops had landed in the Dutch East Indies, the operation progressed with
striking ease through the spontaneous cooperation of the local inhabitants, and the tenor of
the administration of the occupied areas turned out to be different from that in the Philippines
and Malaya. The [previous] administration of the Dutch East Indies and its inhabitants, how-
ever, was in outline as follows:(21)
In 1602, the Dutch established the East India Company as a chartered company with
Ambon serving as its base. In 1618, the East India Company moved to Jakarta and renamed
this [city] Batavia. In 1798, the Dutch government disbanded the East India Company and
took direct control over the East Indies. 
The Dutch East Indies Government-General had its seat in Batavia and consisted of eight
departments. Although the director of each department was appointed by the Governor-
General, the chiefs of the army and the navy departments were appointed by the Monarch.
Regional administration was divided into Java (including Madura and called the inner
territory) and the outer territories, consisting of the remaining areas. Then further division
into residencies was undertaken, resulting in Java being divided into seventeen residencies
with the exception of the principalities of Solo and Yogyakarta, Sumatra being divided into
ten residencies, etc. Each residency was then further divided into sub-residencies [regencies],
and a Dutch official was posted at either level.
In the principalities of Solo (capital Surakarta) and Yogya (capital Yogyakarta) the ruler
enjoyed a large measure of self-rule. Living in a royal palace and maintaining a private army,
he preserved the old traditions and customs from the feudal age; however, concerning mat-
ters of administration, the [native] ruler was supposed to accept the advice and supervision
of the Dutch resident.
The Dutch government neglected the education of the indigenous population and avoided
the appointment of natives [to colonial government service]. After the Russo-Japanese War,
movements for independence arose among the indigenous population, but the Dutch Gov-
ernment-General suppressed them.
According to the national population census of 1930, the total population of the Dutch
East Indies was approximately 60,730,000, which could be broken down into an indigenous
population of approx. 59,140,000, and about 1,230,000 Chinese, 210,000 Dutch, 7,400 Germans,
7,200 Japanese, 2,400 British, 800 Swiss, 600 Americans, and other nationalities.
While the overseas Chinese used their talents as merchants, the Dutch, the British and
the Americans were engaged in the large-scale production of agricultural and forestry prod-
ucts for export, as well as in the exploitation of mineral products. As for the indigenous pop-
ulation, most of them were engaged in a feudal type of subsistence farming. Literate
indigenous inhabitants formed only five percent of their population.
The Dutch East Indies Military Preparations
Holland essentially was a naval power. As previously explained, its homeland was occupied
by Germany in May 1940. The land power of the Dutch East Indies was not very great and,
after the occupation of the homeland, it was forced to rely on local reinforcements to
strengthen its war potential and on reinforcements from the Americans and the British (Aus-
tralia) to build up its military preparations.
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The intelligence that the [Imperial Japanese] Army General Staff Office had gained by 10
September 1941 was as follows:(23)
Strength of the Dutch East Indies Army
Before WW II, its force consisted of an inner territory army of 19,300 men (fifteen infantry
battalions, two artillery regiments and others, Europeans accounting for thirty percent),
and an outer territory army of 12,000 men (fourteen infantry battalions and others, Euro-
peans accounting for fifteen percent), making a total of 31,300 men. However, at present
the inner territory army amounts to 50,000 men (two divisions as its core), the outer ter-
ritory army 20,000 men (fifteen infantry battalions as its core), reaching a total of 70,000
men, which is a 2.2-times increase in size. At present, preparations are ongoing to consol-
idate the force, setting 100,000 men [in total] as a goal, however it is very unlikely that
this goal will be achieved in this year.
Their disposition is as shown in Illustration No. 3.
Strength of the Dutch East Indies Navy
Cruisers Destroyers Submarines Others
Before the war 2 8 12 21
At present 5 8 12 56
Strength of the Dutch East Indies Air Force
The total number of the aircraft of the army and the navy before the war was about 320
(of which about 150 were front-line aircraft).
However, at present they have about 500 aircraft (of which 300 are front-line aircraft)
at their disposal, which means the numbers have approximately been doubled.
Furthermore, there will apparently be another increase of about 150 aircraft in the fu-
ture.
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Illustration No. 3—Disposition of the Dutch East Indies Army Strength (Including British Forces in British
Borneo). Survey as of 10 September 1941
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Chapter III Operational Preparations Prior to the War
1. Situation Until Summer 1941
As stated above, the Dutch government sought refuge in England on 13 May 1940. On29 May, the British forces retreated from Dunkirk, and in June the French army sur-rendered to Germany. Now that a German landing on British soil was foreseeable
and, like an orphaned child, the Dutch East Indies was left on its own in eastern Asia, IGHQ,
for the first time, started research on a southern operation. At that time, as preparation for
worst-case scenarios, IGHQ had drawn up operation plans for war against either the Soviet
Union, the United States or Britain, or against two or more of them, while handling the China
Incident at the same time. However, specific plans were made only for cases of dealing with
a single country and, moreover, operations that assumed the Dutch East Indies as an hypo-
thetical enemy had never been considered at all. Therefore, the Army Department of IGHQ
assigned personnel to separately study the four areas of the Philippines, Malaya, Hong Kong,
and the Dutch East Indies. Maj. Okamura Masayuki, staff officer of Section 2 (Operations
Section), was ordered to conduct the investigation into the Dutch East Indies. He took up the
assignment from 16 July onwards along with Maj. Shiho Kenkichi, head of the Resources and
Materials Group of Section 3 (Organization and Mobilization Section), and Maj. Katō Tsukasa,
member of the Economic Mobilization Bureau of the Ministry of War.(17, 20) The findings of
Staff Officer Okamura’s investigations were in outline as follows:(17)
The military strength of Java is built around a core of two divisions, but with about two-thirds
of the force consisting of indigenous troops, they do not have much of a fighting spirit. Although
more and more pillbox positions are built in all areas of the Dutch East Indies, even those along
the Bandung stronghold front are perfunctory and of a typical standard type. The barbed-wire
entanglements that are being constructed are little more than a poor excuse. If it were possible
to land unexpectedly and carry out a surprise attack, we could probably force the surrender of
the whole Dutch East Indies Army on Java within a couple of days with only one of our brigades.
However, from the point of international good faith we cannot do this. [On the other hand,] if
we were to attack a militarily prepared Java, it would come down to an assault. In this case, we
would need to deploy two divisions. But once the landing is carried out successfully, Java could
be conquered in about one week because of its well-developed grid of good motorways.
In June and July, IGHQ judged that if Japan were to settle things in the southern area, Great
Britain, which faced a crisis, and the United States, which was struggling to cope with the
drastically changed situation in Europe, could not afford to interfere in the issues between
Japan and the Netherlands.(17, 18) However, from the beginning of August, the British gradually
regained their self-confidence in defending their homeland. As stated above, IGHQ had stud-
ied the four areas separately, but in the middle of August it made a comprehensive study of
these four areas together.(18) In this study, the assessment was made that if Japan were to settle
things in the southern area, both the Dutch and the British would put up resistance while
maintaining an inseparable relationship; the United States, however, would maintain a cau-
tious attitude in East Asia.(17, 18) Thus a plan was conceived which proposed the following: in
dealing with the southern area one army with two divisions as its core would deliver a sur-
prise attack on the Dutch East Indies, followed by an attack on Malaya by another army; if
the situation should require it, the Dutch East Indies and Malaya were to be attacked simul-
taneously; when war against the United States was inevitable, again another army would at-
tack the Philippines; the sequence of the attacks on the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and the
Philippines was to be determined according to the contingency of a war against the United
States.(18)
As it was, the German air raids against Britain failed to show the desired results and grad-
ually Britain showed signs of recovery. In the meantime, while actively supporting Britain,
the United States showed a willingness to contain Japan. In the Navy Department of IGHQ
the view grew stronger that if [Japan] were to resort to military force in order to settle the
southern question, war against the United States would be inevitable because the United
States and Britain were inseparably tied together. Therefore, on 28 August the Navy Depart-
ment presented the Army Department with a memo about the interpretation of the Outline
of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation (as previously explained the
decision by the Liaison Conference [between the IGHQ and the Government] on 27 July to
“seize a favorable opportunity to settle the southern question”) and requested the Army De-
partment to take it into careful consideration. At the time, the Army Department had been
entirely preoccupied with the matter of stationing troops in northern French Indochina based
on the Outline, and did not have any attention to spare for the Dutch East Indies issue.(17, 18)
On 23 September, the stationing of troops in northern French Indochina became a fact.(7, 13)
Then on 26 September, the United States declared an embargo on scrap iron against Japan.(13)
Included as members of the (aforementioned) Kobayashi Delegation, which had been dis-
patched in accordance with the Outline, were Col. Ishimoto Itsuo, chief of the Resource Sec-
tion of the Ministry of War, and Lt. Col. Nakayama Yasuto, chief of Section 3 of General
Affairs of the Army Aviation Headquarters (later in charge of the Military Administration
Department of the Dutch East Indies invasion army), along with Navy Capt. Nakahara Yoshi-
masa and Navy Lt. Cdr. of Engineering Nakasuji Tōichi.(46) The party left Tokyo on 30 August
and arrived in Java on 12 September, where they tried to negotiate the import of 3,150,000 or
more tons of oil to Japan, but the negotiations were very tough.(12, 13) On 17 October, the del-
egation was recalled. The only result it had achieved was an agreement on the import of
1,800,000 tons of oil.(12)
By advancing into northern French Indochina, Japan tried to shut down the supply route
to the Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] regime, but it brought no prospects for settling the China
Incident. Furthermore, after having put an embargo on scrap iron, the United States was
showing signs of taking measures to put an embargo on oil. And, to top it all, the negotiations
between Japan and the Netherlands gave only cause for pessimism. Under these circum-
stances, the southern question flared up again in October at IGHQ and the Army as well as
the Navy Department engaged in another series of studies. The Army Department made the
following judgment:(10) “As the German forces are expected to land on the British mainland
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next spring,(10, 17) and we may assume that the United States and Britain can be separately
[dealt with], we need to take advantage of the favorable opportunity to settle the South
(Dutch East Indies and Malaya) in order to settle the China Incident.” Subsequently, the Army
Department laid down its course of preparing “an operation to first capture the Dutch East
Indies by a sudden attack with an army consisting of the 5th and the 48th Divisions as its
core, and then to capture Malaya with another army with four divisions as its core, including
the Imperial Guard Division and the 18th Division.” Accordingly, on 12 October, it issued
orders that the 5th Division assemble at Shanghai, and, on the 22d, that the Imperial Guard
Division assemble in Shantou [Swatow], the 18th Division in Guangdong [Canton] and the
48th Division on Hainan.(10) The Navy Department initially agreed to this; however, at the
end of the month, it stated to the Army Department that “dealing with the South would ul-
timately come down to war against the United States. If anything, Japan should [face this
fact and] be determined to fight the United States from the start.”(7, 10)
On 15 November, the Navy Department put a preparatory fleet mobilization into motion.
It was obvious that putting into motion a southern operation that would entail war with
the United States had to be avoided. The above-mentioned plan of the Army Department
drawn up in mid-October had already disappeared by the end of October.(7, 10) In the mean-
time, Maj. Kondō Dempachi had taken the place of Staff Officer Okamura as officer in charge
of the Dutch East Indies [operation].(17)
Late in November, a discussion arose about mediating the border dispute between French
Indochina and Thailand [Franco-Thai War] that had just broken out. If this [situation] could
be guided to our advantage, then air bases could be pushed forward into southern French
Indochina and Thailand, which would facilitate the [Japanese] transoceanic operations.(7, 17)
In the previous month, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands had held a [defense]
conference in Singapore. On the recall of Special Envoy Kobayashi (he had left Surabaya on
22 October), it had been decided to dispatch again a special envoy, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who
took his departure on 30 November [editor’s note: in Chapter I, p. 3, it is said that he left
Tokyo on 11 December, which agrees with Yoshizawa’s autobiography]. Ambassador Yoshi -
zawa arrived in Batavia (Jakarta) on 28 December, and negotiations started from 2 January
1941.(13)
The Army Department of IGHQ followed closely the start of Ambassador Yoshizawa’s
negotiations and the progress of the mediation of the border dispute between French In-
dochina and Thailand.(7, 17) Earlier, when Special Envoy Kobayashi was to return home, Lt.
Col. Nakayama Yasuto had been instructed to stay behind. Col. Ishimoto Itsuo, however, had
died of illness on 29 September while in Java.(13) When the new ambassador, Yoshizawa,
headed for the Dutch East Indies, he was accompanied by Col. Harada Yoshikazu, staff officer
of the Army Department of IGHQ (and later vice chief of staff of the Dutch East Indies inva-
sion army), and Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori, member of the Army General Staff Office (and later
staff officer of the Dutch East Indies invasion army), as members of the delegation.(37, 42) About
two months after the arrival of these two officers, Col. Nakayama Yasuto (promoted to
colonel in March) returned home.(46)
Until around June or July 1940, the Army Department of IGHQ had thought that Great
Britain and the Netherlands could basically be separately [dealt with]. Since about August,
it had started considering Britain and the Netherlands as inseparable [when dealing with
them], but the United States and Britain as still separable. However, by the end of 1940, it
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had concluded that Britain, the United States and the Netherlands were inseparable.(17) The
reason was that the circumstances had changed: Britain had pulled itself together again and
a German landing on British soil had become unlikely; the United States had started its active
support for Britain, China and the Netherlands; moreover, in Singapore the [defense] con-
ference between the United States, Britain and the Netherlands had [also] been held. The
Army Department, considering it imperative to avoid war with the United States, kept a very
close watch on the resumption of negotiations with the Dutch and on the [Japanese] media-
tion between French Indochina and Thailand.(7, 17) Nevertheless, it kept implementing the
above-mentioned plans made in October when the southern question had resurged. The
Thai-French Indochina Border Dispute [Franco-Thai War] was settled through [Japanese]
mediation on 11 March 1941, but in the meantime the following measures had been put into
effect:
1. In October the 5th Division was ordered to carry out landing operation exercises. More-
over in December, the Imperial Guard Division, the 18th and the 48th Division received
orders to carry out exercises for operations in tropical environments, in particular for
landing operations. These divisions had been unofficially informed that their area of op-
eration would be Malaya.(1, 10)
2. In addition, in December the Research Department of the Taiwan Army was established
and instructed to carry out investigations, examinations and tests of direct necessity to a
southern operation by March 1941.(16)
3. Concerning the Dutch East Indies, sorting of information had been started since about
December. Lt. Col. Murakami Kimisuke, head of the Southern Group of Department 2
(Intelligence Bureau; and later intelligence staff officer of the Dutch East Indies invasion
army), along with Lt. Cols Furuki Shigeyuki, Kadomatsu Shōichi and Ishikawa Susumu,
and Maj. Hashida Sei, all of the same department, had been assigned to the study and
sorting of data.(19)
Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō, member of the Transport Section of the Economic Mobilization
Bureau at the Ministry of War (and later staff officer for shipping of the Dutch East Indies
invasion army) had been ordered to examine the data particularly from the standpoint of
shipping transport and landing operations.(44)
4. In about December, the Inspectorate General of Military Training (whose deputy chief
was Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, and whose chief of its General Affairs Department was
Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō; Lieutenant General Imamura later became commander of
the Dutch East Indies invasion army, and Major General Okazaki its chief of staff) con-
ducted a study exercise of bicycle units from Toyohashi City to Kanamarugahara [Kana-
maruhara] in Tochigi Prefecture simulating the traversing of Malaya from north to south.(36)
5. From January through February 1941, a training trip for staff officers was held in Kyūshū,
during which operation rehearsals, mainly for landing operations, were carried out by
the relevant staff officers.(17)
6. From late March through early April, the Army Department of IGHQ held an exercise of
its ground, sea and air units with the 5th division serving as the core, in which after cross-
ing the sea from eastern China and landing at Karatsu in northern Kyūshū, they were
supposed to capture Sasebo. The exercise simulated the crossing of the ocean, landing at
“the neck” or a narrow part of the Malay Peninsula, and then capturing Singapore. Com-
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mander of the army of this exercise was Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, the deputy chief of
the Inspectorate General of Military Training.(17)
As previously explained, the southern question, which had resurged in October of the pre-
vious year, outwardly quieted down while the negotiations between Japan and the Nether-
lands were resumed and the mediation of the border dispute between French Indochina and
Thailand went on.
However, as soon as the mediation of the Thai-French Indochina border dispute was con-
cluded on 11 March, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, receiving a magnificent send-off, set out to
visit Germany, Italy and the USSR on the following day. On 13 April, the day the Soviet-
Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed,(7) an assembly of army and division commanders was
held, which was filled with an unusual air of excitement.(11) During the assembly, 2d Division
Commander, Lt. Gen. Yoshimoto Teiichi was informally instructed by the chief of Army Gen-
eral Staff to conduct research and training for a southern operation.(56) The 2d Division, having
returned home from Manchuria in November of the previous year (1940), had earned a rep-
utation for bravery with, among others, the night attack on Gongchangling during the Russo-
Japanese War. It had also played an active role as the division stationed in Manchuria when
the Manchurian Incident had occurred.
On 27 September of the previous year the Tripartite Pact had been signed.(7) On the 12th
of the following month, the American President had declared that he would oppose this pact,
and in the same month the United States had held the [defense] conference in Singapore with
Britain and the Netherlands.(13) [In such circumstances,] Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s recent
visit to Germany, Italy and the USSR hinted at an important turning point. In the operation
plan of the administrative year 1941 (drawn up at the end of 1940), it had been laid down
that in a worst-case scenario of war with the United States, the corps in charge of the invasion
of the Philippines would be the 7th and the 16th Divisions. The divisions, which had been
instructed at the end of 1940 by IGHQ to carry out training while simulating an operation in
Malaya, were, as already mentioned, the Imperial Guard Division and the 5th, the 18th and
the 48th Divisions. No divisions were mentioned other than these. Now, however, the name
of the 2d Division appeared, with Java as its target.(17)
As a result of Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s European visit, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality
Pact, which was of great significance, had been signed in mid-April,(7) and simultaneously
Japan had started negotiations with America,(7, 10) while on Java, Ambassador Yoshizawa still
continued his invariably difficult negotiations.
In May, discussions to station troops in southern French Indochina appeared. However,
these did not originate from a scheme to aggressively carry out a southern operation, but
rather from the possibility to obtain [military] bases should the worst come to the worst, as
continuing efforts were still being made to avoid war between Japan and the United States.(10,
17) In the meantime, the 2d Division had been training local tactics in the vicinity of Onahama
in Fukushima prefecture while simulating an operation on Java.(56)
On 17 June, the negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands broke down and on the
22d of the same month Germany began its eastern campaign against Russia. On 2 July, the
Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation (i.e. proceeding with the advance
into the South, while settling the northern question in response to the changing situation) was
decided upon, after which, on 7 July, a mobilization of military forces directed at the northern
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area (i.e. the Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army or KANTOKUEN) was launched.
On 25 July, the forces to be stationed in southern French Indochina departed Hainan Island.
On the following 26th, the United States officially announced that it had frozen all of Japan’s
assets in the United States. Britain and the Netherlands immediately followed suit. This sud-
den turn of events caused the Army and Navy Departments of IGHQ to seriously tackle the
planning of operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, as well as an
invasion of the southern areas. Before this opportunity arose, definite plans for an invasion
of the southern areas had not yet been made, due to the developments mentioned above.(7, 10)
The Yoshizawa delegation left Java for home on 27 June.(13) Col. Harada Yoshikazu re-
turned home at the same time, while Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori remained in Batavia (Jakarta).(37, 42)
He did not return home until one month prior to the opening of hostilities.(42)
2. Preparations in the Summer and Fall of 1941
Start of Full-scale Research; Conception of a Three-division Plan for the Dutch
East Indies
When the United States froze all Japanese assets on 26 July and essentially instituted an oil
embargo in consequence of Japan’s advance into southern French Indochina, the Japanese
Army, based on the Outline of National Policies of 2 July, was in the midst of a large-scale mo-
bilization of military forces directed against the North [the Soviets], and the concentrated
transport [of troops] to Manchuria and Korea.(10)
On 9 August, it was decided to abandon the idea of carrying out a northern operation
within the present year, and [instead] to prepare a southern operation scheduled to be ready
by the end of November should the negotiations with the United States fail.(10) On this occa-
sion, it was decided that for the time being Maj. Shigeno Nobuo, staff officer of Section 2,
and Maj. Nishiura Setsuzō, staff officer of Section 3 of the Army Department of IGHQ, were
to exclusively devote themselves to research on the Dutch East Indies operation.(45) Later,
Major Nishiura was appointed staff officer for the lines of communication of the Dutch East
Indies invasion army.
It spoke for itself that the Navy, which was supposed to play the leading role in a war
against the United States, took the lead over the Army in its research. In early mid-August
the Navy Department was the first to hold a [tactical] map exercise.(10) This Navy map exercise
tentatively scheduled the Army’s capture of Singapore to take place about five months after
the opening of hostilities because the problem of Thailand also had to be dealt with. Conse-
quently, it advocated a “clockwise advance” (note: advancing via Malaya toward Java was
referred to as a “counter-clockwise advance,” and advancing via the Philippines toward Java
and Sumatra was called a “clockwise advance.”) The plan of this exercise was to capture the
Philippines from the north in two months, followed by capturing Java sometime between
day x + 80 and day x + 90 (note: x represents the day of the opening of hostilities), then cap-
turing Singapore through a pincer attack, i.e. by simultaneously attacking from Sumatra in
the south and from Malaya in the north. In this map exercise the forces deployed by the Army
for the capture of the Philippines consisted of two divisions, and the same number were de-
ployed for the capture of the Dutch East Indies as well.(10) The previous summer, Staff Officer
Okamura had judged that two divisions should be deployed for the Dutch East Indies (Java),
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which remained unchanged in this exercise. After handing over his charge of the Dutch East
Indies to Staff Officer Kondō, Staff Officer Okamura was sent to inspect the 5th Division’s
landing exercise in northern Kyūshū (March), the 48th Division’s invasion operation in
Fuzhou (April) and the Twenty-fifth Army’s advance into southern French Indochina (July).(17)
Against the Navy Department’s clockwise plan, the Army Department advocated a
counter-clockwise plan, arguing that a swift advance via Malaya was imperative not only
because it was sounder and would lead to an early overthrow of British authority as well as
to the blocking of British reinforcements, but also because it might make a shortening of the
schedule feasible.(10)
After the above-mentioned Navy map exercise, the Army Department carried out its own
war game on 14 – 15 August, which resulted in the following tentative conclusions:(10)
1. The invasion of Malaya and the invasion of the Philippines are to be commenced at the
same time. A slight delay in the invasion of Java on account of this will be all right. 
2. The 48th Division is to be incorporated into the Philippines invasion army. After the capture
of Manila, it is to be diverted to the Dutch East Indies invasion army and to land in Java.
3. After the capture of Hong Kong, the 38th Division is to land in southern Sumatra and oc-
cupy Palembang.
4. The 2d Division shall be employed for Java in accordance with the plan that has been
nursed for a while.
5. Based on the above, the Dutch East Indies invasion army shall be reorganized into a force
with three divisions as its core.
6. A paratroop unit shall be dropped at Palembang. 
As a result, the following changes were made to the previous deployment plan of the armies:
Malaya invasion army: was to consist of the Imperial Guard Division (stationed in French
Indochina at the time), the 5th Division (in eastern China at the time), the 18th Division
(in southern China at the time) and the 48th Division (also in southern China at the time)
as in the original plan, but the 48th Division was removed.
Philippines invasion army: was originally to consist of the 7th Division (in Hokkaidō at the
time) and the 16th Division (in the Kyōto divisional district at the time), but [in the new
plan] it was to consist of the 16th and the 48th Division.
Dutch East Indies invasion army: was to be made up of two divisions in the original plan,
that is, the 2d Division (in the Sendai divisional district at the time) and another division,
but it was now provided with three divisions: the 2d Division, the 38th Division (in south-
ern China at the time and to join after the capture of Hong Kong), and the 48th Division
(to join after the capture of Manila).
The deployment of a paratroop unit at Palembang was an idea that had been proposed by
Staff Officer [Prince] Takeda-no-miya when Staff Officer Okamura Masayuki had presented
his report on the outcome of his research on the Dutch East Indies operation in September of
the previous year (1940).(17) At that time, the Japanese forces did not have a paratroop unit,
but three months later in December, a [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department was estab-
lished for the first time within the Hamamatsu Army Flying School. The department had
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only twelve members. These twelve had started their research by study-
ing written information from the German military and by listening to
the experiences of airmen who had to make jumps due to flight acci-
dents. In April of the following year (1941), the [Paratroop] Raiding
Training Department became the Baichengzi Army Flying School [Para-
troop] Raiding Training Department, and was transferred from Hama-
matsu to Baichengzi in Manchuria, where it had started to train several
hundred men as paratroop specialists.(93)
The 38th Division was stationed in a swampy area in southern China.
This division had been formed following the China Incident, and its in-
fantry regiments carried a regimental number in the two-hundreds. Nev-
ertheless, the division was an elite division with abundant battle
experience and highly valued by IGHQ, which was convinced that the division would be
able to accomplish the capture of Palembang after capturing the Hong Kong stronghold. In
order to capture Palembang, [the division] would have to travel up several rivers for about
eighty to ninety kilometers as the crow flies, and carry out the operation on swampy ground.
As the 38th Division was well accustomed to rivers and swampy lands in southern China, it
was, also in this respect considered to be the most suitable division.(18) The division’s troops
had been recruited from the Nagoya divisional district.
The 48th Division was a division equipped with motor vehicles and organized in the pre-
vious fall. Its core was made up of the Taiwan Mixed Brigade (consisting of two regiments;
known as the Hada Detachment, it had earned a reputation for bravery in the China Incident
[1937]), and the 47th Infantry Regiment (originally based in Ōita City) of the 6th Division.
Almost all of its men were from Kyūshū. As previously explained, since the previous fall the
division had held an exercise simulating traversing Malaya lengthwise all the way down to
capture Singapore, and it had carried out a landing operation at Fuzhou in the spring [of
1941] as well. The division had assembled on Hainan Island.
IGHQ later (around October) gave the following nicknames to the three divisions that it
had decided to assign to the Dutch East Indies invasion in this [new deployment plan]; it
may be understood that each of the names reflected the division’s history as well as its task
at hand:
2d Division: Isamu-heidan [the “Braves”]
38th Division: Numa-heidan [the “Swampers”]
48th Division: Umi-heidan [the “Mariners”]
On 12 August, [the Army Department of] IGHQ ordered the 48th Division to transfer from
Hainan to Taiwan. Following that (on 23 August), it instructed the division to carry out train-
ing on the assumption of capturing Surabaya on Java straight after capturing Manila.(1, 10) In
addition, it ordered the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department, which was training in
Baichengzi, to transfer to Takanabe in Miyazaki Prefecture.(93)
In September, the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department of the Baichengzi Flying
School was upgraded and strengthened into the Army [Paratroop] Raiding Training Depart-
ment under the direct control of the inspector general of Army Aviation, and transferred to
Takanabe. Its structure was reorganized into one training regiment (four companies) and one
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training air unit (two squadrons).(39) At the Inspectorate General of Army Aviation, Lt. Col.
Itoda Isamu took charge of the department’s organization and training. Later he was ap-
pointed staff officer of the Dutch East Indies invasion army and, as such, flew in over Palem-
bang along with the raiding units and carried out a belly-landing while the troops
parachuted.(39)
During that period (mid-August) the main concern of the Army Department of IGHQ
was whether it was feasible at all to impose double duty on the 38th and the 48th Division
and whether the preparation of the paratroop unit would be ready in time.(10) The department
was not apprehensive about the operations after the landing on Java; it figured that the 48th
Division would swiftly capture the Surabaya stronghold, and that the 2d Division, which
had earned worldwide fame at Gongchangling, would conquer the Bandung stronghold
right after the capture of Batavia.(17)
Afterwards, on 23 August, the Army Department conducted another war game on the
southern operation. When it had contacted the Navy Department on the previous day, it had
been informed that the Navy Department “estimated that there was a probability of one-in-
two of having to face east halfway through the execution of the southern operation in order
to deal with the U.S. Pacific Fleet; that the Navy estimated that the timing of when it could
put the Java invasion army ashore could be set to about ninety days after the opening of hos-
tilities; and that it was working on [the possibility of] conducting an air strike on Hawaii
with the full force of its main aircraft carriers right at the opening of hostilities.”(10)
Several days before (in mid-August), the Navy Department had made
a request to the Army Department for the Army’s cooperation in the cap-
ture of Rabaul.(17) However, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff Tsukada
Osamu flatly refused, saying, “[the Army] does not have any manpower
to waste on such an undertaking.”(10, 43)
The war game of 23 August was conducted with reinforced forces (in-
creased from six to ten divisions), compared to the previous game. While
the force for the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies remained the
same, the 21st Division (stationed in China), the 55th Division (in
Zentsūji), and the 56th Division (in Kurume) were also included for op-
erations in the French Indochina area, along with the Imperial Guard Di-
vision, as well as the 5th and the 18th Division.(10)
[The Situation] After the Decision on the Main Points for the Implementation
of Imperial National Policy of Early September (See Illustration No. 4)
Report to the Emperor on the Prospects for the Southern Operation
After the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government on 2 September, an Impe-
rial Conference was held on 6 September, and the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial
National Policy were decided upon; the most important point stated that “… resolved not to
flinch from waging war against the United States (and Britain and the Netherlands), war
preparations shall be completed approximately by late October.”(3)
At this time, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama reported to the Emperor that in
[the Army’s] estimation, it was possible to complete the southern operation in about five
months, including one month and a half for the Philippines, and about one hundred days
24 Chapter III     /     Operational Preparations Prior to the War
Vice Chief of the Army
General Staff Lt. Gen.
Tsukada Osamu
for Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. The power of the allied forces, relevant to the southern
operation, as estimated at that time by IGHQ, was as follows:(2)
Air Force
Area Current Increase by the end of October
Hong Kong 10 aircraft
Philippines 160 aircraft or more 100 aircraft
Malaya 200 aircraft or more 150 aircraft
Burma 50 aircraft 50 aircraft
Dutch East Indies 300 aircraft 150 aircraft
In total 720 aircraft or more 450 aircraft
Navy
Classification Aircraft Carriers Battleships Cruisers Destroyers Submarines
U.S. Asiatic Fleet 4 2 14 17
U.S. Pacific Fleet (Hawaii) 7 7 18 46 28
Dutch East Indies Fleet 5 8 19
British China Fleet and
East Indies Fleet 2 2 27 15 or 16 1
In total 13 9 52 83 or 84 65
(Note by the author: it seems that the “aircraft carriers” [in this chart] include seaplane
tenders and flying boat tenders.)
Army
Hong Kong 19,200
Burma 35,000
Malaya 80,000 – 90,000 (of which 60,000 – 70,000 regular army)
British Borneo 3,500
Philippines 163,000 (of which 43,000 regular army)
Guam 1,800
Dutch East Indies 70,000 (of which 50,000 in the inner territory [i.e. Java])
Against this, the [Imperial Japanese] Army was considering to assign ten divisions, two num-
bered air forces (about 600 aircraft, supplemented by 500 Navy aircraft), and 2.1 million tons
of army vessels. More specifically, the plan envisioned one division for French Indochina,
five divisions for Malaya (of which one was to have part [of its force] advance into south-
eastern Burma while securing Thailand with its remaining force) and one numbered air force;
two divisions and one numbered air force for the Philippines, and three divisions for the
Dutch East Indies (of which one division would have double duty within the southern area).(2)
When Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama explained the [Army’s] expectation that
it would be possible to complete the southern operation in about five months, His Majesty
pointed out the erroneous estimate that Chief of Staff Sugiyama had made on the China In-
cident as war minister, and strongly warned against [too much] optimism.(16) Later (in No-
vember) when the headquarters of the Southern Army was organized, the staff of the
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headquarters, hearing about the Emperor’s warning, made a resolve to
“pledge on the honor of the southern armies to firmly live up to His
Majesty’s considerations by completing the southern operation within
the term scheduled by IGHQ.”(24)
Report to the Emperor on the Mobilization of Forces Scheduled for the
Southern Operation
On 8 September, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama reported to
the Emperor about the following mobilization:(10)
First half of October: The 16th Division (Kyōto Division — to carry out the
primary landing in the Philippines together with the 48th Division), the 55th
Division (Zentsūji Division — to secure Thailand and occupy the border area of Thailand and
Burma), one-third of the 56th Division (Kurume Division), (Sakaguchi Detachment — to capture
Guam).
Note: As mentioned previously, in the operation plan for war against the United States., two di-
visions were assigned to [the operations in] the Philippines and three battalions to [the opera-
tions in] Guam. That is to say, the 16th and the 48th Divisions were charged with the Philippines,
and the Sakaguchi Detachment with Guam. However, as explained hereinafter, the Army, ad-
vocating a counter-clockwise plan, and the Navy, adhering to a clockwise approach, later came
to a compromise, in which the Sakaguchi Detachment was directed to the Makassar Strait front
and an element of the 55th Division, the Horii Detachment (or South Seas Detachment), was
formed for [the operation in] Guam.
Latter half of October: The 2d Division (Sendai Division — to be brought under the Dutch East
Indies invasion army and head for west Java), the 65th Brigade ([from] Fukuyama — scheduled
for the secondary landing in the Philippines as a reserve for the 48th Division’s redeployment).
During his report to the Emperor, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama explained that
there was a possibility that by the end of the year, [allied] reinforcements of 50,000 to 60,000
troops from Australia and New Zealand, 100,000 from India, and 10,000 to 20,000 troops from
China would be sent to Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies.(2)
Continuing Disagreement Between the Army and Navy on the Operation
On the same day (8 September), the Navy Department was still in favor of a clockwise plan.(9, 10)
The Army Department, however, had proceeded with its research and considered the
counter-clockwise plan a must. Staff Officer Imoto Kumao of Section 2 of the Army Depart-
ment wrote a memo on that day that “for ‘Java,’ synchronized landings from the east and
the west are more appropriate.”
On 10 September, the Navy Department again asked for “support to seize Rabaul,” which
was flatly turned down as before by Vice Chief of Army General Staff Tsukada. Even when
the Navy Department explained that [Rabaul] would “be nothing but an advance position
of the Truk Islands,” and that it would “have naval guard units take over to return [the Army
troops] after the capture,” the request was in vain.(9, 10)
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Map Exercise at the Naval College
From the following day, the 11th until the 20th [of the month], the Combined Fleet conducted
a map exercise at the Naval College.(105, 106, 111, 113) In the first half, this exercise dealt with general
operations, while in the second half the air strike on Hawaii was investigated by only a lim-
ited number of staff in the utmost secrecy. The exercise showed that a surprise attack on
Hawaii with the full force of all aircraft carriers right at the outset of the war was preferable.
On the other hand, concerning the Philippines, the Navy Department wanted to have land-
ings carried out right at the opening of hostilities at Davao as well as in Luzon Island, thereby
separating the Philippines from the Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, it also wanted a speedy
launch of the Dutch East Indies operation. At the time, the main force of the Philippine Army
Air Corps covered the area from the vicinity of Manila to the north. However, as a matter of
fact, the flying ranges of the Japanese Navy fighter planes at that time did not allow an attack
from Taiwan to Manila and the vicinity, nor did they allow an attack from Palau to Davao and
the vicinity (even though their flying range was considerably longer than those of the Army
fighter planes). Therefore, if a full-force surprise attack on Hawaii were to be executed with
carrier aircraft, then the idea of a landing at Davao right at the opening of hostilities had to
be abandoned. So, this war game led to a course of first occupying northern Luzon and after
advancing the air bases, occupying the southern Philippines (Davao and Jolo), followed by
capturing the Dutch East Indies.(105, 106, 111, 113) The dates for capturing these areas were roughly
as follows: northern Luzon on or immediately after the day of the opening of hostilities (day
x), Davao and Jolo approximately between day x + 20 and day x + 30, Tarakan and Menado
approximately on day x + 50, Java approximately between day x + 80 and day x + 90.
Completion of the First Draft of the Southern Operation Plan and Issue of Summons to
Prospective Staff Members
On 17 September, while the Navy was conducting its map exercise at the Naval College, the
Army Department completed its first draft of the southern operation plan.(10)
After that, the Army Department summoned the prospective staff officers of the armies
for the South and held separate study sessions with the prospective staff officers of each army
in the following order: on 25 September with the staff of the Southern Army, on the 26th with
the staff of the Philippines invasion army, on the 27th with the staff of the Malaya invasion
army, and on the 28th with the staff of the Dutch East Indies invasion army.(23)
The officers summoned as prospective staff for the Dutch East Indies invasion army were
the following:(23, 36)
Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō (chief of the General Affairs Department
of the Inspectorate General of Military Training; as prospective chief
of staff of the army).
Maj. Gen. [Col.] Manaki Takanobu (attached to the Military Affairs Bu-
reau of the Ministry of War; as prospective vice chief of staff).
Lt. Col. Oda Akimitsu (he had been made staff of the Northern District
Army since July for the KANTOKUEN [Special Grand Maneuvers of the
Kwantung Army] after serving as instructor at the War College; as
prospective staff officer in charge of operations).
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Maj. Yamashita Yutaka (Appointments and Assignment Section of the Ministry of War; as
prospective assistant staff officer of operations).
Lt. Col. Murakami Kimisuke (he had been transferred to the Information Department of the
Ministry of War after serving as head of the Southern Group of Department 2 of the Army
Department of IGHQ; as prospective staff officer of intelligence).
Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu (Inspectorate General of Army Aviation; as prospective staff officer for
air operations and the [paratroop] raiding group).
Lt. Col. Saiki Ikuzō (Signal Communications Section of the Office of the Army General Staff;
as prospective staff officer for signal communications).
Col. Kitamura Yoshifuto (War College; as prospective senior staff officer of Section 2 of the
army).
Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō (Transport Section of the Ministry of War; as prospective staff officer
for shipping).
Maj. Takahashi Mitsuzō (War Preparations Section of the Ministry of War; as prospective staff
officer for the lines of communication).
At that time, the Army and the Navy Departments [of IGHQ] were in serious conflict over
the counter-clockwise plan versus the clockwise plan.(9, 10)
The primary causes of the conflict between the counter-clockwise and clockwise plans
were: (1) Whereas the Army, considering the state of affairs with the Soviets in the next spring,
wanted to ensure the swift capture of the Singapore stronghold, which fell under its respon-
sibility, the Navy, on the contrary, wanted to quickly capture the Philippines and Java, and
be ready for the U.S. main fleet to come to the attack; (2) The Army attached more importance
to the naval and air forces of the allies around Singapore and their reinforcements coming
across the Indian Ocean and from India, while the Navy put a high priority on the U.S. Pacific
Fleet in Hawaii; (3) The Army was interested in the oil produced in Palembang, while the
Navy was much attracted by the heavy oil produced in Borneo.
The Army had requested the Navy to station part of its air units in the Malaya area, but
the Navy, which was strongly focusing on the Philippines, would not comply with the
Army’s request.(9, 10) On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the Navy had repeatedly asked
for the Army’s support for the capture of Rabaul, but the Army had refused this.(9, 10)
Because of this polarity, both were suffering from the following issues:(9, 10) There were no
major problems with [the operations in] the Philippines and Guam, as they had been pre-
arranged in the operation plan for the [current] administrative year. [However, this was not
the case with the following:] 
The Navy wanted to occupy the oil fields of Miri on its own account right at the opening
of hostilities. Moreover, it also strongly desired to capture Ambon and Kupang at an early
point, but was short of the necessary strength [to do so].
The Army had found that the Malaya Operation might be slowed down substantially due
to an overland journey of one thousand kilometers and because of the naval and air forces
of the allies in Singapore, and that it might end up in a situation where attacks on Java and
Sumatra were to be made [only] from the east.
Because of these circumstances, in the joint study sessions on the 28th by the Army De-
partment staff of IGHQ and the prospective staff officers of the Dutch East Indies invasion
army, a new plan was conceived to have the detachment, charged with the capture of Guam,
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storm Palembang from the Java Sea after completing the capture of Guam.(10, 36) Assessments
of the situation of the paratroop unit around that time indicated that 1,500 troops would be
ready to be put [into action] at the end of October.(10) The [newly conceived] plan was to have
one detachment land in Palembang from the Java Sea and the main force of the army in east-
ern Java, without [first] destroying the allied air and naval forces in Singapore, Sumatra and
western Java.(36) However, it involved great risks. In this study they came to the conclusion
that the loss of [Army] vessels at sea by the time that the invasion units were to arrive at the
shores of Java and southern Sumatra would amount to 85 out of a total of 500 [Army] vessels
(note: this number also includes the transport ships for the Malaya and Philippine invasion
units), that is, one sixth [of the total number].(10) The Army Department of IGHQ decided that
“[the plan] should be reconsidered as there existed a certain amount of concern about the
cover provided by the Navy for the attack on the Dutch East Indies by the Dutch East Indies
invasion army,” and that “the landing points of the main force of the Malaya invasion army
should be changed in a positive way, and that [the date to attack] the Dutch East Indies
should be advanced.” (Note by the author: this means that by moving the landing points in
the Gulf of Thailand as far as possible to the south and, following the development of the
operation, by also carrying out landings on the east coast of Malaya, the period [necessary]
for the invasion of Malaya should be shortened, so that the landings in southern Sumatra
and western Java could be made in a much shorter time frame).(10)
As explained above, as of 28 September [1941] the Navy desired: (1) to carry out a surprise
attack on Hawaii with its main force of aircraft carriers right at the outset of the war, and
also to enable [its unit(s)] to carry out a landing at Davao right at the opening of hostilities
as well; and (2) to capture Rabaul, for which operation it absolutely wanted to have the
Army’s support. The Army, on its part, wanted: (1) to absolutely have the support of Navy
air units in order to speed up the Malaya operation as well as to reduce the loss of vessels;
(2) to enable the 38th Division to land in Palembang via the South China Sea, as well as to re-
alize the parachute drops [of the paratroop unit]; and (3) to carry out simultaneous landings
on Java both from the east and the west.
The Situation in October
The Army Department [of IGHQ] tried to iron out the differences with the Navy Department.
It decided to have the Guam invasion unit, after the capture of the island, proceed all the
way down to Rabaul and capture it, which was fervently desired by the Navy, and once
Rabaul was captured, have the unit turn round and head all the way back to take part in the
Dutch East Indies invasion. In addition, the Army Department also decided to take on the
capture of Miri, Kuching, Ambon and Kupang, which the Navy had been at pains [to find a
way to capture].
The Army Department performed a war game at the War College from 1 to 5 October. On
this occasion, the prospective staff officers of the Dutch East Indies invasion army were com-
pletely taken aback to hear that the detachment which was scheduled to head for Palembang
after the capture of Guam was also to capture Rabaul after seizing Guam, and that Ambon
and Kupang were newly added [to the targets] to capture.(43)
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War Game at the War College
The outline of the war game held at the War College was as follows:(10)
1. Accommodating the request of the Navy, the Army decided to provide units to invade Rabaul,
Ambon, Kupang, Miri and Kuching, to receive in return support from an element of the Navy’s
land-based air [unit] in the Malaya area in an effort to speed up the pace of the Malaya opera-
tion.
2. A surprise attack on Palembang was set to be carried out ten days before the invasion of Singa-
pore, so that the landing on western Java would take place on the same day as the invasion of
Singapore. The landing in western Java was set to be executed on day x + 95. [This date of] land-
ing in Java might be about two weeks later than that of the Navy, which estimated its arrival at
eastern Java between day x + 80 and day x + 90. However, if the U.S. Pacific Fleet were to launch
an offensive [against our forces], the Navy would have to extract and deploy [some of] its air
and sea strength [against it]. In such a case, [the Army] would be able to arrive in Java [before
the Navy].
3. The strength to be employed was set at ten divisions (Imperial Guard, 5th, 18th, 55th, 56th, 21st,
16th, 48th, 38th and 2d Divisions).
4. The operation was divided into three stages: The first stage would feature a practically simul-
taneous start of operations in the Philippines, Hong Kong and Malaya, after which Borneo,
Celebes and Timor would be promptly captured. As the Malaya operation made progress, key
locations in southern Sumatra would be seized. In the second stage Java and northern Sumatra
would be captured, and in the third stage key areas would be secured.
5. Regarding the Dutch East Indies territory of Borneo and eastward, the Navy would capture
Menado, Tarakan and Kendari on its own account. About Balikpapan, Ambon, Makassar, Ban-
jarmasin and Kupang, a tentative plan to capture them through joint actions by the Army and
the Navy had been made. However, the problem of how to share responsibilities with the Navy
for the capture of the east coast line of Borneo and the Celebes front still remained unsolved. 
6. The [army] troops would be deployed as follows:
The 38th Division would [first] capture Hong Kong, after which its main force would go to cen-
tral and south Sumatra, while an element of its force (referred to as Detachment B) would [be
sent to] capture Ambon and Timor.
One-third of the 55th Division (referred to as the South Seas Detachment or Detachment I) would
seize Guam, followed by the capture of Rabaul, after which the detachment would reverse its
course and head for the Dutch East Indies.
Note: this detachment was to be organized to replace Detachment A for capturing Guam and
other [purposes].
One-third of the 56th Division (referred to as the Sakaguchi Detachment a.k.a. Detachment A)
would carry out attacks along the east coastline of Borneo and the Celebes front southward (ex-
cept for the locations which the Navy would attack on its own account).
Note: The detachment was relieved of the duty to capture Guam.
The 48th Division would have Detachment C carry out advance landings at Aparri, Vigan and
Laoag, while the division’s main force would land at Lingayen and seize Manila. Afterwards,
the division would [be directed to] eastern Java.
The 16th Division would detail Detachment D and Detachment E respectively to head in ad-
vance to Davao and Legaspi, while its main force would land in Lamon Bay and head for
Manila.
An element of the 18th Division (Detachment F) and another element of the same division (De-
tachment G), and an element of the 55th Division (Detachment H) would be detailed (sent in
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advance) [respectively] to Miri (followed by Kuching), and the southern and western coasts of
the Gulf of Thailand.
The main force of the 5th Division would land in northern Malaya and go southward along its
west coast.
The Imperial Guard Division would stabilize Thailand and then head southward along the west
coast of Malaya.
The main force of the 55th Division would stabilize Thailand as well as carry out operations in
southeastern Burma along with the advance parties, after taking over from the Imperial Guard
Division.
The main force of the 18th Division would land on the southwestern coast of the Gulf of Thai-
land and first head for the Penang stronghold.
The 56th Division (minus Detachment A) would land on the southeastern coast of Malaya.
The 21st Division would secure French Indochina.
7. The schedule of operations was planned as follows:(10)
day x landing of the advance parties along the Gulf of Thailand
day x + 2 landings of Detachment C at Aparri, Vigan, Laoag
day x + 3 landing of Detachment D at Davao
day x + 5 landing of Detachment E at Legaspi
day x + 10 landing of the Detachment I at Guam
day x + 25 occupation of Hong Kong by the 38th Division
landing of the main force of the Malaya invasion army
day x + 35 Malaya invasion army’s [possible] battle [with the enemy] at the border [of
Malaya], capture of Manila
day x + 45 start of concentration of the main force of the Dutch East Indies invasion army
day x + 70 occupation of key locations in Dutch Borneo and Celebes by Detachment A
day x + 85 occupation of key locations in the southern Sumatra by the 38th Division
day x + 95 occupation of Singapore
landing of the main force of the Dutch East Indies invasion army (consisting of
the 2d Division) in western Java
day x + 120 preparations for landing in northern Sumatra
During the war game, the participants became acutely aware of the fact that the Burma area
was a cause for worry. Therefore it was decided to newly add the 33d Division (stationed in
China) to the Burma area and to establish a new army with this division and the 55th Divi-
sion, which would allow the Malaya invasion army to devote itself entirely to the Malay
Peninsula.(10) As a result, Maj. Gen. Isayama Haruki, who until now had been considered as
prospective chief of staff for the Malaya invasion army, was made the prospective chief of
staff of this newly established army, which in turn resulted in the putting forward of Maj.
Gen. [Col.] Manaki Takanobu, who had been considered until now the prospective vice chief
of staff for the Dutch East Indies invasion army, as prospective vice chief of staff for the
Malaya invasion army.(36) [Manaki was promoted to major general on 15 October.]
In this war game, the [role of] commander of the Dutch East Indies army was [played by]
Lt. Col. Murakami Kimisuke, the role of commander in chief of the allied naval forces by
Col. Kitamura Yoshifuto, and Maj. Kondō Dempachi played the role of the assistant to the
leadership of the Dutch East Indies invasion army.(23)
Immediately after the war game, the persons concerned in the Office of the Army General
Staff, the Ministry of War, and the Army Aviation Department made plans to visit Taka nabe
in Miyazaki Prefecture. The [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department, which had been trans-
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ferred from Baichengzi in Manchuria to Takanabe in September and had been working hard
to establish the unit and provide training to it, was finally ready to hold the first air drop
maneuver of the unit in mid-October.(93)
Report to the Emperor by the Chief of the Army General Staff
After the war game, on 10 October, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama reported to
the Emperor that operations would be carried out in the Philippines, Malaya, French In-
dochina, Thailand, Hong Kong, Guam, British Borneo, Dutch Borneo, Celebes, the Bismarck
Archipelago (note: Rabaul area), the Moluccas and Timor, followed by invasions of Java and
Sumatra; that two divisions (the 16th and the 48th Divisions) as the core would be dispatched
to the Philippines, four divisions (Imperial Guard, the 5th, the 18th and the 56th Divisions)
as the core to Malaya, three divisions (the 2d Division, the 48th Division, which would be re-
deployed after the capture of Manila, and the 38th Division, which would be redeployed
after the capture of Hong Kong) as the core to the Dutch East Indies, and to Thailand and
Burma two divisions (the 55th Division and the 33d Division, the latter being added as a re-
sult of the war game) as the core would be deployed; that after a major part of the southern
operation was achieved, [the Army] was going to capture Burma at a favorable opportunity
(which was decided as a result of the war game); and that it was estimated that in roughly
five months it would be possible to occupy most of the key areas in the South.(2)
Kanoya Map Exercise [Map exercise at Kanoya Naval Air Base]
In the meantime, from 4 to 6 October, the Eleventh Air Fleet (the land-based naval air fleet
which was to operate in the Philippines and then the Dutch East Indies starting out from Tai-
wan) had carried out a map exercise at Kanoya, Kyūshū. This map exercise simulated a case
where three aircraft carriers would be assigned to the air strikes on Hawaii, while the other
carriers would provide support in the southern Philippines, and where the invasion of Davao
was to be conducted on the same day as the opening of hostilities (day x), Legaspi on day x + 2,
Jolo on day x + 14, and Menado on x + 16. 
The Nagato Map Exercise [Map Exercise on the Battleship Nagato]
From 9 to 13 October, the Combined Fleet held a map exercise on board the battleship Nagato,
which lay off Murozumi in Yamaguchi Prefecture.(9) At that time, no top decision had been
made as to the air strike on Hawaii. Concerning the flying ranges of the [naval] fighter air-
craft, research had been moving ahead on the possibility of extending their flying range
enough to attack Manila and vicinity. It appears that the Combined Fleet carried out this map
exercise with the idea of using six aircraft carriers for Hawaii.(112, 113) As for the southern op-
eration, the idea was that the Navy was to solely focus its air power on the Philippines and
after that on the Dutch East Indies, leaving air operations in Malaya entirely up to the Army;
that it would have the Dutch East Indies invasion army land in eastern Java on day x + 70
via the Makassar Strait, and in western Java on day x + 80; and that it would capture Singa-
pore via southern Sumatra, synchronizing the attack with “the Army’s Malaya invasion army
which would come down south through the Malay Peninsula.” Even though the Army had
decided to provide support of in total [a strength of] about one division for Miri, Ambon,
Kupang and Rabaul, the [Navy] plan did not include any air support for the Army in the
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Malaya area. Whereas the Army’s plan was to run great risks to finally reach western Java
on day x + 95, the Navy’s plan was to arrive in eastern Java on day x + 70, in western Java
on day x + 80, and southern Sumatra on day x + 83.(9) [The capture of] Davao, which had
been set on day x in the Kanoya Map Exercise, was now set on day x + 4. The reason for this
[change] had to do with the idea that part of the air strength, which was to engage in the ini-
tial northern Philippines operation, was to be redeployed from Taiwan to Palau. The start of
using Menado and Tarakan [as bases] was set even one month earlier than that in the Naval
College Map Exercise of mid-September. The schedule of landings was as follows:
Malaya (advance parties) day x
Advance parties for northern Luzon day x + 1
Miri in British Borneo day x + 1
Legaspi in Luzon day x + 4
Davao day x + 4
Main force of Malaya advance corps day x + 5
Main force for Luzon
Kuching in Borneo day x + 15
Menado and Ambon day x + 20
Tarakan day x + 25
Kendari day x + 30
Balikpapan day x + 35
Makassar day x + 40
Main Force for Malaya day x + 42
Kupang day x + 45
Banjarmasin day x + 55
Eastern Java day x + 70
Western Java day x + 80
Bangka in Southern Sumatra day x + 83
Note: no date is given in the original documents for the landing by the main force on
Luzon.
On 14 October, the staff officers [Prince] Takeda-no-miya and Kumon, both of whom had ob-
served the Nagato map exercise, returned to the Army Department to give their reports.(9)
Further adjustment was necessary(9, 10) in order to make simultaneous landings on eastern
and western Java possible.
Success of the Paratroop Exercise
The first general paratroop drop exercise was carried out in Takanabe in mid-October as
scheduled. The number of spectators was large enough to make people wonder whether it
might even be bigger than the number of troops doing the drop. 
Solution of the Navy’s Aviation Problem
On 19 October, Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano decided upon the surprise attack on
Hawaii by six aircraft carriers (i.e. the First Air Fleet). It was the day after the Tōjō Cabinet
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Illustration No. 4—Maps Showing the Changes in Operation Plans from Late September to Early October
was established. Also around this time the problem of extending the fly-
ing range of Navy fighter aircraft (by fitting a disposable tank) was
solved.(140) It was decided that the Eleventh Air Fleet (i.e. land-based air-
craft), while deploying the strength of its 22d Air Flotilla as the core to
Malaya, would have its remaining main force (consisting of the main
force of the 21st and the 23d Air Flotilla) operate from Taiwan, and that
the aircraft carrier Ryūjō (of the 4th Carrier Division) along with the sea-
plane tenders Chitose and Mizuho (of the 11th Seaplane Tender Division)
would operate from Palau toward Davao and Legaspi.
The Army and the Navy’s Completion of the Operation Plans in One Stroke
From 9 to 10 October, the Army Department had roughly finished a southern operation plan
and, from 16 to 18 October, deliberated on an overall operation plan.(10) However, the solution
to the Navy’s aviation problem enabled it to finalize its operation plan in one stroke. On 20
October, the Navy Department informally decided on the Imperial Japanese Navy Operations
Policy. At the end of October, the Army and the Navy Department conferred about a Central
Agreement between the Army and Navy and by the 29th [of the month] an agreement on the
basic matters was reached.(9) On the 29th, the Navy Department informally informed the
Combined Fleet. An assessment made by the Army and the Navy Department estimated that
it would be possible to capture Hong Kong in roughly four weeks, Manila in roughly forty
to fifty days or more, Singapore in roughly one hundred days or more, and that it would be
possible to occupy most of the key areas in the South in roughly five months.(2)
Postponement of the Tentative Date for the Opening of Hostilities
The tentative date for opening hostilities was now being postponed. To be more precise,
based on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy, which had been de-
cided upon on 6 September at the Imperial Conference, it had been agreed to finish war
preparations by late October, but, unable to decide on war or peace even in mid-October, the
[third] Konoe Cabinet resigned. The decision on war or peace was further delayed due to
the formation of the Tōjō Cabinet (18 October) and the Emperor’s instruction to [abandon
the decision on the Main Points of September and] start reconsidering it from scratch. [At the
time,] the government was wholly devoting itself to negotiations with the United States in
order to avoid war, which led to a situation where a postponement of the date to open hos-
tilities was inevitable.
Situation of the Troops Scheduled to be Deployed for the Invasion of 
the Dutch East Indies
From 16 to 21 September, the 2d Division carried out a Divisional B Maneuver, received an
Operation A-GŌ [southern operation] training tour from 3 to 4 October, and did tactical re-
search for a southern operation in early October.(58) The division’s provisional formation,
based on Army Order A No. 63, issued on 16 September, was started sometime between 8
and 16 October, and was completed around 22 October. The division had been unofficially
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informed of the Java operation.(53) The 48th Division, which had received a telegram from
IGHQ in mid-August about the change in the division’s assignment from the Malaya oper-
ation to the Philippines and Java operations and had been transferred from Fuzhou to Taiwan
in early September, was presently engaged in training for the Philippine operation.(66) The
38th Division was in the midst of preparing for the invasion of Hong Kong and had not yet
been informed about its assignment to participate in the Dutch East Indies operation. The
146th Infantry Regiment, which was to constitute the core force of Detachment A, had been
given provisional formation orders on 23 October, and its formation had been completed on
30 October at Ōmura in Kyūshū.(53)
3. Completion of Plans and Issue of Orders by Imperial General
Headquarters
Completion of Plans on 1 November and Shipping Plan
(See Illustration No. 5)
In late October, while Prime Minister Tōjō was reconsidering from scratch the Main Points
for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy of 6 September, the Army and Navy Depart-
ments of IGHQ concluded the Army-Navy Central Agreement. [Subsequently] on 27 and 28
October, the Army Department assembled the personnel concerned of each army of the
Southern Army at Ujina Shipping Transport Command, and conducted studies on shipping.
As a result, on 1 November, a shipping transport plan (as in the appended chart of the Army-
Navy Central Agreement) was completed, in which landings on southern Sumatra were to
be carried out approximately on day x + 84, and those on eastern and western Java simulta-
neously on approximately day x + 103. The shipping which the Army was going to employ
for the southern operation amounted to about two million tons (detailed data will be given
later). The shipping transport plan for the Dutch East Indies invasion army was in outline as
follows:(23)
56th Mixed Infantry Group (Detachment A or Sakaguchi Detachment, which consists of an el-
ement of the 56th Division as its core): After leaving Kyūshū, it shall get ready at Palau and cap-
ture Jolo and the east coast of Borneo southward. A tonnage of 50,000 tons shall be allotted to
Detachment A for its continuous use from day x – 22 up to day x + 89. The ships shall be berthed
and loaded at Moji from day x – 22 to day x – 18, and stand by at Palau from day x – 7 to day x – 3,
after which the detachment shall operate in accordance with the arrangements to be made with
the Navy.
South Seas Detachment (Detachment I, which consists of one-third of the 55th Division): After
leaving Shikoku, it shall get ready at the Ogasawara Islands and join the Dutch East Indies op-
eration after capturing Guam and Rabaul. A tonnage of 50,000 tons shall be allotted to Detach-
ment I for its continuous use from day x – 17 to day x + 89. The ships shall be berthed and loaded
at Sakaide (in Shikoku) from day x – 17 to day x – 12, and the detachment shall prepare for op-
erations at the Ogasawara Islands from day x –7 to day x – 3, after which it shall operate in ac-
cordance with the arrangements to be made with the Navy.
38th Division
The 38th Division shall head from Hong Kong to southern Sumatra via Cam Ranh. The division
shall be divided into an advance party, its main force and the Itō Detachment ([at this point] the
plan assumed that the South Seas Detachment would be able to capture Ambon and Kupang
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after the capture of Rabaul, and that Detachment B would [remain in the Division] without
being dispatched separately). The advance party shall be allotted a tonnage of 30,000 tons. After
leaving Hong Kong, it shall rehearse its preparations at Cam Ranh Bay until day x + 64 before
departure from the bay. It shall arrive in southern Sumatra on day x + 78 and finish disembarka-
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Illustration No. 5—Transportation Plan for the Sixteenth Army, 1 November, 1941
tion on day x + 81. The main force shall be alloted a tonnage of 120,000 tons. The ships shall be
berthed and loaded in Hong Kong from day x + 60 until day x + 65. It shall rehearse its prepa-
rations at Cam Ranh Bay from day x + 73 to day x + 78, arrive in southern Sumatra on day x +
84 and finish disembarking on day x + 89. The Itō Detachment (one-third of the division) shall
be allotted 40,000 tons. The ships shall be berthed and loaded in Hong Kong, from day x + 64
to day x + 69. It shall rehearse preparations in Cam Ranh Bay from day x + 93 to day x + 98,
arrive at the northern coast of central Java on day x + 103, and complete disembarking on day
x + 108.
[Sixteenth] Army’s main force (consisting of the 2d Division as its core)
The 2d Division shall be provided with 150,000 tons to cover the distance between the homeland
and Taiwan. From day x + 36 to day x + 41, the ships shall be berthed and loaded at Tokyo Bay
and they shall anchor and stand by in Taiwan from day x + 49 to day x + 54. From Taiwan and
southward, the division shall be united with the other units under the direct control of the Six-
teenth Army. The first transport shall be allotted 260,000 tons. The ships shall anchor in Cam
Ranh Bay from day x + 93 to day x + 98, arrive in western Java on day x + 103, and complete
disembarking on day x + 108.
The second transport shall be allotted 170,000 tons. The ships shall anchor in Cam Ranh Bay
from day x + 100 to day x + 105, arrive in western Java on day x + 110, and complete disem-
barking on day x + 115.
The third transport shall be allotted 130,000 tons. The ships shall anchor in Cam Ranh Bay from
day x + 113 to day x + 118, arrive in western Java on day x + 123, and complete disembarking
on day x + 128.
Core unit of the 48th Division
Its transportation from the Philippines to eastern Java shall be divided into two stages.
The first transport shall be provided with 170,000 tons. The ships shall be berthed and loaded
in Manila Bay from day x + 89 to day x + 95, arrive in eastern Java on day x + 103, and complete
disembarking on day x + 108.
The second transport shall be allotted 100,000 tons. The ships shall be berthed and loaded in
Manila Bay from day x + 96 to day x + 102, arrive in eastern Java on day x + 109, and complete
disembarking on day x + 114.
Initially, it was planned that Detachment A [the Sakaguchi Detachment] was to take charge
of the military administration of Dutch Borneo after its capture.(87, 88) Later, it was decided
that the Navy was to take on the responsibility for the military administration of the area
and that Detachment A was to join the main force of the division in Malaya.(87) Either way,
the detachment was not scheduled to participate in the invasion of Java.(36, 87) In the shipping
plan above, it was for the first time that the Itō Detachment’s landing on central Java was
mentioned. This was decided after the war game at the War College had shown that the Kali-
jati airfield, which was close to the north coast of central Java, should be attacked and occu-
pied right after the landing and put into use, even if this [action] were to carry a risk.(39)
In the plan, the 38th Division [itself] was not to participate in the invasion of Java, as it
was assigned to occupy numerous oil fields and airfields situated over a vast area in southern
Sumatra. [Furthermore,] the issue of when exactly the South Seas Detachment would be able
to join the Dutch East Indies campaign from out of Rabaul became a troublesome item in
drawing up the operational plans for the Dutch East Indies invasion army.
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Illustration No. 6—Rough Overview of the Disposition of the Allied and Japanese Forces
Decision on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy,
and Orders Issued by Imperial General Headquarters
At the Imperial Conference on 5 November, the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial
National Policy were decided upon. While resolved to wage war against the United States,
Britain and the Netherlands [if necessary] and setting the time for the start of military actions
at the beginning of December and having the Army and the Navy complete their operational
preparations [by that time], they stated that the launch of military actions would be aborted
should the negotiations with the United States prove successful by 0000 on 1 December.(3, 7)
Based on the decisions taken at the Imperial Conference, the same day (5 [November])
orders were given for the provisional formation of the Southern Army headquarters and re-
spectively the headquarters of the Fourteenth Army (Philippines), the Fifteenth Army (Thai-
land and Burma) and the Sixteenth Army (Dutch East Indies).(52) The Malaya area was
assigned to the headquarters of the Twenty-fifth Army, which heretofore was stationed in
French Indochina, and its formation was revised as well [for the new assignment].
On the following day, the 6th, the order of battle (note: the formation of armies for a cam-
paign, ordered by the Emperor in the incidence of war) for the Southern Army and the South
Seas Detachment were issued, and orders were given [to the Southern Army] to prepare to
occupy the southern key areas (and to the South Seas Detachment to capture Guam). On the
same day, orders were sent to the China Expeditionary Army to prepare to seize Hong
Kong.(1) Also the orders of appointment of the commander in chief of the Southern Army
and his subordinates were issued on that day.
Meanwhile on the 5th, the Navy ordered the Combined Fleet to implement the necessary
preparations for operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. At the
same time, in preparation for the above-mentioned operations, the Navy Department of
IGHQ instructed the Combined Fleet to have the units involved in the operation proceed to
and be at the ready at the positions to be taken before the launch of the operations.(1)
Then on 15 November, the Army and the Navy Departments of IGHQ carried out a war
game in the presence of the Emperor and explained the plan of the southern operation.(2) On
this day, the Army Department issued the order to the Southern Army for the execution of
the invasions of the southern key areas.(1)
Needless to say, the date and time of the launch of the invasion operations was put on
hold. On 21 November, the Navy Department ordered the Combined Fleet to have the units
involved in the operations proceed to their stand-by positions at sea.(1)
Assessment of the Current Position of the Enemy and the Prospects for the 
Campaign
On 3 and 5 November, Chief of the  Army General Staff Sugiyama, alongside Chief of the
Navy General Staff Nagano, reported to the Emperor about the operation plan. The position
of the enemy at the beginning of September(2, 7) has already been related. The Japanese forces
to be employed for the operation (compared to the total force), which had been recently de-
termined, were in outline as follows:(2)
40 Chapter III     /     Operational Preparations Prior to the War
Army
Ground forces: employment of eleven divisions for the southern operation out of a total of
fifty-one divisions.
Air forces: two numbered air forces (seventy squadrons, seven hundred aircraft) were
to be employed for the southern operation out of a total of five numbered
air forces (151 squadrons, 1500 aircraft).
Navy
Note: The number of army aircraft is the approximate number of aircraft of frontline air units (reserve
aircraft not included). [On the contrary,] the number of naval aircraft includes training unit air-
craft as well as reserve aircraft.
In his explanation to the Emperor, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama gave the following
account:(2) (See Illustration No. 6)
1. With the outbreak of the Second European War, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and in par-
ticular our advance towards the southern regions, the military preparedness of the armies of
the countries in the southern regions is gradually being built up. Malaya has an army strength
of about 60,000 to 70,000 troops and about 320 aircraft. The Philippines has an army strength of
about 42,000 troops and about 170 aircraft, the Dutch East Indies of about 85,000 troops and
about 300 aircraft, and Burma of about 35,000 troops and about 60 aircraft. Compared to the
numbers before the outbreak of the European war, the army strength in Malaya has increased
by about eight times, that in the Philippines by about four times, that in the Dutch East Indies
by about two-and-a-half times and that in Burma by about five times. At present, the total num-
ber amounts to about 200,000 troops and it is expected that the rate of increase will grow even
further from now on. When it comes to an opening of hostilities, [further] reinforcements from
India, Australia and New Zealand are expected. The current military strength in these areas is
estimated to be 300,000 troops or more and about 200 aircraft in India, about 250,000 troops and
about 300 aircraft in Australia, and about 70,000 troops and about 150 aircraft in New Zealand.
The ground forces of these areas, although there may be regional differences, consist of indige-
nous troops, each with some 30 percent white soldiers from the homeland as the core. As their
military training is insufficient, their fighting power is generally low. However, the fact that
they are well accustomed to the tropical climate has to be kept in mind. In addition, due to su-
perior aircraft performance and relatively skilled pilots, their air combat efficiency cannot be
viewed lightly, compared to [the combat efficiency of] the ground forces.
2. Presently the Imperial [Japanese] Army consists of fifty-one divisions as its core with approxi-
mately two million troops altogether, of which some fifteen divisions are deployed in Manchuria
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and Korea as counterforce against [the Soviets] in the North, and some twenty-four divisions
in China as counterforce against the Chinese. The military strength to be put into the southern
operation is planned to be formed with one division currently in French Indochina, about five
divisions currently in training and standing by in the [Japanese] homeland and Taiwan, and
five divisions to be redeployed from China, which make a total of about eleven divisions, ready
to be deployed as needed.
3. We would like to set the time of the opening of hostilities at the beginning of December due to
the following matters: (1) As time progresses, Japan is put in a less and less favorable position
in military preparedness compared to the United States. Especially the disparity in air arma-
ments is expected to increase rapidly. (2) American preparations for war, including the defense
of the Philippines, will make fast progress. (3) Defense ties between the United States, Britain
and the Netherlands will grow increasingly tighter, and the total defensive strength in the south-
ern regions will be reinforced rapidly. (4) The occurrence of a northern operation has also to be
taken into account from next spring onward. (5) Weather conditions in and around the areas of
operation [have also to be taken into consideration].
4. Prospects for the operations: The Southern Army, in conjunction with the Combined Fleet, starts
operations simultaneously by means of preemptive sudden attacks against the Philippines and
Malaya, and swiftly captures southern key areas. Territories to be captured are the Philippines,
British Malaya, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and Timor. Apart from this, the China Expedi-
tionary Army captures Hong Kong with part of its forces. The main constituent of the army op-
erations in the initial period as outlined above are, of course, the landing operations, which are
to be carried out against defended strongholds under a scorching heat and after traveling a long
distance over sea while clearing away attacks by enemy submarines and aircraft. Therefore, con-
siderable difficulties are to be expected. Yet, seen in a broader perspective, the fighting power
of the enemy is dispersed over a wide area and even separated by the sea, which makes it dif-
ficult for them to act in conjunction. Also, they are in a context where it is rather difficult to
swiftly bring in reinforcements from India and Australia against our sudden attacks. On the
contrary, our side will be able to defeat our enemies one by one by using our concentrated fight-
ing power in a sudden offensive. Therefore, by making full use of our organization, equipment,
resources, combat tactics and strategy, which have continuously been improved in a creative
way, and coupled with a close cooperation between the Army and the Navy, we are convinced
of certain victory. We believe that we have definitely all the odds in our favor for the operations
after landing, considering the organization, equipment, potential and strength of the enemy and
our side. After roughly wrapping up the invasion operations of the southern key areas, every
effort is to be made to take the fight out of the enemy through both political and military strategy
and to conclude the war as quickly as possible, but it is imperative to anticipate the possibility
that the war will extend over a long period. Nevertheless, we can strategically maintain an un-
defeatable position by occupying and securing the military bases and air bases of the enemy,
and by securing sea traffic, which will almost certainly enable us to destroy the enemy plans by
employing every possible means.
5. As for the North, the chances of the Soviets advancing and actively taking the offensive are ex-
tremely small as long as the Kwantung Army stays in place.
Operation Plan of the Army (See Illustrations No. 7 and No. 8)
The operation plan drawn up by the Army Department of IGHQ principally concerned the
southern operation. The gist of the southern operation was that at the opening of hostilities,
the Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of the 5th Division at first, then joined by the Imperial
Guard Division, the 18th and the 56th Division one after another in this order) would advance
upon Malaya; then, the Fourteenth Army (advance parties at first, then joined by the main
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force of the 48th and the 16th Divisions) would advance upon the Philippines; an element of
the China Expeditionary Army (i.e. the 38th Division) would advance upon Hong Kong after
confirmation of the landings in Malaya; as the invasions of Malaya and the Philippines pro-
gressed, the Sixteenth Army (consisting of the 2d Division, and joined by the 38th and the
48th Divisions after their captures of Hong Kong and Manila respectively) would advance
upon the Dutch East Indies by using the above [places] as bases and occupy the key resource
areas [in the Dutch East Indies]; apart from the above, the Fifteenth Army (which in the early
stages has the Imperial Guard Division temporarily under its command, and which is joined
by the 55th and the 33d Divisions sequentially in this order) would conduct operations in
Chapter III     /     Operational Preparations Prior to the War 43
Illustration No. 7—Position as of 6 November 1941 and Operation Schedule Until the End of November
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Thailand and southeastern Burma; the 21st Division would stabilize and secure French In-
dochina; the Twenty-fifth Army would capture northern Sumatra after Malaya. As these op-
erations progressed, the overall aim was to completely secure the southern areas. The
summary [of the plan] was as follows. Based on the decisions of the Imperial Conference on
the 5th [of November], the forces to be deployed in the southern operation were supposed
to change their positions by the end of November as shown in Illustration No. 7.
Summary of the General Operation Plan of the Imperial Japanese Army 
I. Southern Operation
1. Operational objective: The objective of the southern operation is to destroy the major bases
of the United States, Britain and the Dutch East Indies in East Asia and to occupy and secure
the key areas of the South. The areas intended to be occupied in this operation are the Philip-
pines, Guam, Hong Kong, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Bis-
marck Archipelago, Dutch Timor, etc.
2. Mission: The Army and Navy, in close cooperation, shall simultaneously start operations in
the Philippines and British Malaya, and strive to accomplish the operational objectives as
quickly as possible.
3. Operational directives:
(1) The operation shall start with the landing of advance corps in Malaya and air strikes on
the Philippines, and taking advantage of the results of the air operations, the main forces
[of the armies in charge of each place] shall be put ashore in the Philippines first, then in
Malaya, and promptly capture the Philippines and Malaya. Apart from this, in the early
stages of the operation, the strategic points of Guam, Hong Kong and British Borneo
shall be captured and stability in Thailand and Indochina shall be secured. Meanwhile,
the strategic points of the Bismarck Archipelago, Dutch Borneo and Celebes shall be cap-
tured as quickly as possible, and, as the Malaya operation progresses, the strategic points
in southern Sumatra shall be occupied and the key resource areas secured, while making
preparations for operations [to attack] Java. The strategic points of the Moluccas and
Timor shall [also] be occupied.
(2) While preparing the air bases to attack Java, superiority shall be gained over the enemy’s
air power and Java shall be captured. After Singapore has been occupied, strategic areas
in northern Sumatra shall be occupied in a timely manner.
(3) Even when the Combined Fleet changes its deployment to an interception position in
response to an action of the main U.S. fleet, or when the Soviets join the war during the
above operations, the Philippine and Malaya operations shall be continued and the pre-
viously-defined objectives of the operation shall be accomplished as quickly as possible.
(4) During the above [operations], air bases in southern Burma shall be seized at favorable
opportunities, and when most of the operations are wound up, operations to deal with
Burma shall be carried out in as far as the situation permits.
(5) In principle, the landing operations shall be carried out in the face of the enemy while
clearing away attacks of its ground, naval and air forces.
(6) Operations in case the British army invades Thailand ahead of us while we are preparing
for the operations … (Omitted by the author.)
(7) If attacked by the enemy while preparing for operations, the units on location shall in-
tercept the enemy at the right moment. If this [attack] should be made after the issue of
the order to start the operation, an attack operation shall be launched immediately.
4. Strength employed:
The military strength to be employed for this operation [as a whole] shall consist of 11 divi-
sions, 9 tank regiments, 2 numbered air forces, and other necessary units under the direct
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control of the [Southern] Army as the core. The distribution of these forces and target areas
is planned as follows:
The Southern Army
The Fourteenth Army shall consist of 2 divisions as its core and conduct operations in
the Philippines area.
The Fifteenth Army shall consist of 2 divisions as its core and conduct operations in the
Thailand and Burma areas.
The Sixteenth Army shall consist of 3 divisions (of which 2 divisions shall be diverted
from other operations after their completion) as its core and conduct operations in
the Dutch East Indies area.
The Twenty-fifth Army shall consist of 4 divisions as its core and conduct operations in
the Malaya area.
The unit under the direct control of the Southern Army shall consist of 1 division, 1 mixed
brigade, and 2 numbered air forces as its core.
The Twenty-third Army (under the command of the China Expeditionary Army) shall
conduct operations in the Hong Kong area with a force of 1 division as its core.
The South Seas Detachment (under the direct control of [the Army Department of] IGHQ)
shall consist of 3 infantry battalions as its core and conduct operations in Guam, the Bis-
marck Archipelago, etc.
5. Launch of the operation: 
1. The date to start the operation (the first day of the operation) shall be specified sepa-
rately… (Omitted by the author.)
6. Outline of the operations:
(1) Operation against the Philippines
The objective of the operation against the Philippines is to defeat the enemy in the Philip-
pines and destroy its major bases. Right at the outset of the war, the air units of the Army
and the Navy, in conjunction with each other, shall carry out air strikes against the air
power and the naval vessels of the enemy in the Philippines from the direction of Taiwan
and Palau as well as from the sea. The Navy units shall make a sudden attack on Batan
Island and immediately get the airfield ready for use. Advance parties shall leave the as-
sembly points after the evening of the day before the first air strike against the Philip-
pines, and with the cooperation of the Army and the Navy land in or around Aparri,
Vigan (and then Laoag), Legaspi, and Davao, occupy the air bases first and get them
ready for use. Then they shall occupy Jolo as quickly as possible, and get the air base
ready for use. Hand in hand with the above operations, the air units of the Army and
the Navy shall advance the air bases and continue the air operations. Exploiting the re-
sults of these operations, the Fourteenth Army shall start landing, by around the 15th
day of the operations at the latest, its main force around Lingayen Gulf and part of its
force around Lamon Bay escorted by a [naval] unit consisting of the Third Fleet as its
core. It shall promptly capture Manila and occupy key places in the islands. After the
landing of the main force of the army, a mixed brigade shall advance on Luzon Island at
the right moment. When the objective of the operation is almost achieved, the 48th Di-
vision shall assemble in or around Manila [to be redeployed] as part of the force for the
capture of the Dutch East Indies.
(2) Operation against British Malaya
The objective of the operation against British Malaya is to defeat the enemy in this area,
capture its strategic points, Singapore in particular, and destroy the British bases in East
Asia. The unit [to attack British Malaya] consisting of the Twenty-fifth Army, the Third
Air Force and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet as its core, shall make surprise landings
in or around Ban Don, Nakhon, Singora and Pattani with advance corps on the first day
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of the operation, promptly occupy airfields, and get them ready for use, while air units
of the Army and the Navy, on and after the first day of the operation, carry out preemp-
tive air strikes against the air power and the naval vessels of the enemy mainly in British
Malaya from the direction of southern Indochina. ([The next] part, omitted by the author,
concerned operations in case the landings experienced difficulties due to obstruction by
the enemy.) Depending on the arrival of some of the ships that have escorted the main
force of the Fourteenth Army [for the invasion of the Philippines], the main force of the
Twenty-fifth Army shall be put ashore in southern Thailand in quick succession, and ex-
panding on the military gains achieved by the advance landing corps in Malaya, it shall
promptly capture Singapore. As the operation progresses, one corps shall seize an op-
portunity and shall land on the east coast of Malaya at a point as far to the south as pos-
sible.
(3) Operation against British Borneo
The objective of the operation against British Borneo is to occupy and secure key resource
areas and air bases. Right at the opening of hostilities, an element of the unit under the
direct control of the Southern Army shall carry out a sudden attack on Miri, occupy the
place, and secure its key resource areas and its air base. Once Miri is occupied, it shall
occupy Kuching, secure its air base and get it ready for use in order to let the Navy ad-
vance its air units.
(4) Operation against Hong Kong
The objective of the operation against Hong Kong is to defeat the enemy and capture
Hong Kong. After confirming the landings of the advance corps or air strikes in Malaya,
the unit consisting of a corps of the Twenty-third Army and the Second China Expedi-
tionary Fleet as its core shall start the operation. First, it shall destroy the warships of the
enemy on location, break through the enemy’s position on Kowloon Peninsula, and then
capture Hong Kong Island. After completion of the capture of Hong Kong, the corps con-
cerned shall assemble near Hong Kong [to be redeployed] as [part of] the force for the
capture of the Dutch East Indies.
(5) Operation against Guam and the Bismarck Archipelago
The objective of the operation against Guam and the Bismarck Archipelago is to capture
Guam first, then occupy air base(s) in the Bismarck Archipelago, and pin down the threat
of the enemy in the equatorial Pacific Islands area. At the beginning of the operations,
the unit consisting of the South Seas Detachment and the Fourth Fleet as its core shall
capture Guam. There the South Seas Detachment turns over [its task of] guarding Guam
to the [naval] landing force. [Then] the Army and the Navy in conjunction shall seize an
opportunity to occupy Rabaul and secure the air base. After that, the South Seas Detach-
ment shall turn over [its task of] guarding Rabaul to the [naval] landing force as quickly
as possible, and move toward the vicinity of Palau.
(6) Operation against the Dutch East Indies
The objective of the operation against the Dutch East Indies is to defeat the enemy in the
Dutch East Indies, capture their bases, and occupy and secure key resource areas. While
the Philippines operation is underway, the Army and the Navy, in conjunction, shall sup-
port an element of the Sixteenth Army to capture Tarakan as quickly as possible. Then,
depending on the situation of the Philippines and Malaya operations, they shall succes-
sively capture Balikpapan and Banjarmasin, and seizing an opportunity in the course of
the above operations or after their completion, capture Ambon and Kupang, get the nec-
essary air bases ready for use, and secure key resource areas as well. Meanwhile about
the same time as the capture of Tarakan, the Navy on its own account shall occupy and
secure Menado first, then Kendari and Makassar. The guarding of Tarakan and Ambon
shall be taken over by the Navy as quickly as possible when the major part of each op-
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eration in these areas is finished. Apart from [this], as the operations in British Malaya
progress, another element of the Sixteenth Army shall seize an opportunity to occupy
the strategic points of Bangka Island and Palembang, get the air bases ready for use, and
secure the key resource areas as well. After having brought the air power of the enemy
on Java under control while preparing the air bases, the main force of the Sixteenth Army
and a corps diverted from the Philippine Islands shall land in the vicinity of Batavia in
western Java and in the vicinity of Surabaya in eastern Java respectively. They shall
promptly occupy Batavia, Bandung and Surabaya, and continue to mop up other key
areas on Java. Once it becomes possible to take control of the Strait of Malacca after the
occupation of Singapore, an element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall land at the right mo-
ment in the vicinity of Medan from the direction of the west coast of the Malay Peninsula
to occupy key areas in the Aceh region and, seizing an opportunity, Sabang Island.
(7) Operations against Thailand and Burma
The objective of the initial operations against Thailand and Burma is to secure the sta-
bility of Thailand, facilitate the operations in Malaya, and prepare for subsequent oper-
ations in Burma. Right at the opening of hostilities, the Fifteenth Army shall have an
element of its force make its way into central and southern Thailand from southern In-
dochina by land and by sea, and secure key places in these areas, while occupying with
part of this force the vicinity of Victoria Point. One corps of the main force of the Fifteenth
Army shall leave Indochina mainly by land right after the opening of hostilities, while
another corps shall leave port in northern China after the opening of hostilities. Each
corps shall advance toward the vicinity of Bangkok from around the 40th day of the op-
eration, and occupy key places in Thailand. As the main force of the Fifteenth Army ar-
rives, an element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be diverted toward the area of its main
force by land and by sea as soon as possible. The Fifteenth Army shall seize an opportu-
nity to occupy Moulmein and other air bases with a part of its force.
(8) Apart from [the above], a corps under the direct control of the Southern Army shall leave
port in northern China in the wake of the reinforcements for the Fifteenth Army, and ar-
riving in Indochina, take charge of securing stability in this area. In particular, it shall be
on the watch for an approach of the Chinese Army.
7. Outline of the air operation
(1) Mission: The air units of the Army, in conjunction with those of the Navy, shall carry out
preemptive air strikes on enemy air bases right at the outset of the war, gain command
of the air and facilitate the landings of the landing troops, after which they shall support
ground operations.
(2) Outline
(a) The air operation of the Army shall give priority to the Malaya area.
(b) Before the start of the war, air bases shall be advanced as follows:
To southern Taiwan for the attack on the Philippines;
To southern Indochina for the attack on Malaya.
(c) Air strike operations shall start on day x, i.e. the day of the start of the landings by
the ground troops. However, if [our air units] are seriously attacked by the enemy
on day x or before, they shall start advancing at the right moment in conjunction with
the Navy. Also, if enemy planes seem to repeatedly reconnoiter our important bases
and convoys, they shall be shot down.
(d) The Army air units shall mainly take charge of covering the convoys of the landing
troops, to which they are assigned on days x – 1 and x – 2.
(e) The operation to advance air units shall start at dawn on day x; [the units] shall pin
down the enemy’s [ability for] action by surprise attacks on their main bases all at
once and facilitate the operations of the landing troops.
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For this purpose, the strikes shall be focused on airfields where bombers, torpedo
bombers in particular, of the enemy are stationed.
(f) Once the landing troops have landed, [the air units] shall promptly advance their
bases to the enemy’s territory and closely cooperate with the ground operations. For
this, about half of the ground duty units shall accompany the first landing units, oc-
cupy the airfields and get them ready for use.
(3) Disposition of the forces:
(a) The Third Air Force (consisting of 5 fighter air groups, 4 light bomber air groups, 4
heavy bomber air groups, and 1 reconnaissance plane air group as its core, including
1 air group each out of the Fifth Air Force’s fighter, light bomber, and heavy bomber
air groups) shall first create a diversion through a Kunming operation by temporarily
deploying in southern China and northern Indochina, and then advance rapidly to
deploy in southern Indochina just before the opening of hostilities to take charge of
covering the convoy of the advance corps of the Twenty-fifth Army in the Gulf of
Thailand. On day x, it shall carry out preemptive air strikes on air bases in northern
Malaya with its main force and those in southern Thailand with part of its force in
order to facilitate the landing operations. After that, the Third Air Force shall
promptly advance its main force to Malaya and part of its force to Thailand as rapidly
as possible and cooperate directly with the ground operations while continuing to
destroy the air power of the enemy.
(b) The Fifth Air Force (consisting of 1 fighter air group, 2 light bomber air groups, 1
heavy bomber air group, and 1 reconnaissance plane air group as its core, minus 1
fighter, light bomber and heavy bomber air group each) shall deploy in southern Tai-
wan, and in conjunction with Navy air units carry out preemptive air strikes on the
air bases located at latitude 16º north and northward on Luzon Island to facilitate the
landing operations. After that, it shall take charge of covering the convoy of the main
force of the Fourteenth Army, and advance its main force to Luzon Island as rapidly
as possible to cooperate directly with the ground operations while continuing to de-
stroy the air power of the enemy. Just before the opening of hostilities, 1 fighter air
group shall be added.
8. Outline of the lines of communication
(1) Southern French Indochina shall be designated as the main lines-of-communication relay
point for the southern operation as a whole; Taiwan shall be designated as a supply trans-
fer base, and Guangdong [Canton] as an auxiliary supply transfer base.
(2) Line-of-communicarion units required in the South shall mainly be provided by divert-
ing units from Manchuria, while all the units in China shall be kept in reserve without
being diverted.
(3) Based on the principle that most of the military power of the nation shall be committed
to the southern operation, operation materials in the homeland as well as in Manchuria
shall be gathered and appropriated for the southern operation, and [all] the matériel re-
quired by the Southern Army for one campaign shall be sent in the first [transport] si-
multaneously with the transport for the landing operation or immediately [after] that.
(4) The supply to our armed forces shall be focused on [the forces] in the South. Manchuria
and China shall be designated as sources of supply of materials; concerning [the forces]
in China in particular, measures to enable them to support themselves on site on their
own account shall be stepped up to the limit.
II. Operations against China in the wake of the start of the Southern Operation (Omitted by the
author)
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III. Operations against Russia in the wake of the start of the Southern Operation (Omitted by the
author)
Operation Plan of the Navy
The Navy Department of IGHQ drew up the following operation plan,(1) based on which the
Combined Fleet made a detailed plan in which from the Combined Fleet the Second Fleet
was assigned the southern operation in general, the Eleventh Air Fleet the air operations
mainly in the Philippines and subsequently the Dutch East Indies, the Third Fleet the sea op-
erations in these areas, and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet the sea operations in the Malaya
area. From way back, the Third Fleet had been the fleet intended for the Philippines opera-
tions in the event of an outbreak of war with the United States. The Combined Fleet had been
carefully considering a case in which the U.S. Pacific Fleet would come to the attack in the
middle of a southern operation.
Mission of the Imperial Japanese Navy for War against the United States, Britain and the
Netherlands
Part 1. Mission in Case War against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands Breaks
Out During the Operation Against China
Chapter 1. Summary
1. The outline of the operational policy of the Imperial Japanese Navy — while continuing [oper-
ations] to take control of the Chinese coast and the lower reaches of the Yangzi basin — is to
promptly destroy the enemy fleet and air power in the East, to occupy and secure strategic re-
gions in the South, to build up a sustainable and unbeatable position, and [eventually] to destroy
[more of] the enemy’s fleet and in the end take the fight out of the enemy.
Chapter 2. Mission of the Combined Fleet
Section 1. Stage-one operations
2. The unit consisting of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and
the Eleventh Air Fleet as its core shall clear the sea in the Philippines, British Malaya, and the
Dutch East Indies of the enemy fleet, destroy them and in conjunction with the Army carry out
the following operations:
(1) [The unit] shall launch operations against British Malaya and the Philippines simultaneously,
conduct preemptive air strikes on the air and naval forces of the enemy in these areas and
[at the same time] put ashore the Army’s advance corps in the key areas in Malaya and the
Philippines as quickly as possible in order to push ahead the air units and intensify the air
operations.
(2) After the above operations [in 2.(1)] produce results, the main force of the Army’s invasion
force shall be put ashore in the Philippines and then in Malaya to promptly capture the
Philippines and British Malaya.
(3) In the early stages of the operations, strategic places in British Borneo shall be occupied, fol-
lowed by those in Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, and southern Sumatra at the earliest oppor-
tunity. Key places in the Moluccas and Timor shall [also] be occupied at favorable
opportunities and the air bases there shall be made ready for use.
(4) As soon as the air bases mentioned in the above [2.(3)] have been made ready for use, air
units shall be advanced one after another to suppress the air power of the enemy in the Java
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area. After [the operation] gets results, the main force of the Army’s invasion force shall be
put ashore on Java and capture it.
(5) After capturing Singapore, strategic areas in northern Sumatra shall be occupied and oper-
ations against Burma shall be conducted at the right moment in order to block the enemy’s
supply route to China.
3. The unit with the Fourth Fleet as its core is assigned to defend and patrol the equatorial Pacific
Islands and protect the sea-lanes in the area. It shall capture Wake Island right at the opening of
hostilities and, in conjunction with the Army, capture Guam and then the strategic places in the
Bismarck Archipelago at the right moment.
Further, it shall attack and destroy advance bases of the enemy in the South Pacific at the right
moment.
4. The unit consisting of the Fifth Fleet as its core shall patrol the sea to the east of Japan, be ready
for surprise attacks of the enemy, and keep watch on the Aleutian Islands area. It shall also de-
fend the Ogasawara Islands and protect sea traffic in the area. At the same time it shall be on its
alert for Russia.
5. The unit with the Sixth Fleet as its core shall be dispatched to the Hawaiian Islands and the U.S.
West Coast right at the opening of hostilities. It is assigned to reconnoiter and watch on the
enemy fleet, conduct surprise attacks on it, and disrupt the sea-lanes [of the enemy] in the area.
6. The unit consisting of the First Air Fleet as its core shall conduct a surprise attack on the enemy
fleet in Hawaii right at the outset of the war and strive to degrade its power. After that, it shall
mainly be assigned to support the operations of the Fourth Fleet and the southern operation.
7. The main force of the Combined Fleet shall be assigned to support operations as a whole and
take action at the right moment according to the movements of the enemy fleet.
8. An element of the Combined Fleet shall be assigned to disrupt the sea-lanes of the enemy in the
Pacific and Indian Ocean areas at the right moment.
9. As for Thailand and French Indochina, efforts shall be made to the utmost extent not to arouse
the hostility of the people while making them accept our operations. However, if any hostile
behavior is observed, armed force shall be used without hesitation so as not to let them hinder
our operations.
Section 2. Stage-two operations
(Omitted by the author. [It concerns] operations after the capture of strategic regions in the
South.)
Chapter 3. Mission of the China Area Fleet (Omitted by the author)
Chapter 4. Mission of the units stationed at naval stations and strategic ports (Omitted by the
author)
Part 2. Mission in Case War Against Russia Breaks Out During the Operations Against the
United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China (Omitted by the author)
The First Fleet (covering the Inland Sea of Japan) consisted of eight battleships as its core,
the Second Fleet consisted of thirteen heavy cruisers as its core, the Third and the Fourth
Fleet of three (and the Fifth of two) light cruisers as their core. The Sixth Fleet was a subma-
rine fleet, the First Air Fleet was an aircraft carrier [unit], and the Eleventh Air Fleet was a
land-based air unit.
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The Order Issued by the Army Department of Imperial General Headquarters
to Prepare for Attack, the Instructions Given by the Chief of the Army Gen-
eral Staff, and the [Army-Navy] Central Agreement
The order of battle of the Southern Army, issued on 6 November, was in outline as follows:
Commander in chief of the Southern Army: General Terauchi Hisaichi
General Headquarters of the Southern Army
Fourteenth Army: Army commander, Lt. Gen. Homma Masaharu; [consisting of] the 16th
and the 48th Divisions and the 65th Brigade as its core
Fifteenth Army: Army commander, Lt. Gen. Iida Shōjirō; [consisting of] the 33d and the
55th Divisions (minus an element of the division) as its core
Sixteenth Army: Army commander, Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi; [consisting of] the 2d Di-
vision and the 56th Mixed Infantry Group as its core
Twenty-fifth Army: Army commander, Lt. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki; [consisting of] the
Imperial Guard Division, the 5th, the 18th, and the 56th Divisions as its core
21st Division
21st Independent Mixed Brigade 
4th Independent Mixed Regiment
Third Air Force: Commander, Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō; [consisting of] the 3d, the 7th,
and the 12th Air Divisions, and the 81st Air Group as its core
Fifth Air Force: Commander, Lt. Gen. Obata Hideyoshi; [consisting of] the 4th and the
10th Air Divisions as its core
10th, 21st and 83d Independent Air Units
The order of battle of the South Seas Detachment issued on the same day was as follows:
Detachment commander: Maj. Gen. Horii Tomitarō, commander of the 55th Infantry
Group; [consisting of] the 55th Division’s Infantry Group headquarters and the 144th
Infantry Regiment as its core.(23)
The order given by the Army Department of IGHQ [Tairikumei] on 6 November to the com-
mander in chief of the Southern Army to prepare for attack read: 
(1) IGHQ shall prepare for the seizure of strategic regions in the South. (2) The commander in
chief of the Southern Army, in cooperation with the Navy, shall assemble the main force of his
army in Indochina, southern China, Taiwan, the Southwest Islands [stretching between the south
of Kyūshū and the north of Taiwan], and the equatorial Pacific Islands and prepare to seize
strategic areas in the South. Separate orders shall be issued for offensive operations ( … the rest
is omitted [by the author]).”(1)
The order given by the Army Department of IGHQ on the same day to the South Seas De-
tachment commander read: 
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(1) (Same as above.). (2) The commander of the South Seas Detachment, in conjunction with the
Navy, shall proceed to the Ogasawara Islands and prepare for the capture of Guam. Separate
orders shall be issued for offensive operations.”(1)
On the same day (the 6th), based on the above IGHQ Army Department Order, Chief of the
Army General Staff Sugiyama issued an instruction [Tairikushi] to the commander in chief of
the Southern Army:
Based on IGHQ Army Department Order No. 556, I instruct you as follows: (1) Summary of the
operations of the Southern Army and the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Op-
eration to which the commander in chief of the Southern Army shall conform in making prepa-
rations for the southern operation are specified in the separate volume. (2) The commander in
chief of the Southern Army shall finish preparations for the operation by around the end of No-
vember (… the rest is omitted by the author).”(1)
The above-mentioned “Summary of the operations of the Southern Army” was an extract of
required information from the previously mentioned “Summary of the General Operation
Plan of the Imperial Japanese Army.”(23) The above-mentioned “Army-Navy Central Agree-
ment” was an agreement made by central command [i.e. the Army and the Navy Department
of IGHQ] to establish the cooperation between the two forces, which consisted of: (1) Oper-
ational objectives, (2) Mission, (3) Strength employed, (4) Launch of the operation, (5) Outline
of the operations, (6) Arrangements about command, (7) Aviation, (8) Sea transportation and
communications, (9) Supply and medical affairs, (10) Transport and escort, (11) Time and
date of the launch of operations and the time to be used for the operations, (12) Agreement
between the Army and the Navy commanders, (13) Information, (14) Operation name and
tactical map, (15) Exchange of intelligence, etc. And the separate volume on “The Army-Navy
Central Agreement on the air [operations] for the Southern Operation” contained agreements
on (1) Strength employed, (2) Outline of the Philippines operations, (3) Outline  of Malaya,
Burma, British Borneo operations, and (4) Outline of the Dutch East Indies operations.(23)
The main points relevant to the Dutch East Indies operations in the Army-Navy central
agreement for the southern operation and the Army-Navy central agreement on the air [op-
erations] for the southern operation were in outline as follows:(23)
1. In the southern operation (Operation A-GŌ), operations against the Philippines (Operation M),
against Malaya (Operation E), against British Borneo (Operation B), and subsequently against
the Dutch East Indies (Operation H) shall be carried out. Assigned to the Sixteenth Army
charged with the Dutch East Indies operation are the 2d Division, the 38th Division (to be di-
verted after the Hong Kong operation), and the 48th Division (to be diverted after capturing
Manila), the 56th Mixed Infantry Group (Sakaguchi Detachment), South Seas Detachment (to
be diverted after the captures of Guam and Rabaul), three tank regiments, five artillery battalions
under the direct control of the Army, and eighty-eight antiaircraft guns as the core.
2. The Fourteenth Army shall conduct operations against the Philippines from Taiwan, the Penghu
Islands, the Southwest Islands, and Palau; the Twenty-fifth Army shall conduct operations
against Malaya from Hainan Island and southern French Indochina; and one detachment under
the direct control of the Southern Army (the Kawaguchi Detachment, an element of the 18th Di-
vision) shall conduct operations against Miri, and subsequently Kuching in British Borneo from
Cam Ranh Bay, and get the air bases there ready for use. Out of the advance parties to attack
the Philippines, the unit charged with the capture of Legaspi and Davao shall leave Palau after
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Illustration No. 8—Overview of the Operation Plan of the Army
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detachments
the evening of the day before the first air strike against the Philippines, make a landing, and
first of all occupy the air bases and get them ready for use. Then, it shall occupy Jolo and set up
an air base ready for use as quickly as possible. The guarding of Jolo shall be taken over by naval
units.
3. The main points in conducting the Dutch East Indies operation are as described in the “General
Operation Plan of the Imperial Japanese Army.” However, the assembly points for the attack
units are only roughly determined as Palau for the units to capture Borneo and the Moluccas,
as Hong Kong for the units to capture Sumatra, as Luzon Island for the units to land in eastern
Java, and as Taiwan and Hong Kong for the units to land in western Java.
4. The operations of the Second, the Third, and the Southern Expeditionary Fleets are as described
in the above “Mission of the Imperial Japanese Navy.” The strength to be employed for the Sec-
ond Fleet is the 4th, the 5th, and the 7th Cruiser Divisions (heavy cruisers), the 2d and the 4th
Destroyer Squadrons, and the 3d Battleship Division (depending on the situation). The strength
to be employed for the Third Fleet is the 16th Cruiser Division (light cruisers) and the 17th
Minelayer Division, the 5th Destroyer Squadron, the 6th Submarine Squadron, the 12th Seaplane
Tender Division, and the 1st and the 2d Base Forces. The strength to be employed for the South-
ern Expeditionary Fleet is the Kashii (a training cruiser), the Shimushu (a coastal defense ship),
and the 9th Base Force, to which one cruiser division, one destroyer squadron, one aircraft car-
rier, and two seaplane tenders shall be added in the early stage of the war.
5. The agreement on the air operations was as follows: At the beginning, 279 aircraft of the main
force of the Eleventh Air Fleet, 40 reconnaissance seaplanes of the Third Fleet, and 144 aircraft
of the Fifth Air Force (apart from this, 30 aircraft are for the air defense of Taiwan) shall start
operations in the Philippines area, and 447 aircraft of the Third Air Force, 117 aircraft of the 22d
Air Flotilla, and 20 aircraft of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet shall start operations in the
Malaya, Burma and British Borneo areas. Air operations in the Burma and Thailand areas are
assigned to the Army, those in the Malaya area are mainly the charge of the Army, those in
British Borneo are assigned to the Navy, and those in the Philippines shall be conducted jointly
by the Army and the Navy. The air cover for the landings of the advance parties in Legaspi and
Davao shall be provided by the Navy only. As the Philippines operations make progress, the
Eleventh Air Fleet shall proceed to the Dutch East Indies operations by exclusively using air-
fields in the central and southern Philippines, and the Fifth Air Force shall shift its position to-
ward Thailand. Although air operations against the Dutch East Indies shall be conducted mainly
by the Navy, those against northern Sumatra shall be conducted mainly by the Army, and those
against southern Sumatra and western Java shall be conducted jointly by the Army and the
Navy.
6. An attack schedule shall be made based on the shipping plan completed on 1 November, which
sets approximately day x + 85 for the landing in southern Sumatra and approximately day x +
103 for the landings in (both eastern and western) Java.
7. If a decision shall be made to wage war (note: that is “provided the Main Points for the Imple-
mentation of Imperial National Policy are approved at the Imperial Conference on 5 November”),
the following commanders are supposed to promptly conclude [specific] arrangements between
them:
(1) [The commanders in chief of] the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet and the Second
Fleet
(2) [The commanders in chief of] the Southern Army and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet
(3) [The commanders of] the Fourteenth and the Sixteenth Armies and [the commander in chief
of] the Third Fleet
(4) [The commanders of] the Fifteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and [the commander in
chief of] the Southern Expeditionary Fleet
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(5) [The commanders of] the Third and the Fifth Air Force and [the commander of] the Eleventh
Air Fleet
(6) [The commander of] the Third Air Force and [the commander in chief of] the Southern Ex-
peditionary Fleet and [the commander of] the 22d Air Flotilla
This central agreement was finally completed after its outline was agreed upon by 29 October
and the shipping plan on 1 November. Since the agreement came shortly after the final de-
cision on the Hawaii air strikes and the solution of the problem of extending the flying range
of naval fighter aircraft, the result was that much of this agreement was generally based on
the Army’s draft, which left the agreement with inevitable issues such as discrepancies be-
tween central command and the Shipping Transport Command, and the yet unspecified uti-
lization plan of Navy ships.
The Order Issued by the Navy Department of Imperial General Headquarters
to Prepare for Attack, the Instructions Given by the Chief of the Navy Gen-
eral Staff
As soon as the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy were decided upon
on 5 November, the Navy Department of IGHQ transmitted on the same day to the Com-
mander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto IGHQ Navy Department Order [Daikairei]
No. 1, ordering him to prepare for operations. The order read as follows:(1)
1. The Empire [of Japan] has decided to complete all preparations for operations, expecting to
wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in early December for the sake
of its self-preservation and self-defense.
2. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall carry out the necessary preparations for
the operations.
3. For particulars, the chief of the Navy General Staff is appointed to give instructions.
Following the above Imperial Navy Order, Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano, on the
same day gave the following instruction to the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet:
The Combined Fleet shall have the necessary units advance at the right moment to take their
preparatory positions before the launch of operations should the opening of hostilities with the
United States, Britain and the Netherlands in early December be inevitable (... the rest is omitted
by the author).(1) (Note by the author: [this is] an instruction given by the chief of staff of the
Navy Department of IGHQ [Daikaishi].)
Orders for Invasion and Deployment
The South Seas Detachment charged with the capture of Guam and Rabaul began boarding
at Sakaide in Shikoku as early as 10 November, left port on the 13th, and first headed for the
Ogasawara Islands. The 56th Mixed Infantry Group charged with capture of the east coast
of Borneo was assembling from Kurume divisional district for boarding at Moji due to start
from the 17th onwards.(53)
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On 15 November, the Army Department of IGHQ transmitted the following IGHQ Army
Department Order to capture strategic regions in the South to the Southern Army.(1) Needless
to say, negotiations with the United States were [still] in progress.
1. IGHQ intends to capture the strategic regions of the South for the sake of the Empire’s self-
preservation and self-defense and the establishment of a Greater East Asia New Order.
2. The commander in chief of the Southern Army shall in cooperation with the Navy promptly
capture the strategic regions in the South in accordance with the following
points:
A separate order shall be issued for the start of the attack (advance).
(1) The regions to be occupied shall be the strategic areas of the Philippines,
British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, and a part of Burma, etc.
(2) (Item concerning Thailand and French Indochina. Omitted by the author.)
(3) In implementing the operations, propaganda and disinformation activi-
ties shall be carried out mainly in the interest of conducting the prosecu-
tion of the operations in our favor.
(4) A military administration shall be established in the occupied areas in
order to restore public order and secure important national defense re-
sources as well as means for the Army to maintain itself on its own ac-
count (... the rest omitted by the author).
When on 21 November the Navy Department of IGHQ issued its order
that “the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall start directing
the units required for conducting operations at the right moment toward
the standby positions at sea,”(1) the Carrier Task Force charged with the
air strikes on Hawaii had already left the Inland Sea separately in indi-
vidual ships or in small units from around the 18th onwards and was
assembling in Hitokappu Bay in the southern Kuril Islands.(103) The 56th
Mixed Infantry Group (i.e. the Sakaguchi Detachment) had left Moji on
the 19th for Palau. Detachment E charged with capture of Legaspi and
Detachment D charged with capture of Davao, too, had left Nagoya on
the 20th for Palau.(53)
4. The Southern Army’s Plan and Orders
(See Illustration No. 9)
On 6 November, General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed commander
in chief of the Southern Army by the Emperor and on the same day re-
ceived the previously described IGHQ Army Department Order to “pre-
pare for invasion.”(23) The principal staff officers, as described above, had
been called up by the Army Department of IGHQ from late September
onwards as prospective staff personnel of the Southern Army, and since
then they had engaged in research side by side with the Army Depart-
ment.
After receiving the IGHQ Army Department Order to prepare for in-
vasion, the staff of the Southern Army made arrangements with the staff
of the Combined Fleet and the Second Fleet on 8 and 9 November.(24) On
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Commander of the
Southern Task Force
(and Commander in
Chief of the Second
Fleet) V. Adm. Kondō
Nobutake
Commander in Chief of
the Combined Fleet
Admiral Yamamoto
Isoroku
Commander in Chief of
the Southern Army
General Terauchi
Hisaichi
the following day, Commander in Chief Terauchi signed the “Agreement
between the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army” and the “Agree-
ment between the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area
and the commander in chief of the Southern Army” at the War College
with Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto
Isoroku and Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet (Navy Southern
Task Force Commander) V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake. The Southern Army
thereafter referred to the first as “General Agreement [Sōkyō] No. 1” (i.e.
Agreement between all the forces for the South), and the latter as “Gen-
eral Agreement No. 2.”(23, 24)
On that day (10 November), Commander in Chief Terauchi finalized
the operation plan of the Southern Army and also on the same day sum-
moned all the army commanders under his command to the premises
of the Army Department of IGHQ and gave them orders concerning the
preparations for the operation.(23)
Earlier, upon receiving the previously described IGHQ Navy Depart-
ment Order on 5 November, the commander in chief of the Combined
Fleet released the operation plans to each unit by Operation Order No.
1 of the same date. Subsequently on 7 November, by Operation Order
No. 2, he gave orders to “[Execute] the first preparations for the opening
of hostilities and set Day Y on 8 December.”(107)
As the provisional formation of the headquarters of each army or-
dered on 5 November had been concluded, the Southern Army’s com-
mand [over these armies] came into effect on 15 November.(1, 23) On the
same day, as previously described, the Army Department of IGHQ car-
ried out a war game in the presence of the Emperor and gave the order
to invade [the South]. At this time, the armies of the Southern Army, in
accordance with the above-mentioned Central Agreement, were drawing
up arrangements at Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture (from 14 to 16 No-
vember ) and in Saigon (from 15 to 17 November) with the fleets con-
cerned.(23, 24) Based on the results of these arrangements, the commander
in chief of the Southern Army on 20 November gave the order to invade
[the South].(23, 24) [Meanwhile,] Detachment A (i.e. the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment), which was to carry out operational preparations at Palau, had
made its departure on the previous day, and Detachments D and E (the
Miura and Kimura Detachments), [which] also [were to prepare at
Palau], left on this day respectively from Moji and Nagoya.(53)
On 15 November, the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern
Area (i.e. the commander of the Navy Southern Task Force), V. Adm.
Kondō Nobutake, gave the [Navy] Southern Task Force Operation Order
No. 1. On 23 November, the commander of the Philippines ([and later]
the Dutch East Indies) Unit (i.e. the commander in chief of the Third
Fleet) V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō, gave the [Navy] Philippines Unit Opera-
tion Order No. 1 at the Terashima-suidō [Channel]. On 20 November, the commander of the
Malaya Unit (i.e. the commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet), V. Adm.
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Commander of the Air
Unit (Commander in
Chief of the Eleventh
Air Fleet) V. Adm. 
Tsukahara Nishizō
Commander of the
Malaya Unit (and Com-
mander in Chief of the
Southern Expeditionary
Fleet) V. Adm. Ozawa
Jisaburō
Commander of the
Philippines ([and later]
the Dutch East Indies)
Unit (and Commander
in Chief of the Third
Fleet) V. Adm.
Takahashi Ibō
Ozawa Jisaburō, gave the [Navy] Malaya Unit Operation Order No. 1(110) at Saigon. Around
20 November, the commander of the Air Unit (i.e. the commander in chief of the Eleventh
Air Fleet), V. Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō, gave the [Navy] Air Unit Operation Order No. 1(113)
at Gaoxiong, Taiwan.
The Combined Fleet’s Plan and Orders
As stated above, the Combined Fleet issued Operation Order No. 1, dated 5 November.
Briefly told, it ran as follows:(107)
1. Stage-one operations shall be divided into three phases:
(1) Phase-one operations: [concerns the period] from the opening of hostilities roughly until the
landing of the main force of the Philippines invasion army (approx. until day x + 20)
(2) Phase-two operations: [concerns the period] from [the end of] the previous phase roughly
until the landing of the main force of the British Malaya invasion army (approx. until day x
+ 40)
(3) Phase-three operations: [concerns the period] from [the end of] the previous phase until
roughly the completion of the major part of the invasion of the Dutch East Indies.
2. Disposition of forces for phase-one shall be as follows: Main force units (under the direct control
of the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, whose core is the First Fleet, consisting of 6
battleships, 2 aircraft carriers and 2 light cruisers as the core, shall be deployed to the Inland
Sea); the Carrier Task Force (whose core is the First Air Fleet, consisting of 6 aircraft carriers, 2
battleships, 2 heavy cruisers and 1 light cruiser as its core, shall be deployed for the air strikes
on Hawaii); the Advance Unit (whose core is the Sixth Fleet, consisting of 27 submarines as the
core, shall be deployed to the Hawaii area); the South Seas [Pacific Islands] Unit (whose core is
the Fourth Fleet, consisting of 4 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 1 training cruiser and 1 seaplane
tender as the core, shall be deployed for the capture of Guam, Wake and Rabaul); the Southern
Task Force (to be explained later); the Northern Task Force (whose core is the Fifth Fleet, con-
sisting of 2 light cruisers, 2 auxiliary cruisers and 1 seaplane tender as the core, shall be deployed
for patrolling the waters east of Honshū and other tasks); the Supply Unit and others.
3. The Southern Task Force mentioned above, shall have the commander in chief of the Second
Fleet as its commander and shall be subdivided as follows:
The Main Unit shall consist of the Second Fleet as its core, with 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers,
10 destroyers and 12 carrier-aircraft.
The Philippines Unit shall consist of the Third Fleet as its core, with 1 aircraft carrier, 5 heavy
cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 3 seaplane tenders, 29 destroyers, base forces, and 104 carrier-aircraft.
The Malaya Unit shall consist of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet as its core, with 5 heavy cruis-
ers, 3 light cruisers, 1 training cruiser, 3 seaplane tenders, 15 destroyers, 21⁄2 land-based air units,
2 base forces, 191 aircraft.
The Air Unit shall consist of the Eleventh Air Fleet as its core, with 51⁄2 land-based air units, 2
destroyers, 308 aircraft [of the units].
The Submarine Unit shall consist of the 5th Submarine Squadron as its core with 16 submarines.
4. In phase-one operations, the Southern Task Force shall be responsible for the air operations, the
occupation of Batan Island, landing operations at Aparri, Vigan (Laoag), Davao, Legaspi and
Jolo, the escort of the main force of the Philippines invasion army, the escort and landing oper-
ations of the Malaya invasion advance corps, the Thailand occupation units and the British Bor-
neo invasion units.
5. In phase-two operations, the Southern Task Force shall: (1) continue with phase-one operations,
[further] extend military achievements, restructure the forces for the Philippines operation,
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[change focus and] prepare for invasion of the Dutch East Indies, and intensify [operations to]
destroy the air and naval war potential of the enemy in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies; (2)
escort the main force of the Malaya invasion army; (3) organize the “Dutch East Indies Unit”
from almost the same forces that constituted the “Philippines Unit” which engaged in Phase
One Operations, while leaving units to defend occupied key areas in the Philippines, whereas
the Dutch East Indies Unit shall execute invasion operations in the order of: (1) Menado,
Tarakan, (2) Balikpapan, Kendari, (3) Banjarmasin, Makassar, and depending on the situation,
Sorong, Ambon and Kupang. The 12th Seaplane Tender Division shall be added to the [Navy]
Malaya Unit before the landing of the main force of the Army’s Malaya invasion army.
6. In phase-three operations, the Southern Task Force shall: (1) continue with phase-two operations
and [further] extend military achievements; (2) escort the invasion army for Sumatra and Java;
(3) destroy sea traffic in the southern areas.
7. Disposition of the forces of the Combined Fleet in phase-two and three operations shall be
roughly the same as in phase-one operations. All units except the Southern Task Force shall con-
tinue with phase-one operations.
8. Stage-two operations
Areas to be occupied or destroyed are: (1) eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Fiji, Samoa; (2) the
Aleutians, Midway; (3) Andaman Islands, and (4) key locations in Australia.
The Agreements Between the Southern Army, the Combined Fleet, and the
Southern Task Force
As previously described, on receiving on 6 November the IGHQ Army Department Order
[Tairikumei] to prepare for invasion, the Southern Army concluded agreements with the Com-
bined Fleet and the Southern Task Force [separately] on the 10th [of the month]. In these agree-
ments (General Agreements Nos. 1 and 2) there was a matter that deserves special mention
with respect to the Dutch East Indies operation, i.e. the invasion schedule. 
The Southern Army, which had heard that the prospect of being able to complete the
southern operation within 150 days had been presented to the Emperor, made it a point of
honor and became firmly determined to try as hard as possible to shorten the schedule even
further. It negotiated with the Navy and obtained an agreement which set the [estimated]
landing in Java on “approximately day x + 80” instead of “approximately day x + 103,” as
indicated in the Central Agreement at IGHQ.(24) As previously described, draft agreements
had [already] been reached between the staffs on the 8th and the 9th, and thus [the agree-
ments] were concluded in a short time on the following day at the War College in the presence
of both chiefs of the Army and the Navy General Staff. [However, the ceremony] presented
an odd sight: Contrary to the Navy Department’s quick agreement to this plan to substan-
tially advance the schedule, the Army Department of IGHQ, which should have been most
pleased about the advancing of the schedule, looked sullen. The reason why the Navy De-
partment quickly agreed was because it was also eager to shorten the invasion schedule,
mindful of an attack by the U.S. main fleet. Moreover, not being fully aware of [the size of]
the Army’s massive lines of communication units that accompanied it, the Navy took the
convoy escorts too lightly.(28) In contrast to the Navy Department, the cause of the Army De-
partment’s sullen looks was not simply a matter of losing face because it had been the Army
Department that had put forward the Central Agreement schedule which [mentioned] ap-
proximately day x + 103 [as the day to land in Java] ([to be precise,] this schedule was made
at Shipping Transport Command). Rather, the reason was that the schedule had been con-
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ceived to operate about two million tons of tonnage so that all ships would move as efficiently
as possible between the homeland, Manchuria, China and the southern areas, back and forth
(north and south), left and right (east and west) considering the current position and task of
each ship for the deployment of over 300,000 troops, and this could not be modified so easily.
The Army Department watched the conclusion of the agreements by the Southern Army with
a sullen look, hoping that it would turn out to be an impractical idea or wishful thinking.(23, 24, 105)
The “Memorandum of Agreement between the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army
(dated 10 November)” signed by General Terauchi and Admiral Yamamoto was a simple
document of no more than a few lines.(23) This was because the Combined Fleet had left the
specific arrangements to the Southern Task Force.
The “Memorandum of Agreement between the commander in chief of the Navy in the
Southern Area and the commander in chief of the Southern Army (dated 10 November),”(23)
signed by V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake and General Terauchi Hisaichi was in outline as follows:
1. Policy for joint operations. In conformity with the Central Agreement of 6 November, the ob-
jectives of the southern operation shall be accomplished within a short period of time in an at-
mosphere of immediate and proper cooperation.
2. Launch of the operations (omitted by the author).
3. Standard dates [to implement operations] of capturing. “[In the following chart] are the key
areas, which the Army and Navy in cooperation with each other, shall capture, as well as the
date of landing (along with assembly points and key areas the Navy shall capture unassisted as
well as the date of landing):”
Note: M stands for [operations against] the Philippines, E for Malaya, B for British Borneo and
H for the Dutch East Indies.
60 Chapter III     /     Operational Preparations Prior to the War
Date of start of landing
Key areas to capture (*stands for the
areas which the Navy will capture
unassisted)
Assembly points
Day x
*M: Batan Island, E: Vicinities of
Ban Don, Nakhon, Singora, Pattani
M: Magong, E: Sanya
Day x + 1
M: Vicinity of Vigan or vicinity of
Laoag and vicinity of Aparri
Magong
Depending on the proviso of 5.2.a) E: Vicinity of Kota Bharu
Sanya (note by the author: “Depend-
ing on the proviso of 5.2.a)” means
that this will be entrusted to the
agreement between the commander
of the Twenty-fifth Army and the
commander of the Malaya Unit)
By day x + 4 M: Vicinity of Legaspi Palau
By day x + 6 M: Vicinity of Davao Palau
Around day x + 8 E: Vicinities of Singora and Pattani Cam Ranh Bay
Around day x + 8 B: Vicinity of Miri Cam Ranh Bay
4. Disposition of forces:
Area H: the Sixteenth Army, consisting of the 2d Division ([stationed in the] homeland), the 38th
Division ([in] Operation C in the initial stage), the 48th Division ([in] Operation M in the initial
stage), the 56th Mixed Infantry Group (i.e. the Sakaguchi Detachment: [in] Palau) and the South
Seas Detachment ([in] Operations G and R in the initial stage) as its core, shall occupy Jolo,
Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin.
Note: C refers to southern China and Hong Kong, G to Guam and R to Rabaul.
Area B: One infantry regiment as its core, under the command of Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi Kiyo -
take.
(Other areas of which the Southern Army is in charge are omitted by the author.)
The areas of “The Philippines followed by the Dutch East Indies” covered by [the Navy’s] South-
ern Task Force shall be assigned to the Philippines Unit and the Dutch East Indies Unit (the
latter shall be organized out of the greater part of the Philippines Unit once the major part of
the Philippines operations has been wrapped up), with the commander in chief of the Third
Fleet as its commander. Its strength shall consist of most of the Third Fleet, the 5th Cruiser Di-
vision, most of the 2d and the 4th Destroyer Squadron, the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d
Section), the 11th Seaplane Tender Division, the 12th SeaplaneTender Division (to join later) and
4 battalions of the special naval landing force as its core, with 4 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers,
1 aircraft carrier, 3 seaplane tenders, 5 minelayers, 33 destroyers, 12 fighter planes, 18 attack
planes, and 40 reconnaissance seaplanes. The disposition at the opening of hostilities is Taiwan
and Amami Ōshima for the main force, and Palau for part of the force.
Note: In the early stage of the war, the Southern Task Force was supposed to guard against the
allied fleets in Singapore and Manila Bay as well as to be on the alert in the waters east of
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By and large around day x + 80 H: Java, Sumatra
Hong Kong for the capture of Suma-
tra, Manila for eastern Java, Taiwan
and Hong Kong for western Java
Other [targets] depend on the arrangements between commanders of the Army and the Navy of each area
By and large around day x + 50 H: Vicinity of Banjarmasin Balikpapan
Around day x + 60
E: South Thailand or East Coast of
Malaya (for the second [landing] of
the main force)
Cam Ranh Bay (Sanya)
By around day x + 60
H: Ambon and Kupang (as far as
possible)
Palau
Around day x + 13 B: Vicinity of Kuching Miri
Around day x + 13 M: Jolo Davao
By around day x + 14
M: Lingayen Gulf,
Vicinity of Lamon Bay
Penghu Islands [for the unit] for
Lingayen Gulf, Amami Ōshima [for
the unit] for Lamon Bay
Around day x + 23 *H: Vicinity of Menado Palau
By around. day x + 25
E: South Thailand or East Coast of
Malaya (for the first [landing] of the
main force), H: Vicinity of Tarakan
Penghu Islands (Guangdong) for
Op. E, Palau for Op. H
Around day x + 35 *H: Vicinity of Kendari Menado
Around day x + 35 H: Vicinity of Balikpapan Tarakan
Around day x + 45 *H: Vicinity of Makassar Kendari
the Philippines in connection with the transport of Detachments A, D, and E, which
started their operations from Palau. It roughly decided its initial disposition as follows:
5. Outline of the Operations
The take-over of the defense of Jolo shall be arranged between the Sixteenth Army and the
Philippines Unit, and that of Tarakan and Ambon shall be arranged between the Sixteenth Army
and the Dutch East Indies Unit.
The assembly of the 48th Division around Manila shall be scheduled for approx. day x + 55, and
its departure from the point of assembly for approx. day x + 70. The [Navy] Philippines (Dutch
East Indies) Unit shall provide escort for the redeployment.
The transfer of the corps to capture Bangka Island and southern Sumatra (consisting of an  ele-
ment of the Sixteenth Army) shall be escorted by the [Navy] Malaya Unit.
The transfer (for the capture of Java) of the element of the 38th Division (from Hong Kong),
along with the main force of the Sixteenth Army (which shall move from Taiwan and later from
southern French Indochina to western Java), shall be escorted by the [Navy] Dutch East Indies
Unit.
Escort for the transfer and redeployment (between Palau and Hong Kong, and departure from
Palau or Hong Kong) of the units to capture Ambon and Kupang (consisting of elements of Six-
teenth Army) shall be arranged between the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth
Army (the rest omitted by the author).
6. About the 40th and the 120th day of operations, meetings shall be held between the commanders
concerned of both the Army and the Navy (the rest omitted by the author).
The Order Issued by the Southern Army to Prepare for Attack, and Its
Operation Plan
On 10 November, Commander in Chief Terauchi concluded the previously mentioned agree-
ments (General Agreement Nos. 1 and 2) at the War College, finalized the operation plan of
the Southern Army, and in the afternoon at the War Ministry assembled the commanders of
the Fourteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and their respective chiefs of staff,
the chief of staff of the Fifteenth Army, the commander and chief of staff of the Third Air
Force, and Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment (the Twenty-fifth Army
commander here was Lieutenant General Yamashita; the newly appointed Fifteenth Army
Commander Lt. Gen. Iida Shōjirō was at this time still in French Indochina as commander of
the Twenty-fifth Army). Commander in Chief Terauchi gave the following instruction to be
handed to all rank and file:
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Units Battleship
Heavy
cruiser
Light
cruiser
Destroyer Submarine
Aircraft 
Carrier
Seaplane 
Tender
Southern
Task Force:
Main units
1 2 6
Southern
Task Force:
Eastern Sup-
port Unit
1 1 2
Malaya Unit 5 2 16 8
Philippines
Unit
4 5 33 1 3
All officers and men shall fully understand the true meaning of this sacred war, never forget
their heavy responsibility, and with an iron will shall be devoted throughout. Firmly united you
shall maintain in everything the harmony and cooperation between Army and Navy, and
demonstrate the very best of your strength. Trusting in certain victory through our superior
valor, you must be determined to achieve the objectives of the expedition in a short period of
time. [Moreover,] to innocent officials and common civilians, you must by offering kindness,
relief, guidance and encouragement, fully extol the dignity of the Imperial Army and not violate
it in the least.
Along with this, he gave the following order to prepare for attack (as well as the operation
plan).(23) However, as a [previous] order by IGHQ had set the start of the exercise of command
on 15 November, this order bore the date of the 15th even though it was handed down on
the 10th.
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 1.1
Southern Army Order Tokyo, 15 November
1. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly prepare to invade the strategic areas in the
South … (omitted by the author). The distribution of forces of the Southern Army is as given in
the separate volume (omitted by the author).
2. Preparations for the operation shall be completed by approx. [month] [day] (note by the author:
left blank in the original document). Excerpts of the operation plan of the Southern Army are as
given in the separate volume … (the rest is omitted by the author).
4. The commanders of the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies,
the commander of the Third Air Force and Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detach-
ment shall make arrangements on operations with the Navy commanders concerned, based on
the excerpts of the Army-Navy Central Agreement, and the General Agreement No. 2, i.e. the
Memorandum of Agreement between the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area
and the commander in chief of the Southern Army.
5. The commander of the Fourteenth Army shall prepare for Operation M (note by the author: the
Philippines operation).
6. The commander of the Fifteenth Army shall prepare for the operation to enter Thailand while
… (the rest is omitted by author).
7. The commander of the Twenty-fifth Army shall prepare for Operation E (note by the author:
the Malaya operation). (Items 8 – 11 omitted by the author.)
12. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall prepare for the occupation of Jolo and Tarakan as
well as the subsequent operations against the eastern outer territories of the Dutch East Indies.
13. In the event of an attack by U.S., British and Dutch forces or by any one of these forces, the com-
manders of the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and [the
commander of] the Third Air Force shall intercept this attack with the forces at their disposal
for the purpose of self-defense. However, such a situation as the above should be settled locally
with the utmost effort.
Separate orders shall be issued for the execution of the advance.
14. Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment shall prepare for Operation B (note by
the author: British Borneo operation) … (the rest omitted by the author). 
Separate volume, excerpts of the operation plan of the Southern Army
Section 1: Operational objective
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Article 1: The objective of the southern operation is to destroy the major bases of the United
States, Britain and the Netherlands in East Asia and to occupy and secure the key areas
of the South.
Article 2: The areas to be occupied by the Southern Army are the Philippines, British Malaya,
Burma, Java and the Islands of Sumatra, Borneo and Timor.
Section 2: Mission
Article 3: The Southern Army shall, in conjunction with the Combined Fleet, launch the opera-
tions in the Philippines and British Malaya simultaneously by means of preemptive
air strikes and strive to accomplish the objective of the operations within a short term.
Section 3: Operational directives
Article 4: The operations shall be conducted in accordance with the previous sections in the fol-
lowing manner:
Phase-one operations
1. Operations shall start with a sudden landing of an advance corps (or a preemptive air strike de-
pending on the situation) against Malaya and a preemptive air strike against the U.S. [forces] in
the Philippines. Then taking advantage of the results of the air operations, the main force of
each invasion corps shall be put ashore first in the Philippines, then in Malaya, and swiftly cap-
ture the Philippines and British Malaya. Apart from this, strategic locations in British Borneo
shall be occupied right at the opening of hostilities, and stability in Thailand and Indochina
shall be secured.
2. The date for the start of the operations (day 1 of operations) shall be given by [separate] order.
Even if the air strikes both in the Philippines and in Malaya on day 1 of operations are impossible
to execute due to the weather, the sudden landing in Malaya shall be carried through as long as
sea conditions permit. However, the landing of the advance parties in the Philippines shall be
postponed depending on the launch of the air operations in the area.
3. During the above [operations], key locations in Dutch Borneo shall be occupied as quickly as
possible, followed by key locations in southern Sumatra as the Malaya operation progresses,
where vital resource areas shall be secured and preparations for operations against Java shall
be made. During or after this, key locations in the Moluccas as well as on Timor shall be occupied
at favorable opportunities.
Phase-two operations
As preparations for the above-mentioned operations make progress, command over enemy air
power in the Java area shall be gained swiftly to seize the island. Also, key areas of northern
Sumatra shall be occupied at the right moment after the capture of Singapore. During phase-
one and phase-two operations, air bases in southern Burma shall be captured at favorable op-
portunities.
Phase-three operations
The occupied areas shall be stabilized and secured. Further, as far as circumstances permit, an
operation for dealing with Burma shall be carried out. Separate orders shall be issued for im-
plementation of this operation.
Section 4: Outline of the distribution of forces and their mission
Article 5: The outline of the distribution of forces of the Southern Army and their mission for
Phase One Operations is as follows:
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The Philippines
The Fourteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as its core), in conjunction with the Navy,
shall swiftly capture Manila, and then occupy key locations within the archipelago. After
the capture of Manila, a unit with the 48th Division as its core shall be assembled in Manila
or its vicinity and prepared so that it is ready to be diverted to the Sixteenth Army.
Malaya
The Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of four divisions as its core), in conjunction with the Navy,
shall swiftly capture Singapore.
Thailand and Burma
The Fifteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as its core), in conjunction with the Navy,
shall secure the stability of Thailand, facilitate the operations in Malaya, and [at the same
time] prepare for subsequent operations against Burma.
The Dutch East Indies
The Sixteenth Army (consisting of three divisions as its core, of which two divisions as the
core shall be redeployed from the Fourteenth Army and the Twenty-third Army), in con-
junction with the Navy, shall occupy vital resource areas of Dutch Borneo, the Moluccas,
Timor and southern Sumatra, secure air bases and make them ready for use.
Units under the direct control of the Southern Army shall consist of one division, two numbered
air forces and other units. The division concerned shall be charged to stabilize and secure
Indochina.
At the beginning of the operations, an element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be brought under
the direct control [of the Southern Army] to occupy key locations in British Borneo.
The numbered air forces, in conjunction with the Navy air unit, shall first destroy enemy air
power in the Philippines, Malaya and Burma, while supporting the operations of the Four-
teenth and the Fifteenth Armies with an element of each [air force], and the operations of
the Twenty-fifth Army with their main force. Then, they shall support the Sixteenth Army
in its operation in southern Sumatra. Furthermore, they shall be charged to cut off the
enemy’s rear lines of communication as well as to attack locations of strategic (and political)
importance at the right moments.
Article 6: The outline of the distribution of forces of the Southern Army and their mission for
phase-two operations is planned as follows:
The Philippines
The Fourteenth Army (consisting of one division and one mixed brigade as its core), in con-
junction with the Navy, shall stabilize and secure key locations within the Philippine Archi-
pelago. At the arrival of another mixed brigade, the division and other units shall get ready
for redeployment.
British Malaya and Northern Sumatra
The Twenty-fifth Army, in conjunction with the Navy, shall secure key locations in Malaya
such as Singapore, and Penang, and [at the same time] have a part of its force occupy key
areas of northern Sumatra. In the meantime, preparations shall be made so that the unit
under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth Army can be diverted to the Sixteenth Army as
quickly as possible, and also the extraction of about 1 division shall be prepared.
Java [Editor’s note: The original text says “Sixteenth Army.” Vol. 34, p. 144 of the War History
Series says “Java,” which is probably correct.] 
The Sixteenth Army, in conjunction with the Navy, shall occupy Java.
The numbered air forces, in conjunction with the Navy air unit, shall support the operations of
the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies with an element of each [air force],
and the operations of the Sixteenth Army in Java with a force as large as possible.
Chapter III     /     Operational Preparations Prior to the War 65
The rest shall largely be the same as in phase-one operations.
Article 7: The outline of the distribution of forces of the Southern Army and their mission for
phase-three operations is roughly set as follows:
The Philippines 
The mission of the Fourteenth Army (consisting of two mixed brigades as its core) shall be
the same as in phase two.
British Malaya
The Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of three divisions as its core) shall stabilize and secure
the key areas in British Malaya, British Borneo as well as in northern Sumatra.
The Dutch East Indies
The Sixteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as its core) shall stabilize and secure the
key areas of the Dutch East Indies (excluding northern Sumatra).
When implementing the Burma operation, the Fifteenth Army (with part of its strength rein-
forced), in conjunction with the Navy, shall occupy key areas of Burma.
The numbered air forces, in conjunction with the Navy air unit, shall support the operations of
the Fourteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies with an element of each [group], and
with a powerful element support the Fifteenth Army in its Burma operation.
The [Navy] Southern Task Force’s Plan and Orders
The [Navy] Southern Task Force received the above-mentioned order of the Combined Fleet
dated 5 November (note: although this order bore the date of 5 November, the whole contents
were completed only after the 10th) and on 15 November issued its Operation Order No. 1.
This order stated that “in conjunction with the Army, the U.S., British and Dutch warships
and air power in the Far East shall be completely destroyed, all bases in the Philippines,
British Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies shall be demolished, and key areas in these
territories shall be captured, while preparations shall be made to intercept attacks by the U.S.
mainland fleets and others.” [Furthermore] the order described plans to divide the operations
[of Stage One] into three phases (until approximately day x + 20, until approximately day x +
40, and until the completion of a major part of [the operation into] the South); to start the op-
erations with preemptive air strikes and the swift disembarkation of part [of the force] in
Malaya; to support the landing operations of the main force of the Fourteenth Army and then
the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army after having supported the landings of the Army
advance parties; to make efforts to destroy the allied warships in Singapore with air and
naval power, as well as obstructing them with mine and submarine warfare; to make [air
bases in] Davao and Jolo ready for use and advance the main force of the Eleventh Air Fleet
from Taiwan to start the Dutch East Indies operation; to deploy submarines on the sea-lanes
in the southern part of the Celebes Sea and capture Menado, Kendari and Makassar one after
another, while capturing Tarakan, Balikpapan, and Banjarmasin one by one in cooperation
with the Army, and then at favorable opportunities, to occupy Ambon, followed by Kupang,
which is intended as a base for operations against Australia; to have the 22d Air Flotilla divert
from the Malaya area to Miri and Kuching, and to advance submarines to the Indian Ocean
in order to carry out invasion operations against southern Sumatra and later against Java;
and to use paratroop units depending on the situation. It was decided to advance the 6th
Submarine Squadron first to Sanya, leaving the Inland Sea on 21 November, the 5th Subma-
rine Squadron first to Palau, leaving the Inland Sea on 25 November, and to advance the
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main force of the Southern Task Force to Magong on 2 December, leaving the Inland Sea on
the 29th [of November]. The disposition of forces for the first phase was set as follows:(110)
Main Force
Main Unit: under the direct command of the commander in chief of the Second Fleet, [con-
sisting of] the main force of the 4th Cuiser Division ([consisting of] 2 heavy cruisers),
part of the 3d Battleship Division ([consisting of] 1 battleship), and 6 destroyers
Eastern Support Unit: [consisting of] 1 battleship of the 3d Battleship Division, 1 heavy
cruiser of the 4th Cruiser Division and 2 destroyers ([assigned to] support operations in
the eastern waters of the Philippines)
Philippines Unit: under the command of the commander in chief of the Third Fleet, [consisting
of] the Third Fleet (minus the 2d Section of the 17th [Minelayer] Division, the 6th Submarine
Squadron and the 12th Seaplane Tender Division), the 5th Cruiser Division ([consisting of]
3 heavy cruisers), the main force of the 4th Carrier Division ([consisting of] 1 aircraft carrier),
the main force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron,
and the 11th Seaplane Tender Division ([consisting of] 2 seaplane tenders)
Malaya Unit: under the command of the commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary
Fleet, [consisting of] the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 1 heavy cruiser of the 4th Cruiser Di-
vision, the 7th Cruiser Division (consisting of 4 heavy cruisers), the 3d Destroyer Squadron,
the 4th Submarine Squadron, 1 division of the 6th Submarine Squadron, the 2d Section of
the 17th Minelayer Division, the 12th Air Seaplane Tender Division (consisting of seaplane
tenders), the 22d Air Flotilla (land-based aircraft), 42 aircraft of the 23d Air Flotilla
Air Unit: under the command of the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet, [consisting
of] the Eleventh Air Fleet (minus the 22d Air Flotilla and 42 aircraft of the 23d Air Flotilla),
2 battalions of the [naval] special landing forces
Submarine Unit: under the command of the commander of the 5th Submarine Squadron, [con-
sisting of] the 5th Submarine Squadron, and the main force of the 6th Submarine Squadron
Note: The basic formation of the Third Fleet consisted of the 16th Cruiser Divison (consisting of
2 light cruisers), the 17th Minelayer Division (consisting of 2 minelayers), the 5th Destroyer
Squadron (consisting of 1 light cruiser and 8 destroyers), the 6th Submarine Squadron, the
12th Seaplane Tender Division (consisting of 2 seaplane tenders). The basic formation of the
Southern Expeditionary Fleet consisted of 1 training cruiser, 1 escort ship, 1 gunboat and
others.(101)
The Southern Army’s Invasion Order
The Southern Army, which had passed down the order to prepare to invade the southern
key areas, then issued the order to invade the southern key areas (dated 20 November).(23, 24)
This order prescribed the actions of each army for the next forty to fifty days.(24)
With respect to the Dutch East Indies operation, this order contains two points that should
be specially mentioned. The first point is that, regardless of previous orders, this order as-
signed the Sixteenth Army to capture Davao. The reason was that when, in accordance with
the above-mentioned General Agreement No. 1, arrangements were made between the Four-
teenth and the Sixteenth Armies and the Navy Philippines Unit at Iwakuni, problems arose
which will be explained later. The second point is that although the date of issue [of the order]
was set as the 20th and it was transmitted to each army on that day, the Sixteenth Army had
been given a verbal notification when on the 19th its chief of staff, Okazaki Seizaburō, had
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Illustration No. 9—The Southern Army Operation Plan
been especially summoned. This was because the 56th Mixed Infantry Group [of the Sixteenth
Army] (i.e. the Saka guchi Detachment) was leaving Moji on the night of 19th for Palau.(23, 24, 36)
The excerpt of relevant articles of this Southern Army order (Southern Army Operation
Order A, No. 2) is as follows:(23)
1–3. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly invade the southern key areas. Separate or-
ders shall be issued for the launch of offensive operations (excerpted by the author).
4. The Fourteenth Army shall swiftly capture the main bases on the Philippines, Manila in par-
ticular (summarized by the author).
5. The Twenty-fifth Army shall make a sudden landing in Malaya and make efforts to establish
a forward foothold in order to capture Singapore (summarized by the author).
6–10. The Fifteenth Army shall advance into Thailand and secure stability [there] while preparing
for the subsequent operations against Burma (summarized and excerpted by the author).
11. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall swiftly occupy Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and then
Balikpapan, Banjarmasin with an element of his force and secure necessary air bases as well
as vital resource areas. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall direct the units, which
are under the command of or led by the Fourteenth Army commander, to guard the assem-
bly point of Palau. The unit to occupy Davao shall receive directions from the Fourteenth
Army commander as to the date and time to depart from its assembly point. After the cap-
ture of Davao, the occupation units in Davao, which were originally under the command of
the Fourteenth Army commander (along with the shipping units and part of the matériel),
shall be returned to the Fourteenth Army. The defense of Jolo and Tarakan shall be turned
over to the Navy swiftly as soon as the major part of each operation in these areas is fin-
ished.
12. Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment shall depart from the assembly point
after the opening of hostilities, carry out a sudden attack, and occupy Miri and Seria first,
secure vital resource areas as well as air bases and, immediately after that, occupy the air
base near Kuching as quickly as possible. (13–14 are omitted by the author).
15. In order to restore order, obtain resources crucial to national defense and secure the means
for the armies to maintain themselves on their own account in the occupied territories, each
army commander and Commander Kawaguchi shall take charge of establishing a military
administration in each area. Separate orders shall be issued concerning the details of the es-
tablishment of a military administration (summarized by the author).
After issuing this order, Commander in Chief Terauchi left Tokyo on 25 November and first
headed for Taipei.(23)
5. Operational Preparations of the Sixteenth Army
Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi had just been transferred to become commander of the Twenty-
third Army in Guangdong in June after taking part as commander in a maneuver from Shang-
hai to northern Kyūshū that simulated a transoceanic landing on Malaya to capture Singapore,
when, on 6 November, he received a telegram from War Minister Tōjō Hideki that read: “You
have been appointed commander of the Sixteenth Army by the Emperor today. Come to
Tokyo tomorrow, the 7th, by the airplane specially sent by central command [IGHQ] and
turn over your duty to incoming commander Lt. Gen. Sakai Takashi.” Lieutenant General
Imamura left Guangdong on the 7th with no idea what his new task was, landed at Tachikawa
Airfield on the 10th, and was met by Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō, with whom he had worked
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at the Inspectorate General of Military Training until four months before. The major general
informed him that the Sixteenth Army would be dispatched to Java should diplomatic ne-
gotiations fail, and that he, Major General Okazaki, had been appointed chief of staff of the
army.(35)
On 5 [November], the day before Lieutenant General Imamura received the above-men-
tioned telegram in Guangdong [Canton], the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial Na-
tional Policy, which expressed the determination to wage war against the United States,
Britain and the Netherlands, had been decided upon at the Imperial Conference in Tokyo.
On the same day, outlines for the provisional formation of the headquarters of the Sixteenth
and the other armies had been issued by Army Order A, No. 79.(3, 52) The detailed regulations
of this outline stipulated that the Fourteenth Army, which was to cross the sea and land in
the Philippines, would be called “Wataru-shūdan,” (Crossing Corps) and that the Sixteenth
Army, which was to conquer the Dutch East Indies, would go by the name of “Osamu-shūdan”
(Pacifying Corps).(52) When Lieutenant General Imamura read the detailed regulations of this
army order, he realized that the completion of the conquest of the Dutch East Indies by the
Sixteenth Army meant the completion of the southern operation and that the Sixteenth Army
was expected to implement an appropriate military administration in particular.(35) The for-
mation of the Sixteenth Army headquarters was completed on 13 November at the War Col-
lege under the supervision of the Eastern District Army commander.(32, 52)
On 6 [November], the day when in Guangdong Lieutenant General Imamura received
the above-mentioned telegram from the War Minister, the order of battle of the Southern
Army was announced in Tokyo, as well as the Army Department of IGHQ’s order to prepare
for attack, and the appointment of army commanders and lesser officers.(1, 23)
On the 10th, when Lieutenant General Imamura arrived in Tokyo, Commander in Chief
[of the Southern Army] Terauchi made agreements with Commander in Chief [of the Com-
bined Fleet] Yamamoto Isoroku and Commander in Chief [of the Second Fleet] Kondō Nobu-
take at the War College. After that, he gathered together Sixteenth Army Commander
Imamura and his colleagues at the War Ministry and gave the previously described instruc-
tion and the Southern Army Order to prepare for attack.(23)
Right after the formation of the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters was completed on 13 No-
vember, Army Commander Imamura departed Tokyo on the same day for Iwakuni, where
from the 14th to the 16th he made arrangements with the commander in chief of the Third
Fleet.(32)
In the meantime, as of 0000 on 15 November, the units included in the order of battle of
the Sixteenth Army were transferred to the command of Army Commander Imamura. (How-
ever, units still in [various distant parts of] homeland Japan, Korea, Manchuria, northern
China and eastern China after that time were to be transferred to his command on leaving
their respective ports of departure.) Further, an order of the Army Department of IGHQ stip-
ulated that Army Commander Imamura was given authority to give commands concerning
preparations for operations to units that were in the order of battle of the army but had not
yet been transferred to his command after 0000 on November 15. This day (15 [November])
was the day when IGHQ issued the previously described order of invasion.(1)
On concluding the Iwakuni Agreement, Army Commander Imamura on the 16th left
Iwakuni for Moji where he took command of the 56th Mixed Infantry Group (Detachment A
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a.k.a. the Sakaguchi Detachment) which was embarking there, gave instructions and encour-
aged them. The next day on the 17th, he left Moji to fly back to Tokyo.(32, 88)
On the 18th, Maj. Gen. Harada Yoshikazu, vice chief of staff [of the Sixteenth Army] took
up his post.(32) The major general, who worked for the Kwantung Army after his return from
Java with Ambassador Yoshizawa Kenkichi, had previously worked in Section 1 of the Army
General Staff Office, along with Lieutenant General Imamura and Major General Okazaki.(37)
He was posted [vice chief of staff] due to the previously described change in Major General
Manaki’s task.(36)
On the 19th, a formal ceremony was held at the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters [provi-
sionally situated] in the War College where all subordinate officers presented themselves to
their commander, after which Army Commander Imamura gave his instructions.(32) In the
evening, Chief of Staff Okazaki was summoned to the General Headquarters [of the Southern
Army] and unofficially informed of the Southern Army’s previously described order of in-
vasion (including the decision that the Sixteenth Army should capture Davao as well).(24, 32)
The Sakaguchi Detachment left Moji that night and headed for Palau first.(88)
From the 24th to the 25th, Army Commander Imamura visited the Sendai divisional dis-
trict, where the 2d Division Commander Lt. Gen. Maruyama Masao and his subordinates
presented themselves to him. He gave them instructions, inspected the division’s exercises
and encouraged the officers and men.(32)
On 1 December, the Imperial Decision to open hostilities was made, which was followed
by the issue on the next day, 2 [December], of the Imperial Order of “Exercise of Armed Force
on 8 December.”(1, 3) However on 1 December, the Sakaguchi Detachment was already in
Palau (it had arrived in Palau on 28 November(88)) and the 2d Division had started moving
to maneuvering grounds in Narashino, Fuji, Toyohashi, etc., in order to vacate its station in
the Sendai divisional district and conduct military exercises.(1, 53) [Even then,] the Sixteenth
Army headquarters was still at the War College in Aoyama, Tokyo, and devoted itself to
drawing up its plan of operation.(32)
Order of Battle [of the Sixteenth Army] (See the table in the appendix.)
The order of battle of the Sixteenth Army (issued on 6 November) was in outline as follows;(1, 23)
details are as shown in the table in the appendix to this volume:
Order of Battle of the Sixteenth Army
Commander of the Sixteenth Army: Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi 
Headquarters of the Sixteenth Army
2d Division
56th Mixed Infantry Group (organization as shown in table No. 1)
8th Tank Regiment, 17th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A), 18th Field Antiaircraft Defense
Unit headquarters, 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B), 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Reg-
iment, 1st Independent Engineer Regiment (E), 1st Independent Engineer Company (electricity),
4th Independent Engineer Company ([to facilitate] the river-crossing of heavy equipment), 168th
Railway Depot headquarters (B), Sixteenth Army Signal Unit (organization as shown in attached
table No. 2), 29th Bridge Building Material Company, Imperial Guard Division River-crossing
Material Company, 6th Division Bridge Building Material Company, 3d Field Military Police
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Unit, Line-of-Communication Unit under the direct control of the Sixteenth Army (organization
as shown in table No. 3) 
Table No. 1
Organization of the 56th Mixed Infantry Group
Commander: the commander of the 56th Infantry Group, Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Shizuo
56th Infantry Group headquarters, 146th Infantry Regiment, 56th Infantry Group Armored Car
Unit, 56th Field Artillery Regiment 1st Battalion, 56th Engineer Regiment 1st Company, 56th
Transport Regiment 2d Company, 56th Infantry Group Medical Unit, and 56th Divisional 1st
Field Hospital
Table No. 2
Organization of the Sixteenth Army Signal Unit
Commander: the commander of the 15th Telegraph Regiment
15th Telegraph Regiment, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 13th Independent Radio Platoons (motor-
ized), 60th Radio Telegraph Platoon (horse-carried), 33d, 34th, 45th, 46th, and 55th Fixed Radio
Units
Table No. 3
Line-of-Communication unit under the direct control of the Sixteenth Army
43d and 48th Line-of-Communication Area Units, 2d Field Transport headquarters, 39th and
102d Independent Motor Transport Battalions, 261st Independent Motor Transport Company,
42d and 44th Field Road Units, 5th and 16th Field Well-drilling Companies, 14th Field Duty
Unit (commander: 14th Field Duty Unit commander, 14th Field Duty Unit headquarters, 107th
and 108th Shore Duty Companies, 45th Sea Duty Company), 61st and 62d Construction Duty
Companies, 18th Field Postal Unit, 18th Line-of-Communication Medical Unit (commander:
18th Line-of-Communication Medical Unit commander, 18th Line-of-Communication Medical
Unit headquarters, 67th, 115th, 116th, and 121st Line-of-Communication Hospitals), 16th Patient
Transport Unit (Commander: the 16th Patient Transport Unit commander, the 16th Patient Trans-
port Unit headquarters, 65th, 66th, and 68th Patient Transport Platoons), 22d Field Water Supply
and Purification Department (B), 13th Line-of-Communication Sick Horse Depot, 19th Veteri-
nary Quarantine Depot (B), 24th Field Ordnance Depot, 24th Field Motor Transport Depot, 24th
Field Freight Depot
About half of the above units under the direct control of the [Sixteenth] Army, other than the
division and the infantry group, were units in Manchuria that had been mobilized for the
KANTOKUEN [Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army], and those that were sta-
tioned in China. They were to be transported to Moji or Gaoxiong to join the 56th Mixed In-
fantry Group and the main force of the Sixteenth Army. The well-drilling companies were
intended to restore and develop oil fields. As mentioned previously, [the Army Department
of] IGHQ and the Southern Army planned to divert the 38th and the 48th Divisions, the South
Seas Detachment, and many other units under the direct control of other armies to the Six-
teenth Army as the capture of Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, Guam, and Rabaul pro-
gressed. 
The order of battle of the South Seas Detachment, which was scheduled to be put under
the command of the Sixteenth Army after the capture of Guam and Rabaul, was as shown in
the table in the appendix to this volume.
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Lineup of the Sixteenth Army Headquarters
Main personnel of the Sixteenth Army headquarters was as follows:
Commander of the Army: Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi
Chief of Staff: Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō
Vice Chief of Staff: Maj. Gen. Harada Yoshikazu
Staff Officers of Section 1
Senior Staff: Col. Takashima Tatsuhiko
Chief Intelligence Staff: Lt. Col. [Col.] Murakami Kimisuke
Chief Aviation Staff: Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu
Chief Operations Staff: Lt. Col. Oda Akimitsu
Staff Officer Intelligence: Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori
Assistant Operations Staff Officer: Maj. Yamashita Yutaka
Staff Officers of Section 2
Senior Staff: Col. Kitamura Yoshifuto
Chief Signal Communication Staff: Lt. Col. Saiki Ikuzō
Chief Shipping Staff: Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō
Staff Officer Line of Communication: Maj. Takahashi Mitsuzō
Staff Officer Line of Communication: Maj. Nishiura Setsuzō
Attached to the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters: Col. Nakayama Yasuto
Ordnance Department Director: Maj. Gen. Yamada Hisamatsu
Intendance Department Director: Maj. Gen. Mukai Kinjirō
Medical Department Director: Maj. Gen. Nakajima Haruhiko
Veterinary Department Director: Col. Kurokawa Sanjirō
Legal Department Director: Col. Tsumura Mikizō
The staff officers of the army headquarters were selected from those who were working at
the central offices of the Army in Miyakezaka, or who were teaching at the War College in
Aoyama at that time, or from those who had had such careers. This, along with the person-
ality of the army commander and the chief of staff and the previous relationships among the
people concerned, might have helped to create an atmosphere where from the beginning the
staff got along well and worked harmoniously. Among the staff officers, Colonel Kitamura
and Lieutenant Colonel Sendō were experts in shipping who had worked in the Shipping Sec-
tion of the Army General Staff Office and given lectures on shipping at the War College. Major
General Harada, Colonel Nakayama, and Major Kuriya had accompanied the Kobayashi and
Yoshizawa delegations to Java, and Colonel Murakami, Lieutenant Colonel Sendō, and Major
Nishiura were officers who had studied the Dutch East Indies operation for a long time.
Formation and Personnel of the Divisions and the Infantry Group
Included in the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army from the very beginning were the 2d
Division and the 56th Mixed Infantry Group. The 38th and 48th Divisions and the South Seas
Detachment were to be added at later stages. The outline of how these units were constituted
and composed, and of their main personnel is shown in the table in the appendix. The details
of their formation were as follows:
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2d Division (“Isamu-heidan,” The Braves)
Division commander: Lt. Gen. Maruyama Masao
This division was formed by Army Order A, No. 63 on 16 September. However, as will be told
later, it was reorganized by Army Order A, No. 5 on 30 January [1942,] because the moving up
of the timing of the Java operation caused a shortage of tonnage, and because the results of the
Fourteenth and Twenty-fifth Army operations created organizational problems. Consequently,
the number of personnel and horses was reduced by respectively 448 men and 1,700 horses,
whereas the number of motor vehicles was increased instead.(52, 31) After reformation, the regular
strength of the division became 13,755 men, 1,335 horses, and 586 motor vehicles.(52) Units inte-
grated into the division and their details were as follows:(52, 1, 53)
2d Division headquarters: 305 men, no horses and 40 motor vehicles.
2d Infantry Group headquarters: 93 men, no horses and 8 motor vehicles.
4th Infantry Regiment: 2,719 men, 203 horses and 36 motor vehicles.
The regiment was [composed of] regimental headquarters, 3 battalions,
1 regimental artillery battery (with 4 mountain guns), 1 antitank gun com-
pany (with 4 guns), and 1 signal company.
The battalions were [composed of] 3 companies, 1 machine gun company
(with 8 guns), and 1 battalion artillery section (with 2 guns). (Note: Ac-
cording to the action report of the 3d Battalion, the actual numbers of men
and horses of the battalion were 791 and 51 respectively, and there were
no motor vehicles.)
The regiment had sufficient bicycles to cover the needs of one-third of its
infantry companies. In addition it was equipped with two-wheeled trail-
ers for heavy firearms.
16th Infantry Regiment: same as above.
29th Infantry Regiment: same as above.
2d Reconnaissance Regiment: regimental headquarters and 4 companies; 439 men, no horses
and 59 motor vehicles.
2d Field Artillery Regiment: regimental headquarters and 3 battalions. The battalions were [com-
posed of] their headquarters and 3 batteries (with 4 guns each). The Regiment consisted of
1,738 men, 726 horses and 68 motor vehicles. The 1st Battalion was equipped with motor
vehicles; the other battalions were equipped with draft horses.
2d Engineer Regiment: regimental headquarters, 3 companies and 1 equipment platoon; 872
men, no horses and 32 motor vehicles.
2d Transport Regiment: headquarters and 3 companies; 381 men, no horses and 105 motor ve-
hicles.
2d Divisional Signal Unit: unit headquarters and 3 platoons; 182 men, no horses and 18 motor
vehicles.
2d Divisional Medical Unit: 491 men, no horses and 36 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional Ordnance Service Unit: 123 men, no horses and 13 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional 1st Field Hospital: 242 men, no horses and 22 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional 2d Field Hospital: same as above.
2d Divisional 4th Field Hospital: 247 men, no horses and 23 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional Water Supply and Purification Department: 196 men, no horses and 25 motor ve-
hicles.
2d Divisional Sick Horse Depot: 47 men, no horses and 7 motor vehicles.
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Commander of the 2d
Division, Lt. Gen.
Maruyama Masao
56th Mixed Infantry Group (Sakaguchi Detachment)
Infantry Group commander: Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Shizuo
Composition, personnel, etc. were as shown in the table in the appendix. The formation of the
unit corresponded to that of the 2d Division. The numbers of men, horses, and motor vehicles
of the detachment were 5,200, 1,200, and 100 respectively.(24)
38th Division (“Numa-heidan” The Swampers)
Division commander: Lt. Gen. Sano Tadayoshi
The division was scheduled to transfer [to the command of the Sixteenth
Army] after the capture of Hong Kong. Composition and main personnel
were as shown in the table in the appendix.
Its infantry regiments consisted of regimental headquarters, 3 infantry bat-
talions, [1] infantry artillery unit (with 4 mountain guns) and [1] signal unit.
Each infantry battalion consisted of battalion headquarters, 4 companies, and
1 machine gun company. Its mountain artillery regiment consisted of regi-
mental headquarters and 3 battalions, and the battalions consisted of 3 bat-
teries. (Each battery was equipped with 4 mountain guns [Type41 and Type94
mountain guns, 2 for each]).(71)
The division was formed for operations against China in 1939, and its forma-
tion and equipment were inferior to those of the 2d Division, which was
planned and prepared to be mobilized for operations against the Soviet
Union.
48th Division (“Umi-heidan” The Mariners)
Division commander: Lt. Gen. Tsuchihashi Yūitsu
Scheduled to transfer [to the command of the Sixteenth Army] after the cap-
ture of Manila. Composition and main personnel were as shown in the table
in the appendix.
The division had originally been formed in November 1940 and been de-
signed to charge toward Singapore after traversing the whole length of the
Malay Peninsula. Accordingly, it was composed of motor-vehicle-based units,
which made it different from the 2d and 38th Divisions.
The infantry regiments consisted of regimental headquarters, 3 battalions,
[1] regimental artillery battery, [1] antitank gun company, [1] signal company,
and [1] motor vehicle squad. The regiment had about 2,550 men, 100 trucks,
4 passenger cars, 5 sidecars, and 1,000 bicycles. The battalions consisted of
their headquarters, 4 companies, [1] machine gun company (with 8 guns),
and [1] battalion artillery section (with 2 guns). The regimental artillery bat-
tery and the antitank gun company were equipped with 4 guns each. Basically the mobile
strength of the regiment consisted in motor vehicles, bicycles, and marching on foot, about one-
third each. Usually, the regimental headquarters, one of the battalions, the regimental artillery
battery, the antitank gun company, and the signal company were transported by the 100 trucks,
and the other 2 battalions rode bicycles, marched on foot, or were shuttled by motor vehicles.(53,
84) However, during the period between the invasion of the Philippines and its departure [from
the Philippines] for Java, the regiment increased its number of motor vehicles so that its full
force could travel by motor vehicles all together. 
The reconnaissance regiment consisted of its headquarters ([equipped with] 7 motor vehicles, 2
sidecars, and 25 bicycles), 1 signal platoon (with 4 vehicles), the 1st and the 2d Companies (with
Chapter III     /     Operational Preparations Prior to the War 75
Commander of the 48th
Division, Lt. Gen.
Tsuchihashi Yūitsu
Commander of the 38th
Division, Lt. Gen. Sano
Tadayoshi
8 motor vehicles and a sidecar each), the 3d and the 4th Companies (with 8 light-armored cars,
2 motor vehicles, and a sidecar each), and [1] motorcycle unit (with 60 motorcycles and a van).(86)
The mountain artillery regiment consisted of its headquarters and 4 battalions. Each battalion
consisted of 2 batteries. In the Philippine operations, the 4th Battalion had [still] used pack horses
while the others were equipped with motor vehicles, but the whole regiment became motor-ve-
hicle-based in the Java operations.(80)
The engineer regiment consisted of 3 companies and was equipped with motor vehicles.(80)
The transport regiment also consisted of 3 companies and was equipped with motor vehicles.(80)
The other units were also equipped with motor vehicles.
Note: The above was [mainly] based on the recollection of the commanders and fragmentary
historical materials of the units. Composition and equipment of the 48th Division as des-
ignated in Army Order A, No. 57 of 1940 were as follows:(52) 
Units integrated [into the Division] Personnel Horses Motor vehicles
48th Division headquarters 300 120 32
48th Infantry Group headquarters 87 0 7
1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment 2,580 535 91
2d Taiwan Infantry Regiment 2,580 0 91
47th Infantry Regiment 2,580 0 91
48th Reconnaissance Regiment 418 0 38
48th Mountain Artillery Regiment 1,783 320 158
48th Engineer Regiment 759 0 48
48th Divisional Signal Unit 187 0 17
48th Transport Regiment 494 0 124
48th Divisional Ordnance Service Unit 131 0 15
48th Divisional Medical Unit 533 0 31
48th Divisional 1st Field Hospital 228 0 20
48th Divisional 4th Field Hospital 233 0 21
The 47th Infantry Regiment was equipped with 85 motor vehicles as of 16 January 1941, and 800
bicycles were provided on the same day.(53)
South Seas Detachment
The detachment was scheduled to assemble in Palau after the capture of Guam and Rabaul, and
to transfer to the command of the Sixteenth Army. Its composition was as shown in the table in
the appendix. The number of men and horses was 4,470 and 1,090 respectively.(5)
Iwakuni Agreement (See Illustrations No. 10 to No. 12)
Having received the order to prepare for the operation to invade the South from Commander
in Chief Terauchi on 10 November, Sixteenth Army Commander Imamura, as previously re-
lated, left Tokyo on the 13th, on the same day as the formation of the headquarters of the
army had been completed, and made arrangements with the Navy at Iwakuni from the 14th
through the 16th.
Based on the agreement of the 10th between General Terauchi and Admiral Yamamoto,
and [that between General Terauchi] and Vice Admiral Kondō (General Agreement No. 1
and No. 2), this Iwakuni Agreement was supposed to arrange matters between the com-
manders of the Fourteenth and the Sixteenth Armies and the Fifth Air Force on the one hand
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and the commanders in chief of the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet.(23) It was a matter
of course that at the time of this agreement the arrangements involving the Sixteenth Army
had to wait until later due to the sequence of the invasions.
On 18 [November], at almost the same time as this [Iwakuni] Agreement, specific arrange-
ments were made in Saigon between the Fifteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies on the one
hand and the relevant naval units.(23)
Let us first see how arrangements were made to coordinate the operations of the Four-
teenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and the Kawaguchi Detachment (assigned to capture
British Borneo) and those of the relevant air and naval units, which preceded the Dutch East
Indies operation.
In early November, IGHQ rated the strength of the allied forces as follows:(110)
The Philippines Area
Warships: 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 14 destroyers and 17 submarines
Aircraft: 238 aircraft
Ground troops: 46,500 troops, additionally 110,500 troops in mobilization
Malaya Area
Warships: 5 or 6 light cruisers, 5 or 6 destroyers; other than these, 3 destroyers in
Hong Kong, 4 battleships and 3–6 heavy cruisers in the Indian Ocean
Aircraft: 317 aircraft (including those in British Borneo)
Ground troops: 68,000 troops (including those in British Borneo)
Dutch East Indies Area
Warships: 5 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 19 submarines
Aircraft: 391 aircraft
Ground troops: 85,000 troops
Against these forces, the plan was that the aircraft of the Third Air Force (under the direct
control of the Southern Army) and those of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet would conduct
preemptive air strikes in Malaya and that those of the Eleventh Air Fleet, the [Navy] Philip-
pines Unit and those of the Fifth Air Force (assigned to the Fourteenth Army) would do like-
wise in the Philippines; that submarine squadrons would be positioned as far as possible to
the south to prevent the allied fleets from coming up north; that other naval units would
have destroyer squadrons convoy the advance and other units [of the Army]; and that two
battleships, nine heavy cruisers, etc. would be deployed in such a way that they could destroy
the allied fleets anywhere should they come up north. An outline of the air and naval forces
[to execute the plan] was agreed upon in Iwakuni and Saigon as follows:(23)
Aircraft The Philippines: 149 army aircraft, 356 navy aircraft
Malaya: 459 army aircraft, 158 navy aircraft
Warships For general support in the Philippines and Malaya areas:
The main unit of the main force of the Southern Task Force, [consisting of] 1 bat-
tleship, 2 heavy cruisers, and 4 destroyers
The Philippines area: 
The main force of the Philippines Unit, [consisting of] 1 heavy cruiser, 3 light
cruisers, and 16 destroyers as its core
Chapter III     /     Operational Preparations Prior to the War 77
The Southern Philippines Area Task Force of the Philippines Unit (to cover the
areas of Davao and Legaspi), [consisting of] 3 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 1
aircraft carrier and 17 destroyers as its core
Eastern Support Unit of the main force of the Southern Task Force (to cover the
eastern waters of the Philippines), [consisting of] 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser,
and 2 destroyers as its core
Malaya area:
Malaya Unit, [consisting of] 5 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 14 destroyers
as its core
The plan envisioned a sudden attack with an air strength twice as strong as that of the enemy
and with an overwhelmingly superior naval strength; and although the priority of the Navy
in the initial stages was [the attack on] the Philippines, the main force of the Southern Task
Force would consider heading for the eastern waters of Malaya should the British fleet move
up north. 
The operational arrangements in the Malaya area agreed upon in Saigon on the 18th were
in outline as follows:(23)
1. A full-scale sudden air attack shall be launched on day x.
2. The Twenty-fifth Army headquarters, the main force of the 5th Division ([consisting of] 9 bat-
talions), and 3 battalions of the 18th Division (i.e. the Takumi Detachment) shall leave Sanya on
day x – 4 and land [respectively] in Singora, Pattani and Kota Bharu on day x. Also 3 battalions
of the 55th Division (i.e. the Uno Detachment) shall land on the same day in the western part of
the Gulf of Thailand.
3. Vehicles and other [equipment] ([loaded on] 44 ships) for the above-mentioned main force of
the 5th Division and the Takumi Detachment shall leave Cam Ranh Bay on day x + 5 and arrive
on day x + 8 catching up [with the main force].
4. Three battalions of the 5th Division, the main force of the 18th Division ([consisting of] 6 battal-
ions), and the primary units under the direct control of the Army shall leave Guangdong [ Can-
ton] and/or Taiwan on day x + 18, and arrive in Singora (and partly in Pattani) on day x + 25.
5. Three battalions of the Imperial Guard Division (which shall be stationed in Thailand under the
command of the Fifteenth Army in the initial stage) shall leave Saigon for Singora on or after
day x + 25.
6. The secondary units under the direct control of the Army shall arrive in Singora around day x
+ 50.
7. The main force of the 56th Division ([consisting of] 6 battalions) shall arrive in the area between
Kuantan and Mersing around day x + 60.
8. The tertiary units under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth Army shall arrive in Singora and
Mersing around day x + 60.
9. The items from No. 5 through No. 8 in the above are yet to be fixed.
10. The [Navy] Malaya Unit, in Phase One of its operations (until approx. day x + 20), shall start
transporting the advance parties of the Twenty-fifth and the Fifteenth Armies each from [Phase
One] disposition A, then it shall change to [Phase One] disposition B, and support the
Kawaguchi Detachment’s operations against British Borneo as well.
Such was the outline of operations and its defining feature was that even though the arrange-
ments for the operations in Malaya up to about day x + 25 were generally fixed, those after
that remained vague and far too vague to mention anything at all concerning Sumatra.
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The arrangements for the operations in the Philippines were made on the 16th (the last
day of the Iwakuni meeting) and were in outline as follows:(23)
1. A full-scale sudden air attack shall be launched on day x.
2. Navy units and army airfield units shall leave Gaoxiong on day x – 1 and land on Batan Island
on day x; the Tanaka Detachment ([consisting of] 11⁄2 battalion of the 48th Division) shall leave
Magong on day x – 1, or day x, and land in Appari on day x + 2; the Kanno Detachment ([con-
sisting of] 11⁄2 battalion of the same division) shall leave Magong on the same [departure] day
[as above] and land in Vigan on the same [landing] day [as above]; the Kimura Detachment
([consisting of] 2 battalions of the 16th Division) shall leave Palau on day x and land in Legaspi
on day x + 4, supported by the [Navy] 4th Raid Unit ([consisting of] 1 light cruiser and 8 de-
stroyers); the Miura Detachment ([consisting of] 1 battalion of the same division) shall leave
Palau on day x + 3 and land in Davao on day x + 6, supported by the [Navy] 5th Raid Unit ([con-
sisting of] 1 light cruiser and 8 destroyers). In addition, the Kimura and the Miura Detachment
shall also be supported by the [Navy] Southern Philippines Area Task Force of the Philippines
Unit (whose strength was previously mentioned,) and the [Navy] Eastern Support Unit from
the main force of the Southern Task Force (whose strength was also previously mentioned).
3. The main force of the 48th Division (which comprises the main force of the Fourteenth Army)
shall leave Magong, Keelung [Jilong] and Gaoxiong on day x + 10 (escorted by 2 light cruisers
and 16 destroyers), and land around Lingayen Gulf on day x + 14; the main force of the 16th Di-
vision shall leave Amami Ōshima on day x + 10 escorted by 1 light cruiser and 8 destroyers,
and land around Lamon Bay on day x + 16.
Let us return to the Iwakuni Agreement. On 14 November, scores of top-ranking commanders
and staff officers entered the gate of Iwakuni Naval Air Force [Base] in plain clothes.(43) The
three-day meeting started with the arrangements between the Fourteenth Army, the Fifth
Air Force ([most of] which was under the command of the Fourteenth Army), the Third Fleet,
and the Eleventh Air Fleet, and after that the arrangements between the Sixteenth Army and
the Third Fleet were taken up. A draft of the latter arrangements had been prepared by the
Third Fleet. Whereas the operational arrangements after about day x + 25 in the arrangements
made [in Saigon] between the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Twenty-fifth Army re-
mained vague, this draft was quite specific, [and covered] even the period up to [the landing
on] Java. This is because the draft was drawn up by the Third Fleet, a leading player of the
Navy, which had totally stuck to the “clockwise” plan. The outline of the draft arrangement
was as follows:(23) (See Illustrations No. 10 to No.12)
1. The Jolo Detachment ([consisting of] about half a battalion) of the Sakaguchi Detachment ([con-
sisting of] the 56th Mixed Infantry Group as its core) shall sail together with the Miura Detach-
ment of the Fourteenth Army to anchor outside Davao port  on day x + 6 and land on Jolo
around day x + 13; the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment shall leave Palau around day x
+ 25 and land on Tarakan around day x + 30; then the Sakaguchi Detachment shall reunite with
the Jolo Detachment, turn over [its task of] guarding Tarakan to a Navy unit and land in Balik-
papan around day x + 35; after that, the detachment shall have an element of its force land in
Banjarmasin around day x + 54 and strive to seize Bali around day x + 70 with [another] element
of its force.
2. Detachment B ([consisting of] two battalions of the 38th Division as its core) shall leave Hong
Kong around day x + 40 to assemble in Palau and seize Ambon around day x + 60, followed by
Kupang.
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3. The South Seas Detachment shall assemble in Palau around day x + 40 and sail to Cam Ranh
Bay (the area where the main force of the army is stationed).
4. Depending on the situation, the South Seas Detachment shall capture Ambon and Kupang in-
stead of Detachment B.
5. The 48th Division shall leave Manila around day x + 71 and land in eastern Java around day x
+ 80; its transport shall be completed in two transports at an interval of 6 days.
6. The main force of the Sixteenth Army ([consisting of] the 2d Division and an element of the 38th
Division as its core) shall assemble in Taiwan by around day x + 50 and then head for Cam Ranh
Bay; it shall leave the Bay around day x + 75 and land in western Java around day x + 80; its
transportation and landing shall be completed in four transports at an interval of 7 days.
7. In the capture of Tarakan, a naval landing force shall also make a landing under the command
of Detachment Commander Sakaguchi; a naval paratroop unit shall also join in the capture of
Balikpapan; depending on the situation, the paratroop unit shall join in the capture of Banjar-
masin as well.
8. The main points of the capture of Banjarmasin and Bali shall be discussed and decided upon,
based on the situation at the time, by the commander of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and
Detachment Commander Sakaguchi.
9. Further arrangements concerning corps and detachments other than the Sakaguchi Detachment
shall be made around day x + 40.
The significant main points of this arrangement, whose full text will be discussed later, are
as follows:
1. [In this arrangement,] the capture of Ambon and Kupang with Detachment B instead of
the South Seas Detachment became the rule.
The war game at the War College in early October had studied the possibility of executing
the capture of Ambon and Kupang with the South Seas Detachment after the capture of
Guam and Rabaul. The [Army-Navy] Central Agreement on 6 November also followed
this idea. However, due to the strong desire for an early termination of the southern op-
eration expressed by the Southern Army on 10 November, it had been changed in such a
way that [the capture of Ambon and Kupang would be executed] “by the South Seas De-
tachment or an element of the 38th Division.” Now it was [again] changed to “in principle
by an element of the 38th Division (Detachment B).” This was because it was expected
that it would take the South Seas Detachment at least forty days to capture Guam and
Rabaul and then turn around and head back to the vicinity of Palau, making the whole
schedule uncertain.
2. [In this arrangement,] Bali, which had never been brought up in either the Central Agree-
ment or in the agreement between the Southern Army and the [Navy] Southern Task
Force, was newly added as a target worth trying to capture.
The [main] reasons were that it was discovered that there was a good airfield on Bali, that
the island was small enough to be captured with a small force even though it might in-
volve some risks because it was very close to Java, especially to the [Dutch East Indies]
naval port of Surabaya, and that the occupation of Bali would make it possible to cut off
support from the United States and Australia and provide effective air support in the cap-
ture of Java.
3. The dates to capture each place were scheduled as follows:
Davao: day x + 6 (as specified in the General Agreement)
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Jolo: day x + 13 (as specified in the General Agreement)
Tarakan: around day x + 30 (specified as “by around day x + 25” in the General
Agreement)
Balikpapan: around day x + 35 (as specified in the General Agreement)
Banjarmasin: around day x + 54 (specified as “around day x + 50” in the General Agree-
ment)
Bali: around day x + 70 (not mentioned at all in the General Agreement)
Java: around day x + 80 (as specified in the General Agreement)
The date for the capture of Tarakan would automatically become around day x + 30, when
the main force of the [Navy] Philippines Unit would be able to turn around and join after
supporting the landing of the main force of the Fourteenth Army in Lingayen Gulf and
replenishing its supplies.(9)
4. The arrangement concerning the main force of the 38th Division was not included.
This was because this arrangement was supposed to be made between the Sixteenth Army
and the [Navy] Malaya Unit.
5. The plan was not realistic.
Due to the fact that the Southern Army strongly requested to shorten the operation period
and that the whole arrangement was drafted by the Navy, the plan unrealistically ex-
pected that a large slow-moving convoy (sailing at some five or six knots) would cover
the distance between Manila and Java (about 1,550 nautical miles) in less than nine days,
and the distance between Cam Ranh and Java (about 1,140 nautical miles) in less than
five days.
6. The Navy envisioned parachute droppings in Menado and Balikpapan (and depending
on the situation, in Banjarmasin as well). [However,] when discussing at the meeting the
use of a [naval] paratroop unit in Balikpapan, [Army] Detachment Commander Sakaguchi
and the staff officer of the Detachment, Yano Tsuneo, stated that since they intended to
land at night and advance to the airfield and into the city at once, they did not hope for a
[naval] paratroop unit to drop into the battles during the landing or just after. [Conse-
quently,] it was arranged that the [naval] paratroop unit would descend at a suitable mo-
ment after the landing of Sakaguchi Detachment.(9)
The text of the Iwakuni Agreement concerning the Dutch East Indies Operation was as fol-
lows:(23)
Arrangement Between the Commander of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and the Commander
of the Sixteenth Army
16 November, 1941
V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō, commander of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit
Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, commander of the Sixteenth Army
I. Outline of the Operations
1. The Sakaguchi Detachment ([consisting of] 3 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battalion as
its core):
[The Sakaguchi Detachment] shall assemble in Palau around day y + 23.
The Jolo Detachment shall land on Jolo around day x + 13 (it sails together with the Davao
invasion unit of the Fourteenth Army up to Davao).
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The Sakaguchi Detachment (minus the Jolo Detachment) shall leave Palau around day x +
25 and land in Tarakan around day x + 30.
[The Sakaguchi Detachment] shall land in Balikpapan around day x + 35.
[ditto] in Banjarmasin around day x + 54.
[ditto] in Bali around day x + 70 (day z – 10).
The day of landing in Java by the main force of the army is indicated as “z,” which is by and
large scheduled for approx. day x + 80.
2. Detachment B ([consisting of] 2 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battalion as its core):
Shall leave Hong Kong around day x + 40 and assemble in Palau.
Shall land on Ambon around day x + 60, followed by Kupang.
3. The South Seas Detachment ([consisting of] 3 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battalion as
its core):
Shall assemble in Palau around day x + 40 and sail to the area of the main force of the army
(Cam Ranh Bay) as quickly as possible.
4. Depending on the situation, the South Seas Detachment may land in Ambon and Kupang
instead of Detachment B. In such a case, a part of Detachment B’s force shall be transported
from the area of Detachment B (i.e. Hong Kong) to Palau if required. Which of the above
plans should be adopted shall be decided by around day x + 40, and the Sixteenth Army
commander shall inform the commander in chief of the Third Fleet.
5. The 48th Division:
Shall assemble in Manila around day x + 60.
Shall depart from Manila on day z – 9 (depending on the situation, the division may advance
its assembly point to Menado beforehand, and leave there on day z – 5); shall go ashore in
eastern Java on day z after being transported in two transports at an interval of six days.
6. The main force of the army ([consisting of] the 2d Division and an element of the 38th Divi-
sion as its core):
Shall assemble in Taiwan by around day x + 50, move to southern French Indochina, leave
port of the area on day z – 5, and go ashore in western Java on day z after being transported
in four transports at an interval of about seven days.
7. Transportation of part of the army:
During the period from day x + 60 to day x + 80, parts of the army shall be transported be-
tween Hong Kong, southern French Indochina and Manila.
II. Outline of the arrangements
8. The arrangement concerning the Sakaguchi Detachment is as in the separate volume No. 1.
9. The arrangement on communications is as in the separate volume No. 2 (omitted by the au-
thor).
10. [Detailed] arrangements concerning Detachment B and others shall be concluded either in
Taipei, Davao, or Palau around day x + 40. The Army and the Navy shall round off discus-
sions and make decisions by day x + 35.
Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet shall also conclude arrangements simultaneously with the
above.
Arrangement between the commander of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and the commander
of the Sixteenth Army: Separate volume No. 1 (Concerning the Sakaguchi Detachment)
16 November, 1941
V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō, commander in chief of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit
Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, commander of the Sixteenth Army
(See Illustrations No. 10 and No. 11)
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I. General Directives
1. The [Sakaguchi] Detachment shall assemble in Palau around day y + 23.
2. The Jolo Detachment ([consisting of] 1 infantry battalion (minus 2 companies), 1 field field
artillery section, and 1 transport squad) shall board the transport ships of the Miura Detach-
ment of the Fourteenth Army (a unit for the capture of Davao), sail together with this de-
tachment and arrive off Davao on day x + 6. Then it shall land in Jolo around day x + 13 and
capture its air base. After clearing the key areas of Jolo, the detachment shall promptly turn
over [its task of] guarding [the island] to the Navy and prepare for transfer towards the area
where the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment [is deployed]. The transfer shall be ef-
fected after the Sakaguchi Detachment’s landing on Tarakan, which is roughly scheduled
for approx. day x + 33. Depending on the situation of the operations in Davao, that is, if the
Jolo Detachment cannot leave for Jolo or a significant delay is expected [in its transfer], the
Sakaguchi Detachment may be required to form another unit for capturing Jolo [out of the
detachment] and have naval war vessels transport the unit.
3. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall land in Tarakan around day x + 30, occupy its air base, and
secure the oil resources there as well. After clearing the key areas of Tarakan, the detachment
shall turn over the guarding [of the area] to the Navy, and land in and around Balikpapan
and Samarinda as quickly as possible, occupy air bases, and secure the oil resources [there]
as well. Depending on the situation, the capture of Balikpapan shall be carried out ahead of
the capture of Samarinda. [The detachment] shall then send its transport ships to Palau for
water and coal supply, after which an element of the detachment ([consisting of] approx. 1
infantry battalion and 1 artillery battery as its core) shall land in Banjarmasin and occupy
its air base.
4. When the landing of the main force of the army draws near (the first day of the landing [in
Java] is indicated as “z,” which is by and large scheduled for approx. day x + 80.), [the Sak-
aguchi Detachment] shall capture Bali ahead of the landing (around day z – 10) with an el-
ement of its force ([consisting of] about half an infantry battalion) and strive to facilitate the
advancement of [the Army’s] air base [to the island].
5. The responsibility for guarding and maintaining security in Balikpapan (including the area
in and around Samarinda), Banjarmasin and Bali shall fall on the Army until otherwise or-
dered.
6. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall be required to set up provisional landing bases in each
landing point, and, in addition [to these], to establish a main landing base in Balikpapan
during the period of operations of the detachment.
7. Concerning the replenishment of supplies for the Sakaguchi Detachment, the hospitalization
and evacuation of its patients and the sending back of mail, the Navy shall provide the nec-
essary support until [the detachment] is able to secure its line of communication with the
main force of the army (evacuation locations shall be set either in Taiwan or in Palau). The
details [of these arrangements] shall be discussed between the commanders of the Navy and
the Army on site.
8. For details of the above, follow the “II. Outline for capturing the [target] areas.”
II. Outline for capturing the [target] areas
1. Capture of Jolo
(1) Landing points and their reconnaissance:
{1} Landing point: the coast northeast of the town of Jolo. If the landing point needs to
be changed depending on the situation, the commander of the escort shall decide
after due consultation with the Jolo Detachment commander.
{2} Reconnaissance by (Navy) aircraft: If possible, [navy aircraft] shall carry out recon-
noitering and provide data necessary for the Jolo landing operation.
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Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet shall conduct the required reconnaissance and provide aer-
ial photographs necessary [for the operations].
(2) Arrival at the assembly point, departure date, and anchorage:
[The detachment] shall assemble in Palau around day y + 23. It shall change ships and
board the transport ships of the Fourteenth Army’s unit for capturing Davao at an ap-
propriate time before leaving.
It shall leave Palau on day x + 3. After the Davao Detachment has captured Davao, [the
Jolo Detachment] shall leave Davao for Jolo as soon as the situation at the Navy, partic-
ularly that of its air operations, shall permit.
(3) Starting date and time of landing and landing schedule:
The landing is scheduled to start before dawn on day x + 13. Landing shall be completed
within one day.
(4) Distribution of the convoy of transport ships, their movements and, if required, the com-
mander’s whereabouts: 
[The ships are] in the order of the Myōgi and the Yamazuki [Yamatsuki]; the commander
of the Jolo Detachment shall board the Myōgi.
The formation of the Jolo Detachment is as follows:
Commander: Lt. Col. Matsumoto Tadasu, commander of the 3d Battalion of the 146th
Infantry Regiment
3d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment (minus 2 companies)
1 Field artillery section
1 Transport squad
(5) Escort at sea and course of the convoy: 
1. Forces to be employed for the escort: 1 light cruiser and 4 destroyers
Commander of the escort: R. Adm. Tanaka Raizō ([on board] of the Jintsū)
2. Course of the convoy: to be decided by the commander of the escort after due con-
sultation with the detachment commander.
(6) Diversions: 
Shall not be executed.
(7) Use of air units:
{1} Forces to be employed: part of the Eleventh Air Fleet
{2} Main points on cooperation: [Air units] shall cover the convoy under sail as well as
at the anchorage, and, at the request of the landing units, support them in their com-
bat.
Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet shall give the above support with an element of both of
its land-based attack plane and fighter plane units, while destroying the enemy
air power.
(8) Outline of the approach to the anchorage and the time of anchoring:
The anchorage shall be at sea to the northeast of Jolo. [Time] to anchor is at 0100 on the
13th.
Other details shall be decided by the escort commander after due consultation with the
detachment commander.
(9) Landing attack and covering fire:
{1} [The detachment] shall land on the coast northeast of the town of Jolo, occupy the
airfield and the radio station promptly. At the same time it shall search for enemy
units on site, and destroy them.
{2} Naval warships shall open fire [only] at the request of the landing unit.
(10) Cooperation between the Navy and the Army after landing:
{1} Once the key areas in and around Jolo are cleared, the detachment shall promptly
turn over [its task of] guarding [the area] to the Navy, assemble in the area of Jolo,
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and as soon as possible join the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment. Transport
ships necessary for this [transfer] shall be brought from the main force of the Sak-
aguchi Detachment. The details of the escort [of the convoy] shall be decided, based
on the situation at the moment, by the escort commander, after due consultation with
the Detachment Commander Sakaguchi.
{2} Once the landing is completed, the emptied ships (the Myōgi and the Yamazuki [Ya-
matsuki]) shall be returned to Davao together with the naval vessels.
(11) Communications:
As specified in the separate volume.
2. Capture of Tarakan
(1) Landing points and their reconnaissance
{1} Landing points:
The main force [shall land on] the coast from Cape Batu to the Karungan River. Part
of the detachment [shall land on] the coast northwest of the Karungan River. De-
pending on the circumstances, part of the detachment or the main force may land in
Lingkas from the beginning or if the situation requires it.
{2} Reconnaissance:
In order to keep the tactics secret, no reconnaissance shall be conducted other than
specified in the following note:
Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet, while being mindful that the tactics should be kept se-
cret, shall prepare aerial photos of the area including Batu, the oil fields, and
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Sadau, and send them to the Sakaguchi Detachment before its departure from
Palau (around day x + 25).
(2) Disposition of landing corps, convoy’s arrival at the assembly point, departure date, and
anchorage:
{1} The detachment shall assemble in Palau around day y + 23, leave Palau as soon as
the situation at the Navy permits (which is roughly scheduled for around day x +
25), and arrive at the landing point in a single transport. The detachment is formed
as follows:
Commander: Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Shizuo, commander of the 56th Mixed Infantry
Group
56th Mixed Infantry Group (headquarters, 146th Infantry Regiment, armored car unit,
1st Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Engineer Company, 2d Transport Company, medical
unit, and 1st Field Hospital)
44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 
6th and the 7th Independent Radio Platoons, and the 33d Fixed Radio Unit
{2} Anchorage at the assembly point is as shown in the attached Illustration No. 1 (omitted
by the author).
(3) Starting date and time of landing and landing schedule:
The landing is scheduled to start before dawn on day x + 30 and shall be completed
within two days. The commander of the Navy’s Dutch East Indies Unit shall decide the
above starting date of landing after due consultation with the Sixteenth Army com-
mander, and both of them shall transmit the date in the form of an order to respectively
the escort commander and the detachment commander by the day before [the detach-
ment] leaves Palau at the latest. However, if it suddenly becomes imperative to change
the schedule after leaving Palau, the escort commander shall make the decision after due
consultation with the detachment commander, and they shall report the decision to re-
spectively the commander of the Navy’s Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army
commander without delay.
(4) Distribution of the convoy of transport ships, their movements and, if required, the com-
mander’s whereabouts:
Shall depend on the arrangements between the escort commander and the detachment
commander.
(5) Escort at sea and course of the convoy:
Forces to be employed for the escort: 1 light cruiser, 8 destroyers, and 4 to 6 minesweep-
ers
Commander [of the escort]: R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji (on board of the Naka)
(6) Diversions:
Shall not be executed.
(7) Use of air units:
1. Forces to be employed: part of the Eleventh Air Fleet
2. Main points on cooperation: [Air units] shall cover the convoy under sail as well as
at the anchorages, and, on the request of the landing units, support them in their
combat.
Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet shall give the above support with an element of both of
its land-based attack plane and fighter plane units, while destroying the enemy
air power.
(8) Outline of the anchorages, the approach to them, and the time of the convoy’s anchorage
and the formation at the anchorage:
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The 1st anchorage shall be at sea to the southeast of Cape Batu. Time [to anchor] is 31⁄2
hours before dawn. Other details shall be decided by the escort commander after due
consultation with the detachment commander.
(9) Landing attack, cover and support for the disembarkation operations:
{1} The naval landing force shall come under the command of Detachment Commander
Saka guchi with respect to the operations during the period from landing on Tarakan
till the completion of clearing the key areas. 
{2} Directives for the landing attack:
{a} Although the landing shall be made as a surprise landing in principle, it shall be car-
ried out by assault if the situation should require it. The change [of plan] shall be or-
dered by the detachment commander.
{b} The detachment shall have its main force land on the coast southeast of the Karungan
River, while part [of the detachment] shall land on the coast northwest of the river.
They shall promptly seize the Batu battery in the first place. They shall search for the
main force of the enemy, wherever it may be, and destroy it and promptly occupy
the towns of Tarakan and Lingkas. The naval landing force shall land on the right
flank of the Army units.
{c} Once the towns of Tarakan and Lingkas have been occupied, the detachment shall
have part of its force secure the airfield, the oil fields, and the areas around Sadau
without missing any opportunity, while clearing up the remnants of enemy troops
with its main force. 
{d} Each of the above units is supposed to start its advance without waiting for the com-
pletion of the landing [of the whole detachment] and strive to quickly achieve battle
results.
{e} During the above operations, the Navy shall have some of its warships make efforts
to block the enemy fleeing by sea.
{f} Although [the attack] is planned as described above, its execution is subject to change
due to consultations based on the situation at the moment, between the commanders
of the Navy and the Army on the spot.
{g} The Navy shall capture Menado with another part [of its units] at about the same
time as the detachment’s capture of Tarakan.
{3} Covering fire for the landing [of the detach-
ment]:
The naval warships shall fire after daybreak
at the enemy’s fort at Batu and other places,
such as the enemy’s artillery in particular, at
the request of the Army units.
(10) Cooperation between the Navy and the Army
after landing:
Once the key areas of Tarakan have been
cleared, the detachment shall promptly turn
over [its task of] guarding [the area] to the Navy,
assemble in the area of [the town of] Tarakan,
and prepare for the next operation, i.e. the cap-
ture of Balikpapan. Depending on the situation,
the Navy and the Army, in conjunction, may oc-
cupy key areas, mainly the oil fields in the
neighborhood, following the capture of
Tarakan. However, it goes against the [original]
aim to postpone the capture of Balikpapan for
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this [task]. The Jolo Detachment has to be brought to Tarakan without delay. The details
of the escort shall be decided by the escort commander, after due consultation with De-
tachment Commander Saka guchi.
(11) Move of the transport ships after the completion of landing:
The transport ships which complete unloading shall be kept on standby on site.
(12) Communications:
As specified in the separate volume (omitted by the author).
3. Capture of Balikpapan, Banjarmasin and Bali
(1) Capture of Balikpapan:
(a) The naval landing force shall come under the command of Detachment Commander
Saka guchi with respect to the operations from the time of landing.
Note: The 1001 Unit (note by the author: [naval] paratroop unit) under the command of
the Eleventh Air Fleet commander shall [provisionally] come under the command
of Detachment Commander Sakaguchi with respect to the operations during the
period after its parachute landing until the clearing of key areas.
(b) Directives for the landing attack:
{1} Balikpapan area:
The detachment shall have its main force land near the Balikpapan pier and parts of
the detachment near the Baru and Sepuluh batteries (note by the author: supposedly
south of Balikpapan), and promptly occupy the oil refineries in particular.
Note: The Navy 1001 Unit shall descend upon key points at the right moment in con-
cert with the Sakaguchi Detachment’s landing, and secure these spots.
{2} Samarinda area:
For the landings in Samarinda and Sanga Sanga, [units] go [upstream] in landing
boats from the mouth of the Pegah River.
{3} Once the key areas are cleared, the Army units shall be responsible for the guarding
in general, the securing of resources as well as various facilities, and maintaining
public order etc., while the Navy units shall be responsible for making the airfields
ready for use and securing them.
{4} Although [the attack] is planned as described above, its execution is subject to change
due to consultations based on the situation at the moment, between the commanders
of the Navy and the Army on the spot.
(2) Capture of Banjarmasin:
Shall be decided by the commander of the Navy’s Dutch East Indies Unit, based on the
situation at the moment, after due consultation with the detachment commander.
Note: The Navy 1001 Unit may cooperate in [the operation].
(3) Capture of Bali:
Shall be decided by the commander of the Navy’s Dutch East Indies Unit, based on the
situation at the moment, after due consultation with the detachment commander.
On concluding the above arrangement, the following problems occurred:
1. The problem of the responsibility for the capture of Davao.
Davao, along with Jolo Island, was a key place suitable not only for preventing the enemy
in the Philippines from fleeing but also to be used as a base for the Dutch East Indies op-
eration. Moreover, there were about twenty thousand Japanese residents in Davao, for
whose rescue the Emperor reportedly had a particularly deep concern.(37, 87) As mentioned
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Illustration No. 12 — The Iwakuni Agreement
previously, the Fourteenth Army planned to have the Miura Detachment (with one bat-
talion as its core) and the Kimura Detachment (with two battalions as its core) of the 16th
Division land in Davao and in Legaspi respectively, and have the main force of the 16th
Division (with three battalions as its core) land in Lamon Bay. Although it wanted to in-
crease the force for Davao in view of the importance of the place, in relation to other con-
cerns, it had limited the core strength to one battalion. Meanwhile, a draft arrangement
between the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army specified that (1) the
Jolo Detachment would sail to Davao together with the Miura Detachment, and [from
there] head for Jolo Island, while the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment would leave
Palau for Tarakan on the 12th day after the landing of the Jolo Detachment on the island;
(2) depending on the situation of the Miura Detachment’s operations in the Davao area,
that is, if the Jolo Detachment were not able to turn to Jolo or significant delay would be
expected in its turn [to Jolo,] the Sakaguchi Detachment might be required to organize
another unit for capturing Jolo [out of the detachment].(23)
All of a sudden this became a focus of discussion. Whether the Miura Detachment
would be able to capture Davao on its own was a cause for concern. The Third Fleet sug-
gested “the possibility of having the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment, which had
been assigned for capture of Tarakan, stand by at the port of Davao instead of Palau.”
The Sixteenth Army stated its view that “it did not want a situation where the Saka guchi
Detachment were dragged into war, unable to stand to see the Miura Detachment fighting
an uphill battle, which might end up hindering the operations in Tarakan.” It added that
“if such a situation could be expected, then it might as well have the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment capture Davao from the beginning.” Hearing that, the Fourteenth Army made a re-
quest for “having the Sakaguchi Detachment under its command during capture of
Davao, because the capture of Davao was the Fourteenth Army’s task.” This led to oppo-
site opinions between the staff officers of the Fourteenth Army and those of the Sixteenth
Army over the command of the Sakaguchi Detachment.(9) That night Maeda Masami, chief
of staff of the Fourteenth Army visited Imamura, commander of the Sixteenth Army, in
his quarters and asked him to agree to putting the Sakaguchi Detachment under the com-
mand of the Fourteenth Army during the capture of Davao. Commander Imamura replied
that “he would follow the decision of IGHQ.”(35) Staff officers of IGHQ and the Southern
Army, who attended this [series of] meetings and paid close attention to the progress of
the Davao issue, noticed that the Fourteenth Army staff gradually turned to the idea that
“it might leave capture of Davao to the Sixteenth Army,” and they judged the Fourteenth
Army lacking in enthusiasm.(9) In the directive of [the Army Department of] IGHQ and
the Southern Army’s order, it was specified that “the Fourteenth Army shall capture
Davao.” But the Miura Detachment was [merely] made up of one battalion as its core and
commanded by a lieutenant colonel, whereas, according to sources, the strength of the
U.S.-Filipino army in Davao was three thousand troops.(87) [On the other hand,] the Sak-
aguchi Detachment was made up of one regiment as its core, and commanded by a major
general. However, it was the one and only corps that the Sixteenth Army could use for
operations for the moment.
After this series of meetings at Iwakuni was over (on the 16th), on the 19th (the day
when the Sakaguchi Detachment left Moji) the Southern Army received approval of [the
Army Department of] IGHQ to change the plan and have the Sixteenth Army capture
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Davao, and gave the order as specified in the above-mentioned Southern Army Operation
Order A, No. 2 on the same day.(9, 24)
2. The next problem was the description in 2.(9){2}{g} of the draft arrangement concerning
the Sakaguchi Detachment. In the Central Agreement, the capture of Menado was agreed
upon as “to be carried out about the same time as that of Tarakan,” and in the agreement
between the Southern Army and the Southern Task Force it was agreed upon as “around
day x + 23” (note: that of Tarakan as around day x + 25). [However,] the above-mentioned
draft [arrangement] prepared by the Third Fleet for this Iwakuni Agreement specified:
“[the capture of] Menado on day x + 23 and that of Tarakan on day x + 30.” In the meeting
the Army insisted that “Menado and Tarakan are the first targets in the Dutch East Indies
operation and that these two should be captured on the same day from a political and
war strategy viewpoint.” In response to this, the Navy made the concession that “Menado
shall be captured about the same time as Tarakan.”(9)
3. The third problem was that, whereas the Southern Army, which desired an early ending
of the southern operation, wanted to arrange the concrete details up to capture of Banjar-
masin, the Navy insisted that it would make no further arrangements after Tarakan.(9) [In
other words,] the Southern Army wanted to give an order to control its actions until about
forty days after the start of war and assign the Sixteenth Army missions up to capture of
Banjarmasin,(24) whereas the Navy, which regarded operational stages in a different way
than the Southern Army, was moreover concerned about changes in the situation such as
the U.S. Pacific Fleet coming to the attack.
4. The fourth problem was that the resourceful Staff Officer Yano Tsuneo of the Sakaguchi
Detachment, seeing that the plan for the capture of Tarakan and Balikpapan entailed, as
previously mentioned, assault landings against the best prepared and strongest front of
the enemy, sought “regardless of this arrangement, permission to have a new arrangement
based on a surprise attack agreed upon between the units of the Army and the Navy on
the spot.”(36, 87) While the Navy had been interested in this area from early on and made
efforts to gather information, the Army had paid little attention to it, so the Sixteenth
Army had no materials to criticize the Navy’s proposal. Moreover, some showed sympa-
thetic views since the Third Fleet had gone to the trouble to prepare a draft, while others
supported the original plan by pointing out the example of the landing that had been
made in the face of the enemy at Wusong in the Shanghai Incident.(36) In the end, it came
down to a decision that it was permitted to interpret in a broad sense the item that “Al-
though [the attack] is planned as described above, its execution is subject to change due
to consultations, based on the situation at the moment, between the commanders of the
Navy and the Army on the spot.”(9, 36, 87)
How Staff Officer Yano Tsuneo demonstrated his resourcefulness will be described later.
[Lieutenant General Imamura] Takes Command of the Sakaguchi Detachment
and Sends It Off 
As soon as the Iwakuni Agreement was concluded on the 16th, Army Commander Imamura
went to Moji(32) where he took command of the Sakaguchi Detachment. On the 17th, he gave
instructions [to the detachment] and demanded that, as the vanguard of the Sixteenth Army,
the officers and men of the Sakaguchi Detachment should always keep in mind the impor-
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tance of this war and operation, and the duty of the detachment, that they should achieve
results in their first campaign with loyalty and bravery, take all possible measures to enhance
and maintain their health, military discipline and morals, and extol the dignity of the Imperial
Army in and outside the occupied areas.(88)
The Sakaguchi Detachment was organized by adding to the 56th Mixed Infantry Group,
organized at the Kurume divisional district, the previously mentioned units under the direct
control of the army, one of which was the 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (com-
mander: Maj. Takagi Takeo). [This battalion] was put under the command of Detachment
Commander Sakaguchi on the 16th on its arrival in Moji after its return from Mudanjiang,
Manchuria, by the order of [the Army Department] of IGHQ of 6 November, which had been
given soon after their arrival there for the KANTOKUEN [Special Grand Maneuvers of the
Kwantung Army].(88)
The Sakaguchi Detachment (5,200 troops, 1,200 horses, 100 motor vehicles, 15 large motor-
ized [landing] craft, and 15 small motorized [landing] craft), embarked on 8 ships, i.e. the
Liverpool-maru, the Hankow-maru, the Tsuruga-maru, the Havana-maru, the Kuretake-maru, the
Nichiai-maru, the Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru], and the Teiryū-maru (45,682 gross tons in total)(24)
and on 19 November left Moji for the assembly/standby spot in Palau first. Soon after the
departure, one of the hawks circling in the blue sky perched on the mast of the Teiryū Maru
which had the detachment commander on board.(88) All officers and men took this as a good
omen and headed straight for the south, confident of their fortunes of war.(88)
The [Navy] Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit Operation Order No. 1
V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō (the commander in chief of the Third Fleet and) commander of the
Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit, which would first operate as the Philippines Unit and
then as the Dutch East Indies Unit, issued [Navy] Philippines Unit Operation Order No. 1 at
Terashima-suidō [Channel] on 23 November in accordance with the above-mentioned [Navy]
Southern Task Force Operation Order No. 1 and the Iwakuni Agreement,(110) left the Channel
on the 26th, and advanced to Magong on the 29th.(103)
In this order Commander in Chief Takahashi stated the date of landing in Menado, which
the Navy was supposed to capture on its own account, as “around day x + 33” and that of
the landing on Tarakan, which the Army and the Navy were to capture in conjunction, as
“around day x + 35.”(110) From a political and war strategy viewpoint, it was desirable that
the capture of these two [places] be carried out on the same day, and eventually it happened
that way. How it happened will be described later.
The disposition of forces given in the [Navy] Philippines Unit Operation Order No. 1 was
in outline as follows. The 5th Raid Unit was charged with the direct escort of the Sakaguchi
Detachment and the Southern Philippines Area Task Force was charged with its indirect
guard.(110) As mentioned previously, the Southern Task Force organized the Eastern Support
Unit (1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser and 2 destroyers) and assigned it for further indirect guard.
Main unit (from Magong to the waters west of Luzon Island): directly led by the commander in
chief [of the Philippines Unit], [consisting of] the heavy cruiser Ashigara and the light cruiser
Kuma of the 16th Cruiser Division and 2 destroyers of the 5th Destroyer Squadron.
1st Raid Unit (from Magong to Aparri): [consisting of] the light cruiser Natori and 6 destroyers
under the command of the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander.
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2d Raid Unit (from Magong to Vigan): [consisting of] the light cruiser Naka and 7 destroyers
under the command of the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander.
3d Raid Unit (from Gaoxiong to Batan Island): [consisting of] 1 destroyer under the command
of the 2d Base Force commander.
4th Raid Unit (from Palau to Legaspi): [consisting of] the light cruiser Nagara (of the 16th Cruiser
Division) and 8 destroyers under the command of the 1st Base Force commander.
5th Raid Unit (from Palau to Davao), [consisting of] the light cruiser Jintsū and 8 destroyers
under the command of the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander.
Southern Philippines Area Task Force (from Palau): composed of the 5th Cruiser Division ([con-
sisting of] the heavy cruisers Myōkō, Haguro and Nachi), the 4th Carrier Division ([consisting
of] the aircraft carrier Ryūjō and 1 destroyer), and the 11th Seaplane Tender Division ([con-
sisting of] the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho) under the command of the 5th Cruiser
Division commander.
Minelayer Unit (from Palau): under the command of the 17th Minelayer Division commander.
Operation Plan of the Sixteenth Army (See Illustration No. 13)
After concluding the arrangement with the Third Fleet at Iwakuni, the Sixteenth Army started
to work on its operation plan in earnest.
The operation plan had undergone changes as the IGHQ plan, the Southern Army’s plan,
the Iwakuni Agreement, and the Southern Army’s revised plan (of the 19th) were made suc-
cessively, and, as of 19 November, the Sixteenth Army was supposed to deploy its forces in
the following way:
Sakaguchi Detachment: shall move from Palau to Davao (the detachment shall take control of
the Miura Detachment as well) and [further] to Jolo (an element of the detachment), Tarakan
(the main force of the detachment), Balikpapan (the full force of the detachment), Banjar-
masin (an element of the detachment), and Bali ([the Sixteenth Army] had made an arrange-
ment with the Third Fleet that “the Sakaguchi Detachment would strive to capture Bali with
part of its forces,” although this was not mentioned in the directive of IGHQ or in the order
given by the Southern Army).
Detachment B (two battalions): shall move from Hong Kong to Ambon and Kupang
South Seas Detachment (three battalions): shall move toward Java via Cam Ranh after capturing
Rabaul (depending on the situation, it shall move to Ambon and Kupang instead of Detach-
ment B).
38th Division (minus Detachment B and the Itō Detachment): shall move from Hong Kong to-
ward southern Sumatra via Cam Ranh. It shall be divided into an advance party and the
main force.
2d Division: shall move toward western Java via Taiwan and Cam Ranh.
Itō Detachment (three battalions): shall move from Hong Kong toward central Java via Cam
Ranh.
48th Division: shall move from Luzon toward eastern Java.
At that time, the Sixteenth Army had a rough idea of the following facts in addition to the
already mentioned Dutch East Indies topography, military preparedness, etc.:(36)
Tarakan and Balikpapan had strong defenses in the cities’ coastal areas where oil refinery and
storage facilities were located, and where many pillboxes were put in place. Tarakan was par-
ticularly [strongly] fortified. At Lingkas there were obstacles along the beach and three lines of
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trenches, while batteries were located at the northwest and southeast ends of the island. In
Ambon there were strong defenses in the city and at the mouth of its bay, and also in Kupang.
Palembang had many pillboxes in the area of the oil refineries (at the south bank of the Musi
River), and Bangka had some defense facilities in and near Mentok.
On Java (See Illustration No. 13) Bandung and Malang were garrison towns. The Bandung strong-
hold had pillboxes and barbed-wire entanglements on the ridges of the mountains surrounding
the city. Especially the areas along the northbound and westbound roads were strongly fortified.
The Surabaya stronghold had batteries, pillboxes, and barbed-wire entanglements along the
Madura Strait and in the areas of Gresik, the west side of Surabaya, and Wonokromo. As for its
land front, the northwest front in particular had strong defenses with three lines of barbed-wire
entanglements. Porong, midway between Surabaya and Malang, had fortress-like trenches with
pillboxes and barbed-wire entanglements.
Entrenched positions with pillboxes were placed along the perimeter of the capital Batavia. In
particular, Tangerang and vicinity in the west of the capital seemed to be a strategic place among
the positions along the outer perimeter with entrenched positions with pillboxes in the west
and northwest of Tangerang. There was an entrenched position too near Leuwiliang, located to
the south of the town. Tangerang and Leuwiliang were meant to serve as bases for offensive
and defensive battles in the western Java area. In Cirebon and [near] the ports of Tanjung Priok,
Semarang and Cilacap, etc. were entrenched positions with batteries. Furthermore, entrenched
positions had been set up everywhere on every promontory or suitable landing spot on the
north and northwest coasts of Java.
In the previously mentioned apportioning of shipping, the main force of the 38th Division,
which would be used for the operations in southern Sumatra, was further divided into an
advance party and the main force. This was based on the idea that, while having the advance
group seize the Mentok airfield and, in concert with a paratroop unit, raid the oil refineries
in Palembang and seize them, the main force of the division would subsequently come
ashore, make sure that the oil resources were securely held, and promptly seize the airfields
in Palembang, Tanjungkarang, etc., and make them ready for use. The concept of forming
the corps that was to land on Java out of the army’s main force consisting of the 2d Division
as its core, the Itō Detachment ([consisting of] three battalions of the 38th Division as its core),
and the core units of the 48th Division, was based on the idea that the main force of the army
consisting of the 2d Division as its core should land in western Java and seize the capital
Batavia, while the Itō Detachment should land on the north coast of central Java, raid the
Kalijati airfield, secure the place, and act in concert with the main force of the army in cap-
turing Batavia, after which both of them should capture the Bandung stronghold, and that
[in the meantime] the core units of the 48th Division should land in eastern Java and capture
the Surabaya stronghold.(36)
Originally, the Java operation was to be carried out by landing only the 2d and the 48th
Divisions in western and eastern Java [respectively]. However, the Itō Detachment was
added, because soon after the war game held at the War College in early October, Lt. Col.
Itoda Isamu had suggested that “air operations against western Java can be conducted from
southern Sumatra and Kuching and those against eastern Java can be done from southern
Celebes and Banjarmasin, but south-central Java will be left as a blind spot, which makes it
seem appropriate to me to raid, occupy, and use the Kalijati airfield. This unit will also be ef-
fective in connecting the corps in eastern and western [Java].” Thus it was decided to put
this idea into practice even though considerable risks were anticipated.(39)
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The Sixteenth Army’s operation plan, which had been worked on in
earnest after the conclusion of the Iwakuni Agreement (on 16 Novem-
ber), was finished around the 21st of the following month. On 21 Decem-
ber, Col. Kume Seiichi, commander of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group
visited the Sixteenth Army headquarters and studied it.(33) The lines-of
communication plan of the Sixteenth Army was completed on 25 De-
cember.(5)
A remarkable change had occurred in the period between the
Iwakuni Agreement and the completion of the Sixteenth Army’s opera-
tion plan. Amazingly successful battle results were achieved in various
regions just after the opening of hostilities on 8 December, and the 38th
Division had already landed in Hong Kong (on the 18th). On the other
hand, the Fourth Fleet [still] failed to capture Wake Island, which conse-
quently meant a postponement of the capture of Rabaul by the South Seas Detachment. That
is to say, the responsibility for the capture of Ambon and Kupang would inevitably have to
be settled on Detachment B. However, this change in the situation was reflected neither in
the Sixteenth Army’s operation plan of around 21 December nor in its lines-of-
communication plan of 25 December. On the day when the lines-of-communication plan was
completed, the British army in Hong Kong surrendered, and the South Seas Detachment was
still in Guam, but this was not reflected in the lines-of-communication plan, either.
The Sixteenth Army’s operation plan, completed around 21 December, was in outline as
follows:(5, 36) (See Illustration No. 13)
Sixteenth Army’s Operation Plan
1. Mission: 
The Sixteenth Army (97,800 men once the 38th and the 48th Division, the South Seas Detachment
and others are attached (excluding the 10,000 ground personnel of the air units), and 11,750
horses) shall, in conjunction with the Navy, capture Davao, Jolo, then Tarakan and Balikpapan
with the Sakaguchi Detachment (5,980 men and 860 horses), and further capture Banjarmasin
and Bali with part of this detachment. [The Army] shall also capture Ambon and Kupang with
Detachment B (2 battalions of the 38th Division as its core, 3,300 men and 560 horses) and, in
conjunction with the army air unit and the navy unit, capture Bangka, Palembang, and other
key locations in southern Sumatra with the main force of the 38th Division (4 battalions as its
core, i.e. 12,360 men, and 1,910 horses, excluding the 10,000 personnel of the air units), secure
resources and air bases, and at the same time make preparations for the capture of Java which
shall be carried out by the main force of the army. Concerning Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and Ambon,
the guarding of these places shall be turned over to the Navy units once they are seized.
As soon as the main force of the army has been concentrated, it shall, almost simultaneously
and in concert, put ashore in western Java the main force consisting of the 2d Division as its
core (27,730 men and 4,970 horses) and the units under the direct control of the army, in the
north of central Java the Itō Detachment (1 regiment as its core, commanded by the commander
of the 38th Division’s Infantry Group, consisting of 5,910 men and 910 horses), and in eastern
Java the unit consisting of the 48th Division as its core (24,600 men and 1,210 horses). They shall
capture Batavia, Surabaya, and Bandung, and then pacify the entire island.
The South Seas Detachment (4,470 men and 1,090 horses) is scheduled to be used [in the
capture of] the mainland of Java. However, depending on the situation, it may [also] be assigned
to capture Ambon and Kupang instead of Detachment B. 
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As for the transport [of the army], the unit with the main force of the 38th Division as its
core, which is responsible for capturing southern Sumatra, shall be divided into an advance
party and the main force, and be transported in one transport each. The [unit for] eastern Java
shall be divided into two transports. As for the units for western Java, the troops shall be divided
into three transports and the military supplies into four transports. Others shall be transported
in one transport each.
2. Southern Sumatra Operations:
The outline of the southern Sumatra operations by the main force of the 38th Division ([consist-
ing of] 4 battalions as its core) is as follows:
(1) It shall have an advance party ([consisting of] 2 battalions as its core) proceed under air and
naval cover, and raid and capture Mentok with an element of the party, and have the main
force of the party go up the Musi and other rivers by boat, capture Palembang in concert
with the paratroop unit, and secure the oil resources.
(2) The main force shall follow the advance party and make sure that the oil resources and the
airfield in Palembang area are securely held, then promptly occupy the Tanjungkarang air-
field, get it ready for use, and after that mop up [the enemy] in southern Sumatra.
3. The operations of the Sakaguchi Detachment:
Shall be executed in accordznce with the arrangement between the Sixteenth Army and the
[Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit in Iwakuni, and in accordance with the one to be concluded be-
tween the Sakaguchi Detachment and the naval unit on site.
4. Ambon and Kupang Operations:
(1) Shall be carried out by Detachment B (or by the South Seas Detachment depending on the
situation).
(2) In the operations for capturing Ambon, [the detachment concerned] shall land on the eastern
coast of the island and head for the city of Ambon and the Laha airfield. In the operations
for capturing Kupang, [the detachment concerned] shall land on the south coast and head
for the city of Kupang and the airfield.
5. Java Operations:
(1) Batavia, Surabaya and Bandung shall be promptly captured and subsequently the entire is-
land shall be pacified.
(2) The 48th Division shall land in the area of Rembang. Using Rembang as its base, it shall
promptly capture Surabaya, and then, using Surabaya as its base, act in concert with the op-
erations of the main force of the army.
(3) The main force of the army shall promptly capture Batavia, and then, using this city as its
base, capture the Bandung stronghold. In order [to realize this]:
{1} The first landing units shall be divided into the Noguchi Detachment ([consisting of] the
2d Reconnaissance Regiment as its core, 2,700 men and 100 horses), the 2d Division
(minus the Noguchi Detachment, 18,880 men and 1,870 horses), and the Itō Detachment
([consisting of] the 38th Infantry Group headquarters and 1 infantry regiment of the 38th
Division as its core, 5,910 men and 910 horses).
{2} The Noguchi Detachment shall land around Carita, charge toward Buitenzorg [Bogor],
facilitate the capture of Batavia by the main force of the 2d Division, and take action so
as to gain advantage for the next operation.
The 2d Division shall land its main force near Merak and Anyer-Lor, and part of its
force near Mauk, and then promptly occupy Batavia and the port of Tanjung Priok.
The Itō Detachment shall land near Cilamaya and then secure the Kalijati airfield.
Further, it shall facilitate the capture of Batavia by the main force of the army and gain
advantage for subsequent operations.
{3} Next, the 2d Division shall advance its main force to Buitenzorg [Bogor] and part of the
division to Cikampek from Batavia in concert with the Itō Detachment.
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Illustration No. 13 — The Operation Plan of the Sixteenth Army as of 21 December 1941
{4} Next, the main force of the army shall make preparations for the attack [on the Bandung
stronghold] along the line connecting Buitenzorg [Bogor], Purwakarta and Subang (i.e.
the line which stretches from the west front to the north front of the stronghold), and at-
tack it from the direction of Buitenzorg [Bogor] with the main force. Depending on the
situation [the army] shall attack the stronghold southward from the direction of Subang
with its main force. (Note: an attack from the west front was anticipated to be difficult
because the force had to cross several steep gorges, but [this course was supported] par-
ticularly by the staff in charge of the line of communication, who held that in any event
it would be superior in safety and certainty. (36))
{5} Detachment D (i.e. the South Seas Detachment, if the South Seas Detachment shall be
charged with the capture of Ambon and Kupang, this operation shall be assigned to De-
tachment B of the 38th Division) shall land in Cirebon, dash forward to Cilacap, cut off
the allied forces’ route for reinforcements from, or escape to, the Indian Ocean, and give
the army an advantage in its operations.
{6} The second landing units (6,150 men and 3,000 horses) of the 2d Division and other units
shall join the operations of the main force of the army after landing. The 48th Division,
after its capture of Surabaya, shall use the town as a base and turn toward central Java.
In line with the situation, it shall act in concert with the main force of the army in its op-
erations.
{7} The main line of communication of the main force of the army shall be established ini-
tially from Merak to Batavia and later from Tanjung Priok to Batavia, Buitenzorg [Bogor],
and Bandung.
{8} Following the capture of the Bandung stronghold, the entire island shall be pacified.
The amount of arms and equipment to be provided to the Sixteenth Army ([consisting of]
the 2d, the 38th, and the 48th Divisions, the Sakaguchi and the South Seas Detachment as its
core) was planned as follows:(5)
48,411 rifles, 1,147 light machine guns, 88 vehicle-mounted light machine guns, 362 heavy ma-
chine guns, 247 vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns, 10 antiaircraft heavy machine guns, 1,156
Type89 heavy grenade launchers, 52 Type10 light grenade launchers, 20 Type97 antitank rifles,
66 Type92 infantry guns, 4 Type11 infantry mortars, 70 Type94 37-mm. guns, 169 TypeRa [Rhein-
metall-model] 37-mm. antitank guns, 112 Type4 37-mm. tank guns, 44 Type90 57-mm. tank guns,
57 Type41 mountain guns (regimental guns), 21 converted Type38 field guns, 74 Type94 moun-
tain guns, 24 Type91 10-cm. howitzers, 24 Type96 15-cm. howitzers, 92 Type88 7-cm. antiaircraft
guns, 36 Type94 light trench mortars, 16 Type89 mortars, 4,898 motor vehicles (5,898 motor ve-
hicles in total, when combined with airfield units), 11 Type94 tankettes, 40 Type97 tankettes, 98
Type95 light tanks, and 44 Type89 medium tanks.
As mentioned previously, the Sixteenth Army completed its line-of-communication plan on
25 December based on its operation plan and the line-of-communication plan of the Southern
Army. The most noteworthy points of the plan were as follows:(5)
1. The main supply points for the [Sixteenth] Army were set by the Southern Army at Batavia,
Surabaya and Palembang.
2. Twenty-four units from mainland Japan, eight units from Manchuria, one unit from southern
China, four units from the Philippines, and two units from Malaya were supposed to be incor-
porated into the line-of-communication units of the army sometime between day x + 25 and day
x + 80. The army decided to apportion necessary line-of-communication units to each corps and
98 Chapter III     /     Operational Preparations Prior to the War
detachment, organize the line-of-communication department of the army with the main force
of the remaining units, and have Vice Chief of Staff Harada serve also as director of the lines-of-
communication department of the army. It also decided to attach the Sumatra oil-drilling unit
(commander: head of the oil-drilling group of the 21st Field Ordnance Depot) to the 38th Divi-
sion and the Java oil-drilling unit of the Army to the 48th Division for the Cepu and other oil
fields.
3. In the plan it was decided that the main supplies to be delivered to the army would be for about
the first six months of operations, that is, ammunition for about one campaign, fuel, provisions
and fodder for about three months, and medical supplies, veterinary goods etc. for about six
months, and that, after that, ammunition and some other supplies would be delivered roughly
every six months.
4. In the plan, the base supply point for the 48th Division was initially set at Rembang and later at
Surabaya. The main force of the army would initially be supplied through the first landing point,
and later through Batavia, the main line-of-communication center.
5. It was decided that the signal communication center of the army would be moved, following
the developments of the operations, to Saigon, a signal ship, [a point] near Merak, Batavia and,
if necessary, Serang and Tangerang one after another.
6. The use of the railway unit of the army ([consisting of] the main force of the 6th Railway Regi-
ment and the 168th Railway Depot headquarters as its core, and assigned to the area of the main
force of the army) was roughly planned as follows:
(1) The army railway unit shall have parts of the unit land in Merak, Mauk, Carita and Cilamaya
along with the first landing units, seize the existing railways quickly and, by operating them,
temporarily carry out the transport of units and munitions toward Batavia, and make its
way into the city without delay. After entering into the city, it shall restore the railway be-
tween Tanjung Priok and Buitenzorg [Bogor] via Batavia.
(2) The main force of the army railway unit shall land near Batavia or Merak ahead of each of
the second and the third landing units. While also directing the parts of the unit that had
landed earlier, it shall restore in the first place the railway between Tanjung Priok and Buiten-
zorg [Bogor] via Batavia with a part of the unit or with its main force, get it ready for con-
ducting the transport through close cooperation with the logistics unit or, if necessary, by
assigning part of the unit to the army line-of-communication unit. Meanwhile, the unit shall
have its main force, or a part of the unit, handle the mobile transport of Detachment D to
Cilacap via Cirebon, and plan for railway combats. The use of the railway unit of the army
after the capture of key locations shall depend on the situation at that time.
(3) During the period from the landings in Merak, Anyer-Lor, Carita, Mauk, and Cilamaya to
[entering into] Batavia, the railway unit of the army shall not do repairs except minor ones.
It should first of all advance into Batavia by quickly seizing the existing railways. Depending
on the degree of destruction of the railways, it shall be expected to promptly advance into
Batavia by motor vehicles without repairing the railways.
(4) The railway between Tanjung Priok and Buitenzorg [Bogor] via Batavia has to be quickly
restored and maintained to the extent that one hundred tons [of transport] per day can be
dealt with, and the necessary disembarkation facilities have to be equipped. The railway be-
tween Batavia and Cilacap via Cirebon has to be repaired so as to move Detachment D for-
ward as much as possible. If necessary, motor vehicles can be used to go forward first in
order to restore [the railway].
(5) During the initial stages after landings, the railway unit of the army shall provide makeshift
armored trains and operate them to advance toward Cirebon from Batavia.
How long did those involved at the time estimate the time required for capturing Java? Before
the opening of hostilities, it seemed to be roughly estimated at twenty to sixty days, though
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the estimation differed from person to person depending on their judgment of the strength,
capability, equipment, and defense facilities of the Dutch East Indies Army, their judgment
of our damage during sea transportation, and their judgment of the reinforcements provided
by the British, U.S. and Australian forces. Some among the staff [of the Army Department]
of IGHQ, who were well-informed of [the strength of] the enemy and ourselves, took it rel-
atively easy, but those who [were charged to] execute the operation were cautious. It seems
that [the Army Department of] IGHQ unofficially announced to the staff of the Southern Army
that “it expected the landing on Java to be on day x + 103 and the completion of the conquest
of Java on day x + 120,”(23) but Staff Officer Yamashita Yutaka (an up-and-coming major),
who was appointed staff (assistant operations staff officer) of the Sixteenth Army from being
a member of a section of the War Ministry, recalls: “I estimated [the time required for the
conquest of Java] to be two months.” After the opening of hostilities, everyone came to
change their estimation of the time necessary to capture Java as they were hearing more and
more about the military gains in the Philippines, Malaya, and other areas and became aware
that the date of the Java operation could be advanced. [Intelligence] Staff Officer Kuriya Tsu-
gunori (who had returned to Japan from Java in the month before the opening of hostilities)
recalled that when he had been asked about his judgment [on the necessary time] by Staff
Officer Arao Okikatsu, chief of operations of the Southern Army some time before the convoy
for capturing Java had left Cam Ranh Bay, his answer had been that it could be captured in
the time required [for the army] to march and travel through [the land], that is, a week, or
ten days including contingency time. However, Army Commander Imamura described the
judgment he had formed at almost the same time as Staff Officer Kuriya above, as follows:
“At the end of early February, the chief of the Operations Bureau of the Army Department
of IGHQ, Tanaka Shin’ichi, came to Saigon and asked me whether it was possible to dispose
of the entire Java invasion within fourteen days (two weeks). I answered that at that moment
I could not tell how many ships would be able to arrive and disembark while braving enemy
torpedoes, and that, though I wished in my mind that we could make the enemy surrender
within a month, my conscience did not allow me to declare that we could [promise to] make
it happen.” (Note: Will be described later [p. 427].)
As mentioned previously, the Sixteenth Army headquarters [temporarily] situated in the
War College completed its operation plan with Commander Kume of the [Paratroop] Raiding
Group on 21 December. However the next day, on the 22d, Col. Takashima Tatsuhiko, senior
staff officer of Section 1 [of the headquarters] went to IGHQ and requested the following
matters:(9)
1. The staff of the Sixteenth Army should be increased so that all of its detachments would have
their own staff officers attached.
2. The capture of Rabaul by the South Seas Detachment should be carried out promptly so that
the detachment could be diverted to the Sixteenth Army soon.
3. Ways to capture both Palembang and Balikpapan simultaneously should be sought out [at the
Army Department]. (Note: at that moment, the operation in the Malaya area was unexpectedly
making sudden progress. Nevertheless, there were no arrangements yet on the Palembang op-
eration between the Sixteenth Army and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet.)
4. The capture of Ambon should be [re]scheduled for around 10 January. (Note: the 38th Division
had already landed on Hong Kong Island on 18 December, which ensured the likelihood of an
early redeployment of Detachment B.)
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5. The Davao unit (note: the Sakaguchi Detachment had already landed in Davao on the 20th)
should be promptly replenished because of the serious damage incurred.
6. Ex-ante reinforcement (note: [increased] assignment of supernumerary personnel for filling va-
cancies before launching the operations) to the 2d Division should be approved.
On this day (the 22d), Staff Officer Oda Akimitsu, chief of operations [of the Sixteenth Army
headquarters], took off from Tokyo for the Southern Army headquarters in Saigon with the
operation plan that had just been completed.(40) At that time, the Sixteenth Army headquarters
assumed that it would still have about another month before its departure from Tokyo.(35, 36, 38)
For this reason, Staff Officer Oda Akimitsu had intended to return to Tokyo as soon as he
finished briefing the Southern Army. However, when on the next day, the 23d, Staff Officer
Oda reported to the headquarters [of the Southern Army] in Saigon, he received an entirely
unexpected command to stay in Saigon, being told that it was doing a study of advancing
the Java operations by about one month from the [original] plan of IGHQ.(40)
Taking Command of the 2d Division and Encouraging the Sakaguchi 
Detachment
Army Commander Imamura, who had taken command of the Sakaguchi Detachment and
sent it off at Moji, dispatched his Vice Chief of Staff Harada Yoshikazu (accompanied by Staff
Officer Itoda Isamu) to Palau upon the safe arrival of the detachment there on 28 November,
to inspect the detachment and give directions as to the final preparation for the operations
as well as to encourage the officers and men.(37, 39)
Army Commander Imamura also visited the Sendai divisional district from 24 to 25 No-
vember, where, after the cadre of the 2d Division presented themselves before him, he gave
instructions, inspected its maneuvers, and gave directions.(32) The 2d Division left Sendai,
Wakamatsu and Shibata one after another from 1 to 16 December, arrived at the maneuver
areas in Narashino, at the foot of Mt. Fuji, in Toyohashi, and Inuyama from 1 to 17 December,
and continued training.(1, 53) Before the opening of hostilities, the 2d Division [was ordered
to] pretend to “be off to the Kunming operations.”(55, 59) Division Commander Maruyama
Masao reported to the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters on 9 December and after that stayed
at the Narashino maneuver area.(32)
Preparation of a Propaganda Group
The propaganda group of the Sixteenth Army was formed as an agency supervised by Staff
Section 1, and was making preparations to be dispatched.(38, 48) Its mission mainly consisted
in counterpropaganda and the breaking of the enemy’s fighting spirit; at the same time, con-
sidering the special characteristics of the Dutch East Indies, it also included the prevention
of the destruction of resources, the heightening of the morale of the officers and men of the
Imperial Army, the news coverage sent to the homeland, the conducting of pacification ac-
tivities to stabilize popular feeling right after occupation, etc. The propaganda group of the
army was granted three million yen as expenses for its formation and equipment before leav-
ing for the front. The group, led by Lt. Col. Machida Keiji, consisted of eleven officers, twenty-
six noncommissioned officers, seventy-three men, eighty-seven drafted personnel, and forty
eight employed personnel. The drafted personnel included men such as Ōya Sōichi, Matsui
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Suisei, Abe Tomoji, Tomizawa Uio, Kitahara Takeo, Ōe Kenji, Takeda Rintarō, Ōki Atsuo,
Asano Akira, Ono Saseo, Yokoyama Ryūichi, Iida Nobuo, Ishimoto Tōkichi, Kurata Fumindo,
Kōno Takashi, Ōchi Hiroshi, Minami Masayoshi, and Shimizu Hitoshi, who represented var-
ious professions such as writer, painter, musician, movie director, printer, stenographer and
advertising balloon manufacturer. The drafted personnel had been given military training
for about ten days(48) and each of them was making preparations for the propaganda activi-
ties; painters and printers were creating posters, propaganda leaflets, etc., while writers were
drafting advertisement copy.(38, 48)
Preparations for the Military Administration
A military administration department was formed within the organization of the headquar-
ters of the army. Maj. Gen. Harada Yoshikazu, vice chief of staff, was concurrently assigned
director to the department, while Col. Nakayama Yasuto was head of the department, and
some twenty personnel of senior official class, some 150 clerical staff and others were as-
signed to it. But it was kept on a small scale with the intention of making use of the local ad-
ministrative structure and personnel as much as possible.(37, 46) IGHQ had issued “Directives
for implementing an administration in the southern occupied areas” on 26 November.(1) In
the previously-mentioned “Transportation, Lines-of-communication and Signal Communi-
cations Plan of the Sixteenth Army,” the army had specified: “In the early stages of the oper-
ation, the administration of the occupied areas shall focus on promptly securing public order
and acquiring important national defense resources, liquid fuel in particular, as well as on
enabling the army that conducts the operation to support itself on site; when implementing
the administration, it shall use the remaining [administrative] structures as much as possible
and run them while especially respecting the traditional organizations and ethnic customs
in order to reduce the burden of the army in achieving its aims; the currency used in the area
of operations shall be a military scrip for the time being, etc.”(5) Based on these rules, it pro-
ceeded with research on and preparations for the military administration.(37, 46)
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Chapter IV Opening of Hostilities and Capture of the
Forward Advance Bases Davao and Jolo
1. Capture of Davao (See Illustrations No. 14 and No. 15)
The Arrangements Between the Army and Navy as Presented [to the Saka–
guchi Detachment]
As previously related, the responsibility for the capture of Davao had been an issue atthe time of the Iwakuni Agreement (concluded on 16 November). On 19 November,it had finally been decided to assign this responsibility to the Sixteenth Army, and
on the same day the Sakaguchi Detachment had departed from Moji. On arrival in Palau on
the 28th, the detachment started planning an operation to take the allied forces by surprise,
and immediately began hard training by practicing cutting paths through the dense roots of
[tidewater] mangrove forests.(87) At the end of the month, Vice Chief of Staff [of the Sixteenth
Army] Harada flew in,(37, 39) and on 1 and 2 December, the 5th Cruiser Division, the 2d De-
stroyer Squadron and other naval units sailed into port.(114, 117) Vice Chief of Staff Harada
passed down the order of the Sixteenth Army, which was based on the Southern Army’s
order of 20 [November] (in which the capture of Davao was added to the assignments [of
the Sixteenth Army]), as well as the revised operation arrangements between the [Navy]
Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army. These arrangements provided how the Saka -
guchi Detachment and cooperating air and navy units should capture Davao, Jolo, Tarakan,
Balikpapan, Samarinda, Banjarmasin and Bali. [The items concerning] the capture of Davao
had been modified so that Detachment Commander Sakaguchi would take command of the
Miura Detachment in the capture. [Also included] in the arrangements [regarding the capture
of Davao] were that the Miura Detachment and the [naval] landing force should take the
credit for the capture, and that the strength of the Sakaguchi Detachment should be retained.
As for the capture of Tarakan and Balikpapan, a frontal attack was still in the plan, and Davao
was also planned to be captured from the direction that the U.S.-Filipino Army seemed to
expect.(88) As will be described later point by point, the Sakaguchi Detachment, which was
training to force its way through areas densely covered with mangroves, would drastically
change the entire approach of the presented operation outline.
[However,] the outline of the proposed operations in Davao and Jolo was as follows:(88)
1. Davao
The unit [consisting of] the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment and the Miura De-
tachment as its core shall leave Palau on day x + 2. Before dawn on day x + 6, the Miura
Detachment shall land around Talomo bay, the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment
in Santa Cruz, one company on Samal Island, and the naval landing force in Kaganjan
(probably the same as Kaganjuan in Illustration No. 14), all about the same time, and each
of them shall capture key locations and airfields in the neighborhood at one stroke. After
mopping up the landing points and their vicinity, an element of the unit shall be dis-
patched toward Cotabato (160 kilometers west of Davao) and seize its airfield. Once each
place has been cleared of the enemy, the Sakaguchi Detachment shall turn over the [task
of] guarding to the Miura Detachment and the naval units, assemble in Davao, and in-
struct and train the troops in preparation for the next operation. The assembly of the third
echelon, the departure of the Jolo Detachment, and the water and coal supply to the ships
shall depend on the situation. Elements of both of the [naval] land-based attack plane and
fighter plane units shall cooperate [in the operations]. The strength of the escort shall be
specified separately.
2. Jolo
The detachment [consisting of] the 3d battalion (minus two companies) of the 146th In-
fantry Regiment under the command of Lt. Col. Matsumoto Tadasu as the core shall make
a surprise landing on the coast northeast of the town of Jolo on day x + 13 and seize the
airfield and the radio station at one stroke. The detachment shall have independent engi-
neers and disembarkation equipment diverted from the Miura Detachment after its cap-
ture of Davao and send these back with the ships to Davao after the capture of Jolo. After
the capture, it shall turn over the [task of] guarding to the Navy and join the main force
of the Sakaguchi Detachment. One light cruiser, four destroyers, and elements of both of
the [naval] land-based attack plane and fighter plane units shall cooperate [in the opera-
tion].
Postponement of the Date for Capturing Davao
As for the waters east of the Philippines, the Navy Philippines Unit had decided to have the
4th Raid Unit ([consisting of] one light cruiser and eight destroyers) cooperate with the
Kimura Detachment scheduled to land in Legaspi on day x + 4, and the 5th Raid Unit ([also
consisting of] one light cruiser and eight destroyers) with the Sakaguchi Detachment sched-
uled to land in Davao on day x + 6 and, apart from these, deploy the Southern Philippines
Area Task Force ([consisting of] three heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, two seaplane ten-
ders, and one destroyer), and position its main unit ([consisting of] one heavy cruiser, one
light cruiser, and two destroyers) on the waters northwest of Luzon (south of Magong). The
Navy Southern Task Force had decided to deploy its main unit ([consisting of] one battleship,
two heavy cruisers, and four destroyers) in the South China Sea and the Eastern Support
Unit ([consisting of] one battleship, one heavy cruiser, and two destroyers) on the waters east
of the Philippines.(110) In addition, the naval aviation unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) had
planned to deploy strong air units in Palau. However, a report came in that the new and
powerful British battleships, HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Repulse and other ships had been
brought to Malaya. As previously related, the [Navy] Malaya Unit mainly consisted of [just]
five heavy cruisers and one light cruiser. Because of this, on 28 November, the deployment
of the Eastern Support Unit [which should have been] on the [sea] east of the Philippines
had to be cancelled, and [further] twenty-seven planes of the air unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air
Fleet) had to be diverted to the Southern Expeditionary Fleet on 2 December.(102) About the
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same time, another element of the Philippines Unit in the eastern [waters] of the Philippines
was also diverted to the west.
V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō, commander of the Philippines Unit had no choice but to give an
order to postpone the capture of Davao scheduled on day x + 6 to day x + 14.(114, 117)
From a report from the Fourteenth Army, the Southern Army learned on the next day, the
4th [of December], that the [Navy] Philippines Unit intended to postpone the date of the cap-
ture of Davao. After consulting with all parties concerned, it sent a telegram on 6 December
to central command [i.e. the Army Department of IGHQ], the Fourteenth Army and the Six-
teenth Army that “in view of the new disposition of the fleets, the date of landing in Davao
shall be changed to day x + 13 (order issued on behalf of a higher authority).”(22, 24)
Opening of Hostilities and Advance of the Date to Capture Davao
Hostilities were opened on 8 December. In the Imperial Rescript on the Declaration of War,
war was declared [only] on the United States and Britain, the Netherlands were left out.(13)
The Carrier Task Force succeeded in making a surprise attack on Hawaii on the 8th.
In the Philippines area, the air power of the allied forces was destroyed at a stroke on the
8th. On the 10th, the Tanaka Detachment (under cover of the 5th Destroyer Squadron) and
the Kanno Detachment (under cover of the 4th Destroyer Squadron) landed in Aparri and
Vigan respectively.(119, 120) Both the air and landing operations in Malaya also made a good
start. On the 10th, HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk.(104) It seemed that [the
U.S.] warships from the Philippines had withdrawn toward the Dutch East Indies.(110)
In the east coast area of the Philippines (more precisely, east coast area of the central and
southern Philippines), R. Adm. Takagi Takeo, commander of the [Navy] Southern Philippines
Area Task Force (and commander of the 5th Cruiser Division), was supposed to carry out air
strikes on Davao and support the capture of Legaspi (in conjunction with the Army’s Kimura
Detachment and the [Navy] 4th Raid Unit under the command of the commander of the
[Navy] 1st Base Force), but due to the diversion of the selected force [to the west] and the
postponement of the date of capture of Davao, he decided to [alter the plan and] have the
11th Seaplane Tender Division ([consisting of] the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho) sup-
port the unit to capture Legaspi from the beginning, and he left Palau at 1300 on 6 December
with the remaining force (i.e. the 5th Cruiser Division ([consisting of] heavy cruisers, the
Myōkō, the Haguro, and the Nachi), the 4th Carrier Division ([consisting of] one aircraft carrier,
the Ryūjō), and the 2d Destroyer Squadron ([consisting of] one light cruiser, the Jintsū, the
15th Destroyer Division and the Amatsukaze and the Hatsukaze of the 16th Destroyer Division),
and carried out air strikes on Davao and Malalag Bay on the 8th by launching an attack plane
unit from the carrier on the sea, but no aircraft of the allied forces were found.(102, 114, 117, 124)
After the air strikes on Davao, the [Navy] Southern Philippines Area Task Force changed its
course and on the early morning of the 9th joined the unit [to support] the capture of Legaspi
([consisting of] one light cruiser, the Nagara, and the Yukikaze and the Tokitsukaze of the 16th
Destroyer Division, which had left Palau for the attack on the 8th), and headed for Legaspi.(114,
117) The landing in Legaspi was scheduled before dawn on the 12th.
In these circumstances, Rear Admiral Takagi had been sounding out the view of R. Adm.
Tanaka Raizō, commander of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, since the 11th, and following the
success of the landing in Legaspi on the 12th, he proposed to the commander of the Philip-
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pines Unit (V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō) to advance the date of the capture of Davao.(114, 117) Vice
Admiral Takahashi consulted V. Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō, commander in chief of the
Eleventh Air Fleet, and gave the order “to capture Davao as soon as possible if the situation
permitted, regardless of the date specified in the Classified Order of the Philippines Unit No.
1.”(117)
The Plan to Capture Davao
The 2d Destroyer Squadron ([under] Commander R. Adm. Tanaka Raizō), which returned
to Palau on the morning of the 14th after finishing supporting the landing operations in
Legaspi, immediately made arrangements with the Sakaguchi Detachment and reported on
the 15th that “it had made arrangements with the Army’s Sakaguchi Detachment to advance
[the date of] the 5th Raid Unit’s attack on Davao by two days.”(117) The 5th Cruiser Division
([under] Commander R. Adm. Takagi Takeo) returned to Palau on the 16th, and reported
that, because the enemy’s movements in the areas to the south of Luzon and in the Molucca
Sea were unknown, it wanted to continuously use the 4th Carrier Division (the aircraft carrier
Ryūjō) in these areas up to and including the attack on Jolo, and that it had made arrange-
ments with the Sakaguchi Detachment to tentatively set [the date of] the capture of Jolo on
the 25th.(114, 117) The 4th and the 5th Destroyer Squadrons and the 1st and the 2d Base Forces,
which had escorted the advance units and put them ashore in northern Luzon, were on their
way to [their next duty of] escorting the main force of the Fourteenth Army and the main
force of the 16th Division, which should land in Lingayen Gulf on the 22d, and in Lamon
Bay on the 24th respectively, while the Malaya Unit was escorting the 5th Division, etc. and
the Kawaguchi Detachment, which should land around the Gulf of Thailand and in British
Borneo respectively. [This unit] was subsequently scheduled to escort the transport of the
main force of the Twenty-fifth Army.(102)
The Sakaguchi Detachment had obtained information that “some twenty thousand Japan-
ese nationals had been confined [in Davao] upon the declaration of war.”(87) Also, it had ob-
tained information that “the strength of the U.S.-Filipino Army in Davao, which had consisted
of only about two companies before, had been gradually reinforced and reached some three
thousand troops.”(87, 50)
As mentioned previously, the Sakaguchi Detachment had made arrangements with its
navy counterparts on the 14th–15th to draw up an operation plan. While drafting it, special
consideration was given to such points as that [the detachment] would adopt a method which
might take the U.S.-Filipino Army by surprise regardless of the proposed outline of attack
arranged between the [Navy] Philippines Unit and the Sixteenth Army, that it would try to
safely rescue the resident Japanese nationals, that it would let the Miura Detachment of the
Fourteenth Army take the credit for the capture, and that it would avoid damage to the
Matsu moto Battalion which was assigned to capture Jolo right after the capture of Davao.
Adopting the ideas of his staff officer, Yano Tsuneo, the detachment commander [Sakaguchi]
drew up a plan in which, regardless of the presented outline of attack, the main force would
take a detour all the way around Samal Island and be put ashore at the rear of Davao, while
part of the force would be put ashore on the coast of Talomo Bay, and by occupying the air-
field at a stroke, [the detachment would] make the U.S.-Filipino Army in Davao beat a hasty
retreat, allowing [the detachment] to safely rescue the Japanese nationals as well as to keep
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the facilities in Davao intact. He requested the Navy not to directly shell Davao from the sea
for the safety of the Japanese nationals. He also planned to let the Miura Detachment and
the naval landing force have the honor of the capture of Davao, and [for this purpose,] par-
ticularly made sure that the regimental commander would stay with the colors at sea, because
especially the movement of the colors would become a news story. Many officers and men
of the 146th Infantry Regiment were dissatisfied with this plan because this operation was
the opening battle of the war [and they craved the honor], but the detachment commander
kept them under control.(87)
The operation plan of the Sakaguchi Detachment was in outline as follows:(89, 90)
Right Wing Unit:
Commander: Lt. Col. Miura Toshio; consisting of the whole of the Miura Detachment, the
7th Company of the 146th Infantry Regiment, and [1] armored car unit (minus 1 platoon) as
the core;
Shall land in the mouth of the Panacan River, attack the Sasa airfield at night, subsequently
capture the city of Davao, in hot pursuit chase the U.S.-Filipino Army toward the Davao
River, and, in concert with the left wing unit, capture and destroy the defeated enemies on
the right bank of the Davao River.
Left Wing Unit:
Commander: Maj. Kanauji Ken’ichi; consisting of the 2d Battalion (minus the 7th Company)
of the 146 Infantry Regiment, half of the regimental artillery unit, half of the regiment’s an-
titank gun unit, and 1 armored car platoon as the core;
Shall land on the coast of Talomo Bay, keep guard over the southwest with part of the unit,
occupy Talomo and its vicinity with the main force, and, in concert with the right wing unit,
capture and destroy the defeated enemies on the right bank of the Davao River. After that,
[it] shall conquer Malagos (2 kilometers northwest of Talomo) and Malalag (95 kilometers
southwest of Davao). [Editor’s note: Malagos is actually 20 km. from Talomo, and Malalag
75 km. from Davao.]
Rear Base Unit:
Commander: Lt. Col. Matsumoto Tadasu; consisting of the 3d Battalion (minus the 10th and
the 12th Companies) of the 146th Infantry Regiment and 1 field artillery section as the core;
Shall be positioned at the rear of the right wing unit. After the right wing unit advances
into the city of Davao, [it] shall secure key locations and function as a rear base for the right
wing unit mopping up the city of Davao and its vicinity.
1st Field Artillery Battalion (minus the 1st and 3d Battery and the battalion supply train):
The main force of the battalion headquarters shall accompany the Miura Detachment and
be charged with reconnoitering the enemy’s movements and the terrain. If it seems to meet
resistance from the U.S.-Filipino Army, it shall put the battalion under single control and co-
operate with the right wing unit in its battle.
Headquarters of the Detachment (minus an element):
After landing on the coast of Tibungco, shall advance into the city of Davao.
3d Battery of the 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion:
Shall be assigned to the aerial defense around the anchorage, while staying on board.
146th Infantry Regiment (minus the main force of both of the 2d and the 3d Battalion):
Shall remain on board as reserve.
Note: The Miura Detachment consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 33d Infantry Regiment
(Battalion commander: Maj. Tsunoda Isamu), 1 engineer platoon and 1 independent
engineer platoon as the core and was under the command of Lt. Col. Miura Toshio,
who was attached to the 33d Infantry Regiment of the 16th Division.(89, 90)
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Departure, Landing and Occupation
After 1600 on 16 December, the Sakaguchi Detachment and the Miura Detachment left Palau
for Davao one after another in respectively eight and four transport ships.(117) The convoy
was escorted by the 5th Raid Unit (consisting of one light cruiser and six destroyers) com-
manded by R. Adm. Tanaka Raizō, commander of the 2d Destroyer Squadron. A fleet which
included the 5th Cruiser Division (consisting of three heavy cruisers), the 4th Carrier Division
(consisting of one aircraft carrier, the Ryūjō, and a destroyer, the Shiokaze), and the 11th Sea-
plane Tender Division (consisting of the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho) and others,
under the command of R. Adm. Takagi Takeo, commander of the 5th Cruiser Division was
assigned to give direct support.(102, 114, 117)
Although the convoy came under a torpedo attack by an allied submarine on the morning
of the 17th, it sustained no damage.(102, 117) Coming under no further attacks after that, it en-
tered anchorage on the night of the 19th. A very strict blackout had been enforced over the
city of Davao, its vicinity and the areas to the south of the city, while many lookout posts
had been set up as well. However, there were scattered lights along the coast where the main
force of the Sakaguchi Detachment came to anchor after taking a detour around Samal Island,
[which meant that] it had taken the enemy by complete surprise.(87)
The Miura Detachment, assigned to seize the airfield in a night attack and then capture
the city of Davao, and the naval landing force, assigned to capture the oil storage facilities at
Lanang in a night attack, each reported that they had successfully made surprise landings at
0400.(87, 89, 90) When Detachment Commander Sakaguchi came ashore in the second transport
and advanced toward the airfield believing that the airfield had been secured in the night
attack by the Miura Detachment, he only found that the Miura Detachment had not been
able to launch a predawn attack, that some fifty soldiers had been killed when our naval
planes mistakenly bombed them while they were preparing for an attack after daybreak, and
that this had put the detachment in a difficult position for carrying out the attack. He also
found that the naval landing force, which should have captured the oil storage facilities at
Lanang in a night attack, had not been able to carry that out either and was moving toward
the airfield.(87)
Detachment Commander Sakaguchi had hoped to quickly seize the airfield as well as
Davao City and rescue the resident Japanese nationals before sunset, so he had been pressing
the Miura Detachment to attack. However, when he found the detachment in a situation too
difficult from which to launch an attack, he at last decided to bring the Matsumoto Battalion
into play. He had intended to deploy it in the capture of Jolo planned right after [this opera-
tion], which was one of the reasons why he wished to avoid committing the battalion [in
Davao], but there was no other option.(87) Around 1000, he ordered the Matsumoto Battalion
to capture Davao from the direction of the coast.(87, 89, 90) The battalion immediately attacked
and advanced, defeated the U.S.-Filipino Army, and stormed into Davao around 1500. After
the advance of the Matsumoto Battalion, the Miura Detachment moved into the airfield and
then into Davao. The U.S.-Filipino Army on the airfield and in and around Davao fled to the
mountains in the west.(87)
Earlier, the left wing unit had landed near Talomo at 0500 without meeting with resistance
from the U.S.-Filipino Army and immediately advanced towards the line of the Davao River.
[However,] the U.S.-Filipino Army put up considerable resistance at the line of the Talomo
River. Finally after daybreak, the left wing unit succeeded in beating back the U.S.-Filipino
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Army and advanced eastward. However, its advance was difficult because the U.S.-Filipino
Army had set up several lines of permanent positions on Matina Hill, where the sources of
the [city’s] water supply were located, and counterattacked from there using these positions
as strongholds.(87)
Detachment Commander Sakaguchi, who had moved into Davao just after 1500, learned
that a considerable number of the U.S.-Filipino Army troops were on the other side of the
Davao River and that the left wing unit was engaged in a hard battle. He had ordered the
Miura Detachment to cross the river and attack [the enemy], but then, in view of the condition
of the detachment, he newly ordered the Ezaki Engineer Company to cross the Davao River
and attack the enemy. The company immediately started its advance and together with the
left wing unit made a frontal attack on the U.S.-Filipino Army from both sides. The U.S.-Fil-
ipino Army retreated northwestwards along the Davao River valley. The Ezaki Company
and the left wing unit were able to make contact after sunset.(87)
As soon as the Sakaguchi Detachment had entered Davao, it had started the operation to
rescue resident Japanese nationals. They were detained in a junior high school in the north-
west end of the city, at the wharf of Davao, in Mintal (six kilometers west of Davao), in Daliao
(six kilometers west-southwest of Davao), and other places on the eastern coast opposite
Davao, and in the area in the north of Davao in groups of some two thousand people each.
Influential people were detained in a prison in Beruna Colony, located fifty kilometers north-
west of Davao.(50, 87) [Editor’s note: the distances and directions are not all correct; “Beruna”
Colony is probably a corruption of “(Davao) Penal Colony.”] The detachment was able to
successfully rescue the Japanese nationals detained in warehouse(s) at the Davao wharf by
breaking down the walls [of the building(s)] just before raging fires (which had been caused
by the shelling of the Navy) spread to the warehouse(s). After rescuing the Japanese nationals
in Davao, the Sakaguchi Detachment rushed in all directions to rescue Japanese nationals in
various places throughout the area where the defeated enemy was still rampant.(87) It was on
the morning of the 24th that the detachment rescued the Japanese residents detained in
‘Beruna’ Colony. Dramatic scenes abounded: a [Japanese] elementary school principal got
on top of an armored car of the Sakaguchi Detachment on its way to rescue [Japanese resi-
dents] to lead the way; a Japanese civilian jumped on a machine gunner of the U.S.-Filipino
Army who was firing at the officer and men of the Sakaguchi Detachment when they ap-
proached the detention camp, etc.(50, 87)
Upon the capture of Davao, the Miura Detachment started constructing defensive works
by piling sandbags. The Sakaguchi Detachment had the unit charged with the capture of Jolo
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Matsumoto prepare for the subsequent operation
and, with the rest of its troops, he mopped up the remaining enemies in and around Davao.
A number of the resident Japanese formed a volunteer corps to cooperate in this operation.(87)
It had been agreed that the Navy would not shell the city from its ships when capturing
Davao.(87) However, on the early morning of the 20th, when a motor launch of the destroyer
Amatsukaze guarding the anchorage in Talomo Bay approached the Davao wharf to capture
small boats and came under fire of the U.S.-Filipino Army, the Amatsukaze opened a protective
bombardment at 0715. Some shells hit the oil tanks in Davao City and caused a big fire.
The 4th Carrier Division (consisting of the aircraft carrier Ryūjō and a destroyer, the Shio -
kaze) had conducted reconnoitering attacks on Davao with six carrier-based attack planes on
the 19th. On the next day, the 20th, it provided cover for the landing, and after that until the
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22d, it took charge of direct air support over the anchorage. The 5th Cruiser Division (con-
sisting of the heavy cruisers Myōkō, Haguro and Nachi) acted practically in concert with the
4th Carrier Division. The 11th Seaplane Tender Division (with only the seaplane carrier the
Chitose) moved westward on the waters north of the [Army] attack units. On the 20th, it co-
operated in their landing attacks with its on-board reconnaissance seaplanes, set up a floating
air base in Talomo Bay as early as the same evening, and started conducting aerial patrols
and reconnoitering attacks on [enemy] bases on Mindanao. On the 20th, R. Adm. Irifune
Naosaburō, commander of the 32d [Special] Base Force, hoisted his standard in Davao.(102)
The losses of the 146 Infantry Regiment (formed in Ōmura, Kyūshū) consisted of twenty-
two men (amongst whom were four officers, four noncommissioned officers, and fourteen
soldiers), including those killed in the Jolo operations which will be described later.(53) This
shows that the officers led from the front and fought bravely, but at the same time, it raises
a question as to what the previously mentioned visit of Takashima, senior staff of Section 1
of the Sixteenth Army, to IGHQ on the 22d and his request that the Davao unit be promptly
replenished because of the serious damage incurred, was all about. In fact, it shows that the
damage to the Miura Detachment, when our naval planes mistakenly bombed it, was really
serious. At the time of landing, Detachment Commander Miura deployed the main force of
the 1st Battalion of the 33d Infantry Regiment (with Maj. Tsunoda Isamu as the battalion
commander) in the front line, and put [other] elements of it and the 7th Company of the
146th Infantry Regiment under his direct control. The battle of the Tsunoda Battalion went
as follows: (89, 90)
Arrival at the shore at 0400. With no beach/underwater obstacles nor shore-side pillboxes found,
we made a successful landing, straightaway gathered near the Panacan Bridge, and cut the tele-
phone lines above the roads. The left front line company reached the southern end of the airfield
around 0630. Then our naval air units unleashed a fierce aerial bombardment. Sunrise was at
0640. Battalion Commander Tsunoda had reinforcements of one platoon of the 1st Company
and the 7th Company of the 146th Infantry Regiment (minus one squad) sent by Detachment
Commander Miura, and decided “to advance towards the barracks and launch a frontal attack
on the enemy.”
Although Detachment Commander Sakaguchi had intended to let the Miura Detachment
take the credit for the capture of Davao, he regretted the unexpected turn of events. He had
no other choice but to order the Matsumoto Detachment, assigned to the capture of Jolo, to
charge [into Davao] at short notice, because the Miura Detachment had incurred [too much]
unforeseen damage, and the large fires that had broken out in the city made him concerned
about the imminent danger to which the Japanese residents were exposed.
2. Capture of Jolo Island (See Illustration No. 15)
As previously explained, the main points of the operation for the capture of Jolo were pre-
sented in the Iwakuni Agreement and in the subsequent arrangement between the [Navy]
Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army (which was brought by its Vice Chief of Staff
Harada [to Palau]); they were further adjusted in the arrangement between Detachment
Commander Sakaguchi and R. Adm. Tanaka Raizō, commander of the [Navy] 5th Raid Unit
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Illustration No.14—The Capture of Davao
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Illustration No. 15—The Capture of Jolo
(and commander of the 2d Destroyer Squadron) in Palau on 15 December, along with the
main points of the operation for the capture of Davao.
In the above-mentioned arrangement of 15 December, it was specified that the landing
[on Jolo] should be around 25 December; that the [Jolo] unit should sail along with the unit
for the capture of Davao [up to Davao], from where it should separately advance [toward
Jolo]; that the Army Jolo Detachment, consisting of the 3d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Reg-
iment (minus two companies) and one field artillery section as the core, under the command
of the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Matsumoto Tadasu, should board the Yamazuki-maru
[Yamatsuki-maru]; that two [naval] ships with a naval construction unit on board should go
along with it; that they should be directly escorted by the [Navy] 5th Raid Unit (consisting
of the Jintsū and the 15th Destroyer Division as the core under the command of Rear Admiral
Tanaka, commander of the 2d Destroyer Squadron); that the Jolo Detachment should land
on the coast to the west of Kaunayan (depending on the situation, on the coast between Dain-
gapic Point and Mangalis Point), and first seize the airfield, the radio station, and the center
of [Jolo] town; that naval bombardments should be conducted [only] on request; that emptied
ships and the [Navy] 5th Raid Unit should return to Davao after completion of the disem-
barkation; that the [Navy] Southern Philippines Area Task Force (made up of the 5th Cruiser
Division (consisting of three heavy cruisers), the 4th Carrier Division (consisting of one air-
craft carrier and one destroyer) and the 11th Seaplane Tender Division (consisting of one sea-
plane carrier)) should support [the operation], etc.(114, 117)
The headquarters of the 21st Air Flotilla, a land-based [naval] air unit, advanced [its base]
to Palau on 19 December, and an element of the land-based air flotilla advanced [its base] to
Davao from the 22d.(102)
On 22 December, it was decided that the landing on Jolo would be conducted on the 25th.
(117) As mentioned previously, the Matsumoto Battalion (i.e. the Jolo Detachment), which had
been dragged into unexpected battles in Davao on the 20th, rapidly made preparations after
that, embarked on the Yamazuki-maru [Yamatsuki-maru], and left Davao at 1200 on the 23d.
Two naval transport ships and ships of the [Navy] 5th Raid Unit and the Southern Philippines
Area Task Force left Davao from the evening of the 22d to the 23d.(114, 117) On the 23d in the
morning, a heavy bomber of the allied forces raided Davao, and in the afternoon, a flying
boat of the allied forces came reconnoitering the convoy. On the 24th, there was a report that
“an enemy light cruiser was seen,” but it did not result in any engagement,(117) and there were
no raids [either] by allied planes on this day.(117)
The Matsumoto Detachment began landing [operations] at 0040 on the 25th and reached
the coast west of Kaunayan at 0120.(117) Although it succeeded in landing secretly as sched-
uled, it could not launch a night attack mainly due to the inaccuracy of its maps and its un-
familiarity with the terrain.(15, 87) After dawn, it eliminated some slight resistance from the
U.S.-Filipino Army and seized the airfield around 0600, the barracks around 0700, the town
of Jolo around 0800, and the radio station around 1030.(117) The airfield was fit for immediate
use, and four land-based aircraft were advanced from Taiwan to Jolo airfield as early as the
[same] afternoon.(102)
After occupying the whole area of the town of Jolo, the Matsumoto Detachment started
mopping up the U.S.-Filipino Army (about three hundred troops), which had fled toward
the mountain forests on the eastern coast. Not understanding the intention [of the Detach-
ment], the [local] Moro people put up stubborn resistance with bamboo spears and hunting
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guns. However, once the Matsumoto Detachment had succeeded in winning over the chief
of the tribe to its side, they began to cooperate with the detachment, which made the capture
of the remaining defeated troops in the island so easy that it completed clearing the island
in a few days.(15, 87) The losses that the Matsumoto Detachment incurred in the battle for Jolo
were only two men.(53)
[In the meantime,] only one allied plane came flying over on the 25th, and not a plane
came to raid on the 26th.(102)
The 4th Carrier Division ([consisting of] one aircraft carrier, the Ryūjō, and one destroyer,
the Shiokaze), which had provided direct air cover until the 24th, returned to Palau on the
26th. The 11th Seaplane Tender Division (the seaplane carrier Chitose), which had taken
charge of the direct air cover until the fighter planes of air units (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet)
advanced to the Jolo base on the 26th, returned to Davao on the 28th.(102, 103) The 5th Cruiser
Division (consisting of the heavy cruisers Myōkō, Haguro, and Nachi) advanced to a spot one
hundred nautical miles southeast of Jolo and turned around to return to Palau on the 28th.(114)
The air unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) advanced the whole force of its Tainan Air Group
(about fifty fighter planes) to Jolo by 2 January.(102) The Matsumoto Detachment turned over
the guarding of Jolo to the Navy, departed from Jolo at 1200 on 13 January, and arrived in
Tarakan on the morning of the next day as will be described later.
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Chapter V Decision to Advance [the Schedule of] the
Java Operation and the Sixteenth Army
1. Decision to Advance [the Date of the Operation]
(See Illustration No. 16)
On 19 December, the Southern Army Operations Section (more precisely, Senior StaffCol. Ishii Masayoshi and Chief of Operations Lt. Col. Arao Okikatsu, both in Section1 of the Southern Army Staff) in Saigon set their minds on bringing forward the Java
operation by about one month (note: about one month earlier than planned by IGHQ).(24) It
was two days before the Sixteenth Army headquarters [still located] at the War College com-
pleted its operation plan, six days before it made its line-of-communication plan, and one
day before the Sakaguchi Detachment landed in Davao.
The reason that they set their minds on moving up the Java operation was [the fact that]
since the opening of hostilities, the war situation had developed quite favorably, which made
them conclude that “most of the goals of Operation A-Gō [i.e. the southern operation] should
be attained by making use of the current war momentum and by conducting the operation
on the concept of strategic pursuit.”(24) Section 1 of the Southern Army Staff considered that
“it was of vital importance for Japan to establish its sphere of self-preservation and self-de-
fense before the enemy was fully ready to destroy its commerce; that allowing the U.S. and
British naval forces to unite [in a counterattack] would result in restricting the operations of
our Navy and prevent it from gaining independent command of the seas in the Indian Ocean
as well as in the West Pacific, which [the staff] feared would cause the Dutch East Indies op-
eration to be conducted under anxiety and strain.”(24) Although the staff judged that an ad-
ditional tonnage of some half a million tons would be necessary to attain this end,(24) they
determinedly planned to accelerate the operation.
The war situation up to the day before [they started planning] (the 18th) was in outline
as follows:
Huge achievements had been made in the first engagements, which dispelled the worries
about the eastern waters for the present. The Twenty-fifth Army, which had succeeded in
carrying out a surprise landing in Malaya, had shifted to chasing the enemy after breaking
through the Jitra line by as early as 13 December, which the British Indian Army had boasted
could check the advance of the Japanese Army for at least three months. By 17 December,
the command post in Alor Setar had revised the operation plan as follows:
The Imperial Guard Division and the 5th Division shall charge toward Singapore along the west
coast, while the Takumi Detachment ([which] came ashore in Kota Bharu and is going south-
ward along the eastern coast) shall advance toward Kuala Lumpur or Gemas from the direction
of Kuantan, and facilitate the operations of the main force of the army. [On the other hand,] the
18th Division, which will be transported to Singora in the third transport, will after arrival tem-
porarily remain there on standby and, taking an opportunity, land in or near Mersing and charge
toward Kluang and Johor Bahru.
The 56th Division, which had been scheduled for transport and landing in or near Mersing
as the last corps of the Twenty-fifth Army, was now considered unnecessary for the capture
of the Malay Peninsula. The 38th Division assigned to the capture of Hong Kong broke
through the stronghold around Tai Mo Shan [Damaoshan] with unexpected swiftness, com-
pletely seized the whole of the Kowloon [Jiulong] Peninsula by 14 December, and was about
to go ahead with the landing on Hong Kong [Island]. As for the Philippines, after succeeding
in destroying the enemy air power right at the outset of the war, operations of the advance
units progressed as scheduled. The landing of the main force of the Fourteenth Army around
Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay scheduled for 22 and 24 December respectively and the sub-
sequent operations could be looked forward to with confidence, while the prospect that the
redeployment of the 48th Division to the Java operation could be carried out ahead of sched-
ule looked very good. The Kawaguchi Detachment (consisting of three battalions of the 18th
Division as its core) had made a successful landing near Miri on 16 December and the Saka -
guchi Detachment had departed from Palau on the 17th for the capture of Davao. The success
of the subsequent operations of these detachments was [also] judged unquestionable. The
2d Division stood by on the mainland [of Japan] fully prepared, while the 1st [Paratroop]
Raiding Group was preparing for departure in Kyūshū, following the instruction issued by
the chief of the Army General Staff of IGHQ on 8 December.(1) The only concern was the delay
in the schedule of capturing Rabaul by the South Seas Detachment and the [resultant] delay
in it making a U-turn to join the Dutch East Indies operation, which had been caused by the
Fourth Fleet’s failure to capture Wake Island (on 10 December). The South Seas Detachment,
which [was expected to] to capture Guam and then Rabaul, and then join the Dutch East In-
dies operation, had to wait in Guam to no purpose, even though it had captured the island
as early as 10 December, because the Fourth Fleet was in the middle of preparations to retry
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capturing Wake Island. However, the operations of the Twenty-fifth Army went so smoothly
that the 56th Division, which were to be transferred along with the 18th Division, was now
considered unnecessary for the operations in the Malay Peninsula, so the delay in the oper-
ations of the South Seas Detachment was not really worth bothering about.
What is more, that night (the night of the 18th), the 38th Division succeeded in landing
on Hong Kong Island. As described previously, the division [was among those] planned to
be redeployed to the Dutch East Indies operation. The Southern Army judged it was time to
concretize its phase-two operations (the operations for the capture of Java).
On the 19th, the Operations Section of the Southern Army, as previously described, set
its mind on advancing [the schedule of] the Java operation and on the same day informed
the staff of the Second Fleet that it wanted to conclude further arrangements between the
Army and the Navy (the arrangements for phase-two operations, i.e. the operations for the
capture of Java, which followed those concluded on 10 November) and that it was consider-
ing as subjects of the arrangements the schedule for the capture of the Dutch East Indies, the
outlines of the capture of Palembang (about [the use of] the paratroop unit and the cover
provided by the ships), matters concerning anti-submarine [measures] and shipping, etc.(24)
The Operations Section of the Southern Army set its mind on having the acceleration of
the Java operation agreed and tried to promptly conclude agreements for phase-two opera-
tions, which had been expected around day x + 40 (i.e. 17 January), ahead of schedule. As to
the reasons [why it hastened the conclusion of agreements], it has to be pointed out that apart
from the already-described general situation, and with the exception of eastern Borneo [and
further east] (which the previous arrangements already covered up to the outline for the cap-
ture of Bali), the outlines for the capture of key areas outside Java, e.g. west of Borneo and
southern Sumatra, had yet to be covered. However, now the stage had been reached where
specific arrangements for the operations to capture southern Sumatra could be concluded.
The first arrangement [necessary] concerned the operations on the west coast of Borneo,
where the Kawaguchi Detachment, which had landed in Miri on the 16th, was going to land
in Kuching on the 21st.(118) Naval planes were supposed to advance into Kuching and launch
air operations against Sumatra and western Java as soon as the Kuching airfield became
ready for use. The second arrangement [necessary] was that preparations for a Kuantan land-
ing operation were taking shape. By seizing Kuantan, air support from its airfield for the
southern Sumatra operation would become possible. The value of the Kuantan airfield had
been mentioned for the first time in Saigon on 10 December by Kumon Aribumi, a staff officer
of IGHQ.(24) The next day, the 11th, when IGHQ Staff Officer Kondō Dempachi returned to
Tokyo from Saigon, the Southern Army told him: “We are currently studying a speedup of
the operations, and [more precisely]we are considering advancing [the schedule of] the cap-
ture of Singapore by seizing Kuantan and [also] landing in Mersing and Bangka on approx-
imately day x + 60. We would like [IGHQ] to consider an increase in tonnage of 150,000 tons
in total: 50,000 tons each for the new operations, for replenishment, and for matériel.”(24)
Landing in Kuantan at this time [of the operations] had not been included in the previous
plans. The next day, the 12th, the Southern Army settled on an outline for the operations on
the east coast of Malaya.(23) In the previous plans, the 5th and the Imperial Guard Division
would advance southward along the west coast of Malaya, while the 18th Division was
scheduled to land in Singora around day x + 25 (12 January) and would head for Penang,
while the 56th Division in the subsequent transport would come ashore in Kuantan and
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Mersing around day x + 60 (6 February). In the [new] plan, this was changed: now the 18th
Division, expected to arrive first, would be used for the east coast of Malaya. [To be exact,]
two battalions of the 18th Division as the core would be put ashore in Kuantan on day x + 17
(25 December), while the main force of the 18th Division (four battalions as its core) would
be put ashore on day x + 40 (17 January) in Endau and Mersing.(23, 24) The Twenty-fifth Army
had on the whole no objection to this plan and, on the 15th, ordered the Takumi Detachment
(going southward from Kota Bharu along the east coast) to go [further] southward and act
in concert with the units landing in Kuantan. On the 17th, it unofficially disclosed the army’s
intention to the staff officers of the 18th Division, while revising its operation plan in accor-
dance with [the outline] mentioned above.(53) [Meanwhile,] on this day (the 17th), the South-
ern Army explained the Kuantan operation to the staff of the Third Air Force, the [Navy]
Malaya Unit, and the 22d Air Flotilla.(23, 24) At this time, [ the operations to] capture Davao (on
the 20th) and Jolo (on the 25th) had not yet been executed. Since the start of the study on the
southern operation in 1940, it had been consistently taken for granted that the operations via
the east of Borneo would proceed more quickly than those conducted via Malaya. However,
the sinking of two large British battleships and the smooth progress in the Malaya and British
Borneo operations had brought about these alterations [in the plans].
On this day (the 19th [when the Southern Army contacted the Navy Southern Task Force]),
out of the three land-based air flotillas of the Southern Task Force, the 21st Air Flotilla head-
quarters had moved to Palau from Taiwan.(102, 104) This flotilla was supposed to move to Davao
without delay when the Sakaguchi Detachment had captured Davao (on 20th). The 23d Air
Flotilla was still in southern Taiwan together with the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters,(102, 104)
while the 22d Air Flotilla (assigned to the [Navy] Malaya Unit) was in southern French In-
dochina.(102, 104) As mentioned previously, right before the opening of hostilities, the [Navy]
Southern Task Force attached great importance to the movements of the British fleet and con-
sidered the possibility of having to advance the 23d Air Flotilla to Kuching (scheduled to be
captured on the 21st) after the Philippines operations. However, after the sinking of the two
large British battleships, it decided to have the air flotilla advance to Jolo (scheduled to be
captured on the 25th) and then go southward along the east coast of Borneo.
The next day, the 20th, Section 1 of the Staff of the Southern Army made a proposal to ad-
vance [the schedule of] the operations for capturing Java at the staff meeting of the head-
quarters [of the Southern Army].(24) A staff officer of the Shipping Transport Command
stationed at the Saigon command post made a comment that “provided that the ships cur-
rently allocated [to the army] are not returned, it seems possible,” but Section 1 judged that
“it will probably be necessary to assign an additional 150,000 to 300,000 tons of tonnage.”(24)
On this day, the Southern Army sent a telegram to the Army Department of IGHQ to inform
it that it was considering a plan to complete the Java operation by and large by day x + 90
and requested central command’s considerations.(23, 24) [Also] on this day, Vice Admiral
Kondō, commander of the Southern Task Force, left Cam Ranh Bay and headed northeast-
ward with his main unit for the support of the landing of the 48th Division, etc. around Lin-
gayen Gulf (scheduled for the 22d).(118)
On the next day, the 21st, Col. Hattori Takushirō, chief of Section 2 (Operations Section)
of the Army Department of IGHQ, arrived in Saigon with a draft outline for operations
against Burma and to transmit the arrangements for subsequent operations.(24) While the
tasks of the Fifteenth Army (with the 33d and 55th Divisions as its core) remained the same
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as mentioned previously, IGHQ would later on divert the 56th Division (from the order of
battle of the Twenty-fifth Army) to the Fifteenth Army to have it join the Burma operation.
The Southern Army told Colonel Hattori on his arrival that the operations were making fa-
vorable progress; that it was necessary to accomplish the Java operation quickly; that for this
purpose it wanted an additional tonnage of about 150,000 tons; and that the South Seas De-
tachment did not have to be incorporated in the Sixteenth Army, and so on.(24) Colonel Hattori
agreed, and the next day, the 22d, he sent the following telegram to the chief of Department
1 (the chief of the Operations Bureau) of the Army Department of IGHQ:(23)
(Preliminaries omitted by the author)
1. The arrangements for the Malaya area operations are currently concluded between the [South-
ern] Army and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet in Cam Ranh Bay as specified in the Southern
Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 166 and will be completed today. On completion of the
arrangements, these will be passed down as an order to the Twenty-fifth Army. As for the use
of the 56th Division, it seems that the [Southern] Army is presently considering to have it land
in or around Singora at the predetermined time, and later use it for the northern Sumatra oper-
ations at the right moment.
2. The [Southern] Army is currently studying together with the shipping staff [the possibility] of
accelerating as much as possible the completion of all the operations including the Dutch East
Indies operation (which is hoped to be completed by around day x + 90). Various [details] have
to be considered concerning these arrangements, however it is [at least] necessary to additionally
requisition about 150,000 tons of tonnage. I will bring back the definite plan of these [arrange-
ments], and I would like IGHQ to go ahead with the research.
3. The [Southern] Army is studying the Burma operations based on the IGHQ plan. However,
these operations shall need to be studied in connection with Item 2 above as they involve ships
transporting the reinforcements for the Fifteenth Army.
4. Please inform me urgently whether it is possible to embark about four battalions of the 38th Di-
vision as the core from about day x + 25 to day x + 30, as these are necessary around day x + 50
for the quick capture of Bangka Island and southern Sumatra. Furthermore, also from the view-
point of the above, it would be better that the unit to be diverted from Hong Kong to the Six-
teenth Army should be transferred to the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army as soon as
possible.
5. The [Southern] Army considers it acceptable that the South Seas Detachment will not be trans-
ferred to the Southern Army if [the detachment] is needed [otherwise] in terms of general op-
erations.
As of that day (the 22d), the Navy Southern Task Force had not yet thought about advancing
the Java operation. As previously described, in the eastern area, Davao was captured six days
behind schedule. The Southern Task Force was also critical of the Southern Army’s intention
of conducting a Kuantan landing operation, which had not been in the plan. On this day, the
Southern Task Force (the Second Fleet) sent the following telegram to the Malaya Unit (the
Southern Expeditionary Fleet):(23)
Dated 22 [December], from Chief of Staff, Second Fleet
To Chief of Staff, Southern Expeditionary Fleet
We have no objection to the plan to accelerate the operations for capturing Malaya so as to
promptly gain control of the fate of Singapore. However, we would need more careful consid-
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eration if this purpose requires more reinforcement of the naval strength than [initially] planned.
Above all, we think that changing the schedule of just one area to rush forward to capture Suma-
tra should better be avoided, unless the operations in Malaya progress very smoothly. In our
opinion, the priority is to destroy the enemy’s sea power as much as possible before pulling our
decisive battle strength from the southern area. For this reason, in regard to capturing the South,
we want to accelerate the operations in Malaya and the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies as
simultaneously as possible, while taking into account the progress in both areas, and coupled
with advancing submarine units into the Indian Ocean, destroy the enemy and its key areas by
encirclement.
On the next day, the 23d, the Southern Army concluded arrangements with the [Navy]
Malaya Unit (Southern Expeditionary Fleet) in Cam Ranh Bay on the previously mentioned
Kuantan and Mersing operations, etc. (which were called “General Agreement No. 3” by the
Southern Army). They were in outline as follows:(23)
Operation Q (operation to capture Kuantan)
A unit consisting of two battalions of the 18th Division as its core shall assemble at Cap Saint
Jacques (note: south of Saigon) no later than day x + 15, depart on day x + 18, and assemble at
Singora no later than day x + 20. It shall [again] depart on day x + 21 (29 December), land in
Kuantan around the 31st under the direct escort of an element of the 3d Destroyer Squadron,
and seize the airfield near Kuantan in cooperation with the Takumi Detachment coming down
south along the east coast of Malaya.
Note: The [pronunciation of] letter ‘Q’ is equivalent to [a Japanese word with the meaning
of] “quick, rapid, or hurry.” It expresses the Southern Army’s intention at that time.
Operation S (operations against Endau and Mersing)
The main force of the 18th Division (with four infantry battalions as its core) shall depart from
Humen in southern China around day x + 31, arrive in Cam Ranh Bay no later than day x + 33.
It shall depart from Cam Ranh Bay around day x + 36 (13 January), and be put ashore in or near
Endau or Mersing under the direct escort of a unit consisting of the 3d Destroyer Squadron as
its core.
Transport of Part of the Twenty-fifth and the Fifteenth Armies
A unit under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth Army (in the 1st transport) and three infantry
battalions and others of the 5th Division, and [also] a unit under the direct control of the Fif-
teenth Army and half of the 33d Division (55 ships in total) shall leave Magong on day x + 23.
The former shall land at Singora around day x + 30 (7 January) escorted by the 5th Destroyer
Squadron (which belongs to the Philippines Unit and which provided cover for the landing of
the Tanaka Detachment at Aparri and that of the main force of the 48th Division at Lingayen
Gulf). The latter shall land in Cap Saint Jacques or Saigon around day x + 28 under cover of the
Kashii (a training cruiser), the Shimushu (a coastal defense ship), and others.
On that day (the 23d), Staff Officer Oda Akimitsu of the Sixteenth Army arrived in Saigon
with “the Sixteenth Army operation plan which had just been finalized on the 21st” in hand
in order to report [the plan to the Southern Army].(24) Having thought that the Sixteenth Army
headquarters would not leave [Tokyo] for another month or more, he was surprised to hear
about the advancement of [the schedule of] the Java operation. He decided to stay in Saigon
with only the barest necessities [he had brought with him] and sent a telegram to the head-
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quarters of the army in Tokyo, advising that the command post [of the army] be advanced
to Saigon immediately.(40)
[Also] on that day (the 23d), the main force of the [Navy Hawaii] Task Force returned to
Hashirajima in the Inland Sea.(103) However, the 2d Carrier Division was to return later due
to its cooperation in the second attack on Wake Island (which was captured on the 23d).(103)
On receipt of the previously mentioned telegram from [Colonel] Hattori, chief of Section
2, at the Army Department of IGHQ, Staff Officer Okamura Masayuki went to liaise with the
Navy Department on the next day, the 24th. On the same day, he reported the following re-
sults:(9)
1. The Combined Fleet wants to capture Ambon around day x + 30. The reasons are that it wants
to capture the island before the enemy reinforces it, and also that it wants to dispose of Ambon
quickly in order to make aircraft carriers available for [the operation to] capture Java (around
day x + 80), etc. On the other hand, Commander Yamamoto of the Navy Department wants to
have the 2d Carrier Division depart from Moji around 10 January (day x + 33) and capture
Ambon around day x + 55.
2. The Navy Department wants an increase in the strength of Detachment B assigned to capture
Ambon to three battalions if the Southern Army does not need the 56th Division for the Malaya
operation.
3. The Navy Department wants Pontianak to be captured by the Kawaguchi Detachment around
day x + 40 (17 January) so that the air operations against southern Sumatra and western Java
can be more favorably conducted.
4. The Navy Department wants the 38th Division to leave Hong Kong on day x + 40 (17 January)
and land in southern Sumatra around day x + 60 (6 February), because it will be impossible to
[carry out the operations to] capture Palembang on day x + 50 (27 January) due to [issues of] es-
cort.
5. The Navy Department wants the capture of Singapore to precede that of Medan in northern
Sumatra.
Let me add a little more explanation to the above report of Staff Officer Okamura. The first
point concerns Ambon. In the original plan, Ambon was scheduled “to be captured by the
South Seas Detachment.” Then it was changed to “to be captured by the South Seas Detach-
ment (or depending on the situation, by Detachment B).” In IGHQ’s plan it was supposed
“to be captured while seizing an opportunity.”(23) The Southern Army did not seem much in-
terested in capturing Ambon either, because it attached more importance to the line of oper-
ations directed straight toward Java. However, the unexpected battle results achieved in
various regions in the initial operations gave the Combined Fleet hope to capture Ambon at
an early moment. Ambon was a strategically important place against the U.S. and Australian
forces, and there was also a report that the Australian Army had moved into Ambon.(23) In
the meantime, as the South Seas Detachment was still in Guam waiting for the opportunity
to start for Rabaul, it was decided that Detachment B should be used [for the capture of
Ambon] instead of the South Seas Detachment (with three battalions as its core). This led
[the Navy Department] to request the reinforcement of Detachment B, originally set to consist
of two battalions as its core, to three battalions as the core. The second point is that the Naval
General Staff and the Combined Fleet considered using the strength of the First Air Fleet (an
aircraft carrier fleet) for capturing Java (around 26 February). The third point concerns the
fact that a naval plane had found a large airfield at Ledo (in the hinterland of Pontianak).(23)
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This led the Navy Department to plan this new [operation] of capturing it in order to enhance
the support for the air operations against Sumatra and western Java. [However,] on that day
(the 24th), the Kawaguchi Detachment had not yet seized the Kuching airfield. The fourth
point concerns the plan of the Southern Army to use the 18th Division, which would arrive
first, instead of the 56th Division for the east coast of Malaya, and to change the task of the
56th Division to the capture of northern Sumatra. When the Navy tried to reschedule the es-
corts for the 18th Division from southern China to Malaya, those for the previously men-
tioned units of the Twenty-fifth and the Fifteenth Armies from Magong to Singora and to
Saigon, those for the 38th Division from southern China to southern Sumatra, and those for
the main force of the Sixteenth Army from Taiwan to Cam Ranh Bay, it came to the conclusion
that for reasons of escort capacity it was impossible to let the 38th Division capture Bangka
and Palembang around day x + 50 (27 January), and that the operations for capturing north-
ern Sumatra should be executed after the capture of Singapore. [The Navy] then wondered
why the division assigned to capture Singapore could not be used for the capture of northern
Sumatra as well, and it questioned the need for the 56th Division in the northern Sumatra
operation.
As previously described, the [Navy] Southern Task Force was not exactly pleased with
the Southern Army’s changes in the plan. On that day (the 24th), however, the Navy Depart-
ment of IGHQ held a meeting with the Combined Fleet and the First Air Fleet, where they
reached the conclusions as indicated in the previously cited report of Staff Officer Okamura,
so on that day, the chief of staff of the Combined Fleet sent the following telegram to the
Southern Task Force:(23)
Dated 24 [December] from Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet
To Chief of Staff, Second Fleet
1. The Army asked our opinion about advancing [the schedule of] the southern operation. The
Combined Fleet replied that it agreed to the idea in principle and asked [the Army] to discuss
details with the Second Fleet. So you should consult with the Southern Army so as to shorten
the schedule of this operation as much as possible in view of the current war momentum.
2. The 2d Carrier Division is expected to be transferred to the Southern Task Force in the next
phase and be able to advance to Palau in early January.
3. In relation to the recent situation of enemy reinforcements coming from Australia, it is at present
necessary to promptly conquer the line from Ambon to Kupang. We would like you to study a
plan to capture Ambon as well as Tarakan and Menado simultaneously around day x + 30.
As will be explained later, from the standpoint of the Southern Task Force, it was totally un-
thinkable to seize Ambon along with Tarakan and Menado at the same time in terms of escort
strength, the situation of the Sixteenth Army and the 38th Division, etc. The Combined Fleet,
however, was very keen on the capture of Ambon.
The next day, the 25th, the Southern Task Force replied to the above-cited telegram as fol-
lows:(23, 117)
1. As for conducting the current operations in the area of the Dutch East Indies Unit, the following
plan is under consideration with due regard to the Combined Fleet classified telegram No. 929.
a) Standard schedule of capturing
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[Capture of] Tarakan around 10 January, Balikpapan and Kendari around 20 January, Ambon
around 25 January, and Timor Island around 15 February. However, [the capture of] Kendari
could be after [the capture of] Ambon depending on the situation.
b) Forces to be employed for escorting
[The escort on] the line between Tarakan and Balikpapan will be a force consisting of the
4th Destroyer Squadron as the core, and the others a force consisting of the 2d Destroyer
Squadron as the core.
2. Concerning the preparation and use of the army forces to be employed for the capture of Ambon
and Kupang, we will promptly discuss the matter with the Southern Army. However, in view
of the situation in those areas, we would like to request a favor of central command as well in
that it will consider pushing the Army to prepare particularly strong forces.
This telegram raises the question of why Menado was omitted. Concerning this matter, “land-
ing in Menado was arranged approximately day x + 23, and in Tarakan by approximately
day x + 25” in the Agreement between the Southern Army and the Southern Task Force of 10
November. However, in the meetings for the Iwakuni Agreement on 16 November, the Navy
had [presented] a plan in which the capture of Menado was scheduled a week earlier than
that of Tarakan, which made the Army demand that “both should be captured at the same
time because [these places] were the first points to be captured in the Dutch East Indies.” [At
that time,] the Navy promised to state for the record that “Menado will be captured about
the same time as Tarakan.” Still, in Operation Order No. 1 of the Philippines (Dutch East In-
dies) Unit issued on 23 November, which should have been based on the [Iwakuni] Agree-
ment, it stated that “Menado [shall be captured] around day x + 33, and Tarakan around day
x + 35.” After that, the issue remained undecided.
In the above telegram, a plan of how to employ the 2d and the 4th Destroyer Squadron
was mentioned. Actually, the destroyer squadrons [assigned to] the Southern Task Force were
the 2d to the 5th Squadrons ([according to] the standard formation, a destroyer squadron
consisted of a light cruiser and four destroyer divisions (although the 5th Destroyer Squadron
had [only] two divisions); a destroyer division consisted of two sections, and a section con-
sisted of two destroyers). They were employed as follows:(117, 118, 119, 120)
The 2d Destroyer Squadron (the [light cruiser] Jintsū and the 8th, the 15th, and the 16th Destroyer
Division): was assigned to the Philippines Unit and, with its main force, charged with the escort
of the transport convoy of the unit for capturing Legaspi, Davao, Jolo, etc.
Note: The 18th Destroyer Division was also included in the squadron formation, but it was
transferred to the [Hawaii] Task Force.
The 3d Destroyer Squadron (the [light cruiser] Sendai and the 11th, the 12th, the 19th and the
20th Destroyer Divisions): was assigned to the Malaya Unit and charged with the escort of the
transport convoy in the Malaya, British Borneo and Sumatra areas.
The 4th Destroyer Squadron (the [light cruiser] Naka and the 2d, the 4th, the 9th and the 24th
Destroyer Divisions): was assigned to the Philippines Unit and, with its main force, charged
with the escort of the Kanno Detachment to Vigan and the main force of the army to Lingayen.
The 5th Destroyer Squadron (the [light cruiser] Natori and the 5th and the 22d Destroyer Divi-
sion): was assigned to the Philippines Unit and, with its main force, charged with the escort of
the Tanaka Detachment to Aparri and the main force of the Fourteenth Army to Lingayen Gulf.
After that, it was temporarily charged with the escort of the transport convoy of the main force
of the Twenty-fifth Army and an element of the Fifteenth Army under the command of the
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Malaya Unit. Next, it was supposed to return to the Dutch East Indies Unit to escort the main
force of the Sixteenth Army to western Java.
The escort for the transport of the main force of the 16th Division from Amami ōshima to
Lamon Bay was conducted by the Commander of the 1st Base Force who had an element of
the 4th Destroyer Squadron assigned to his command.(124)
The Malaya Unit, which provided cover to the first landing (launched on the 8th) and the
second landing (launched on the 16th) of the Malaya advance corps and also to the Kawa -
guchi Detachment’s British Borneo operations (its landing was launched on the 16th at Miri),
had announced the shift of the disposition of forces to phase-two dispositions on the previous
day (the 24th).(120) Also, on the same day, the unit passed down [as an order] the outline of
Operation Q.(118) [In the meantime,] after the landing at Miri on the 16th, the Kawaguchi De-
tachment had postponed its departure for capturing Kuching scheduled for the 20th, because
it came under attack from a flying boat and three or four bombers three times on the 17th,
from two or three bombers from the direction of Kuching several times on the 18th, and from
a total of six bombers from the direction of Tarakan twice on the 19th. However, as eighteen
planes of the Malaya Unit advanced to the Miri airfield from French Indochina on the 22d,
[the detachment] departed from Miri at 1500 on the same day. It came ashore at Kuching on
the morning of the 24th (which is three days behind schedule), and seized the Kuching air-
field at 1640 on the 25th.(91, 92, 118, 130) The main unit of the Philippines Unit, which had sup-
ported the main force of the Fourteenth Army to land around Lingayen Gulf, returned to
Magong on the 23d.(103) The main unit of the Southern Task Force, which also had supported
the landing of the main force of the Fourteenth Army around Lingayen Gulf, formed the
Eastern Support Unit with the battleship Haruna and lesser vessels on the 23d, and sent it
separately toward the waters east of Mindanao, while the main force returned to Cam Ranh
Bay on the 24th.(103) The landings in Davao and Jolo were successfully carried out on the 20th
and the 25th respectively.(114, 117)
[Taking advantage of] the momentum to advance the Java operation and of the situation
described above, the Combined Fleet transmitted a preliminary order on this day (the 25th)
that “it would shift the disposition of forces to phase-two dispositions as of 1200 on the 26th,”
which was two days ahead of schedule, and officially announced the order on the next day,
the 26th.(117)
Upon receiving the above order (on the 26th), the Southern Task Force immediately issued
an order to shift the disposition of forces to phase-two dispositions.(119) At that time, the South-
ern Task Force judged that the surface ships of the allied forces had retreated mainly to the
Dutch East Indies and decided in outline on the following operational policy for phase
two.(110)
1. As the Philippines operations are for the most part finished, the Philippines Unit (i.e. the Third
Fleet) will divert most of its fleet to the Dutch East Indies operation, leaving [only] an element
of small warships in the Philippines.
2. The land-based unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet, whose main force is [still] in Taiwan, and whose
21st Air Flotilla Headquarters has advanced to Palau on the 19th) will continuously have an el-
ement of its force cooperate with the Army in its operations against Luzon from Taiwan, while
having the main force of the unit advance to Davao and Jolo to employ it in the Dutch East
Indies operation.
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3. In the Malaya area, the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army shall promptly be put ashore in
order to try to capture Singapore at an early date, while an air unit (the 22d Air Flotilla) shall be
advanced to western Borneo and northern Malaya to carry out air operations over the Java Sea
and the Malacca Strait in cooperation with the unit advanced into the eastern regions [i.e. in
eastern Borneo and further east].
4. The 5th Submarine Squadron deployed in the Malaya area shall come under the direct command
of the Southern Task Force and be advanced to Penang and further toward the Indian Ocean,
the 6th Submarine Squadron shall be advanced toward the direction of Australia, and the 4th
Submarine Squadron, while still assigned to the Malaya Unit, shall be advanced to the Java Sea
to engage in submarine warfare.
5. The [Navy] paratroop unit (i.e. the 1st and the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force assigned to
the Eleventh Air Fleet) shall be first employed for Tarakan (or depending on the situation,
Menado).
6. The 2d Carrier Division (consisting of two aircraft carriers), which shall be newly assigned (note:
expected be transferred to the Eleventh Air Fleet around 16 January), shall first of all cooperate
in the capture of Ambon.
The [Army Department of] IGHQ, which had received the previously mentioned telegram
from Colonel Hattori on the 22d, studied [the possibility of] increasing the shipping tonnage
by 150,000 tons as requested by the Southern Army, only to reply to the army on the 27th
that it could not afford to provide additional ships.(23, 24) On receiving this telegram, the South-
ern Army simultaneously learned that the Army Department of IGHQ had ordered the Ship-
ping Transport Command to prepare the return of some 300,000 tons from the South to the
homeland by the end of February.(23, 24) The Southern Army took this matter very seriously,
and immediately on the same day sent the following telegram:(23, 24)
Dated 27 [December] from Chief of Staff, Southern Army
To Vice Chief of Army General Staff
1. I received Army General Staff Telegram No. 43. It is extremely disappointing that there is no
likelihood of an additional requisition of ships. Now that it has come to this, we will study [the
matter] and do our best to manage [the necessary transportation] with the currently allocated
ships. As you are fully aware, in order to bring forward the Java operation, the [Southern] Army
is rearranging the entire [shipping plan] by calling off or putting off [some of] the transportation
of other armies, and it cannot be managed by [only] rearranging the shipping [plan] of one area.
Therefore, it would be appreciated if you understand that it cannot be decided solely by the
opinion of the Sisteenth Army as suggested in your reply.
2. Also, according to Central Shipping Transport Telegram No. 308, an order was transmitted to
the captain general of Shipping Transport Command to prepare the return of some 300,000 tons
to the mainland from January until the end of February, just when the shipping for our opera-
tions will be at its peak. As this will affect the foundation of our operation plan, we would like
to be informed of the actual situation immediately.
On that day (the 27th), the Southern Army decided to cancel Operation Q.(23, 24) This came
about as follows:(23, 24)
On completing the previously mentioned arrangements with the Malaya Unit on the 23d, the
Southern Army had passed down an order [for Operation Q] to the Twenty-fifth Army and the
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Third Air Force on the same day. The Southern Task Force also gave an order the next day, the
24th. However, even though the [Navy] Malaya Unit, the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Air
Force had for the time being consented to the Kuantan landing operation at the strong insistence
of the Southern Army and made arrangements and passed down the orders for it as previously
described, all three still had misgivings and in the end came to regard it as unsuitable.
The [Navy] Malaya Unit was annoyed because [the operation] had not been included in the
original plan and came suddenly out of the blue. Moreover, it felt that [the operation] was risky
unless it gained control over the allied air power in Singapore.
The Third Air Force thought it odd that it had to gain air control over Singapore in advance
in order to capture Kuantan for its own sake, instead of [the original idea of] capturing Kuantan
for the purpose of attacking the allied air forces in Singapore [and other places].
The Twenty-fifth Army felt that it had better not conduct the risky Kuantan landing opera-
tion, because the Takumi Detachment was coming south at a good speed along the east coast
toward Kuantan.
Nevertheless, arrangements were made and the order was passed down. Despite the efforts
of the Third Air Force and the Malaya Unit, little progress was made with the preparation and
implementation [of attacks] for gaining air control over Singapore.
The Koba Detachment (consisting of two battalions of the 18th Division as its core), charged
with the capture of Kuantan, left Guangdong on the 20th, entered the port of Cap Saint Jacques
on the 23d, [again] left it on the 25th under cover of the 3d Destroyer Squadron and arrived in
Singora on the morning of 27th. By this time, the judgment was that the Takumi Detachment
would be able to seize Kuantan by around the 31st at the latest.
On this day, both the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Air Force offered their opinion that
the Kuantan landing operation should be called off. The Malaya Unit also informed the Southern
Army on this day that it was not confident [about the operation]. That evening, the Southern
Army unwillingly decided to call off Operation Q. [In the altered plan,] the Koba Detachment
was to land in Kota Bharu and rush toward Kuantan by land.
As for western Borneo, on the previous day (the 26th), the Southern Army had sent a telegram
to the commander of the Kawaguchi Detachment (in Kuching) to “investigate and report im-
mediately on [the possibility] to seize airfields near Bara or Ledo by either land or sea as
quickly as possible in further cooperation with the Navy. The results of reconnaissance by
the air units will be forwarded later.”(23) However, on the 28th [the Southern Army] received
information from [the Army Department of] IGHQ about a road between Kuching and
Singkawang, and on the same day, ordered the detachment to prepare for the capture of Ledo
as follows:(23)
Dated 28 [December] from Chief of Staff, Southern Army
To Detachment Commander Kawaguchi
1. The road between Kuching and Singkawang seems [good enough] to be used by motor vehi-
cles.
2. We would like the Kawaguchi Detachment to be ready to seize, without missing an opportunity,
airfields near Bengkayang or, depending on the situation, a port (Singkawang or Pontianak),
which leads to these [airfields].
The 21st Air Flotilla headquarters had advanced into Davao from Palau on the previous day
(the 27th). The Sakaguchi Detachment had landed in Davao on the 20th, and the Matsumoto
Detachment had landed in Jolo on the 25th, as previously described. The 48th and the 16th
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Divisions were rushing to Manila from Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay respectively. The
Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters and the 23d Air Flotilla headquarters were still in Taiwan.
On that day (the 28th), the commander of the [Navy] Southern Task Force, estimating that
the start of [the operations for] capturing Tarakan and Menado would be around 10 January,
gave an order to his Eastern Support Unit to leave Magong at a suitable moment and advance
to the waters between Mindanao and Palau. He also indicated that the main unit of the South-
ern Task Force should leave Cam Ranh Bay on 9 January and Magong on the 14th to advance
to Palau.(120) On this day (the 28th), the Dutch East Indies Unit (the former Philippines Unit,
presently in Magong) issued [an order to shift to] phase-two dispositions.(117) The Sixteenth
Army headquarters was still located in Tokyo.
On the next day, the 29th, General Terauchi, commander in chief of the Southern Army
had a meeting with Vice Admiral Kondō, commander of the Southern Task Force, on the
heavy cruiser Atago, the flagship of the Southern Task Force, in Cam Ranh Bay to discuss ad-
vancing [the schedule of] the Java operation and informally reached an agreement.(23) This
means that they had the meeting nineteen days ahead of schedule, despite the fact that the
[previous] agreement on 10 November specified that “[a meeting for] the next agreement
will be around day x + 40.” [In the meeting,] it was informally agreed that the capture of
Bangka and Palembang would be around day x + 60 and that of Java around day x + 70 (16
February).(23) As previously mentioned, the capture of Java had been scheduled for around
day x + 103 in the IGHQ plan. On the same day (the 29th) as the above agreement was
reached, Vice Admiral Takahashi, commander of the Dutch East Indies Unit (the [former]
Philippines Unit), issued his orders concerning the Dutch East Indies operation by way of
the Dutch East Indies (Philippines) Unit Classified Order No. 3.(110)
The next day, the 30th, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama had a talk with Chief
of the Navy General Staff Nagano and requested the cooperation of the Navy in the acceler-
ation of the Java operation in the following terms.(2) [Meanwhile] the Combined Fleet, which
had captured Wake Island in the second attack on the 23d, was going to capture Rabaul in
cooperation with the South Seas Detachment in late January, and along with this [progress],
had become enthusiastic about [attacking] areas of northeastern Australia.
Needless to say, the Java operation is very difficult. [In fact,] in the light of the results of previous
studies such as war games and others, the operations against Malaya and Java were deemed
the most difficult. This can be said in particular about the air operations. As it is, in the Malaya
operation, owing to divine aid and the close cooperation between the Army and the Navy, we
were able to achieve brilliant military gains by conducting a surprise attack on the enemy. How-
ever, as for the Java operation that we will conduct shortly, we must expect that it will be ex-
tremely difficult compared to the Malaya operation, owing to the facts that the enemy has
rapidly been reinforcing its defense in the area these days, that it is more difficult to make a sur-
prise attack on Java than on Malaya, and that the enemy is getting familiar with our ways of
conducting landing operations, and so on. In view of these characteristics of the Java operation,
the Army is determined to accomplish the operation after thorough preparations. We sincerely
hope that the Navy will also closely cooperate [with the Army] in various operations, in air op-
erations in particular, so that we can fully demonstrate the essence of cooperation between the
Army and the Navy in the final stage of the southern operation.
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After obtaining the approval of central command and the Combined Fleet, on 1 January
(1942), the commander in chief of the Southern Army and the commander of the Southern
Task Force signed the draft agreement of the 29th on bringing forward the Java operation.(23)
On 4 January when the New Year functions of the Imperial Court were over, Chief of the
Army General Staff Sugiyama offered the Emperor the following report on the advance of
[the schedule of] the Java operation:(2)
Allow me to humbly offer my report on the conduct of our future operations in the southern
area. As I have often reported, the operations in the southern areas have on the whole been de-
veloping quite favorably. Enemy bases such as Hong Kong and Manila have already been seized
in land battles, and now we have come to the conclusion that the capture of Singapore will also
come about in just over one month. In sea battles, we delivered fatal blows to the U.S. and British
naval forces in the Pacific Ocean. I know that at this very moment the Imperial Army and Navy
are in full-scale pursuit of the enemy on land, at sea and in the air in the southwest Pacific. Of
course, we realize that we must stay on our guard even more so after victory and that we must
strictly guard against any failure or setback caused by negligence or carelessness. However, we
consider it appropriate to use this momentum of the war, take advantage of the fact that the
enemy has yet to recover his whole posture and promptly finish the capture of predetermined
areas such as Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies. The swift
completion of the capture of the above predetermined areas is not only advantageous for pur-
suing the southern operation itself, I also believe it is all the more imperative when considering
the conduct of the Empire’s war from a political and military strategic point of view, especially
in view of the changing state of affairs in the northern area. That is, I think that it is appropriate
to carry out the Dutch East Indies operation ahead of the initially conceived [schedule] and con-
duct the Burma operation as soon as possible. Hereafter, I will relate the details of how to bring
forward the Dutch East Indies operation and implement the Burma operation.
1. The conduct of the Dutch East Indies operation
Based on the above-mentioned judgment of the situation, the commander in chief of the South-
ern Army made the following agreement with the commander in chief of the Second Fleet on
this operation.
Although the outline of the operations against the Dutch East Indies is the same as that
which was already shown to you along with the war games, etc., the dates of conducting the
operations have been advanced in all areas ahead of schedule in the light of the present situation
where the enemy army as well as navy in the Dutch East Indies is being reinforced. That is, [we
will first] set the landing of the main force of the Sixteenth Army on Java about day x + 70 (16
February, about one month ahead of schedule) as the standard, and accordingly set the landings
in or around Bangka and Palembang, which have to precede the landing in Java, around day x
+ 60 (6 February), the landing in Ambon around day x + 48 (25 January), and in Kupang about
day x + 65 (11 February), and all operations will be directed [on this basis].
For this purpose, the 38th Division, which was charged with the capture of Hong Kong and
performed brilliantly, has quickly replaced its losses after the fall of Hong Kong, and has already
started boarding the ships in order for its main force to operate in Bangka and Palembang, and
for an element of it to operate in Ambon and Kupang as the Eastern Detachment. Likewise, the
48th Division, which was charged with the operations against the Philippines, has turned over
the remaining operations in Bataan Peninsula to other corps and is gradually assembling in
order to prepare for the Dutch East Indies operation. The commander of the Sixteenth Army,
who was standing by on the mainland, has already gone to Saigon, and the 2d Division will
successively depart from the mainland in the second half of this month.
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As this advancement of the Dutch East Indies operation changes the scheduled dates, some
tightness in shipping, escort, etc. may occur. It is also expected that the early transfer of the 48th
Division may cause to some extent a delay in destroying the enemy on Bataan Peninsula. It may,
perhaps, also somewhat delay the transportation of the 56th Division. However, from the point
of view of conducting the whole operation as we first explained, we consider [the advancing of
the schedule] appropriate. Moreover, as it is within the task you assigned to the commander in
chief of the Southern Army, the Army Department [of IGHQ], in complete unity with the Navy
Department has been providing directions to the best of its ability in order to facilitate the army
on site to accomplish the plan. In this regard, I would like you to give an order to incorporate
the 38th Division into the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army today, and later an order to in-
corporate [other] units under the direct control of other armies into the order of battle of the
Sixteenth Army.
2. The Burma operation
We have studied how to conduct the Burma operation for a long time and after doing research
with the army on site as well, for the most part completed a final draft, which I would like to
bring to your attention.
(Omitted by the author. This part explains [the Army’s plan] that, with the objective to secure
key areas in Burma after destroying the British Army as well as tightening the blockade against
China, the Fifteenth Army will advance along the line of the Salween River near Moulmein as
quickly as possible, make preparations for [subsequent] operations, and with its main force
promptly occupy key areas in central Burma from the area along the road between Moulmein
and Pegu, and that the force to be employed will be the 33d Division and the 55th Division as
its core, possibly reinforced with the 56th Division and others.)
Concerning the full-scale operations against Burma as described above, and after further
communication with the Navy, I would like to ask your favor of giving an Imperial Order to
the commander in chief of the Southern Army [to execute the operations].
In short, I have reported on the advancement of [the schedule of] the Dutch East Indies op-
eration and the implementation of the Burma operation in regard to the conduct of subsequent
operations in the southern area. Furthermore, the South Seas Detachment is expected to land
on the Bismarck Archipelago on the 23d of this month. If these operations progress smoothly
from now on, we expect to be able to complete the capture of the predetermined areas by around
the end of March. We will even more try not to make mistakes in the operation plans and thereby
promptly accomplish the original objectives. Herewith I conclude my report.
2. The Cam Ranh Agreement and Shipping Issues
Contents of the Agreement
The memorandum of agreement informally reached on 29 December in Cam Ranh Bay and
signed on 1 January was as follows:(23, 95)
General Agreement No. 4
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Commander in Chief of the Navy in the Southern
Area and the Commander in Chief of the Southern Army
1 January 1942
General Terauchi Hisaichi, commander in chief, Southern Army
V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake, commander in chief, Second Fleet
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In view of the current progress of the southern operations, the following revisions and additions
were made to the agreement of 10 November 1941:
1. Standard dates [to implement operations] of capturing
[Based on] the following standard schedule, implementation [of each operation] is to be
arranged between the relevant commanders:
2. [The Army’s] Sea transport and assignment of escort [by the Navy]
A summary of the transport [plan] of the Army and the escort to be provided [by the Navy] are
as shown in the attached chart. (Omitted by the author.)
A comparison of dates in the plan and the actual [dates of] implementation [of the operations]
concerning the places already captured is as follows:
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Date of start of landing 
Key areas to capture 
(* stands for the areas
which the Navy will cap-
ture unassisted)
Assembly points
Commanders between
whom an arrangement
should be made
Day x + 33
* Menado and vicinity
Tarakan and vicinity
Davao or Jolo
Commander in chief of the
Third Fleet
Commander of the
Sixteenth Army
Day x + 43
* Kendari and vicinity
Balikpapan and vicinity
Menado and Tarakan
Day x + 48 Ambon Davao
Day x + 53
* Makassar and vicinity
Banjarmasin and vicinity
Kendari and Balikpapan
Roughly day x + 60 Bangka and Palembang Cam Ranh
Commander in chief of the
Southern Expeditionary
Fleet
Commander of the
Sixteenth Army
Roughly day x + 65 Kupang Ambon
Commander in chief of the
Third Fleet
Commander of the
Sixteenth Army
Roughly day x + 70 Java
Luzon Island for eastern
Java
Gaoxiong for western Java
Same as above
Roughly day x + 80 Northern Sumatra Penang
Commander in chief of the
Southern Expeditionary
Fleet
Commander of the
Twenty-fifth Army
For others, the arrangements between the supreme commanders of the Army and the Navy in each area
will apply
A comparison of the schedule to capture targets yet to be captured in the agreements and
arrangements made so far and in the agreement made this time is as follows:
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Key areas captured
Agreement between the
Southern Army and the
Navy on 10 November
(General Agreement No. 2)
Arrangements between the
Fourteenth and the
Sixteenth Army and the
Navy on 16 November and
those between the Twenty-
fifth Army and the Navy on
18 November
Implementation
Batan Island, Ban Don,
Nakhon, Singora, and
Pattani
Day x (8 December) Same as on the left 8 December
Vigan and Aparri
Day x + 1
(9 December)
Day x + 2 (10 December) 10 December
Legaspi
No later than day x + 4
(12 December)
Day x + 4 (12 December) 12 December
Davao
No later than day x + 6
(14 December)
Day x + 6 (14 December) 20 December
Singora, Pattani and their
vicinities
Around day x + 8
(16 December)
16 December
Miri and its vicinity
Around day x + 8
(16 December)
16 December
Kuching
Around day x + 13
(21 December)
24 December
Jolo
Around day x + 13
(21 December)
25 December
Lingayen Gulf
By around day x + 14
(22 December)
Day x + 14
(22 December)
22 December
Lamon Bay Same as above
Day x + 16
(24 December)
24 December
Target to be captured
Central Agreement,
5 November
General Agreement
No. 2, 10 November
Iwakuni Agreement,
16 November
General Agreement
No. 4, 1 January
Menado Around day x + 23
About the same time
as Tarakan
Day x + 33
Tarakan Around day x + 25 Day x + 30 Day x + 33
Kendari Around day x + 35 Day x + 43
Confusion Caused by Bringing Forward the Java Operation
After the war, Army Commander Imamura and staff officers of the Sixteenth Army unani-
mously recalled that “the headquarters of the army were scheduled to leave Tokyo in mid-
January and we were preparing the operations; then, around 23 December, all of a sudden
the request came to advance to the South in quick order, which was followed by telegrams
urging us to come to the South. We had to wait for planes to be arranged and left Tokyo on
the 30th.” As described previously, Staff Officer Oda, who had left [Tokyo] around the 22d
to liaise with [the Southern Army], ended up remaining in Saigon. On the other hand, Lt.
Col. Ueno Shigeru, staff officer of Shipping Transport Command, who was working at its
Saigon command post and was also posted to the Southern Army, recalled the situation as
follows:
Around 20 December, the captain general of the Shipping Transport Command sent his chief of
the staff and Staff Officer Mabuchi back home to Ujina to prepare the Java operation based on
the prearranged plan, and ordered them to prepare the transport for the 2d Division, the trans-
port ships for the landing on Java, and matériel for small boats. However, in Saigon, it was sud-
denly decided to advance [the schedule of] the Java operation by one month based on the
intention of the Southern Army. We fundamentally changed the original plan, and started to
handle the shipping according to a new plan, which was in outline as follows:
1. The transportation of units under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth Army scheduled in
and after January will be slightly delayed and the transport ships will be changed.
2. The transportation of the 21st Division will be postponed so as to land in Haiphong in Feb-
ruary.
3. The transportation of the 33d Division and the units under the direct control of the Fifteenth
Army will be postponed and the transport ships will be changed.
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Balikpapan Around day x + 35 Day x + 35 Day x + 43
Makassar Around day x + 45 Day x + 54 Day x + 53
Banjarmasin
By and large around
day x + 50
Day x + 54 Day x + 53
Ambon By around day x + 60 Day x + 60 Day x + 48
Kupang By around day x + 60 Roughly day x + 65
Bali Day x + 70
Bangka and
Palembang
Day x + 85
By and large around
day x + 80
Roughly day x + 60
Java Day x + 103
By and large around
day x + 80
Roughly day x + 70
Northern Sumatra Roughly day x + 80
By the above arrangements, some 90,000 tons, consisting of eighteen transport ships, for the
main force of the 38th Division will be moved to Hong Kong around 10 January, some 210,000
tons, consisting of forty transport ships, for the 2d Division and the unit under the direct control
of the Sixteenth Army will be moved to Gaoxiong, and some 170,000 tons, consisting of thirty-
five transport ships, for the 48th Division will be moved to Lingayen, both by the scheduled
date.
Although the above arrangements were, of course, immediately communicated to [the head-
quarters in] Ujina, they had no way of knowing the intention of the Southern Army, and it seems
that no information concerning the advancement of the landings on Java was provided at that
moment by IGHQ [either]. This caused unexpected trouble. The transport ships, which left
Japan’s mainland, Dalian and Shanghai, acted against the intention of [the command post in]
Saigon. It seems that the transport ships and shipping units were confused by different instruc-
tions from Saigon and Ujina. Although it was just for one or two days, the whole shipping sit-
uation was thrown into total confusion.
The above recollections raise the question of what brought about the confusion despite the
fact that the schedule in General Agreement No. 2 (the agreement between the Southern
Army and the Navy Southern Task Force concluded at the War College on 10 November,
[which set the capture of] Java on day x + 80) did not much differ from that in General Agree-
ment No. 4 (the agreement between the Southern Army and the Navy Southern Task Force
concluded at Cam Ranh Bay on 1 January, [which set the capture of] Java on day x + 70), the
fact that General Agreement No. 2 was given as an instruction in the separate volume of
Southern Army Operation Order No. 1 (dated 15 November), and the fact that the Saigon
command post of the Shipping Transport Command (captain general: Lieutenant General
Saeki) was attached to the Southern Army. Furthermore, it raises the question of how the sit-
uation could develop in the above-mentioned way even though the Chief of the Army Gen-
eral Staff Sugiyama and other staff of the Army Department of IGHQ had been present at
the conclusion of General Agreement No. 2 at the War College on 10 November and had been
informed of Southern Army Operation Order No. 1.
The reason was that the Southern Army in Southern Army Operation Order No. 1 only
ordered the commanders of the armies, the air force, and the commander of the Kawaguchi
Detachment to make arrangements on operations with the Navy commanders concerned,
based on the excerpts of the Army-Navy Central Agreement, and the General Agreement
No. 2 (see the previous description for the original text), but the order lacked [directives con-
cerning] the shipping arrangements to back up [the above arrangements].
Most of the ships were operated under the direct control of IGHQ. (Note: For example, in
December 1942, when the southern operation was over and fierce battles were fought in the
Solomons, out of an Army tonnage of 1.26 million tons, 200,000 tons were allotted to the
Southern Army, 20,000 tons to the China Expeditionary Army, but 1.04 million tons were em-
ployed under the direct control of IGHQ.)
More specifically, in the Army Department [of IGHQ], the chief of transport and commu-
nications (the director of Department 3) under the command of the inspector general of lines
of communication (i.e. the vice chief of the Army General Staff [Lt. Gen. Tanabe Moritake])
planned the operation of ships under the direct control of IGHQ and gave instructions to the
captain general of the Shipping Transport Command (who was under the command of the
chief of Army General Staff) to operate the ships according to plan. This means that the com-
mander in chief of the Southern Army had no discretion to operate ships that were under
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the direct control of central command, nor was the captain general of the Shipping Transport
Command (Lt. Gen. Saeki Bunrō) allowed to operate such ships by order of the Southern
Army even though he was posted to the commander in chief of the Southern Army with re-
gard to the southern operation. 
Although the previously mentioned Southern Army Operations Order No.1 was distrib-
uted to the Shipping Transport Command (more precisely its command post), it believed
that the order had been distributed just for reference and paid no attention to it. Moreover,
with respect to shipping, it considered the Sixteenth Army as so-called “passengers.” Fur-
thermore, it assumed that the shipping plan indicated in the instruction issued by the chief
of the Army General Staff of the Army Department of IGHQ (i.e. the Central Agreement
[which was attached as a separate volume]) was the only one in force. Still more, as described
previously, IGHQ ([particularly] the Inspectorate General of Lines of Communication and
the Bureau of the Chief of Transportation and Communication) considered General Agree-
ment No. 2 of 10 November as an impractical idea or wishful thinking.
Whatever the case, the Southern Army was well aware of the authority of each agency
concerning such shipping operations. In this respect, the agreement between the Southern
Army and the Southern Task Force of 10 November (i.e. General Agreement No. 2) was con-
cluded to set the target they were striving after and it was something that demanded serious
consideration from the Army Department of IGHQ (and should it prove feasible, measures
for implementation). 
Distinctive Features of the Cam Ranh Agreement
The main points, which might also be called the distinctive features, of the agreement signed
on 1 January are the following:
1. [The schedule of] the landing on Java was set thirty-three days ahead of that in the Central
Agreement of 5 November, and ten days ahead of the General Agreement No. 2 of 10 Novem-
ber.
2. Judging that the capture of Singapore would be possible in early February, about one month
ahead of the originally estimated date of about day x + 100, it was decided to advance bases to
southern Sumatra, while skipping over Singapore before completing its capture. It was also de-
cided to advance a base to Ledo in western Borneo, so that naval planes could be advanced
there.
Note: Although the Southern Army insisted that Bangka and Palembang should be captured
on day x + 50, it turned out that [the Navy] could not manage to provide escort forces at
sea, and that it would take days to seize the airfield at Ledo and make it ready for use, so
the date [to capture these places] was set around day x + 60.(9, 23, 24, 119) On 6 January, the
Southern Army ordered the Kawaguchi Detachment to capture Ledo.(23)
3. As previously described, setting the capture of Tarakan and Menado on different days had been
an issue, but it was agreed to set the date to capture both places on the same day [in this agree-
ment]. [However,] it was put off by about three days due to the delay in the capture of Davao
and Jolo, etc.
4. [The date to] capture Ambon was set on day x + 48 because, as previously mentioned, the Com-
bined Fleet strongly demanded its capture at an early date. It was decided to use Detachment
B for the capture instead of the South Seas Detachment and the force to be employed for De-
tachment B was increased to three battalions as requested by the Navy.(9, 24) It was [also] decided
to return the South Seas Detachment [to the control of the Army Department of IGHQ].
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5. The starting point of the operations to capture Tarakan, Menado and Ambon [editor’s note: the
text mistakenly says Palau] was changed from Palau to Davao,(119) for reasons that Davao was
already seized and that the city was advantageous from a geographical point of view and the
capacity of its base.
6. The capture of Bali was not included [in the agreement], for reasons that not sufficient time for
its capture was expected any longer due to the extremely shortened schedule, that, unlike at the
time of the Iwakuni Agreement, [the operations to] capture Southern Sumatra, Ledo and Kupang
were set before the capture [of Java], and that an increase in lines of operation would cause a
shortage of forces to be employed for escort.
7. The cooperation of an element of the Carrier Task Force (i.e. the 2d Carrier Division with the
aircraft carriers, Sōryū and Hiryū) in capturing Ambon was included in the plan.(110) [However,]
at the time of the conclusion of this agreement, it was not [yet] determined whether or not the
main force of the Carrier Task Force would cooperate in the operation to capture Java.
8. It was planned that the Navy air unit would advance into Borneo (including Ledo) and further
east, and with a part also into Malaya and southern Sumatra, whereas the army air unit would
advance into southern Sumatra from Malaya.(23, 24)
9. It was [also] planned that the Twenty-fifth Army would capture Malaya only with the 5th Di-
vision, the Imperial Guard Division, and the 18th Division, and that, after the capture of Singa-
pore, a part of the army was to capture northern Sumatra; the 56th Division was given up so
that [the division could join] the Burma operation.(23, 100)
Shipping Routes and Ships
The tonnage allotted to the Sixteenth Army for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies in the
Cam Ranh Agreement was a total of 910,000 tons, in about 178 ships.(23) The breakdown was
as follows:(23)
Until the first landing in Java: 610,000 tons in about 118 ships
The second landing in Java and thereafter: 300,000 tons in about 60 ships
Note: The number of ships and tonnage are those specified in General Agreement No. 4. The same
applies hereinafter.
The amount of tonnage, the shipping routes and the schedules for each corps, detachment,
etc. were planned as follows:(23)
Sakaguchi Detachment: [shall be provided with] about 46,000 tons in total in eight ships.
[The detachment] shall leave Jolo or Davao on 8 January (day x + 31), sail under the direct
escort of the Navy, land in Tarakan on 10 January (day x + 33); shall leave Tarakan on 17 Jan-
uary (day x + 40), sail under the direct escort of the Navy, land in Balikpapan on 20 January
(day x + 43); shall leave Balikpapan on 27 January (day x + 50), sail under the direct escort
of the Navy, and land in Banjarmasin on 30 January (day x + 53).
Eastern Detachment (Detachment B, consisting of three battalions of the 38th Division): [shall
be provided with] about 40,000 tons in total in about seven ships.
[The detachment] shall leave Hong Kong on 9 January (day x + 32), sail under the direct es-
cort of the Navy, stay at Davao from 16 January (day x + 39) to 18 January (day x + 41); shall
leave Davao on 19 January (day x + 42), sail under the direct escort of the Navy, land in
Ambon on 25 January (day x + 48); shall leave Ambon on 7 February (day x + 61), sail under
the direct escort of the Navy, land in Kupang on 11 February (day x + 65). The ships shall
stay at Kupang for debarkation until 12 February (day x + 66).
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Main force of the 38th Division (consisting of four battalions as its core): [shall be provided with]
about 90,000 tons in total in about 18 ships.
[The unit] shall board in Hong Kong in the period from 11 January (day x + 34) to 19 January
(day x + 42), leave Hong Kong on 20 January (day x + 43), sail under a light direct escort or
under an indirect escort, stay in Cam Ranh Bay [for the period] from 25 January (day x + 48)
to 29 January (day x + 52); shall leave Cam Ranh Bay on 30 January (day x + 53), sail under
the direct escort of the Navy, land in Bangka and Palembang on 6 February (day x + 60).
Disembarkation shall be completed on 7 February (day x + 61) and on 10 February (day x +
64) in Bangka and Palembang respectively.
Core unit of the 48th Division: [shall be provided with] about 220,000 tons in total in about 45
ships.
[The unit] shall board in Luzon Island in the period from 1 February (day x + 55) to 7 Feb-
ruary (day x +61), leave Luzon on 8 February (day x +62), sail under the direct escort of the
Navy, land in the vicinity of Surabaya on 16 February (day x + 70). Disembarkation shall be
completed on 19 February (day x + 73). Of these ships, a tonnage of 170,000 tons in total in
35 ships shall comprise those which shall gather in Gaoxiong from the 21st to the 27th of
January, and a tonnage of 50,000 tons in total in about 10 ships shall comprise those which
shall gather in Gaoxiong from 3 December to 27 January from the mainland, Manchuria and
Korea, China, etc.
Core unit of the 2d Division: [shall be provided with] 160,000 tons in total in about 30 ships.
[The unit] shall board in Osaka in the period from 11 January (day x + 34) to 19 January (day
x + 42), sail under the indirect escort of the Navy, and stay at Gaoxiong during the period
from 29 January (day x + 52) to 5 February (day x + 59); shall leave Gaoxiong on 6 February
(day x + 60), sail under the direct escort of the Navy, and land in the vicinity of Batavia on
16 February (day x + 70). Disembarkation shall be completed on 19 February.
Unit under the direct control of the [Sixteenth] Army, which shall land in western Java: [shall
be provided with] 50,000 tons in total in about 10 ships.
[The unit] shall board in China in the period from 23 January (day x + 46) to 27 January (day
x + 50), leave on 28 January (day x + 51), stay at Gaoxiong from 2 February (day x + 56) to 5
February; shall leave on the next day, the 6th (day x + 60), sail under the direct escort of the
Navy, land in western Java on 16 February (day x + 70). Disembarkation shall be completed
on 19 February.
The Army started the war with a tonnage of about 2.1 million tons,(23) of which about 1.75
million tons was used for the southern operation as of 25 November. The breakdown was:
about 1.5 million tons in troopships, about 150,000 tons in military supply ships, and about
100,000 tons in special purpose ships. Out of the troopships, about 1.45 million tons was in
use and about 50,000 tons was held in reserve.(23)
Around the time of the Cam Ranh Agreement, the main shipping related to the southern
operation was as follows:(23) Transportation of the main force of the Fourteenth Army to the
Philippines was completed ([more precisely, the transport of] the 48th Division to Lingayen
[was completed] on 22 December, and that of the 16th Division to Lamon Bay on 24 Decem-
ber), and the first and the second landing of the Malaya advance corps (consisting of the
main force of the 5th Division, etc.) had [also] been completed ([respectively] on 8 December
and on 16 December).(118, 119, 120, 124, 125)
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Units on Board [and in Transit Around the Time of the Cam Ranh Agreement]
Main force of the 33d Division and an element of the unit under the direct control of the Fifteenth
Army (about 70,000 tons [in total]): After departing from eastern China, [the unit] left
Magong on 31 December and arrived in Bangkok on 10 January.
Three battalions of the 5th Division and the first unit of the unit under the direct control of
Twenty-fifth Army (about 330,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] left Magong on 31 December
and arrived in Singora on 8 January.
Main force of the 18th Division and part of the unit under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth
Army (about 170,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] was supposed to land in Endau and Mersing,
and left the area of Guangdong on 7 January and arrived in Cam Ranh on 10 January.
Second unit under the control of the Twenty-fifth Army (210,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] was
supposed to head for Malaya from China, [but] that seems to have been changed.
65th Brigade (50,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] was heading for the Philippines from Taiwan,
leaving Gaoxiong on 30 December. It arrived in Lingayen on 1 January.
Sakaguchi Detachment (46,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] was using the ships for operations in
Davao and Jolo.
Note: The tonnage was as specified in the Central Agreement. The same applies hereinafter.
Units in the Middle of Embarking and Those About to Embark Shortly 
An element of the Imperial Guard Division and others (170,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] was
supposed to head for Malaya from French Indochina and Thailand.
Main force of the 21st Division (about 100,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] was supposed to head
for French Indochina from northern China. (Its transportation was postponed, and [conse-
quently] it left Qingdao on 20 January and arrived in Haiphong on 3 February.)
Main force of the 56th Division (about 100,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] was supposed to head
for Malaya from Kyūshū.
The Twenty-fifth Army had arranged with the [Navy] Malaya Unit on 18 November to “land
near Endau and Mersing around 6 February.” (This was also postponed. [The unit eventu-
ally] started assembling in Moji on 11 February and left Moji on the 16th to be transported
to Burma.)
2d Division (160,000 tons [in total]): [The division] was heading for Taiwan from the mainland
(and later for Java [as its destination]).
Fifth Air Force (100,000 tons [in total]): As the Philippines operations were almost over, [the
group] was heading for Thailand.
Units Embarking in the Beginning or Middle of January
Half of the 33d Division (70,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] will head for Thailand from eastern
China.
Part of the 21st Division (50,000 tons [in total]): [The unit] will head for French Indochina from
northern China.
Third unit of the unit under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth Army (110,000 tons): [The unit]
will head for Malaya from southern China.
Units Embarking in Late January
38th Division (190,000 tons [in total]): [The division] will head for the Dutch East Indies from
Hong Kong.
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Units Embarking from Mid-February Onward
Units for capturing Java consisting of the 2d and the 48th Division as its core (830,000 tons [in
total]): [The units] will head for Java from Taiwan, French Indochina and the Philippines.
As described previously, in order to meet the advanced schedule of the Java operation, the
Saigon command post (attached to the Southern Army) of the Shipping Transport Command
allotted the ships it managed to make available for transporting the units for the Java oper-
ation by such arrangements as putting off the transportation of the 21st, the 33d, and the 56th
Divisions and the units under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth and the Fifteenth Armies,
or by transporting them in smaller units at a time over a longer period.(27) Fortunately, the
damage and loss of ships since the opening of hostilities was smaller than expected. Accord-
ing to a report of the Shipping Transport Command, the damage and loss for fifty-five days
from 4 December to 27 January was as follows:(23)
Sunk: 20 ships (115,000 tons [in total])
Too damaged to be used: 8 ships (48,000 tons [in total])
In total: 28 ships (163,000 tons [in total])
The shipping situation at the time of the Cam Ranh Agreement was as described above. Later,
on 15 January, ships to be used by the Sixteenth Army for the operations against Java (ex-
cluding ships for the Sakaguchi and the Eastern Detachment) were determined as follows:(24)
Transport ships
First transport: 220,000 tons for the main force of the army, 210,000 tons for the 48th Divi-
sion, and 130,000 tons for the 38th Division, making a total of 560,000 tons. 
Second transport: 150,000 tons
Third transport: 100,000 tons
In total: 810,000 tons
Ten extra-large [motorized landing] craft, 170 large-sized motorized [landing craft], 170 small-
sized motorized [landing] craft, 5 armored craft, 5 Type–A high-speed craft, 6 Type–B high-
speed craft, 80 boats with Yanmar engines, and 20 small lighters.
3. The Orders from [the Army Department of] Imperial General
Headquarters 
The 38th Division captured Hong Kong on 25 December and made a triumphal entry into
the city on the 28th.(53) The 48th Division, which had landed at Lingayen Gulf on 22 December,
occupied Manila on 2 January in concert with the 16th Division, which had landed at Lamon
Bay on 24 December.(53) The Twenty-fifth Army kept on advancing southward, setting itself
the goal to complete the capture of Singapore by 11 February (Empire Day).(53)
As previously described, on 4 January, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama pre-
sented a report about advancing [the schedule of] the Java operation to the Emperor.(2) [Ac-
cordingly, the Army Department of] IGHQ issued the following orders to transfer units for
the Dutch East Indies operation:(1)
138 Chapter V     /     Decision to Advance the Java Operation and the 
Sixteenth Army
IGHQ Army Department Order No. 585 of 4 January(1)
Units to be transferred from the order of battle of the Twenty-third Army in southern China to
the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army as of 1200 on 4 January:
38th Division
2d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion (under the supervision of the 3d Division)
5th Independent Antitank Gun Battalion (under the supervision of the 16th Division)
One element of the 14th Telegraph Regiment (under the supervision of Southern China Area
Army)
5th Field Gas Company B (under the supervision of the 2d Division)
18th Field Gas Company B (under the supervision of the 7th Division)
17th Water Supply and Purification Department (under the supervision of the 1st Division)
Note 1: “Supervision” means that, for example, when “under the supervision of the 3d Divi-
sion,” the mobilization or formation of this unit was supervised by the 3d Division.
Note 2: On this day, by IGHQ Army Department Order No. 584, [the Army Department of]
IGHQ transmitted to the South Seas Detachment (in Guam) an order “to capture Rabaul
as quickly as possible after about mid-January in cooperation with the Navy.”(1)
IGHQ Army Department Order No. 588 of 14 January(1)
The 48th Division shall be removed from the order of battle of the Fourteenth Army to be incor-
porated into that of the Sixteenth Army. The transfer of command [to the Sixteenth Army] shall
take effect when it departs from a port in Luzon. However, the commander of the Sixteenth
Army is allowed to give commands concerning preparations for operations prior to this [trans-
fer].
On 29 January, the Twenty-fifth Army was pressing on Johor Bahru.(23) The implementation
of the Java operation was finally taking concrete shape. However, as previously described,
the Southern Army’s request for an additional allotment of 150,000 tons of shipping was re-
fused and the tonnage would not be enough however hard it tried to juggle the ships.(23, 24)
[As a result, the Army Department of] IGHQ decided to cancel the transfer of the units which
on 6 November had been ordered to join the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army but which
might not be able to make it from Manchuria in time. Instead, in order to reinforce the Six-
teenth Army, it decided to divert some units of the Fourteenth Army and the Southern Army,
etc. in the Philippines and other areas to the Sixteenth Army, and issued the following order:(1)
IGHQ Army Department Order No. 594 of 29 January
The following units shall be removed from the order of battle of the Southern Army, the Four-
teenth, and the Twenty-fifth Armies to be incorporated into that of the Sixteenth Army. The
transfer of command [to the Sixteenth Army] shall take effect when the unit leaves port at its
current location for the Dutch East Indies operation.
1. Units to be diverted from the order of battle of the Southern Army to that of the Sixteenth Army
23d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (minus the Antiaircraft Searchlight Company): (Twenty-first
Army)
138th Railway Depot headquarters (B): (Home unit, 5th Division)
2. Units to be diverted from the order of battle of the Fourteenth Army to that of the Sixteenth 
Army
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8th Independent Antitank Gun Company: (16th Division)
10th Independent Antitank Gun Company: (Home unit, 4th Division)
4th Tank Regiment: (Fifth Army)
45th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B): (Home unit, 6th Division)
48th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B): (20th Division)
30th and 31st Independent Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battery: (Home unit, 3d Division)
3d Independent Engineer Regiment (A), (horse-carried): (2d Division)
One battalion of the 6th Railway Regiment and one element of its Material Depot (Northern 
China Area Army)
5th Independent Radio Platoon (motorized): (China Expeditionary Army)
51st and 52d Independent Radio Platoon (motorized): (Home unit, 5th Division)
40th Fixed Radio Unit: (Home unit, 5th Division)
26th Bridge Building Material Company: (Home unit, 3d Division)
13th River-crossing Material Company: (Home unit, 51st Division)
14th River-crossing Material Company: (53d Division)
209th Independent Motor Transport Company: (Home unit, Imperial Guard Division)
258th and 259th Independent Motor Transport Company: (Home unit, 4th Division)
38th Patient Transport Platoon: (2d Division)
8th Water Supply and Purification Department: (1st Division)
3. Units to be diverted from the order of battle of the Twenty-fifth Army to that of the Sixteenth 
Army
2d Tank Regiment (minus one light tank squadron): (Home unit, Imperial Guard Division)
34th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B) (Home unit, Imperial Guard Division)
35th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (minus an element) (B): (Home unit, Imperial Guard 
Division)
28th Motor Transport Regiment: (Home unit, 51st Division)
45th Independent Motor Transport Battalion: (Home unit, 3d Division)
212th Independent Motor Transport Company: (Home unit, Imperial Guard Division)
307th and 308th Independent Motor Transport Company: (Taiwan Army)
4. Unit to be diverted from the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army to [that of] the Kwantung Army
8th Tank Regiment: (Eastern District Army)
5. Units to be diverted from the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army to [that of] the Fifth Army in
Manchuria
42d Field Road Unit: (56th Division)
44th Field Road Unit: (Home unit, 57th Division)
6. Unit to be diverted from the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army to [that of] the Twentieth 
Army in Manchuria
16th Field Well-drilling Company: (52d Division)
Note: The [organization] in parentheses above is the unit that supervised the mobilization or
formation of the units.
After a course of events, which will be described later, the convoy of the main force of the
Sixteenth Army would leave Cam Ranh Bay for Java on 18 February. Just before that day, on
the 16th, [the Army Department of] IGHQ issued the following order increasing units:(1)
IGHQ Army Department Order No. 600 of 16 February
The following [unit] shall be incorporated into the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army as of its
departure from a port in the mainland:
5th Fixed Radio Unit: (under the supervision of the Northern District Army)
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[Consequently,] just before landing on Java, the main units of the Sixteenth Army were the
following:
2d Division
38th Division
48th Division
56th Mixed Infantry Group
4th Tank Regiment and 2d Tank Regiment (minus [one] light tank squadron)
17th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
2d and 5th Independent Antitank Gun Battalion, and the 8th and the 10th Independent Antitank
Gun Company
16th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment and 23d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (minus the Anti-
aircraft Searchlight Company); 44th, 45th and 34th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B), 35th
Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B) (minus an element); 30th and 31st Independent Field
Antiaircraft Artillery Battery
(Engineer units and others are omitted. The details are as shown in the appended table.)
4. The Southern Army’s Operational Direction
The Orders to Prepare for the Capture of Java and the Aviation Plan
From the start of its research on the southern operation in the summer of 1940 until the de-
cision to open hostilities, the Southern Army had consistently thought that the operations
heading for Java via the east of Borneo would make faster progress than those heading for
Java via Malaya. However, the reality was that after the opening of hostilities, with two
British battleships sunk and the Twenty-fifth Army starting to charge [southward] at a good
speed in Malaya, the capture of Davao was, as previously described, six days behind schedule
in the eastern area. [Consequently,] the Southern Army gave the following order to the
Twenty-fifth Army as early as 23 December:(23)
Southern Army Order Saigon, 23 December
1. The overall operations of the Southern Army are progressing as scheduled.
2. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly capture Singapore.
3. The commander of the Twenty-fifth Army shall promptly seize Singapore in the following man-
ner:
a) He shall expand the military gains attained so far, and swiftly capture Singapore from the
direction of the west coast of Malaya.
b) By and large by day x + 23, he shall raid and secure the enemy airfield near Kuantan with a
part [of the army]. Furthermore, he shall have a corps land in or near Endau or Mersing at
a favorable opportunity to facilitate the operations of the main force of the army. The coop-
eration with the Navy for the above operations will be based on General Agreement No. 3.
Around the time of passing down the above order, the Southern Army expected that the op-
erations in Malaya would progress faster than those in the east of Borneo theater. It planned
to sharply accelerate the operations in Malaya and in western Borneo, and by [speeding up
and] synchronizing the operations in the east of Borneo theater with those in west, carry out
the landing operations in both eastern and in western Java simultaneously at an early date.
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On 28 December, the Southern Army ordered the Kawaguchi Detachment to prepare for cap-
turing Ledo.(23)
On 3 January, Lieutenant General Imamura, commander of the Sixteenth Army, arrived
in Saigon with his chief of staff, Okazaki, and other personnel of the command post [of the
army].(32) The next day, the 4th, the Southern Army showed the Sixteenth Army what it in-
tended to do, explained General Agreement No. 4 signed on 1 January, and gave its views
on the operations of the Navy, its plan of how to use the [transport] ships, its operation sched-
ule and their relation to the air operations, etc.(24) Army Commander Imamura firmly stated
that he “fully agreed to bringing forward the Java operation.”(24)
Although, as previously described, the Kuantan landing operation ordered by the South-
ern Army order of 23 December had been called off on the 27th,(23) the Takumi Detachment
seized [the town of] Kuantan on the 31st and the Kuantan airfield on 3 January, and from the
4th onwards it put its all into making the airfield ready for use.(23, 53)
Now the problem to be immediately addressed in the western theater was the capture of
Ledo. As for the Endau and Mersing landing operations ordered by the Southern Army order
of 23 December, the departure [of the units in charge] from Cam Ranh Bay was scheduled
for day x + 36 (13 January), and the main force of the 18th Division was preparing for board-
ing in Humen, southern China. (It left Humen on 7 January and arrived in Cam Ranh on 10
January.(53))
On 5 January, the Southern Army ordered the Sixteenth Army to prepare for capturing
Java and the next day, the 6th, it ordered the Kawaguchi Detachment to capture the airfield
in Ledo.(23) The reason why these orders were issued in reverse order was that the prepara-
tions of the Kawaguchi Detachment for capturing Ledo were delayed,(23) as will later be de-
scribed in detail. The order given to the Sixteenth Army was as follows:(23)
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 32
Southern Army Order Saigon, 5 January
1. The overall operations of the Southern Army are progressing as scheduled.
2. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly prepare for capturing Java. The cooperation
with the Navy shall be based on General Agreements No. 2 and No. 4.
3. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall prepare for capturing Java in the following man-
ner:
a. By and large around day x + 60, he shall secure key resource areas in Bangka Island and
southern Sumatra with part [of the army], and promptly make air bases [there] ready for
use.
b. He shall seize Ambon and Kupang as quickly as possible. When the major part of the oper-
ation in Ambon is achieved, he shall turn over the guarding [of the place] to the Navy.
4. The Third Air Force shall closely cooperate in the Sixteenth Army’s operation against Bangka
Island and southern Sumatra, while continuing its previous mission. It shall destroy the air
power of the enemy in Sumatra in a timely manner.
5. The captain general of the Shipping Transport Command shall closely cooperate in the opera-
tions conducted by the commanders of the Sixteenth Army and the Third Air Force.
6. I will [command from] Saigon.
Count Terauchi Hisaichi, commander in chief of the Southern Army
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The order given to the Kawaguchi Detachment [by the Southern Army] on the 6th was as
follows:(23)
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 34
Southern Army Order Saigon, 6 January
Detachment Commander Kawaguchi shall promptly seize, mainly by land, the airfields near
Bengkayang and the ports in Dutch Borneo, which lead to these [airfields].
From the start, the Southern Army had the idea to divert the Fifth Air Force, assigned to the
Fourteenth Army, to the operations in Thailand [and neighboring areas] when the Philippines
operations were for the most part over and assign it mainly to the Burma operation. Now, as
Manila was completely occupied on 2 January and the [Army Department of] IGHQ had re-
cently revealed its concept for the Burma operations, the Southern Army issued an order on
8 January to put the Fifth Air Force under the direct control of the army mainly to conduct
air operations in Burma in direct cooperation with the operations of the Fifteenth Army, but
also to cooperate with the Third Air Force with heavy bomber units when required at the
time of the attack on Singapore.(23) On 10 January, the Southern Army drew up a supplemen-
tary plan for its air operations, including a concretization of the preparations for the Java op-
eration.(2) The following is an excerpt from this plan of items concerning the Java operation:
Supplement to the Southern Army’s Air Operation Plan
Southern Army Staff, Section 4, 10 January
I. Mission
1. In quick response to the rapid progress in the overall operations, the air units of the Southern
Army, in conjunction with the Navy air units, shall extend the military gains achieved since
the opening of hostilities, fiercely pursue and destroy the British and Dutch air forces so as
not to give them opportunities for reinforcement, and closely cooperate with operations of
each army. 
3. For the frequent and rapid advancement of bases and the continuous air operations we ex-
pect the lines of communication to be beyond reproach.
II. Outline of Operations
5. For the period of capturing Singapore and destroying the enemy air power in Sumatra (from
around 1 January to around 5 February)
(1) The Third Air Force shall have its main force attack key military facilities of the enemy
near Singapore, while at the same time destroying the enemy air power in Malaya and
northern Sumatra, and with an element of its force directly cooperate in the operations
of the Twenty-fifth Army. It shall anticipate the possibility that it may temporarily have
to cooperate with its full force in the Twenty-fifth Army’s attack on Singapore.
(4) The Navy air unit is supposed to promptly advance its main force to the bases in western
Borneo near Kuching or Ledo and an element of its force to northern Malaya and strive
to destroy the enemy warships near Singapore and the enemy air power in Singapore,
eastern Sumatra and Java. The details shall be arranged separately.
6. For the period of capturing Sumatra and Java (from around 1 February to around 25 Febru-
ary)
(1) The Third Air Force shall promptly destroy the enemy air power in Sumatra and coop-
erate with an element of the Sixteenth Army in its attack on Bangka and Palembang.
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When air bases on Bangka Island and in southern Sumatra become ready for use, it shall,
without missing any opportunity, move forward as much strength as possible to swiftly
destroy the enemy air power in western Java. At the same time it shall closely and di-
rectly cooperate in the landing operation of the main force of the Sixteenth Army. It shall
cooperate in subsequent operations [as well] while advancing its bases into Java one
after another.
(3) (a)The Navy air unit shall still have its main force in western Borneo and an element of
it in northern Malaya and is supposed to try to destroy the enemy warships and air
power in western Sumatra and Java.
(b) Concerning the air operations in the operation for capturing southern Sumatra,
arrangements shall be directly made between the Sixteenth Army, the First Southern
Expeditionary Fleet (note by the author: the Southern Expeditionary Fleet was re-
named the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet on 3 January), and the Third Air Force.
(c) The Eleventh Air Fleet is supposed to advance its bases into Celebes and southern
Borneo to try to destroy the enemy warships and air power in eastern Java and [also]
cooperate in the landing operations of part of the Sixteenth Army in eastern Java.
(d) The arrangements for the air operation to support the Sixteenth Army’s operation in
western Java shall be directly made between the Third Air Force and the 22d Air
Flotilla, those in the landing operations in eastern Java shall be directly made between
the Sixteenth Army and the Eleventh Air Fleet.
7. For the period of the northern Burma operations (about 25 February onwards)
(1) The Third Air Force shall cooperate with the army in securing stability in Sumatra and
Java with an element of its force for each area, and also cooperate with an element or the
main force of its fighter plane and heavy bomber units in the Fifth Air Force’s operations
when required. At the same time, it shall prepare for subsequent operations.
9. From March onwards we shall carry out the operations while preparing for sudden changes
in [the state of affairs in] the north at any time and [also] gradually change our position so
that it will be easier to secure a long-lasting stability of the key areas in the South as well as
to carry out air operations in Burma.
III. Disposition of forces to be employed and summary of the operations
10. For the period of capturing Singapore and destroying the enemy air power in Sumatra
(1) In order to destroy the enemy air power in and around Singapore, airfields in Ipoh and
Kuantan shall be ready for use by around 10 January.
(2) When required, two heavy bomber air groups of the Fifth Air Force shall be diverted to
cooperate in the attack on key places in Singapore.
(3) When required, the Third Air Force shall cooperate with its full strength in the Twenty-
fifth Army’s crossing of the Johor Strait.
(4) In consideration of the next operations, transport units and Type–1 fighter plane units
shall at the right moments be scheduled for maintenance in order to keep up military
strength.
(5) Just after the capture of Singapore, the following transfer shall be arranged:
a. The 73d Independent Squadron and one-third of the 84th Airfield Battalion of the
Twenty-fifth Army shall prepare to be transferred to the Sixteenth Army.
b. (Omitted by the author.)
(6) The preparation of Kluang and Kahang airfields for the southern Sumatra operation shall
be completed by around 31 January.
(7) The transfer of the main force of the Fifth Air Force from the Philippines to Thailand
shall be completed by and large by 25 January.
11. For the period of capturing Sumatra and Java
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(1) Main points of cooperation with part of the Sixteenth Army in capturing southern Suma-
tra
(a) By 31 January the deployment of fighter plane units in Kluang, Kahang and Batu
Pahat, light bomber air groups in Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur, and heavy bomber air
groups in Ketil, Alor Setar and Ayer Tawar shall be completed.
(b) Force to be employed: 9 command reconnaissance planes, 40 Type–1 fighter planes,
30 Type–97 planes, 9 assault planes, 20 twin-engine light bombers, and 30 heavy
bombers. 
(c) The units mentioned in the previous item, except for the heavy bomber unit, shall be
pushed forward when airfields in southern Sumatra are ready for use.
(d) Air ground support units that have landed in Sumatra under the command of the
Sixteenth Army shall be transferred to the Third Air Force when they have completed
the preparation of the airfields.
(e) Detailed arrangements with the Navy shall be made between the Sixteenth Army,
the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and the Third Air Force.
(2) Main points of cooperation with the main force of the Sixteenth Army in capturing Java
(a) Mentok, Palembang and Tanjungkarang, which are to be used as bases, shall be
promptly seized and made ready for use. 
(b) Forces to be employed: same as mentioned in the previous item.
(c) As soon as air bases on Java are ready for use, air units shall advance their bases one
after another. At that time, air ground support units under the command of the Six-
teenth Army shall be transferred to the Third Air Force.
(d) For this period, the 73d Independent Squadron and one-third of the 84th Airfield Bat-
talion of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be transferred to the Sixteenth Army.
(e) The arrangements for the air operations in western Java shall be directly made by
the end of January between the Third Air Force and the [Navy] 22d Air Flotilla.
(f) The Eleventh Air Fleet and the Third Fleet shall cooperate in the air cover for the
landing operations in eastern Java. Arrangements in detail shall be directly made be-
tween the Sixteenth Army and the above Navy units. 
(g) Subsequent operations to destroy the enemy air power on the Australian front shall
be carried out under the responsibility of the Navy by using bases in eastern Java
and the Lesser Sunda Islands.
(3) Cooperation in the capture of northern Sumatra by an element of the Twenty-fifth Army
(4) Main points of cooperation with the Fifteenth Army in the Burma operation (omitted by
the author)
12. Main points of cooperation in air operations in the final stages of the Burma operation (omit-
ted by the author)
13. As for the use of XX Units (note by the author: paratroop raiding units), although the main
goal is to let them cooperate in the operation to capture Palembang, their exact use shall be
decided depending on the situation of the enemy air [power], the timing of the arrival of
the units, and the situation of our bases, etc.
14. The disposition of air units in the final phase of Operation A-Gō [southern operation] is
planned as follows:
(The rest omitted by the author.)
The outline of the cooperation of the air units in the Java operation was arranged in the fol-
lowing way: the Army shall let the Third Air Force support the operation by advancing the
force from Malaya via southern Sumatra to western Java; [it shall also] put an element of the
ground support units of the Third Air Force under the command of the Sixteenth Army and
have it seize airfields upon landing and make them ready for use; the Navy shall let the 22d
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Air Flotilla (which shall [temporarily] be transferred from the command of the Eleventh Air
Fleet to the control of the [Navy] Malaya Unit) support the operation from the west coast of
Borneo with its main force and from Malaya with an element; [it shall also] let its air unit
(i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) advance the 21st Air Flotilla southward from Davao to Celebes
and the 23d Air Flotilla from Jolo to eastern Borneo, and have them support [the army’s]
landings in Java from [the bases in] southern Celebes and southeastern Borneo [respectively].
The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group (consisting of its headquarters led by Col. Kume Sei-
ichi, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment led by Maj. Takeda Takeo, the 2d [Paratroop] Raid-
ing Regiment led by Maj. Kōmura Takeo, and its air unit led by Maj. Niihara Sueto), which
had been given the order for provisional formation on 1 December, completed its formation
on the 5th at Nyūtabaru, Miyazaki [Prefecture].(93) Then, on the 8th, it received an instruction
issued by the chief of the Army General Staff of the Army Department of IGHQ, which read,
“[the group] shall successively proceed to the South and place itself under the command of
the commander in chief of the Southern Army,”(1) and, on the 19th, first of all the 1st Regiment
left Moji on the Meikō-maru.(93) On 1 January, Lt. Col. Kinoshita Hideaki, attached to the
Group, reported to the headquarters of the Southern Army and informed them that “the
[Paratroop] Raiding Group consists of an air unit of three squadrons and two regiments of
ground troops, making a total of 1,500 men. It is going to assemble either in Saigon or Phnom
Penh. Assembling is expected to be complete in mid-January.”(23) However, an unexpected
accident happened just after this. The Meikō-maru, which transported the 1st [Paratroop]
Raiding Regiment sank on 3 January at 15º15’ north 112º55’ east due to a spontaneous com-
bustion of incendiary bombs.(23) Although it was fortunate that all the officers and men were
rescued by the escorting destroyers, because they had foreseen [the explosion] just before it
happened and jumped into the sea, they suffered an outbreak of paratyphoid fever, which
dealt them a mental as well as physical blow.(23) Group Commander Kume, after arranging
a hasty dispatch of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment, left Takanabe ahead by air on 8 Jan-
uary, put himself under the command of the Southern Army on the same day, and went
ahead to Phnom Penh.(23)
Shipping Operations
As soon as it was decided to bring the Java operation forward, Lt. Gen. Saeki Bunrō, captain
general of Shipping Transport Command, drew up a plan that (1) the transport of troops of
units unrelated to the Java operation should generally be postponed by ten to twenty days,
(2) the allotment of ships for units scheduled to be transported after January should be com-
pletely changed, and (3) ships scheduled to be in dock [for repair] but which were still usable
should be assigned for short-distance transport, and their docking should be postponed for
the present. He generally decided to operate the ships in the previously described way, but
worked it out as follows:(27)
Operations related to the Eastern Detachment (Detachment B)
An element of the 5th Anchorage headquarters and one half platoon of the 104th Sea Duty Com-
pany were moved from Cam Ranh Bay to Hong Kong, and put under the command of the East-
ern Detachment Commander on 5 January in Hong Kong. In addition, one company of the 14th
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Independent Engineer Regiment was put under the command of the Eastern
Detachment Commander on 5 January in Hong Kong.
Five transport ships, 40,000 tons in total, were allotted to the Eastern De-
tachment: the Miike-maru, the Zen’yō-maru, the Ryōyō-maru, the Yamaura-maru,
and the Africa-maru. They were scheduled to leave Hong Kong around 12
January and assemble in Davao around 20 January.
Operations related to the main force of the 38th Division
The main force of the 5th Anchorage headquarters, the headquarters and one
company of the 14th Independent Engineer Regiment, one company of the
26th Independent Engineer Regiment, and one and a half platoon of the 104th
Sea Duty Company were put on standby in Cam Ranh until the arrival of the
main force of the 38th Division (from Hong Kong), and were put under the
command of the commander of the 38th Division in Cam Ranh on 20 January.
The 65th Construction Duty Company was moved from the mainland to Hong Kong, and put
under the command of the commander of the 38th Division in Hong Kong on 12 January.
Eighteen transport ships, 120,000 tons in total, were allotted to the main force of the 38th Di-
vision: the An’yō-maru, the Tajima-maru, the Ōyō-maru, the Tacoma-maru, the Mansei-maru, the
Alaska-maru, the Shinkyō-maru, the Gin’yō-maru, the Rakuyō-maru, the Makassar-maru, the Shin-
sei-maru No. 1, the Toyofuku-maru [Hōfuku-maru], the Argun-maru, the Lima-maru, the Buyō-maru,
the Boston-maru, the Meigen-maru, and the Singapore-maru. The force was scheduled to board in
Hong Kong on 18 January, complete assembling in Cam Ranh Bay on 24 January and finish
changing ships by 31 January.
The Shōji Detachment (two battalions of the 38th Division as its core, [scheduled for] Java)
Six transport ships, 40,000 tons in total, were allotted to the detachment: the Taigen-maru No. 3,
the Naples-maru, the Calcutta-maru, the Suwa-maru, the Kōzan-maru, and the Glasgow-maru. The
detachment was scheduled to board in Hong Kong, leave [there] on 30 January, and assemble
in Cam Ranh Bay.
The main force of the Sixteenth Army (the 2d Division as its core)
The 40th Anchorage headquarters, the 120th Shore Duty Company and the 67th Construction
Company embarked from the mainland on 10 January and were seconded to the Sixteenth Army
commander in Gaoxiong. The main force of the 6th Independent Engineer Regiment, two pla-
toons of the 10th Independent Engineer Regiment, and the 59th Sea Duty Company were moved
to Gaoxiong, and seconded to the Sixteenth Army commander in Gaoxiung on 27 January. 
Forty [editor’s note: only 39 are mentioned in the text] transport ships, 220,000 tons in total,
were allotted to the force, and after the boarding at Ujina and other ports in the mainland, they
were scheduled to sail successively to Gaoxiong under the direct escort of the 9th Cruiser Divi-
sion to assemble there. (Five ships were boarded and left on 15 January, six ships on the 16th,
twenty-one ships on the 18th and the 19th, and, other than these, seven other ships were boarded
and left from [other] ports on the mainland. Apart from these, one other ship joined in Gaoxiong
by 4 February.) Most of the ships were scheduled to finish assembling by 25 January and then
start the changing of ships and other [preparations].
The [allotted] transport ships were: the Aden-maru, the Biyō-maru, the Tsurushima-maru, the
Tōhō-maru [A], the Dainichi-maru, the Brazil-maru, the Tōfuku-maru, the Taihei-maru, the Akagisan-
maru, the Hōeisan-maru, the Taiei-maru, the Shinshū-maru, the Colombia-maru, the Pacific-maru, the
Heian-maru, the Tōsei-maru, the Zuishō-maru, the Taizan-maru, the Haridono-maru [Somedono-
Captain General of the
Shipping Transport
Command
Lt. Gen. Saeki Bunrō
Chapter V     /     Decision to Advance the Java Operation and the 147
Sixteenth Army
maru?] the Fushimi-maru, the Erii-maru, the Uchide-maru, the Nichiwa-maru, the Suwa-maru, the
Shinanogawa-maru, the Genoa-maru, the Toyooka-maru, the Tempei-maru, the Maebashi-maru, the
Taketoyo-maru, the Teikai-maru, the Tatsuno-maru, the Atsuta-maru, the Sydney-maru, the Kaimei-
maru, the Toyama-maru, the Ryōga-maru, the Kōyō-maru, and the Reiyō-maru. The hospital ships
the Hōrai-maru and the Mizuho-maru, and the air defense ships, the Ayato[san]-maru and the
Ryūjō-maru were [also] included in the convoy.
Operations related to the 48th Division
The 45th Anchorage headquarters and the 121st Shore Duty Company were moved from Osaka
to Gaoxiong. They boarded the transport ships for the 48th Division at Gaoxiong on 20 January
[along with the division], and were seconded to the 48th Division commander in Lingayen. The
26th Independent Engineer Regiment, the 39th Sea Duty Company and the 68th Construction
Duty Company were [also] made to board the transport ships for the 48th Division at Lingayen
on 30 January.
Thirty-six transport ships, 210,000 tons in total were allotted to the division: the Yamagiku-
maru, the Kenkon-maru, the Hague-maru, the Nankō-maru, the Aden-maru, the Kōnan-maru, the Jo-
hore-maru, the Takaoka-maru, the Holland-maru, the Hokkō-maru, the Kyokusei-maru, the Taiei-maru
[Daiei-maru], the Kenzan-maru, the Anzan-maru, the Himalaya-maru, the Havre-maru, the Arizona-
maru, the Chōkō-maru, the Nisshū-maru [Nichihide-maru], the Biyō-maru, the Italy-maru, the Asaka-
maru, the Kashū-maru, the Yoneyama-maru, the Hakuroku-maru [Hakushika-maru], the Teiyō-maru,
the Hamburg-maru, the Denmark-maru, the Arabia-maru, the Tokushima-maru, the Miyadono-maru,
the Jinsan-maru [Jinzan-maru], the Wales-maru, the Suez-maru, the Tamon-maru, and the Yasukawa-
maru. Apart from these, the Satsuma-maru, the Minryō-maru and the Hozugawa-maru were also
assigned. Most of these ships were made to assemble by 31 January, and four ships by 4 February
in Lingayen. Other than these, the faster ships, the Sasako-maru and the Sagami-maru, were made
to leave Saigon on 31 January to arrive at Lingayen Gulf on 5 February. (The background of this
will be described later.)
The transport convoys were assigned the following armed protection:(27)
[The convoy of] the 38th Division (including the Eastern Detachment and the Shōji Detachment)
Three air defense ships were included, which mounted twenty-one antiaircraft guns, seven field
guns and some antiaircraft machine guns. Since the number of transport ships for the 38th Di-
vision was twenty-nine ships in total, this meant one gun per transport ship on average.
[The convoy of] the 48th Division
To the total of thirty-six transport ships two air defense ships were added, which mounted
twenty-four antiaircraft guns, thirty field guns and twenty-two machine guns, which meant
two guns per transport ship on average.
[The convoy of] the main force of the Sixteenth Army
Forty transport ships were joined by two air defense ships, the Ayatosan-maru and the Ryūjō-
maru, which mounted forty-four antiaircraft guns, twenty-four field guns and twenty machine
guns, which meant two guns per transport ship on average.
The reason why the captain general of the Shipping Transport Command arranged the ship-
ping transport in the above-mentioned way was that he had received the following order
from the commander in chief of the Southern Army on 30 December:(23)
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Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 24
Southern Army Order Saigon, 30 December
1. I intend to prepare for Operation H (note by the author: this indicates the Dutch East Indies op-
eration in a broad sense and the Java operation in a narrow sense).
2. The captain general of the Shipping Transport Command shall conduct the preparatory trans-
portation of the Sixteenth Army for Operation H. From now on, the 1st and the 2d Debarkation
Group commanders shall be seconded to him in regard to the operation of ships allotted to the
Southern Army and the shipping in preparation of Operation H.
3. The following units shall be put under the command of the Sixteenth Army commander:
1st Debarkation Group headquarters ([from] the Fourteenth Army)
6th Independent Engineer Regiment (minus one company (minus two platoons)) ([from] the
Fourteenth Army)
28th Independent Engineer Regiment ([from] the Fourteenth Army)
10th Independent Engineer Regiment (minus two companies (minus one platoon)) ([from] the
Fourteenth Army)
14th Independent Engineer Regiment headquarters and one company ([from] the Twenty-fifth
Army)
One company of the 26th Independent Engineer Regiment ([from] the Twenty-fifth Army)
Main force of the 5th Anchorage headquarters ([from] the Shipping Transport Command)
39th Sea Duty Company ([from] the Fourteenth Army)
59th Sea Duty Company ([from] the Twenty-fifth Army)
104th Sea Duty Company (minus one platoon) ([from] the Shipping Transport Command)
68th Construction Duty Company
The commanders of the Fourteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and the captain general of the
Shipping Transport Command shall put the units which are listed above and which are under
their command under the command of the Sixteenth Army commander. The transfer of com-
mand will start at 0000 on 10 January for the units to be transferred from the Fourteenth Army
and at 0000 on 3 January for the units to be transferred from the Twenty-fifth Army and the
Shipping Transport Command.
4. (Omitted by the author)
5. The commanders of the Fourteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies shall put the following units
under the command of the captain general of the Shipping Transport Command:
Main force of the 1st On-board Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment ([from] the Twenty-fifth Army)
2d On-board Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Its main force [from] the Twenty-fifth Army; an
element [from] the Fourteenth Army)
1st Ship Repair Depot ([from] the Fourteenth Army)
2d Ship Repair Depot ([from] the Twenty-fifth Army)
Shipping Signal Regiment (Its main force [from] the Twenty-fifth Army; an element [from] the
Fourteenth Army)
Vessel Launching Unit ([from] the Twenty-fifth Army)
Transfer of command will start at 0000 on 10 January.
(The rest omitted by the author.)
Based on this order from the Southern Army, the captain general of the Shipping Transport
Command, Lt. Gen. Saeki Bunrō, issued on 1 January the following order and took the fol-
lowing measures:(23)
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Order 1 January
1. The Southern Army is preparing for Operation H. For that purpose, the units listed in Separate
Volume No. 1 shall be newly put under the command of the Sixteenth Army commander and
the units listed in Separate Volume No. 2 shall come back under my command. Further, from
now on the 1st and the 2d Disembarkation Group commanders shall be seconded to me in re-
gard to the operation of ships allotted to the Southern Army and the shipping in preparation of
Operation H.
2. I intend to arrange the shipping for Operation H.
3. The 1st Disembarkation Group commander [Maj. Gen. Itō Shinobu] shall handle the ship units
(including boats, matériel, fuel; the same applies hereinafter.) to be newly put under the com-
mand of the Sixteenth Army commander based on Separate Volume No. 3 and prepare the ship-
ping for Operation H.
4. The 2d Disembarkation Group commander [Maj. Gen. Tanabe Suketomo] shall closely cooperate
with the 1st Disembarkation Group commander in regard to the transfer of the ship units listed
in Separate Volume No. 3 that shall be removed from the command of the Twenty-fifth Army
commander and put under the command of the Sixteenth Army commander.
5. The commanders of the 1st and the 2d On-board Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments shall be located
in Saigon and in Gaoxiong respectively, and mainly prepare for antiaircraft and antisubmarine
self-defense related to the shipping for Operation H based on Separate Volume No. 4, while
continuing their current tasks. When the operation is conducted, they are supposed to directly
take part in it as shall be instructed separately.
6. The commander of the Shipping Signal Regiment shall be located in Saigon, and mainly prepare
for communications related to the shipping for Operation H according to Separate Volume No.
5, while continuing his current tasks.
7. The commander of the 1st Ship Repair Depot shall still continue his current tasks in Singora.
The commander of the 2d Ship Repair Depot shall visit Cam Ranh and Gaoxiong, repair broken
or damaged vessels, and arrange matériel related to the shipping for Operation S (note by the
author: the Endau and Mersing operation) and Operation H, while preparing for subsequent
actions.
8. The commander of the Vessel Launching Unit shall conduct the move involved in the transfer
of the ship units listed in item 4. After that, he shall prepare the movement of ships for Operation
H.
9. Colonel Yoshimura in Ujina shall be assigned to prepare the shipping for Operation H, in par-
ticular, to make a plan and arrange the shipping of the 2d Division, the units attached to the di-
vision, and the units under the direct control of the [Sixteenth] Army that accompany the
division.
10. The commander of the Southern China Shipping Unit shall prepare the shipping for Operation
H in Guangdong and Hong Kong. In particular, he shall arrange the embarkation of the 38th
Division.
11. The 1st Anchorage superintendent shall prepare the shipping for Operation H in Saigon and
Cam Ranh. In particular, he shall facilitate the arrangements at the assembly spot of the transport
ships in Cam Ranh.
12. The commander of the Gaoxiong Anchorage shall prepare the shipping for Operation H in Tai-
wan. In particular, he shall facilitate the arrangements at the assembly spot of the transport
ships.
13. Colonel Yoshimura in Ujina, the commander of the Southern China Shipping Unit, the 1st An-
chorage superintendent and the commander of the Gaoxiong Anchorage shall cooperate with
each unit concerned in regard to the shipping in items 3 to 8 above.
14. I shall be in Saigon.
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(Separate Volume No. 1) (Omitted by the author. Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 24-3)
(Separate Volume No. 2) (Omitted by the author. Same as above No. 24-5)
(Separate Volume No. 3) 
Operation H, Ship Units Allotment Plan
Detachment B (with two battalions of the 38th Division as its core):
An element of the 5th Anchorage headquarters
One company of the 14th Independent Engineer Regiment
One half platoon of the 104th Sea Duty Company
Boats: 2 extra-large [motorized landing] craft, 20 large motorized [landing] craft, 20 small mo-
torized [landing] craft, 1 armored craft, 1 Type–A high-speed craft, and 1 Type–B high-speed
craft. 
Main force of the 38th Division:
Main force of the 5th Anchorage headquarters
Headquarters and one company of the 14th Independent Engineer Regiment
One company of the 26th Independent Engineer Regiment
104th Sea Duty Company (minus one and a half platoon)
67th Construction Duty Company (from the mainland)
Boats: 8 extra-large [motorized landing] craft, 35 large motorized [landing] craft, 35 small mo-
torized [landing] craft, 1 armored craft, 1 Type–A high-speed craft, and 1 Type–B  high-speed
craft, and 20 boats with Yanmar engines.
48th Division:
45th Anchorage headquarters
28th Independent Engineer Regiment
121st Shore Duty Company (from the mainland)
39th Sea Duty Company (minus one platoon)
50th Construction Duty Company
Boats: 10 extra-large [motorized landing] craft, 60 large motorized [landing] craft, 60 small mo-
torized [landing] craft, 2 armored craft, 2 Type–A high-speed craft, and 2 Type–B  high-speed
craft, 30 boats with Yanmar engines, and 10 small lighters
2d Division:
40th Anchorage headquarters
Headquarters, two companies, and two platoons of the 6th Independent Engineer Regiment
Two platoons of the 10th Independent Engineer Regiment
120th Shore Duty Company
One platoon of the 39th Sea Duty Company
59th Sea Duty Company
65th Construction Duty Company
Boats: 10 extra-large [motorized landing] craft, 60 large motorized [landing] craft, 60 small mo-
torized [landing] craft, 2 armored craft, 2 Type–A high-speed craft, and 2 Type–B high-speed
craft, 30 boats with Yanmar engines, and 10 small lighters
As previously described, the sudden advancement of [the schedule of] the Java operation
brought absolute chaos to the shipping operations. On the night of 31 December, Lieutenant
General Saeki, captain general of the Shipping Transport Command, sent from the Saigon
command post the following classified military telegram (note: classified military telegrams
are sent by priority) in order to unify the transport:(23, 27)
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The situation has changed. From now on, all ships involved in the southern
operation shall be operated under the orders of Saigon regardless of the orig-
inal plan or the directions from Ujina.
With this telegram, [control of] the movements of the transport ships was
changed and taken over by Saigon. By 2 January, it succeeded in bringing
everything under the sole command of Saigon.(27)
As previously described, the Southern Army issued an order to trans-
fer the 1st Disembarkation Group to the Sixteenth Army on 30 [Decem-
ber], when the 1st Disembarkation Group was assembling in Gaoxiong
after the Philippines operation. On 5 January, Maj. Gen. Itō Shinobu,
commander of the group flew from Gaoxiong to Saigon, where he re-
ceived orders from the headquarters of the Southern Army and the com-
mand post of the Shipping Transport Command, and returned to Gaoxiong. [He] came under
the command of the commander of the Sixteenth Army on 10 January.(94)
Transfer of the 38th and the 48th Divisions [to the Sixteenth Army]
As previously told, IGHQ ordered the change in the order of battle of the 38th and the 48th
Divisions on 4 January and 14 January respectively. For the 38th Division, which had held a
triumphal entry into Hong Kong on 28 December, and was assembling to prepare for its next
operation,(53) this posed no problems. However, the 48th Division, which had seized Manila
on 2 January, was [still] facing the U.S.-Filipino Army on the Bataan Peninsula and the situ-
ation in Bataan was rather precarious. At that time, the Southern Army was considering to
divert the 48th Division and many other ground units to the Java operation and to divert the
Fifth Air Force to the Burma operation; in fact, it had already ordered the air unit on 1 January
to prepare itself.(23) In order to discuss the diversion of forces [with the Fourteenth Army]
and arrange it to their mutual satisfaction, Commander in Chief of the Southern Army Ter-
auchi dispatched Aoki Shigemasa, vice chief of staff of the Southern Army, [to the Philip-
pines]. Lieutenant General Aoki dropped by the headquarters of the Fourteenth Army in
Cabanatuan on 4 January and went on to Manila on 5 [January], where he conferred with the
chief of staff of the [Fourteenth] Army, Lt. Gen. Maeda Masami, and other officers.(23, 53) The
Fourteenth Army agreed on the whole, but made the following requests:(53)
1. It would like the extraction of the Independent Engineer Regiment (A) and the Railway Regi-
ment to be reconsidered because [many] roads and railways on Luzon Island had been de-
stroyed.
2. The extraction of the 48th Division from the Bataan front required that the 65th Infantry Brigade
(which had started landing around Lingayen on 1 January) would take its place. In addition,
[the army] would like to hold a memorial service in Manila around 15 January before the diver-
sion of troops to other theaters. Therefore, it would like the diversion to be implemented after
that date.
3. It would like the heavy bomber air groups and fighter plane air groups to remain [in the Philip-
pines].
In response to [these requests], Lieutenant General Aoki stated that leaving the Railway Reg-
iment was reasonable, but that the 48th Division should be assembled in Lingayen in time
1st Disembarkation
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for boarding the ships between 1 and 7 February for the Java operation, and that leaving the
air unit [in the Philippines] would be very difficult.(53) He returned to Saigon on the 8th,(24)
where it was decided that the diversion of the 48th Division would be implemented as dis-
cussed with the Fourteenth Army; that, regrettably, from the railway regiment one battalion
would be transferred to the Sixteenth Army, while its main force (consisting of two battalions)
would be kept [in the Philippines]; that the heavy field artillery [units] which the 48th Divi-
sion requested to keep under its command would not be extracted from the Fourteenth Army
and that those for the Sixteenth Army would be transferred from the Twenty-fifth Army
(note: the heavy field artillery [units] to be transferred from the Twenty-fifth Army were still
in Manchuria), and that all of the Fifth Air Force would be diverted to the Thailand theater,
etc.(24) On the same day, the Southern Army immediately issued an order to divert the Fifth
Air Force,(23) and also issued orders to successively divert the ground units to the Sixteenth
Army, as will be explained later.
The diversion of the 48th Division, which after seizing Manila was spearheading the attack
on Bataan, should have been a matter of careful consideration. However, at that time, the
thought of bringing forward the Java operation was dominant, and the staff officers of the
IGHQ who accompanied Lieutenant General Aoki as observers also held the same view as
the Southern Army. [So] on 9 January, the 48th Division was relieved on the front line by the
65th Brigade.(80)
The Transfer of Other Units
Along with the decision to bring forward the Java operation, the Southern Army issued the
following orders for the transfer of units to the Sixteenth Army:(23)
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 24 of 30 December:(23)
The 1st Disembarkation Group headquarters and other units related to shipping, eleven
units in total (described above)
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 25 of 1 January:(23)
One company of the 14th Independent Engineer Regiment (D)
This unit handled the shipping of the Eastern Detachment, which [the Army Department
of] IGHQ had transferred from the Twenty-third Army to the Southern Army.
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 27 of 3 January:(23)
The 23d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (minus the Antiaircraft Searchlight Company)
This unit was ordered to transfer from the Imperial Guard Infantry Group in Saigon to the
command of the Sixteenth Army.
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 29 of 4 January:(23)
The 50th Construction Duty Company
This unit was transferred from the Fourteenth Army to the command of the Sixteenth Army,
and simultaneously the 68th Construction Duty Company, which was delayed, was put
under the command of the Fourteenth Army [instead].
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 30 of 4 January:(23)
The 2d Tank Regiment (minus [one] light tank squadron), the 45th Independent Motor Trans-
port Battalion, and the 212th, the 307th, and the 308th Independent Motor Transport Com-
pany
These units were under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army, but still were stuck north
of Taiwan due to transport delays.
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 33 of 5 January:(23)
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The 34th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B) and the 35th Field Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion (minus one battery) (B)
These were also under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army.
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 37 of 15 January:(23)
An element of the 25th Air Signal Unit (i.e. two radio squads), an element of the 2d Meteor-
ological Company (two weather observation details), and the 7th and the 33d Airfield Com-
panies
These units were transferred from the air unit of the Southern Army to the command of the
Sixteenth Army in Cam Ranh, and were expected to accompany the 38th Division’s units in
the capture of Sumatra to repair and make the air bases ready for use.
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 38 of 15 January:(23)
The 4th Air Ground Support headquarters, the 24th Airfield Battalion, the 28th Airfield Bat-
talion, an element of the 1st Air Signal Regiment, the 9th Field Airfield Construction Unit,
an element of the 9th Field Aircraft Repair Depot, the 298th Independent Motor Transport
Company, the 123d Ground Duty Company, and the 4th Meteorological Company
These units were engaged in the Philippines operation under the orders and command of
the Fifth Air Force. Aiming to transfer these units to the Sixteenth Army to have them
promptly repair air bases upon seizing them, the Southern Army, already on 1 January, had
ordered that “[the units] shall prepare for redeployment to take part in the Dutch East Indies
operation under the command of the Sixteenth Army.”(23)
The 8th and 10th Independent Antitank Gun Companies, the 4th Tank Regiment, the 45th
and the 48th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions (B), the 30th and the 31st Independent
Field Antiaircraft Artillery Batteries, the 3d Independent Engineer Regiment (A), one bat-
talion of the 6th Railway Regiment and an element of the Material Depot, the 5th, the 51st,
and the 52d Independent Radio Platoons (motorized), the 40th Fixed Radio Unit, the 26th
Bridge Building Material Company, the 13th and the 14th River-crossing Material Compa-
nies, the 209th, the 258th, and the 259th Independent Motor Transport Companies, the 38th
Patient Transport Platoon, and the 8th Water Supply and Purification Department
These units were engaged in the Philippines operations. As previously described, their trans-
fer from the Fourteenth Army was decided upon as a result of the conference with the vice
chief of staff [of the Southern Army], Aoki.
The 138th Railway Depot Headquarters (B)
This unit was expected to move from French Indochina to Gaoxiong, come under the com-
mand of the Sixteenth Army, and conduct works related to the capture of the railway [sys-
tem] in Java.
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 41 of 18 January:(23)
The 28th Motor Transport Regiment
This unit used to be under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army and was in Gaoxiong at
that time.
As previously mentioned, the transfer of the majority of the above units was later ordered
by [the Army Department of] IGHQ in the form of a change in the order of battle.
The Order for Capturing Java
Due to developments that will be explained later, the capture of Tarakan and Menado was
carried out on 11 January, a day behind schedule ([as specified in] the Cam Ranh Agreement,
i.e. General Agreement No. 4).
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After that, the Navy met with difficulties and found it increasingly impossible to keep to
the schedule of the Cam Ranh Agreement. On 19 January, the Southern Army received a
telegram from the Navy Southern Task Force in which it requested a delay of about ten days
in the schedule. However, the Southern Army was firmly determined to carry out the oper-
ation as specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement. Knowing that the Sixteenth Army had yielded
to the request of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and postponed the capture of Tarakan by
one day (from 10 to 11 January), the scheduled date of the capture of Balikpapan by four
days (from 20 to 24 January) and that of Ambon by 6 days (from 25 to 31 January, the details
of which will be described later), the Southern Army was displeased about this and the next
day, the 20th, it resolutely issued the following order to carry out the capture of Java:(23, 24)
Southern Army Order Saigon, 20 January
1. The overall operations of the Southern Army are progressing as scheduled.
2. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly capture Java. The cooperation with the Navy
shall be based on General Agreement No. 2 and No. 4.
3. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall swiftly capture Java in the following manner:
(a) Exploiting the results of having gained command of the air over Java, he shall land his main
force in western Java and almost simultaneously an element [of his army] in eastern Java.
When conducting the landing operations, he should expect interference from the naval and
air forces of the enemy. 
(b) After the landing, he shall defeat the enemy and promptly seize Batavia, Surabaya and Ban-
dung.
(c) He shall swiftly make air bases in Java ready for use.
4. The commander of the Third Air Force shall assist in the Sixteenth Army’s operation in the fol-
lowing manner:
(a) As soon as the airfields on Bangka Island and southern Sumatra have been made ready for
use, he shall advance there, without missing an opportunity, as much strength as possible,
swiftly destroy the enemy air power in western Java, and directly and closely assist in the
landing operations of the main force of the Sixteenth Army.
(b) As soon as the air bases in Java are ready for use, he shall swiftly advance an element of his
group.
5. The captain general of the Shipping Transport Command shall closely assist in the operations
conducted by the commanders of the Sixteenth Army and the Third Air Force.
6. I shall [command from] Saigon.
Count Terauchi Hisaichi, commander in chief of the Southern Army
5. The [Navy] Southern Task Force’s Shift to Phase-Two 
Operations
The Shift to Phase-Two Operations
As previously told, the Southern Army had divided the southern operation into three stages,
and set the capture of the Philippines, Malaya and British Borneo as the first stage and the
capture of Java as the second stage. On the other hand, as previously mentioned, the Navy
Southern Task Force had divided the southern operation into four stages, and set the period
up to the completion of covering the landing of the main force of the Fourteenth Army in
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the Philippines as the first stage, the period up to the completion of covering the landing of
the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army in Malaya as the second stage, and the Java operation
as the third stage.
As already mentioned, the Navy’s shift to phase-two operations was implemented first
by the Malaya Unit (the Southern Expeditionary Fleet), then by the Combined Fleet, then by
the Southern Task Force (the Second Fleet), then by the Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit
(the Third Fleet), and then by the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet), in that order.
The Malaya Unit: On having completed the escort of the first transport of the Malaya ad-
vance corps (consisting of the main force of the 5th Division, the Takumi Detachment, etc.)
and the covering of its landing (on 8 December), the covering of the landing (on 16 December)
of the second transport of the Malaya advance corps (the horse trailers of the units in the
first transport, etc.), the escort and the covering of the landing of the British Borneo Unit (the
Kawaguchi Detachment) (in Miri on 16 December and in Kuching on the 24th, which on the
20th was rescheduled from the 21st to the 24th), and moreover on having concluded an
arrangement (General Agreement No. 3) with the Southern Army on the escort for subse-
quent transports (such as those of the three battalions of the 5th Division, and the main force
of the 18th and the 33d Divisions, etc.), the Malaya Unit issued an order to shift to second
phase dispositions on the 23d and implemented it on the 24th.(118) The contents of the arrange-
ment concluded on the 23d were as follows:(23)
1. The Koba Detachment, which would leave Cap Saint Jacques on 26 December and land in Kuan-
tan on 31 December via Singora, would be directly escorted by an element of the 3d Destroyer
Squadron.
2. The three battalions of the 5th Division, the first [transport] units under the direct control of the
Twenty-fifth Army, the main force of the 33d Division, and the units under the direct control of
the Fifteenth Army, which were to assemble in Magong from the mainland, Manchuria and
Korea, Taiwan and China, would be directly escorted by the core unit of the 5th Destroyer
Squadron, temporarily transferred from the Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit. They were
scheduled to leave Magong on 31 December, and land in Singora and southern French Indochina
on 7 and 5 January respectively.
3. The main force of the 18th Division, which was scheduled to leave Guangdong on 7 January,
arrive in Cam Ranh on the 10th, leave the bay on the 13th, and land in Endau and Mersing on
the 17th, would be directly escorted by the 3d Destroyer Squadron.
The Combined Fleet: Despite the fact that the Southern Task Force was critical of bringing
forward the Java operation, the Combined Fleet discussed it with the Navy General Staff,
and sent a telegram on the 24th that it agreed to the idea of bringing forward the Java oper-
ation, that it was hoping in particular for an early seizure of Ambon, and that it was [also]
considering letting the 2d Carrier Division take part in the operation. It transmitted a pre-
liminary order on the next day (the 25th) that it would shift to phase-two dispositions two
days ahead of schedule, and implemented the shift as of 1200 on the next day, the 26th.(117, 119)
The commander of the Southern Task Force had departed from Cam Ranh Bay on the
20th with his main unit to provide cover for the landing of the main force of the Fourteenth
Army around Lingayen Gulf (expected to start on 22 December). The landing of the Four-
teenth Army went smoothly, and since on the other hand the moment to launch the Dutch
East Indies operation was drawing near, he issued an order on the 23d to form and dispatch
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the Eastern Support Unit (note: the Eastern Support Unit reached Magong on the same day,
then headed for the waters southeast of Mindanao), while he himself returned to Cam Ranh
Bay with the rest of his main unit on the 24th. There he received the order of the Combined
Fleet to shift to phase-two dispositions, and on the 26th he gave orders to shift to phase-two
dispositions. At the same time, he decided to have the 5th Destroyer Squadron, which had
been diverted to the Malaya Unit from the Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit, rejoin the
Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit upon completion of its escort duties from Magong to
French Indochina and Malaya.(117, 118, 119, 120) As for himself, partly due to the cancellation on
the 27th of the Kuantan landing operation, he decided to leave Cam Ranh Bay after conclud-
ing agreements with the Southern Army (on and after the 29th [of December]) with his main
unit on 9 January, sail to Magong for replenishments, and leave Magong on the 14th to ad-
vance to Palau. He gave his orders on 28 [December] and advanced to Palau on 18 January.(103,
120) The phase-two operational policy of the Southern Task Force was as previously described.
The commander of the Philippines (Dutch East Indies Unit) had sallied forth from
Magong on the 19th with his main unit to support the landing of the main force of the Four-
teenth Army around Lingayen. As the landing seemed to go smoothly, he returned to
Magong on the 23d, where, when learning that the landings in Davao on the 20th had been
successful, that the Southern Task Force had issued an order to form and dispatch the Eastern
Support Unit on the 23d, that the landing by the main force of the 16th Division around the
Lamon Bay on the 24th had started smoothly, that the landing in Jolo on the 25th had been
successful, that on the 26th, the Southern Task Force had ordered the shift to phase-two dis-
positions, and that on the 28th, the Southern Task Force had ordered that its main unit should
change course toward Palau, he [also] ordered the Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit on
the 28th to shift the disposition of its forces to phase-two dispositions. [Then] on 2 January,
he left Gaoxiong with his main unit, and advanced to Davao on 6 January.(102, 103, 117)
All this had come about in the following way: First, the Southern Army had proposed the
Kuantan, Endau and Mersing operations (on 12 December) and urged the [Navy] Malaya
Unit to shift to phase two at an earlier date; then it proposed the advancement of [the sched-
ule of] Java operations to [the Army Department of] IGHQ and the [Navy] Southern Task
Force (19–21 December); this was supported by IGHQ and the Combined Fleet (on the 24th);
the Combined Fleet urged the Southern Task Force, which then ordered the Philippines
(Dutch East Indies) Unit to shift to phase-two dispositions. [At that time,] the air unit (the
Eleventh Air Fleet) had not yet shifted to phase two. The chief of staff of the Combined Fleet,
Rear Admiral Ugaki, considered the situation and concluded that “[at least things were] car-
ried out as scheduled in the Central Agreement of November.”(108) On 2 January, the air unit
issued an order to shift the disposition of its forces to phase-two dispositions.(117) The Eleventh
Air Fleet headquarters [finally] advanced from Gaoxiong to Davao on 7 January. The 23d
and the 21st Air Flotilla headquarters advanced from Gaoxiong and Palau to Jolo and Davao
on 3 January and 27 December respectively.(102, 104)
The Dutch East Indies Unit’s Phase-Two Mission
On 3 January, [the Navy Department of] IGHQ organized the Third Southern Expeditionary
Fleet [for operations] in the Philippines, and changed the name of the Southern Expeditionary
Fleet into the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet on the same day.(1, 101) The [Navy] Philippines
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(Dutch East Indies) Unit, which started operations as the Philippines Unit at the opening of
hostilities, became the Dutch East Indies (Philippines) Unit as of [the start of] phase-two dis-
positions on 28 December, and started preparing for the Dutch East Indies operation with its
main force, while leaving behind an element for the Philippines operations. [With the estab-
lishment of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet], it fully became the Dutch East Indies
Unit on 3 January.
On 29 December (the day when the Cam Ranh Agreement was concluded), Commander
in Chief of the Third Fleet V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō issued in Magong the phase-two operation
plan by means of the Dutch East Indies (Philippines) Unit Order No. 3, Classified. Its main
points are in extract as follows:(110)
Information on the Enemy and the Situation of Friendly Forces
(1) The U.S. Pacific Fleet was almost completely destroyed at a stroke at the opening of hostilities,
and for the present there is no possibility of a transoceanic attack by its main force. (2) Although
the movements of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet are unknown since the opening of hostilities, it is almost
certain that it has already pulled back into or south of the Celebes Sea. The movements of the
British Far East Fleet are also unknown after its main force was completely destroyed. However,
it is highly likely that the U.S. and British fleets in the East will join the Dutch fleet and come
out in an allied defensive battle chiefly in the waters of the Dutch East Indies and Australia. (3)
Although the U.S., British and Dutch submarines have incurred some losses, most of them still
frequently appear everywhere, and it is expected that from now on many will be active espe-
cially in the Dutch East Indies waters. (4) Although the U.S. air units in the Philippines were al-
most completely destroyed, some of them have fled to the Dutch East Indies area and it seems
that they are planning to counterattack along with the British and the Dutch air forces. (5) Judg-
ing from geographical features and the armaments of the Dutch forces, it is necessary to be on
the alert for enemy mines in the Java Sea and the southern part of the South China Sea. (6) The
air unit of the Southern Task Force has already advanced some elements into Davao and Jolo
and been conducting operations against area H (note by the author: the Dutch East Indies). Their
deployment is expected to be complete around 5 January. (7) The 2d Carrier Division is sched-
uled to be incorporated in the air unit of the Southern Task Force around 16 January. (The rest
omitted by the author.)
The Plan
Based on the mission [stated in] the Philippines Unit Order No. 1, Classified, the Dutch East In-
dies Unit shall, in cooperation with the air unit of the Southern Task Force and the Sixteenth
Army, capture Tarakan and Menado first, and one after another seize and advance into strategic
points in the Makassar Strait, the Molucca Sea and the Banda Sea. At the same time, acting in
concert with friendly forces [such as] the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Malaya invasion
army, it shall push forward with the encirclement of Java to swiftly capture Java at the center.
Operational outline
1. By securing close cooperation and contact with friendly air units, we expect to sally forth  while
having command of the air as much as possible.
2. Against enemy submarines and mines strong direct escort forces shall be employed, and by
having them closely cooperate with the base forces and the air unit, we are determined to main-
tain a perfect surface escort and landing cover.
3. Against the enemy surface forces, first of all sufficient forces shall be employed so that such an
enemy force can be destroyed [just] by the escort forces on site. In addition to this, efforts shall
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be made to catch and destroy such [an enemy surface force], in concert with the search and
attack [operations] of strong support units and friendly air units.
4. As for the capture of strategic points in the Dutch East Indies, the destruction and seizure of the
enemy’s important air bases shall be the principal objective, and we aim to advance simultane-
ously in the east and the west by and large in the following order and schedule:
(a) The areas in eastern Celebes, to the east of it, and the Banda Sea
Solely by the Navy: Menado (around 10 January) ➝ Kendari (around 20 January) ➝Makas-
sar (to be captured around 25 January – 14 February, seizing a favorable opportunity.)
Solely by the Army: Ambon (around 25 January) ➝ Kupang (around 5 February)
(b) The area of the Makassar Strait and eastern Java
In conjunction with the Army: Tarakan (around 10 January) ➝ Balikpapan (around 20 Jan-
uary) ➝ Banjarmasin (around 30 January) ➝ Surabaya area (around 16 February)
Depending on the situation, in conjunction with the Army: capture of Makassar around 5
February, and also Bali almost simultaneously with the capture of Surabaya.
(c) Western Java
In conjunction with the Army: Batavia area (around 16 February)
Distribution of Forces (summarized by the author)
Main unit: the main force of the 16th Cruiser Division
Western Attack Unit:
1st Escort Unit: the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron as its core
2d Base Unit: the main force of the 2d Base Force as its core
1st Air Unit: the auxiliary seaplane tenders the San’yō-maru and the Sanuki-maru as its core 
3d Escort Unit: the 5th Destroyer Squadron (after rejoining [the Dutch East Indies Unit])
Eastern Attack Unit:
Support Unit: the 5th Cruiser Division as its core
2d Escort Unit: the main force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron as its core
1st Base Unit: the main force of the 1st Base Force as its core
2d Air Unit: the 11th Seaplane Tender Division as its core
Eastern Philippines Unit: the 32d Special Base Force as its core
Western Philippines Unit: the 17th Minelayer Division as its core
Mission of Each Unit (summarized by the author)
The main unit shall stay on the alert in Malalag Bay (note: inside Davao Gulf); depending on
the information on the enemy, it shall sail towards Celebes and the Makassar Strait. It mainly
covers the Western-Attack Unit.
The 1st Escort Unit shall escort the Sakaguchi Detachment, leave Davao around 7 January, an-
chor at sea east of Cape Batu on Tarakan Island before daybreak on 10 January, put the de-
tachment ashore, join the invasion and secure the air base to advance a unit of the Eleventh
Air Fleet. [Then] it shall have the 2d Kure Special Landing Force replace the Army unit,
escort the Sakaguchi Detachment, leaving Tarakan around 18 January, put the detachment
ashore in Balikpapan before daybreak around 20 January, join them in seizing the air base
and resource areas, and advance the air unit of the Eleventh Air Fleet. Next, it shall escort
an element of the Sakaguchi Detachment, leaving Balikpapan around 28 January, invade
Banjarmasin before daybreak around 30 January, and secure the enemy’s air base. In the
event that the 1001st Unit (a paratroop unit) shall cooperate in the operation, a special order
shall be issued.
The 2d Base Unit shall take on the defense of Tarakan and Balikpapan, and other related tasks.
The 1st Air Unit shall cooperate with the 1st Escort Unit by providing guard against submarines
and support in the landing attacks.
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The 3d Escort Unit shall sail to Gaoxiong after rejoining from the Malaya Unit, escort the main
force of the Sixteenth Army from there, leave Gaoxiong (Magong for part of the army) on 30
January, sail to Cam Ranh Bay, leave the bay on 11 February, and put the army ashore in
Batavia and the vicinity on 16 February. An element of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet
shall cooperate with the unit.
The Support Unit of the Eastern Attack Unit shall provide cover and support in the capture of
Menado, Kendari, Ambon, Makassar and Kupang, etc. and [also] be on the watch for the di-
rection of Australia.
The 2d Escort Unit shall leave Davao on 8 January, and capture Menado in a raid on 10 January
to advance a unit of the Eleventh Air Fleet. Then it shall have an element of the force partic-
ipate in a predawn raid on Kendari under the command of the 1st Base Force commander
around 20 January, and provide cover [for the operation] with most of its force. After that,
it shall escort Detachment B of the Army from Menado to Ambon (Detachment B is to be es-
corted from Davao to Menado beforehand by an element of the 2d Escort Unit after the cap-
ture of Menado), capture Ambon around 25 January, and secure its airfield. Then, it shall
further escort Detachment B (depending on the situation, an element of its force shall be left
behind in Ambon), and in conjunction with the detachment, prepare for the capture of Ku-
pang [to be carried out] around 5 February. [Possible] use of the 1001st Unit (the paratroop
unit) shall be determined by a later order.
The 1st Base Unit shall guard the anchorage in Bangka (note: north of Menado) after the capture
of Menado. Then it shall conduct a sudden predawn attack on Kendari with most of the unit
and an element of the 2d Escort Unit under its command around 20 January under the cover
of the 2d Escort Unit, and secure the air base [there] to advance an air unit of the Eleventh
Air Fleet. Depending on the situation, it shall capture Makassar.
The 2d Air Unit shall cooperate with the 2d Escort Unit by providing guard against submarines
and support in the landing attacks.
The Eastern Philippines Unit, the Western Philippines Unit (omitted by the author)
The Dutch East Indies Unit issued the above orders, but compared with the Cam Ranh Agree-
ment (i.e. General Agreement No. 4 of 1 January) the following differences appear:
1. The schedule and the outline of the capture of Makassar were not fixed due to a shortage of
strength.
2. Complying with the strong wish of the Combined Fleet, the capture of Kupang was scheduled
six days ahead of the plan specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement.
3. Complying with the strong wish of the Eleventh Air Fleet, the capture of Bali (airfield) was [also]
included in [this] plan, which was not the case in the Cam Ranh Agreement. And so, due to the
tight schedule and a shortage of strength, it was decided to conduct it as a detached operation
of the Java landing operation.
6. Departure of the Headquarters of the Sixteenth Army and
Revision of Its Operation Plan
Issue of the Order to Assemble and Departure of the Headquarters of the
Army 
As previously described, the Sixteenth Army headquarters ([still] at the War College) had
planned “to depart from the mainland after the New Year, around mid-January,” when out
of the blue a telegram came from Staff Officer Oda, who had arrived in Saigon on 23 Decem-
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ber, saying: “[the idea of] bringing forward the Java operation by about one month is being
studied, and the presence of the army commander and the chief of staff is urgently re-
quested,” which was followed by a telegram from the Southern Army pressing [the head-
quarters] to come over.(35, 36, 38)
On the 25th, Army Commander Imamura decided “to advance the command post of the
army from Tokyo to Saigon on the 29th and its headquarters to Gaoxiong,” and he issued an
order on the 27th to the 2d Division and the units under the direct control of the army to as-
semble in Gaoxiong, Taiwan, to prepare for the subsequent operations.(32, 33) At that time, the
2d Division headquarters was in barracks on the Narashino Maneuvering Grounds.
Where to set up the headquarters of the army was a problem. Gaoxiong was a well-
equipped major shipping base where not only the 2d Division, but also various other units
of the Sixteenth Army transported from the mainland, Manchuria and Korea, and China
would assemble, complete preparations for the operations, sort out the order of embarkation,
etc. On the other hand, Saigon was the place where the headquarters of the Southern Army
and the command post of the Shipping Transport Command were located, and it was [also]
close to Cam Ranh Bay, which was the base of the Navy and the transit point for the 38th Di-
vision. But then again, Taipei was the seat of the Taiwan Army headquarters and the transport
and communications hub in Taiwan. Considering the advantages and disadvantages of each
place, the army commander decided to [first] set up his command post in Saigon, his head-
quarters in Gaoxiong, and his liaison office in Taipei, and [later] close the command post and
the liaison office as the situation changed.(35, 36, 38) He also decided that he would go ahead to
Saigon by plane, accompanied by his chief of staff, both senior staff officers, his [chief of] avi-
ation staff, Itoda, his [chief of] signal communications staff, Saiki, and his intelligence staff,
Murakami and Kuriya, and a communication code officer to set up the command post, while
he would have his vice chief of staff, Harada, fly to Gaoxiong beforehand in another plane
accompanied by other staff officers, to wait for the arrival of the army headquarters coming
in by ship and simultaneously conduct other tasks in Gaoxiong and Taipei as well.(35, 36, 38) As
a result, before being reunited with his army headquarters on 17 February, the army com-
mander and his chief of staff were only present at the army headquarters from 19 to 21 Jan-
uary and from 25 January to 3 February. In this period, the staff of the army headquarters in
Gaoxiong, the shipping staff in particular, had to rack their brains [to coordinate the situa-
tion].(32, 44)
Due to a lack of available flights, Army Commander Imamura finally took off together
with the personnel of the command post at 1500 on the 30th. He stopped over at Akeno, of-
fered a prayer for victory at the Ise Shrine, and left Yamada on the next day, the 31st, for
Shanghai first. However, due to trouble with the aircraft, the plane made an emergency land-
ing on Cheju Island.(32, 33, 34)
Makeshift Measures for the 38th Division
The army commander and his group, who were forced to start the year 1942 on an isolated
island in southern Korea, left Jeju Island at 1700 on 1 January (the day when the Cam Ranh
Agreement was signed), spent the night in Shanghai, flew from Shanghai to Taipei on the
next day, the 2d, and arrived at Taipei airfield at 1100. At the headquarters of the Taiwan
Army they received telegrams notifying them of “the advancement of the schedule of the
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[Java] operation,” “Detachment B’s embarkation on 6 January and its departure from Hong
Kong on 9 January,” and other matters.(34) Learning that Detachment B would head for
Ambon after calling at Davao, they immediately sent a telegram to order the Sakaguchi De-
tachment in Davao to transfer an antiaircraft artillery battery to Detachment B at Davao.(36)
Staff Officer [of the Army Department] of IGHQ Sejima Ryūzō, who was visiting Taipei after
attending the Cam Ranh Agreement, informed them that “military radio [units] required for
Detachment B will be transferred from the Twenty-third Army ([in] southern China),” and
also shared with them lessons learned in the Malaya operation.(34) After that, the Army com-
mander and his group left Taipei for Guangdong at 1330.(34) On the next day, the 3d, they
hurriedly gave the necessary briefings at Guangdong airfield to the chief of staff of the 38th
Division, Col. Abe Yoshimitsu, its chief of operations staff, Maj. Oyadomari Chōsei, and Maj.
Tosaka Susumu, staff officer of the 38th Division assigned to the Eastern Detachment (De-
tachment B), and [finally] arrived in Saigon via Tourane that evening.(32, 34, 36)
Note: According to documents [kept by] Staff Officer Tosaka, the 38th Division had been given
the order on 30 December by the Twenty-third Army commander “to form a detachment,
consisting of one infantry regiment and one artillery battalion under the command of the
infantry group commander as its core, so as to be suitable for an operation on an isolated
island, and be ready for embarkation in Hong Kong on 6 January and departure on 9 Jan-
uary.”
Reception of the Order to Prepare for the Capture of Java and Making
Arrangements with the Navy
The [Sixteenth] Army commander and his officers received a report from Staff Officer Oda,
and were [further] given details on the advancement of [the schedule of] the Dutch East In-
dies operation at the Southern Army headquarters the next day, the 4th.(24, 36) On that day,
[the Army Department of] IGHQ issued the order for the transfer of the 38th Division.(1) The
place where the army commander should station himself became an issue again that night,
but it was decided that both he and his chief of staff would station themselves in Saigon.(36)
The next day, the 5th, Army Commander Imamura received the previously described
order of the Southern Army to prepare for capturing Java (that is, to capture Bangka, southern
Sumatra, Ambon and Kupang, and be ready for capturing Java).(23, 24)
On the next day, the 6th, the Sixteenth Army received a telegram from the Dutch East In-
dies Unit, which proposed the following contents for the arrangement [between the army
and the unit], and wired back its approval.(117) The main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit
advanced to Davao on this day.(103)
1. Detachment B (i.e. the Itō Detachment on four transport ships) shall leave Hong Kong on 12
January under the escort of the 8th Destroyer Division, and arrive in Davao on 18 January. It
shall subsequently capture Ambon on 25 January and Kupang on 5 February under the direct
escort of a force with the 2d Destroyer Squadron as its core.
2. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall capture Tarakan on 11 January, Balikpapan on 21 January, and
Banjarmasin on 31 January [starting] from Davao escorted by a force with the 4th Destroyer
Squadron as its core.
3. The main force of the Sixteenth Army shall assemble in Gaoxiong between 29 January and 5
February, and land in Batavia or its vicinity around 16 February under the direct escort of the
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5th Destroyer Squadron. Details shall be arranged between the commanders of the 5th Destroyer
Squadron and the Sixteenth Army on 26 January in Gaoxiong.
4. The 48th Division shall leave Manila on 7 February and land in Surabaya or its vicinity around
16 February escorted by a force with the 4th Destroyer Squadron as its core. Details shall be
arranged between commanders of the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the 48th Division on 4 Feb-
ruary in Manila.
The Southern Army’s Dissatisfaction and the Escort Issue
There are three noteworthy points with regard to the arrangement above. The first is the
delay in making the arrangement. The delay in the advance of the command post [of the Six-
teenth Army] to Saigon via Taiwan on account of plane trouble was one reason, but [what
was worse,] Vice Chief of Staff Harada and the rest of the personnel of the army headquarters
to be stationed in Gaoxiong also were forced to start the new year on Kakamigahara airfield
in Gifu prefecture due to a plane accident. The commander of the Navy Dutch East Indies
Unit had planned to advance to Davao on his flagship, the Ashigara, on 2 January after con-
cluding arrangements with the Sixteenth Army commander on 29 December in Gaoxiong
([according to] the telegram of 28 December from the Third Fleet).(117) However, as of the 29th,
[chief of] Shipping Staff Sendō was the only staff of the army in Taiwan while Army Com-
mander Imamura and other officers were still in Tokyo, which gave the main unit of the
Dutch East Indies Unit no choice but to leave Gaoxiong [without an arrangement] on 2 Jan-
uary to advance to Davao on the 6th. (Army Commander Imamura and his group made it to
Taipei on their way to Saigon on the day that Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet Taka-
hashi departed from Gaoxiong.) The second point was that the schedule of the capture of
Tarakan and other places was set one day later than specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement.
This was due to the fact that the captures of Davao and Jolo were conducted behind the sched-
ule [arranged in November] as previously mentioned, and that fixing the airfields of Davao
and Jolo was making slow progress because of their bad condition. Particularly, the slow
progress in fixing the bases [became the primary cause of the delay], as a large force of the
23d Air Flotilla was expected to advance into Jolo after the change in the air operation plan.
[Thus a postponement] was requested by the Navy and approved by the Sixteenth Army.(119)
Upon receiving the approval of the Sixteenth Army on 6 January, the commander of the
[Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit issued an order for the postponement the next day, the 7th.
The third point is the comment made by the 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander R. Adm.
Hara Kenzaburō, that “although the Dutch East Indies Unit has planned and ordered that
the 5th Destroyer Squadron shall escort the main force of the Sixteenth Army in fifty-six ships
to Batavia, I am not confident at all that I can carry out the escort only with the force of my
squadron of one cruiser and eight destroyers.”(35) At that time, the Southern Task Force had
four destroyer squadrons, of which the 3d Destroyer Squadron was assigned to the Malaya
Unit to be employed for the Bangka and Palembang operations. The other three destroyer
squadrons were assigned to the Dutch East Indies Unit: the 2d Destroyer Squadron ([con-
sisting of] three destroyer divisions) was planned and ordered to be employed for [the escort
of] the [Army] Eastern Detachment, the 4th Destroyer Squadron ([consisting of] three de-
stroyer divisions) for [the escort of] the Sakaguchi Detachment and the 48th Division, and
the 5th Destroyer Squadron ([consisting of] two destroyer divisions) for the main force of the
Sixteenth Army, as mentioned above.(117, 118, 119, 120) As previously pointed out, the [Navy] Dutch
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East Indies Unit, which would also conduct operations on the Celebes front, was not even in
a position to decide on the outline of the capture of Makassar due to a shortage of strength,
let alone to increase the strength of [the squadron of] Rear Admiral Hara.
On 9 January, Army Commander Imamura sent his Chief of Operations Staff Oda to the
headquarters of the Southern Army to request that (1) the Navy’s strength for the escort be
increased and (2) the date of landing in Java be postponed.(24, 35) The Southern Army was
firmly determined to achieve a swift capture of Java and its chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Tsukada
Osamu, who was dissatisfied with the Sixteenth Army’s delay in advancing its command
post and its postponement of the schedule for capturing Tarakan and other [places], [just]
answered that (1) the Navy’s escort capability should be trusted and (2) the landing on Java
should definitely be carried out on day x + 70 as specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement.(24, 35)
Army Commander Imamura thought: “It is not the Army but the Navy itself, particularly
the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander and the Dutch East Indies commander (the com-
mander in chief of the Third Fleet) responsible for the task, who are worried about the escort.
If things go wrong, whether the Navy is to be blamed or not, it will be my men, the Emperor’s
subjects and their elders’ beloved sons who will be sunk to the bottom of the sea by the enemy
navy.” He decided to immediately meet Commander in Chief Terauchi in person to request
his considerations. However, before doing so, he thought it necessary to check the fighting
power of [the squadron of] Rear Admiral Hara and visited the commander of the Malaya
Unit (the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet), V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō, at his headquarters
in Saigon to ask him about it.(35) [Editor’s note: According to the description on p. 185 and
188, this meeting took place in Cam Ranh.] Vice Admiral Ozawa told Lieutenant General
Imamura his expectation that “by the time the main force of the Sixteenth Army heads for
Java, the Malaya Unit will be able to support [the escort]; you may count on it,” which made
Lieutenant General Imamura feel extremely grateful [and relieved].(35)
Sending off the Eastern Detachment
As soon as he had wired the Dutch East Indies Unit on 6 January his approval of the arrange-
ment, Army Commander Imamura ordered Senior Staff Officers Takashima, of Section 1, and
Kitamura, of Section 2, to leave Saigon immediately (on the 6th) for Hong Kong (for the 38th
Division and the Eastern Detachment), and then head for Gaoxiong; and he had them depart
on that very day.(33, 36, 43) As previously told, the 38th Division had come under the command
of the army commander two days before, on the 4th, and the Eastern Detachment had started
embarking on that very day, the 6th. The army commander very much wanted to see and
encourage Maj. Gen. Itō Takeo, commander of the 38th Infantry Group, who at the decision
to form the detachment was appointed commander of the Eastern Detachment, but he could
not leave Saigon(36) When he had met with the staff of the 38th Division for a brief moment
at Guangdong airfield previously on 3 January under the described circumstances, the details
of the Eastern Detachment had not yet been decided, and thus he had not met with Major
General Itō.(36) Senior Staff Officers Takashima and Kitamura left Saigon and arrived in
Guangdong on the 6th, reached Hong Kong on the 7th, passed down the army’s order to the
38th Division, encouraged the Eastern Detachment, and flew from Guangdong to Taiwan on
the 8th.(33, 43)
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The Eastern Detachment concluded arrangements with the 8th Destroyer Division com-
mander in Hong Kong on the 11th, departed from Hong Kong on the 12th, and headed for
Davao first (where it arrived on the 18th).(117) Details of the Eastern Detachment will be given
later.
Revision of the Operation Plan
As previously described, immediately after the conclusion of the arrangement with the Dutch
East Indies Unit, Senior Staff Officers Takashima and Kitamura went to the headquarters of
the [Sixteenth] Army in Gaoxiong via Hong Kong. Staff Officers Murakami and Kuriya de-
parted to gather information from the Kawaguchi Detachment in British Borneo and the
Twenty-fifth Army in Malaya respectively. Staff Officer Itoda left to liaise with the Third Air
Force and the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group.(36, 39, 42) Staff Officer Saiki flew from Saigon to
Hong Kong on the 6th, to give directions and support for the departure of the Eastern De-
tachment, together with Staff Officer Nishiura, who arrived in Guangdong from Gaoxiong
on the 8th.(34)
Ever since the advancement of [the schedule of] the Java operation became an issue, Staff
Officer Oda had been working on a revision of the operation plan, which he substantially
finished by the 6th. Before this, the chief of Section 2 of the Army Department of IGHQ, Hat-
tori, had visited Saigon and sent the following telegram to Tokyo on 30 December:(23)
To Vice Chief of Army General Staff Dated 30 December
I have returned to Cam Ranh Bay. The Southern Army has worked out the following final draft
regarding the conduct of subsequent operations:
1. The situation in the Malaya area is as already reported. However, due to the Takumi Detach-
ment’s advance to Kuantan and vicinity, etc., Operation Q has been called off and Operation S
will be conducted around day x + 40.
2. The whole Operation H will be brought forward so that landing operations in Java of the main
force will be carried out around day x + 70. Detachment B ([consisting of] three battalions of the
38th Division) will embark around day x + 40, assemble in Palau, and conduct operations against
Ambon around day x + 50, and then against Kupang. The main force of the 38th Division will
embark around day x + 35 and conduct operations against Mentok and Palembang around day
x + 60. The 2d Division (including the units under the direct control of the [Sixteenth] Army)
and the 48th Division ([also] including the units under the direct control of the army) will em-
bark around day x + 33 and day x + 55 respectively, and both will land in Java around day x +
70. The operations in the Makassar Strait will be conducted on the whole according to the pre-
arranged plan. [However,] as an increase in the total tonnage for the above [operations] cannot
be expected, non-urgent transportation will be called off or postponed, and the formation of the
force for the Sixteenth Army will be reduced to a minimum as well.
3. The main force of the 21st Division will embark around day x + 36 and an element of it around
day x + 48 respectively, and [both] will be moved to northern French Indochina. The 56th Divi-
sion will embark around day x + 57 and be moved to southern French Indochina or Thailand as
reserve for the [Southern] Army.
The above items were discussed between the [Southern] Army and the Second Fleet yesterday in
Cam Ranh, and they reached an agreement.
4. Regarding the Burma operation, the [Southern Army] on the whole shared our view, except the
part of the draft of the operational guidelines which was revised as a result of various kinds of
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research. Further, by around the end of January first of all the Moulmein operation will be con-
ducted.
Note: Q indicates the Kuantan landing operations (which [would] have been carried out by the
Koba Detachment), S indicates the Endau and Mersing landing operations (to be carried
out by the main force of the 18th Division), and H the Dutch East Indies operation.
To Chief, Department 1 Dated 30 December
In view of the results of observations mainly of the Malaya operations, items to be considered
in regard to the disposition of forces for Operation H, in particular the order of embarkation,
are as follows. It would be appreciated if you shared them with the Sixteenth Army.
1. The strength, the formation and the composition of the army should be as light as possible.
However, the commitment of army engineers and military police should be raised as much as
possible. Heavy artillery and medium tanks would require much time to unload and may de-
stroy roads.
2. Operations against an area along one road in one direction should be conducted with a combat
group consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery battery (or two batteries), one light
tank squadron, one engineer company, a motor transport company, a mobile repair squad, and
a signal unit, by having the group charge [into the area].
3. After landing, broken bridges rather than enemy resistance will hinder our advance most. Al-
though there may be various countermeasures against this, the most effective way, in short, is
to have a unit consisting of an elite infantry battalion as its core charge ahead while keeping
close proximity to the enemy. The order of embarkation should be decided after due consider-
ation of this fact.
4. The following units shall be put ashore at the earliest moment:
Engineer units, river-crossing material units, an element of the supply depot to collect and
supervise supplies of materials, and military police units.
5. Further, as mentioned in the previous telegram, in view of the purpose of this war and the actual
situation of public order right behind the front lines, it is urgently required to promptly advance
agencies for implementing a military administration into site so that a [time] gap between the
operations and the [beginning of] governing the occupied area will not be created.
6. I will head for Hong Kong next.
The reasons why the Sixteenth Army decided to revise at this time the previously described
operation plan of 21 December generally can be inferred from the above telegram. They are
roughly as follows:(36, 40)
1. While the army was made to give up the South Seas Detachment, it had [the strength of] De-
tachment B (the Eastern Detachment) with two battalions as its core increased to three battalions
as the core [instead].
2. As the real fighting power of the allied forces was becoming more or less clear, bold operations
came to be considered appropriate.
3. It came to be considered appropriate to employ a combat group with three infantry battalions
as its core and combined with various [kinds of] troops as a unit in the operations.
4. The advancement of [the schedule of] the Java operation reduced fears of large troop reinforce-
ments in Java by the U.S., British and Australian forces.
The Sixteenth Army revised its operation plan roughly as follows. The details will be de-
scribed later one by one:
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1. Detachment B shall consist of three battalions commanded by the infantry group commander
of the 38th Division as its core, and renamed the Eastern Detachment.
2. [Previous] plans concerning the South Seas Detachment shall be deleted.
3. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall [operate] as previously planned.
4. The force to join the central Java operations from the 38th Division (other than the Eastern De-
tachment) shall consist of two battalions as its core. (In the previous plan, [a unit of] three bat-
talions commanded by the infantry group commander as its core was considered for this task.
This unit should preferably have three battalions as its core, as it would take the risk of making
a landing on its own in front of the Bandung stronghold. However, now that the Eastern De-
tachment was [increased to] three battalions, and also in terms of the main force of the 38th Di-
vision, [the strength of] this unit had to be [limited to] two battalions as its core.) The use of this
detachment and the main force of the 38th Division (consisting of four battalions as its core)
shall remain as previously planned.
5. The 48th Division shall additionally be given the task of seizing Cilacap at a favorable oppor-
tunity. (This was caused by the fact that [the army] had to give up the South Seas Detachment.) 
6. The 2d Division shall form a powerful unit to head for Buitenzorg [Bogor] along the road at the
foot of the mountains in the south [of Java] with one infantry regiment (minus one battalion)
and one reconnaissance regiment, commanded by the infantry group commander, as its core.
(In the previous plan [this unit] was to consist of two infantry battalions, commanded by the
reconnaissance regiment commander, as its core.) This unit shall anticipate the possibility that
it may have to charge toward Bandung following the seizure of Buitenzorg [Bogor].
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Chapter VI The Launch of the Dutch East Indies
Operation
1. The Policy of the [Japanese] Government Towards the
Netherlands
O
n 1 December, the government decided to go to war with the United States and Great
Britain, and at the same time also with the Netherlands. However, with respect to
the Netherlands, it was decided that until the first military actions against the
Netherlands were launched (i.e. the landings in Tarakan and Menado in the Dutch East In-
dies, scheduled to take place about one month after the opening of hostilities), Japanese ini-
tiatives to enter into a state of war should be avoided. More precisely, on 4 December, the
following decisions were made on how to deal with the Netherlands:(3)
The Treatment of the Netherlands
1. Until a state of war with the Netherlands [actually] breaks out, the Netherlands will be treated
as a quasi-enemy country; the [Dutch] minister and his staff shall be put under close watch and
protection [within their embassy] and the use of codes shall be prohibited. (Consequently, also
all communications with the enemy countries shall be absolutely forbidden.)
2. In the event war is declared by the Netherlands, Japan shall announce its entry into a state of
war with the Netherlands. Also, in the event a state of war with the Netherlands breaks out be-
fore the latter declares war, Japan shall announce its entry into a state of war with the Nether-
lands as specified above, and thereafter treat the country as an enemy country under
international law.
As previously described, on 8 December, the Imperial Rescript on the Declaration of War
was proclaimed, but the Netherlands was left out of the [list of] belligerent nations.
Right after the opening of hostilities, [Japan was] notified by the Dutch government on
10 December that “as Japan has opened hostilities with the United States and Great Britain,
with both of whom the Netherlands maintains close and inseparable relations, the Nether-
lands considers that it is now in a state of war with Japan.” However, regardless of the pre-
vious decisions, the Japanese government ignored this [notification].(12) Instead, against the
background of better-than-expected military gains since the opening of hostilities, [the gov-
ernment] wished to effect as much as possible a so-called bloodless occupation of the Dutch
East Indies. On 13 December, the following policy was decided upon at the Liaison Confer-
ence between IGHQ and the Government:(3)
Directives for War against the Dutch East Indies Following the Changes in the War Situation
With due regard to the developments of the situation, efforts shall be made based on the fol-
lowing points, so that the objectives of the occupation as determined according to the pre-
arranged plan shall be attained as much as possible without resorting to force:
1. Efforts shall be made to conduct negotiations at an appropriate moment by the end of this year
with the Government General of the Dutch East Indies by and large on the following condi-
tions:
(1) The Dutch East Indies shall abandon all hostile acts against the Empire [of Japan], and im-
plement measures to prevent disturbances as well as the destruction of infrastructure and
resources following the occupation of vital areas of the Dutch East Indies by the Imperial
Japanese Army.
(2) The Empire [of Japan] shall respect the existing Dutch East Indies administrative structure,
and also strictly protect the life and property of all inhabitants.
2. Operations shall be executed based on the prearranged plan, regardless of a shift in the negoti-
ations. Provided that the negotiations are successful, the occupation shall be carried out without
resorting to force.
3. A declaration of entering into a state of war with the Netherlands shall not be made during ne-
gotiations.
4. The future territorial status of the Dutch East Indies and other matters shall not be touched upon
during the negotiations.
These [diplomatic] maneuvers were conducted through the intermediary of Switzerland, but
ended in failure. In fact, their chance of success had been considered extremely small from
the very start.
As will be explained later, the Sakaguchi Detachment landed in Tarakan on 11 January,
and on the same day landings and paratroop droppings of Navy units were also carried out
in Menado. On the next day, the 12th, the [Japanese] government issued the following dec-
laration:(3, 13)
Declaration by the Imperial Japanese Government
Even though the Empire [of Japan] has recently opened hostilities with the United States and
Great Britain, it has refrained from taking hostile measures against the Dutch East Indies out of
consideration to spare the inhabitants as much as possible the ravages of war. Nevertheless, the
Dutch Government has not only given notice to the Empire [of Japan] that it regarded the fact
that Japan had opened hostilities with the United States and Britain, with both of whom the
Netherlands maintains close and inseparable relations, had brought about a state of war between
the Netherlands and Japan, but since then, its forces have also actually engaged in all forms of
hostile acts against the [Japanese] Empire. Moreover, it has recently turned the Dutch East Indies
into a base for U.S., British and Dutch forces to put up resistance against Japan.
Although the Empire [of Japan] feels no enmity towards the innocent civilians of the Dutch
East Indies, the Imperial Army and Navy have finally come to open hostilities on 11 January
against the Dutch forces in order to crush the Dutch hostile acts as well as to protect the lives
and property of the Empire’s subjects.
2. The Launch of the Dutch East Indies Operation
As already told, on 28 December, the [Navy] Dutch East Indies (Philippines) Unit Com-
mander Vice Admiral Takahashi gave the following orders concerning the disposition of
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forces and the immediate schedule: (On this day, Army Commander Imamura was still in
Tokyo.)
Western Attack Unit (commander: commander in chief of the Third Fleet)
1st Escort Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the 2d Kure
Special Landing Force as its core) in conjunction with the Sakaguchi Detachment: shall
seize Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin.
2d Base Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the 2d Base Force as its core): shall cooperate
with the 1st Escort Unit.
1st Air Unit ([with] the auxiliary seaplane tenders the San’yō-maru and the Sanuki-maru as
its core): shall cooperate with the 1st Escort Unit. [Editor’s note: the Japanese text says
“2d Air Unit,” which is a misprint.]
Eastern Attack Unit (commander: commander of the 5th Cruiser Division)
2d Escort Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the Sasebo Com-
bined Special Landing Force, and the 1st Kure Special Landing Force as its core): shall
seize Menado, Kendari and Makassar.
1st Base Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the 1st Base Force): shall cooperate with the
force above.
2d Air Unit ([consisting of] the 11th Seaplane Tender Division with the seaplane tenders the
Chitose and the Mizuho as its core): shall also cooperate with the 2d Escort Unit.
Support Unit ([with] the 5th Cruiser Division as its core): shall support the Eastern Attack Unit’s
operations.
Main unit ([consisting of] the main force of the 16th Cruiser Division): shall support all opera-
tions and cover the Western Attack Unit.
Landings in Tarakan and Menado are scheduled for 10 January.
On 2 January, the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron (which had provided cover for
the landing of the main force of the 48th Division around Lingayen) advanced into Davao,
where its commander, Nishimura, immediately held a preliminary meeting with the com-
mander of the Sakaguchi Detachment.(119) On this day, Army Commander Imamura and his
group made a stop at Taipei between 1100 and 1330 on their way from Shanghai to Guang-
dong, while the commander in chief [of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit], Takahashi, left
Gaoxiong with his main unit. On the previous day (1 January), the 65th Brigade had landed
around Lingayen Gulf.(23) The 2d Destroyer Squadron, which would newly comprise [part
of] the Eastern Attack Unit, and the 5th Cruiser Division, which would support that unit,
had been charged with operations in Davao and Jolo, and thus remained in Davao.(114, 117) Fur-
ther on this day, the 2d, the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet, Tsukahara (sta-
tioned in Taiwan) implemented the phase-two disposition of forces, and directed the 1st Air
Raid Unit (the 21st Air Flotilla) to carry out operations in the Celebes area from Davao, and
the 2d Air Raid Unit (the 23d Air Flotilla) in the east coast area of Borneo from Jolo.(117, 141)
The Combined Fleet issued an order on the same day “to incorporate the 2d Carrier Division
into the Southern Task Force on 7 January.” The Southern Task Force and its air unit (the
Eleventh Air Fleet) planned to use this [division] for support in seizing Ambon.(107, 110) On this
day (2 January), the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters and the 23d Air Flotilla headquarters
were still based in Takao. The air unit stationed 97 aircraft in Gaoxiong, 89 in Davao, 18 in
Peleliu, 41 in Jolo and 9 in Legaspi.(143) [However,] the airfields of Davao and Jolo were in
such an extremely poor condition that Commander in Chief Tsukahara had to send a
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telegram to all parties concerned that “as for Jolo, a runway of 50 m wide and about 1000 m
long is expected to be completed and ready for use by 5 January. Concerning the Davao land-
base, a runway of 1200 m long is supposed to be completed by 6 January, however, due to
soft soil and many squalls, the rolling and compaction work of the parking area has not pro-
gressed satisfactorily.”(117) From 22 December, land-based aircraft had started to advance into
Davao and on the 27th the 21st Air Flotilla had advanced its headquarters from Palau to
Davao.(143) The air unit which had proceeded to Davao started reconnaissance of the Menado
area from 24 December and began attacking its airfield from the 26th. Land-based aircraft
had started to move into Jolo since the 26th and they delivered their first strike on Tarakan
on 30 December.(104)
On the next day, the 3d, the formation of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Philip-
pines) was announced, which allowed Vice Admiral Takahashi to concentrate on the Dutch
East Indies operation from that time onwards.(1) In the late afternoon of this day, Commander
Imamura and his group arrived in Saigon.(32) Commander Takahashi’s flagship the Ashigara
was on its way to Davao.(103)
On the next day, the 4th, Commander Imamura received an explanation on bringing for-
ward the schedule of the Java operation from the Southern Army in Saigon.(24) Also on this
day, the 38th Division was incorporated into the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army,(1) while
Vice Chief of Staff of the Southern Army Aoki Shigemasa, arrived at the Fourteenth Army
headquarters and started negotiations for the transfer of the 48th Division,(23, 80) while the rest
of the Sakaguchi Detachment left Palau for Davao.(88)
On January 5, the Southern Army gave Commander Imamura orders to prepare for cap-
turing Java as well as to carry out the seizure of Bangka, Palembang, Ambon and Kupang.(23, 24)
[At this moment] Commander in Chief [of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit] Takahashi was
still on his way to Davao. [Also] on this day, the senior staff officer of the Third Fleet, Capt.
Yamaki Akira (who left Gaoxiong on 2 January by air and arrived in Davao on the afternoon
of the 4th), assembled the senior staff officers of each division, squadron and others on board
the Nachi, the flagship of the 5th Cruiser Division, explained the order given on the 29th, and
discussed the arrangements.(113) After the meeting, the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander,
R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji, made an operational arrangement with Detachment Commander
Sakaguchi, and immediately on the same day (the 5th) the latter gave the order to capture
Tarakan.(88) Rear Admiral Nishimura and the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander, R. Adm.
Tanaka Raizō, respectively issued orders to the 1st Escort Unit to prepare for the capture of
Tarakan,(119) and to the 2d Escort Unit to prepare for the capture of Menado.(117)
On the next day, the 6th, Commander in Chief Takahashi (on board the heavy cruiser
Ashigara) entered the port of Davao.(103) On the same day, the Eastern Support Unit of the
Southern Task Force (the battleship Haruna and the heavy cruiser Maya) left Magong to head
for the southeastern waters of Mindanao.(103) With the arrival of the reinforcements of the
Sakaguchi Detachment on that day, now the entire force of the detachment (except its Matsu -
moto Detachment at Jolo) was completely assembled off Daliao (southwest of Davao).(88)
While the headquarters of the 23d Air Flotilla had proceeded from Gaoxiong to Jolo on the
3d, the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters was still stationed in Taiwan.(143) As already described,
Commander in Chief Takahashi sent to Army Commander Imamura (in Saigon) on that day
a telegram concerning the arrangements, and also requested that the start of the capture of
Tarakan and other places be delayed by one day.
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At 0030 on the following day, the 7th, Commander in Chief Takahashi sent the following
order by telegram:(119)
The Dutch East Indies Unit Order No. 3, Classified, shall be revised as follows:
The [date of] capture of Menado and Tarakan shall be changed to 11 January and consequently
the schedule of operations of each [relevant] unit shall roughly be delayed by one day.
On this day (the 7th), the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters advanced from Gaoxiong to
Davao.(143) Also on the same day, in accordance with the Combined Fleet order (dated 2 Jan-
uary), the Southern Task Force (based in Cam Ranh) ordered the incorporation of the 2d Car-
rier Division (with the aircraft carriers Sōryū and Hiryū) into the air unit (the Eleventh Air
Fleet).(117) After the operations at Hawaii and Wake Island, the 2d Carrier Division had re-
turned to base in Kure on 29 December.(103) The commander of the [Navy] Dutch East Indies
Unit reported on this day (the 7th) the following:(117)
1. With the arrival of the main unit on 6 January, which left Gaoxiong on 2 January, the assembly
of the Dutch East Indies invasion unit at Davao is completed.
2. – 5. (Omitted by the author)
6. The airfields in both Legaspi and Jolo have been made ready for use and each base force is
preparing for transfer. Public order has already been secured at Legaspi. Even though the Special
Landing Force is preparing for transfer, except for one element to be left behind, the situation
at Jolo still requires a considerable degree of caution. As for Davao, although the demands of
the air unit have not yet been fulfilled due to poor airfield conditions and continuous hindrance
by the weather, efforts are being made day and night to get it ready.
7. The Dutch East Indies invasion unit shall start its scheduled operations as of today.
The Sakaguchi Detachment had [originally] been scheduled to depart from Davao on the
6th, but, following the one-day postponement, the detachment left at 1100 on the 7th, and
headed for Tarakan.(88) The 21st Air Flotilla had made a fierce attack on Ambon on the previ-
ous night.(103) Although the flotilla had been delivering strikes on Menado from 26 December
onwards, and the 23d Air Flotilla on Tarakan from 30 December onwards, they hardly en-
countered enemy aircraft.(103) On that day (the 7th), the commander in chief of the Eleventh
Air Fleet, Tsukahara, gave the 21st Air Flotilla commander [R. Adm. Tada Takeo] orders to
raid and seize the air base of Menado on 11 January, employing the 1001st Unit (minus the
3d Yokosuka Naval District Special Landing Force; note: a paratroop unit) and the necessary
air force.(117)
Note: As previously told, the [first] use of the paratroop unit of the Navy (the 1001st Unit) had
been changed to Tarakan (or depending on the situation, Menado). On 31 December, its
use was decided as follows:(110)
Employment of the 1001st Unit
1. In capturing Menado, about 300 men shall be dropped on the airfield on the day of land-
ing of the invasion unit, and seize the airfield.
2. The unit shall not be used for the capture of Tarakan due to the bad condition of the Jolo
Air Base.
3. Against Balikpapan, 600 men shall depart from Tarakan and be dropped on the airfield
of Balikpapan in two groups one day prior to landing [of the invasion unit] in order to
secure the airfield and provide support for the landing.
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The air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) started operations with the following disposition of
forces: 114 aircraft for the 1st Air Raid Unit ([consisting of] the 21st Air Flotilla) (for the
Menado area), 105 aircraft for the 2d Air Raid Unit ([consisting of] the 23d Air Flotilla) (for
the Tarakan area), and 18 aircraft (flying boats) for reconnaissance.(110)
3. The Capture of Tarakan (See Illustration No. 17)
Change in the Landing Plan
As already described, the arrangement between the commanders of the Navy Dutch East In-
dies Unit and the Sixteenth Army (drafted by the Dutch East Indies Unit) signed on 16 No-
vember, specified that the landing on Tarakan Island would be made on the strongly
[fortified] front on both banks of the Karungan River. And as already told, Staff Officer Yano
Tsuneo of the Sakaguchi Detachment had at that time insisted that he wanted “to execute
the operation in a modified way regardless of the [original] plan.” When he received “no ob-
jections,” he began training for passing through the jungle as soon as the detachment had
arrived in Palau. However, in the Detachment Order handed down on 17 November, and
even in those handed down on 25 November and 12 December, which followed the addi-
tional assignment of tasks to capture Davao, the Sakaguchi Detachment still described its
landing points as both banks of the Karungan River.(88) This came from the idea of deceiving
your own forces [in order to deceive the enemy]. As a matter of fact, Chief of Staff [of the
Sixteenth Army] Okazaki had found out about a certain Katsuyama, who had returned to
Japan after twenty-odd years of doing business in Tarakan. Hearing that “there is a road from
Tarakan City to the east coast through the jungle which Dutch forces also use during maneu-
vers,” he had sent this person immediately around the end of November from the homeland
to the Sakaguchi Detachment (in Palau at the time) in order to serve as guide.(36) Thus the
detachment commander’s intention to land on the east coast [of the island] became firmer
and more resolute than ever.
Arrangements with the Navy
Upon the arrival of the 4th Destroyer Squadron in Davao on 2 January, Detachment Com-
mander Sakaguchi on the same day made a preliminary arrangement with Squadron Com-
mander Nishimura Shōji. On the following day, the 5th, they [officially] concluded an
“Arrangement between the Navy 1st Escort Unit and the Army Sakaguchi Detachment,”(119)
which was in outline as follows:(88)
Landing points: The main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment shall land on the east coast of
Tarakan, one element of the detachment on the southeastern end of the island, and the 2d
Kure Special Landing Force also on the east coast of the island.
Disposition of forces for the landing: (1) One and a half army battalion shall land in the central
part of the east coast of Tarakan and seize the oil fields and Lingkas. (2) One army battalion
shall land on the southeastern end of the island and, after seizing the battery at Mengacu,
seize Lingkas. (3) One battalion of the [naval] 2d Kure Special Landing Force shall, after
landing on the central part of the east coast of the island, seize the airfield.
No special reconnaissance of the landing points shall be conducted.
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The transport convoy shall leave Daliao (note: 15 km southwest of Davao) at 1100 on 6 January,
drop anchor at 1930 on 9 January at anchorage no. 1 and 0000 on 10 January at anchorage
no. 2. The first landing shall be launched (from anchorage no. 1) at 2130 on the 9th and the
second landing (from anchorage no. 2) at 0200 on the 10th.
Distribution of ships:
Right Wing Unit (the 1st Party): the Tsuruga-maru, the Liverpool-maru (with the right wing unit
commander on board), the Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru], the Hankow-maru, the Ehime-maru, the
Kunikawa-maru (with the 2d Kure Special Landing Force on board) and the Kano-maru.
Left Wing Unit (the 2d Party): the Havana-maru (with the left wing unit commander on board),
the Teiryū-maru (with the detachment commander on board), the Kuretake-maru, the Nichiai-
maru, the Kagu-maru, the Kunitsu-maru, and the the Rakutō-maru.
Note: The Kunikawa, the Kano, the Kagu, the Kunitsu and the Rakutō belonged to the Navy.
Forces employed for the escort: One cruiser (the Naka), ten destroyers, three submarine chasers
and three patrol boats under the command of 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear
Admiral Nishimura.
Forces employed for support: The auxiliary seaplane tenders the San’yō-maru and the Sanuki-
maru, and one element of the 23d Air Flotilla.
The landings are to be made as surprise landings.
Covering fire for the landings shall be provided by the Navy warships [only] upon request by
the commanders of the landing forces.
Transport ships shall move their anchorage one by one to the Lingkas anchorage when ordered
after the landings.
When ordered, the Kuretake-maru shall sail to Jolo under the escort of a destroyer and return the
Jolo operation unit of the Sakaguchi Detachment to [its parent unit] in Tarakan.
The Plan and Order for Capture
Based on the preliminary arrangements previously made (on the 2d), Detachment Com-
mander Sakaguchi issued the following order:(119)
Sakaguchi Detachment Order Daliao, 0800, 5 January
1. The Imperial Army has completed its occupation of Manila on 3 January, and is further engaged
in destroying the defeated enemy. The key areas of Davao and vicinity are practically cleared;
public order has largely been restored and the local Japanese nationals have for the most part
returned to their present residences.
The Jolo Detachment, which is still stationed in Jolo Island, has largely completed the mopping
up of the enemy there, and is now being relieved of its guard duty by the naval landing force.
The Dutch East Indies government, which has foreseen our attacks and proclaimed total resist-
ance, has had its warships and aircraft conduct repeated attacks on our forces.
2. The detachment shall leave the port of Davao at 1100 tomorrow on the 6th, go ashore at Tarakan
on the night of the 9th, and capture the island to seize its airfield, as well as to secure the oil re-
sources.
3. The 1st Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battery shall come under the command of Detachment B after
the departure of the [Sakaguchi] Detachment from Davao. The command shall be transferred
when Detachment B enters the port of Davao.
4. Both [left and right] wing units as well as the units under the direct control of the detachment
shall be charged with the capture of Tarakan in conformity with Separate Volume No.1: Main
points of the capture of Tarakan and Separate Volume No. 2: Tarakan Landing Plan of the Saka -
guchi Detachment.
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5. The particulars [of the operation] shall be given through the staff officers.
6. I am in Daliao and shall board the Teiryū-maru at 1000 tomorrow on the 6th.
Separate sheets: Distribution of Forces (note: excerpted by the author)
Right Wing Unit
Commander: Regimental Commander Col. Yamamoto Kyōhei
146th Infantry Regiment (minus 2d Battalion, 3d Battalion (minus two companies), half of
[both] regimental artillery and antitank gun units)
1st Engineer Company (minus one platoon)
Medical Unit (minus half of the unit), Radio [Unit]
Left Wing Unit
Commander: Battalion Commander Maj. Kanauji Ken’ichi
2d Infantry Battalion (minus 6th Company), half of [both] regimental artillery and antitank
gun units
One engineer platoon, Radio [Unit]
Squad for Collecting Cast-off Articles
Commander: Capt. Tajima Toshitsugu
Units under the direct control [of the Detachment]
Detachment headquarters (minus three mark–3 radio squads), 6th Infantry Company, ar-
mored car unit, 1st Field Artillery Battalion (minus one platoon), 44th Field Antiaircraft Ar-
tillery Battalion (minus one battery), 2d Transport Company (minus one squad), half of the
medical unit, 1st Field Hospital, 6th and 7th Independent Radio Platoon, 33d Fixed Radio
Unit, 1st Independent Engineer Company (minus two platoons), one element of the 45th
Anchorage headquarters, 16th Shipping Signal Platoon, attached military police unit (minus
one element).
Separate Volume No. 1: Outline of the Capture of Tarakan
I. Mission
1. The detachment shall make surprise landings on the shore at Amal and on the shore at
[Cape] Batu. Then taking advantage of the darkness of the night, it shall seize at a stroke the
oil fields of Tarakan as well as the Lingkas area with its main force, and all batteries along
the Karungan [River] with one element [of the detachment], after which it shall capture the
airfield.
2. After the landing at Tarakan, the Jolo Detachment shall be brought back [from Jolo]. When
the whole island [of Tarakan] has been cleared [of the enemy], the main force of the detach-
ment shall turn over guard duty to the naval landing force and assemble in or near Tarakan
to make preparations for the capture of Balikpapan.
II. Directives
3. The detachment shall leave the port of Davao on day x + 30. Escorted by Navy warships
and aircraft, the detachment shall head straight for the island of Tarakan in Dutch Borneo,
while closely guarding itself against [enemy] aircraft and submarines, and enter the waters
south of the Adat Reef (note by the author: 25 km east of Tarakan) off Amal in the evening
of day x + 33, for temporary anchoring.
4. The right wing unit shall swiftly transfer to [landing] boats in the waters south of the Adat
Reef, carry out a surprise landing on the shore at Amal, catch and destroy the enemy sur-
veillance units in and around Amal. Without waiting for the completion of the landing, the
unit shall swiftly work its way through the swamps and jungle, carefully so as to keep its
purpose hidden, launch a sudden attack on the Pamusian oil field and seize it. While having
one element secure the site, the main force shall seize the river-head area, barracks, radio
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station, main plants and the Lingkas pier at one fell swoop, by which it shall crush the
enemy’s demolition plans, and catch and destroy the enemy forces by daybreak.
5. The transport ships of the left wing unit shall leave the waters south of the Adat Reef at the
appropriate time and temporarily anchor east off [Cape] Batu. Before dawn on day x + 34,
the unit shall land in or near Batu, and raid and seize all batteries east of the Pamusian River
and secure them by daybreak.
6. The Makiuchi Unit of the Naval Landing Force (which from the moment of landing till the
clearing of the key areas of Tarakan shall be put under the command of Detachment Com-
mander Sakaguchi during the operation) shall land in or near Amal before dawn following
the right wing unit, get itself ready [for the operation], start toward the airfield via Tarakan,
seize it, and secure the airfield and the Batu Dua oil field. Depending on the circumstances,
the landing shall be made in the vicinity of the Lingkas Pier.
7. The right wing unit shall have a unit, consisting of about two companies led by the battalion
commander as its core, advance behind the naval landing force, and after the latter’s seizure
of the airfield and the Batu Dua oil field, secure both the Juwata and Gunung Cangkol oil
fields, while staying in very close contact with the [naval] force and being particularly on
the alert for aerial warnings.
8. The armored car unit shall land in or near Batu and, as long as the situation permits, coop-
erate with the naval landing force in its attack on the airfield. Then the unit shall cooperate
with the battalion assigned to capture the Juwata oil field in capturing the oil field, after
which the unit shall be on standby at Tarakan. Depending on the circumstances, the landing
shall be made in the vicinity of the Lingkas Pier.
9. The detachment headquarters and the 6th Infantry Company shall land in or near Batu after
dawn and go to the BPM office. Depending on the circumstances, the landing shall be made
at or near the Lingkas Pier.
10. The Squad for Collecting Cast-off Articles shall land along with the right wing unit, and
from there on it shall accompany the right wing unit as it advances, to collect and sort
weapons, ammunition and other matériel.
11. The right wing unit shall have its engineer unit make efforts to find and remove the enemy’s
demolition devices as well as to prevent fires during the period of the capture [operation]
of the whole island.
12. When the capture of Tarakan Island makes progress, and as far as the situation permits, the
Kuretake-maru shall be swiftly dispatched to Jolo for the return transport of the Jolo detach-
ment.
13. When the key areas of Tarakan Island have been cleared, guard duty shall be turned over to
the Navy, and the main force shall be assembled in Tarakan and its vicinity to prepare for
the capture of Balikpapan.
14. During the capture of Tarakan Island, the Navy shall have its aircraft strike the enemy po-
sitions in Juwata at daybreak, and, along with its warships, cut off the enemy’s retreat to the
north from Juwata and vicinity.
15. “Yama” [Mountain] and “Kawa” [River] have been set as nighttime passwords.
Advance, Landing and Capture
As already told, a “one-day postponement” was announced [past] midnight on 6 January,
and at 0800 on the 7th, first of all a clearing unit (of seven destroyers) left Malalag Bay (note:
southwest of Davao). [Then] the transport convoy ([consisting of] nine ships of the Sakaguchi
Detachment, two ships of the 2d Kure Special Landing Force, three ships of the Construction
and Defense Squads, two ships of the Eleventh Air Fleet, sixteen ships in total) left the an-
chorage of Daliao at 1100.(119) One light cruiser (the Naka), ten destroyers, six minesweepers,
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three submarine chasers, one converted auxiliary gunboat and other warships [for escort]
and the sixteen transport ships comprised a total of forty ships; they sailed at a speed of 8.5
knots.(119) It was calm on 7 January.(119) On the 8th, there was a report of (an) allied
submarine(s) but no attack was made.(119) On the afternoon of the 9th, aircraft of the 23d Air
Flotilla spotted one merchant vessel and one gunboat in the port of Lingkas; they bombed
them and caused a fire.(119) The convoy continued to sail calmly. Although it came under
attack from three allied bombers and two allied fighter planes at 1750 on the 10th and again
from three bombers at 1818, it sustained no loss and anchored at anchorage No. 1 at 1900.(88)
[Another] report of submarine(s) came in the evening, but there was no attack. First of all, at
2130 the first landing unit of the right wing unit of the Sakaguchi Detachment, followed by
troops of the 2d Kure Special Landing Force at 2200, left Anchorage No. 1 by their own land-
ing boats.(119) Just before that, at around 2100, fires broke out at two locations on Tarakan Is-
land.(119) The convoy of the left wing unit left Anchorage No. 1 at 0030 on the 11th, and reached
anchorage No. 2 at 0110. At 0220 it completed changing to the landing craft and departed.(119)
The sky above Tarakan was burning red from the oil field fires set by the Dutch East Indies
forces.(87) Although the [landing boats] were expected to sail in the dark night for about 15
nautical miles from Anchorage No. 1 to the shore, the silhouette of the island was clearly vis-
ible.(87) The right wing unit and the 2d Kure Special Landing Force successfully went ashore
at 0000 and at 0030 on the 11th respectively.(119) However, as they had mistaken the fire at the
Gunung Cangkol oil field for that of the Lingkas oil field located to its south, they had landed
four to six km north of their intended landing point, the mouth of the Amal River.(87) The
commander of the right wing unit only noticed this after the landing craft had gone back for
another transport.(87) They had no choice but to head south for the mouth of the Amal River
on foot.(87) When they reached the mouth of the Amal River, the day had [already] broken.(87)
The right wing unit made a sudden attack on the pillbox position(s) located there, defeated
the guards, captured several of Indonesian soldiers and, by interrogating them, learned the
rough disposition of the Dutch East Indies forces. Breaking through the jungle, the right wing
unit advanced to the north side of the Tarakan oil field.(87) It was around 1100 on the 11th.(87)
The moment the right wing unit advanced to the north side of the oil field, it came under
fierce gunfire from a Dutch East Indies unit, which made it difficult to move forward.(87) When
night fell, a counterattack was launched by the Dutch East Indies unit, whereupon [the Japan-
ese troops] attempted a night assault. Although some elements successfully seized both bar-
racks No. 1 and No. 2, [the attempt] was not an entire success, as the regimental headquarters
and another element ended up [being pushed] back to their original position.(87)
Meanwhile at 1700, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi (still on board) sent the Navy
escort unit the following wire: (1) Although the right wing unit and the 2d Kure Special Land-
ing Force have advanced as far as the highlands east of Tarakan, they are blocked by a strong
enemy artillery position, and their advance is delayed. They intend to break through the po-
sition tonight by means of night raids. (2) The situation of the left wing unit is unknown. (3)
Bombing is requested on the battery position to the east of the foreign residential area of the
town of Tarakan as well as on the batteries of Juwata at the northern end of the island and
on the little island of Sadau (at the high-angled gun artillery position). The air unit decided
to carry out the bombing in the early morning of the 12th, as it was [already] too late for
bombing on the 11th.(119) However, after the start of attacks at daybreak on the 12th, a bearer
of a flag of truce dispatched by the [Dutch] garrison commander [Lt. Col. S. de Waal] came
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to announce the surrender.(87) The right wing unit commander, Colonel Yamamoto, sent a
wire to Detachment Commander Sakaguchi, stating: “The [Dutch] commander and his men
have announced surrender at 0820. Therefore, the prompt landing of the detachment com-
mander by way of the Lingkas Pier is requested.”(88)
It was known that the left wing unit had departed from anchorage No. 2 at 0220 on the
11th and succeeded in landing at 0400, but as of 1700 on the 11th [the wire stated that] “the
situation of the left wing unit is unknown.” [Furthermore,] as of 2030 on the same day [it
was said that] “the actions and the military gains of the left wing unit after landing are un-
known, but [it is certain that] the Mengacu Battery is not yet seized because it occasionally
fires at [our] boats operating near the port entrance.”(119) Nevertheless, Colonel Yamamoto’s
telegram asked for the landing [of the detachment commander] at the Lingkas Pier since the
[Dutch] garrison commander and all his men had surrendered. At 1100, 4th Destroyer
Squadron Commander Nishimura ordered the commander of the 2d Base Force to sweep
the sea for mines.(119) Four minesweepers promptly set out and approached the Mengacu
Channel around 1200, when suddenly they came under fire from the battery at Karungan.
By 1215, the first two ships had been sunk(119) and so had one large-sized motorized [landing]
craft of the Army.(88) At 1252, the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander ordered by telegram
the remaining two sweepers to “stop firing and head back.”(119)
What had happened to the left wing unit? And what did Detachment Commander Saka -
guchi do? After completing its landing at the landing point at Cape Batu at 0400 on the 11th
as scheduled, the left wing unit tried to advance in the jungle towards the rear of the western
battery. However, due to the extremely dense vegetation and the steep terrain in the jungle,
it was only able to move forward by about 100 meters per hour, and got disoriented again
and again. When it [finally] reached the rear of the battery, it was about noon on the 12th.(87)
Detachment Commander Sakaguchi, with no reports at all either from the left wing unit after
its landing, or from his liaison officer dispatched to the left wing unit, had absolutely no clue
about the situation [of the unit] until the night of the 11th. At midnight on the 11th, he had
the 56th Field Artillery Regiment 1st Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Namekata Shōichi take
command of one infantry company, go ashore at the point where the left wing unit had
landed and, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, advance along the coast to seize
the battery.(87) At 0430 on the 12th, the Namekata Unit went ashore on the coast to the south-
east of the Mengacu Battery, and around daybreak reached the front of the battery. However,
the terrain blocked its progress. Although the left wing unit reached the rear of the Karungan
Battery by noon of the 12th as mentioned above, not knowing the [exact] position of the bat-
tery, and also due to the poor condition of communications and having a hard time to move,
it [finally] seized the battery at 1710 on the following day the 13th.(87, 119)
In the final analysis, because of the three [following] reasons, that is, (1) insufficient en-
forcement of the order of the Dutch East Indies garrison commander, (2) the left wing unit’s
delay in seizing the battery, and (3) hasty minesweeping, Minesweepers No. 13 and No. 14
and one army [landing] craft were sunk in broad daylight right in front of their fellow war-
ships. The situation at that time was recorded as follows by the 44th Field Antiaircraft Ar-
tillery Battalion:(88)
The brisk attack by the frontline unit of the right wing unit, carried out by means of night raids,
finally made the enemy commander surrender on the morning of the following day, the 12th.
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Our Navy immediately started minesweeping in the southern waters of Tarakan Island, after
which it was intended that the detachment commander would land at the shore of Lingkas in
front of Tarakan for a meeting of both commanders, when all of a sudden, by fierce fire of the
enemy’s coastal artillery, two of the Navy’s minesweepers and one army large-sized motorized
[landing] craft were sunk in the blink of an eye. The detachment commander had no choice but
to enter the town of Tarakan from the direction of the mouth of Amal River from which the main
force of the landing unit had [started] its advance, and accept the enemy’s unconditional sur-
render. Thus, the firing of the above-mentioned coastal artillery was the result of the fact that
the enemy’s order had not been fully enforced.
Having changed plans and entering [the town of] Tarakan after landing at the mouth of Amal
River, the Sakaguchi Detachment headquarters ([more precisely] Staff Officer Yano) sent a
telegram at 2100 on the 12th with the following content: “(1) The detachment commander
entered Tarakan at 1930 via Amal. (2) At 0830 the commander of the right wing unit ordered
the enemy in talks to suspend hostilities in the area, [in particular] to cease hostile operations
of the Karungan Battery, but when he tried to reach the battery, it opened fire on our ships
which was extremely regrettable. (3) At present, all enemy troops as far [north] as the airfield
(seized by the naval landing force) have been completely disarmed. Disarmament of enemy
troops north of the airfield will be carried out tomorrow on the 13th. (4) The Karungan Bat-
tery will be dealt with tomorrow morning on the 13th. Accordingly, we will notify when [it
will be safe enough to] start the minesweeping [operation] … [omitted by the author]. (7)
The Lingkas defense is heavily fortified; should we have attempted to carry out a landing at
this location as in the army agreement, then the landing troops would have been totally de-
stroyed.”(119) On the morning of the following day, the 13th, Detachment Commander Sak-
aguchi received a visit from the Dutch East Indies garrison commander, and officially
accepted the latter’s surrender.(87) The mopping up of the enemy on the whole island was
completed on the same day.(87) Prior to this, on the 12th, the destroyer Yamakaze discovered a
Dutch minelayer attempting to get away at night to the north of the Island, and together with
patrol boat No. 38 sank the ship.(119) Further, as soon as the Kuretake-maru had completed its
handling of cargo at 2000 of the 11th, the destroyer Suzukaze escorted the Kuretake-maru to
pick up the Matsumoto Detachment in Jolo.(119)
On the 14th the Sakaguchi Detachment turned over its guard duty [of the island] to the
Navy.(119)
The strength of the Dutch East Indies Army at Tarakan Island at the opening of hostilities
had been 1,400 men, including 800 infantry, 400 artillery and 70 engineers, which, with three
120-mm. guns and twelve field guns as the core, had [also] been well equipped with numer-
ous machine guns. [After the battle,] 871 [men] were made prisoner of war.(100) The only loss
sustained by the Sakaguchi Detachment was just seven men killed in action.(53) By contrast,
the Navy sustained heavy casualties; 156 men were killed when two of its minesweepers
were sunk, and 15 men were killed and 27 injured when they were bombed at the airfield on
the 13th.(119)
The Sakaguchi Detachment suffered enemy air strikes from the 10th until the13th; no
more strikes were made after that.(88) The number of the [enemy] aircraft which came for
strikes(88) and the military gains of the 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (consisting
of two batteries) was reported as follows:(88)
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Illustration No. 17—The Capture of Tarakan
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10th: 3 aircraft came flying in at 1740 6 bombs dropped
4 aircraft came flying in at 1812 6 bombs dropped 1 aircraft downed
11th: 1 B–17 came flying in at 1255 3 bombs dropped
12th: 3 aircraft came flying in at 1255 9 bombs dropped
3 aircraft came flying in at 1832 9 bombs dropped
13th: 3 aircraft came flying in at 1110 6 bombs dropped 2 aircraft downed
3 aircraft came flying in at 1400 5 bombs dropped
Total number of fired [antiaircraft] shells: 339 shots; military gains: 3 aircraft brought
down
Note: The three aircraft reported to have been downed, apparently included planes
shot down by Navy fighter planes.
The oil facilities had been substantially destroyed. In Lingkas, oil had for a large part been
consumed by fire, but there was [still] 12,300 tons of heavy oil left in the surviving tanks, and
[also] 120 oil drums of heavy oil.(119)
Tarakan’s airfield was much narrower than expected. A thirty meter wide and about
seven-hundred meter long runway was finally ready for use on the 16th, and nine fighter
planes and two land-based reconnaissance planes advanced from Jolo on the same day.(119)
[However,] it required considerable effort to get the facility ready for [the Navy land-based]
medium-sized attack plane units to advance. As the Dutch East Indies forces had laid sub-
marine mines all over the waterway, it was impossible for [the Japanese forces] to bring in
matériel. The total number of swept mines had reached 77 by the 17th, and 173 by the 24th.(119)
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Right After the Capture of Tarakan
4. The Capture of Menado (See Illustration No. 18)
On the day the Sakaguchi Detachment landed on Tarakan Island, the Navy carried out land-
ings and parachute droppings in Menado. The force employed from the Dutch East Indies
Unit and the tasks assigned to this operation were as follows:(114)
Eastern Attack Unit (commander: the 5th Cruiser Division commander)
Support Unit 
Main force of the 5th Cruiser Division (heavy cruisers the Haguro and the Nachi; the Myōkō
was damaged on 4 January and sent back to the mainland for repair) as its core: shall support
all operations.
2d Escort Unit
Main force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron (consisting of the light cruiser Jintsū, the 15th and
the 16th Destroyer Division), and the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force (minus two
platoons) as its core: shall directly escort the convoy, capture Menado, secure its air base and
make it ready for use.
1st Base Unit
1st Base Force as its core (with the light cruiser Nagara (which belongs to the 16th Cruiser
Division), and others): shall support the 2d Escort Unit, defend the Bangka anchorage and
protect the sea transport.
2d Air Unit
11th Seaplane Tender Division (with seaplane tenders the Chitose and the Mizuho) as its core:
shall provide guard against submarines and support in the landing attacks.
The 2d Escort Unit commander laid down the course of action, in which he would have the
main force of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force go ashore at the town of Menado
on the west coast and an element at Kema on the east coast to carry out a pincer attack against
the Dutch East Indies forces to seize the airfield in the Langoan area. On 5 January, he passed
down his orders at Davao.(117)
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Naval Paratroop Unit Drop at Menado
The 1001st Unit ([consisting of] the 1st
Yokosuka Special Landing Force) under the
command of the commander in chief of the
Eleventh Air Fleet would carry out the para-
troop drop. On 7 January, Commander in
Chief [of the Fleet] Tsukahara ordered that
“the unit be put under the command of the
1st Air Raid Unit (i.e. the 21st Air Flotilla)
until the drop, which shall be executed on 11
January.”(144) It was decided that, in coopera-
tion with the 1st Air Raid Unit, the 1001st
Unit would drop two companies (334 men)
on 11 January and one company (74 men) on
12 January at Langoan to seize the Langoan
airfield and the Kakas Sea [plane] Base.(144)
On 9 January, the convoy of ten ships and
its escort ships sailed from Davao.(117) On this
day, an allied plane flew close to reconnoiter
and another three heavy bombers came to
drop bombs, but no damage was sustained)
At 1400 on the 10th, the convoy separated
into those heading for Menado and those for
Kema.(117) At 1830, three flying boats came
and dropped bombs but no damage was sus-
tained) No allied surface vessels appeared ei-
ther. On the following day, the 11th, the Menado unit (about 1,800 men) and the Kema Unit
(about 1,400 men) successfully landed at 0400 and 0420 respectively. Repulsing a small num-
ber of Dutch East Indies troops, the units headed for the airfield.(117) Six enemy planes came
to attack and dropped bombs [on the Japanese troops] in Menado at 0635, followed by six
planes at 0650, and three planes at 1540; four planes came to attack in Kema at 0620, followed
by three planes at 0700, five planes at 1430 and four planes at 1628, but no major damage
was sustained in either area.(117)
On this day, two companies commanded by the 1001st Unit’s battalion commander, con-
sisting of 334 men in total, had boarded twenty-eight planes and left Davao at 0630. At 0952
they parachuted in, and completely seized the Langoan airfield at 1130 and the Kakas Sea
[plane] Base at 1800.(144)
On the following day, the 12th, one company of reinforcements (74 men) also parachuted
in at 0952, and the paratroop unit, the Menado landing unit and the Kema landing unit each
succeeded in making contact.(144) On this day eight [enemy] planes flew in to drop bombs [on
the Japanese troops] in Kema at 0815, followed by three planes at 0835, and also four planes
flew in to drop bombs in Menado at 1030, which caused little damage.(117) On this afternoon,
ten fighter planes and one reconnaissance plane of the 21st Air Flotilla advanced into Kakas
Airfield.(134) From then on, no more air raids by allied planes were seen.
This paratroop operation at Menado was the first ever paratroop operation carried out
by Japanese forces. The Army, which was planning to employ the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding
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Group for a surprise attack on Palembang, requested [the Navy] to delay the announcement
about the paratroop operation at Menado. The Navy approved this request, and delayed its
announcement until the droppings at Palembang. Thus on 15 February the following com-
muniqués were released:(13)
IGHQ Communiqué (1700 on 15 February)
The Imperial Navy Paratroop Unit took part in the battle to capture Celebes on 11 January
and achieved splendid results.
IGHQ Communiqué (1710 on 15 February)
The powerful Imperial Army Paratroop Unit succeeded in executing a surprise dropping at
Palembang on Sumatra, the largest oil field area in the Dutch East Indies, at 1126 on 14 Feb-
ruary, and while destroying the enemy and securing the airfield and other vital locations, it
is further expanding military gains.
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1. [Commander Imamura’s] Orders to the 38th Division
The Sixteenth Army’s Arrangements with the [Navy] Malaya Unit
On 9 January, a meeting was held at the command post of the Sixteenth Army inSaigon with the staff officers Oyadomari Chōsei of the 38th Division and AkatsukaKazuo of the 48th Division, who [both] had flown in on the day before.(32) On the af-
ternoon of the next day, the 10th, Army Commander [Imamura], Chief of Staff Okazaki, and
Staff Officer Oda left for Cam Ranh Bay, where they had a meeting with the [Navy] Malaya
Unit (the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet) on the flagship, the Chōkai, on both the 11th
and the 12th, and also with the commander and staff officer(s) of the 5th Destroyer Squadron,
after which they returned to Saigon on the night of the 12th.(32, 120)
The general situation at that time was as follows:
1. Anticipating the seizure of Kuala Lumpur (seized on the 11th), the Twenty-fifth Army had given
the following order in Ipoh on 10 January:(53) “(1) The enemy in central Malaya is [for the most
part] destroyed near Slim, [after] being severely attacked and closely pursued by the 5th Divi-
sion, and part of the remnants are retreating southward. [Meanwhile,] the 18th Division will
land in Mersing shortly. (2) The army shall closely pursue the enemy toward Singapore.” The
main force of the 18th Division had left Humen in southern China on the 7th and had arrived
in Cam Ranh Bay on the 10th.(53) The Southern Army had held talks with the [Navy] Malaya
Unit at Cam Ranh Bay on the 11th with the 18th Division also participating, where they agreed
on [the plan] that the main force of the 18th Division ([consisting of] four battalions as its core)
would land in Mersing on 17 January, and they signed [the arrangement] on the 12th.(23) In Kuan-
tan, the airfield had been made ready for use on the 10th.(53) [Previously] on 6 January, the South-
ern Army had ordered the Kawaguchi Detachment to seize the airfields in Ledo.(23) [Editor’s
note: Called Singkawang II and Singkawang III in Dutch sources. The latter was just an emer-
gency landing strip.] The Southern Army had completed the previously mentioned “Supple-
ment to the Southern Army’s Air Operation Plan” on 10 January.(2) The main force of the 33d
Division had arrived in Bangkok from eastern China [also] on 10 January.(23, 120) The Sakaguchi
Detachment had landed in Tarakan on 11 January,(119) and the Eastern Detachment had left Hong
Kong in southern China on 12 January to head first for Davao.(118)
2. The information on the allied forces, obtained by 8 January, was in outline as follows:(23)
(1) In Burma, the enemy was making every effort to build up its preparations against our of-
fensive: It seemed that two divisions extracted from the northwest of India had arrived in
Rangoon around 23 December, and the Chinese Army was also continuing its advance into
Burma.
(2) In Malaya, the British Indian Army was planning to hold out by having the units, which
were previously deployed in several lines along the west coast, and the front line division
of the Indian Army fight as a rearguard. Some 1,000 British Indian troops had been stationed
in groups over the whole area of Kuantan on the east coast, but their main force had retreated
westward on the 5th due to the attacks by our army. There was information that an element
of Australian troops had arrived in or near Singapore, but it seems that large corps had yet
to arrive for support. In Singapore, some 70 allied aircraft were found on 3 January, which
was [increased to] 114 aircraft on 7 January. It is certain that [the air force] had been reinforced
[with aircraft] from the Dutch East Indies and Australia.
(3) In Sumatra, sixteen aircraft were found in Palembang, seven in Pekanbaru, and two in
Medan on 3 January.
(4) Some 800 British Indian troops, who had been stationed in or near Kuching in British Borneo,
had retreated in the direction of Siluas (note: southwest of Kuching) in Dutch [Borneo] at
the end of December.
As previously described, the Southern Army had planned “landings in Bangka and Palem-
bang around day x + 60 (6 February)” with the aim of (1) seizing the oil resources in Palem-
bang and its environs, the area with the richest oil field of the Dutch East Indies, (2) cutting
off reinforcements for the allied forces in Singapore as well as blocking the retreat of the
forces from the area, and (3) obtaining an air base for [the operation to] capture Java. It [also]
intended to use the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group for seizing the oil resources in Palembang.
However, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment, which had been shipwrecked on 3 January,
had reached Bangkok on the 11th with almost nothing more than the clothes on its back, and
the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment had not yet left the mainland. (It departed from Moji
on the 15th.(23, 93)) The Southern Army had come to think that it was impossible to use the
[paratroop] raiding group for Palembang, because of the material and moral shock which
the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment had sustained and the actual condition of the 2d [Para-
troop] Raiding Regiment with its insufficient level of training.(28)
Due to the fact that the [paratroop] raiding group was in the above-described condition,
and the fact that the immediate concern of the [Navy] Malaya Unit was focused on the Mer -
sing landing operation, which was expected to involve great risks, and the fact that the 38th
Division would advance its assembly point to Cam Ranh and from then on work on prepar-
ing for the southern Sumatra operation, etc., the arrangements between the Sixteenth Army
and the [Navy] Malaya Unit were somewhat less specific. In outline they can be imagined as
having been as follows:
1. The Sixteenth Army shall have the main force of the 38th Division (with four battalions as its
core) leave Hong Kong around 20 January, advance to Cam Ranh Bay around 24 January, and
prepare for Operation L (i.e. the Bangka and Palembang landing operations).
2. The [Navy] Malaya Unit shall prepare for Operation L, while carrying out the Mersing landing
operation ([of] the main force of the 18th Division, scheduled to land on 17 January), the seizure
of the base on the Anambas [islands] (on the sea east of Singapore), and the operations against
the coast west of Ledo.
3. The Sixteenth Army shall have the Operation L unit leave Cam Ranh around 31 January and
have its advance party land in Bangka and Palembang on day L (6 February).
4. The Malaya Unit shall support these operations with the main force of its air and naval capac-
ity.
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5. The droppings of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group in Palembang shall be tentatively scheduled
for the day before day L. The Southern Army shall be pressed for the execution [of the operation].
6. At a later date, the [Navy] Malaya Unit shall make further arrangements with the 38th Division
about its escort and with the Third Air Force about its air cooperation.
At that time, the 3d Destroyer Squadron was the only destroyer squadron in the Malaya Unit
and it had been decided that its commander, R. Adm. Hashimoto Shintarō, leading the light
cruiser Sendai, and the 11th and the 20th Destroyer Divisions, would provide the direct escort
of the Mersing landing unit, while the 12th and the 19th Destroyer Divisions, each respec-
tively incorporated in the main unit of the Malaya Unit and the main escort unit ([consisting
of] the 7th Cruiser Division as its core), would provide the indirect escort of the Mersing
landing unit.(118) The 5th Destroyer Squadron under the command of R. Adm. Hara Kenz-
aburō ([consisting of] the Natori and the 5th and the 22d Destroyer Division, i.e. one light
cruiser and eight destroyers), which had [temporarily] been transferred from the Philippines
(Dutch East Indies) Unit to the Malaya Unit to escort the main force of the 33d Division, one
regiment of the 5th Division, and others from Magong to Singora and Bangkok, was returned
from the Malaya Unit to the Dutch East Indies Unit after finishing escorting the transport
convoy on 9 January, and it was in the middle of changing course in order to escort the main
force of the Sixteenth Army from Gaoxiong to Java. On its way, it made a call at Cam Ranh
Bay for about five hours on the 12th, and had talks with the Sixteenth Army as well as with
the Malaya Unit as previously told.(120) Due to the Southern Army’s acceleration of the Java
operation, it had been decided that the 5th Destroyer Squadron would escort the main force
of the Sixteenth Army straight to Java from Gaoxiong (without calling at Cam Ranh). At that
time, the 5th Destroyer Squadron had received the following telegram from the [Navy] Dutch
East Indies Unit:(120)
Dated 6 January at 2030, from Chief of Staff, Third Fleet
The following matters have been decided in the arrangement between the Sixteenth Army and
the Third Fleet:
1. The escort of Detachment B has been changed and assigned to the 8th Destroyer Division.
2. The main force of the Sixteenth Army shall assemble in Gaoxiong from 29 January to 5 Feb-
ruary and directly go [to the waters] close to Batavia without calling at Cam Ranh Bay. The
details shall be specified in the arrangement between the 5th Destroyer Squadron com-
mander and the [Sixteenth] Army commander.
Dated 6 January at 2100, from Chief of Staff, Third Fleet
The Third Fleet and the Sixteenth Army made a preliminary arrangement in Gaoxiong on 29
December and then concluded the formal arrangement by telegram. Therefore, no further face-
to-face meetings will be held. A summary of the arrangement is as follows:
1. Army Detachment B (or the Itō Detachment, in four transport ships) shall leave Hong Kong
on 12 January and arrive in Davao on 18 January under the escort of the 8th Destroyer Di-
vision. After that, it shall capture Ambon on 25 January and Kupang on 5 February under
the escort of a force consisting of the 2d Destroyer Squadron as its core.
2. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall be escorted by a force consisting of the 4th Destroyer
Squadron as its core, and is scheduled to capture Tarakan on 11 January, Balikpapan on 21
January, and Banjarmasin on 31 January. (Accordingly, part of the operation to capture
Menado is also set on 11 January.)
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3. The main force of the Sixteenth Army shall be escorted by a force which consists of the 5th
Destroyer Squadron as its core. It shall depart from Gaoxiong during the period from 29 Jan-
uary to 5 February and land in or near Batavia around 16 February. The details shall be spec-
ified between the commanders of the 5th Destroyer Squadron and the Sixteenth Army in
Gaoxiong on 26 January.
4. The 48th Division shall leave Manila on 7 February [under the escort of] a force consisting
of the 4th Destroyer Squadron as its core and land in or near Surabaya around 16 February.
The details shall be specified between the commanders of the 4th Destroyer Squadron and
the 48th Division in Manila on 4 February.
The 8th Destroyer Division, which would escort the Itō Detachment, belonged to the 2d De-
stroyer Squadron. As previously explained, because the operation schedule was quite tight
and the forces employed for escorting were extremely limited, the [Navy] Southern Task
Force (including the Dutch East Indies Unit, the Malaya Unit, and others) had no extra
strength to spare for the rear. On 14 January, the Navy Department of the IGHQ [even] passed
down an order that “the second transport convoy of the unit under the direct control of the
Twenty-fifth Army (in twenty-four transport ships) from Magong to Singora shall be pro-
vided by the Second China Expeditionary Fleet.”(1) It was during these meetings [in Cam
Ranh] on the 11th and 12th that, before directly reporting his concerns to [Southern Army]
Commander in Chief Terauchi, [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura had sought the opin-
ion of [First Southern Expeditionary Fleet] Commander in Chief Ozawa, who had given him
a reassuring response. (See the previous description [p.164].) 
Army Commander [Imamura] Heads for Gaoxiong After Giving Orders to
the 38th Division
On 14 January, the 48th Division ([in] the Philippines) was added to the order of battle of the
Sixteenth Army by order of [the Army Department of] IGHQ.(1)
On the next day, the 15th, the previously mentioned preliminary arrangement made be-
tween the Sixteenth Army and the [Navy] Malaya Unit in Cam Ranh on the 12th was [offi-
cially] signed.(120)
The 2d Division was supposed to start leaving Moji from that day (the 15th) and come to
Gaoxiong first.(53)
Army Commander Imamura left Saigon at 0900 on the next day, the 16th, along with Chief
of Staff Okazaki, leaving [Chief of] Operations Staff Oda and others in Saigon. He arrived in
Guangdong at 1700 via Sanya on Hainan Island, made a courtesy call on the Twenty-third
Army commander, and left Guangdong at 1300 on the next day, the 17th, for Hong Kong,
where, after the commander and cadre of the 38th Division had presented themselves before
him, he gave instructions and took command of the division.(32) Division Commander Sano
Tadayoshi reported that (1) the damage that the division had sustained through the capture
of Hong Kong was not so serious, and that the valuable experiences gained through fighting
against a European army was rather a big advantage for them; that (2) the Itō Detachment
(or the Eastern Detachment), which had embarked with the help of Staff Officers Saiki Ikuzō
and Nishiura Setsuzō dispatched from Saigon and Taiwan respectively, had been sent off by
Senior Staff Officers Takashima Tatsuhiko and Kitamura Yoshifuto, who had come from
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Saigon representing the army commander, and that it had left Hong Kong on the 12th, under
the escort of the 8th Destroyer Division, and was heading first for Davao.(35, 36)
At 0900 on the next day, the 18th,(32) Army Commander [Imamura] gave the 38th Division
commander in outline the following order:(66)
1. The main force of the 38th Division (minus the Eastern Detachment and the Shōji Detachment)
shall advance first to Cam Ranh Bay by late January and leave the bay around 31 January under
a naval escort, pass through [the waters] off the coast of Singapore, and put ashore an element
on Bangka Island around 6 February to seize Mentok airfield. On the same day, the main force
shall go upstream on the Musi River, rush to Palembang, secure the place, relieve the paratroop-
ers, and at the same time have a powerful unit advance as swiftly as possible to Telukbetung,
which faces the Sunda Strait, and seize the airfield there.
2. The Shōji Detachment ([consisting of] the main force of the 230th Infantry Regiment as its core)
shall be put under the direct command of the [Sixteenth] Army and shall advance to Gaoxiong
first.
Incidentally, Chief of Staff Okazaki considered that motorization [of the army] was absolutely
essential in order to accomplish a blitzkrieg-like operation against the Dutch East Indies
where the roads were considerably developed, and he had sent in advance a telegram to the
38th Division to instruct them to equip [its units] with motor vehicles seized in the war.(36)
However, according to the report from the division, the Twenty-third Army had not allowed
it. Understanding the Twenty-third Army’s position, Chief of Staff Okazaki then borrowed
eighty motor vehicles [from the Twenty-third Army] by handing in exchange a bond of bor-
rowing to its chief of staff, Major General Kuribayashi, and equipped [the division] with
them.(36) Later, the Shōji Detachment achieved great results in seizing at a stroke the Kalijati
airfield on the day of its landing by using these motor vehicles, and thereby enabling the ad-
vance of the 3d Air Division under the command of Major General Endō as early as the next
day.
After issuing the above orders to the 38th Division on the 18th, Army Commander Ima-
mura left Hong Kong for Gaoxiong at 1000 on the same day, where, after a long absence, he
took command of the headquarters of the army.(32) Vice Chief of Staff Harada and Staff Offi-
cers Takahashi, Nishiura, Yamashita and others had left Tokyo on 2 January, arrived in Taipei
on the 5th, then [first] stationed [the army headquarters] at [the facility of] the Taiwan Army
headquarters in Taipei. After welcoming Staff Officers Takashima and Kitamura from Saigon
on the 8th, they had moved from Taipei and set up the army headquarters in Gao xiong on
the 12th.(45, 33, 34)
After mostly finishing what he had to do in Gaoxiong, the army commander was consid-
ering departing for the Philippines to take command of the 48th Division there, when the
[Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit (the Third Fleet), which had [once] stated in its order that “it
would hold no further face-to-face meetings with the Sixteenth Army, and that, from now
on the commanders of the 4th and the 5th Destroyer Squadrons should arrange matters re-
spectively with the commanders of the 48th Division and the Sixteenth Army,” notified its
“wish to make operational arrangements with the Sixteenth Army in Manila from the 21st
onward.” So the army commander flew from Gaoxiong to Manila on the 21st, ahead of sched-
ule.(32) On the previous day (the 20th), the Southern Army had given the Sixteenth Army the
previously mentioned order to carry out the operation to capture Java.(23, 24)
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2. The Manila Conference and the Arrangements Between the
Sixteenth Army and the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit
An Unexpected Request from the [Navy] Southern Task Force
On 19 January, the Southern Army received a telegram from the [Navy] Southern Task Force
(i.e. the Second Fleet), which explained the totally unexpected situation in the eastern part
of the Dutch East Indies, and requested postponement of the landings on Java due to this
[situation].(23, 24) At that time, the 38th Division had finished its embarkation and was to leave
Hong Kong and head southward on the next day, the 20th. Furthermore, the 2d Division was
due to arrive in Gaoxiong from the day after next, the 21st, and the 48th Division had been
preparing for the Java operation since the 8th, while the Twenty-fifth Army had given an
order on the 10th to pursue the enemy toward Singapore and, though behind schedule, was
going to carry out a landing in Mersing on the 26th.(53) [Actually,] it was the postponement
from 17 to 26 January of the date of landing in Mersing (though it was decided that only the
unloading of plane fuel and ammunition would do and that the landing of the main force of
the 18th Division was no longer necessary), and the delay in capturing the Ledo airfield by
the Kawaguchi Detachment that the Southern Army really worried about. It had never
dreamed of a delay in the operations on the east coast of Borneo [and further east]. Three
days before (on the 16th), it had [even] recorded in its journal: “Directives for Operation H
(note by the author: the Java operation): Although the principle is to carry out simultaneous
landings in eastern and western Java, the landing in eastern Java may have to be carried out
on its own [first], should by any chance Operation L (note by the author: the Bangka and
Palembang operations) be delayed.”(24) And so it stuck to its conviction that it should land
on Java on day x + 70 (16 February) in any case.(23, 24)
Dated 19 January at 0000 from Chief of Staff, Second Fleet
To Chief of Staff, Southern Army
Regarding the schedule for capturing the Dutch East Indies, the bases seized in the eastern part
of the Dutch East Indies are in an unexpectedly bad condition, and even though we are trying
by every possible means to expand them and make them ready for use, the fact remains that
the advance and deployment of [our] air force is gradually getting delayed, whereas the enemy
has been launching counterattacks from the many bases [still under its control]. In addition, if
we consider the situation at Tarakan, where [submarine] mines were laid over extensive areas,
it becomes inevitable to postpone the scheduled dates of landing in Banjarmasin, Makassar,
Timor and Java by about ten days in order to proceed with the coming capture operations with-
out serious problems. Therefore, in order to arrange the details, we will send the senior staff of-
ficer of our fleet to the meeting to be held in Manila from 21 to 23 January between the Sixteenth
Army, the Third Fleet, and the Eleventh Air Fleet. We would like you to especially see to it that
also from your headquarters a staff officer will be dispatched.
The Southern Army took the situation seriously and decided to dispatch Col. Ishii Masayoshi,
senior staff officer of Section 1, Col. Tanikawa Kazuo, senior staff officer of Section 4, and
[Navy] Capt. Ishihara Itsu, staff officer of the Second Fleet seconded to the Southern Army,
to Manila. At the same time, it sent the [Navy] Southern Task Force and the Army Department
of IGHQ the following telegrams:(23)
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To Chief of Staff, Second Fleet (dated 19 January at 1730)
We have taken note of the Second Fleet Telegram Classified No. 702 regarding the schedule for
the capture of H. The [Southern] Army considers that it is essential that the schedule should not
be postponed even if it entails some risks, as it is highly likely that allowing the enemy time to
increase its preparations step by step would rather make the capture operations more difficult.
Therefore, it has asked the corps under its command for full support not only for the air units
of the Army but also for those of the Navy in respect to seizing airfields and making them ready
for use, and replenishing fuel and ammunition [for their aircraft]. We would like to ask your
understanding of the above in advance. We shall send Staff Officers Ishihara, Ishii, and Tanikawa
to Manila.
Dated 19 January from Chief of Staff [Southern Army]
To Vice Chief of Army General Staff
Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 557
1. We have received a telegram from the Second Fleet, which is summarized as follows: (The
following part omitted by the author.)
2. In response, we wired back, stressing that the [Southern] Army wants to keep the invasion
schedule specified in General Agreement No. 4 as standard at all costs, as it is apparent that
postponement of the date of capture would rather result in the enemy’s reinforcement of its
defense (naval and air [defense] in particular) and cause further delay in our advance, and
we informed [the fleet] that we would provide full support for the Navy air units as well by
seizing airfields and making them ready for use, and replenishing fuel and ammunition [for
their aircraft], in order to increase the fleet’s confidence.
3. However, regarding Operation H (note by the author: the Java operation), our operational
policy was originally based on the assumption that we would resolutely carry out the policy
by applying overwhelming results against the enemy air power, as the air power of both the
enemy and us is evenly matched. Now that the enemy’s air power in H has been slightly in-
creased, and, moreover, a reinforcement of enemy naval vessels seems to be arriving soon,
it is perfectly clear that a postponement of several days will rather cause a delay of more
than a dozen days. Therefore, we judge that it is too late to hesitate in carrying out the plan
of operations.
4. We [provided] the above [information] just in case a proposal [would be made to you] by
the Navy General Staff.
The General Situation Until Then
I. Information on allied forces
Southern Army Special Report No. 5 (from 9 to 20 January)(23)
1. General situation
(1) The allied forces of the enemy in the Southwest Pacific seem to be preparing for a protracted
[war] by making every effort to strengthen the line between Burma and Australia via the
Dutch East Indies (Sumatra and Java), while continuing resistance in Malaya and the Philip-
pines. Although it is not yet known for certain how much Britain and the United States have
reinforced their military strength since around the time of the opening of hostilities, it is
roughly estimated as follows:
{1} Burma
One Indian Army division and about fifty aircraft.
{2} Malaya
About one Indian Army brigade and about one Australian Army brigade.
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Some U.S. and Dutch aircraft.
It seems that Britain is dispatching more warships from the Indian Ocean to reconstruct
its Eastern Fleet, but the details are unknown.
{3} The Dutch East Indies
Whereas the details of ground troops and aircraft are unknown, the main force of the
U.S. Asiatic Fleet seems to have fled to this area. Regarding their route of transport, it is
almost certain that Britain for sure but also the United States is using the Indian Ocean
route. (The rest omitted by the author.)
II. Operation S (the Endau and Mersing landing operation) has up to now progressed as
follows:
As previously mentioned, the Southern Army drew up plans for Operation Q (the
Kuantan landing operation) and Operation S on 13 December, concluded General
Agreement No. 3 at Cam Ranh on 23 December, and on the same day ordered by
means of Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 20 that Operation Q [would be car-
ried out by a force of] two battalions of the 18th Division as its core, which would land
in Kuantan around 31 December, and that Operation S [would be carried out by] the
main force of the 18th Division ([consisting of] four battalions as its core), which would
land in Mersing around 7 January. However, it cancelled Operation Q on 27 December
and had the unit supposed to conduct the operation (i.e. the Koba Detachment) land
in Singora [instead] and go southward along the east coast. [Meanwhile] the Takumi
Detachment, which had gone ahead southward along the east coast, occupied Kuantan
on 31 December, and the airfield there was made ready for use on 10 January.(23) As
previously told, the Southern Army unwillingly called off Operation Q for four rea-
sons: the opinions offered by the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Air Force, the opin-
ion of the Navy, and the swift advance of the Takumi Detachment. Instead, it poured
great enthusiasm in conducting Operation S and insisted on its definite implementa-
tion.(23) As for the Twenty-fifth Army, it had great expectations for the Mersing landing
operation because the progress of its operations since its advance to the banks of the
Perak River had not been very good. The main force of the 18th Division charged with
the Mersing operation was [also] extremely enthusiastic, partly because the units
formed out of this division and commanded by Detachment Commanders Takumi,
Koba and Kawaguchi had been achieving brilliant military gains on the east coast of
Malaya and the west coast of Borneo.(23) The air [support] arrangements for Operation
S were made on 3 January (the day when [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura
moved to Saigon).(23) Anticipating that a landing close to Singapore would trigger fierce
counterattacks by the allied air and naval forces, it was decided that the air operation
should be absolutely perfect. This resulted in a plan for an unusually massive air op-
eration since the opening of hostilities, in which a total of more than 300 aircraft, con-
sisting of about 110 fighter planes, about 80 heavy bombers of the Third Air Force of
the Army and about 20 fighter planes and about 100 land-based attack planes of the
1st Air Unit (the 22d Air Flotilla) of the Navy would be employed. Also, it was decided
that almost all airfields in Malaya would be used, among which those in Kota Bharu
and Sungai Petani would be shared by the Army and the Navy, and that the Army
would advance about 60 Type–97 fighter planes to the Kuantan airfield to provide per-
fect cover for the convoy.(23) Furthermore, it was decided that the air operation should
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be launched as soon as possible from 10 January onwards to destroy the allied air
power in and around Singapore.(23) Subsequently, on 11 January, the Southern Army
conferred about the operational arrangements for Operation S in Cam Ranh and con-
cluded them on the next day, the 12th.(23) (On that day, the Sixteenth Army had a pre-
liminary meeting with the [Navy] Malaya Unit in Cam Ranh on the operations against
Bangka and Palembang.(32)) The top echelon of the 18th Division (who arrived at Cam
Ranh Bay on 10 January) also participated in the arrangement.(23) In this arrangement,
it was decided to roughly set the landing date as 17 January, and if a change [in the
date] were necessary, both parties should discuss and determine [a new date] by noon
three days prior [to the landing date]. The point of landing should be the coast of
Endau, and the landings should take place for two days in eleven fast ships, which
would leave Cam Ranh Bay on 14 January under the direct escort of the Navy 3d De-
stroyer Squadron (of about six destroyers) with the Sendai as flagship as its core, and
under the indirect escort of almost the whole force of the Malaya Unit.(23) In concluding
this arrangement, heated arguments were exchanged over the schedule between the
Southern Army and the Navy; the former insisted on carrying out the operations
against Bangka, Palembang and Java as scheduled in General Agreement No. 4 (the
agreement concluded on 1 January), while the latter would like to carry out secure
surface escort operations after [first] gaining command of the air.(23) Although the op-
eration to destroy the enemy air power based on the above-mentioned arrangement
of 3 January was started on 12 January, the start on the Navy side [was delayed to] the
following day, the 13th, due to bad weather on the east coast of Malaya.(23) What was
more, it did not produce the expected results: repeated attacks by our forces ended in
vain as the allied air forces escaped from Singapore. Instead, the allied air forces came
to attack the anchorage in Singora on the 12th and the 13th and in Sungai Petani on
the 15th, and it seemed from observation that they were also being reinforced.(23)
Around this time, the Twenty-fifth Army’s offensive was regaining its momentum; on
11 January it stormed into Kuala Lumpur, a place of strategic importance, and its lead-
ing group closed in on Gemas on the 14th. It was now expected that [the Twenty-fifth
Army] would be able to advance to the Straits of Johor around 25 January.(23) On 14
January (two days before the [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura left Saigon for
Hong Kong and Gaoxiong), the chief of staff of the Twenty-fifth Army [Lt. Gen. Suzuki
Sōsaku] sent the following telegram to the chief of General Staff of the Southern
Army:(23)
Tomi [Twenty-fifth Army] Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 723 (dated 14 January)
The operations of the [Twenty-fifth] Army are making more progress than expected. In view
of the current situation, where most of the immediate enemy has been destroyed and so has
its morale, we have come to the conclusion that Operation S does not need to be carried out
in order to [facilitate] the capture of Singapore. Instead, the army would like to promptly
launch the Sumatra operation following the capture of Singapore. Therefore, although we
appreciate the special consideration of [the Army Department of] IGHQ and the Navy [for
Operation S], we would like to propose that Operation S be cancelled for the above reason,
and that the main force of the 18th Division will be put ashore in Singora and assemble on
the coast opposite of Penang.
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The Southern Army received the above telegram on the same day (the 14th). It was
[also] the day when the 18th Division was supposed to leave Cam Ranh Bay for Op-
eration S.(23) The above telegram of the Twenty-fifth Army had been sent to [the Army
Department of] IGHQ as well, and also to the Navy by its liaison officer.(23) [Mean-
while] the [Navy] Malaya Unit had wired the Southern Army on the same day (the
14th) that “it would postpone the landing date of Operation S (by two days [in total])
to the 19th in view of the insufficient results of the air operations to destroy the enemy
in the Malaya theater.”(23) The 18th Division, however, which wanted to be engaged in
the operations of the war as soon as possible, wired the chief of staff [of the Southern
Army] under the name of Division Commander Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi Ren’ya, on the
same day (the 14th) the following telegram:(23)
KiKu [18th Division] Staff Telegram No. 25 (dated 14 January)
Even though the division hoped and tried every way to persuade [the Navy] to depart as
soon as possible [for Operation S], the Navy did not agree to our departure because of the
less-than-expected results of the air operation to destroy the enemy air power, and it even
further postponed [the departure] by one day, which eventually forced us to [just] watch
the situation. Although it has made efforts to improve its air operation by changing the meth-
ods, the timing and other [factors], the Navy seems to think that [even] departure under a
blackout will probably be difficult depending on the results [of the air operation] from to-
morrow onwards. We really would like to have the [Southern] Army’s help as well, so that
this operation [of ours] will be swiftly accomplished.
At that time, the results of the massive air operations launched from 12 January on-
wards to destroy the enemy air power were not as anticipated: the allied air forces had
fled to Sumatra, and [their] aircraft still kept on making occasional guerrilla-like at-
tacks.(23) [However,] the Southern Army headquarters had no accurate knowledge of
the insufficient results of these air operations.(23) Furthermore, there was also the prece-
dent of Operation Q, when the Southern Army, though deploring the Navy’s proposal
to postpone the operation, had reluctantly accepted it, because it had been formally
consulted.(23) However, it did not approve the Twenty-fifth Army’s proposal to cancel
Operation S and turned it down.(23) While the Southern Army found the [Navy] Malaya
Unit’s proposal cowardly, it felt obliged to agree to the proposal as it had been formally
consulted, and it sent on the same day the following telegram to the chief and vice
chief of staff of the Malaya Unit under the name of the chief of staff [of the Southern
Army]:(23)
Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 504 (dated 14 January)
Although the results [of the damage] caused to the enemy warships in the air operation
against Singapore are not clear, we completely overwhelmed the enemy air forces and not
more than about fifty [enemy] aircraft are left. As the enemy aircraft are only vainly trying
to escape to preserve themselves, the [Southern] Army judges that the cover of the convoys
under sail and at the anchorages may be expected to be perfect. In view of the progress of
the operations along the west coast of Malaya, we are very much afraid that further delay
in implementing Operation S at this moment in order to await [further] results in the air op-
erations will mean that we will not only lose a battle opportunity but also delay the launch
194 Chapter VII     /     The Capture of Java’s Dehors
of Operation H. We would appreciate your understanding that when the [Southern] Army
concluded the agreement on the air operations we counted on carrying out the operations
under such results as attained up to today. And we would like you to understand that also
concerning the implementation of Operation L our view remains the same as the above.
Note: Operation H means the Java [operation], and L means the Bangka and Palembang op-
erations.
Thus, on 16 January, the day of the operation convoy’s departure after the two-day
delay came at last, but the Southern Army received another telegram from the Malaya
Unit:(23)
On the 14th, an Army reconnaissance plane scouting [the enemy around] Singapore spotted
one aircraft carrier and seven warships in its naval port, and six or seven ships which seemed
to be battleships or cruisers on the sea south of [Kampung Sungai] Buntu. On the 15th, we
identified on reconnaissance photos by a Navy reconnaissance plane, one battleship (appar-
ently Renown–class) and five destroyers anchored in the naval port. Others are unidentified
due to clouds. Our unit plans to destroy these enemy [ships] first. We would like to request
a postponement of Operation S for the time being.
The same day (the 16th), the Southern Army received yet another telegram from the
Malaya Unit to the effect that the latter wanted to postpone Operation S until the 21st,
to which the army reluctantly sent a reply of approval. Then again on the same day
(the 16th) the army received the following consultative telegram, this time from the
Southern Task Force (the Second Fleet):(23)
In view of the enemy’s movements in the Singapore area and the present progress of the
Army operations in the E area, we [propose to] cancel Operation S. The Navy’s cooperation
in the sea transport and debarkation of matériel for the Army air bases to the Endau and
Mersing areas shall be arranged between the commander in chief of the Southern Army and
the commander of the Malaya Unit.
Note: E indicates Malaya.
On this day (the 16th), the judgement of Section 1 of the Southern Army Staff was [still]
as stated in the previously mentioned “Directives for Operation H” that “although the
principle is to carry out simultaneous landings in eastern and western Java, the landing
in eastern Java may have to be carried out on its own [first], should by any chance Op-
eration L be delayed.”(24) On the previous day (the 15th), after receiving the information
about the allied fleet in the Singapore area, the commander of the Malaya Unit (and
commander in chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet), Vice Admiral Ozawa,
had left Cam Ranh Bay with his main unit and was sailing southward,(103) while the
commander of the Southern Task Force (and commander in chief of the Second Fleet),
Vice Admiral Kondō, who had left Magong on the 14th and was on his way [with his
fleet] to Palau,(103) had sent the Southern Army the above-mentioned proposal to dis-
cuss cancelling the operation. It was [also] the day when [Sixteenth] Army Commander
Imamura left Saigon for Hong Kong and Gaoxiong.(32)
The Southern Army headquarters finally recognized the fact that the results [of the
air operation] to destroy the enemy air power were insufficient.(23) At that time, the
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front line of the Twenty-fifth Army was closing in on Gemas, but the actions of the al-
lied air forces were still brisk.(23) The next day, the 17th, in reply to telegram No. 153
sent by the Southern Army on the 16th (the telegram concerning the postponement
[of operation S] until the 21st), the Malaya Unit (in the middle of its mission) expressed
its views as follows:(23)
To Chief of Staff, Southern Army
From Chief of Staff, First Southern Expeditionary Fleet
Concerning Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 153, we have the following views:
The Southern Expeditionary Fleet considers the main objective of Operation S to be the ac-
celeration of the operations of the Twenty-fifth Army. By maintaining close contact and
working together with the army we are familiar with the progress of its operations in detail.
At the same time, in the light of the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of Operation
Q, we are very concerned about the delay of day S, and through the departments concerned
both in the Army and the Navy, we have often signaled to the [Southern] Army as well our
intention regarding stepping-up the air operation. Whereas the operations of the Twenty-
fifth Army are developing more rapidly than expected, the progress of the air operations,
which had been delayed and were finally launched on the 12th, has failed to live up to our
expectations, partly due to bad weather. As of the 14th, it seems that we have been able to
practically overwhelm the enemy fighter planes, but most of the enemy torpedo bombers
are yet to be destroyed. We judged that it was highly possible that in carrying out Operation
S as scheduled under such circumstances [our] transport fleet would sustain serious damage,
and thus we postponed [the operation]. You may understand from the above that we con-
sider the enemy attack planes as the main object of our air operation. We would like you to
understand that our view is significantly different from yours. Because it would be unpleas-
ant to carry out under these circumstances in cooperation [with you] Operation L hereafter,
we would like to have a full discussion on another occasion.
Unlike the Twenty-fifth Army, the Southern Army not only focused on the operations
in Malaya, but also in particular on the implementation of the Bangka, Palembang and
Java operations, and thus [the Southern Army considered] it urgently necessary to
promptly make airfields ready for use. [In other words,] even if it were [no longer]
necessary to put ashore forces for the capture of Singapore, it was still necessary to
disembark the forces and the matériel for making the airfields near Kluang and Ka-
hang ready for use. [Consequently,] instead of giving full approval to the cancellation
of Operation S, the [Southern] Army sent on the same day (the 17th) the following
reply for a conditional cancellation [of Operation S]:(23)
To Chiefs of Staff, Second Fleet and First Southern Expeditionary Fleet
From Chief of Staff [Southern Army]
We have no objection to your proposal concerning Operation S on the following conditions:
The sea transport to Endau or Mersing shall be conducted in two ships by 26 January at the
latest. The Navy shall take charge of the mine sweeping of and near the landing points and
the cover of the ships under sail and at the anchorages; whereas the Army shall take charge
of the air defense. The time required for disembarkation will be a whole day and a night.
Further, the units on stand-by in Cam Ranh Bay shall be put ashore in Singora and Bangkok.
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After receiving replies from the Southern Task Force and the Malaya Unit that [both]
had no objections to the above telegram, the Southern Army ordered the cancellation
of Operation S on 19 January, and at the same time gave an order to the Third Air Force
to “transport and land [the ground units of] the air units (including the matériel),
presently on stand-by in Cam Ranh Bay, near Endau or Mersing by 26 January at the
latest in cooperation with the [Navy] Malaya Unit.”(23) On the previous day (the 18th),
the main unit of the Southern Task Force ([under the command of] Vice Admiral
Kondō) had arrived in Palau to support the Dutch East Indies operation.(103) Also on
this day (the 19th), the main unit of the Malaya Unit returned to Cam Ranh Bay,(103)
because there were not as many enemy warships in Singapore as reported, and the al-
lied fleet had not appeared either.(118) Meanwhile, Sixteenth Army Commander Ima-
mura, who had ordered the main force of the 38th Division to first advance to Cam
Ran Bay, had arrived in Gaoxiong on the previous day (the 18th).(32)
It was on this [very] day (the 19th) and under the above-mentioned circumstances
that the Southern Army received the telegram mentioned in the beginning [of this sec-
tion] from the Southern Task Force, that is, the telegram to the effect that the forward
push of the bases in the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies could not be carried out
as scheduled, and that it would like to request that the landings on Java scheduled for
16 February be postponed by about ten days. For the Southern Army the two messages
[the delay in the forward push and the postponement of the Java landings] contained
in the telegram came totally unexpected. 
III. The Ledo airfields issue (See Illustration No. 19)
At that time, one of the concerns of the Southern Army was [the progress of the oper-
ation to] seize the airfields in Ledo and make them ready for use. The issue was in out-
line as follows:
As previously described, [in preparation] for conducting the southern Sumatra and
Java operations, the plan was that the Army air units would go southward along the
Malay Peninsula, while the main force of the land-based aircraft of the [Navy] Malaya
Unit would advance into western Borneo (i.e. Kuching) to carry out further operations
[from there].
The Kawaguchi Detachment had seized the airfield in Kuching on 25 December.(23)
However, the Kuching airfield was against expectations in such a bad condition that
it was judged too difficult to be fixed for use.(23) On learning that the
airfield in Ledo found on 20 December was quite vast, the Southern
Army sent a telegram to Detachment Commander Kawaguchi on 26
December that for the sake of the [Navy] Malaya Unit it “wanted him
to investigate and report immediately on [the possibility] of seizing
the airfields near Bara or Ledo by either land or sea as quickly as pos-
sible in further cooperation with the Navy.” It was followed by an-
other telegram on 28 December, saying: “The road between Kuching
and Singkawang seems [good enough] to be used by motor vehicles.
We would like the Kawaguchi Detachment to be ready to seize, with-
out missing an opportunity, the airfields near Bengkayang or, de-
pending on the situation, a port (Singkawang or Pontianak), which
Commander of the 35th
Infantry Brigade
Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi
Kiyotake
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leads to these [airfields].”(23) On concluding General Agreement No. 4 ([about] bringing
forward the Java operations) on 1 January, the Southern Army directed the [coming]
operations with great enthusiasm, and as previously mentioned, on 6 January, ordered
the Kawaguchi Detachment to capture Ledo. However, Detachment Commander
Kawa guchi was away from Kuching, having gone to the north from 27 December to
12 January, doing things like having an audience with the Sultan of Brunei. [His ab-
sence] worried and irritated the Southern Army, and [so did the fact that] preparations
for seizing Ledo had not much progressed.(23, 92)
Detachment Commander Kawaguchi was away from Kuching for the following
reasons. The mission assigned to the detachment on 20 November ([by] Southern
Army order) was that “the [commander of the] Kawaguchi Detachment shall depart
from the assembly point after the opening of hostilities, attack Miri and Seria first, se-
cure vital resource areas as well as air bases and, immediately after that, occupy the
air base near Kuching as quickly as possible. In the occupied territories, he shall [also]
assume the task of establishing a military administration.”(23) Furthermore, the South-
ern Army order he received on 6 January was a simple one, which read, “Detachment
Commander Kawa guchi shall promptly seize, mainly by land, airfields near
Bengkayang, and ports in Dutch Borneo which lead to these [airfields].”(23) No change
in the basic mission of establishing a military administration, which had been stated
in the Southern Army order of 20 November, was mentioned, nor was the intention of
the Southern Army conveyed adequately. Furthermore, the detachment commander
had enough confidence in his regimental commander to let [the latter] duly make
preparations for [the seizure of] Ledo. He also felt that it was not totally impossible to
expand and make the Kuching airfield ready for use.(23, 92)
After the operations to seize Miri, the Kawaguchi Detachment ([consisting of] the
35th Infantry Brigade headquarters and the 124th Infantry Regiment of the 18th Divi-
sion as its core) left [an element of] its forces consisting of one infantry battalion and
one company as the core in Miri and Seria, and seized Kuching with the rest. After the
seizure of Kuching, Detachment Commander (Brigade Commander) Maj. Gen.
Kawaguchi Kiyotake left Kuching with one infantry battalion (minus two companies)
and others on 27 December, and returned to Miri, leaving in Kuching a unit consisting
of five infantry companies as its core under the command of the commander of the
124th Infantry Regiment, Col. Oka Akinosuke. [Commander Kawaguchi] stationed
himself in Brunei and Labuan on 31 December and 1 January, and in Jesselton from 8
to 11 January.(23, 92) On 28 December, Detachment Commander Kawaguchi received a
telegram from the Southern Army with an order to prepare for seizing Ledo, as to
which, on the 29th, he wired back to the Southern Army from Miri, that (1) in view of
the activities of enemy aircraft and submarines, he considered it appropriate to ad-
vance by land, and that (2) because he thought it necessary to reinforce the troops [in
Kuching] from Miri, he would like to request ships to be sent. [This] was followed by
another telegram on the next day, the 30th, from Miri to the effect that “[the com-
mander] would dispatch Maj. Shiraishi Michinori, the 18th Division staff officer at-
tached to the detachment, for discussing future operations.”(23) At that time, the rainfall
in Kuching was getting heavier and heavier. The impatient Southern Army read this
telegram from Miri and as a last resort wired back that “As [our] Staff Officer Satō is
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at your location, we request you to postpone the dispatch of [your] Staff Officer Shira -
ishi until after the seizure of Ledo.”(23) On the next day, the 31st, Detachment Com-
mander Kawaguchi sent the Southern Army a telegram that “the road leading to Ledo
is in an extremely bad condition: no bridges [were found] across the rivers, and there
is no prospect of obtaining provisions and fodder on the way there. Besides, the air-
fields in Ledo, Bengkayang, Pontianak and others have already been destroyed by the
attacks of [our] naval aircraft. On the other hand, Kuching airfield has good soil, and
we expect that part of the airfield will be ready in a few days, and it will be available
from around 1 January. I recommend you to consider giving up the Ledo operation
and using the Kuching airfield [instead].” However, the Southern Army paid no at-
tention to it because it was wired from Miri.(23) On 2 January, the Kawaguchi Detach-
ment reported on the situation in Kuching. The main point was that at the Kuching
airfield extension work was in progress, aiming at making [a field of] 300 meters wide
and 800 meters long, and that an extension of its length to 1,000 meters was expected
to require about ten days, and to 1,200 meters another fifty days, and to 1,500 meters
another sixty days.(23) It was absolutely out of the question because [a runway of] 1,200
meters long was required for the Navy land-based attack planes.(23) On the next day, 3
January (the day [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura advanced to Saigon), the
Southern Army sent a telegram under the name of Senior Staff Officer of Section 1 Col.
Ishii Masayoshi to Staff Officer Shiraishi [attached to the Kawaguchi Detachment], which
read “Report the progress of the preparations for the operation by return telegram”
and implicitly pressed him for action.(23) On this day (the 3d), the Southern Army held
talks about the already-mentioned air [support] arrangement for Operation S and oth-
ers with the [Navy] Malaya Unit, where they deliberated [the issue] and decided that
“Ledo shall be captured by land. Seizure by sea shall be conducted when possible
without strain.”(23) At that time, the Southern Army felt that Regimental Commander
Oka Akinosuke and Detachment Commander Kawaguchi Kiyotake were hesitating
to prepare for the Ledo operation.(23) On the next day, the 4th, the Southern Army in-
quired of the Navy about its eagerness to use the Ledo airfield,(23) and learned that the
Malaya Unit had the intention to advance almost all of its air units to Ledo.(23) Just then
(on the 5th), the Kawaguchi Detachment (whose commander was still in Miri at that
time), sent in the following report on the state of preparation for the Ledo operation:(23)
Telegram sent on 5 January
1. Regarding the new operations, the detachment has been taking action as shown in the sep-
arately sent telegram No. 255.
2. The progress of preparation and the situation known as of yesterday, the 4th
(1) The enemy troops who retreated from the neighborhood of Kuching consist of some 800
men and seem to be demoralized.
(2) The stretch of eighty kilometers of road between Bau and Siluas in Dutch [Borneo] is a
narrow defile. There are many streams with suspension bridges and log bridges. A con-
struction unit has been sent in advance to repair them.
(3) The progress of establishing an overland line of communication is as shown in the sep-
arately sent telegram No. 256. An infantry company is scheduled to be sent to Siluas in
advance.
3. The units diverted from Miri are assembling in Kuching in about four seized small cargo
ships, of which the first ship will be arriving on the 6th.
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4. It is expected that the unit in Kuching will be able to launch the new operation from the 8th
onwards.
Having received the above telegram, the Southern Army issued its Operation Order A,
No. 34 on the next day, the 6th, which read: “Detachment Commander Kawaguchi shall
promptly seize, mainly by land, enemy airfields near Bengkayang and ports in Dutch
Borneo which lead to these [airfields].”(23) [Editor’s note: The orders concerning the
Kawaguchi Detachment are quoted in slightly different redactions on pp. 143, 198, 299.]
The Kawaguchi Detachment (with its commander in Miri) received the above South-
ern Army order and drew up the outline of the Ledo operations roughly as follows:(23, 91)
outline of the Ledo operation by the Kawaguchi Detachment
1. Operational Objective
(1) [The detachment] shall promptly seize the enemy airfields near Bengkayang and the
ports in northwestern Borneo which lead to these [airfields].
2. Mission
(2) The detachment shall promptly seize the airfields near Bengkayang and the ports which
lead to these [airfields] with its main force both by land and by sea.
3. Operational Directives
(3) An element of the Kuching guard unit shall be advanced to the area of the upper reaches
of the Sarawak River near the border to set up a line-of-communication route.
(4) The 1st Unit ([consisting of] five companies under the command of the regimental com-
mander) shall assemble near the upper reaches of the Sarawak River to attack the air-
fields by land.
(5) The 2d Unit ([consisting of] three companies under the command of the battalion com-
mander) shall land in or near Pemangkat by sea and then capture Singkawang and Pon-
tianak. An element of the unit shall directly cooperate with the 1st Unit in its attack on
the Ledo airfields.
(6) The timing of the landing of the 2d Unit shall be decided depending on the progress of
the preparation for the operations of the 1st Unit.
Then, on 8 January, the Kawaguchi Detachment reported to the Southern Army that
“the completion of the line of communication will be delayed by a few days from the
scheduled date, the 9th, because fragile log bridges were found at several places near
the border, and in some places streams flow over thirty meters [wide],” and that “on
the path leading to Siluas in Dutch [Borneo] there are dozens of log bridges and sus-
pension bridges that are so [flimsy] that they barely allow a single native to cross; it
would take about two weeks [for us to repair them] so that military forces can consec-
utively cross them.” Further, on the 11th, it reported that the “the advance party from
Kuching attacked some 500 enemy troops in or near [Jagui]babang (about 115 kilome-
ters southwest of Kuching) in Dutch Borneo on 10 January,” and the same day, it re-
ported on the state of the Kuching airfield as follows:(23)
The state of the Kuching airfield
1. A runway of 100 meters wide and 800 meters long was completed on 3 January. The exten-
sion work is still in progress, and we expect to extend it to 100 meters wide and 1,000 meters
long by 20 January.
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2. The extension plan is [to construct a runway of] 300 meters wide and 1,000 meters long from
east to west, and [another of] 300 meters wide and 1,500 meters long from north to south. 
3. There are 57 holes caused by explosions of land mines.
In the meantime, on 10 January, the Southern Army completed its air operation plan
based on the air [support] arrangement concluded with the [Navy] Malaya Unit on
the 3d. It stated that “the Navy air unit shall promptly advance its main force to the
bases in western Borneo near Kuching or Ledo, and an element of its force to northern
Malaya, and strive to destroy the enemy warships near Singapore and the enemy air
power in Singapore, eastern Sumatra and Java.”(2)
Detachment Commander Kawaguchi, who, positioning himself in Miri, had pur-
sued [the task of] seizing Sandakan and other vital places in northeastern British Bor-
neo, and rescuing Japanese nationals there, returned from Jesselton to Miri on 11
January, and arrived in Kuching on the evening of 14 January.(23, 92) During this period,
the Southern Army was worried and irritated to the highest degree.(23)
On the next day, the 15th, Detachment Commander Kawaguchi wired to the South-
ern Army from Kuching to report on the progress of assembling the detachment for
the Ledo operation: “(1) Three infantry companies under the command of the battalion
commander and one machine gun company [have assembled] in the area between
Risau (eight kilometers northeast of Siluas), and [Jagui]babang (twelve kilometers
northeast of Siluas) by 13 January, one infantry battalion and one artillery section by
the 14th, and further, the regimental headquarters, one infantry company, and one an-
titank gun company by the 15th. (2) The detachment headquarters, one infantry bat-
talion (minus one company), and one engineer platoon have assembled in Kuching
by the 15th. (3) Machine gun units and others [will join] on and after the 16th.” He
also added: “We have given instructions to launch an attack on Siluas, after the main
force of the regiment, which is now assembling to attack the immediate enemy, ad-
vances to [Jagui]babang (scheduled for the 15th).”(23)
Three days later, on the evening (of the 18th), Staff Major Shiraishi of the
[Kawaguchi] Detachment unexpectedly turned up at the Southern Army headquarters.
The headquarters thought that he had come to report the seizure of the Ledo airfield
and the [current] situation, only to be greatly disappointed to hear to their surprise
that he [only] had come to make an interim report. [The headquarters] explained to
him in no uncertain terms that “the seizure of the Ledo airfield would determine the
success of the next operations, those against Bangka and Palembang in particular.”
The 38th Division charged with the Bangka and Palembang operations was in the mid-
dle of embarkation at Hong Kong, and scheduled to depart from the port in two days
(on the 20th) to head southward. On the next day, the 19th, Staff Officer Shiraishi sent
the following telegram to Detachment Commander Kawaguchi in Kuching:(23)
1. I contacted the headquarters. The [Southern] Army recognized the activities of the detach-
ment and expressed appreciation.
2. The [Southern] Army has high expectations [of us], as it considers that the detachment’s
rapid seizure of airfields in and near Ledo, Singkawang and Pontianak would decide the
success of the coming operations.
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3. In view of the important position [the detachment was given] to decide the [success] of the
operations, it is considered necessary for the detachment to seize [the airfield in] Ledo by
all means and make it ready for use by the end of January at the latest. Navy planes will use
the airfield in Ledo. 
Then, the Southern Army received the following telegram sent on 18 January from the
Kawaguchi Detachment:(23)
1. Five infantry companies under the command of the regimental commander ([hereafter]
called the 1st Dutch Borneo Unit) have assembled in and near Dobare [Tebarau?] without
trouble.
2. Three infantry companies under the command of the battalion commander ([hereafter] called
the 2d Dutch Borneo Unit) have assembled in Kuching today, the 18th.
Illustration No. 19—Map of Ledo and Borneo
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3. The Siluas unit is scheduled to launch an attack on the 19th. Accordingly, we are urging it
to destroy the enemy in and near Sanggau [Sanggan] to [swiftly] advance to Ledo, but it is
expected to take a few days. We are making inquiries as to [the progress] of the regiment,
and we will report to you as soon as we know.
Then, the Southern Army received another telegram from the Kawaguchi Detachment sent
on the 19th to the effect that “Kuching and vicinity was suffering from the heaviest rainfall
in the past twenty years, and that the condition of the roads in the border area had become
so bad that the mud was knee-deep.” The Army further received the following telegram sent
on the same day:(23)
The overland attack to complete the mission to seize the Bengkayang airfield has not progressed
as planned due to natural and geographical [factors], and enemy resistance; all forms of trans-
port are interrupted, and provisions and fodder sent in advance are gradually decreasing. Thus,
we cannot exclude the possibility of total failure and we are preparing an attack by advancing
[a unit] by sea under XX (note by the author: the two characters in the original text are illegible)
to land near Pemangkat. The plan is as follows:
1. The first echelon shall consist of about two infantry companies under the command of the
battalion commander equipped with a machine gun, a battalion [Type92] gun, and a regi-
mental [75-mm. Type41 mountain] gun in six large-sized motorized [landing] craft, six small-
sized motorized [landing] craft and four fishing boats. It shall leave Kuching on the night of
the 22d, reach the bay south of Cape Datu on the morning of the 23d, leave there around
noon on the same day, and land in or near Pemangkat at dawn on the 24th.
2. The second echelon shall consist of one infantry platoon equipped with two machine guns,
and one battalion gun in two seized motorized sailing boats. It shall leave Kuching on the
morning of the 23d and land in Pemangkat.
3. The third echelon (accompanied by the detachment commander) shall consist of two infantry
platoons equipped with one machine gun and one battalion gun in a passenger boat ([of]
173 tons) seized on the coast. It shall leave around noon on the 23d, and land in Babakappa
[?] on the morning of the 24th.
4. After landing, an element shall seize Sambas and the main force shall seize Singkawang and
advance towards Bengkayang, though [the operation] shall depend on the enemy’s move-
ments.
5. We would like the Navy to provide cover against enemy aircraft and surface warships from
morning till sunset on the 23d and during the morning from daybreak [on the 24th], but if
it is impossible, we shall carry out the attack on our own.
The above was the situation concerning Ledo until the day (the 19th) when the Southern
Army received the already-mentioned telegram from the Southern Task Force, which wished
“to postpone the date of [the operation to] capture Java by about ten days [due to] the diffi-
culty in advancing its bases to eastern Borneo [and further east].”
The Effect on the Malaya Unit and the Order of the Southern Army
The telegram of the Southern Task Force (the Second Fleet) on the 19th, which proposed the
postponement [of the Java operation] by ten days, [also] affected the Malaya Unit.
As previously mentioned, the Southern Army immediately wired back to the Southern
Task Force concerning the latter’s telegram of the 19th, and [also] sent a telegram to the Army
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Department of IGHQ on the same day. On the next day, the 20th, the senior staff officer of
Section 1 of the Southern Army, Ishii Masayoshi, along with the senior staff officer of Section
4, Tanikawa Kazuo, and the Navy staff officer with the Southern Army, Ishihara Itsu, left
Saigon and first made a stopover at Cam Ranh on their way to Manila. There Ishii made the
arrangement relating to Operation S (the arrangement about the operation to put ashore the
units connected with the air units and their matériel in Endau in two transport ships on the
26th) with the chief of staff and others of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet (the Malaya
Unit). He also held talks on the subsequent operations. At the meeting, [the Navy Malaya
Unit] shocked Ishii and his group by bringing up [a request] to the effect that “we would
like you to agree to a delay of Operation L (the operations against Bangka and Palembang)
by two weeks, because the Kuching airfield is in bad condition with no prospect of [when it
will be] ready for use due to the heavy rainfall, and there is no prospect of when the Ledo
airfield will be seized and made ready for use either.”(23) (Note: Col. Tanikawa Kazuo wrote
in his diary for this day, “I left Saigon in the morning, arrived in Cam Ranh, and contacted
the [First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet. It tabled a bombshell motion to change the timing
of Operation L.”)
Although Colonel Ishii found “[the time frame] far too leisurely and the argument con-
taining many objectionable points,” he firmly determined, “there is no need to agree to such
a preposterous proposal. Anyway, let’s argue the case in Manila.”(23)
Staff Officer Shiraishi of the Kawaguchi Detachment, who accompanied the group,
“looked greatly impressed, seemingly taken aback by the significance of the Ledo operation
[he was reminded of] anew.”(23) After the meeting was over, he sent the following telegrams:(23)
To Detachment Commander Kawaguchi 
From Staff officer Shiraishi (dated 21 January)
Yesterday, the 20th, we had talks with the Southern Expeditionary Fleet at Cam Ranh Bay.
1. In the wake of the Army, the Navy will transport fuel and ammunition to Singkawang by
sea. The 2d Unit shall seize as many trucks as possible in and near Singkawang in order to
facilitate the transport of fuel and ammunition by land. It shall further take actions necessary
to go up the Sambas River, and unload them near Ledo.
2. In order for the Navy to transport the fuel and ammunition, I would like you to let the Navy
use the two small cargo ships (or motorized sailing boats, if unavailable) which the Army
seized, and instruct them to advance right after the Army’s boat units.  
3. [According to the Navy] it will shortly advance its base to the Anambas (note by the author:
[a group of islands] located halfway between Singapore and Ledo), and there are no mines
laid by the enemy in the waters north of Cape Datu.
4. The cooperation of Navy aircraft while we are sailing cannot be expected due to [the location
of] their bases.
5. The [Southern] Army from the commander in chief down has high hopes that the detach-
ment will put up a good fight. Besides, I paid a call to the division commander at Cam Ranh
Bay. He expressed satisfaction with the detachment’s service.
To Detachment Commander Kawaguchi 
From Staff officer Shiraishi (dated 22 January)
Please pass on [the following information] to the commander of the 1st Dutch Borneo Unit (note
by the author: Regimental Commander Oka).
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1. The situation in Tarakan has failed to come up to expectations. Delay in progress [of the op-
erations] through the area is unavoidable. Right now, the value of the Ledo airfield has be-
come immense and the operation of the 1st Unit will give the Navy a tacit prod.
2. I reported that the 1st Unit has been fighting bravely in spite of the bad weather, which
pleased the [Southern] Army. However, in view of the fact that [the Army Department] of
IGHQ and others pin their hopes on the ongoing operation as a key to the success of the
coming operations, the Southern Army earnestly hopes for swift success at all costs.
The plan which the Malaya Unit presented at the above-mentioned meeting on the 20th was
that Operation S [would be conducted] up to 28 January, the Ledo operation from 31 January
to 5 February, and Operation L (the Bangka and Palembang operations) from 11 to 18 Febru-
ary, and the landing in Bangka and Palembang on 18 February.(24)
Staff Officer Shiraishi reported to [18th] Division Commander Mutaguchi as mentioned
in the above telegram. Due to the change of the outline of Operation S which the Southern
Army was forced to make on 17 January, the main force of the 18th Division left Cam Ranh
on 20 January escorted by the 3d Destroyer Squadron, landed in Singora on 22 January,(118)
and then headed for Singapore by land along the west coast.(53)
As previously told, the Southern Army was shocked by the proposal from the Southern
Task Force to postpone the capture of Java by ten days, which was followed by the “bomb-
shell motion”(25) on the next day, the 20th, by the Malaya Unit to postpone the capture of
Bangka and Palembang for about two weeks. The Southern Army highhandedly issued the
following order on the same day.(23, 24) It was an order that the Sixteenth Army, a corps under
the command of the commander in chief of the Southern Army, should carry out the Java
operations as had been agreed with the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern
Area.
Southern Army order Saigon, 20 January
1. The overall operations of the Southern Army are progressing as scheduled.
2. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly capture Java. The cooperation with the Navy
shall be based on General Agreement No. 2 and No. 4.
3. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall swiftly capture Java in the following manner:
(a) Exploiting the results of having gained command of the air over Java, he shall land his main
force in western Java and almost simultaneously an element [of his army] in eastern Java.
When conducting the landing operations, he should expect interference from the naval and
air forces of the enemy.
(b) After the landing, he shall defeat the enemy and promptly seize Batavia, Surabaya and Ban-
dung.
(c) He shall swiftly make air bases in Java ready for use.
(Note by the author: Item No. 4 and No. 5 refer to the tasks of the Third Air Force commander
and the captain general of the Shipping Transport Command. See the previous description
[p. 155].)
6. I shall [command from] Saigon.
Count Terauchi Hisaichi, commander in chief of the Southern Army
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The Situation in the Eastern Part of the Dutch East Indies
In the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies, under the already-described circumstances, the
Dutch East Indies Unit (the Third Fleet) Commander V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō, who had ad-
vanced to Davao on 6 January, the same night issued an order to “postpone the capture of
Tarakan and Menado by one day, and also the subsequent schedule by one day.” [Conse-
quently,] the landings in Tarakan and Menado were carried out on 11 January, one day behind
the schedule specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement (General Agreement No. 4).
However, in conducting the next operations against Balikpapan and Kendari, other prob-
lems came up. (General Agreement No. 4 had scheduled the date of landing [in these places]
for 20 January.)
First, the airfield in Tarakan was smaller than expected, and therefore it needed to be ex-
tended and made ready for use, while fuel and ammunition also needed to be accumulated
there. However, the sweeping of mines laid all over the waterway was not making much
progress, partly because two out of the four [available] minesweepers had been shelled and
sunk.(119) As for the progress of the minesweeping, twenty-seven mines had been disposed
of on 15 January, nineteen mines on the 16th, eighteen mines on the 17th, and a total of sev-
enty-seven mines by the 17th; by the 24th, a total of 173 mines were disposed of.(119) As for
the airfield, on the 16th, they barely managed to extend the runway to 30 meters wide and
700 meters long, which made the commander of the 1st Escort Unit (R. Adm. Nishi mura
Shōji, commander of the 4th Destroyer Squadron) wire on the 16th to the commander of the
2d Kure Special Landing Force and the leader of the construction squad that “if the Tarakan
airfield cannot be made ready [in time] for the advance of [the Navy] land-based medium-
sized attack planes, it will greatly hinder the coming operations. As the scheduled date to
launch the next operations is getting close, you shall make the airfield ready for use at any
cost as soon as possible so that the land-based medium-sized attack planes can use [the air-
field].” On the 18th, the situation [didn’t seem to have changed] so he again wired to the
commander of the 2d Kure Special Landing Force that “the task of guarding [is important
but] all possible efforts shall be devoted to transporting the unloaded matériel and getting the
airfield ready at any cost, as making the airfield ready is at present the most important [mat-
ter] for the [coming] operations.”(119) Such was the situation as of the 18th, despite the fact
that the landing in Balikpapan was set for 20 January, and accordingly departure from
Tarakan on 17 January in the Cam Ranh Agreement (General Agreement No. 4).
Secondly, the 1st Air Raid Unit (i.e. the 21st Air Flotilla in Davao), charged with the sup-
port of the operations in the east of Celebes, had sent the following telegram [to the com-
mander of the Dutch East Indies Unit] on 14 January:
According to the reconnaissance of our land-based reconnaissance planes conducted today on
the 14th, some thirty enemy submarines were going underwater dispersed between Labuha
and the west point of the Sula Islands about 1650. They can be calculated to reach the vicinity
of Menado tomorrow morning. In addition, in Ambon, about twenty-five enemy aircraft have
gathered and one mid-sized cruiser [was also spotted]. Tomorrow, the 15th, our unit will attack
Ambon with all of our land-based medium-sized attack planes and fighter planes, and search
for enemy submarines and attack them with all of our flying boats (ten available at most). Fur-
ther, we will postpone advancing our headquarters to Menado scheduled for tomorrow, the
15th.
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For the above reasons, about 0900 on 15 January Vice Admiral Takahashi, commander of the
Dutch East Indies Unit, ordered R. Adm. Takagi Takeo, commander of the Eastern Attack
Unit ([and] commander of the 5th Cruiser Division) to attack the enemy submarines in the
Molucca Sea, and also issued an order “to delay the date of [the operations to] seize Kendari
and Ambon to 24 January and to 29 January respectively. The [new] dates for the subsequent
invasion schedule will be announced after they are determined depending on the construc-
tion units’ preparations for departure, and on the progress in making the bases ready.”(117) At
that time, the Tokyo-maru and the Ken’yō-maru, which were supposed to transport the 1st Con-
struction Squad to be redeployed from Legaspi, had left the [Japanese] mainland behind
schedule, and were expected to reach Legaspi no sooner than 15 January.(117, 145)
Just on this day (the 15th), the following report came to the Dutch East Indies Unit (i.e.
the Third Fleet) from Tarakan:(119)
Sent by the 1st Escort unit at 2300 on the 15th
The seizure of Balikpapan was scheduled to start on the 21st, and we were proceeding with the
preparations. Then the army changed its operation outline in the light of the course of things
during the Tarakan operation, among which is that the Tarakan airfield needs to be made fully
ready. We discussed [these matters] with Detachment Commander Sakaguchi and decided to
conduct the operation in tandem with the Kendari operation on the 24th.
In summary, when the 4th Destroyer Squadron, which had carried out the landing operation
in Tarakan on the 11th, considered it difficult to conduct the coming [operation to] seize Ba-
likpapan as scheduled due to [the condition of] the Tarakan airfield and the [presence of]
mines, the 21st Air Flotilla [stationed] in Davao had just reported on the state of the allied
warships in the Molucca Sea on the 14th. This was followed by the order on the 15th, issued
by the Third Fleet [also stationed] in Davao to the Eastern Attack Unit ([consisting of] the
5th Cruiser Division, the 2d Destroyer Squadron, and others), to postpone [the operations
to] seize Kendari and Ambon. With the underlying facts that [the operations to] seize Balik-
papan and Kendari were originally planned to be conducted simultaneously, and that Yano
Tsuneo, staff officer of the Sakaguchi Detachment, again showing his resourcefulness, had
proposed new “Operational outline for seizing in the coming operation the oil resources in
Balikpapan intact, in the light of the fact that the oil resources in Tarakan had been destroyed
in advance,” the 1st Escort Unit saw in the order to postpone [the operation to] seize Kendari
an opportunity to report its decision to “also postpone [the operation to] seize Balikpapan
until the 24th.” 
The commander of the Dutch East Indies Unit ([and] commander in chief of the Third
Fleet) approved this telegram from the 1st Escort Unit, and issued the following order by
telegram on the 16th:(119)
Sent by the Dutch East indies unit at 2400 on the 16th
In view of the readiness of the Tarakan base and other [factors], the [date of] advancing into Ba-
likpapan will on account of these [factors] be changed to about 24 January.
At that time, the 2d Carrier Division ([consisting of] the aircraft carriers Sōryū and Hiryū),
had been transferred from the Combined Fleet to the Southern Task Force by the order of 8
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January; it had left the Bungo Channel at 0600 on 13 January, and was sailing southward,
heading first for Palau.(117) The [Army] Eastern Detachment charged with seizure of Ambon
had left Hong Kong on 12 January and was under way, heading first for Davao.(117)
While the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit (i.e. the Third Fleet [stationed] in Davao) and
the [Navy] air unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet, whose commander in chief had advanced into
Davao on 7 January one day behind the commander in chief of the Third Fleet) were in the
above situation, Commander of the Southern Task Force ([and] Commander in Chief of the
Second Fleet) Vice Admiral Kondō advanced into Palau on 18 January and took command
of the Eastern Support Unit, which he had organized and dispatched previously (on 23 De-
cember).(103) The main unit of the Southern Task Force ([under the command of] Vice Admiral
Kondō) had left Cam Ranh Bay on 8 January after signing the Cam Ranh Agreement on 1
January, and advanced to Palau on 18 January via Magong (which he left on the 14th), be-
cause the Malaya area operations had passed the critical point, and the time [to conduct] the
Dutch East Indies operations was approaching.(103, 109) On advancing into Palau, the Southern
Task Force immediately invited Capt. Yamaki Akira, senior staff officer of the Third Fleet,
and Capt. Takahashi Chihaya, senior staff officer of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to meet and started
talks with them.(113, 136) At the meeting, Captain Yamaki strongly demanded a two-week post-
ponement of the schedule of the subsequent Dutch East Indies operation:(113)
1. The seized airfields in Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and Menado are all in such an unexpectedly bad con-
dition that [several] days will be required to extend and make them ready for use, and that two
weeks would be required after their seizure before land-based attack plane units could use them.
2. It is impossible to arrange the escort ships, if the invasion [were to be conducted] according to
the schedule specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement.
3. The current schedule has put us in a situation where the [operations to] gain command of the
air by the land-based air units are started almost simultaneously with the departure of the in-
vasion units from their bases. [Consequently,] the latter will [have to] rush headlong into the
points to be seized before [the air operations] have brought about sufficient results, which we
fear may  increase the damage to the invasion units.
4. In Tarakan, the mines laid by the enemy gave us a lot of trouble and much time was spent on
minesweeping, which, as a result, caused a delay in the operation schedule. It may be expected
that the [farther] we go southward from now on, the more minefields [will be encountered],
which means that it is necessary to allow more time for sweeping mines.
5. In the current schedule, escort ships cannot afford to take time off for maintenance; their engines
cannot be maintained because they have to be ready all the time for sailing at high speed, and
[they] break down one after another. [Moreover,] the officers and crew are exhausted because
they cannot take time off [either], which makes us worry about the prospect [for the coming op-
erations] if the operations continue [in this way].
6. In the current circumstances, it will be difficult to provide escort forces at the time of [the oper-
ation to] seize Banjarmasin. Even if escort can be provided, it will be dangerous to pass in front
of Java with the enemy on your flank.
The staff officer of the Eleventh Air Fleet (the [land-based] air unit), Takahashi Chihaya, also
requested a postponement of the invasion date(s):(136)
1. It has taken more days than expected to make the airfields ready for use, which has resulted in
a successive delay in the forward deployment of the air units. I am of the same opinion as the
Dutch East Indies Unit on the postponement of the schedule.
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2. As for the air operations prior to the invasion of Java, it is all right to conduct those against east-
ern Java from Balikpapan and Makassar, and call off [the seizure] of Banjarmasin.
3. Among the recently seized documents in Tarakan, detailed materials were found on the airfield
on Bali. As the airfield on Bali seems far better than we expected, we really want this airfield to
be seized before the landing in Java.
In response to these views, the Southern Task Force stated that a postponement of the inva-
sion schedule would be awkward both from the point of view of the general conduct of the
operations and from the point of view of good faith towards the Southern Army and de-
manded [more] effort [to keep to the original schedule]. In the end, however, it accepted that
[a postponement] was unavoidable, but consolidated the views on a two-week postponement
into a ten-day postponement and, as previously told, sent the telegram to the Southern Army.
The Manila Conference
In accordance with the Cam Ranh Agreement (the agreement of 1 January between the South-
ern Army and the [Navy] Southern Task Force), the Manila Conference had been prepared
as the place where the Sixteenth Army and the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit were to make
arrangements [for the Java operation], but putting aside the Sixteenth Army, the Southern
Army turned it into a scene of dispute with the Southern Task Force [about the invasion
schedule].
On the 21st, Col. Ishii Masayoshi, senior staff officer of Section 1, Col. Tanikawa Kazuo,
senior staff officer of Section 4, [both] from the staff of the Southern Army, Lt. Col. Miyashi
Minoru, chief of operations staff of the Third Air Force, [Navy] Capt. Ishihara Itsu, staff officer
[of the Second Fleet] seconded to the Southern Army, and [Navy] Capt. Tomari Mitsuyoshi,
senior staff officer of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, directly flew to Manila across
the South China Sea by a naval land-based attack plane.(23)
Colonel Ishii felt confident because when he had already gone to bed in Cam Ranh the
night before, Staff Officer Arao [of the Southern Army] had visited him from Saigon, bringing
the following telegram [from Tokyo]:(23)
To Chief of Staff, Southern Army
From Vice Chief, Army General Staff
I acknowledge Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 557.
As a result of our contact with the Navy, [we learned that] the Navy General Staff is of the same
opinion as the Army, and that it does not wish to postpone the operation schedule. Further, it
very well understands the sentiments of the Army. In addition, according to the telegram(s)
from the Combined Fleet to the Second and the Third Fleets, the former demands [an explana-
tion of] the reasons [to request] the postponement of the operation schedule. As this is the situ-
ation [at the Navy], the Navy General Staff, according to the above communication, may be
expected to send a telegram to the Combined Fleet, the Second and the Third Fleets that “keep-
ing in mind that the postponement of the operation schedule may have a significant impact on
all parties, [they should] prudently deal with it.” [This] XX (note by the author: two characters in
the original text are illegible) situation is for you to keep in mind in your negotiations with the
Navy side.
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On the Navy side, Senior Staff Officer Capt. Yanagisawa Kuranosuke and Gunnery Staff Of-
ficer Cdr. Fujita Masamichi, [both] of the Second Fleet, Capt. Yamaki Akira, senior staff officer
of the Third Fleet, and Capt. Takahashi Chihaya, senior staff officer of the Eleventh Air Fleet,
four in total, flew from Palau on the night of the 19th to Manila. From Gaoxiong, Cdr.
Yoshikawa Shūkichi, senior staff officer of the 5th Destroyer Squadron also joined them. From
Saigon, [Navy] Lt. Cdr. Iguchi, liaison staff officer with the Third Air Force, and Cdr. Kimura
Kenji, senior staff officer of the 12th Seaplane Tender Division (who was to be transferred
and attached to the Third Fleet headquarters), came accompanying [Navy] Capt. Tomari Mit-
suyoshi, senior staff officer of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet. As for the Sixteenth
Army, Commander Lieutenant General Imamura, Chief of Staff Major General Okazaki, and
Senior Staff Officer of Section 1 Colonel Takashima had arrived in Manila at 1330 (on the
21st) from Taiwan.(32, 33) Staff Officer Oda had arrived from Saigon.(40)
On arriving at the Manila Hotel, Staff Officer Ishii of the Southern Army requested the
holding of immediate talks (on the 21st) between Colonel Tanikawa of the Southern Army,
[Navy] Captain Yanagisawa of the Second Fleet, [Navy] Captain Takahashi of the Eleventh
Air Fleet, [Navy] Captain Tomari of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, [Navy] Captain
Yamaki of the Third Fleet, and himself only, excluding the presence of the personnel of the
Sixteenth Army, who had been put up at the same hotel.(23) The meeting was held as requested
and on that day, following [Navy] Captain Yamaki’s explanation, they discussed [the matter]
until 0130.(23) [Navy] Captain Yamaki explained that he had “visited the Second Fleet and
earnestly requested a postponement of [Operations] L and H for two weeks, but that Com-
mander in Chief Kondō had sternly demanded to reduce the number of days [of the post-
ponement].” And he requested, “I would like you to accept a postponement of ten days, that
is, to set H on day x + 80, as there is no other way.”(23) [Navy] Captain Yamaki gave the fol-
lowing grounds [for his request]: “The airfields occupied so far are in an unexpectedly bad
condition and they require at least two weeks before allowing the [naval] land-based
medium-sized attack planes to use them; a [naval] land-based medium-sized attack plane
weighs twelve tons fully-loaded, which imposes particular requirements; from now on the
Third Fleet has to seize a number of airfields such as those in Balikpapan, Kendari, Makassar,
etc. one after another, and the details of [their condition] are [still] unclear; what is more, [the
farther] the Third Fleet proceeds southward, the vaster the minefields will become, and
sweeping them is not easily done; furthermore, the above-mentioned schedule with a ten-
day postponement of the operation has already dropped the whole [operation against] Ban-
jarmasin, and included instead the seizure of the airfield on Bali just before day H (the date
of landing in Java) ([because] the capture of Banjarmasin is out of the question in the light of
the enemy movements and the time required, because the seaway leading there [passes] just
in front of Surabaya, and because it is difficult to arrange warships for the [Banjarmasin] con-
voy); furthermore, if the [main] convoy leaves Lingayen on 8 February, and sails at a speed
of eight knots, it will arrive in Java no sooner than the 19th, [which means] it cannot be on
time if H (the date of landing in Java) is set on day x + 70, i.e. 16 February, [and thus] setting
H on day x + 70 is totally out of the question.”(23)
On the next day, the 22d, the negotiations with the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet
were conducted from morning onwards with the staff officers of the Sixteenth Army taking
part, too.(23) Senior Staff Officer Captain Tomari of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet for
the present insisted on the proposal of a two-week postponement which the Fleet had pre-
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sented to the Southern Army at Cam Ranh Bay.(23) The Southern Army firmly opposed it, ar-
guing that the Navy should try and use airfields in Malaya as its base if the Kuching airfield
was in bad condition and [the usefulness of] the airfields in Ledo was unknown, and that at-
tacks against L (Bangka and Palembang) and H (Java) would not be totally impossible if the
airfields in Kluang and Kahang in Malaya were seized, which was regarded as certain judg-
ing from the progress of the operations of the Twenty-fifth Army, and thus the heated nego-
tiations went on and on.(23) The staff officers of the Sixteenth Army considered the attitude of
the staff officers of the Southern Army incomprehensible, wondering why a postponement
of a mere ten days had to be so stubbornly refused, and spoke for the Fleet.(23, 38, 40) In the end,
they decided to [first] settle on a compromise proposed by Captain Yanagisawa of the Second
Fleet, and, at 1500, [Senior] Staff Officer Ishii of the Southern Army sent the following
telegram to Saigon:(23) [Editor’s note: According to the description on p. 222, the final com-
promise was proposed by Colonel Kawagoe, chief of staff of the 48th Division.]
To Chief of Staff, Southern Army, sent at 1500 on 22 January 
Since yesterday, the 21st, we have negotiated the dates of L and H with the fleets as best as we
could. The Navy has also made the utmost efforts to reduce the days [of the postponement],
but it turned out that they could not be reduced any further than the following schedule:
L was set on day x + 64. (Note by the author: originally set on day x + 60)
Western part of H was set on day x + 75. (Ditto: originally set on day x + 70)
Eastern part of H was set on day x + 77. (Ditto: originally set on day x + 70)
Makassar was set on day x + 63.
Kupang was set on day x + 74. (Note by the author: originally set on day x + 65)
The seizure of Banjarmasin shall be omitted in order to shorten the [delayed] schedule, and air
operations against H will be conducted from Makassar and Balikpapan. However, if possible,
the airfield on Bali will be seized around day x + 75. Furthermore, OSAMU-SHūDAN (note by the
author: the Sixteenth Army) wishes to conduct the landings on eastern and western H almost
simultaneously on day x + 77 for reasons of control of the army.
Please [inform me of] your ideas and give your instructions about the above as soon as possi-
ble.
Although the Sixteenth Army’s wish for landings both in eastern and in western Java on day
x + 77 was mentioned in the above telegram, Colonel Ishii rejected it because he thought that
“the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit would probably have much more difficulties in proceed-
ing with its operations than the Malaya Unit had, which means that the schedule would be
pushed back more and more if simultaneous landings were laid down as a principle.”(23) The
headquarters of the Southern Army in Saigon sent the following reply:(23)
From Chief of Staff, [Southern Army]
To Staff officer ishii
Although the postponement of the invasion schedule was extremely disappointing, we will
adopt the shortest schedule indicated in your report as the new invasion schedule. From now
on, through even closer cooperation between the Army and the Navy, we are determined to
successfully carry out Operation H, firmly keeping to the new invasion schedule. Finally, we
appreciate the great efforts you and the other [officers] have made. Meanwhile, according to the
OSAMU [Sixteenth Army] Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 43, it seems that [the army] accepted the
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Third Fleet’s proposal concerning a significant change in the schedule of [the operation to] seize
Ambon. However, this is a matter to be decided between the [Southern] Army and the Second
Fleet, and as this applies to subsequent operations as well, you must warn [the army] about it.
As the above telegram reached Manila on the 23d, Staff Officer Ishii and his group and the
staff officers of the Sixteenth Army took it as [approval] that “the new schedule was decided,”
and discussed concrete arrangements with the Navy based on it. The same evening, [Six-
teenth] Army Commander Imamura invited the staff officers of the Southern Army and the
naval staff officers, Captain Yanagisawa, Captain Yamaki, Captain Tomari and Captain Taka-
hashi, to thank them for their efforts, and asked for their continuous support and coopera-
tion.(32)
Colonel Ishii and his group left Manila at 1000 on the next day, the 24th, and returned to
Saigon.(23) Colonel Ishii reported: “So far as it goes, agreement was reached by suppressing
the requests from the units under the control of the Second Fleet. However, the invasion
schedule was curtailed to the limit. In particular, this was achieved based on the idea that
[the convoys] should depart when the air units were ready for deployment, and not on the
idea that the convoy should depart after the enemy air power was totally destroyed. The air-
fields in Ledo will be pivotal as they will enable us to bombard as far as Surabaya, but if they
cannot be prepared in time for the operations against Bangka and Palembang, the airfields
in Malaya will be used to launch [bombardments] instead. Such was the way in which we
worked out [the schedule].”(24) Naval Staff Officer Ishihara stated: “We would like the Army
not to force on us unreasonable [operations], as this schedule is [shortened] to the limit.”(24)
Soon [the proposal for] the agreement (dated 25 January) on the standard schedule for
landings based on the results of the Manila Conference got to the commander in chief of the
Southern Army in Saigon from the commander in chief of the Second Fleet in Palau.(23) How-
ever, in this agreement, the word “around” had been added to each of five [newly-scheduled]
landing dates, which provoked controversy again.(23) Some argued that it was necessary to
determine the exact dates [and remind the Navy of the sense of exactness] by having it delete
the word “around.”(23) However, the sender was the commander in chief of the Navy in the
South, and besides, it was also forwarded to the commanders in chief of fleets. Consequently,
[the Army] reluctantly settled [the matter] by letting [Navy] Captain Ishihara send the fol-
lowing telegram to the chief of staff of the Second Fleet [R. Adm. Shiraishi Kazutaka]:(23)
From Staff officer ishihara
To Chief of Staff, Second Fleet
The [Southern] Army received the 2F (note by the author: the Second Fleet) Classified Telegram
No. 750, and found it regrettable that the word “around” appeared in front of the scheduled
dates of invasion. The army considered the fact that the word “around” was added despite the
serious negotiations at the Manila Conference, which were primarily about deciding the dates,
would make the decisions at Manila meaningless. [The army] wanted the deletion of the word
“around” from the [formal] agreement so desperately that it would have requested [another]
discussion on this issue. However, in the light of the fact that this was formally [proposed as
an] agreement by the [commander in] chief of your fleet, I managed to convince the army at
last after various negotiations, and succeeded in bringing [the situation to a point] where after
waiting a while, the return telegram from [the Army General Staff in] Tokyo with the reply of
no objection was received [from them as well]. Such being the case, it is hoped that, in view of
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the difficult circumstances of the Manila Conference, you will consider this invasion schedule
as the standard, regardless of the word “around,” and do your very best to seriously keep to
this [schedule.]
The above-mentioned telegram of the official [proposal for the] agreement sent by the com-
mander in chief of the Second Fleet was as follows:(119)
To Commander in Chief, Southern Army
From Commander in Chief, Second Fleet
CC Combined Fleet, Southern Task Force, Chief of Navy General Staff
Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 750, 2100, 25 January
We would like to make the following additions and revisions to the agreement of 1 January,
1942, between the commander in chief of the Southern Army and the commander in chief of
the Navy in the South, and [would like to] discuss these [with you].
1. Standard dates [to implement operations] of capturing (areas to be seized, the dates to start
landing [operations])
(a) Makassar, around day x + 63; (b) Bangka and Palembang, around day x + 64; (c) Kupang,
around day x + 74; (d) Western Java, around day x + 75; (e) Eastern Java, around day x + 77
2. The seizure of Banjarmasin shall be conducted overland from Balikpapan as quickly as possible.
However, depending upon the circumstances, the operation may be launched after consultations
between the commander of the Sixteenth Army and the commander in chief of the Third Fleet.
3. The air base on Bali shall be seized in conjunction by the Army and the Navy around day x +
75, so that it can be used as an air base at the time of [the operations to] capture eastern Java.
The details of the implementation of the above operation shall be arranged between the com-
mander of the Sixteenth Army, the commander in chief of the Third Fleet, the commander of
the Third Air Force and the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet.
4. The commander of the Third Air Force and the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet
shall be included in the [number of] commanders with whom the arrangements for the opera-
tions to capture Java shall be made.
Schedule for L and the western part of H
The schedule for the landings in Bangka and Palembang (L) and western Java (H) was
arranged on the 22d as follows:(23)
1. The airfields in Kluang and Kahang shall be seized by around 25, or 26 January (day x + 48, or
day x + 49) at the latest.
2. The army aircraft shall be ready in Malaya by 3 February (day x + 57). The Navy shall make ef-
forts to have those of its aircraft which are to be deployed in Malaya ready by the same day as
well.
3. The deployment of the naval [land-based] medium-sized attack planes to the airfield in Ledo
shall be completed by 6 February.
4. The advance party of the units for seizing Bangka and Palembang ([consisting of] two battalions
of the 38th Division as its core, in seven transport ships) shall leave Cam Ranh on 4 February
(day x + 58) and come ashore in Bangka and Palembang on the night of 10 February (day x +
64). The 3d Destroyer Squadron (reinforced with four destroyers and four minesweepers) shall
leave Cam Ranh on 5 February [editor’s note: the text says “March,” which clearly is a misprint]
(day x + 59) to escort them.
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5. The main force of the 38th Division (in twelve transport ships) shall leave Cam Ranh on 6 Feb-
ruary (day x + 60), and come ashore in Palembang on the night of 11 February (day x + 65). The
cruiser the Yura, four destroyers, and a few minesweepers shall leave Cam Ranh on 7 February
(day x + 61) to escort them.
6. The convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army ([consisting of] the 2d Division and the
Shōji Detachment as its core) shall leave Cam Ranh Bay on the night of 12 February (day x +
66), and come ashore in western Java on the morning of 21 February (day x + 75). The 5th De-
stroyer Squadron ([consisting of] eight destroyers, if possible, reinforced with two destroyers
of the 4th Destroyer Squadron) shall accompany and escort them. The ships to be charged with
the escort of the main force of the 38th Division shall join the 5th Destroyer Squadron at sea on
the night of 17 February (day x + 71), after replenishing at Anambas on 16 February (day x +
70).
[Thus,] the increase of forces to escort the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army, an
issue about which Commander Imamura of the [Sixteenth] Army was worried, and about
which Commander in Chief Ozawa [of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet] had given
him kind assurances, was taken up.
The issue of the Eastern Part of H and Bali
The postponement of the schedule [for the operation against] eastern Java gave time, which
was welcomed by those in the Shipping Transport Command, the Sixteenth Army and the
48th Division. However, the sudden decision to capture Bali disconcerted the people con-
cerned. The capture of Bali was included neither in the central agreement nor in the Tokyo
agreement of the Southern Army. Although it had come up in the arrangement between the
[Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army at the Iwakuni Conference, it was
[again] completely ignored in the Cam Ranh Agreement of the Southern Army. Consequently,
it had fallen out of the scope of both the Southern Army and the Shipping Transport Com-
mand. In the end, however, it was decided that one battalion of the 48th Division would be
assigned [for its capture]. In order to rush headlong toward [the island] under circumstances
where control of the air as well as of the sea was yet to be gained, faster ships had to be allo-
cated. [Chief] Shipping Staff Sendō Shunzō of the Sixteenth Army was quite at loss consid-
ering that “[most of] the faster ships are already badly damaged in [previous operations in]
various areas. If the ships have to be arranged out of those already allocated to the Sixteenth
Army, it will be depressingly [difficult].”(44) Staff Officer Ueno Shigeru of the Shipping Trans-
port Command painstakingly made inquiries, found two faster ships, the Sasako-maru and
the Sagami-maru in the middle of unloading in Singora, and arranged for them immediately
(on 25 January).(27) Both ships quickly completed unloading, left Singora, entered port at Cap
Saint Jacques on 28 January and left the port on the 31st after hasty preparations to hurry to
Lingayen.(27)
The Banjarmasin Issue
As previously mentioned, Colonel Ishii had wired at 1500 on 22 January that “the seizure of
Banjarmasin shall be omitted in order to shorten the [delayed] schedule,”(23) because the Navy
had stated that the air operations against Java would be conducted from southern Celebes
and Balikpapan [first], and then also from Bali once the island had been captured. However,
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the seizure of Banjarmasin before [the operation to] capture Java had been reported to the
Emperor and included in the orders issued by the Army and the Navy Departments of IGHQ
to the Southern Army and the Southern Task Force. [Consequently,] previously in Tokyo, the
Southern Army had ordered the Sixteenth Army to capture [Banjarmasin] by the order of 20
November. Also, the Southern Task Force had given an order to capture the place, as men-
tioned previously. Neither the staff officers of the Southern Army nor those of the Southern
Task Force could ignore the IGHQ order (of 6 November), and sent on the 23d the following
lame telegrams:(23)
To Vice Chief of Army General Staff
From Chief of Staff, Southern Army, 23 January 
Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 604
1. According to the current study of the invasion schedule conducted in Manila, the [rapid]
progress of the entire H (note by the author: the Java operation) is hoped for by omitting the
seizure of Banjarmasin.
2. We request your understanding [of the above] in advance, as its seizure is among the items in
the central agreement.
3. However, we expect to seize Banjarmasin almost at the same time as [the operation against]
eastern Java or when the opportunity arises afterwards.
To Navy Department of the iGHQ
From Senior Staff officer of the Second Fleet at manila
Classified Telegram No. 175 of the 23d
As a result of research and discussions with the [Southern] Army headquarters and other parties
concerned (the Third Fleet, the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the Eleventh Air Fleet, the
Sixteenth Army and the Third Air Force), an agreement was reached and the following definite
plan was worked out. We would like you to urgently let us know your view. Further, we would
like the Navy General Staff to pass on the contents of this telegram to the Army General Staff,
too.
1. Standard dates [to implement operations] of capture
(a) Ambon: day x + 54, 31 January
(b) Makassar: day x + 63, 9 February
(c) Bangka and Palembang: day x + 64, 10 February
(d) Kupang: day x + 74, 20 February
(e) Western Java: day x + 75, 21 February
(f) Eastern Java: day x + 77, 23 February
2. In order to put [the entire operation] within the invasion schedule of the preceding item, it was
decided to call off the surface escort of the Sakaguchi Detachment, and to plan an overland
seizure of Banjarmasin from Balikpapan [instead]. In addition, as an air base [to be used] at the
time of landing in eastern Java, Bali shall be captured. It is scheduled for day x + 75 (21 Febru-
ary).
3. In order to use the Ledo airfield for the air operation at the time of [the operations to] seize
Bangka and Palembang, both the Army and the Navy shall cooperate with each other as much
as possible. Also, the naval air forces shall be advanced to the seized bases in southern Malaya.
4. The reinforcement of the army forces for mopping up [enemy remnants] in Mindanao shall be
considered at the [Southern] Army headquarters.
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The Army Department of IGHQ sent the following reply telegram on the next day, the 24th
(the day the participants of the Manila Conference headed back).(23)
From Vice Chief of Army General Staff, sent at 1440 on 24 January 
To Chief of Staff, [Southern Army] 
Army General Staff Telegram No. 551
We respectfully acknowledge Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 604.
The key to the operations to capture Java lies in the success or failure of the air operations, for
which, as you are well aware, the seizure of Banjarmasin is invaluable. Thus, the operation plan
approved by the Emperor as well as the central agreement paid particular attention to it. Fur-
thermore, in view of the fact that the enemy efforts to strengthen the defense of Java [have pro-
gressed so much that] they cannot be taken lightly, we are deeply concerned about the results
of air operations in a situation where the cooperation of the aircraft carriers cannot necessarily
be expected. If there are difficulties in conducting the operation from the sea, are there no other
ways, such as an overland seizure or maneuvering along the coast in small boats? [Furthermore,]
even if there is not enough time after the seizure to make the base ready for use before the launch
of operations to capture Java, may it not be better to occupy [Banjarmasin] in order to ensure
[the success of] subsequent operations? Please pay further attention to these points.
While feeling that the telegram was “very considerate,”(23) the Southern Army was [more]
concerned about the delay in the agreement with the Second Fleet (the Southern Task Force)
and sent the following telegram to [the Army Department of] IGHQ on the next day, the
25th:(23)
To Vice Chief of Army General Staff
From Chief of Staff, Southern Army, sent on the 25th
Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 622
1. We respectfully acknowledge Army General Staff Telegram No. 551.
2. We are absolutely of the same opinion about the value of Banjarmasin. However, we omitted
[the operation] from the new plan because the seizure [of the place] in conjunction by the Army
and the Navy might cause a significant delay in the invasion of Java.
3. Nevertheless, in order to securely carry out the invasion of Java, we decided to seize Banjarmasin
by land as well as by the sea, and took [the necessary] steps.
4. Further, we intend to capture Bali with two faster ships together with the Navy no later than
day x + 75. 
The Southern Army eagerly awaited the reply telegram from [the Army Department of]
IGHQ, but since no reply came, it lost patience(23) and sent the next day, the 26th, another
telegram to [the Army Department] of IGHQ:(23)
To Vice Chief of Army General Staff
From Chief of Staff, Southern Army, sent on the 26th 
Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 632
Concerning the omission of Banjarmasin [from the new plan], mentioned in Southern Army
Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 604, your urgent reply is requested because of [the time required
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for] the revision of the agreement between the Army and the Navy. In this regard, we would
like you to refer to Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 622.
In response to this telegram, the Army Department of IGHQ sent the following reply:(23)
From Vice Chief of Army General Staff, sent on the 26th 
To Chief of Staff, [Southern Army] 
Army General Staff Telegram No. 591
We respectfully acknowledge Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 632. I am contacting
you again, praying for certain success in the operation [to] capture Java.
We have also been negotiating about the cooperation from aircraft carriers in the Java operation.
However, at present it cannot be expected for sure, as the Navy is extremely cautious about
sending them to a sea where the enemy air force is [still] strong. Although the value of seizing
Banjarmasin for the air operations against Java remains to our mind unquestionable, we would
like to know the status of the discussions between the Army and the Navy on the prospects for
success of the air operations at your end. As to your view that the capture of Java might be sig-
nificantly delayed if the Army and the Navy in conjunction should capture [Banjarmasin], the
Navy General Staff has doubts, too. Although it thinks that it might represent the view of the
Navy on site, we want to know the true state of affairs. For your information, the Navy General
Staff also fully recognizes the necessity of seizing Banjarmasin, and has already ordered [the
units] on site that the place needs to be seized and made ready for use before the landings on
Java.
When the staff officers of Section 1 of the Southern Army Staff read the telegram, they felt
“worse than ever.”(23) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Tsukada Osamu, who had orchestrated the south-
ern operation plan as vice chief of Army General Staff until just before he was transferred as
chief of staff [of the Southern Army], was also disgusted with the attitude of [the Army De-
partment] of IGHQ, and gave vent to his frustration by saying: “[The Army Department of]
IGHQ got it wrong. At the beginning of the preliminary study on the southern operation,
the original plan was that [the airfield in] Banjarmasin would be used by army aircraft for
the attack on Java. Despite the fact that the Navy is now in charge of this area, they must be
saying all these things out of recollections from that time. Why do they keep on grumbling
about such trivial things when the Navy says it won’t use [the airfield]?”(23) The Southern
Army wired [again] the following telegram on the next day, the 27th:(23)
To Vice Chief of Army General Staff
From Chief of Staff, [Southern Army], dated 27 January 
Southern Army Staff Section 4, Telegram No. 658
We are deeply aware of the significance of the seizure of Banjarmasin, which was mentioned in
Army General Staff Telegram No. 591 (in which you requested reconsideration of our decision
regarding its seizure). The Army and the Navy on site have been studying [the feasibility] of
carrying out [the seizure] according to plan as best as possible. However, as a result of a detailed
study of matters related to the escort to be provided by Navy warships, the [possible] dates of
seizing air bases, the setting up [of our bases] and making them ready for use, and to other [fac-
tors] in the entire Java operation, we regrettably came to the conclusion that conducting the
seizure of Banjarmasin as planned would cause another delay of about two weeks in the capture
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of eastern Java. Although both the Army and the Navy fully realize that the air operations in
the Java invasion operation will never be easy, they do not believe that the tactical value of seiz-
ing Banjarmasin as planned can compensate for the strategic disadvantage of a two-week delay
in the invasion schedule. Thus, in order to make up for the disadvantage of revising the [pre-
pared] plan, the decision was made to capture Bali as well as swiftly seize Banjarmasin by land
and by maneuvering small boats along the coast, of which you were already informed in the
previous telegrams.
The reference in the above telegram to “Southern Army Staff Section 4” indicates that this
telegram was drafted by Section 4 of the Southern Army Staff, that is, the section in charge
of air-related matters of the Southern Army. Seven days of exchanging telegrams had not yet
settled the matter, and without a settlement, the Southern Army and the Southern Task Force
could not conclude the Manila Agreement.
How did [the Army Department of] IGHQ, which had stated in its report to the Throne
that the seizure of Banjarmasin would take place ahead of [the Java operation] and had given
orders accordingly, view the strength of the allied air and naval forces? Col. Tanikawa Kazuo,
senior staff officer of Section 4 of the Southern Army wrote in his diary for 3 February as fol-
lows: 
The state of reinforcement of [enemy] air forces in the Far East ([source:] Army General Staff)
1. [number of aircraft] already sent in:
100 aircraft in Burma, 110 aircraft in Malaya, 10 aircraft in the Dutch East Indies, 100 aircraft in
India, which make a total of 320 aircraft (40 aircraft from Chongqing included).
2. [number of aircraft] diverted within the East Asia:
40 aircraft to Burma from India, 40 aircraft to Malaya from the Dutch East Indies, 50 aircraft to
Malaya from Australia, 30 aircraft to the Dutch East Indies from Australia.
3. [number of aircraft] to be sent to East Asia shortly:
245 aircraft from the British mainland and Egypt ([consisting of] 64 bombers and 181 fighter
planes), 40 aircraft to the Dutch East Indies from the United States (fighter planes), 80 Australian
Air Force aircraft returning from the British mainland and north Africa ([consisting of] three
bomber squadrons and two fighter plane squadrons), which make a total of 365 aircraft.
4. 240 aircraft to Egypt from the British mainland.
5. The increase of U.S. aircraft in the above:
Already increased: 90 aircraft to Malaya, 10 aircraft to Dutch East Indies, which make a total of
100 aircraft ([consisting of] 60 fighter planes and 40 super heavy bombers). 
To be sent in shortly: 40 aircraft to the Dutch East Indies.
As for the allied naval power, the U.S. Far East Fleet in the Philippines had retreated to the
Dutch East Indies without a fight, and the British Fleet in Malaya was also expected to retreat
to the Dutch East Indies. On 20 January, the Southern Army submitted the Southern Army
Special Report No. 5, in which it stated: “Lieutenant General MacArthur still seems to remain
in Corregidor Island. Java now serves as the operational command center of the allied forces,
replacing Singapore. In fact, the General Headquarters of the allied forces of the Southwestern
Pacific has been set up in Surabaya, and the commander in chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet,
Hart, also seems to have stationed himself there. It seems that the U.S. Fleet based on
Surabaya and Ambon has taken charge of the waters of Celebes and further east.”(23)
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The Southern Army had never thought that the concept of [strategic] pursuit was easy
[to implement], either. As previously mentioned, [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura
had considered directly requesting Commander in Chief [of the Southern Army] Terauchi
for an increase in warships to escort [his army]. Also Colonel Tanikawa, senior staff officer
of Section 4 of the Staff Department of the Southern Army headquarters, who was responsible
for planning and directing the air operations of the Southern Army, held a grim but deter-
mined view and wrote in his diary for 2 February as follows:
My beliefs regarding the Bangka, Palembang and Java operations
The time has really come for the final stage of the southern operation, the Bangka, Palembang,
and Java operations. While various studies and discussions have been conducted about [the
prospects for] success or failure in these operations, my beliefs are as follows:
1. We shall definitely succeed in the Bangka, Palembang and Java operations. However, the
degree of risk and damage involved will be the most serious in the whole southern opera-
tion, and we must be fully prepared for that in advance.
2. Some elements in the operational environment of the Bangka, Palembang and Java opera-
tions, such as the movements of the enemy and the terrain, may of course make the opera-
tions incomparably more difficult than those in the initial stages of the Malaya landing
operations. However, what makes me believe in our certain success is based on the nature
[of the enemy], which is essentially a colonial army. When the high command of the German
Eastern Army started doubting the success of its operations in the middle of the Battle of
Tannenberg, only Hoffmann, who alone grasped the nature of the Russian Army, was not
shaken, believing in the success [of the operation]. My belief is just like that.
3. That we have to carry out the Bangka, Palembang and Java operations without waiting for
the results of the air operation to destroy the enemy power, nay, because we are unable to
afford to wait, simply cannot be helped. After all, if we do not conduct the operations this
way, we will remain unable to estimate when to conduct the operations and, moreover, a
great strategic disadvantage will be the result. It simply is the inevitable fate of the Southern
Army to swiftly carry out the risky operations against Bangka, Palembang and Java. We did
expect the risks from the beginning. Nevertheless, I believe that we will be absolutely suc-
cessful. The most important thing is to be mentally prepared not to waver in the middle of
the operations.
Incidentally, on the next day, the 28th, the issue of the seizure of Banjarmasin came to an
abrupt end. The Southern Army received the following telegram from [the Army Department
of] IGHQ on the 28th:(23)
From Chief of Army General Staff, sent at 1130 on the 28th
To Commander in Chief, Southern Army 
Army General Staff Telegram No. 611
Reply to Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 604
Although there were various arguments about the seizure of Banjarmasin, we learned from Six-
teenth Army Operation Order A, No. 119 ([sent to us in] OSAMU [Sixteenth Army] Staff Section
1 Telegram No. 84) that the army planned to seize the airfield on its own and make it ready for
use by early February. Since it became clear to us that you also intended to attach great impor-
tance to the place for the Java operation, we approved everything.
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The staff officers of the Southern Army looked at each other in dumb surprise.(23) Sixteenth
Army Operation Order A, No. 119 was a surprise, but the attitude of [the Army Department
of] IGHQ was [even] more of a surprise.
Now at last, the commander in chief of the Southern Army and the commander in chief
of the Navy in the South were able to sign the Manila Agreement. It was actually [already]
28 January.(119)
What on earth was stated in Sixteenth Army Operation Order A, No. 119 mentioned in
the above telegram from the chief of Army General Staff, and how had it come about? Things
had gone as follows: after the discussions on the 21st and on the morning of the 22d in
Manila, Colonel Ishii had sent a telegram to the Southern Army in the afternoon of the 22d
that “[the seizure of] Banjarmasin will be omitted,” and [likewise] [Navy] Captain Yanagi-
sawa had sent a telegram to the Navy General Staff, the Southern Army and others that “an
overland attack [will be made].”(23) On the next day, the 23d, the Southern Army had wired
[the Army Department of] IGHQ that “the seizure [of Banjarmasin] in advance [of the Java
operation] will [reluctantly] be omitted. However, we expect to seize [Banjarmasin] about
the same time as the landings in Java or when the opportunity arises afterwards,”(23) [in reply]
to which, the Army Department of [IGHQ] had wired the Southern Army on the next day,
the 24th, to the effect that “We want you to seize it in advance by all possible means.”(23) At
that time, the Sakaguchi Detachment had left port in Tarakan at 1700 on the 21st, started
landing in Balikpapan before daybreak of that day (the 24th), and was in the middle of a
fight to seize the city [and surrounding] areas.(119) However, that morning, some destroyers
of the allied forces came to attack the anchorage of the convoy of the Sakaguchi Detachment,
and some damage was caused.(116) On learning the intention of the Army Department of
IGHQ, the Southern Army immediately (about the night of the 24th) wired the Sixteenth
Army to order “the Saka guchi Detachment to take charge of guarding Balikpapan and make
the airfield ready for use once the place was seized, and also capture Banjarmasin by land
and by sea on their own.” In this order, [the Southern Army] demanded that the Saka guchi
Detachment make every effort, while giving as example the operation of the Kawaguchi De-
tachment in western Borneo when it sailed the distance of some four hundred kilometers in
small boats.(23) After the Manila Conference, the Sixteenth Army headquarters returned from
Manila to Gaoxiong on the 24th, where it received the above Southern Army order and, on
the 25th, issued the following order:(22)
oSAmu [Sixteenth Army] operation order A, No. 119
Sixteenth Army Order, Gaoxiong, 25 January
1. Based on the requirements of the general situation, it has been decided that there will be no di-
rect escort provided by Navy warships for the seizure of Banjarmasin.
2. After the seizure of Balikpapan, the detachment shall leave [part of] its force with the required
strength to take charge of guarding the place and cooperate in making the Balikpapan airfield
ready for use. Then (by early February at the latest), it shall promptly seize the Banjarmasin air-
field on its own in the way described below, so that the Navy can advance its air base there. It
shall keep in mind that the rapid seizure of the airfield and making it ready for use is of ex-
tremely great significance, as [the airfield] will be the one and only base for the fighter plane
units charged in particular with the air operations to destroy the air power of the enemy, [which
is essential to] the conduct of the entire operation of the army.
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(a) An element of [the detachment] will seize Banjarmasin and its airfield by land.
(b) Another element of [the detachment] will take core personnel of the Navy Airfield XX (note
by the author: the two characters in the original text are illegible) and as much fuel and am-
munition for fighter planes as possible from Balikpapan in motorized boats, and fishing
boats and others in possession of the Navy, and by maneuvering along the coast seize Ban-
jarmasin and make its airfield ready for use.
(c) In cooperation with the naval core personnel, the army will mainly take charge of making
the airfield ready for use. For that purpose, [the army] shall make efforts to draft local peo-
ple.
3. Sanga Sanga and Samarinda shall be seized mainly by land with another element of the force.
In other words, whereas [the Army Department of] IGHQ sent the already-mentioned
telegram on the 26th and for two days, the 26th and the 27th, made the Southern Army feel
“worse than ever,”(23) the Sixteenth Army had simply given an order on the 25th based on
the talks with the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet at the Manila Conference, to seize
[Banjarmasin] no later than 10 February, thirteen days ahead of the date of landing in eastern
Java (day x + 77, i.e. 23 February), and had [already] settled the issue on the 25th. Ultimately,
[the confusion] was caused for the following three reasons:
1. Staff Officer Ishii had gathered from [the discussions in] Manila that “the seizure of
the [Banjarmasin] airfield, which had been intended for the Navy’s use, was no longer
necessary if the Navy wouldn’t use it,” and the Southern Army had assumed that the
Sixteenth Army had shared the impression.
2. The Southern Army had not thought that the Sakaguchi Detachment could attack Ban-
jarmasin so soon. However, the Sakaguchi Detachment, which had come ashore on
the morning of the 24th despite the fact that its anchorage had been raided by several
[enemy] destroyers, had [already] advanced its headquarters to the city of Balikpapan
before daybreak on the 25th, and had started operations to mop up [the enemy] on
the 26th.
3. As mentioned previously, the Sixteenth Army gave the order to the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment on the 25th, but it was not until one day later that it reported the full text of the
order to [the Army Department] of IGHQ and the Southern Army by OSAMU [Sixteenth
Army] Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 84 sent at 1545 on the 26th. Then again, it was not
before the 28th that the signal section of both [the Army Department] of IGHQ and
the Southern Army belatedly decoded [the telegram].
The Sixteenth Army did not know that the Southern Army and [the Army Department of]
IGHQ had been exchanging telegrams [over the seizure of Banjarmasin], or that this issue
had been delaying the conclusion of the Manila Agreement until the 28th, either.(36, 40)
After signing [the Manila Agreement] on the 28th, the commander in chief of the Second
Fleet gave the following order:(119)
Southern Task Force Telegraphic order No. 78 (at 1700, 28 January)
The supplemented and revised agreement on Operation H with the commander in chief of the
Southern Army has come into effect as Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 750 (note by the
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author: the already-described telegram of 25 January). Each unit shall conduct operations in
conjunction with the relevant army units conform to the above agreement.
As seen in Army General Staff Telegram No. 591 of the 26th, the Navy Department of IGHQ,
too, strongly felt the necessity of seizing Banjarmasin and had sent telegram(s) to the units
on site to reaffirm the necessity of seizing [the airfield of] the town and making it ready for
use ahead of the Java landings. However, ultimately, the units on site could not give what
they did not have, and the Dutch East Indies Unit (the Third Fleet) sent the following
telegram to the 1st Escort Unit (the 4th Destroyer Squadron) on 28 January.(119) [Consequently,]
two days later, the 30th, the 4th Destroyer Squadron left Balikpapan for Lingayen Gulf in
order to escort the 48th Division from the Philippines to Java.(119)
We will cancel [the task of] the 1st Escort Unit to provide an escort to Banjarmasin. It has been
decided that the Sakaguchi Detachment will seize Banjarmasin by land as well as by boat by
maneuvering them along the coast. The 2d Base Unit shall have an element with fishing boats
as its main [force] transport the base matériel, fuel, etc. of the Eleventh Air Fleet, and cooperate
with the Sakaguchi Detachment.
The Plan of the Sixteenth Army and the Dutch East Indies Unit,
and the Arrangement Between Them
As already described, at the Manila Conference, [the entire meeting] on 21 January was spent
on discussions between the Southern Army and the Navy, and although the Sixteenth Army
was included in the conference on the 22d, the Southern Army kept on taking the lead. The
chief of staff of the 48th Division, Col. Kawagoe Moriji, who attended the conference on that
day, recalled the situation as follows:
In the meeting on the 22d, the Navy insisted that the seizure and preparation of airfields had
not progressed as planned, and that, in eastern Borneo, [the whole operation of] seizing the Ban-
jarmasin [airfield], making it ready and accumulating fuel and ammunition [there] would be
completed around the date set in the plan before the opening of hostilities [at the earliest], and
could not be done as scheduled in the recent Cam Ranh Agreement, and such was the case in
Celebes. On the other hand, the Southern Army insisted that what had been decided at the recent
Cam Ranh Agreement could not be changed because it had been reported to [the Army Depart-
ment of] IGHQ. Both would not yield a bit, strongly insisting that they would not mind arguing
their points all night that night. The argument was broken off once at my
suggestion, and resumed in the afternoon, but once again became so heated
that you could not imagine when it would come to an end. Explaining that
[actually] the 48th Division would be in the biggest trouble, I presented a
compromise adopting half of each argument. The Navy agreed with it right
away, but the Southern Army did not give an inch. [Then,] in response to
that, the Navy argued that it was the airfields for fighter planes that were the
biggest problem. (Note by the author: Staff Officer Ishii’s telegram of 1500
already mentioned in the above was sent at this juncture.) As the arguments
did not come to an end, I spoke again and suggested seizing Bali ahead of
the Java landing operations and conducting airstrikes on Java from Bali. [The
reason for my suggestion was that] while the main force of the Sixteenth
Army was supposed to come ashore in western Java under cover of the Army
Chief of Staff of the
48th Division, Col.
Kawagoe Moriji
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air units (and of part of the Navy air units as well), my division was expected to come ashore
in eastern Java under cover of the Navy air units only. My words greatly changed the direction
of the discussion. The Southern Army staff officers asked me which units [I had in mind] to cap-
ture Bali and when, to which I answered that the 48th Division shall capture it with a force con-
sisting of one infantry battalion, one mountain artillery battery, one engineer platoon and one
medical platoon as its core, and the best timing would be about one week prior to the landing
in Java. They all immediately agreed, and told me that I should go to Davao and make arrange-
ments with the Eleventh Air Fleet, as the Dutch East Indies Unit [the Third Fleet] was in the
middle of the operations to seize Balikpapan and Kendari at that time, and that the Third Fleet
would abide by the results. That was how the difficult agreement was reached at last. (Note by
the author: [Navy] Staff Officer Yanagisawa’s telegram of the 22d already mentioned in the
above was sent at this juncture.)
On the next day, the 23d, the staff officers of the Sixteenth Army held preliminary talks with
the Navy in Manila,(32) and Chief of Staff of the 48th Division Kawagoe flew to Davao accom-
panied by Staff Officer Akatsuka Kazuo.(80) The airfield in Davao was rough and bumpy,
crudely made with wire netting laid out [over the runway], on which they barely managed
to land.(80) Chief of Staff Kawagoe felt that he [now] understood the trouble the Navy had in
constructing airfields. He had talks with Commander in Chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet V.
Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō and his chief of staff, Ōnishi Takijirō, in which it was decided that
the landing location would be the narrow sandy beach on the southeast coast of Bali, and
detailed arrangements were made.(80) Commander in Chief Tsukahara shocked Chief of Staff
Kawagoe by saying: “Two fast transport ships with a speed of over seventeen knots will be
necessary. We would like the Army to arrange them. If impossible, we will look into the [pos-
sibility that] the Navy arrange them.”(80) This led to the already-described search for faster
ships and the choosing of the Sasako-maru and the Sagami-maru. Chief of Staff Kawagoe and
his companion returned to Manila the next day, the 24th.(80) On that day (the 24th), the par-
ticipants of the Manila Conference returned [to their units].(23, 32) It was also the day that the
landings in Balikpapan and Kendari were carried out, which will be described later.(117, 119)
The Situation of the Sixteenth Army and its operation Plan
The situation as of the 23d, when the Sixteenth Army held talks with the Dutch East Indies
Unit in Manila, was roughly as follows:
1. The Sakaguchi Detachment was sailing southward from Tarakan in order to land in
Balikpapan before daybreak of the next day, the 24th.(119)
2. The Eastern Detachment had arrived in Davao on the 18th, and was preparing for the
seizure of Ambon.(117) Although the landing in Ambon was scheduled for 25 January
in the Cam Ranh Agreement, on 15 January it was postponed by the Dutch East Indies
Unit until the 29th, and [again] on 19 January further postponed until the 31st.(117)
3. The 38th Division, which had left Hong Kong on 20 January, was approaching Cam
Ranh Bay.(66) (It reached the bay on the 24th.)
4. The 48th Division, whose task at the battlefront in Bataan had been taken over by the
65th Brigade on 8 January, was preparing for the Java operation in Manila.(79)
5. As for the 2d Division, following the IGHQ Army Department Instruction No. 1037(1)
of 24 November, the headquarters of the division had arrived [at the maneuvering
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grounds] in Narashino from 7 to 8 December, the 4th Infantry Regiment at the foot of
Mt. Fuji from the 11th to the 17th, the 16th Infantry Regiment [also] in Narashino from
the 3d to the 6th, the 29th Infantry Regiment in Toyohashi from the 1st to the 4th, while
the other units had also arrived by train generally in the same way, and [all of them]
had started training at the maneuvering grounds.(53) Later on 27 December, they were
ordered by the Sixteenth Army (in Tokyo at that time) to advance to Gaoxiong. How-
ever on 3 January, while preparing for the move, 448 personnel, 1,700 horses, and some
matériel were transferred to units on the mainland,(31) which was followed by the order
that some of the men and horses of the 16th Infantry Regiment (197 men and 178
horses) and the 3d Battalion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment would be transported
in the second and later transports and follow on.(31) The Division embarked during the
period of 15 to 23 January at Ujina left the port, and [its ships] arrived in Gaoxiong
one after another from 21 January onwards (the arrival [of the ships] was completed
on the 26th).(31) On 14 January, the Navy Department of IGHQ had ordered by Instruc-
tion No. 40 that “the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall provide the con-
voy transporting the Army 2d Division (in about thirty-three transport ships), which
will leave Moji on 18 January, with direct escort from Moji to Gaoxiong. The com-
mander in chief of the Chinkai Guard District shall put the 32d Destroyer Division
under the command of the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet regarding the
above escort.”(1) On 15 January, by Telegraphic Operation Order No. 43, the com-
mander in chief of the Combined Fleet gave the order that “the 9th Cruiser Division
commander shall provide the escort to the Army transport convoy [mentioned] in
IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No. 40. The force to be employed for the escort
shall consist of the 9th Cruiser Division, the 1st Section of the 27th Destroyer Division,
and the 32d Destroyer Division.”(129) The 9th Cruiser Division consisted of the light
cruisers Oi and Kitakami and its commander was R. Adm. Kishi Fukuji.(129)
As already described, in the operation plan of the Sixteenth Army (which was the revision
of the previous operation plan after [the army] had on 5 January received the Southern
Army’s order to prepare for the invasion of Java) as well as in the recent Manila Conference,
three issues had arisen: (1) the issue of capturing Bali with an element of the 48th Division
ahead of [the Java operation], (2) the issue of the seizure of Banjarmasin, and (3) the issue of
a shortage of naval forces to provide [sufficient] escort. At that time (as of the 23d), the forces
which [the Navy] could afford to employ for the escort of the large convoy of fifty-six ships
with the main force of the Sixteenth Army aboard to western and central Java was just one
light cruiser and eight destroyers (i.e. the Natori under the command of Rear Admiral Hara,
commander of the 5th Destroyer Squadron with the 5th and the 22d Destroyer Divisions)
([as seen in] the order of the Southern Task Force of 4 January). [Therefore,] the Navy was
reluctant to separately land the Shōji Detachment (in Patrol), which was rather close to the
naval port of Surabaya. It also stated that it would not be able to fully guarantee the safety
[of the army] against a threat from the Indian Ocean if the main force of the army landed in
Merak. So, the strengthening of the escort force by bringing in part of the [Navy] Malaya
Unit and others became the topic of this conference. 
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The Situation of the [Navy] Dutch East indies unit and its operation Plan
As of 23 January, the situation of the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit was roughly as follows:
1. The South China Sea: Of the 5th Destroyer Squadron ([consisting of] one light cruiser and eight
destroyers) that had finished escorting the main force of the 33d Division, one regiment of the
5th Division, and others to Bangkok and Singora, the flagship the Natori and the four destroyers
of the 22d Destroyer Division had left Singora on 9 January, arrived in Magong on 16 January,
left port on the 21st, and arrived in Gaoxiong on the same day, where they had stayed since
then. The four destroyers of the 5th Destroyer Division [of the 5th Squadron] had left Singora
on the 12th and arrived in Magong on the 18th. Thereafter, they had joined the main force, and
were also in Gaoxiong.(120)
2. The Makassar Strait: The Western Attack Unit was escorting the Sakaguchi Detachment for the
landing operations in Balikpapan which would be conducted on the next day, the 24th.(119) The
Western Attack Unit consisted of the 1st Escort Unit (the main force of the 4th Destroyer
Squadron), the 2d Base Force, and the 1st Air Unit ([consisting of] the auxiliary seaplane tenders
the San’yō-maru and the Sanuki-maru), and they were under the direct control of the Dutch East
Indies Unit commander.(119) Leaving Davao on this day (the 23d), the Dutch East Indies Unit
commander was sailing southward, leading the main force [of the unit] (the 16th Cruiser Divi-
sion) to support [the operation to] seize Balikpapan.(119)
3. The Molucca Sea: The Eastern Attack Unit under the command of the 5th Cruiser Division com-
mander was sailing southward to go ashore in Kendari on the next day, the 24th. The Eastern
Attack Unit consisted of the Support Unit (the 5th Cruiser Division), the 1st Base Unit (with the
1st Base Force as its core), the 2d Escort Unit ([made up of] the main force of the 2d Destroyer
Squadron), and the 2d Air Unit (i.e. the 11th Seaplane Tender Division with the seaplane tenders
Chitose and Mizuho).(117)
4. Tarakan and Menado had been captured on the 11th, one day behind the schedule set in the
Cam Ranh Agreement. The upcoming operations against Balikpapan and Kendari were to be
conducted on the 24th, four days behind the schedule of the Cam Ranh Agreement. The opera-
tion to seize Ambon was also changed and to be conducted on the 31st, six days behind the
schedule of the Cam Ranh Agreement.(117, 119)
While this was the situation of the Dutch East Indies Unit, the plan for its [coming operations]
was that its Eastern Attack Unit would have to head eastward to seize Ambon right after the
seizure of Kendari, then head westward to seize Makassar, and again head eastward to seize
Kupang, while its Western Attack Unit would seize Balikpapan [first], then cooperate in the
seizure of Makassar while conducting the operation to seize Banjarmasin at the same time,
and on top of that, escort the 48th Division from the Philippines to Java. [For the Dutch East
Indies Unit,] it was absolutely impossible to strictly keep to the schedule of the Cam Ranh
Agreement, and [the unit] was also painfully aware that it had a serious shortage of destroy-
ers. In these circumstances, the cancellation of the escort in the operation to seize Banjarmasin
was of help in terms of both the schedule and the scarcity of destroyers. However, if the rea-
son to omit [the operation against] Banjarmasin had been “the danger of sailing immediately
north of Surabaya and exposing the flank [of the convoy to the enemy naval port],” then the
previously described arguments for an attack on Bali [naturally] raise the question: “Then
what about Bali? Would that not be all the more dangerous?” Ultimately, [the tight schedule
and the shortage of forces brought about that] the commander of the 4th Destroyer Squadron
would leave Balikpapan (on 30 January), about two weeks before the seizure of Makassar
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(12 February), for the Philippines with his main force escort to the 48th Division; that the el-
ement left behind [in Makassar] to support the seizure of the place would be withdrawn im-
mediately after its cooperation; and that the dangerous [operation] to capture Bali would be
supported by just a small force commanded by the 1st Base Force commander [R. Adm. Kubo
Kyūji]. The details will be described later along with the issue of the escort of the main force
of the Sixteenth Army.
The Arrangements between the Sixteenth Army and the Air and Naval units
(See Illustration No. 20)
With all the above-mentioned problems involved, the Sixteenth Army concluded the follow-
ing arrangements on 23 January in Manila with the air and naval units concerned:
memorandum of the Arrangements for operation H between the Sixteenth Army, the Third Air
Force, the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet
I. Distribution of the landing forces, landing points, names for landing sectors and their re-
connaissance
1. Landing points and names for landing sectors
(1) Units in the first transport
{1} Area No. 1 ([assigned to] the 2d Division and the main force of the units under the
direct control of the army)
Sector A Landing Unit ([consisting of] 2 infantry battalions and 1 reconnaissance reg-
iment as its core): on the south side of Merak
Sector B Landing Unit ([consisting of] 2 infantry battalions as its core): on the north
side of Merak
Sector C Landing Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the [2d] Division and the
main force of the units under the direct control of the army): along Bantam Bay
Note by the author: Although Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō, chief shipping staff of the Six-
teenth Army, explained in detail and stressed the unsuitableness of the coast of Ban-
tam Bay and the advantages of the coast of Merak, the Navy emphasized the threat
from the Indian Ocean and finally overcame [the opposition of] the army.(44)
{2} Area No. 2 ([assigned to] the Shōji Detachment, [consisting of] 2 infantry battalions
as its core): [on the coast near] Patrol
Note by the author: The Navy expressed disapproval of the idea of separately [land-
ing] the Shōji Detachment, particularly of putting it ashore closer to the naval port of
Surabaya, but this time the army had its way.(44)
{3} Area No. 3 ([assigned to] the 48th Division as its core)
Sector D: Right Wing Unit ([consisting of] 3 infantry battalions as its core): on the
north side of Kragan
Sector E: Left Wing Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the division): on the south
side of Kragan
Note by the author: Although the Sixteenth Army initially planned to put Sector D
and Sector E at a considerable distance [from each other], the 48th Division opposed
this.(80)
(2) Units in the second transport
Area No. 1: Batavia (or Bantam) about 100,000 tons
Area No. 3 Surabaya (or Kragan) about 50,000 tons
(3) Units in the third transport
Area No. 1: Batavia (or Bantam) about 100,000 tons
226 Chapter VII     /     The Capture of Java’s Dehors
2. Reconnaissance of the landing points
(1) Reconnaissance by aircraft
Army: Thirty copies of the photomaps on a scale of about 1 to 25,000 of the landing
coasts of Areas No. 1 and 2 shall be delivered to the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters
in Saigon by around 10 February (three copies of which shall be delivered to the 12th
Seaplane Tender Division (the Kamikawa-maru) in Cam Ranh).
Navy: Thirty copies of the photomaps on a scale of about 1 to 25,000 of the landing
coast of Area No. 3 shall be delivered to the 48th Division in Jolo (the Pata anchorage)
by around 10 February.
(2) Other prior reconnaissance, if necessary, shall be conducted by arrangement between
the commanders of the landing corps, escort units and air units.
II. Assembly points, arrival and departure dates of the transport ships
Note by the author: “H” indicates the date of landing on western Java, which was 21
February, and “I” that on eastern Java, which was 23 February. At the Manila Con-
ference, the dates of landing in western and eastern Java were respectively set five
days and seven days behind those specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement, which al-
lowed [the units concerned] to call at Cam Ranh and Jolo respectively.
III. Starting date and time of the landings and the schedule
1. Starting dates of landings
The first day of the landings are set as follows:
Eastern Java: on day I
Western Java: on day H
Although day I and day H are scheduled for “XX,” the Sixteenth Army commander shall
fix [them] after due consultation with the commander in chief of the Third Fleet by 1200 on
day H – 9. However, if further changes [to these dates] become necessary after the departure
[of the units], [new dates] shall be decided upon through consultations each time.
Note by the author: “XX” had been set as day x + 75, and day x + 77, that is, 21 and 23
February. However, on 10 February, both of them were changed to day x + 80, that
is, 26 February. This had come about in the following way: 
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Transports Areas Assembly Points Dates of Arrival Dates of Departure
First
Areas No. 1 and No. 2
Gaoxiong, then 
Cam Ranh
Leave Gaoxiong dur-
ing the period from
the beginning till 6
February one after an-
other, and assemble in
Cam Ranh
H – 8
Area No. 3
Lingayen, then the
Jolo/Pata 
anchorage
Complete embarka-
tion by 7 February,
leave on 8  February,
and assemble at the
Pata anchorage on 
12 February
I – 7
Second
Area No. 1
Advance from mainland Japan to Cam Ranh first, and then go
ashore in Batavia (or Bantam)
Area No. 3
Advance from Lingayen to Jolo or Davao, and then go ashore in
Surabaya (or Kragan)
Remarks
The Sixteenth Army commander shall determine the second and later transports after due
consultation with the commanders of the 4th and 5th Destroyer Squadrons
On 21 January at the Manila Conference, it was agreed that the dates [of the landings]
would be set as day x + 75 and day x + 77, and that the Third Air Force commander
and the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet would be included in those
with whom arrangements on H would be made. On 23 January, staff officers of the
Sixteenth Army, the Third Fleet, the Third Air Force and the Eleventh Air Fleet made
a draft of this memorandum of the arrangement for Operation H in Manila.
On 25 January, the Second Fleet sent the formal [proposal for the] agreement to the
Southern Army. On 28 January, the agreement between the Second Fleet and the
Southern Army came into effect.
On the 30th, this memorandum of the arrangement for Operation H officially came
into effect.
On 4 February, a postponement of [Operation] L for four days came up as an issue.
On the 6th, a postponement of [Operation] L for another two days came up.
On the 10th, the Southern Army and the Second Fleet reached an agreement to set
the schedule of both H and I on day x + 80.
2. Start of the landings
Entry into the anchorage shall be made around 0000 for both day H and day I. Although the
start of the landings is set at 0200 for both day H and day I, [the landings] in each area shall
be started as soon as [the units] in the area are ready.
3. Landing schedule
(1) Units in the first transport
Area No. 1: [shall be completed] in about seven days.
Area No. 2: [shall be completed] in about five days. Depending on the circumstances, on
day H + 2 and onwards, units yet to be debarked may be [again] transported and put
ashore at Area No. 1. The decision of whether to implement [this] shall be made by the
Sixteenth Army commander after due consultation with the 5th Destroyer Squadron
commander.
Note by the author: The sentence after the phrase “depending on the circumstances” was
added reflecting the Navy’s opinion.(44)
Area No. 3: [shall be completed] in about five days.
(2) Units in the second transport
Area No. 1: [shall be completed] in about five days.
Area No. 3: [shall be completed] in about five days.
IV. Distribution of the convoy of transport ships, the commander’s whereabouts, and the escort
forces:
Note by the author: Of the ships in the table below, the Natori was the flagship of the 5th
Destroyer Squadron, the Yura was the flagship of the 5th Submarine Squadron, and
the Sendai was the flagship of the 3d Destroyer Squadron. The Yura and the Sendai
belonged to the Malaya Unit. As of 23 January, only the 5th Destroyer Squadron
had been decided as the force to escort [the transport ships] to Areas No. 1 and No.
2, and [its task] was planned as shown in this table. However, a reinforcement with
two destroyers from the air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) was announced on 28 Jan-
uary, which was followed by a reinforcement with the Yura and five destroyers from
the Malaya Unit on 17 February. “No. 333” is unknown.
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V. Route of the convoys
As shown in Supplement No. 1 (omitted by the author)
VI. Reconnaissance and diversions
The Navy air units shall conduct feint bombings of enemy naval bases and others in the
Probolinggo area (note by the author: southeast of Surabaya).
VII. Anchorage and the formation at the anchorage:
Anchorages and the convoy’s formation at the anchorage shall be determined by the com-
mander of the landing corps after due consultation with the commander of the escort.
VIII. Outline of landing attack
Although [the landing shall be made] as a surprise landing in principle, it shall be carried
out by assault if the situation should require it.
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Transport
Areas and
Convoys
Units
Number of
Ships
Commander’s whereabouts Escort
ForcesArmy Navy
First
Area No. 1
1st convoy
Sector A
landing unit
8
Infantry group
commander/
the Kōyō-maru
The Natori
5th 
Destroyer
Squadron
and
6 destroyers,
1 light
cruiser, and
5
minesweep-
ers of the
First South-
ern Expedi-
tionary Fleet
as the core
2d convoy
Sector B
landing unit
6
Regimental
commander/
the Reiyō-maru
3d convoy
Sector C 
landing unit
(main force of
the division
and main force
of the unit
under the di-
rect control of
the [Sixteenth]
Army)
27
2 munitions
ships
1 No. 333
1 water supply
ship
1 coaling ship
1 repair ship
Army com-
mander/the
Sakura-maru
Division com-
mander/the
Ayatosan-maru
Area No. 2 4th convoy
Shōji
Detachment
7
Regimental
commander/
the Suwa-maru
The Yura or
the Sendai
(depending
on situation)
Area No. 3
5th convoy
Right Wing
Unit
6
Regimental
commander/
the Aden-maru
The Naka
6th convoy
Left Wing Unit
(main force of
the division)
19
2 munitions
ships
1 water supply
ship
1 coaling ship
1 hospital ship
1 repair ship
Division com-
mander/ the
Teiyō-maru
Infantry group
commander/
the Tonegawa-
maru
4th 
Destroyer
Squadron
(minus 1 
destroyer 
division)
An element
of the 2d
Base Force
Second
Areas No. 1
and No. 3
To be determined depending on the situation at the time
IX. Use of air units
1. Forces to be employed
(1) The Eleventh Air Fleet
About 80 Type–1 land-based attack planes, about 35 Type–96 land-based attack planes,
about 70 Type–0 fighter planes, and about 5 land-based reconnaissance planes.
(2) The Third Fleet
About 50 reconnaissance seaplanes
(3) The Third Air Force
About 15 command reconnaissance planes, about 4 army reconnaissance planes, about
40 Type–1 fighter planes, about 50 Type–97 fighter planes, about 20 assault planes, about
20 twin-engine light bombers, and about 30 heavy bombers.
The above forces may slightly be increased or decreased depending on the situation.
2. Bases to be used
(1) [Bases] in Sumatra, Borneo and others
{1} The Palembang [airfield] shall be made ready and used by the Army. The Navy may
use this [base] by advancing some land-based attack planes, or as a relay base for
about thirty-six land-based attack planes when attacks on enemy surface forces in
the Indian Ocean are necessary.
{2} The Mentok [airfield] shall be made ready for use mainly by the Army, but with the
cooperation of the Navy. The Army and the Navy shall share the airfield and each
shall advance thirty fighter planes. However, when the Army starts using the Tan-
jungkarang airfield, the Navy shall exclusively use the Mentok airfield.
{3} The Ledo [airfield] shall be used by the Navy. However, the Army may advance some
command reconnaissance planes there.
{4} As for the airfields other than the above, those in Sumatra shall be used by the Army,
and those in Borneo by the Navy.
(2) [Bases] in Java
{1} [The airfields in] Batavia and Cililitan (note by the author: east of Batavia [editor’s
note: south of Batavia; the civil airfield, Kemayoran, was east of the city]) shall be
made ready for use by the Army and shared by the Army and the Navy in the fol-
lowing way:
The Navy: about 36 land-based attack planes and about 27 fighter planes.
The Army: about 20 twin-engine light bombers and about 15 command reconnais-
sance planes.
{2} The Buitenzorg [Bogor] and Kalijati [airfields] shall be made ready and used by the
Army. However, if the Batavia or Cililitan airfields cannot be used or if it takes more
time than expected to make them ready, the Navy shall advance about 27 fighter
planes to the Kalijati [airfield].
3. Outline of operations
(1) [We shall] promptly destroy the enemy air power in Java. The areas assigned [to the
Army or the Navy] in particular are as follows:
{1} The areas assigned [to the Army and the Navy] after the advance of the Army air
units to Palembang are roughly decided as follows:
The Navy: [the area] east of 108º east
The Army: [the area] west of 108º east
{2} In general the Navy shall mainly take charge of destroying the remnants of the enemy
air power after the Army has gone ashore.
(2) The attack on enemy warships shall be mainly assigned to the Navy.
(3) Covering of the convoy under sail and at anchorage
{1} The main force of the Sixteenth Army
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(a) The Navy shall be charged with the cover before and on day H – 2.
Note: The cover in the area northward of 5º north shall be provided by the First
Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
(b) The cover of the convoy up to the point of separation of the Shōji Detachment
from the main force of the army (indicated as point “j” in Supplement No. 1) on
day H – 1 shall be charged to the Navy. After that, the Navy shall take charge of
the cover of the Shōji Detachment, and the Army of the cover of the rest of the
main force of the army. However, guarding against [enemy] submarines shall be
wholly assigned to the Navy.
{2} The 48th Division
Along with guarding against [enemy] submarines, the Third Fleet shall take charge
of guarding the sky [over the anchorage] as well, from the time when the convoy en-
ters the anchorage until the advance of the fighter planes of the Eleventh Air Fleet
there. After that, the Eleventh Air Fleet shall take over [the task of] guarding.
{3} The guarding of the sky over the anchorage
The guarding of the sky shall be provided by the Army all the time until sunset on
day H + 2 over the anchorage for the units landing in Bantam, and on day H + 1 over
that for the units landing in Merak. After that, it shall provide air cover as needed
depending on the situation.
(4) Support of the ground operations
{1} The area of the main force of the Sixteenth Army
(a) The Army shall be in charge of the direct support of the ground operations.
(b) The Navy shall be in charge of cutting off the transport routes of the enemy in
the Cilacap area. It shall [also] be in charge of attacking enemy reinforcements or
forces in retreat when requested by the Army.
{2} The area of the 48th Division
The Third Fleet shall be in charge of direct support of the ground operations and the
Eleventh Air Fleet shall provide appropriately provide support at the request of the
Army. The Army shall join in [the direct support] if possible.
4. Information
(1) Military gains of [the operation] to destroy the enemy air power
The results of reconnaissance of enemy airfields, weather information and others shall
promptly be shared between the Army and the Navy air units.
(2) Other information concerning enemy movements and others shall be exchanged every
time [it is obtained].
5. Allotment [of facilities] and rules about the use of the shared airfields
The allotment [of facilities] and rules about the use of the airfields shared by the Army and
the Navy shall be arranged between senior commanding officers of the Army and the Navy
[units] which [actually] use the airfield.
6. Identification of friends
Conforms to the agreement between the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet.
X. Defense facilities of landing bases
1. The landing bases shall be set up as follows:
For Areas No. 1 and No. 2: Batavia (Bantam shall be used at the beginning.)
For Area No. 3: Surabaya (Kragan shall be used at the beginning).
2. The Navy shall take charge of the sea defense, the Army of the defense on land, and both
shall jointly take charge of the air defense.
XI. Move of the transport ships after the completion of disembarkation
After completing disembarkation, [the transport ships] shall be moved to the required areas
under the direct or indirect cover of the escort unit in the area.
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Illustration No. 20—Overview of the Arrangements for Operation H
XII. Signal Communications
As specified in the signal communication arrangement in the separate volume (omitted by
the author).
XIII. Others
1. The 48th Division shall have an element seize the Bali airfield in conjunction with the Navy
no later than day I – 2 to make it ready for use, with the aim of advancing a naval air base.
Note by the author: On 28 January, when the cancellation of the seizure of Banjarmasin by
sea and the [implementation of] the new [plan of] capturing Bali was decided, the South-
ern Task Force issued the order to “capture Bali around 21 February (day I – 2).” How-
ever, the Dutch East Indies Unit changed the order to “capture Bali on 18 February (day
I – 5).” This shall be described later.
2. The Navy, in concert with the ground operations, shall take control of the waters south of
Java, and block the enemy’s retreat.
3. Details other than the above shall be discussed and decided between the commanders of
the landing corps, escort forces and air units concerned.
As mentioned earlier, while the Manila Agreement had officially become effective on 28 Jan-
uary, this draft of the arrangement on Operation H (of 23 January), [officially] came into effect
on 30 January.(135) [Later] on 10 February, only the dates of “day H and day I” were modi-
fied.(96)
The Navy’s Shift to Phase-Three Operations and the Decision to Bring in the
Carrier Task Force
The above arrangements on Operation H stated that the Navy would take control of the wa-
ters south of Java, and block the enemy’s retreat. This was a critical matter when considering
the fact that the allied forces, which had retreated from the Philippines and Malaya after the
opening of hostilities, and those reinforced from the United States, Britain and Australia, had
been concentrated in Java. However, on 23 January, when this preliminary arrangement for
Operation H was made, the participation of the First Air Fleet (the Carrier Task Force), the
Sixth Fleet (the Submarine Fleet) and others in the Java operation had not yet been decided.
On 23 January, when this preliminary arrangement for Operation H was made, the South
Seas Detachment with the cooperation of the Fourth Fleet, was in the middle of its landing
operation on Rabaul, which was also supported by the First Air Fleet.(116)
At that time, the Combined Fleet, which had supported the Rabaul landing operation,
was also interested in implementing Carrier Task Force operations on the northeast coast of
Australia, following the Rabaul operations.
The reason why the Army Department of the IGHQ repeatedly requested the Southern
Army during the time after the Manila Conference until 27 January to seize Banjarmasin
ahead [of the Java operation] was that it intended to tell [the army] that the latter should
seize Banjarmasin before landing on Java just to be on the safe side, as it was difficult to
expect the cooperation from the Carrier Task Force. 
Because of the Army’s request to have the Carrier Task Force participate in the Java op-
eration, the concern of the Combined Fleet about the risky operation to capture Bali, and the
[possible] military gains for the Carrier Task Force when it participated in the Java operation
compared to conducting operations against the northeast coast of Australia, the Navy de-
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cided on 30 January to have part of both the Carrier Task Force and the Sixth Fleet join the
Java operation. The details will be described later.
Regarding the Navy’s shift to phase-three operations (the operation to capture Java), the
Combined Fleet ordered the shift to take effect as of 1200 on 24 January.(117) [The shift to phase-
three operations] was ordered by the Southern Task Force on the same day (the 24th),(117) and
by the Dutch East Indies Unit on 28 January when the issues of Banjarmasin and Bali were
settled.(117, 119)
The most distinctive feature of the phase-three disposition of the Dutch East Indies Unit
was that [the task of] escorting the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army ([to be
conducted by] the 3d Escort Unit, [consisting of] the 5th Destroyer Squadron as its core) in
the South China Sea was newly added to the current [tasks of providing] escorts along the
Makassar Strait front ([provided by] the 1st Escort Unit, [consisting of] the 4th Destroyer
Squadron), and in the Molucca Sea ([provided by] the 2d Escort Unit, [consisting of] the 2d
Destroyer Squadron). The second distinctive feature was that the escort of the Sakaguchi De-
tachment would be provided no farther than Balikpapan, and that the [forces for the can-
celled part of the escort] would be diverted to the escort of the 48th Division, and that the
Celebes front was extended from Kendari to Bali via Makassar. The phase-three disposition
of the Dutch East Indies Unit (ordered on 28 January) was supposed to be as follows after
the ongoing operation to seize Ambon (on 31 January):
Main Unit [consisting of] the 16th Cruiser Division (minus the Nagara, which left the heavy
cruiser Ashigara as its only component), one section of one destroyer division of the 4th De-
stroyer Squadron: Shall support the entire operation mainly in the eastern part of the Java
Sea, [sailing] from Davao, to the Makassar Strait and Surabaya.
1st Escort Unit [consisting of] the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron: Shall escort the 48th
Division from Lingayen Gulf to Surabaya.
2d Base Unit: Shall work in conjunction with the Sakaguchi Detachment’s [operation to] seize
Banjarmasin, [the operation of] the Eleventh Air Fleet to prepare the Banjarmasin air base,
and [the operation of] the 1st Base Force to seize Makassar. After that, it shall join the escort
of the 48th Division. 
2d Air Unit [consisting of] the 11th Seaplane Tender Division ([made up of] the seaplane tenders,
Chitose, and Mizuho): After cooperating in the seizure of Ambon and Makassar, it shall co-
operate with the 1st Escort Unit and the 2d Base Unit.
3d Escort Unit [consisting of] the 5th Destroyer Squadron (which was reinforced with one section
of the 6th Destroyer Division, and also with the light cruiser Yura, the 11th and the 12th De-
stroyer Division of the Malaya Unit): Shall escort the main force of the Sixteenth Army from
Gaoxiong to western Java.
1st Air Unit [with] the auxiliary seaplane tenders Kamikawa-maru and San’yō-maru: Shall coop-
erate with the 3d Escort Unit.
Eastern Support Unit [of the Dutch East Indies Unit, consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Division (minus
the Myōkō under repair in the mainland; namely, the heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi) and
one and a half destroyer divisions: Shall support the 2d Escort Unit and the 1st Base Unit.
2d Escort Unit [consisting of] the main force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron: Shall escort the East-
ern Detachment and [take part in] the operations to seize Kupang.
1st Base Unit [consisting of] the light cruiser Nagara and the 21st Destroyer Division, but rein-
forced with two destroyer divisions for [the operation to] seize Makassar [till its completion]
and (one destroyer division for Bali [till its completion]): Shall take part in the Makassar and
Bali invasion operations.
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Celebes Guard Unit
Ambon Guard Unit
The destroyers employed in the Dutch East Indies Unit were insufficient as already described,
and consisted of eight destroyer divisions, that is, the 8th, the 15th, and the 16th Destroyer
Divisions of the 2d Destroyer Squadron (note: the 18th Destroyer Division initially included
in the squadron was transferred to the Carrier Task Force), the 2d, the 9th and the 24th De-
stroyer Divisions of the 4th Destroyer Squadron (note: the 4th Destroyer Division initially
included in the squadron was transferred to the main force of the Southern Task Force, and
later to the carrier-based air units), the 5th and the 22d Destroyer Divisions of the 5th De-
stroyer Squadron. [Because of the insufficient strength,] it was decided to newly add the fol-
lowing four and a half destroyer divisions as reinforcements:
In [the order] issued on 21 January, the 21st Destroyer Division (with four destroyers) was
transferred from the main-force unit,(114) and participated in [the operations] to seize
Kendari and Makassar, and in the operation of the Kanemura Detachment to capture
Bali.
In [the order] issued on 28 January, the 7th Destroyer Division (with three destroyers) was
transferred from the Carrier Task Force (the First Air Fleet),(114) and participated in [the
operations] of the Eastern Detachment to seize Ambon and Timor.
In [the order] issued on 28 January, the 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division (with two
destroyers) was transferred from the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet),(114, 120) and joined
the escort of the main force of the Sixteenth Army, which headed from Cam Ranh Bay
to western Java.
In [the order] issued on 17 February (though it was informally decided at the Manila Con-
ference), the 11th Destroyer Division (with three destroyers) and the 12th Destroyer
Division (with one destroyer) were transferred from the Malaya Unit (the 3d Destroyer
Squadron)(120) and joined the escort of the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth
Army from Anambas southwards.
In this way, the number of destroyers to escort the convoy of the main force of the Six-
teenth Army, which [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura had been concerned about, was
increased from the eight destroyers of the 5th Destroyer Squadron ([consisting of] the 5th
and the 22d Destroyer Division) to fifteen destroyers.
3. [Army Commander Imamura’s] Orders to the 48th Division,
the Sakaguchi Detachment, and the Main Force of the Army 
After completing the arrangements with the Third Fleet, the Third Air Force, and the Eleventh
Air Fleet on 23 January, [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura, in Manila on the next day,
the 24th, gave the 48th Division the orders regarding the Java operations and returned to Tai-
wan on the same day.(32) On the next day, the 25th, in Gaoxiong, Army Commander [Ima-
mura] wired the Sakaguchi Detachment the order regarding [the operation to] seize
Banjarmasin.(22) On the day after the next day, the 27th, the leadership of the [Sixteenth] Army
made arrangements about the Java operation with the commander of the 5th Destroyer
Squadron in Gaoxiong.(120) After completing these arrangements, [Sixteenth] Army Com-
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mander Imamura passed down his order regarding the Java operation to the main force of
the army ([consisting of] the 2d Division, the Shōji Detachment, and others) in Gaoxiong on
30 January.(31) Then the army commander gave instructions about the assembly and embarka-
tion of the main force of the army and flew from Gaoxiong to Saigon on 3 February,(32) which
was the day before the date, the 4th, when the 38th Division was to start leaving Cam Ranh
Bay for the Bangka and Palembang operations (in the renewed schedule set at the Manila
Conference). On the 4th, the following day in Manila, the 48th Division commander made
arrangements for the Java operation with the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander, who had
sailed in from Balikpapan.(119)
[Army Commander Imamura’s] Orders to the 48th Division 
(See Illustration No. 21)
As previously mentioned, the army commander had given his orders to the 48th Division
on 24 January. In the afternoon two days before this (the 22d) in Manila, the [48th] Division
Commander Lieutenant General Tsuchihashi and his staff and commanding officers had pre-
sented themselves before Army Commander [Imamura.] [Commander Imamura] gave in-
structions and invited the commanding officers of the division in the evening, where he
thanked them for their service in the invasion of the Philippines over dinner, and requested
them to put up a good fight in the Java operation.(32) As previously described, Chief of Staff
Kawagoe and Staff Officer Akatsuka [of the 48th Division] had flown to Davao on the previ-
ous day (the 23d) to make arrangements about [the operation to] capture Bali with the
Eleventh Air Fleet, and they had returned on that day (the 24th).(80) Staff Officer Akatsuka
had previously (on 8 January) reported to the [Sixteenth] Army command post in Saigon by
order of Division Commander Tsuchihashi, but, due to the circumstances at that time, he had
returned with no particular instructions given.(80)
The order of the Sixteenth Army passed down on the 24th was roughly as follows:(31)
1. The transfer of command of the units currently in the Philippines and to be brought under the
control of the 48th Division shall take effect at the time of their departure from the ports in the
Philippines, and for the others at the time of their arrival at ports in the Philippines. However,
the division commander was given authority to give the necessary commands concerning prepa-
rations for operations to the former before the specified time.
2. [The 48th Division shall] embark at Lingayen during the period from 1 to 7 February and leave
the gulf about 8 February to advance to the anchorage at Jolo (Pata).
3. With the aim of advancing a naval air base, the division shall have an element ([consisting of]
about one infantry battalion and one mountain artillery section as its core) capture the Bali air-
field in conjunction with the Navy no later than day I – 2, and swiftly make it ready together
with the Navy air base ground crew.
4. The division shall come ashore in the areas south and north of Kragan before dawn on day I,
and have part of its force promptly secure the crossing point of the Solo River and the oil re-
sources in Cepu.
About the same time, the main force of the army shall land in western Java.
Day I is tentatively set on 23 February, and the exact date shall be announced later. Even if day
I should be delayed, [the division] shall leave Lingayen more or less as scheduled, stand by in
Jolo, and decide the time for leaving Jolo so that it shall be able to land in or near Kragan before
dawn on day I.
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5. Next, while destroying the enemy, the division shall promptly seize Surabaya, and at the same
time when a good opportunity arises, have a powerful element [of the division] dash toward
Cilacap to block the enemy’s retreat. After [successfully] seizing Surabaya, [the division] shall
promptly set up a landing base there.
6. After that, [the division] shall act in concert with the main force of the army and mop up [the
enemy] in eastern Java. During the action, it shall make efforts to prevent the destruction of the
existing resources and to secure airfields. 
The Arrangements of the 48th Division with the 4th Destroyer Squadron
The 4th Destroyer Squadron (under the command of R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji) originally
consisted of its flagship the Naka and the 2d, the 4th, the 9th, and the 24th Destroyer Division
(each of which was made up of four destroyers). When the commander escorted the Sak-
aguchi Detachment and was engaged in the Balikpapan landing operation on 24 January by
leading the Naka, the 24th Destroyer Division, the 9th Destroyer Division (minus the Yam-
agumo), the 2d Destroyer Division (minus the Murasame) as the 1st Escort Unit, he received
an order from the Dutch East Indies Unit on 29 January, and left Balikpapan on the 30th with
the Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division (with three destroyers) to hurry to Manila.(119) The
9th Destroyer Division and two destroyers of the 24th Destroyer Division would rejoin his
formation at Jolo after supporting the seizure of Makassar.(119) During this [operation], the
other two destroyers of the 24th Destroyer Division had been transferred to the main unit of
the Dutch East Indies Unit,(119) while the 4th Destroyer Division had remained part of the
main force of the Southern Task Force.(119) As soon as Rear Admiral Nishimura arrived in
Manila, 48th Division Commander Tsuchihashi immediately made arrangements with him
(on 4 February), which were in outline as follows:(119)
Summary of the Arrangements Between the 48th Division and the 4th Destroyer Squadron
1. Outline of action:
[The division] shall leave Lingayen Gulf on 8 February, arrive in Jolo on 12 or 13 February, from
where it shall depart on day I – 7, and enter the anchorage in Kragan on the night of day I – 1.
2. Tasks [to be discharged] at the assembly points:
7 February: arrangement of signal communications between the ships’ captains at Lingayen
Gulf
14 February: arrangements between the escort unit, the transport convoy and the ships’ captains
in Jolo.
3. Outline of the transport from Lingayen Gulf to Jolo: (omitted by the author)
4. Distribution of the convoy:
1st Section [consisting of] six ships: (1) the Yamagiku-maru, (2) the Kenkon-maru, (3) the Hague-
maru, (4) the Nankō-maru, (5) the Aden-maru (with Regimental Commander Imai on board),
and (6) the Kōnan-maru.
2d Section [consisting of] six ships: (21) the Johore-maru, (22) the Takaoka-maru, (23) the Holland-
maru, (24) the Hokkō-maru, (25) the Kyokusei-maru, and (26) the Taiei-maru [Daiei-maru].
3d Section [consisting of] six ships: (31) the Kenzan-maru, (32) the Himalaya-maru, (33) the Havre-
maru, (34) the Arizona-maru (with Division Commander Tsuchihashi on board), (35) the
Anzan-maru, and (36) the Chōkō-maru.
4th Section [consisting of] six ships: (41) the Nisshū-maru [Nichihide-maru], (42) the Biyō-maru,
(43) the Italy-maru, (44) the Asaka-maru, (45) the Kashū-maru, and (46) the Yoneyama-maru.
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5th Section [consisting of] six ships: (51) the Hakuroku-maru [Hakushika-maru], (52) the Teiyō-maru
(with Infantry Group Commander Abe on board), (53) the Hamburg-maru, (54) the Denmark-
maru, (55) the Arabia-maru, and (56) the Tokushima-maru.
6th Section [consisting of] six ships: (61) the Miyadono-maru, (62) the Jinsan-maru [Jinzan-maru],
(63) the Wales-maru, (64) the Suez-maru, (65) the Tamon-maru, and (66) the Yasukawa-maru.
7th Section [consisting of] three ships: (71) the Satsuma-maru, (72) the Minryō-maru, and (73) the
Hozugawa-maru.
Other than the above: (two ships) the Sagami-maru and the Sasako-maru.
Total (excluding the two ships above): thirty-nine ships
Note: The Sagami-maru and the Sasako-maru carrying the units for the surprise attack on Bali
shall join the main convoy at the Makassar Strait and sail along with it. The number
before the name of each ship indicates her number in each section [of the convoy].
5. Landing points and distribution of forces:
The Imai Unit ([consisting of] two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion, under
the command of Col. Imai Kazufumi, commander of the 1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment, as
its core) shall come ashore in sector (B) of Kragan. After landing, it shall advance to Sedan
and Mazeran.” (Note by the author: “Sedan” seems to be in the vicinity of the Serang River.
“Mazeran” is taken as Magelang. Whether the word “advance” above meant an advance in
a strict sense or not is unclear.) [Editor’s note: Sedan is actually located about ten kilometers
south-southwest of Kragan at the foot of Mount Lasem. “Mazeran” could not be identified.
It is unlikely to be Magelang, which is more than two hundred kilometers to the southwest
in central Java and was not reached by the Japanese forces until a week after the landings.
The author shows his doubts about the identification with Magelang by his remark on “ad-
vance in a strict sense.” However, “Mazeran” might be a corruption of “Semarang.”]
The Kitamura Unit (the 48th Reconnaissance Regiment under the command of Lt. Col. Kitamura
Kurō, commander of the regiment) shall [also] come ashore in sector (B) of Kragan. After
landing, it shall advance to Bojonegoro.
The Abe Unit ([consisting of] three infantry battalions, two tank squadrons, and two mountain
artillery battalions, under the command of Maj. Gen. Abe Kōichi, commander of the 48th
Infantry Group, as its core) shall come ashore in sector (A) of Kragan. After landing, it shall
advance into Ponjōru（Bulūjaku） (note by the author: these seem to be located several kilo-
meters south of Kragan). [Editor’s note: “Ponjōru” is almost certainly “Bancar,” and “Bulū-
jaku” is a corruption of “Bulujowo.” Both are located on the coast southeast of Kragan. See
also Illustration No. 63, p. 556.]
The Tanaka Unit ([consisting of] two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion,
under the command of Col. Tanaka Tōru, commander of the 2d Taiwan Infantry Regiment,
as its core) shall [also] come ashore in sector (A) of Kragan. After landing, it shall advance
to Cepu.
6. Landing date and time, and the schedule:
(1) Day I, the starting date of the landings, is [tentatively] scheduled for day x + 77 (23 February);
[the division] shall leave Jolo on day I – 7, anchor at 0100 on day I, and start the landing [op-
eration] at 0200 on the same day. However, if mines are found at the anchorage and need to
be removed, it may wait for the completion [of the minesweeping] before entering the an-
chorage.
(2) The landing shall be completed in five days. For the disembarkation of munitions, the an-
chorage shall be changed to the area east of Cape Bendo.
7. Outline of the escort:
(1) Sea route plan: as shown on separate sheet (omitted by the author).
(2) Navigation speed: eight knots normal speed.
(3) Direct escort shall be provided.
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Forces [to be employed for the escort] are:
One cruiser and four destroyers [for the route] between Lingayen and Jolo, however, three
submarine chasers and one minelayer shall be added as far as the Apo [Reef] Channel. And
one cruiser, nine destroyers, two minesweepers, six submarine chasers and one minelayer
shall be employed for [the route] between Jolo and Kragan. 
Note by the author: At the time of this arrangement (4 February), the 2d Destroyer Division,
(three destroyers of) the 9th Destroyer Division, one section (two destroyers) of the
24th Destroyer Division and two minesweepers of the 2d Base Force were to be em-
ployed as the destroyers and the minesweepers in the escort force. However, when the
operation was actually conducted, one destroyer of the 24th Destroyer Division was
removed and two minesweepers of the 2d Base Force were added instead.
(4) Formation to be adopted when sailing during an alert: (omitted by the author)
8. Entry into the anchorage, landing under combat conditions, and cover:
(1) The commander of the escort [unit] shall give the command to “get into formation to enter
the anchorage” at an appropriate moment before entering the anchorage. The formation is
as shown in the separate drawing (omitted by the author).
(2) Anchoring formation is as shown in the separate drawing (omitted by the author).
(3) Although the landing shall be made as a surprise landing in principle, it shall be expected
that it may be carried out by assault.
(4) Covering fire at the landing front by the Navy warships shall [only] be provided upon re-
quest of the division commander and the wing commanders. However, naval bombardments
of the area west of Cape Bendo (inclusive) and the area east of Cape Petokol (inclusive) shall
be provided at the discretion of the naval commander.
(5) Guarding in [and from] the sky shall be assigned to the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air
Fleet.
9. Actions of the transport ships after disembarkation:
(1) After completing the disembarkation, the transport ships shall return to the designated ports
under direct or indirect escort of the escort units.
(2) If possible, the escort unit may make a feint by leading transport ships on their return to the
vicinity of the mouth of the Kuto River (located eight nautical miles west of Cape Korowe-
lang). [Editor’s note: About thirty kilometers west of Semarang.]
10. Others:
Illustration No. 21—The Area of the 48th Division
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(1) By the time of departure from Jolo, the naval air unit shall prepare aerial photographs of the
vicinity of the landing points and send them to the 48th Division.
(2) The actions of the commanding officers after landing
The 48th Division commander shall land in area (A) in the 3d landing on day I, and position
himself in Kalipang (three kilometers southeast of Kragan).
The commander of the 1st Escort Unit shall be on board the Naka, and timely take action
near the anchorage [when necessary].
(3) A seaplane base shall be set up near the landing points by the seaplane tenders Chitose and
Mizuho of the Third Fleet.
(4) With the aim of removing [obstacles] from the Surabaya Strait [and securing the waterway
there], the stronghold on Madura Island shall be captured as swiftly as possible after the
seizure of Surabaya. For that purpose, the landing forces shall [start] from the vicinity of
Kragan or Tuban [and] go ashore on Madura Island by maneuvering along the coast using
boats. The minesweeping and cover necessary for this operation shall be separately arranged
with the naval units concerned.
(5) Signal communication and exchange of information (omitted by the author).
[Army Commander Imamura’s] Order to the Sakaguchi Detachment to
Seize Banjarmasin
As already described, [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura, who ordered the 48th Divi-
sion to capture eastern Java after the Manila Conference and returned to the army headquar-
ters in Gaoxiong on the 24th, simply gave the Sakaguchi Detachment the order to seize
Banjarmasin by 10 February on the 25th, when the Southern Army and the [Army Depart-
ment of] IGHQ were in the middle of exchanging telegrams, both of them feeling frustrated
and worried the whole time. The reasons have already been touched upon, but in detail they
were as follows:
1. The Southern Army thought that the Sakaguchi Detachment was in a difficult situation because,
firstly, the detachment, which started [the operation to] land in Balikpapan before daybreak on
the day before (the 24th), was reported to have four transport ships (the Tsuruga-maru, the Kure-
take-maru, the Sumanoura-maru and the Tatsugami-maru) sunk, and two transport ships (the Ku-
magawa-maru and the Asahisan-maru) and one patrol boat seriously damaged by several
destroyers of the allied forces which had devastated the anchorage in the middle [of the opera-
tion]; and secondly, [the Southern Army] judged it impossible for the Sakaguchi Detachment to
be ready to seize Banjarmasin by land and that it would be difficult to seize the place overland
before the Java landing [operation] due to the terrain and the distance. [The Southern Army]
also judged it difficult to seize [the place] even by sea before the Java landing [operation], be-
cause of the previously described situation at sea, and the fact that the cooperation of the Navy
could not be expected.(23)
2. In contrast to this, the Sixteenth Army and the Sakaguchi Detachment had no doubts at all be-
cause they had been ordered to seize Banjarmasin by the Southern Army’s order of 20 November
of the previous year.(40, 87) The detachment’s resourceful staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Yano,
had already worked out a plan to carry out surprise attacks both overland and by landing craft,
even if the Navy did provide an escort.(87) On receiving a telegram of the Sixteenth Army from
Manila (to the effect that cooperation from Navy warships could not be expected), the Sakaguchi
Detachment immediately informed the Sixteenth Army that it definitely reckoned on seizing
[Banjarmasin] both by land and by landing craft before 10 February; moreover, that the loss
[sustained due to] the sinking of the transport ships was no more than thirty-nine men, and that
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the operation to seize Balikpapan had progressed [so] favorably [that] its headquarters had [al-
ready] entered the city before dawn on the 25th.(87) Accordingly, on the night of the 25th as al-
ready described, the Sixteenth Army gave the Sakaguchi Detachment the order to seize
Banjarmasin and on the morning of the next day, the 26th, wired a copy of the order to the [Army
Department] of IGHQ and the Southern Army.(22) Both the Sixteenth Army and the Sakaguchi
Detachment never even dreamed that until the 28th, IGHQ and the Southern Army would have
a heated argument [about Banjarmasin].(40, 87)
The Arrangements of the Main Force of the Army with the 5th Destroyer 
Squadron (See Illustration No. 22)
Two days later, on the 27th, the Sixteenth Army, along with the 2d Division and the Shōji De-
tachment, made arrangements with the 5th Destroyer Squadron in Gaoxiong for the western
Java invasion operation.(120) The situation at that time was as follows:
Eastern Detachment: left Davao on that day (the 27th), with the intention to land in
Ambon on 31 January.(119)
Sakaguchi Detachment: was preparing for the [operation to] seize Banjarmasin after hav-
ing landed in Balikpapan on the 24th and completed mopping up [the enemy] on the
26th.(88)
38th Division: having arrived in Cam Ranh on the 24th, it was preparing for the Bangka
and Palembang operations and was scheduled to leave port on 4 February.(66)
48th Division: was in Manila waiting for the arrival of the 4th Destroyer Squadron com-
mander from Balikpapan following the army’s order of the 24th.(36)
2d Division: had been arriving in Gaoxiong one after another from the 21st onward, and
had completed its arrival the previous day, the 26th.(53)
Shōji Detachment: its convoy was scheduled to leave Hong Kong on the 29th and arrive
in Gaoxiong on the 31st. The detachment commander had flown in ahead on the
25th.(75)
5th Destroyer Squadron: its main force had arrived in Magong from Singora on 16 January
and the remainder on the 18th.(120)
1st Base Unit: had landed in Kendari with the support of the 5th Cruiser Division and the
2d Destroyer Squadron on the same day as the Sakaguchi Detachment [in Balikpapan]
(24 January), and was preparing for the operation to seize Makassar.(120)
The contents of the arrangements were roughly as follows:
A Summary of the Arrangements Between the Commanders of the Sixteenth Army, the 2d Divi-
sion, the Shōji Detachment, and the 5th Destroyer Squadron for the Western Java Landing op-
erations
1. Assembly point(s) and tasks [to be discharged] there:
(1) The transport ships shall arrive in Gaoxiong one after another by 5 February and then gather
in Cam Ranh Bay by 10 February according to the following schedule:
Eleven transport ships (under the escort of the Nagatsuki and the Minazuki) shall leave Gao -
xiong at 1000 on 1 February.
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Seventeen transport ships (under the escort of the Harukaze and the Hatakaze) shall leave
Gaoxiong at 1000 on 3 February.
Eighteen transport ships (under the escort of the Fumizuki and the Satsuki) shall leave Gao -
xiong at 1000 on 5 February.
Eight transport ships (under the escort of the Asakaze and the Matsukaze) shall leave Gao -
xiong at 1000 on 6 February.
Note by the author: the names within parentheses are of the destroyers belonging to the 5th
Destroyer Squadron.
(2) Tasks [to be discharged] at Cam Ranh Bay
11 February: Arrangements between the landing units within each sector, those between the
escort units within each area, those between the ship captains, and those for signal commu-
nications
12 February: Training of the army itself
2. Distribution of the Convoy:
1st Convoy: [consisting of] eight ships; the Kōyō-maru (with Infantry Group Commander Nasu
[on board]), the Nichiwa-maru, the Hokumei-maru, the Shinshū-maru, the Colombia-
maru, the Atlas-maru, the Ryūnan-maru, and the Genkai-maru.
2d Convoy: [consisting of] seven ships; the Akitsu-maru, the Momoyama-maru, the Pacific-maru,
the Kizan-maru, the Reiyō-maru (with the commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment,
Fukushima, [on board]), the Tsuyama-maru, and the Sydney-maru.
3d Convoy: [consisting of] thirty-two ships
1st Section: [consisting of] six ships; the Tatsuno-maru, the Haridono-maru [Somedono-maru?],
the Takesato-maru [Taketoyo-maru?], the Heian-maru, the Akagisan-maru, and the
Hōrai-maru.
2d Section: [consisting of] five ships; the Atsuta-maru (with Division Commander
Maruyama [on board]), the Ryūjō-maru (with Army Commander Imamura [on
board]), the Fushimi-maru, the Shinanogawa-maru, and the Ayatosan-maru.
3d Section: [consisting of] six ships; the Taizan-maru, the Dainichi-maru, the Hōeizan-maru,
the Tōsei-maru, the Taihei-maru, and the Genoa-maru.
4th Section: [consisting of] five ships; the Brazil-maru, the Tōfuku-maru, the Toyooka-maru, the
Mizuho-maru, and the Sakura-maru.
5th Section: [consisting of] five ships; the Maebashi-maru, the Tokiwa-maru, the Tempei-maru,
the Miikesan-maru, and one munitions ship.
6th Section: [consisting of] five ships; the Erii-maru, the Zuishō-maru, the Tōhō-maru [B], the
Gifu-maru, and one munitions ship.
4th Convoy: [consisting of] seven ships; the Daigen-maru No. 3 [Taigen-maru?], the Naples-maru,
the Calcutta-maru, the Glasgow-maru, the Suwa-maru (with Detachment Commander
Shōji [on board]), the Kōzan-maru, and the Yamazuki-maru [Yamatsuki-maru].
Fifty-four ships in total.
3. Landing points and distribution of forces:
Area No. 1
Sector A (south of Merak): the unit [consisting of] two infantry battalions and reconnaissance
regiment as its core, under the command of Maj. Gen. Nasu Yumio, the 2d Infantry
Group commander, which shall be [transported] in the first convoy (in eight ships).
Sector B (north of Merak): the unit [consisting of] two infantry battalions as its core, under
the command of Col. Fukushima Kyūsaku, the 4th Infantry Regiment commander,
which shall be [transported] in the second convoy (in seven ships).
Sector C (western part of Bantam Bay): the main force of the 2d Division and that of the unit
under the direct control of the Sixteenth Army, which shall be [transported] in the
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third convoy (in thirty-two ships). The transport shall be under the command of
Col. Satō Hanshichi, the 29th Infantry Regiment commander.
Area No. 2
The Patrol coast: the unit [consisting of] two infantry battalions as its core, under the com-
mand of Col. Shōji Toshishige, the 230th Infantry Regiment commander, which shall be
[transported] in the fourth convoy (in seven ships).
4. Date and time of the landings and the schedule:
(1) Day H, the starting date of the landings, is [tentatively] scheduled for day x + 75 (21 Febru-
ary). It shall be fixed by 1200 on day H – 9.
(2) Departure from Cam Ranh Bay shall be at 1000 on day H – 8.
(3) Scheduled time for anchoring is around 0000 on day H (for every area).
(4) Scheduled time to start landing is around 0200 on the same day ([landings] shall be launched
as soon as [the units] are ready).
(5) Landing schedule
Sectors A and B (Merak): about five days.
Sector C (Bantam Bay): about seven days. 
Area No. 2 (Patrol): about five days.
(6) Depending on circumstances, on day H + 2 and onwards, the units supposed to be put
ashore in Area No. 2 may be taken to Area No. 1 for debarkation. The implementation shall
be discussed and decided by the commanders of the Sixteenth Army and the 5th Destroyer
Squadron.
Note by the author: the 5th Destroyer Squadron considered it dangerous to carry out land-
ing [operations] in Patrol.
5. Outline of escort:
(1) Scheduled route: as shown in the separate drawing (omitted by the author)
(2) Navigation speed: eight knots normal speed
(3) Direct escort shall be provided. Forces [to be employed for the escort] consist of the Natori,
the Yura, sixteen destroyers, five minesweepers, and another ship, of which the Yura, six de-
stroyers, and five minesweepers shall join later. 
Note by the author: As for destroyers, the 5th and the 22d Destroyer Division of the 5th De-
stroyer Squadron participated from the beginning, the 6th Destroyer Di-
vision of the 1st Destroyer Squadron joined at Cam Ranh Bay, and the
11th and the 12th Destroyer Division of the 3d Destroyer Squadron
joined from Anambas.
(4) Formation to be adopted when sailing during an alert: as shown in the separate drawing
(omitted by the author).
6. Entry into the anchorage, landing under combat conditions, and cover:
(1) The commander of escort [unit] for [each landing sector] shall give the command to “get
into formation to enter the anchorage” at an appropriate moment before entering the an-
chorage. The formation is as shown in the separate drawing (omitted by the author).
(2) Anchoring formation is as shown in the separate drawing (omitted by the author).
(3) Although the landings shall be made as surprise landings in principle, they shall be carried
out by assault depending upon the situation.
(4) In Area No. 1, an element of the 1st landing unit shall raid and seize Merak Island and Pan-
jang Island.
(5) Covering fire at the landing front by the Navy warships shall [only] be provided upon re-
quest of the landing unit (detachment) commander of each landing sector.
7. Actions of the transport ships after debarkation and the succeeding transport ships:
(1) After completing the disembarkation, the transport ships shall return appropriately. In prin-
ciple indirect escort shall be provided on the way back; however, depending on the move-
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ments of the enemy, they might be escorted as far as the vicinity of the Karimata Strait (note
by the author: about 500 kilometers northwest of Batavia).
(2) The ships of the second transport ([consisting of] about twenty-five ships) for Area No.1
shall leave Cam Ranh Bay around day H + 14, and enter [the anchorage of] Bantam (or
Batavia) for debarkation around day H + 22 under the escort of the Navy.
8. Others:
(1) The actions of the commanding officers after landing
The Sixteenth Army commander: shall go ashore in Sector C before dawn on day H, and ad-
vance his command post to Serdang [editor’s note: “Sedan” in the Japanese text here is prob-
ably a corruption of “Serdang”].
The 2d Division commander: shall land along with the units of the second landing on day
H, and advance toward Serdang first.
The Shōji Detachment commander: shall land in or near Patrol along with the units of the
second landing on day H, and thereafter advance along the Batavia Highway.
The 5th Destroyer Squadron commander: shall directly escort the transport convoy. After
arriving in Sector C, he shall generally positioned himself on the waters outward of the sector
and adopt an appropriate guarding posture.
(2) Signal communications (omitted by the author)
(3) Exchange of information (omitted by the author)
In [making] this arrangement, the Navy again opposed [the idea of] separately putting the
Shōji Detachment ashore in Patrol out of concern about the escort.(44, 138) However, as this [plan]
had become fixed since the studies conducted at [the Army Department of] IGHQ before the
opening of hostilities, the Sixteenth Army did not listen to the Navy’s [advice].(44) The Navy
decided to leave fate to Heaven and agreed to it.(138) When [making] this arrangement, the
Navy side asked, “Which ship are you going to take, Commander?”(138) to which Army Com-
mander Imamura replied, “I will go aboard the Ryūjō.”(138) The Ryūjō-maru was a best ship
along with the Akitsu-maru. It was able to carry thirty to forty large-sized motorized [landing]
craft and more small-sized ones; it was also equipped with a deck to carry and launch aircraft,
and had a unique appearance.(94) The Navy tentatively suggested with a laugh: “We think it
better for you, Commander, to go on board the poorest ship because [the Ryūjō-maru] will
inevitably come under attack from the enemy once you enter the Java Sea.” However, [the
Navy] left it at that, presuming that he had intentionally chosen [it] for its convenience of com-
mand as well as to boost the morale [of his men].(138) [As a matter of fact,] this ship, the Ryūjō-
maru, was torpedoed in Bantam Bay, and the army commander ended up swimming in the
sea which was covered with fuel oil; however, this indeed boosted the morale of the army.
[Army Commander Imamura’s] Orders to the 2d Division and the 
Shōji Detachment
When Army Commander Imamura had given the order on the 25th to the Sakaguchi De-
tachment to seize Banjarmasin, he had also ordered the main force of the army to advance
its assembly point to Cam Ranh Bay, and on the 30th, as soon as the above-mentioned
arrangements with Rear Admiral Hara, the 3d Escort Unit commander (and the 5th Destroyer
Squadron commander) had been completed on the 27th, he gave the main force of the army
the following order concerning the Java invasion operation:(31)
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Sixteenth Army order
1. The army, in conjunction with the 5th Destroyer Squadron, shall have the units of the first trans-
port ([consisting of] the 2d Division (minus one artillery battalion) and the Shōji Detachment as
its core) leave Cam Ranh Bay on day H – 6, go ashore on western Java before dawn on day H,
and destroy the enemy to promptly seize Batavia first and then Bandung.
Day H indicates the first day of landing and the date shall be given later by an order.
About the same time, the 48th Division shall land in eastern Java, and promptly seize Surabaya
first. The Third Air Force and the air units under the command of the First Southern Expedi-
tionary Fleet shall closely and directly cooperate in the operations of the main force of the army.
The main force of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet shall be charged with the indirect escort
for the main force of the army.
2. The 2d Division shall promptly seize Batavia first in the following manner:
(1) Part of the army shall land in or near Merak and the main force near Bojonegara before dawn
on Day H, and they shall promptly advance to the Ciujung River line first.
(2) A powerful element of the army shall rush to Buitenzorg [Bogor] in order to divide the
enemy into those in the Batavia area and those in the Bandung area, to cut off their escape
and reinforcement routes, and to secure a foothold as far forward as possible for the army’s
subsequent seizure of Bandung.
(3) The main force of the division shall advance through the areas along the road between
Serang – Tangerang – Batavia towards Batavia and the area to its south, and promptly seize
them.
(4) [The division] shall give the air units as much support as possible in making the airfields
ready for use and in transporting fuel and ammunition.
3. The Shōji Detachment shall land in or near Patrol before dawn on day H, promptly seize and
secure the Kalijati airfield, and also gain control of the crossing point over the Citarum River in
order to divide the enemy in the Bandung and the Batavia areas, and to cut off their escape and
reinforcement routes. Depending on the situation, the detachment shall have one element pre-
pare for participating in seizing Batavia. The air units shall be provided with as much support
as possible in making the airfields ready for use; moreover, the detachment shall also be respon-
sible for arranging their quarters, supplies, guarding, etc.
Illustration No. 22—The Area of the Main Force of the Army
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The Army’s Plan and Conduct of the Operation
The enemy position on Java as far as it was known to IGHQ before the opening of hostilities
has already been described. Since then, the Sakaguchi Detachment, which had landed in
Tarakan on 11 January, had reported in mid-January, as information obtained from prisoners,
the following deployment of the Dutch East Indies Army:(24)
In Java, one division had been deployed in each of the eastern and western parts, and later an
additional division was established in central Java. The army commander was Lieutenant Gen-
eral Ter Poorten, who was positioned in Bandung. In eastern Java, a unit [consisting] of three
infantry battalions as its core was stationed in Malang and another [consisting] of one infantry
battalion as its core in Surabaya. In central Java, a unit [consisting] of three infantry battalions
as its core was stationed in Magelang, and one [consisting] of one infantry battalion as its core
in Surakarta and Cilacap. In western Java, a unit [consisting] of three infantry battalions as its
core was stationed in Bandung and another [consisting] of three infantry battalions as its core
in Batavia.
Since before the opening of hostilities the Government-General in Batavia had reportedly
been moving to Bandung one [department] after another. It was only natural to expect that
the allied forces would put up strong resistance by taking advantage of the pillbox positions
set on the steep mountainsides surrounding the four fronts of Bandung, turning the Bandung
stronghold into a bastion. However, it was unlikely that from the outset they would abandon
Batavia, which was the capital and the center of politics, the economy, communications, trans-
port, etc., and which, on top of that, had the good harbor of Tanjung Priok. 
What made it even more unlikely that the allied forces would abandon Batavia from the
outset, but on the contrary might be expected to launch aggressive counterattacks near
Tangerang, was the consideration that reportedly there were a considerable number of pillbox
positions around the perimeter of Batavia, especially in the west and northwest of Tangerang,
and also waterside obstacles and defense facilities all along the north coast, and that accord-
ing to successive reports after the opening of hostilities, the Dutch East Indies Army had
been further enlisting troops, that the British Indian Army in Malaya was being reinforced
and so was the Australian Army in the Dutch East Indies, that the forces repelled from the
Philippines and Malaya had been gathering in Java, and that the reinforcements intended
for Malaya had been redirected to Java. As previously described, when Army Commander
Imamura advanced to Saigon in early January, he revised the operation plan which had been
drawn up in Tokyo in early mid-December. Even in late January the plan remained un-
changed. If anything, he had become rather more cautious than in early January. [After all,]
the Sakaguchi Detachment had sustained the loss of four transport ships and serious damage
to two ships in Balikpapan, which was merely an advance base of the allied forces. The South-
ern Army, on the other hand, insisted that the departure of the convoy for the Java invasion
should be synchronized with the occupation of air bases in Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes,
and that the air operation should be launched at the same time as the departure of the convoy.
However, only a couple of destroyers of the U.S., British and Dutch fleets had been sunk
other than the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Although the number of the destroyers to escort
the large convoy of fifty-four ships was increased from eight to sixteen (in reality, fifteen) at
his request, he was worried about how many ships of the convoy would be able to arrive in-
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tact. After due consideration of these matters, the army commander set the initial mission of
the 2d Division. His idea was that [the division] should first seize Batavia, and then the Ban-
dung stronghold, but to [decide later] how to carry it out depending on the subsequent sit-
uation.(36)
Army Commander Imamura was the most concerned about the Shōji Detachment. First
of all, for various reasons, in particular those related to the distribution of forces among the
Shōji Detachment, the main force of the 38th Division, and the Eastern Detachment, he had
been forced to limit the strength of the Shōji Detachment to only two battalions as its core.
Secondly, both the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit and the 5th Destroyer Squadron objected
to the landing point due to its riskiness. Thirdly, the Kalijati airfield, which the detachment
was to seize, was also of great importance to the allied forces and, what is more, it was very
close to the Bandung stronghold (in the vicinity of which the main division of the Dutch East
Indies Army should be expected). Moreover, it was also close to Cilacap, where British and
Australian reinforcements were expected to land. [The detachment] was definitely short of
strength. [However,] Chief of Staff Okazaki set his eyes on Lt. Col. Ōno Takeo, commander
of the 2d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion, whose companies had been separately as-
signed to other corps in different areas.(36) He right away assigned the latter to the Shōji De-
tachment, and put him in charge of the command at the landing point (note: the
disembarkation of the detachment was scheduled to take five days), so that Detachment
Commander Shōji would be able to rush toward Kalijati and the bridge over the Citarum
River, free of worry about his rear.(36) As the operations of the Shōji Detachment were not
only highly risky but also closely and inseparably linked to the operations of the 2d Division,
Army Commander Imamura decided to specially assign his Assistant Operations Staff Officer
(Maj.) Yamashita Yutaka to the Shōji Detachment.(36) Prior to this (when he attended the
Manila Conference and assigned the 48th Division its mission), Army Commander Imamura
had assigned Intelligence Staff Officer Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori, and Line-of-Communication
Staff Officer Maj. Nishiura Setsuzō to the 48th Division.(36)
The Situation of the 2d Division
The 2d Division had left Ujina during the period from 15 to 23 January, and arrived in Gao -
xiong from 21 to 26 January. After it had concluded arrangements with the 5th Destroyer
Squadron on the 27th, and received the order of the army on the 30th, it left Gaoxiong for
Cam Ranh Bay during the period from 1 to 6 February. We may illustrate the movements of
the division from its time in the Japanese mainland onwards by citing the following records
of the 3d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment, which boarded the Tokiwa-maru:(60)
16 – 21 September 1941: Landing training of the 4th Infantry Regiment on the coast of Ishino-
maki 
9 October: Given the order of mobilization
16 October: The first day of the mobilization
29 October: Completion of the mobilization
4 November onwards: Joint training with transport ships near Matsushima
17 December: Arrival of the regiment at the barracks at the foot of Mt. Fuji
12 January 1942: Departure from Gotemba
13 January: Arrival in Hiroshima
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15 January: Embarkation of the main force of the regiment and lessons in the Indonesian lan-
guage
18 January: Finished loading the Tokiwa-maru (with a mixed shipment of the main force of the
3d Battalion, one transport platoon, half a sick horse depot, and one bridge building material
platoon), and departure from Ujina to assemble in Shimonoseki
21 January at 1000: Departure from Shimonoseki for Magong (?). We were told that we would
arrive around the 27th. We were also told that [the ship] would call at Magong (?) for a few
days, and that it would take about two weeks to sail to the Dutch East Indies. 
22 January: Naval aircraft came flying over twice; the course followed the line of the Gotō Is-
lands – the Dan’jo Archipelago – Magong.
26 January: Entry into the port of Magong
28 January: It was decided that we would “leave the current place at 0700 on the 31st and call
at Gaoxiong.” We were told that as a divisional reserve battalion, we would be in charge of
the disembarkation of some two thousand and several hundred cases of military supplies
at the time of landing.
29 January: Water filters were distributed.
30 January: It was decided that we would leave Magong the next morning and advance to
Gaoxiong; the final landing place shall be decided in Gaoxiong.
31 January: Departure from Magong at 0700; arrival in the port of Gaoxiong at 1600
1 February: In order to receive the divisional orders, only the commander went ashore in
Gaoxiong and learned the plan for the landing in Java.
2 February: We were told that the landing at the northwest tip of Java was scheduled for the
23d of the month. We were also told that [due to the schedule], [the ship] would call at Cam
Ranh Bay and depart from there on the 15th.
3 February: From today or tomorrow, bombing raids on Java and Australia are supposed to
start. [The ship] came alongside the quay at Gaoxiong. The officers and men were sent ashore
to bathe for the first time since Hiroshima. We should depart on the 5th.
4 February: An ordnance unit, an army signal unit, a tank unit, an independent engineer unit,
an antiaircraft artillery unit, and others were additionally loaded onto the Tokiwa-maru.
5 February: Departure from Gaoxiong for Cam Ranh Bay at 1000 under direct escort of the
Navy
From 15 January onwards, the officers and men of this battalion sailed for forty-five days on
dangerous waters far beyond the equator, packed in the small space of a ship without bathing.
Confusion at the Port of Gaoxiong
What can be observed based on the above-related movements of the Tokiwa-maru is that on
the basis of the Cam Ranh Agreement of 1 January, she and the other ships hastily left Shimo -
noseki; that according to the plan at that time she was supposed to head [straight] for Java
with a stop at Magong only for a supply of coal and water, but that the Manila Agreement,
which became officially effective on 28 January, gave five extra days to spare, so she changed
her route from Magong to also call at Gaoxiong; but that there she ended up being crammed
with many more fighting units.
As already mentioned, bringing forward the Java operation necessitated an increase in
shipping tonnage of about 300,000 tons. But as the Southern Army understood the predica-
ment of the [Army Department] of IGHQ, it requested an increase of only 150,000 tons. Be-
cause the [Army Department of] IGHQ did not even approve this increase of 150,000 tons,(24)
the Southern Army had to make do [with what it had] and drew up a plan for the period
from 16 January onwards based on the following shipping volume:(24)
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First transport: 130,000 tons for the 38th Division
210,000 tons for the 48th Division
220,000 tons for the main force of the army
Subtotal: 560,000 tons 
Second transport: 150,000 tons
Third transport: 100,000 tons
Total 810,000 tons
Because of the unexpected advance of the operation schedule, the movements and the car-
goes of ships hurriedly coming from the Japanese mainland, Manchuria, Korea and China
varied from ship to ship. Because the absolute number of ships was too small, and because
they had to be loaded in a way to meet [the requirements] of the operation plan, some units
had to disembark to be transported later and even units in the first transport had to be
switched to other ships. The port of Gaoxiong was in chaos. [Chief] Shipping Officer Sendō
of the Sixteenth Army described the situation at that time as follows:(44)
At the assembly point in Gaoxiong, I was swamped by a dizzying amount of all kinds of tasks:
taking control of units unexpectedly arriving from all areas without notice, sorting them by area
and arranging transportation for them, replenishing a huge number of ships with coal and water,
the distribution of landing craft, loading war matériel, changing the ships of the units, and so
on. In addition, the cramped wharf was so overflowing with departing, incoming and waiting
ships that the anchorage was extended as far as the exposed open sea. Moreover, due to the
[limited] tonnage, a considerable quantity of forces, equipment and matériel of the units in the
first transport had to be left behind at the assembly point. It remains a painful memory of that
time that instead of sympathizing with the feelings of those who were not able to join the glo-
rious front line after having left for the war in high spirits, or imagining the feelings of the unit
commanders who left while leaving behind even their weapons and matériel, which they re-
garded as indispensable for accomplishing their tasks, and the men in charge of this equipment,
I steeled myself against taking pity in order to persuade [the commanders] that considering the
characteristics of the operations of our army, they should be firmly determined to accomplish
their tasks without regret, even if their forces were decimated on the sea.
Similar problems also occurred in Lingayen Gulf. No matter what, the Japanese were short
of ships. According to the transportation plan sent to the 48th Division from the Southern
Army ([to be precise,] the Saigon command post of the Shipping Transport Command) in
mid-January, the 48th Division was divided into three transports:
(See the previously described plan of the Southern Army of 16 January.)
First transport: Division headquarters, two infantry regiments, two mountain artillery battalions,
one engineer regiment, one bridge building material company, and one transport
company.
Second transport: The other fighting units of the 48th Division, and the 4th Tank Regiment and the
units of the 17th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment.
Third transport: The other units.
That is to say, it would take three months to complete all the transportation.(80) Chief of Staff
Kawagoe [of the 48th Division] ordered his staff members: “Though we [calculated accom-
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modation] on the basis of seven people per 3.3 square meters in the Philippines invasion op-
eration, try and make a plan this time on a basis of ten people [per 3.3 square-meters].”(80)
The plan was completed the next morning. When he reported it to Division Commander
Tsuchi hashi, the latter ordered: “Re-plan it so that all the fighting units will be transported
in the first transport.”(80) Although Chief of Staff Kawagoe and his staff reviewed it for three
days and nights,(80) the tonnage was still insufficient. Calculation on a basis of fifteen people
per 3.3 square meters did not work, either. Lying in his bed, feeling that he had exhausted
every possible means, Chief of Staff Kawagoe looked at the entire ship allocation plan of the
Southern Army.(80) By chance he noticed that about fifteen ships were to call at Gaoxiong from
Dalian, Dagu and Shanghai with bridge building material companies, field hospitals and
others on board. He immediately roused all staff members from their beds, and ordered them
to work out [a new calculation] on the assumption that these ships would be emptied in Gao -
xiong and moved to Lingayen Gulf. The next morning, it turned out that the rear units of
the division, the 4th Tank Regiment, and the units of the 17th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment
would be able to go on board, not to mention the fighting units of the division. Maj. Tanabe
Masaki, chief staff officer for the line of communication with the rear, was immediately sent
to the branch office of the Shipping Transport Command to make arrangements to cancel the
assignment of the previously mentioned units from the Kwantung Army and the China Ex-
peditionary Army to the division, disembark them at Gaoxiong, and have the empty ships
hurry from Gaoxiong to Lingayen. This proposal was approved by the Southern Army (the
command post of the Shipping Transport Command), which enabled Division Commander
Tsuchihashi to go ashore in Java with all the fighting units he had in the Philippines. On the
other hand, however, the units forced to disembark at Gaoxiong were not able to participate
in the Java operation after all and cursed their luck.(80)
Note: The required tonnage of “three tons per person and nine tons per horse” was the standard
in the China operations for military transport ships (cargo ships), and in principle, freight
belonging to the units was not specifically included in the count and loaded in vacant spaces.
Three tons per person was equivalent to three people per 3.3 square meters. As the southern
operation would take place in a tropical region, it was considered [preferable] that more
space be allocated than in the case of the above-mentioned China operations. This standard
of “three tons per person (three people per 3.3 square meters)” was a calculation based on
the premise that double or triple bunks could be used.(148)
Especially, I would like to add that the military horses of the 2d Division, mainly bred in
Hokkaidō, sailed southward beyond the equator without being allowed to “disembark for
bathing,” unlike the people [on board]. Whether they would endure sailing in the tropical
zone was a matter of great concern. However, the result came as a surprise. The officers and
men from the Tōhoku district were solid, familiar with handling horses, and they really
loved horses. During the sailing, [even] the officers voluntarily took the initiative to live in
the horse stalls at the bottom of the ships and treated them with tender care day and night.
Out of more than 1,000 military horses, only three succumbed during the sailing.(94)
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The Army Commander Changes his Departure Date from Gaoxiong
After concluding the arrangements with the 5th Destroyer Squadron on the 27th, Army Com-
mander Imamura paid a visit to the Taiwan Army headquarters and the Government-General
of Taiwan in Taipei with Chief of Staff Okazaki on the 28th to express his appreciation and
asked them to look after affairs while he was away. The next morning, he returned to Gaox-
iong by train, and gave orders to the 2d Division and others on the 30th as already de-
scribed,(32) which put an end to the main administrative work he had to do in Gao xiong. In
Cam Ranh Bay, the 38th Division was supposed to make arrangements with the Malaya Unit
(the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet) on the next day, the 31st, with the 3d Destroyer
Squadron and the 9th Base Force on the day after next, 1 February, and leave for Bangka and
Palembang on the evening of the 4th.(118) (Before the Manila Conference, it was supposed to
leave Cam Ranh Bay on 31 January.) While concerned about the 38th Division in Cam Ranh
Bay, Army Commander Imamura had planned to leave Gaoxiong by aircraft on 1 February,
after observing in person the arrival of the convoy of the Shōji Detachment (from Hong Kong;
though the detachment commander had already flown ahead to Gaoxiong on the 25th) and
the arrival of part of the convoy of the 2d Division (from Magong), both expected to arrive
in Gaoxiong on the 31st, the passing down of orders to the 2d Division and to the Shōji De-
tachment, and the change of ships of men and freight. However, there was a pile of problems
in Gaoxiong. Amid the chaos in Gaoxiong, which has been described, the commanders of
the units, who were ordered to disembark and remain in Gaoxiong, pestered the shipping
staff, insisting that their men would not be convinced unless they were brought back in the
first transport unit, or they would be too ashamed to face [people] at home. Also, he [Ima-
mura] thought it necessary to give all possible instructions to the Shōji Detachment, which
was going to put its head into the lion’s mouth, so to speak. Originally, when Army Com-
mander Imamura was still an officer attached to a company of the 4th Sendai Infantry Reg-
iment, Colonel Shōji had joined the company as a probationary officer, and was directly
trained by him. Then, when Army Commander Imamura graduated from the War College
and returned as a company commander of the regiment, Shōji served as a senior officer of
the company. Furthermore, when Army Commander Imamura was the commander of the
Twenty-third Army, Shōji served as the regimental commander of a division under the control
of the army. Only a few companies in infantry regiments had a probationary officer (1 person)
assigned to it, and the officers who trained probationary officers and the latter were usually
bound by deep comradeship. Apart from the relationship from the time when Shōji was a
probationary officer, Army Commander Imamura and Colonel Shōji also had the other con-
nections mentioned above.
Army Commander Imamura had asked Lt. Gen. Sano Tadayoshi, commander of the 38th
Division, to specifically appoint Colonel Shōji as commander of the unit to seize Kalijati. It
was partly because the regiment under the command of Colonel Shōji, who was trained in
the 4th Infantry Regiment of the 2d Division, would be the most suitable for the joint oper-
ations with the 2d Division. However, the main reason was that he expected that with Colonel
Shōji as the commander of the detachment, which not only had to cope with difficult circum-
stances but also conduct its operations in close and inseparable connection with the main
force of the army, he would have a detachment commander who would be of one mind with
him as army commander and that even if he was unable to communicate with [the detach-
ment] as he wished, [Shōji] would take the appropriate actions.
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Because of all the many problems [listed] above, the army commander decided for the
time being to postpone his departure, which was scheduled for the 31st.(32) On that day, the
army commander learned that the Eastern Detachment had successfully landed in Ambon
that morning, which left Bangka, Palembang, Banjarmasin Bali, and Kupang [as places to be
seized]. On the next day, 1 February, the first convoy left Gaoxiong.(120) The second, the third
and the fourth (the last) convoys were scheduled to leave Gaoxiong for Cam Ranh on the 3d,
the 5th, and the 6th respectively.(120) The army commander had continuously been directing
various units, but receiving a telegram on the next day, the 2d, which will be described later,
he left Gaoxiong for Cam Ranh Bay on the 3d, parting from 2d Division Commander
Maruyama, 1st Disembarkation Group Commander Itō Shinobu, and Detachment Com-
mander Shōji. He stayed in Sanya that night for aircraft availability reasons.(32)
4. The Southern Sumatra Invasion Operation
The Issue of a Second Postponement of Operation L Arises
Army Commander Imamura had put off his departure from Gaoxiong scheduled for 31 Jan-
uary because of the postponement of the invasion schedule (a decision made on 28 January)
and the actual situation at Gaoxiong. Then on 2 February he received a telegram from the
Malaya Unit (the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet) requesting “a postponement of the op-
erations against Bangka and Palembang.”(33) Considering that “this is a serious matter which
may affect the schedule of the landing operation in Java,”(33) [the commander] hastily left
Gaoxiong on the following day, the 3d, and flew to Sanya on Hainan Island on the same
day.(32) As previously described, the 38th Division (which had left Hong Kong on 20 January
and arrived in Cam Ranh on the 24th) had postponed its departure scheduled for 31 January
till 4 February as a result of the official conclusion of the Manila Agreement on 28 January
and was about to leave Cam Ranh on the evening of 4 February to head for Bangka and
Palembang.
Chief of Staff Okazaki, Senior Staff Officers Takashima and Kitamura, Staff Officer Oda
and others accompanied Army Commander Imamura, while Staff Officers Kuriya and
Nishiura, and Staff Officer Yamashita had been attached to the 48th Division and the Shōji
Detachment respectively. Vice Chief of Staff Harada, Staff Officer Sendō and others remained
in Gaoxiong to take care of remaining affairs. Earlier, as soon as the outline of the Mersing
landing operation had been changed on 19 January (in such a way that the landing operation
of the main force of the 18th Division was called off, and that air unit(s) and their matériel
were to be put ashore in Endau on the 26th in two transport ships instead), and the arrange-
ments between the [Navy] Malaya Unit and the [Army] Third Air Force had been concluded
on the same day based on the [new] outline, [Chief Aviation] Staff Itoda, who had been left
in Sagion, had returned to Gaoxiong on the same day (the 19th) to report on the situation.(32)
Then he had immediately flown back again to French Indochina, working busily between
the Southern Army, the Third Air Force and the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group in an effort
to realize the Palembang paradrop operation.(39) By around 22 January, the Southern Army
had abandoned the idea of dropping the [paratroop] raiding unit at Palembang for three rea-
sons: the fact that the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment had been shipwrecked, the 2d [Para-
troop] Raiding Regiment’s insufficient level of training and the delay of its departure from
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the [Japanese] homeland, and the moving up of the operation schedule. Nonetheless, Staff
Officer Itoda zealously persuaded all parties, and by the 25th had convinced them to imple-
ment the parachute raid.(24, 39) After that, he stayed on in Saigon to proceed with the prepara-
tion of the specifics of the Palembang paratroop operation.(39) In addition, the Sixteenth Army
had also dispatched Staff Officer Saiki to French Indochina in order to prepare for the Bangka
and Palembang operations.(34) He had left Taiwan on 23 January and arrived in Saigon on the
25th, where at the Southern Army headquarters he learned about the [decision in] the Manila
Agreement to change the schedule (the departure of the 38th Division from Saigon, which
had been set on 31 January in the Cam Ranh Agreement, was changed to 4 February in the
Manila Agreement). Arriving in Cam Ranh Bay on the 27th, he visited 38th Division Com-
mander Sano on board the Gin’yō-maru to pay his respects and then headed for the Chōkai,
the flagship of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief, Vice Admiral
Ozawa. There, along with Staff Officer Itoda he took part in making preliminary arrange-
ments for the Bangka and Palembang operations between the Sixteenth Army, the [Navy]
Malaya Unit (the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet) and the Third Air Force, and returned
to Saigon on the 28th. On the 31st, he once again left Saigon for Cam Ranh Bay, this time
along with Southern Army Staff Officers Arao and Matsumae, and Sixteenth Army Staff Of-
ficer Itoda, to complete the “Arrangements for the air [operations] of the Bangka and Palem-
bang operations between the Sixteenth Army, the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and
the Third Air Force” on board the Chōkai, the flagship of the Malaya Unit, with all parties
concerned. Then he attended the conclusion of the “Arrangements for the Bangka and Palem-
bang operations between the 38th Division and the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet,” and
returned to Saigon on the next day, 1 February. While dealing with these, he [also] worked
on, among other things, accommodating the 38th Division’s request for an increase in the
number of small cargo ships.(34)
While such was the situation at Cam Ranh Bay, the [Sixteenth] Army commander and his
group arrived in Sanya on Hainan Island on the 3d, and then, via the Nha Trang airfield in
French Indochina, reached Cam Ranh Bay at 1230 on the 4th. They were met by 38th Division
Commander Sano, and paid a visit to [Navy] Commander in Chief Ozawa.(32, 33) The [Navy]
commander in chief and his officers requested Army Commander Imamura that “due to the
current condition of the Ledo airfield and other [matters], it is not possible to let the 38th Di-
vision start from Cam Ranh Bay tonight. I would like you to agree to postpone the schedule
for at least two days.”(36) Earlier on that day (the 4th), [Sixteenth] Staff Officer Saiki in Saigon
had already sent a military classified telegram to [the army commander arriving in] Cam
Ranh, signaling the intention of the Southern Army that “it would definitely not agree to a
change of schedule.”(34) Nevertheless, the army commander and his officers shared the feeling
that the request of the [Navy] Malaya Unit was inevitable under the circumstances.(36, 39) In
the evening, the army commander and his group arrived from Cam Ranh in Saigon, where
four of them, i.e. Senior Staff Officers Takashima and Kitamura, Staff Officer Oda and Navy
Staff Officer Wakatsuki (staff officer of the Third Fleet seconded to the Sixteenth Army) went
straight to the Southern Army Staff Office to make a “request for consent to a postponement
of the schedule.”(23) The Southern Army staff turned red with anger as they saw “the Sixteenth
Army coming in a body, having sided with the Malaya Unit.”(23) Once again a heated ex-
change concerning the issue of a postponement of the schedule started.(23)
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(1) Preparations for the Southern Sumatra Invasion Operation
To what extent had the preparations for the Southern Sumatra invasion operation been mak-
ing progress by this time?
We have already related that as soon as the Cam Ranh Agreement to move up the Java
operation had formally become effective (on 1 January), the Southern Army had ordered the
Sixteenth Army on 5 January “to prepare for [the operation] to capture Java as well as to
carry out [the operations] to seize Bangka, Palembang, Ambon and Kupang,” that as soon
as the formal arrangement with the Malaya Unit had been concluded on 15 January, [Six-
teenth] Army Commander Imamura had given orders to the 38th Division commander on
18 January in Hong Kong to carry out the Bangka and Palembang operations; that the 38th
Division had departed from Hong Kong on 20 January and advanced to Cam Ranh Bay on
the 24th, but that its departure from Cam Ranh Bay scheduled for the 31st had been post-
poned to 4 February according to the [decisions] made at the Manila Conference which had
been held in the meantime; and that just before the Manila Conference, the change in the
outline of the Mersing landing operation, the delay in the Kawaguchi Detachment’s [opera-
tion to] seize the Ledo [airfields], and the regrettable shipwreck of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding
Group had occurred.
Start of the Southern Sumatra Operation of the Third Air Force
While assisting the Twenty-fifth Army with its operations in Malaya, the Third Air Force had
already started preparations for the coming Sumatra operation as early as mid-December.
To be concrete, it had had the 81st Air Group reconnoiter the Medan airfield since 11 Decem-
ber, and the airfields of Pekanbaru, Palembang and Mentok since the 17th, while having the
7th Air Division investigate the general situation of [the enemy] air [forces and fields] in
Northern Sumatra. [Further,] from the beginning of January, it had the 81st Air Group to con-
tinuously watch the Medan and Pekanbaru airfields, while having an element advance and
attack these airfields in the following way:(96)
28 December: The 3d Air Division ([consisting of] the 59th and the 75th Air Groups, from
the Sungai Petani base) attacked the Medan airfield with twenty-five aircraft (seven
fighter planes and eighteen light bombers), and blew up or set fire to four aircraft on
the ground, hangar(s) and powder magazine(s).
16 January: The 3d Air Division ([consisting of] the 59th, the 75th and the 90th Air Group,
from the Sungai Petani and Ipoh bases) attacked the Medan airfield with its main force,
set fire to one aircraft on the ground and blew up the runway.
17 January: The 7th Air Division ([consisting of] the 64th and the 12th Air Groups, from
the Alor Setar and Ipoh bases) attacked the Pekanbaru airfield with forty-one aircraft
(nine fighter planes and thirty-two heavy bombers), set fire to five aircraft on the
ground and warehouse(s), and blew up seven aircraft and the runway.
23 January: The 7th Air Division ([consisting of] the 98th Air Group, from the Ketil base)
attacked the Palembang airfield with its twenty-seven aircraft (heavy bombers), set
fire to one aircraft on the ground, fought against fifteen enemy aircraft which came to
intercept, and shot down five of them. Our loss was fourteen aircraft moderately or
slightly damaged.
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The Situation in Late January
The British Indian Army in Malaya, in expectation of reinforcements being sent in, was seen
to put up resistance by taking up successive in-depth positions over a very long distance. In
particular, in early and mid-December it put up resistance by taking up strong positions in
the Jitra line sector, and from late December to early January in the sector south of the Perak
River (the Kampar and Slim sectors), during which time it also strengthened [the defense of]
the whole sector of Gemas, Bakri and their vicinities in the south of the peninsula.(23) In mid-
January, the Twenty-fifth Army, while getting one after another reports such as “on 15 Janu-
ary, a battleship carrying 1,600 men arrived in Singapore; on 16 January more reinforcements
arrived; fifty pursuit aircraft and B–17 bombers arrived [as well],” had carried out attacks
on the strong [enemy] positions in the vicinities of Gemas and Bakri with the Imperial Guard
Division and the 5th Division.(23) Around that time the 18th Division had been on standby at
Cam Ranh Bay since 10 January for the landing operation near Endau and Mersing.(23) The
5th Division had seized the strong position near Gemas [in an engagement] from around the
14th until the 19th,(23) and the Imperial Guard Division those near Bakri [in an engagement]
from around the 18th until the 22d.(23) In the meantime, on the 15th, acting on reports that
“enemy battleships and an aircraft carrier [had been] spotted at Singapore,” the [Navy]
Malaya Unit had departed from Cam Ranh Bay and headed south, which, on the 17th, had
resulted in the decision to change the outline of the Endau and Mersing landing operations.
The Southern Army had ordered this [change] on the 19th, and the 18th Division left Cam
Ranh Bay on the 20th, arrived at Singora on the 22d, and started the landing [operation].(23,
118) As the information concerning the battleships and an aircraft carrier in Singapore had
proved false, the main unit of the [Navy] Malaya Unit had returned to Cam Ranh Bay on the
19th.(103) The Third Air Force, while successively advancing its air bases, had continued its
battle to destroy the enemy air power in conjunction with the naval air units of the Malaya
Unit, and also assisted the Twenty-fifth Army in its ground operations.(23) Command of the
air above the battlefronts and their vicinities was largely in Japanese hands.(23) Nevertheless,
the British Air Force still possessed about 150 to 160 aircraft and kept carrying out guerilla-
like attacks against our air bases from its base in Singapore.(23) The Twenty-fifth Army’s op-
eration became a high-speed pursuit battle after it had destroyed the British Indian Army
near Gemas and Bakri.(23) The 5th Division, which had advanced to Labis on the 21st, to Yong
Peng on the 24th, and to Kluang on the 25th, [finally] made a long-awaited charge into Johor
Bahru at 1530 on the 31st.(23) The Imperial Guard Division advanced to Batu Pahat on the
25th, and to the Strait of Johor line on the 31st.(23) As for the [Navy] Malaya Unit, after calling
off the mid-January operation to lure out the battleships and the carrier [believed to be] in
Singapore (both of which turned out to be false reports), it provided escort for the transport
of the 18th Division between Cam Ranh Bay and Singora from 20 to 22 January, and from
the 24th onwards, [the unit] shifted [its operation] to provide escort for the disembarkation
operation at Endau (in which [the ground units of] the air units and their matériel transported
in two ships were disembarked instead of the cancelled landing operation of 18th Division)
and [subsequently] to occupy the Anambas base, both of which were realized on the 26th.(23,
118, 126) With the advance of the Twenty-fifth Army and the gradual approach of Japanese air
bases, the British air forces fled to Sumatra one after another.(23) Now the Dutch East Indies
Air Force became the main constituent [of the enemy].(23) The Dutch East Indies Air Force
had been gradually reinforced with U.S. air forces, and at the beginning of February, its
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strength was estimated at about one hundred aircraft in Sumatra and some three hundred
aircraft in Java, including the aircraft of the British air forces which had escaped [the Japanese
attacks].(23) Reconnaissance of the general state of the [enemy] air forces and fields in Sumatra
and the attack operations against the island had progressed as previously described. As for
the U.S., British and Dutch warships, few had sustained any significant damage apart from
the Prince of Wales and the Repulse [which had been sunk].
The Enemy Position at the End of January
The information which the Southern Army had obtained by the end of January on the allied
army and air force reinforcements since the opening of hostilities was as follows:(23)
1. Burma area
Apart from reinforcements of at least one division and other technical units of the [British] Indian
Army, also Chiang [Kai-shek]’s Sixth Army has been moved up close to the border, of which
two corps have [already] entered Burma for certain. It appears that the remainder is also taking
the route to enter [Burma]. This information is mainly based on the following sources (omitted
by the author).
It appears that the air force has been increased by some fifty aircraft. 
This information is mainly based on the following sources (omitted by the author).
2. Malaya area
An increase of one brigade of Indian troops [is known] for sure, apart from [this], an increase of
about one division of Indian troops as well as elements of British and Australian troops must
be assumed. This information is mainly based on the following:
(1) On 8 January, a brigade of Indian troops had newly assembled at Malacca. As a result of an
engagement, it was identified as the 45th Independent Brigade of the [British] Indian Army,
which had newly arrived (degree of certainty A).
(2) Australian reinforcements have successively been sent in, and their strength is said to be
seventy thousand something (intelligence from A; degree of certainty B-).
(3) On the morning of 15 January, 1,600 men (mostly British, but also including some U.S. Air
Force personnel) arrived in Singapore in four transport ships (intelligence from A; degree
of certainty B).
Apart from the above, the following active movements of convoys have been [observed] re-
cently:
(a) On 16 January, reinforcements in five transport ships arrived (18 January, intelligence
from A).
(b) At 1250 on 23 January, ten transport ships were heading northward off Cape Jabung
(about one hundred kilometers northeast of Jambi) (aircraft reconnaissance).
(c) On 28 January four 8,000-ton-class transport ships, led by warships, were heading south-
westward through the Singapore Strait (reported by the Sugawara Group).
Also on the same day five transport ships under [naval] escort were heading northward
through the Bangka Strait (reported by a naval air unit).
Concerning the above, it is by and large certain that these are reinforcements of the
[British] Indian Army, as seen in the following [reference] information:
[Reference] information
According to the intelligence from A (Jiemin), it seems that two brigades of the British
18th Division were those in Singapore on the 28th, and one brigade of the division (the
53d Brigade) was apparently the one which had been in Singapore before that [day]
(Army General Staff Office Report).
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Further, the increase in air [forces] should be over two hundred aircraft (however, some
[of them] must have been deployed in Sumatra). This information is mainly based on
the following:
{1} Both on 20 and 24 December, one [air] squadron each heading for East Asia waited for
its turn to get aboard at Basra (Army Report from Italy; degree of certainty B).
{2} On 8 January, a reinforcement of a dozen or more twin-engine bombers arrived from
Egypt (intelligence from A and Jiemin report; degree of certainty B).
{3} On 12 January, aircraft arrived from Australia (though their number was unclear) (intel-
ligence from A and Jiemin report; degree of certainty B).
{4} Reinforcements sent to Malaya from the Dutch East Indies right after the opening of hos-
tilities consisted of fifteen bombers (statement of (a) Dutch POW; degree of certainty A).
{5} On 16 January, fifty U.S. aircraft (P–40) arrived (intelligence from A, Jiemin report, and
monitored broadcast; degree of certainty B).
{6} On 28 January, fifty Hurricanes and fifty-one Spitfires will be transported to XX (note by
the author: the two characters in the original text are illegible) via Batavia (intelligence
from A passed on by Army General Staff; degree of certainty C).
{7} On 20 January, two Indian [air] squadrons were transported to Singapore from Iraq (in-
formation from a military attaché in Italy; degree of certainty C).
3. Dutch East Indies area
Apart from a reinforcement of an estimated two ([or] three) battalions to Sumatra, [the situation]
is still unknown. However, up to now the arrival of large troop numbers is unthinkable. This
information is based on the following:
(1) From 25 to 26 January, eighteen transport ships (about a total of 80,000 tons) were anchored
in and around the port of Padang on Sumatra (naval air unit information; degree of certainty
A).
(2) Recently, units of allied forces have arrived in a certain port of the Dutch East Indies (broad-
cast monitored on 27 January; degree of certainty B).
(3) On 28 January, six U.S. Army regiments arrived in Surabaya (intelligence from A and Jiemin
report; degree of certainty C).
Further, as for air force units, U.S. equipment and training personnel must have arrived in con-
siderable numbers, but [details] remain unknown. However, the current number of aircraft is
estimated to have reached about five hundred.
This information is based on the following:
{1} Three thousand U.S. air personnel arrived in Java (information of 28 January and Cheng
Jiemin report, degree of certainty C).
{2} According to the statement of a Dutch East Indies POW pilot, the current number of air-
craft in the Dutch East Indies is some seven hundred, and they are dispersed over every
airfield (degree of certainty C).
[Editor’s note: Cheng Jiemin could not be identified with any certainty. He might have
been Chiang Kai-shek’s spymaster, whose report the Japanese somehow got hold of, cf.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Bureau_(Republic_of_China).]
Reconsideration of the Employment of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group
The general condition of the shipwrecked 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment and the 2d [Para-
troop] Raiding Regiment has already been mentioned, but in detail their state was as follows:
When the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment was sailing south from Magong along with the
main force of the 33d Division, the ship which was carrying the regiment, the Meikō-maru,
sank due to a spontaneous combustion of its cargo on 3 January.(23) Although [the regiment’s]
men were rescued by escorting destroyers, all of its weapons and matériel were lost.(23) On
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the 7th, Lt. Col. Kinoshita Hideaki, who was attached to the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group,
sent a telegram from Bangkok to the Southern Army to say that “the regiment will arrive in
Bangkok on the 9th. Upon arranging clothes and personal effects for the present, the regiment
will leave Bangkok by train on the 12th. I request you to arrange the whole set of paratroop
clothing, parachutes, weapons, equipment, supply containers, medical supplies and matériel
[sufficient to equip] one regiment to be immediately sent from the Inspectorate General of
Aviation.”(23) Then on the 9th, Lieutenant Colonel Kinoshita [again] sent the Southern Army
a telegram from Bangkok that(23) “I fear that it is highly likely that the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding
Regiment cannot be [ready] in time for the date of the operation because of its heavy loss. I
request you to keep in close contact with the Inspectorate General [of Aviation for the infor-
mation] about the date and time of arrival of items subsequently dispatched from the home-
land. In my humble opinion, it is faster and more certain to employ the 2d Regiment as an
emergency expedient. Therefore, I believe a swift additional assignment of the 2d Regiment
as well as resupply of sunken equipment and matériel for the [paratroop] air unit should be
given top priority. I would like you to also give consideration to the employment of the 1st
Regiment once its re-equipment is completed.”(23) It meant that it was impossible for the time
being to assign the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment difficult missions even if the regiment
were re-equipped. In a following telegram sent on the 11th, the lieutenant colonel reported:
“The bulk of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment has come ashore at Bangkok on the morn-
ing of the 11th. All arrived with only the clothes they were wearing, but their morale is
high.”(23) [From this telegram] the Southern Army got the impression that the men had been
rescued separately and were coming ashore in small groups. On 15 January, the 1st [Para-
troop] Raiding Group Commander, Col. Kume Seiichi, arrived in Guangdong, southern
China, with the main force of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit.(23) On the 17th the Inspectorate
General of Aviation wired the Southern Army:(23) “The 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment left
Moji on the 15th, heading for Haiphong in French Indochina; the regiment brings along
weapons, clothes and matériel to be handed over to the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment,
with which, in our expectation, the loss sustained by the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment
in the shipwreck of the Meikō-maru can be completely replaced; special operational training
for about one week was provided to Lieutenant Toku naga, 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment
1st Company commander, and his men, a total of sixty-four personnel; the [Paratroop] Raid-
ing Air Unit 3d Squadron is scheduled to depart around 20 January.”
As already described, the scheduled date for the Palembang landing set forth in General
Agreement No. 4 (Cam Ranh Agreement) was 6 February. Accordingly, the drop of the para-
troops at Palembang had been scheduled for 5 February. However, taking into account the
physical and mental blow which the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment had suffered as well
as the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment’s insufficient level of training and the shortness of
time allowed to prepare for the operation, the Southern Army abandoned the idea of con-
ducting the Palembang [paratroop] raiding operation, for which it had had high hopes since
before the opening of hostilities. On 22 January, the Southern Army drew up the following
plan concerning the deployment of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group:(24)
First Deployment: About day x + 60 (6 February)
Pekanbaru or Jambi in central Sumatra
Second Deployment: About day x + 80 (26 February)
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Sabang, Pangkalan Susu, or Pangkalan Brandan in northern Suma-
tra, and the Andamans in the waters northwest of Sumatra
Third Deployment: About day x + 90 (8 March)
Yenangyaung in Burma
As a matter of fact, on the day when the Southern Army drew up the above plan at Saigon,
Staff Officer Ishii unofficially concluded [an agreement] on a four-day postponement of the
Palembang [operation] at Manila.(23) It gave an extra four days to spare. Sixteenth Army Staff
Officer Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu, who had been involved in the establishment and training of the
paratroop raiding group at the Inspectorate General of Aviation, now was staff officer of the
Sixteenth Army, which was going to conduct the Palembang landing operation. Staff Officer
Itoda passionately advocated the employment [of the paratroop raiding group] at Palem-
bang.(39) Also 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander Colonel Kume, who had just then
arrived, made a strong request for conducting the Palembang paratroop operation. Thus, on
the 24th (the day when the 38th Division advanced to Cam Ranh Bay), the Southern Army
changed its mind to conduct the Palembang paratroop operation.
The Third Air Force Draws up the Outline of the Air Operations 
[for Operation] L
After the employment of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group (under the direct control of the
Southern Army) for the Palembang [operation] was decided (for which operation the raiding
group was to be brought under the control of the Third Air Force), the Third Air Force ([led
by] Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō) drew up the “Outline of the Air Operations [for Operation]
L”(96) on the 25th, based on the “Supplement to the Southern Army’s Air Operation Plan” of
10 January.(2) L refers to Bangka and Palembang in a narrow sense, and in a broader sense to
Southern Sumatra. Here it is used in the broader sense.
outline of the Air operations [for operation] L
I. Mission
1. [We shall] expand the military gains in the Singapore operation and while constraining the
Dutch East Indies Air Force from reinforcing or gathering strength in Southern Sumatra,
closely cooperate with the Sixteenth Army in its Bangka and Palembang operations.
2. While conducting this operation, [we shall] at the right moment launch the air operations
against western Java and prepare [to give] direct cooperation in the land-
ing operation of the main force of the Sixteenth Army in western Java.
II. Directives
1. For the period of the capture of Singapore
(1) Prior to the landing (or disembarkation) operation in or near Endau,
a Singapore air operation shall be conducted, [in which] the remaining
enemy air power shall be destroyed, and through attacks on vital tar-
gets in the Singapore area, efforts shall be made to crush the enemy’s
will to resist.
(2) At the time of the Twenty-fifth Army’s [operation to] capture Singa-
pore, we shall speed up the capture by bombing vital points on the
island along with the bombardment by the army.
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(3) When the Kluang, Kahang and Batu Pahat airfields are seized and made ready for use,
preparations for the capture of Singapore and Operation L shall be swiftly completed.
The deployment plan of the forces is as shown in Supplement No. 1 (note by the author:
the contents of Supplement No. 1 is roughly the same as Illustration No. 23).
(4) During this period, [forces shall be] assigned to timely conduct attacks on the airfields
in Sumatra, cut off the line of retreat of the enemy air power in the Singapore area, pursue
them, and constrain the Dutch East Indies Air Force from reinforcing or gathering
strength, so that the [operation to] capture Singapore as well as the execution of Opera-
tion L will be facilitated.
2. For the period of the capture of southern Sumatra
(1) [Forces shall be] assigned to support the operations of the Sixteenth Army’s Bangka and
Palembang landing units, in conjunction with Navy air units.
(2) Between day L – 4 and day L – 2, the chief concern of the fighter plane units of the 3d Air
Division shall be to destroy the enemy air power in Palembang.
(3) On day L – 1, the [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall be dropped in Palembang. On this oc-
casion one element will facilitate this action.
(4) When the airfields in Southern Sumatra are seized and made ready for use, a powerful
element shall be advanced [there] without missing an opportunity. Most of the element
shall swiftly destroy the enemy air power in western Java, while an element of it shall
support the Sixteenth Army’s operation to mop up southern Sumatra. Meanwhile, in
order to give direct support to the main force of the Sixteenth Army in the western Java
landing operation, preparation of the Tanjungkarang airfield shall be accelerated.
(5) The outline of the cooperation between the Army and Navy air units in Operation L shall
be arranged separately.
(6) Before and after the capture of Singapore and right at the launch of Operation L, the re-
maining force of the [Third] Air Force may also conduct [operations to] search for enemy
ships near Singapore and in the Malacca Strait and attack them.
3. Others
(1) Forces not involved in Operation L and the Java operation shall directly cooperate with
an element of the Twenty-fifth Army in northern Sumatra. The details shall be planned
separately.
(2) An element of the fighter plane [unit] may be charged with the air defense of the Singa-
pore area.
III. Disposition of forces to be employed and outline of operations
1. The Attack on Singapore
(1) The outline of the attack before the capture of Singapore by the Twenty-fifth Army is as
shown in Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 174 Supplement “Outline of Air Op-
eration Po.” [Editor’s note: the text has “Bo,” which is a mistake for “Po” (Singapore),
see Vol. 34 of the War History Series.]
(2) Once the Kluang, Kahang and Batu Pahat airfields are seized, the 15th Air Ground Sup-
port Unit shall be advanced to southern Malaya with the aim of accelerating the [set-up
of] air bases and the accumulation of matériel for Operation L.
(3) Prior to the start of Operation L, the distribution of air units shall be changed as follows:
[Units] under the direct control of the [Third] Air Force: 81st Air Group, 98th Air Group,
and 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group.
3d Air Division: 15th Independent Air Unit (minus the 51st Independent Squadron), 59th
Air Group, 64th Air Group, 75th Air Group, 90th Air Group, and 27th Air Group.
7th Air Division: 51st Independent Squadron, 12th Air Group, and 60th Air Group.
12th Air Division: 1st Air Group, 11th Air Group, and 47th Independent Squadron.
(4) Missions of each unit based on the distribution above are as follows:
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(a) 81st Air Group (note by the author: Command Reconnaissance):
Shall undertake general reconnaissance in Sumatra, Java and other locations, espe-
cially reconnaissance that will serve as preparation for the invasion of Java. For this
purpose, the airfields in Kuching or Ledo in Borneo may be used temporarily. One
element of the group shall directly support the [paratroop] raiding group in its op-
eration.
(b) 3d Air Division:
Shall support the Twenty-fifth Army and also cooperate in Operation L.
(c) 7th Air Division:
Shall cooperate in the operation to capture Singapore. If required, it shall be employed
as reinforcement in Operation L (in preparation for the northern Sumatra operation). 
(d) 12th Air Division:
In cooperation with the 3d Air Division, shall take charge of gaining command of the
air in and around Singapore, conducting surveillance of the Pekanbaru airfield. It
shall [also] destroy [the enemy] when opportunities arise. If possible, it shall provide
Illustration No. 23 — Scheduled Disposition of Air Units (25 January, 1942)
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the air defense of the anchorage of the units for Operation L, and [also] make prepa-
rations for cooperation in the Java operations.
2. Direct Support in Operation L
(1) From 1700 until the evening of the day before day L (scheduled for 10 February) an ele-
ment of the fighter [planes] of the 3d Air Division shall be charged with covering the
sailing transport convoy of Operation L.
(2) Concurrently with Item (1), support shall be provided to the [Paratroop] Raiding Group’s
execution of its raiding mission. For this purpose, the reconnaissance unit shall be
charged with reconnaissance of the drop point in Palembang and vicinity before and
after the drop. [Further,] Type-1 fighter plane units shall be charged with direct cover of
the [Paratroop] Raiding Air (Transport) Unit.
(3) After the drop of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group until the arrival of the landing units of
Operation L, its fighting power, where necessary, shall be maintained and nurtured [with
supplies provided] by descending (landing) airborne (transport) units or by airdrops.
Along with this, direct support shall [also] be given to the [Paratroop] Raiding Group
during its ground combat, if required.
(4) When the Palembang airfield is seized and made ready for use, an element of the 12th
Air Division and the 3d Air Division each will swiftly advance to the airfield to provide
direct support for the landing units of Operation L (including the [Paratroop] Raiding
Group) in their ground operations. Further, at an opportune moment, the air operations
for the Java [operation] shall be launched. For this purpose, preparation of the Tan-
jungkarang airfield shall be accelerated so that assault [plane] units and Type–97 fighter
[plane] units can be advanced.
At that time, the operation to land air units, fuel and ammunition at Endau was to be carried
out on the following day, the 26th.(23) The 18th Division, whose landing [operation in] Endau
and Mersing had been cancelled, had left Cam Ranh Bay on the 20th under escort of the 3d
Destroyer Squadron, landed in Singora on the 22d, and was now moving south along the
west coast of Malaya.(23) The 5th Division had seized Kluang on the 24th, while the Imperial
Guard Division was in the middle of attacking the British Indian Army near Batu Pahat.(23)
The Twenty-fifth Army wished to capture Singapore by Empire Day (11 February), whereas
the Southern Army, for its part, wished to seize Palembang right before that.(23, 24) Based on
these circumstances (the Manila Agreement was to be formally concluded on 28 January),
the plan as of that day (the 25th) was that the 38th Division would depart from Cam Ranh
on 4 February and land in Palembang on 10 February, and that the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding
Group would be dropped on Palembang the day before the landing [operation], namely on
9 February.(23, 24) The Southern Army had framed a plan to bring the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding
Group under the control of the Third Air Force for executing the paradrop operation, and it
had unofficially notified [both units].(23, 24)
The types and the rough number of aircraft kept under the air groups were as follows:(23)
59th Air Group: twenty-four fighter planes
1st, 11th, and 64th Air Group: thirty-six fighter planes each
27th Air Group: thirty-six assault planes
75th and 90th Air Group: twenty-seven light bombers each
12th, 60th and 98th Air Group: twenty-seven heavy bombers each
81st Air Group: eighteen command reconnaissance planes
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Implementation of the Endau Landing Operation and the Occupation of the
Anambas Islands
On the 26th, the day after the Third Air Force had decided on the previously explained “Out-
line of Air Operations [in Operation] L,” the Endau debarkation operation and the operation
to occupy Anambas (note by the author: islands in the waters east of Singapore) were carried
out.(118, 126) The landing operations in Endau and Mersing had been planned in order to secure
with the main force of the 18th Division air bases for Operation L, as well as to capture and
destroy the British Indian Army in the northern part of Johor, which was directly in front of
the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army. However, as already explained, on 17 January the
plan had been changed to [just] putting ashore air units, fuel, ammunition and matériel in
two transport ships. The operation to occupy the Anambas islands, [on the other hand], was
to be conducted so that the [Navy] Malaya Unit could advance [air] bases for conducting the
southern Sumatra and Java operations.(102) While the Malaya Unit had been considering the
risks and was carefully making preparations for the Endau and Mersing operations that were
to be carried out with the main force of the 18th Division, it had from 15 January onwards
been engaged in an operation to lure the [enemy] fleet out of Singapore, as previously de-
scribed ([for this purpose] its main unit had left Cam Ranh Bay on the 15th). However, on
the 17th, air reconnaissance had made clear that “no warships other than one cruiser, five
destroyers and seven transport ships were found in Singapore naval port.” The operation
was canceled and its main unit had returned to Cam Ranh Bay on the 19th.(118)
Note: At 0230 on the 16th, the Malaya Unit had wired all units: “According to photo reconnais-
sance by naval aircraft on the 15th, [enemy] battleships are anchored at Singapore. It appears
that they are accompanying an aircraft carrier. It is likely that the enemy aircraft carrier will
conduct an air raid on Cam Ranh Bay.”(118)
Following the cancelation of the [original] Endau and Mersing operations, the Malaya Unit
(Vice Admiral Ozawa), who had returned to Cam Ranh Bay, assembled the senior staff offi-
cers of all units on his flagship, the Chōkai, in the bay on the 20th.(118) The 3d Destroyer
Squadron was assigned to escort “the two transport ships leaving Singora on the 24th to put
ashore [personnel and matériel] at Endau on the 26th,” after providing escort to “the 18th
Division leaving Cam Ranh Bay on the 20th to arrive in Singora on the 22d.”(118) The 9th Base
Force was set to leave the bay of Puolo Condore (note: southwest of Saigon) on the 24th to
conduct [the operation to] occupy the Anambas Islands on the 26th.(126) The 7th Cruiser Di-
vision was set to support both of these operations.(115, 118, 126)
The two transport ships carrying the 20th Independent Engineer Battalion and other units,
aviation fuel and ammunition left Singora on 24 January and reached the Endau anchorage
on the morning of the 26th.(23) They came under attack from about thirty [enemy] aircraft
around 1630, about twenty aircraft around 1900 and [again] about six aircraft around 2000 on
the same day, but the [enemy aircraft] were defeated by our 12th Air Division.(118) The transport
ships completed debarkation around 1200 on the 28th, sustaining no damage, and headed
back [to their base].(23) Meanwhile on the night of the 26th, two allied destroyers attacked the
anchorage, but the 3d Destroyer Squadron sank one of them and put the other to flight.(118)
The 9th Base Force occupied the Anambas on the 26th as planned.(126)
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As previously described, the landing operations in Endau and Mersing with the main
force of the 18th Division had been changed after, on the 14th, the Twenty-fifth Army had
proposed to cancel them and the Malaya Unit had proposed to postpone them, which had
been followed by the Malaya Unit’s launch of its operation (to lure out and destroy the bat-
tleships and the aircraft carrier which were reported to be found in Singapore) on the 15th.
Due to the telegrams from the [Navy] Southern Task Force and the Malaya Unit, and the [re-
ported] progress of the operation of the Twenty-fifth Army on the 16th and the 17th, it was
decided to change [the operation plan] (by calling off the employment of the 18th Division
and replacing it with the transportation [of personnel and matériel] in two ships), and on the
19th the order was given [to change the operation]. But how did this change actually work
out? The situation around the time when the operation [plan] was changed was that “the
Twenty-fifth Army [had] charged into Kuala Lumpur on 11 January, the van of the army
[had] closed in on Gemas on the 14th, and seized the town on the 16th, while it [was] expected
to reach Johor Strait around the 25th.” However, after that, the war had not progressed very
smoothly for the Twenty-fifth Army. It was not able to seize the airfield in Kluang until the
25th, and that in Kahang until the 27th.(23) On the 22d, Southern Army Staff Officer Saitō
Tomoo sent the following telegram to the [Southern] Army headquarters from Gemas, which
left the Southern Army with the impression that “the fact that it had to shift the 18th Division,
which should have been assembling on the coast opposite Penang [in preparation] for the
northern Sumatra operation, to the Singapore front had effectually been a wasteful detour,
and that the Endau and Mersing operations should have been carried out as planned, even
if they had to be implemented a couple of days behind schedule.”(23)
We arrived in Gemas on the late night of yesterday, the 21st. Although the Twenty-fifth Army
has been planning to dispatch a detachment from Kluang to the Mersing area and is making
the greatest efforts to clear supply route(s) for the air [unit(s)], [my] estimation of the progress
of the next operations is that the Kahang and Kluang airfields will not be ready until around 4
or 5 February at the very best, due to transportation and other [factors] in preparation for the
capture of Singapore. It is expected that the use of these airfields as bases to cooperate in Oper-
ation L from the 5th or the 6th will lead to terrible confusion. Furthermore, in view of the fact
that tenacious resistance from the enemy may be expected in the capture of Singapore, and in
view of the present state of its defense facilities, the reality is that it will be necessary [for the
Twenty-fifth Army] to request cooperation of the air units of XX (note by the author: the two
characters [in the original text] are illegible), heavy bombers in particular. Due to the above mat-
ters, I believe that it is highly necessary to re-examine when to launch operation L. In the light
of this situation, I also believe that it is necessary for the chief of operations, if possible, the chief
or vice chief of staff to get into direct contact with the Twenty-fifth Army headquarters.
Note: On the day that Staff Officer Saitō wired the above, an informal agreement was reached
at Manila on a four-day postponement of Operation L.
The Army-Navy Arrangement on the Air Operations [in Operation] L
(See Illustration No. 24)
As explained above, the 38th Division had advanced to Cam Ranh Bay on the 24th, the Third
Air Force’s operation plan, including the parachuting operation of the [Paratroop] Raiding
Group, was completed on the 25th, and the [operations to] disembark [personnel and matériel]
at Endau and to occupy the Anambas were carried out on the 26th, which was followed by
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the occupation of the Ledo airfield on the 27th.(23) (As for the latter, the seizure was [success-
fully] carried out but things would not go smoothly at all afterwards, as will be explained
later). On the following day, the 28th, the air [operation] arrangement for Operation L was
concluded on board the flagship of the Malaya Unit, the Chōkai, at Cam Ranh Bay.(34) Staff
Officers Saiki and Itoda participated from the Sixteenth Army.(34, 39) The arrangement read as
follows:(96)
Arrangement on the Air [operation in] operation L between the First Southern Expeditionary
Fleet Commander in Chief, the Sixteenth Army Commander and the Third Air Force Commander
First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief, V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō
Sixteenth Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi
Third Air Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō
I. Name of Operation and Basic Dates
1. The Operations in Bangka Island and Palembang shall be called Operation L.
2. The day when the advance party of the 38th Division lands in Mentok shall be indicated as
day L, and is scheduled for 10 February. In case a change of date for day L is required due
to the progress of the air operations, weather conditions or enemy movements, a decision
shall be made by 1200 on day L – 6 upon deliberation between the First Southern Expedi-
tionary Fleet commander in chief and the Sixteenth Army commander. However, regarding
[matters involving] air operations, the Sixteenth Army commander shall consult the Third
Air Force commander.
II. Forces to be employed
1. Navy
1st Air Unit: About 100 land-based attack planes, about 30 fighter planes, and 6 land-based
reconnaissance planes.
Malaya Unit: About 40 seaplanes.
2. Army
About 9 command reconnaissance planes*, about 40 Type–1 fighter planes*, about 30 Type–
97 fighter planes*, about 9 assault planes*, about 20 twin-engine light bombers*, and about
30 heavy bombers.
*Indicates aircraft to be advanced to the airfields in southern Sumatra. 
Depending on the condition of the airfields, the above number of aircraft shall be slightly
changed.
III. [Air] bases to be used and distribution of forces
1. Navy
(a) When the Ledo [airfield] is fit for use:
Ledo and Kuching [airfields]: 2 air units of land-based attack planes, about 30 fighter
planes, and 6 land-based reconnaissance planes.
Kuantan: about 30 land-based attack planes.
Sungai Petani: about 10 planes.
(b) When [the airfields in] Ledo and Kuching are unusable, [aircraft] shall be advanced in
the following way:
Kuantan: about 60 land-based attack planes, and some of the fighter planes.
Kahang: about 30 fighter planes.
About 30 land-based attack planes may use [the airfield] as an advance base for refueling.
If the XX Unit (note by the author: the [paratroop] raiding unit) should use the airfield,
[the use by the land-based attack planes] shall be only until and including day L – 3 or on
day L + 7 and onwards.
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Sungai Petani: about 10 land-
based attack planes.
Kota Bharu: about 40 land-based
attack planes.
2. Army
Kahang: about 25 Type–1 fighter
planes, about 45 transport planes.
The remaining units to be used for
Operation L shall use the Kluang,
Batu Pahat, Kuala Lum pur, Ipoh,
Ketil and other airfields. Depend-
ing on the readi- ness and other
circumstances of the airfields, the
above disposition and the forces
deployed will be changed.
3. The Army shall be charged with
making the Mentok and Palembang
[air] bases ready for use. In the
preparation of Mentok, the Navy
shall cooperate. In the initial days
after the seizure of the Mentok and
Palembang [air] bases, Mentok shall
be shared by the Army and the Navy
in the following way, whereas Palem-
bang shall be used by the Army:
Navy fighter planes and others:
about 30 planes.
Army fighter planes: about 30 planes.
When possible, the Army shall assist the Navy in the transport of its aviation fuel. After that,
the use of this [air] base shall be newly arranged between the Army and the Navy command-
ers concerned.
IV. Outline of the operation
1. We shall be determined to swiftly destroy the enemy air power in Sumatra as well as sup-
press the enemy air power in Java. The areas assigned to [the Army and the Navy] are
roughly decided as follows. However, [both] shall attack the enemy in the other’s area as
occasion may require.
Navy: [the area] east of the line connecting Mentok and Palembang ([the line] included).
Army: [the area] west of the above-mentioned line ([the line] included).
2. The attack on enemy warships shall be charged to the Navy.
3. Covering of the convoy
(1) Under sail
(a) Direct cover provided on day L – 1 by [both] the Army and the Navy fighter planes
in conjunction shall be as follows:
Until 1400: the Navy.
From 1400 onwards: the Army. In case XX Unit (note by the author: the [paratroop]
raiding group) is used, its cover [will be started] roughly from 1700 onwards.
In case XX Unit (note by the author: the [paratroop] raiding group) is used, the Navy
fighter planes shall provide cover [for the convoy] on its own as much as possible.
(b) The guarding under sail other than the above shall be charged to the Navy. 
Illustration No. 24 — The Points Mentioned in the Arrange-
ment on the Air [Operation in] Operation L
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(2) At the anchorages for the Mentok and Palembang [operations], and while sailing up-
stream
The guarding against enemy aircraft after both the Army and the Navy fighter planes
are advanced in the area shall be provided by both forces in conjunction; the guarding
other than the above shall be assigned to the Navy.
(3) Support for ground operations and the operations to sail upstream
Support for the operations to sail upstream to Palembang shall mainly be assigned to
the Navy. Support for ground operations after that shall be assigned to the Army. How-
ever, the Navy shall be charged with this [task] until the Army aircraft are advanced to
the area.
V. Exchange of Information
The Army shall make efforts to reconnoiter the movements of the enemy air forces in the Batavia
area and provide the Navy with the information.
The 38th Division’s Operation Plan
As we have seen, the Sixteenth Army had received orders from the Southern Army to capture
Southern Sumatra on 5 January, concluded a formal arrangement with the [Navy] Malaya
Unit on 15 January, and had given its orders to the 38th Division on the 18th. The last had
left Hong Kong on the 20th and reached Cam Ranh Bay on the 24th. Although the [original]
schedule of its departure from Cam Ranh Bay had been set for 31 January, the departure had
been postponed to 4 February as a result of the Manila Agreement (effective on the 28th).
We have also mentioned that [the Army Department of] IGHQ rated the military potential
of the 38th Division very highly,(18) but that at the same time it was deeply concerned about
the loss the division might sustain during the [operation to] capture Hong Kong.(18) Because
of these concerns, IGHQ had never shown its intention of imposing a double duty on the di-
vision until after the capture of Hong Kong, even though it had already decided to impose
the double duty on the 38th Division for both the capture of Hong Kong and the invasion of
Java [as early as in] the summer of 1941 and ever since had strongly adhered to this fixed
course of action.(18) After the opening of hostilities, when the 38th Division had been about
to cross over to Hong Kong Island on 17 December, after clearing away the strongholds on
the Kowloon Peninsula, Staff Officer Takayama Shinobu had suggested at IGHQ that “the
38th Division should be given instructions about training for the next duty,”(9) but without
giving any instructions, IGHQ had [only] closely watched the 38th Division’s progress in its
capture of Hong Kong.(18) The division had taken control of Hong Kong on 25 December,
grandly made a triumphal entry into Hong Kong on the 28th, and after that taken up the
task of guarding, when suddenly on the 30th, the division had received orders to organize
and dispatch the Eastern Detachment, which was followed by orders to have the Shōji De-
tachment join the Java operation and the main force of the division the Sumatra operation.(66)
By contrast, the 48th Division, which was another powerful division with a long history and
brilliant military achievements, consisting of the 1st and 2d Taiwan Infantry Regiment, and
the 47th Infantry Regiments (originally stationed in Ōita, Kyūshū), had been notified in the
summer of 1941 that the division was scheduled to be “charged with [the duty to] invade
Java, subsequent to the invasion of the Philippines.”(80) The different treatment of these divi-
sions, i.e. whether they were informally notified or not, after all originated from the different
expectations [which IGHQ had] of the capture of the Hong Kong stronghold and the field
operations in the Philippines.(18)
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The loss sustained by the 38th Division in the operation to capture Hong Kong was un-
expectedly small; four hundred men were killed (among whom were thirty-five officers), and
eight hundred men were wounded (among whom were fifty officers).(24) The proportion of
officers among the casualties was high; nevertheless, morale had risen even more. The ranks
were replenished with men from the 104th Division [stationed] in the Guangdong sector.(24)
Having handed over the Eastern Detachment and the Shōji Detachment, a total of five in-
fantry battalions as the core, that is, the 38th Infantry Group headquarters, the 228th Infantry
Regiment, the 230th Infantry Regiment (minus the 3d Battalion), one battalion and one com-
pany of the 38th Mountain Artillery Regiment, one company of the 38th Engineer Regiment,
one company of the 38th Transport Regiment, one-third of the medical unit, and one element
of one field hospital, the force kept by Division Commander Sano consisted of four battalions
as the core.(66) [Additionally,] one independent motor transport battalion, one shipping engineer
regiment, one anchorage headquarters, one sea transport unit, one oil-drilling unit, one railway
unit platoon and one shore duty company were brought under the control of the division.(66)
Regarding the allied forces in Sumatra, the following intelligence had been acquired: “It
appears that about ten thousand troops of the Dutch East Indies Army have been deployed
in Sumatra and stationed by about one battalion in each vital location. It also appears that
elements of British and Australian forces have entered the island;” “Ground forces in south-
ern Sumatra are estimated at about three thousand men;” “In Palembang and its vicinity,
there seems to be the Palembang-Jambi territorial headquarters (commanded by a colonel),
[one] infantry battalion (commanded by a lieutenant colonel and made up of two to three
companies), machine gun(s), some infantry artillery, four to five light tanks, antiaircraft ar-
tillery and some aircraft.”(23, 24)
As for maps and charts, a map on a scale of 1 to 1,000,000, a map of southern Sumatra on
a scale of 1 to 500,000, a map of Palembang and its vicinity on a scale of 1 to 50,000, a hydro-
graphical chart of the Musi River, aerial photographs of Palembang and others had been dis-
tributed.(66) Regarding the topography, the 38th Division possessed more or less the following
information:(66)
There are many swamps and woods in the vicinity of Palembang, which in general makes off-
road passing not easy. Railways have been laid between Palembang and Telukbetung, and be-
tween Palembang and Lubuklinggau, but their capacity is unknown. There is a railroad
workshop in Lahat.
A motorway runs alongside the railroad from Palembang to Martapura and Tanjungkarang,
and another runs between Palembang, Lahat and Lubuklinggau. Other motorways than the
above are unknown.
The Musi River allows 5,000 to 6,000-ton-class ships to navigate up to the vicinity of Palem-
bang. However, it is difficult unless around high tide as there are shoals around its estuary. The
current is slow. The Saleh River is navigable for landing boats up to [the point] near Martapura,
and the Telang River up to [the point where] it joins the Musi River.
There are motor vehicles and boats available in Palembang and its vicinity, but their numbers
are unclear. Oil sources are located in Jambi, Sekayu, Tebatagung, and Lahat, and oil is conveyed
to Palembang through iron pipes.
The main facilities of Palembang include barracks (northwest of the city of Palembang), the Sun-
gaigerong oil refinery (about five kilometers east of the city), the Plaju oil refinery (about five
kilometers east of the city) [editor’s note: the Japanese text has an unidentifiable place name,
which is probably a misreading for “Plaju”], the north Palembang airfield (about ten kilometers
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northwest of the city) and the new Palembang airfield (somewhere in the middle between the
city and the north airfield, but its exact location is unknown).
The 38th Division’s Tough Job
As previously explained, it is no exaggeration to say that the Greater East Asian War was
launched for the oil in Palembang. It was one of the main missions of the Southern Army to
occupy Palembang at an early stage before [the facilities] were destroyed by the allied forces.
However, as the Palembang airfield was a superior airfield, the Palembang [operation] also
became inextricably linked to [wider] strategic factors, which chiefly concerned the advance-
ment of the Java operation. [As a result, the Palembang operation] became entwined in a tan-
gle of desiderata:(28) (1) the wish to safely get hold of the oil resources at an early stage, for
which purpose the location should be securely seized in a surprise attack prior to the capture
of Singapore; (2) the wish to carry out the landing operation of Operation L safely and
soundly by seizing the Palembang airfield in a surprise attack beforehand; (3) the wish to fa-
cilitate [the operation to] capture Singapore as well as to cut off the allied forces’ retreat from
the city by seizing the Palembang airfield before the capture of Singapore and isolating the
latter, and at the same time, the wish to quickly launch air operations against Java by seizing
this airfield. However, the following matters also greatly affected [the planning]:(28) (1) as
there was a limit to the capacity of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group, the unit could not be left
isolated in enemy territory for a long time; (2) and yet, early departure of the convoy of the
38th Division would give a clue to the plan beforehand; (3) and still more, beyond reason or
logic, there was the wish to make Singapore fall by Empire Day, i.e. 11 February. The Southern
Army had painstakingly drawn up the following plan:(28)
4 February Departure of the advance party of the 38th Division from Cam Ranh Bay.
5 February
6 February Departure of the main force of the 38th Division from Cam Ranh Bay.
7 February The Twenty-fifth Army’s ([consisting of] the Imperial Guard Division,
the 5th, and the 18th Divisions) crossing at night of the Johor Strait and
landing [on Singapore Island].
8 February Day 1 of the attack on the Singapore stronghold.
9 February Day 2 of the attack on the Singapore stronghold; drop of the 1st [Para-
troop] Raiding Group on Palembang.
10 February Arrival of the advance party of the 38th Division in Palembang at night;
day 3 of the attack on the Singapore stronghold; surrender of the British
Forces.
11 February Empire Day; arrival of the main force of the 38th Division in Palembang.
As of 30 January, the Southern Army was worrying about the issue of how it should divide
the limited strength of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group between the oil resources of Palem-
bang and the airfield.(28) Commander in Chief [of the Southern Army] Terauchi also expressed
his feelings that “the paratroop unit must not be made to fight until death.”(30)
Whereas the Southern Army was having a hard time with strategic issues, the 38th Divi-
sion, the unit to implement the [operation], had tactical issues to rack its brain over. Since
before the opening of hostilities, the Dutch East Indies authorities had boasted: “We have
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500,000 tons of oil in storage in Palembang. If the Japanese forces should come up the river,
we will release 10,000 ton of oil per day into the river, and burn up the convoy coming up
the river.”(36) [However,] there was no other way conceivable [to get to Palembang] than to
ascend the river. Even if fire should not be set to released oil, it would still be easy [for the
enemy] to position artillery and transfix the limited rivers leading to Palembang, or to install
obstacles and blockade the waterway. Together with the Shipping Transport Command and
others, the 38th Division conducted studies on the allied forces’ [possible use of] illumination,
ground fire, underwater obstacles, setting fire to released oil and attacks by small warships
or torpedo boats, [and also on] treacherous tidal currents, changes of water depth due to the
tides, waves and whirlpools, reefs, shoals, narrowing waterways, branching waterways,
mazes and all other kinds of inhibitory factors, and prepared countermeasures.(27) It was de-
cided to first send forward the advance party, which operated more lightly, so that the expo-
sure to the allied forces of the convoy sailing from Cam Ranh Bay was minimized.(66) [Also,]
in order not to leave the Paratroop Raiding Group, which was to seize the refineries and the
airfield in Palembang before they were destroyed and burned by the allied forces, isolated
too long in enemy territory, [the 38th Division] wanted to plan the operation in such a way
that [the division] could conduct it lightly and swiftly by seizing Mentok, the eye of the es-
tuary, in a sudden attack, and keep the ascent to Palembang concealed as long as possible.
Consequently, assuming that the paratroop unit would parachute down in Palembang at
1130 on day L – 1, a plan was drawn up in which the convoy of the advance party would
enter the anchorage off Mentok and off the estuary on that night, and that before dawn on
the following day (day L) an element would go ashore in Mentok by making a surprise attack,
while by about the same time, the main force would reach the mouths of all (three) usable
rivers, start navigating up these three rivers by motorized boats at daybreak, reach Palem-
bang by the evening of the same day and support the paratroop unit.(66)
The 38th Division planned the operation in outline as follows:(96) (See Illustrations No. 29
and No. 30)
1. Disposition of forces
Advance party (in 8 transport ships)
Commander: Col. Tanaka Ryōsaburō, 229th Infantry Regiment commander.
Mentok Landing Unit
Commander: Capt. Orita Masaru, 229th Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion commander, [con-
sisting of] one half infantry battalion as its core.
Musi River Ascending Unit
Commander: Col. Tanaka Ryōsaburō, 229th Infantry Regiment commander, [consisting
of] one infantry battalion and one battery as its core.
Saleh River Ascending Unit
Commander: Lt. Col. Iwabuchi Tsuneo, 38th Engineer Regiment commander, [consisting
of] one infantry company, one battery and one engineer company as its core.
Telang River Ascending Unit
Commander: Maj. Miyazawa Shigezō, 229th Regiment 2d Battalion commander, [consist-
ing of] one half infantry battalion and one artillery section as its core.
Main force of the division (in 14 transport ships)
[Consisting of] two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and one engineer company as
its core.
2. Outline of the conduct of the operation
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(1) The Mentok landing unit shall carry out a surprise landing on the shore south of the Mentok
airfield at around 0300 on day L. It shall first seize the airfield and make it ready for use,
after which it shall seize strategic points on Bangka Island.
(2) Units to go upstream to Palembang (the Musi, the Saleh and the Telang Ascending Units)
After transferring to boats at the Mentok anchorage, the main force of the advance party
shall start going upstream around 0700 on day L, [divided into] the Musi, the Saleh and the
Telang Ascending Units. In cooperation with the [Paratroop] Raiding Group, they shall first
seize resources and important facilities in Palembang and its vicinity.
(The Navy shall be charged with clearing the waterway of the Musi River up to three [nau-
tical] miles upstream of the Palembang railway wharf, using one large-sized motorized
[landing] craft and ten small-sized motorized [landing] craft. When the waterway is cleared,
six transport ships shall ascend the Musi River to Palembang.)
After that, the Martapura and the Tanjungkarang airfields as well as the oil producing re-
gions around [Talang] Abab and Limau shall be swiftly seized, and also preparation for [the
operations] to mop up enemy naval bases in Lampung and Semangka Bays shall be made.
The seizure of Martapura and Tanjungkarang are scheduled for day L + 6 and day L + 9 re-
spectively.
(3) The main force of the division shall reach the mouth of the Musi River on day L + 2, ascend
the Musi River in its [transport] ships as they are, go ashore in Palembang and vicinity and
extend the military gains of the advance party.
3. The airfield units and aviation matériel that will accompany the 38th Division shall be as shown
in Separate Sheet No. 1.
4. The sailing route plan of the 38th Division is as shown in Separate Sheet No. 2. (Omitted by the
author.)
Separate Sheet No. 1: The deployment plan of air ground support units for operation L
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Units Mentok Palembang
7th Airfield Company
(heavy bombers)
entire force
33d Air[field] Company
(fighter planes)
about two-thirds about one-third
Elements of the
25th Air Signal Unit
one squad one squad
Elements of the
2d Field Meteorological Company
one meteorological 
observation detail
one aerology detail
Remarks
1. In case it is difficult to use the Mentok airfield, a part or the greater part
of the force may be transferred to Palembang.
2. Aside from [units indicated in] this table, about 1,800 coolies will be trans-
ported, of which 1,000 will be posted in Mentok and 2,000 in Palembang
(note by the author: the numbers, which do not tally, are true to the orig-
inal document).
The [Southern Army’s] Decision to Employ the [Paratroop] Raiding Group
Mainly for [the Seizure of] the [Palembang] Airfield; the 38th Division’s
Arrangements with the [Navy] Malaya Unit
On 31 January, the Southern Army Staff Officers Arao Okikatsu (lieutenant colonel, chief of
operations) and Matsumae Misoo (lieutenant colonel, aviation staff), and the Sixteenth Army
Staff Officers Itoda Osamu (lieutenant colonel, chief of aviation) and Saiki Ikuzō (lieutenant
colonel, chief of signal communications) went from Saigon to Cam Ranh Bay, where in the
morning, on board the flagship of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the Chōkai, they
concluded arrangements on the air [operations] for Operation L, and also in the afternoon
on the same ship attended the [conclusion of] the arrangement between the 38th Division
and the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet.(34)
In the arrangements for the air [operations] made in the morning, the deployment of the
1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group was decided upon. As mentioned earlier, the Southern Army
had been thinking hard about the problem of where it should mainly use the 1st [Paratroop]
Raiding Group, as the latter’s strength and capacity were limited: for the seizure of the air-
field or for the seizure of the oil refineries. Staff Officer Arao, in line with the thinking of
Commander in Chief Terauchi, stressed that the group should mainly be employed for the
seizure of the airfield.(28) That night the Southern Army gave orders to the Third Air Force
and the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group, by which it brought the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding
Group (which had formerly been under the direct command of the Southern Army) under
the command of the Third Air Force commander, and ordered the Third Air Force com-
mander to carry out the parachute drop operation on Palembang, giving priority to the
seizure of the airfield. Staff Officer Arao recorded it in his journal as follows:(24)
Attended the preliminary arrangement between the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the
38th Division in Cam Ranh.
1. I stressed that the seizure of the airfield was the primary operational objective, and that the
seizure of the Palembang oil field came next (as the landings will [probably] overrun their sched-
ule).
2. Advance Party: Two battalions of the 229th Infantry [Regiment]. The Orita Battalion ([consisting
of] two companies) [will be assigned] to occupy Mentok. The main force will depart at 0330 on
day L in large- and small-sized motorized [landing] craft. In ascending the Musi River, [the unit]
shall be divided in three groups [to go up different routes] and advance to Palembang at day-
break on day L + 1. [This operations will be conducted in] twelve extra-large-sized motorized
[landing] craft, twenty-five large-sized motorized [landing] craft, eighteen small-sized motor-
ized [landing] craft, and for use by the Navy two large- and thirteen small-sized motorized
[landing] craft. In total: twelve extra-large-sized motorized [landing] craft, twenty-seven large-
sized motorized [landing] craft, and thirty-one small-sized motorized [landing] craft. 
3. Main force: in eight extra-large-sized motorized [landing] craft
4. Five small cargo ships: [shall] assemble at Cap Saint Jacques at noon on 1 February, and arrive
at the Mentok [anchorage] around 1200 on day L via the Anambas.
5. Sixty to seventy fishing boats [shall] leave Cap Saint Jacques on 5 February, and arrive on 15
February. Ship captains need to be given training to ascend rivers. The 38th Division has [al-
ready] considered which unit will handle the emergency when the waterway is blocked.
Success is imperative. We have to expect [some] loss of transport ships.
6. [The Southern Army] shall clearly state in its Operation Order A, No. 47 that in the use of the
[Paratroop] Raiding Group priority should be given to the seizure of the airfield.
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The order, which the Southern Army issued on this day, specifying the seizure of the airfield
as the priority for the [Paratroop] Raiding Group, read as follows:(96)
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 48
Southern Army order Saigon, 31 January
1. Hereafter the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall be put under the command of the Third Air
Force commander.
2. The Third Air Force commander shall employ the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group for the purpose
of Operation L in the following way: 
(1) The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall seize the Palembang airfield in order to facilitate
Operations L and H, and if possible, it shall [further] seize and secure the oil refineries in
Palembang before the enemy destroys them.
(2) Time of execution of the first drop and/or landing shall be the morning of day L – 1. If
weather conditions do not allow this, execution shall be aborted.
(3) The parachute unit and/or landing unit shall be put under the command of the Sixteenth
Army commander on the arrival of the main force of the 38th Division in Palembang.
(4) When Operation L is completed, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group (with the exception of
the parachute and/or landing unit) shall be returned to the unit to which it originally belongs
without separate orders.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Greater East Asia War broke out with oil as the main
cause. In order to seize Palembang, the biggest oil resources in the Dutch East Indies, the
Army had [specifically] started to prepare the employment of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding
Group, which was the only one of its kind. And, in order to make the surprise parachute
drop a success, the announcement of the Navy’s earlier employment of its paratroop unit in
Menado (11 January) had been suppressed. Why then did it give the order to “seize the air-
field first, and the oil refineries [only] if possible”? The [main] reasons were the following:(28)
1. Due to circumstances that will be explained later, the Southern Army considered the
seizure of the Palembang airfield absolutely imperative for strategic and tactical reasons.
Furthermore, following the wishes of IGHQ, the army had also decided that it definitely
had to seize the oil refineries in Palem-
bang as well. However, due to the tim-
ing [of the operation], the air power and
the military capacity of the [paratroop]
raiding group had their limits. This led
to the decision to carry out paradrops
on both the airfield and the oil refiner-
ies, but with priority on the airfield.
2. The Palembang airfield was large to
the extent that one could say that no
other airfield in central or southern
Sumatra could match it in size, and
thus the Southern Army approached
the seizure of this airfield with grim
determination.
Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama disembarking at
the Palembang airfield
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The words recorded in the aforementioned journal of [Staff Officer] Arao that “We
have to expect [some] loss of transport ships,” reflect how keenly the Southern Army at
that time actually felt about [the operation to seize] the Palembang airfield.
In the study that the Southern Army had conducted on the southern operation with
the Second Fleet in early November of the previous year, it had realized that “whereas
brazen transports in large convoys and bold landings may be possible in the surprise
(sudden) attack operations in the Philippines and northern Malaya in the early stages
after the opening of hostilities, around the time of the Bangka and Palembang operations,
the allied forces will probably have recovered themselves and launch a counteroffensive
with superior power. At that time, advancing in convoys may be impossible, and it is
imaginable that [attack operations] will have to be made in large- and small-sized motor-
ized [landing] craft.”
Now, the Southern Army felt that it faced a situation similar to the one described
above, and about which it had been worried [since] before the opening of hostilities. As
mentioned previously, the Southern Army judged that about five-hundred aircraft were
currently [deployed] in the Dutch East Indies, among which were dozens of B–17s and
B–24s. On top of that, also one hundred and some dozen British aircraft were present. It
goes without saying that it worried about the fact that the allied forces still had many air-
craft, but the Southern Army was especially deeply concerned about the B–17s and B–24s,
for it had learned that in the Celebes theater the [Navy] Type–0 fighter planes had been
powerless against the B–17 and B–24 flying fortresses.
On 17 January three B–24s and two B–17s had flown in for an attack over Menado
(the northern tip of Celebes), which [Japan] had seized on 11 January. Seven [Navy] Type–
0 fighter planes had intercepted them but failed to bring them down. The Eleventh Air
Fleet reported the following points as lessons [learned in] combat:(134, 141)
(1) The B–24 and B–17 models that have newly appeared are both very strong in their armored
protection. Each Type–0 fighter plane fired all the bullets it had at close range, but failed to
bring them down. It is necessary to increase as quickly as possible the power of our fighter
planes’ armor-piercing ammunition and also to increase the amount of 20-mm. ammunition
loaded on each aircraft.
(2) It is conceivable that from now on the allied forces will fly these models to Australia to re-
inforce their strength. It is necessary to intensify our operations to intercept them.
(3) Judging from the circumstances when the Type–0 fighter planes pursued [the enemy aircraft]
for two hundred nautical miles, we consider that the allied forces are using [bases in] Java,
Timor and other areas.
(4) In order not to be attacked out of range (i.e. from [bases] whose distances exceed our flying
range) it is necessary for us to have large attack planes ready.
The Southern Army was deeply concerned that allied aircraft, including the dozens of
“fortresses of the sky,” against which the Japanese fighter planes had been powerless,
would conduct furious attacks from Palembang. Moreover, [if seized and used,] the
Palembang airfield would enable [the Army] to forestall the retreat of the allied forces in
the Singapore area as well as to conduct attacks on Java. From a strategic and tactical
[viewpoint], the Southern Army regarded it as absolutely necessary to make a surprise
attack and seize this airfield.
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As for the oil refineries, in view of the earlier examples of Tarakan, Balikpapan and
others, the Southern Army expected a certain degree of destruction [of facilities] by the
allied forces. However, the Army [also] knew that it was impossible [for the allied forces]
to completely destroy [these oil facilities].
Taking these characteristics of the airfield and the oil refineries, and the capacity of
the [Paratroop] Raiding Group into account, the Southern Army issued the aforemen-
tioned order.
3. Another reason was the fact that the [Japanese] air units and the [paratroop] raiding group
had limits to their capacity due to the factor of timing.
Although the Southern Army had the Third and the Fifth Air Forces under its com-
mand, the army had to simultaneously carry out Operation L, the Singapore operations
and the operations in the Burma area. In particular, it was difficult to carry out Operation
L and the capture of the Singapore stronghold at the same time. The state of [progress of
preparation of the seized] airfields was [delayed] as Staff Officer Saitō had described in
his above-mentioned telegram. And also for the [Navy] Malaya Unit, the state of the air-
fields in Kuching and Ledo was [deplorable] as has been explained before. If Japan had
had enough aircraft and airfields available, and if it had been an operation to be conducted
after the Palembang [airfield] was rendered powerless, it could have focused on [the op-
eration to seize] the oil refineries. However, that was not the case.
The 1st Raiding Group was also in a difficult situation. The shipwreck of the 1st Raid-
ing Regiment and its subsequent state was as described before, and it turned out to be
impossible to use [the regiment for the operation] after all. The decision was made to em-
ploy the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment [instead]. However, as mentioned above, the
regiment had just arrived, and its level of training was insufficient. [So,] Colonel Kume,
commander of [the 1st Paratroop] Raiding Group and Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Lieu-
tenant Colonel Itoda resolved to accompany the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment, and
perform a belly-landing [with their aircraft] at the time of the parachute drop of the reg-
iment (neither officer had parachute experience). Because of these limits to the capacity
of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group, the Southern Army had made the decision that the oil
refineries should be “seized and secured, [only] if possible.”
4. The factor which fundamentally affected the employment of the [Paratroop] Raiding
Group this time was the timing [of the operation].
The prime factor in the timing [of the operation] was the Southern Army’s firm de-
termination to “resolutely carry out [the operations] according to the schedule set in the
Manila Agreement.” At the root of this determination of the Southern Army were its sense
of duty that “the schedule set in the Manila Agreement should be accomplished by all
means because the schedule had been reported to IGHQ;” its judgment of the situation
that “Java should be taken in strategic pursuit, while taking advantage of the state of the
war;” its philosophy regarding the Army and the Navy’s joint operations that “these
should be carried through with unshakeable faith;” and its faith as supreme commander
in the units under its command.
The second factor was the [timing of the operation] in relation to the Singapore [op-
eration], that is, the parachute drop had to be carried out right before the fall of Singapore,
and the 38th Division had to be put ashore in connection with the drop. These aims and
their relation to the schedule have already been explained.
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The Southern Army approached the [Navy] Malaya Unit and the Sixteenth Army
with the unshakeable faith that the operations demanded such timing.
[On the other hand,] the Malaya Unit looked at it in a way quite different from the
Southern Army. That is, whereas the Southern Army’s point of view was that “the timing
must not be delayed, and for that, we will move on as soon as the airfields are ready for
use,” the [Navy] Malaya Unit’s point of view was “to [first] beat the enemy before moving
on.” As described earlier, on 31 January the arrangements on the air [operations in] Op-
eration L as well as “the arrangements for Operation L between the 38th Division and the
[Navy] Malaya Unit” were concluded. On the same day, the Southern Army gave order(s)
concerning the [Paratroop] Raiding operation. However, the Classified [Navy] Malaya
Unit Operation Order No. 17 (note: the order to execute the Bangka and Palembang op-
erations), which Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa passed down on the next
day (1 February) read as follows:
This operation shall be swiftly launched the moment the enemy air power in the Malaya area,
eastern Sumatra, western Borneo and western Java has generally been brought under control.(130)
Earlier (just before the opening of hostilities), when the issue had arisen whether the land-
ing of an element of the Twenty-fifth Army in Kota Bharu should be carried out simulta-
neously with the landings in Singora and other points in Thai territory, and the Navy
Department of IGHQ and the Combined Fleet had shown disapproval because of the risks
involved, Commander in Chief Ozawa had nevertheless, once it became his decision to
make, resolutely and clearly supported the plan and thereby deeply impressed the
Twenty-fifth Army, the Southern Army and the Army Department of IGHQ. Even though
this very man, this very Commander in Chief Ozawa, [now] showed a [more cautious]
way of thinking, as seen in the above-mentioned order, the Southern Army would not
hear of any delay at all in the timing [of the operation].
Also, [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura, who was widely known for his brav-
ery as a commander with a resolute and indomitable fighting spirit, and who was partic-
ularly famous for the great authority he had shown on the battlefield in Nanning,
southern China, as commander of the 5th Division, [had shown his concern] when he had
a proposal submitted to the Southern Army staff to reinforce the escort strength. But the
Southern Army staff [had dismissed the proposal even from such a man] by simply saying
that he should trust the strength of the escort of the Navy, as we have seen. 
All this was based on the Southern Army’s belief that “No postponement of the tim-
ing [of the operation], nor [too much] cautiousness should be allowed.”
5. In short, in relation to the timing of the attack on Singapore, [factors such as] the current
superiority of the allied air forces, in particular the threat of the “Fortresses in the Sky,”
progress in the reinforcement of the allied forces in the Sunda Islands, and the current
progress in the preparations for the attack on Singapore made [the Southern Army] think
that it was imperative to seize the Palembang airfield without delay in a sudden attack.
On the other hand, in view of the specific character of the southern operation and of the
intentions of IGHQ, [also] the Palembang oil refineries were targets, which had to be
seized in a paratroop operation. Because of the demands of the timing [of the operation],
the Japanese air operations had to make do with insufficient operational forces and in-
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sufficient preliminary attacks, and they also had to be conducted with insufficient para-
trooper strength. It was highly risky to let the convoy of the 38th Division proceed under
insufficient air support, and although resigned “to expect [some] loss of transport ships,”
this [again] made [the Southern Army] attach all the more importance to the necessity of
seizing the Palembang airfield in a paradrop raid. The judgment regarding the oil refiner-
ies was as previously explained. All this resulted in the decision to drop the [Paratroop]
Raiding Group on both the Palembang airfield and the oil refineries on day L – 1, with
the airfield as the primary objective.
Note: The convoy of the 38th Division consisted of eight ships for the advance party and four-
teen ships for the main force, a total of twenty-two ships. Further, anticipating the difficulties
of sailing upstream and landing, seventy motorized [landing] craft as well as sixty to seventy
fishing boats or small cargo ships were made ready. In order to have the convoy safely reach
[the waters of] southern Sumatra and [successfully] carry out the upriver sailing, the landing,
and the disembarkation while removing underwater obstacles, it was a matter of course to
deny the allied forces the use of the Palembang airfield, but it was also necessary to swiftly
have Japanese air units advance to the airfield.
The Arrangements Between the 38th Division and the [Navy] malaya unit
Following the arrangements on the air operations between the Southern Army and the
[Navy] Malaya Unit (the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet) on the morning of the 31st, in
the afternoon, arrangements were made between the 38th Division and the Malaya Unit,
which were roughly as follows:(96, 118)
1. Forces 
(1) The Army: 38th Division
(a) Advance party: two infantry battalions and two batteries as the core, [in] eight ships.
Mentok landing unit: one-half infantry battalion as the core.
River-ascending Unit [toward] Palembang: one-and-one-half infantry battalion and two
batteries as the core.
(b) Main force: two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion as the core, [in] fourteen
ships
(2) The Navy
(a) Forces to escort the advance party: the 3d Destroyer Squadron ([consisting of] one light
cruiser (the Sendai) and four destroyers), a few minesweepers and submarine chasers.
(b) Forces to escort the main force: the Yura (light cruiser), the Shimushu (coastal defense ves-
sel), four destroyers of the 3d Destroyer Squadron and other small warships. 
(c) Supporting surface forces: the main force of the surface unit of the Malaya Unit ([con-
sisting of] five heavy cruisers (its flagship, the Chōkai, and [the cruisers] Kumano, Suzuya,
Mikuma and Mogami of the 7th Cruiser Division), one aircraft carrier (the Ryūjō), two aux-
iliary seaplane tenders (the Kamikawa-maru and the Sagara-maru), six destroyers and oth-
ers).
(d) Air force: the whole force of the 22d Air Flotilla.
(e) River-ascending Unit [toward] Palembang: the main force of the 9th Base Force ([con-
sisting of] auxiliary minesweeper(s), guard ship(s), fishing boat(s) and others).
2. Schedule for the departure of the transport ships from the assembly point and the start of the
landing (going upstream)
Advance party:
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Mentok Landing Unit ([in] two ships): shall depart from the assembly point in the
evening of day L – 6, arrive at the Mentok [anchorage] before daybreak, and swiftly go
ashore at Mentok.
River-ascending Unit [toward] Palembang ([in] six ships): shall depart from the assembly
point in the evening of day L – 6, arrive at the Mentok [anchorage] before daybreak and,
after changing to [landing] craft and reaching the mouths of the Musi, the Telang and
the Saleh rivers, start going upstream early in the morning.
Main force ([in] fourteen ships): shall depart from the assembly point in the evening of day
L – 4, and reach the mouth of the Musi River before daybreak on day L + 2.
Landing and debarkation is expected to take about ten days for the Mentok landing unit,
and about two weeks for the River-ascending Unit [toward] Palembang and the main force
of the division.
3. Support for the landing and disembarkation, and cooperation concerning the waterway of the
Musi river
(1) A small Navy vessel shall lead the way when the advance party maneuvers craft from the
Mentok anchorage to the mouth of [each] river to go upstream.
(2) Members of the Navy Special Minesweeping Unit shall borrow fifteen large- and small-sized
motorized [landing] craft from the Army at the Mentok anchorage in which they shall clear
the waterway of the Musi River and sweep the river sailing upstream from the river mouth
up to Palembang.
4. Others
Details such as escort at sea, entry into the anchorage, guarding at the anchorage and the wa-
terway shall be arranged between the 38th Division commander and the 3d Destroyer Squadron
commander/9th Base Force commander.
The [Navy] Malaya Unit’s Orders; the Arrangements Made Between the
38th Division and the Navy Escort Force/Navy River-ascending Unit
In conformity with the arrangements made on the 31st, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Ad-
miral Ozawa released the Plan for Operation L by means of [Malaya Unit] Operation Order
No. 17 on the next day, 1 February, and ordered its execution.(115, 118) In this operation plan,
Items 1 and 2 read:
1. Operational objective:
Consists in assisting the 38th Division to swiftly land in Bangka and Palembang and their vicini-
ties, and seizing the key locations in these areas.
2. Mission:
(1) The operation shall be started swiftly when the enemy air power in the Malaya area, eastern
Sumatra, western Borneo and western Java has largely been brought under control.
(2) The transport convoy shall be on standby in Cam Ranh Bay and at the right opportunity de-
part under the escort of the Escort Unit.
The distribution of forces, outlines of the tasks of each unit, signal communications, replen-
ishment and the arrangements between the Navy and the Army were specified in Item 3 and
below.(115, 118)
The outline of the disposition of forces was as follows:(115, 118)
Main Unit, under the direct command of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in
chief: the Chōkai (heavy cruiser), the 7th Cruiser Division (four heavy cruisers), and five de-
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stroyers of the 3d Destroyer Squadron, [shall be charged with] support for the entire opera-
tion.
Escort Unit, led by the 3d Destroyer Squadron commander:
1st Escort Unit: [consisting of] the 3d Destroyer Squadron under the direct command of the 3d
Destroyer Squadron commander (minus eight destroyers) as the core, [shall be charged with]
the direct escort of the advance party.
2d Escort Unit, led by the captain of the Yura: [consisting of] the Yura (light cruiser), two de-
stroyers of the 3d Destroyer Squadron, the Shimushu (coast defense vessel) as the core, [shall
be charged with] the direct escort of the transport convoy of the main force.
1st Air Unit, led by the 22d Air Flotilla commander: [consisting of] the 22d Air Flotilla, and the
Kanoya Air Group (minus half of its strength) as the core, [shall be charged with] (1) de-
stroying enemy warships, (2) destroying the enemy air power in the area east of Bangka and
Palembang in Sumatra, western Borneo and suppressing the [enemy] air power in western
Java, (3) escorting the transport convoy(s), (4) conducting the guarding over sea, and (5)
preparing air base(s) in Malaya for use.
2d Air Unit, led by the captain of the Kamikawa-maru: [consisting of] the auxiliary seaplane ten-
ders Kamikawa-maru and Sagara-maru as the core, [shall be charged with] (1) escort of the
transport convoy(s), (2) conducting the guarding at the anchorages [for] the Bangka and
Palembang [operations] and support for the operation to ascend the rivers [to] Palembang.
3d Air Unit, led by the 4th Carrier Division commander: [consisting of] the 4th Carrier Division
(the aircraft carrier Ryūjō), and one destroyer, [shall be charged with] attacking enemy war-
ships.
River-ascending Unit [toward] Palembang, led by the 9th Base Force commander: [consisting
of] the Hatsutaka, the Eikō-maru, the 91st Guard Unit, element of the 91st Signal Unit, the
Special Minesweeping Unit ([made up of] the Rumoi-maru, the Otowa-maru, eight auxiliary
guard ships, and four fishing boats), the Shimushu (after completion of its task in the 2d Es-
cort Unit), [shall be charged with] (1) the operation to ascend the rivers up to Palembang,
(2) minesweeping and guarding at anchorages [off] Bangka and at the mouth of the Musi
River, depending on the circumstances.
(The rest omitted by the author)
Arrangements Between the 38th Division, the Escort unit and the Navy River-ascending
unit
On 1 February, the 38th Division commander made arrangements on the details [of the op-
eration] at Cam Ranh Bay with R. Adm. Hashimoto Shintarō, commander of the Escort Unit
([and also] 3d Destroyer Squadron commander), and R. Adm. Hiraoka Kumeichi, com-
mander of the [Navy] River-ascending Unit ([and also] 9th Base Force commander). The out-
line was as follows:(118)
1. Distribution of the transport convoy and the commanders whereabouts
Advance Party:
1st Section: (1)(2) the Tajima-maru (with 38th Engineer Regiment Commander Iwabuchi
on board), (2)(3) the Tacoma-maru, (3)(4) the Mansei-maru, and (4)(5) the Ōyō-maru (with
Battalion Commander Miyazawa on board).
2d Section: (5)(?) the An’yō-maru (with Battalion Commander Orita on board), (6)(?) the
Alaska-maru, (7)(1) the Kinugawa-maru (with 229th Infantry Regiment Commander
Tanaka on board), and (8)(6) the Sado-maru (air defense ship).
1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hashimoto will be on board of the Sendai, and
[Navy] River-ascending Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hiraoka on the Hatsutaka.
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Main Force:
3d Section: (9)(1) the Argun-maru, (10)(2) the Singapore-maru, (11)(3) the Shinkyō-maru,
(12)(4) the Rakuyō-maru, (13)(5) the Lima-maru, (14)(6) the Gin’yō-maru (with Division
Commander Sano on board), and (15)(7) the Tsushima-maru.
4th Section: (16)(8) the Meigen-maru, (17)(9) the Taketsu-maru [Buyō-maru?], (18)(10) the
Kenzui-maru, (19)(11) the Makassar-maru, (20)(12) the Shinsei-maru No. 1, (21)(13) the Fusō-
maru (hospital ship), and (22)(14) the Hirokawa-maru (air defense ship).
2d Escort Unit Commander [Navy] Captain Miyoshi will be on board the Yura.
Note: The first parentheses ( ) represent the ship’s number, and the second parentheses
( ) the order of ships in ascending the Musi River.
2. Disposition of forces of the Landing Units
Advance Party (Commander: Colonel Tanaka)
Mentok Landing Unit: [consisting of] one half of infantry battalion, led by Captain Orita
(on board the An’yō-maru).
Musi River Ascending Unit: [consisting of] one infantry battalion and one battery, led
by Colonel Tanaka (on board the Kinugawa-maru).
Saleh River Ascending Unit: [consisting of] one infantry company, one battery, and one
engineer company, led by Lieutenant Colonel Iwabuchi (on board the Tajima-maru).
Telang River Ascending Unit: one-half infantry battalion, and one artillery section, led
by Major Miyazawa (on board the Ōyō-maru).
Debarkation Operation Unit: [consisting of] twenty-seven large-sized motorized [land-
ing] craft, thirty small-sized motorized [landing] craft, and four extra-large motorized
[landing] craft, led by Lieutenant Colonel Morimoto.
Main Force (Commander: the 38th Division commander)
[Consisting of] two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and one engineer company
3. Date of the transport convoy’s departure from the assembly point, date and time to start landing
(going upstream) and the landing schedule
Advance Party
Mentok Landing Unit ([in] two ships): [shall] depart from Cam Ranh Bay at 1900 on day
L – 6, arrive at the Mentok [anchorage] at 0000 on day L, and start landing around 0200
on day L. The landing shall be complete in about ten days.
River-ascending Unit [toward] Palembang ([in] six ships): The same as the above for the
time of departure from Cam Ranh Bay and arrival at the Mentok [anchorage]. After ar-
riving at the Mentok [anchorage], the units shall reach the mouths of the Musi, the Telang
and the Saleh Rivers around 0700 on day L by maneuvering [landing] craft, and each
start ascending the rivers. The transport ships shall change their anchorages to the mouth
of the Musi River at an appropriate time and sail upstream to Palembang, as soon as the
waterway of that river is cleared. The landing shall be completed in about two weeks.
Main Force ([in] fourteen ships)
[Shall] depart from Cam Ranh Bay at 1800 on day L – 4, and arrive at the mouth of the Musi
River about day L + 2. The landing shall be completed in about two weeks.
4. Reconnaissance of the landing points and the rivers to ascend
No reconnaissance shall be undertaken other than covert aerial photo-reconnaissance by
Army and Navy aircraft.
5. Escort at sea
(1) Forces to be employed for escort
(a) Forces to be employed for direct escort
1st Escort Unit: the 3d Destroyer Squadron ([made up of] the Sendai, the 11th Destroyer
Division, and the Asagiri), 1st Minesweeper Division, 11th Subchaser Division (minus
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Subchaser No. 9). [Editor’s note: The text says “Minesweeper No. 9,” which is a mistake.
See also under 2d Escort Unit below.]
2d Escort Unit: the Yura, the Shimushu, the 20th Destroyer Division (minus the Asagiri),
the Shōnan-maru No. 7, the Shōnan-maru No. 12, and the Subchaser No. 9.
(b) Forces to be employed for indirect escort: the Hatsutaka and the Eikō-maru
(2) Navigation 
(a) Navigation route: as shown on the separate drawing (omitted by the author).
(b) Navigation speed: eight knots normal speed.
(c) Navigation formation: as shown on the separate drawing (omitted by the author).
(3) Outline of escort 
6. Entry into the anchorage
(1) Anchorages and the formation at the anchorage: as shown in the separate drawing (omitted
by the author).
(2) Outline of entry into the anchorages
(a) Formation to enter the anchorage: as shown in the separate drawing (omitted by the au-
thor).
(b) The command to “get into formation to enter the anchorage” shall be given two hours
before anchoring, and the minesweepers shall start clearing the route ahead as soon as
they are ready. When sailing at a very low speed, the transport ships shall navigate while
steering clear of mines.
7. Landing under combat conditions and cover
(1) The landing attack in Mentok [shall be made] as a surprise landing in principle. However,
it will be carried out by assault while eliminating attacks of enemy army, naval and air forces,
if the situation should require it.
(2) Landing cover: No naval bombardment shall be conducted.
(3) Support for debarkation operations
(a) The Navy
At [the anchorages of] Mentok and at the mouth of the Musi River, subchasers and aux-
iliary minesweepers shall provide guarding and relief in the waters in and around the
transport convoy anchorage.
At the Mentok [anchorage] on the early morning of day L, the transport ships will change
anchoring spots, and minesweeping shall be conducted.
When the river-ascending unit [toward] Palembang of the advance party maneuvers its
[landing] craft towards the Musi, the Telang and Saleh Rivers from the Mentok [anchor-
age], two small warships shall lead the way up to the mouths of the rivers above.
Assembly points for the [landing] craft units shall be [the side of] the Kinugawa-maru for
the craft heading for the mouths of the Musi and the Telang Rivers, and [the side of] the
Tajima-maru for those heading for the mouth of the Saleh River. 
The expected time of departure from the assembly points (along the ships’ side) shall be
about 0300.
(b) The Army
The Army shall assist the debarkation of seaplane base equipment from the Eikō-maru at
Mentok.
8. Coordination between the Army and the Navy in the Musi River waterway
(1) After anchoring at the Mentok [anchorage], the Eikō-maru shall promptly dispatch crew for
nine small-sized motorized [landing] craft to the Kinugawa-maru, and those for one large-
and one small-sized motorized [landing] craft to the Ōyō-maru, to receive [a total of] one
large-sized motorized [landing] craft (including engine operators) and ten small-sized mo-
torized [landing] craft from the Army. These landing craft will be returned to the Army near
the station pier of Palembang once the clearing of the waterway is completed.
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(2) Zone to be cleared: The naval river-ascending unit shall clear the waterway from the mouth
of the Musi River to three nautical miles upstream of the Palembang railway wharf.
(3) Waterway guidance: Although no waterway guidance for the transport ships will be pro-
vided in the mouth of the Musi River in principle, the Navy shall provide guidance in dan-
gerous areas as the occasion may demand.
(4) The naval river-ascending unit shall report the progress of [its operation to] clear the water-
way to the Kinugawa-maru.
9. Signal communications (the rest omitted by the author.)
The 38th Division’s Order
On 1 February, 38th Division Commander Sano concluded the above detailed arrangements,
and on the next day, the 2d, he issued the following divisional order concerning Operation
L:(69)
NUMA [38th Division] Operation Order A, No. 101
38th Division order Gin’yō-maru, Cam Ranh, 1800, 2 February
1. The [Sixteenth] Army shall destroy the enemy in the Dutch East Indies, seize its bases, and
also secure key military locations and vital resource areas.
2. The division, in conjunction with the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, shall capture south-
ern Sumatra to secure oil resources. Further, it shall swiftly seize air bases in Bangka Island,
Palembang, Martapura, and Tanjungkarang and their vicinities, make them ready for use,
and also destroy enemy naval bases in Lampung Bay and Semangka Bay, to facilitate the
army’s subsequent operations.
The Third Air Force will closely cooperate with the division in executing the operation.
The memorandum of arrangements with the [Navy] 9th Base Force and the 3d Destroyer
Squadron are as shown in the separate volume.
Five small cargo ships and about seventy fishing boats are expected to be newly allocated
[to the division].
3. The advance party shall depart from Cam Ranh Bay on a date to be given in a separate order,
and arrive [on the waters] south of Mentok on Bangka Island around 0000 on day L. About
two infantry companies, led by the battalion commander, shall land on the island, first seize
the Mentok airfield and make it ready for use, and seize Pangkalpinang and other strategic
points on Bangka as well. The main force [of the advance party] shall switch to [landing]
craft on or around the waters [off Mentok], and go up the Telang, Musi and Saleh River
roughly in the disposition detailed below, to seize Palembang. In cooperation with the air-
borne [paratroop] raiding unit, which is scheduled to have already arrived there, it shall
first seize the Palembang airfield and make it ready for use. Also, it shall secure the oil re-
fineries, the power station, and other vital facilities of the city as well as the oil fields in and
around [Talang] Abab and Limau. Further, it shall prepare to seize the air bases in Martapura
and Tanjungkarang as well as to destroy the enemy naval bases in Lampung and Semangka
Bay.
The 3d Destroyer Squadron and the 9th Base Force of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet
shall assist [the advance party] in its landing attack on Bangka Island as well as in its ascent
of the rivers to Palembang.
[The details of the disposition]
(1) Telang River ascending unit
About two infantry companies, and about one artillery section as the core, led by the
battalion commander.
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(2) Musi River ascending unit
About three infantry companies, and about one battery as the core, led by the advance
party commander.
(3) Saleh River ascending unit
About one infantry company, and about one battery as the core, led by the engineer reg-
iment commander.
4. Staff Officer Hosokawa shall accompany the advance party and direct the operations.
5. The Ordnance Department director shall have the main force of the Ordnance Department
accompany the advance party, together with one element of the Ordnance Service Unit, to
facilitate the operation [of the advance party].
6. The Intendance Department director shall have the main force of the Intendance Department
accompany the advance party, to facilitate the operations [of the latter].
7. The Medical Department director shall have one element of the Medical Department accom-
pany the advance party, to facilitate the medical needs [of the latter].
8. The commander of the disembarkation working unit shall have one element assist the ad-
vance party in the landing attacks at Bangka Island, and have the main force cooperate [with
the river-ascending units] in going up the Telang, Musi and Saleh Rivers. Also, [the com-
mander] shall put [his unit] in charge of the disembarkation operations of the advance party
as well as the main force of the division in or near Mentok and Palembang. In addition, one
powerful element shall seize shipping matériel in and around Mentok and Palembang, and
secure loading/unloading facilities. Five small cargo ships and about seventy fishing boats
shall be allocated in or near the Mentok [anchorage].
9. Having been put at the disposal of the advance party commander, the 7th Airfield Company
commander shall cooperate in seizing the Palembang airfield and making it ready for use,
and in making preparations for seizing the Martapura and Tanjungkarang airfields and oth-
ers. About six hundred coolies will be allocated for the construction of the airfields.
10. Having been put at the disposal of the advance party commander, the 33d Airfield Company
commander shall first cooperate in seizing the Mentok airfield and making it ready for use.
Following the advance party’s seizure of Palembang, he shall cooperate [with the party] in
securing the airfield and making it ready for use, as well as in making preparations for seiz-
ing the Martapura and Tanjungkarang airfields and others. About nine hundred coolies will
be allocated for the construction of the airfields.
11. Having been put at the disposal of the advance party commander, one element each of the
25th Air Signal Unit and of the 2d Field Meteorological Company shall respectively have a
part of them stationed in Mentok and their main force in Palembang, in order to provide as-
sistance in securing the airfields and making them ready, and to make preparations for seiz-
ing the airfields mentioned in Items 9 and 10.
12. The 2d Company of the Shipping Signal Regiment shall have its main force accompany the
advance party and one element the main force [of the 38th Division]. It shall be charged with
the signal communications within the convoy during sailing, and with those between the
landing units of the convoy and the disembarkation working unit at the time of the advance
party’s landing attack, and the disembarkation of the advance party and the main force.
13. The oil-drilling unit shall have its main force accompany the advance party, take charge of
taking possession of the oil resources, and also make preparations so that [the unit] can start
operating [the oil production facilities] as soon as possible.
14. The units which shall constitute the main force shall depart from Cam Ranh Bay on a date
to be given in a separate order, arrive at the mouth of the Musi River before daybreak on
day L + 2, and go up the river toward Palembang.
15. The 3d Battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment shall be prepared to promptly come under
the command of the advance party commander upon its arrival in Palembang.
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16. The Mitsuoka Unit of the 4th Tank Regiment shall be prepared to promptly come under the
command of the advance party commander upon its arrival in Palembang.
17. The 23d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (minus two batteries and the Antiaircraft Searchlight
Company) shall be charged with the air defense during sailing and when entering the an-
chorage.
18. The 45th Independent Motor Transport Battalion (minus two companies) shall be prepared
to promptly come under the command of the advance party commander upon its arrival in
Palembang.
19. The director of the Military Administration Department shall put part [of the department]
at the disposal of the advance party commander and have it prepare for introducing a mil-
itary administration, while having the main force [of the department] still continue its cur-
rent duties as before.
20. The head of the Propaganda Group shall put part [of the group] at the disposal of the ad-
vance party commander, and assign it propaganda activities in the division’s areas of oper-
ation, while having the main force [of the group] still continue its current duties as before.
21. From the time of departure from Cam Ranh Bay until entry into the anchorage, all radio
[contact] between the advance party and the main force shall be strictly sealed off other than
the Mark–7 radio of the Shipping Signal Unit.
22. In particular, each unit shall do everything possible to enhance the reputation of the Imperial
Army at home and abroad by acting in the great founding spirit of our nation.
23. I shall be on board the Gin’yō-maru, and shall on day L + 2 leave Cam Ranh Bay along with
the main force to head for Palembang.
Division Commander Sano Tadayoshi
The oil-drilling unit
I will add some explanations about the oil-drilling unit mentioned in the above order.
In September 1941, the oil-drilling group was formed on site within the 21st Field Ordnance
Depot in Saigon. First, Maj. Ōkubo Tōru, accompanied by two personnel drafted from Nippon
Oil Corporation, arrived by air in Saigon to prepare the formation.(49) Then in October, the main
force of the oil-drilling group ([consisting of] about eight commissioned officers including the
group commander Lt. Col. Nagahata Yoshinobu, about ten noncommissioned officers, and about
150 drafted oil engineers) arrived in Saigon by sea to complete the formation. In November, in
order to restore the oil fields in the Miri and Seria sectors in British northern Borneo, the oil-
drilling group was first put under the control of the Kawaguchi Detachment, and the group as-
sembled at Cam Ranh Bay. On 13 December, it departed from Cam Ranh Bay along with the
Kawaguchi Detachment, and went ashore in the Miri and Seria sector on the 16th, where it
worked on the restoration of the oil fields when the latter were seized.(49) This time [however],
the 38th Division was to seize the oil fields in southern Sumatra, but the Twenty-fifth Army also
was to seize the oil fields in northern Sumatra, following the capture of Singapore. Therefore,
arrangements were made to have the Miri oil-drilling group operate in the following way:(49)
The main force, directly led by Group Commander Lieutenant Colonel Nagahata, was
brought under the control of the 38th Division, which would seize the oil fields in southern
Sumatra (Palembang [in particular]), and was transferred from the Miri and Seria sector.
The oil-drilling unit led by Maj. Katō Shunji, who was attached to the group, was brought
under the control of the Twenty-fifth Army, which would seize the oil fields in northern Sumatra,
and was transferred from the Miri and Seria sector.
The Borneo oil-drilling unit led by Maj. Ōkubo Tōru, who was [also] attached to the group,
remained in the Miri and Seria sector.
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The Operational Preparations of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group
As described earlier, around 22 January the Southern Army had abandoned the idea of using
the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group in [the operation against] Palembang. However, by the
25th it had changed this [policy], and on the 31st, gave the order [to employ the group in the
Palembang operation]. Col. Kume Seiichi, commander of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group,
along with the main force of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit ([consisting of] eighteen air-
craft), had reached Guangdong in southern China on 15 January, left there on the 18th and
arrived in Sanya, Hainan [on the same day], from where they departed on the 19th, to arrive
in Phnom Penh in French Indochina.(23) On 22 January, the Southern Army had shown him
the [new] policy on the use of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group,(24) and on 26 January at Phnom
Penh he had passed down Operation Order A, No. 22,(96) and had his units make preparations
according to the following plan. Although the Southern Army had already changed its mind
by that day, it had not yet notified Colonel Kume [about it]. As we have seen, the 1st [Para-
troop] Raiding Group consisted of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment ([which had been]
shipwrecked), the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment ([which had] left the port of Moji on 15
January) and the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Group. The [Paratroop] Raiding Regiments were
made up of four companies with 160 men each, and the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Group was
made up of four squadrons (of nine aircraft) and one airfield company.(93)
outline of the operation Plan of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group(96)
First [Operation] (in early February)
Pekanbaru (note: central Sumatra) [paradrop] raiding operation: The objective is to seize the
airfield and suppress enemy aircraft activity. Forces to be employed are 180 men led by a
company commander of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment. The operation shall be
launched from the Taiping base.
Jambi (note: central Sumatra) [paradrop] raiding operation: The objective is to  seize the airfield
in order to advance Japanese Type–97 fighter plane unit(s), and at the same time, to try to
carry out a sudden attack on Palembang by using seized motor vehicles. Forces to be em-
ployed are 270 men led by the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment commander. The operation
shall be launched from the Kluang base.
Second [Operation] (in late February)
Sabang (note: an island northwest of Sumatra) [paradrop] raiding operation: The objective is to
seize and secure this important island, which is a maritime strategic point. Forces to be em-
ployed are 270 men, led by a [paratroop] raiding regiment commander. The operation shall
be launched from the Ayer Tawar base.
The Andamans (note: an archipelago west of the Malay peninsula) [paradrop] raiding operation:
The objective is to seize and secure the archipelago, a major maritime strategic point. Forces
to be employed are 180 men, led by a [paratroop] raiding regiment commander. The opera-
tion shall be launched from the Tavoy base.
Third [Operation] (in early March)
Yenangyaung (note: Burma) [paradrop] raiding operation: The objective is to seize and secure
a large oil field area. Forces to be employed are three companies, led by a [paratroop] raiding
regiment commander. The operation shall be launched from the Lampang base.
As the above plan shows, there was no outlook yet for when it would be possible to use the
shipwrecked 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment.
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As explained earlier, because of the postponement of Operations L and H, decided at the
Manila Conference, and the opinions expressed by the people concerned, the Southern Army
had from about the 24th strengthened its resolution to use [the Paratroop Raiding Group]
against Palembang, and on the 31st it passed down the order for the drop on the Palembang
airfield (the chief aim), and on the oil refineries (a part of them).(96) Based on this Southern
Army order of the 31st, the Third Air Force Commander Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō on the
same day gave the following order:(96)
Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 244
Third Air Force order Sungai Petani, 2000, 31 January
1. The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall be newly brought under my command.
2. A part of the [Third] Air Force shall make preparations for the [Paradrop] Raiding Operation
[in Operation] L. The outline of preparatory training for the [Paradrop] Raiding Operation
[in Operation] L is as shown in the separate volume (omitted by the author).
3. The 7th Air Division commander [Maj. Gen. Yamamoto Kenji] shall temporarily put the 98th
Air Group commander under my direct command.
4. In preparation for the [Paradrop] Raiding Operation [in Operation] L, the 98th Air Group
commander shall, based on the outline in the separate volume, have the required force en-
gage in joint training with the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group in Phnom Penh, Sungai Petani
and Ketil and their vicinities. The commander shall also give assistance to the 1st [Paratroop]
Raiding Group with its shift of position to Malaya. He shall arrange the particulars with the
1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander. The Southern Army is expected to take care of
the ground duties, quartering and supplies in Phnom Penh.
5. The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander shall conduct joint training with the 98th
Air Group according to the outline in the separate volume. Further, he shall rapidly advance
the personnel and matériel for the first and the second [Paradrop] Raiding Operation [in
Operation] L to Sungai Petani and have [the unit(s)] make preparations for the subsequent
operations. When rapidly advancing personnel and matériel to Sungai Petani, the com-
mander shall have the assistance of the 98th Air Group.
6. The 18th Air Ground Support commander shall be charged with the ground duties as well
as quartering and supplies for the units mentioned in the previous item(s).
7. I am in Sungai Petani, and shall advance toward [Kluang] or its vicinity when the Kluang
airfield is ready for use.
In accordance with the above order, 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander Colonel
Kume on the same day (the 31st) at Phnom Penh issued Operation Order A, No. 25, released
the following outline of the operational preparation plan and prepared for the operation.(96)
1. (Assisted by twenty-seven aircraft of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit, and about nineteen
heavy bombers of the 98th Air Group), 260 men led by the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment
Commander Maj. Kōmura Takeo, shall carry out a sudden attack on the Palembang airfield
and seize it, after which they will seize and secure [the city of] Palembang. [In the meantime,]
130 men led by a company commander of the regiment (assisted by thirteen aircraft of the
[Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit, and about eight heavy bombers of the 98th Air Group), shall
carry out a sudden attack on the Palembang oil refineries and seize them.
Note: One [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit aircraft was able to carry ten paratroopers. The rea-
son that the number of the aircraft and that of the paratroopers [allocated for the at-
tack] on the Palembang airfield did not match is due to the fact that one aircraft was
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to carry out a belly-landing, and twenty-six aircraft were to be employed for the para-
troopers.
2. Schedule of Preparations for the Operation
2 till 4 February [inclusive]: Joint training with heavy bombers at Phnom Penh
5 till 6 February [inclusive]: Rapid advance to Sungai Petani
7 February: Preparation for the operation at Sungai Petani
8 February: Rapid advance to the Kluang or the Kahang airfield
9 February: Execution of [paradrop] raiding [operation]
On 4 February (the day when the advance party of the 38th Division was scheduled to leave
Cam Ranh Bay), Third Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Sugawara passed down
the following order concerning the execution of Operation L.(96)
Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 257
Third Air Force order Sungai Petani, 0800, 4 February 
1. Information on Palembang and its vicinity is as shown in Information Record No. 67 in the sep-
arate volume (note by the author: original document missing).
2. The [Third] Air Force shall continue to cooperate with the Twenty-fifth Army and at the same
time execute Operation L in cooperation with the Sixteenth Army and the Navy. The start of
[the operation to] capture Singapore has been scheduled for the night of 7 February, and day L
for 10 February; for both separate orders shall be issued. The outline of the cooperation with
the Twenty-fifth Army in the operation to capture Singapore is shown in separate volume No.
1 (omitted by the author); the outline of the air operations [in Operation] L in separate volume
No. 2 (note by the author: described earlier); the memorandum of the arrangement on air [op-
erations] between the Army and the Navy regarding Operation L in separate volume No. 3 (note
of author: described earlier); and the outline of the [Paradrop] Raiding Operation [in Operation]
L in separate volume No. 4.
3. The 7th Air Division commander shall in conformity with separate volume No. 1 mainly coop-
erate in the Twenty-fifth Army’s operation to capture Singapore. He may use the Kluang airfield
as an advance base for an element of his force except on day L – 1. Further, from 2400 on 5 Feb-
ruary onwards, he shall temporarily put the 64th Air Group under the command of the 3d Air
Division commander at Kahang.
4. The 3d Air Division commander shall discharge the duties stated below:
(1) Continue his cooperation with the Twenty-fifth Army in its operation.
(2) Search for enemy aircraft in Palembang and its vicinity and destroy them, mainly with his
fighter plane unit(s) between day L – 4 and day L – 2.
(3) Carry out the [paradrop] raiding operation against Palembang and its vicinity in conformity
with separate volume No. 4.
(4) Provide cover for the convoy of the 38th Division under sail, with an element of his fighter
plane unit(s) from 1700 of day L – 1 until about the evening [of the same day].
(5) Make preparations to advance an element of his force to the Palembang airfield when it is
seized and ready for use in order to cooperate with the Sixteenth Army.
[Also,] he shall temporarily put the 64th Air Group under his command at Kahang at 2400
on 5 February.
5. The 12th Air Division commander shall discharge the duties stated below:
(1) Continue the tasks stated in Item 5 of Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 230, particu-
larly the cooperation with the 3d and the 7th Air Divisions in their combat in the air above
the Singapore sector between day L – 4 and day L – 2.
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(2) Keep watch on the Pekanbaru airfield during Operation L and seize the opportunity to
search for enemy aircraft appearing at the airfield and destroy them.
(3) Make preparations to advance an element to the Palembang airfield on day L and onwards,
so that it can take charge of the air defense of the place and its vicinity.
The 1st Squadron of the 11th Air Group shall be returned to its original command after pro-
viding cover for the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit during its rapid advance to the Kluang
and the Kahang airfields.
6. The 1st Raiding Group commander shall, in conformity with separate volume No. 4, carry out
a paratroop raid on or around the Palembang airfield and the oil refineries at 1130 on day L – 1,
seize and secure these surroundings, while facilitating the attacks of the [Third] Air Force and
the 38th Division.
[The commander] shall temporarily put the 12th Transport Squadron under his command and
have the 3d Air Division, the 81st and the 98th Air Group cooperate in the execution of the
[paradrop] raiding [operation] until the completion of Raiding Operation L. However, he shall
give instructions to the 98th Air Group commander regarding the details of the raiding opera-
tion.
The parachuting and landing units shall come under the command of the Sixteenth Army com-
mander from the moment of the landing of the 38th Division at Palembang. After completion
of Operation L, the other units under [the command of] the group shall, without separate orders,
be returned to their original command.
7. The 81st and the 98th Air Groups, in conformity with separate volume No. 4, shall be charged
with the raiding operation, along with the units mentioned in the previous item. The 98th Air
Group commander shall receive instructions from the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group com-
mander regarding the details of the raiding operation.
8. The 1st Squadron of the 11th Air Group shall return to its original command on day L – 2, after
[covering] the rapid advance of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit to the Kluang and the Kahang
airfields.
9. I shall be in Kluang.
Note by the author: Outline of the Third Air Force’s disposition of forces at that time
[Units] under the direct control of the [Third] Air Force: the 81st (command reconnaissance),
and the 98th (heavy bombers) Air Groups, 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group
3d Air Division: the 27th (light bombers), the 75th (light bombers), the 90th (light bombers), and
the 59th (fighter planes) Air Groups, and the 50th Independent Squadron (command recon-
naissance)
7th Air Division: the 64th (fighter planes), the 12th (heavy bombers), and the 60th (heavy
bombers) Air Groups, and the 51st Independent Squadron (command reconnaissance)
12th Air Division: the 1st (fighter planes), and the 11th (fighter planes) Air Groups, and the 47th
Independent Squadron (fighter planes)
Separate volume No. 4 outline of [Paradrop] Raiding operation [in operation] L
1. Mission 
[We shall] seize the Palembang airfield to facilitate Operations L and H, and [also] seize and
secure the oil refineries in Palembang before the enemy destroys them.
2. Outline of the Operations 
(1) Prior to day L – 1, the 3d Air Division (including the units [temporarily] attached) shall
destroy the enemy air power in Palembang.
(2) The first (paradrop) raid shall be set at 1130 on day L – 1. 
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However, the execution shall be aborted by separate order(s) if inevitable due to weather
or other conditions.
(3) By the evening of day L – 2, the first echelon shall be deployed to Kahang, the second
echelon and one air group of light bombers of the 3d Air Division to Kluang, to be ready
for the launch of the raiding [operation].
(4) The first and the second echelons shall operate separately. The first echelon shall execute
the parachuting [operation] on the Palembang airfield and its vicinity, and the second
echelon on the Palembang oil refineries and their vicinity. Each shall mop up the enemy
in the surroundings, seize and secure the objectives of their respective operations until
the arrival of the 38th Division. The paratrooper unit of the first echelon shall [also] attack
Palembang barracks, circumstances permitting.
(5) The air groups of light bombers of the 3d Air Division shall in general accompany the
first or the second echelon, and attack the barracks in Palembang city right before the
parachuting [operation].
(6) [Some aircraft of] the reconnaissance unit(s) under the direct control of the [Third] Air
Force shall fly ahead of the echelons while others shall accompany them, to conduct sur-
veillance of the battle site.
(7) After the execution of the paradrop [operation], the first and the second echelon as well
as the air groups of light bombers shall assemble and return as quickly as possible. The
air groups of heavy bombers shall return to their bases, while the [Paratroop] Raiding
([paratrooper] transport) Air Unit shall return to its after refueling at the Kluang or the
Kahang airfield. However, units that can directly return to their bases shall not conduct
the above-mentioned refueling.
(8) After providing the cover for the execution of the first [paradrop] raiding operation, one
element of the fighter plane units of the 3d Air Division shall provide air cover [also] for
the convoy roughly from 1700 onwards. Further, if required, it shall support the ground
battle, while making sure of the progress of the Japanese troops.
(9) The 3d Air Division will timely have its command reconnaissance unit conduct surveil-
lance of the combat site of the paratroopers unit.
(10) The second [paradrop] raid shall be prepared, set for 1500 on the day after that of the
first raid. The forces to be employed in [the second] paradrop (and landing) [raid] shall
be about two squadrons of the air transport unit as the standard, and its drop zone shall
be set at the Palembang airfield.
3. The disposition of the forces to be employed and the operation schedule are as shown on
Separate Sheet No. 1.
4. The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander shall decide on the details of the basic stan-
dard for the joint operations, the drop zones of the echelons, and the dispositions during
the flight.
Separate Sheet No. 1
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Rough overview of disposition of forces to be employed and 
the schedule of Palembang [paradrop] raiding operation
Date Disposition of forces Operation objectives (tasks) Outline of actions
Day L – 4
through
Day L – 1
Fighter planes of the 3d
Air Division (including
units brought under the
command of the divi-
sion)
To destroy enemy aircraft on
the Palembang airfield.
Attacks shall be made at a good op-
portunity. The launching bases will
be the Kluang and Kahang airfields.
Required forces of the
12th Air Division
To take command of the air
over the Singapore sector; to
watch on the Pekanbaru air-
field; and to destroy enemy air-
craft on this airfield, if required.
Attacks shall be made at a good op-
portunity. The launching base will be
Batu Pahat.
Day L – 2
The first raiding unit of
the [Paratroop] Raiding
Group, the 98th, the 59th,
the 64th Air Group, three
aircraft of the 81st Air
Group, one air group of
light bombers of the 3d
Air Division
For the first [paradrop] raid,
each echelon will assemble by
the evening at the Kluang or
the Kahang [airfield], to pre-
pare for departing on day L – 1.
1. The first raiding unit of the [Para-
troop] Raiding Group will depart
from Sungai Petani and advance to
the Kluang or the Kahang [air-
field].
2. The 98th Air Group shall depart
from the Ketil [airfield], assemble
two squadrons at the Kahang [air-
field], and another at the Kluang
[airfield].
Day L – 1
1st Echelon:
One element of the 2d
[Paratroop] Raiding
Regiment [transported
by] about two
squadrons of the [Para-
troop] Raiding Air Unit. 
About two squadrons of
the 98th Air Group, the
64th Air Group, one air-
craft of the 81st Air
Group (accompanying).
2d Echelon: 
One element of the 2d
[Paratroop] Raiding
Regiment [transported
by] about two
squadrons of the [Air]
Transport [Unit]. 
One squadron of the
98th Air Group, the 59th
Air Group, one aircraft
of the 81st Air Group
(accompanying).
Another aircraft of the
81st Air Group (to go in
advance).
1. 1st Echelon: To execute the
[paradrop] raid at the Palem-
bang airfield and its vicinity,
secure the airfield, and
quickly make it ready for use
by Type–97 fighter planes.
2. 2d Echelon: To execute the
[paradrop] raid at the oil re-
fineries in Palembang and
their vicinity, seize and se-
cure these refineries before
destruction by the enemy. 
3. The 98th Air Group shall
transport the weaponry and
matériel respectively for each
transport squadron of both
echelons, and [also] provide
cover fire against antiaircraft
fire at the rear of the trans-
port squadrons. 
4. The air groups of fighter
planes shall provide the di-
rect cover for each echelon
respectively. 
5. The command reconnais-
sance planes shall conduct re-
connaissance just before and
during the time of the opera-
tion, and provide guidance.
1. Execution of the [paradrop] raid
shall be at 1130.
2. The 1st echelon will depart from
the Kahang, and the 2d  from the
Kluang base.
3. [All units] shall return to their ad-
vance base(s). However, units that
have sufficient flight range shall di-
rectly return to their original base.
4. If it is impossible to operate in this
[way] due to the situation of the
transport aircraft, the number of
units shall not be reduced even if a
reduction in the number of men
should be necessary.
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Day L – 1
[cont.]
One element of the light
bomber unit(s) of the 3d
Air Division 
Attacks against the barracks in
the city of Palembang.
1. [The operation] shall be conducted
right before the execution of the
first [paradrop] raid. [The element]
shall operate along with one of the
echelons as long as it can. 
2. [It] shall depart from the Kluang
base.
One element of the
fighter plane unit(s) of
the 3d Air Division (in-
cluding units brought
under the control of the
division)
Air cover for the convoy of the
38th Division
1. After returning from [the task] to
cover the first [paradrop] raid, it
shall swiftly go to the air above the
convoy, to provide cover from
roughly 1700 onwards.
2. This [operation] shall be sus-
pended so that [the unit] can return
and land at dusk.
Day L
3d Echelon: 
One element of the 2d
[Paratroop] Raiding
Regiment [transported
by] about two
squadrons of [Air]
Transport [Unit]. About
1 squadron of the 98th
Air Group, about one-
half of fighter plane
unit(s) of the 3d Air Di-
vision (including the
units brought under the
control of the division),
one aircraft of the 81st
Air Group
1. To execute the [paradrop]
raid at the Palembang airfield
and its vicinity, to reinforce
[the first raiding unit].
2. The tasks for the air units to
cooperate [in the above oper-
ation] shall be the same as on
the previous day.
1. The Kluang airfield shall be used
as the base to launch [the opera-
tions]. 
2. Execution of the [paradrop] raid is
scheduled at 1500. The launching
[of the operation] shall be given in
separate order(s).
Elements of the 3d and
the 7th Air Division
To support the ground combat
in Palembang and its vicinity, if
required.
An Element of the 12th
Air Division
To prepare to advance to the
Palembang airfield and under-
take the task of the air defense
of Palembang and vicinity, as
soon as the airfield has been
provisionally made ready.
Day L – 1
Day L
Command Reconnais-
sance Unit of the 3d Air
Division
To conduct surveillance of the
battle site at the appropriate mo-
ments after the drop of the
[paratroop] raiding group.
Comments
1. The advancement of forces on day L onwards shall be announced by separate order(s).
2. This table shall in part be subject to change depending on the situation.
(2) Postponement of [Operation] L and H
Second Postponement of [Operation] L (Two Days)
As we have seen, on 1 February the [Navy] Malaya Unit (First Southern Expeditionary Fleet),
the naval escort unit and the naval river-ascending unit had already passed down orders re-
garding the execution of Operation L; the 38th Division had done so on 2 February, and the
Third Air Force on 4 February. And the time of departure [of the advance party] from Cam
Ranh Bay had been set at 1900 on 4 February. 
However, just before the time of departure (on the evening of the 4th), Colonel Takashima
and Colonel Kitamura, senior staff officers of Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sixteenth Army,
Chief of Operations of the Sixteenth Army Lieutenant Colonel Oda, and [Navy] Commander
Wakatsuki, staff officer of the Third Fleet seconded to the Sixteenth Army, came to the staff
office of the Southern Army, where Staff Officer Wakatsuki requested Colonel Ishii, senior
staff of Section 1 of the Southern Army, “to postpone the execution of Operation L for just two
days, because not much progress has been made in making the Ledo airfield ready for use.”(23)
In fact, this was exactly what the Southern Army had been wary of, because [for one
thing,] such an atmosphere [of favoring postponement] had [indeed] been detected on the
31st during the previously described visit of the [Southern Army] Staff Officers Arao and
Matsumae to Cam Ranh Bay, [and for another,] because [the Southern Army] knew that the
[Navy] Malaya Unit had sent a telegram on the 2d to the Sixteenth Army headquarters in
Gaoxiong about its wish to postpone the operation,(33) and that on this very day (the 4th) Six-
teenth Army Commander Imamura and his party were visiting Cam Ranh Bay to have talks
with the Malaya Unit about it.(34) Thus, on the early morning of the 4th, the Southern Army
had let Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Saiki, who stayed in Saigon, send a military classified
telegram (note: which was sent with priority) [to the Sixteen Army commander at] Cam Ranh
Bay, to notify them that “the Southern Army would definitely not agree to a change of sched-
ule of day L.”(34)
The Southern Army staff office was disgusted that the Sixteenth Army staff officers had
joined the Navy staff officer en bloc, and that the Navy again requested another postpone-
ment just as at the time of the Kuantan, Endau and Mersing operations, or at the Manila Con-
ference.(23) Colonel Ishii mainly argued with [Navy] Commander Wakatsuki and insisted: “It
has been mutually agreed at the Manila [Conference] that in the event the Ledo airfields were
unusable, because [at that time] the seizure of the Ledo airfields was still uncertain, [other]
airfields in the Malaya area would be used [instead] for conducting the air campaign; as the
arrangements have been settled that way, the fact that the Ledo airfields cannot be used does
at this late date not constitute a reason for a postponement.”(23) Navy Commander Wakatsuki
explained: “The 22d Air Flotilla has started moving its forces to the Ledo area, judging that
it could use the airfields, even though it wondered whether it was the right thing to do be-
cause the situation in Ledo was still unclear; subsequently, the Flotilla learned that it would
take longer than expected to make the airfields ready for use, but that it is now too late to
redirect the forces to the Malaya area.”(23) The staff officers of the Sixteenth Army made com-
ments implying that they rather supported Commander Wakatsuki of the Navy, as they had
done at the Manila Conference,(23, 40) and the discussion went on for about one hour.(23) Navy
Commander Wakatsuki repeated time and again that “this is the last time to request a post-
ponement and there will be no such requests again from now on.”(23) Colonel Ishii did not
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yield, but when breaking up [the meeting], he felt that “a two-day postponement would
probably be inevitable.”(23) After receiving approval, Staff Officer Ishii sent the following
telegram to the Southern Task Force (i.e. the Second Fleet).(23)
1. At the talks, which the OSAMU-SHūDAN (note by the author: the Sixteenth Army) had with the
First Southern Expeditionary Fleet at Cam Ranh Bay today, a request for a two-day postpone-
ment of the launch of Operation L was made by the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet because
the airfields had not yet been made ready for use.
2. Presently, we have completed all our preparations and scheduled the start of our ground attacks
against Singapore from the 7th onwards. As the surrender [of Singapore] is imminent, we would
like to seize an opportune moment ahead [of the fall of Singapore] to carry out [Operation] L.
We would like your consideration for the realization of the above.
In reply to this telegram, the Southern Task Force (the Second Fleet) wired back as follows:(23)
[We] would like a one- or two-day postponement be [decided] in talks between the Sixteenth
Army and the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
The date to launch [Operation] L, which had been set on “roughly day x + 60” at the sugges-
tion of the Southern Army ([in the] Cam Ranh Agreement) on 1 January and postponed to
“day x + 64” on 28 January ([in the] Manila Agreement), now had to be postponed once again
to “day x + 66.” Having received the reply from the [Navy] Southern Task Force, the Southern
Army, while sending the following telegram to seek the approval of the Army Department
of IGHQ on the same day (the 5th), issued an order to postpone [Operation] L by two days,
setting it on 12 February.(23)
From: Chief of Staff, Southern Army, sent on 5 February
To: Vice Chief, Army General Staff
1. On the 4th, a request for a two-day postponement of [Operation] L came from the First Southern
Expeditionary Fleet to the OSAMU-SHūDAN.
2. The reason for this was a delay in providing the Ledo airfields with fuel and ammunition. De-
spite the arrangement that the airfields in Malaya should be used if there was no prospect for
using the Ledo airfield for [Operation] L, the Navy had focused itself on the Ledo airfield, which
it said resulted in another delay in providing other airfields in Malaya with fuel and ammuni-
tion.
3. As for the Army, the Twenty-fifth Army has seized Kluang on 25 January, as agreed with the
Navy. The Third Air Force and the OSAMU-SHūDAN have both completed their preparations.
At 1022 on the 4th, the [Navy] Malaya Unit, under the name of the senior staff officer, notified
its subordinate units that “Day L is expected to be postponed by two days; the decision will
be made after consultation with the Sixteenth Army commander around noon today.” It was
followed by a telegram sent at 1530 on the same day under the name of the chief of staff [of
the unit], which read: “For the present moment the date [of Operation] L is expected to be
postponed by two days.”(130)
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The Situation at Ledo Until Then
The Kawaguchi Detachment had seized the Ledo airfield on 27 January and from the 28th
until the end of the month provisionally repaired a 50-meter wide and 1,000-meter long run-
way. However, for the deployment of the Navy land-based medium-sized attack planes, the
runway had to be extended to a length of 1,300 meters. The detachment was working at full
stretch day and night in an area right below the equator on the rebuilding of the roads and
the airfield, allowing its officers and men only a few hours of sleep per day.(23) Moreover,
Ledo was located far into the interior, and the roads leading to the area from the coast had
in places been destroyed, and also more than a dozen bridges had been demolished. On 3
February, an element of the [Navy] land-based medium-sized attack planes took the risk and
performed a landing (note by the author: although the number of planes is unknown, it was
apparently a trial landing performed by just a few aircraft). However, even on 4 February,
the fuel accumulated in Ledo was just a mere total of two hundred drums. The matter was
that the supplies were [first] transported upriver for about forty-five kilometers by motorized
[landing] craft from Pemangkat on the west coast to Sambas, taking as much as sixteen hours,
and then with great difficulty from Sambas to Ledo for about eighty kilometers along a de-
stroyed road.(23)
Previously, the Ledo situation has been described up to the point that on 19 January the
Kawaguchi Detachment reported to the Southern Army its plan (1) to have the 1st unit led
by Regimental Commander Oka ([consisting of] five infantry companies as the core) seize Ledo
by way of the Kuching – Ledo road, and (2) to have the 2d unit under the direct command
of Detachment Commander Kawaguchi ([consisting of] three companies led by a battalion
commander as the core) depart from Kuching by sea on the night of the 22d until noon on
the 23d in three echelons and land on the shore west of Ledo; and I have described that (3)
on the 20th the bombshell motion of a two-week postponement of [Operation] L tabled at
Cam Ranh Bay had led to heated arguments between Staff Officer Ishii and Malaya Unit Staff
Officer Tomari, which had made [Kawaguchi Detachment] Staff Officer Shiraishi so acutely
aware of the significance of Ledo that he had immediately sent a telegram to Detachment
Commander Kawaguchi. Since then, the following developments had occurred in Ledo.
The Seizure of Ledo
On 23 January, Detachment Commander Kawaguchi had wired to the Southern Army from
Kuching about the situation at the Kuching airfield: “At the Kuching airfield, it is easy to
take off and land when the weather is fine, but in rainy weather, even experienced pilots will
need extra caution when flying small aircraft. Although [the runway of] the airfield runs
1,000 meters from north to south, the northernmost 100 meters are not usable at present, be-
cause the ground level is being raised.” However on the same day, having received the pre-
viously mentioned telegram sent by Staff Officer Shiraishi from Saigon (“that [the Army
Department] of IGHQ and others pin their hopes on the ongoing operation”), Commander
Kawaguchi sent the following telegram to the Southern Army:(23)
Kawaguchi Detachment Telegram No. 73 (sent on 23 January)
1. The weekly precipitation in Kuching until yesterday the 21st amounted to about forty inches,
which is one-fourth of the annual precipitation; it was a heavy rainfall rarely seen in recent years.
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2. The Siluas River and streams in its vicinity have flooded and turned the whole place into a sea.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to cross the water because not a single dugout canoe was found
around the place, and making a raft will not do because neither the bamboo nor the wood is
buoyant.
3. There are three-meter high plunging breakers at sea, and even during daytime there is a risk
that boats will capsize. As enemy flying boats frequently come flying over Kuching and its vicin-
ity, our intentions will be discovered if we do not sail at night in the dark. Consequently, we
must wait until the day that sailing by night becomes possible.
4. As the situation on land and at sea is as such, we cannot do anything no matter how impatient
we are, and thus we request your understanding.
On the following day, the 24th, Detachment Commander Kawaguchi (at Kuching) again sent
the Southern Army the following telegram.(23) The [Navy] Malaya Unit, meanwhile, had
launched [the operation to provide] cover for the disembarkation operations at Endau as
well as the Anambas landing operations with this day (the 24th) as day 1 (both the debarka-
tion and the landing operations were executed on the 26th).(118, 126)
Kawaguchi Detachment Telegram No. 80 (sent on 24 January)
1. Even though the waves are finally subsiding, they are still two and a half meters high, and it is
[still] difficult to sail in boats. Consequently, I have decided to postpone [the operation] for an-
other day.
2. According to a telegram sent to the [naval] landing force, the Navy’s fighter planes and the
Kamikawa-maru (an auxiliary seaplane tender) should arrive in Kuching around the 27th.
3. If it were possible to have the Navy aircraft arrive tomorrow on the 25th, they would be able to
assist in the actions of our unit from the 25th onwards.
On the following day, the 25th, Detachment Commander Kawaguchi wired the Southern
Army: “As the waves have subsided to two meters high, the first echelon ([consisting of]
large- and small-sized motorized [landing] craft and fishing boats) shall leave Kuching this
evening, the second and the third echelons ([consisting of] seized small steamships) on the
morning of tomorrow the 26th, and all of them are expected to land in and around Pemangkat
around daybreak on the 27th.”(23) Then on the same day, the detachment commander wired
the following by means of Kawaguchi Detachment Field Telegram No. 88:(23) “(1) On the 23d
and the 24th the weather has improved, and the weather is fine today too. The airfield was
bombed yesterday, the 24th, but nevertheless it was made ready; (2) According to a report
from the 1st unit, it expects to seize the Ledo [airfield] on the 29th; (3) I express my sincere
gratitude for the concern you have shown to Staff Officer Shiraishi while he was in Saigon.”
Simultaneously, Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Murakami, who was attached to the detach-
ment, also wired the following to the Southern Army by means of Kawaguchi Detachment
Field Telegram No. 89:(23)
The departure of the 2d unit of the Kawaguchi Detachment was delayed due to high waves,
but its first echelon is scheduled to depart on the evening of the 25th. Although the detachment
commander persistently insists on sailing without support, [I am of] the opinion that it is better
if the detachment be provided with air cover while moving southward on the afternoon of the
26th if possible.
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The 1st unit, led by Col. Oka Akinosuke, had started its operations on 24 January, driven
away forty to fifty enemy soldiers in Siluas and its vicinity on the morning of the same day,
after which the unit had defeated about one thousand enemy troops at Sanggau [Sanggan],
and seized the Ledo airfield at 1000 on the 27th.(23, 91)
The 2d Unit, under the direct command of Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi Kiyotake, had departed
from Kuching between 1930 on the 25th and 1100 on the 26th in three echelons (with Detach-
ment Commander Kawaguchi accompanying the third echelon). The unit successfully made
a surprise landing in Pemangkat at 0700 on the 27th. After sending a telegram to Commander
in Chief Terauchi [of the Southern Army]: “Although it is the august virtue of His Majesty
the Emperor that enabled us to accomplish without cover the above important task (note by
the author: maneuvering the boats at sea along the coast and landing at Pemangkat), we owe
it [also] to your constant guidance for which we are deeply grateful” (Kawaguchi Detachment
Field Telegram No. 96 sent on the 27th), the unit continued to closely pursue the allied forces,
which were taking flight both by land and by sea, and on the same day successfully seized
Sambas at 1500, followed by Singkawang at 2100.(23) Detachment Commander Kawaguchi
reported to the Southern Army by telegram: “We will continue our operation to first mop
up the main forces of the enemy in the Pontianak area, [then] turn around and charge toward
the Ledo area; while advancing northward to the Siluas area, we shall swiftly seize the air-
fields and make them ready for use.” However, the Southern Army had already learned from
a report by 1st unit Commander Oka that the 1st unit had [already] seized the Ledo airfield.
Having received a telegram from the Southern Army which told him to “report the actual
situation of the Ledo airfields by return,” the detachment commander wired on the morning
of the 28th the following Detachment Telegram No. 101:(23)
1. While overcoming repeated stiff resistance and dealing with blown up bridges, an element of
the detachment has reached Singkawang at 2100 on the 27th. However, in pursuing [the enemy],
the detachment has no other means but to do it mainly on bicycles and on foot.
2. Gathering from the talk of the natives, it appears that the Ledo airfields have been destroyed to
a considerable degree.
3. Recognizing that repair of the airfields is the most urgent matter in view of the overall operations
of the Southern Army, the detachment shall change its plan. On the early morning of the 28th it
shall leave Singkawang; while having one element undertake the above-mentioned seizure and
preparation [of the airfields], it shall engage with the main force in hot pursuit of the enemy in
Pontianak to mop them up. 
Then, on the 28th, Detachment Commander Kawaguchi wired by means of Detachment Field
Telegram No. 104 from Singkawang to the Southern Army that “measured with the eye, the
[main] Ledo airfield is 300 meters wide and 1,000 meters long, and has been blasted in four-
teen or fifteen places.”(23) Meanwhile on the evening of the same day, 1st unit Commander
Oka wired by means of Detachment Telegram No. 399 to the Southern Army from Ledo that
“[repair] work at the [main] Ledo airfield has finally started since the afternoon of the 28th,
and with the [available] strength, the repair of the 50-meter wide and 1,000-meter long run-
way will be done in a couple of days.”(23)
In the meantime, the Navy Malaya Unit had been providing support for the Southern
Army’s disembarkation operation at Endau (carried out in two transport ships), and had also
been conducting the operation to occupy the [enemy] base on the Anambas Islands.(118, 126) The
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forces had in outline been deployed as follows: the 3d Destroyer Squadron (minus the 12th
and the 19th Destroyer Divisions) had provided the direct escort for the two Army transport
ships which left Singora on the 24th and entered the anchorage and engaged in the debarka-
tion [operation] at Endau on the 26th; the 9th Base Force had left Puolo Condore on the 24th
and occupied Anambas Islands on the 26th; the 7th Cruiser Division (with the 19th Destroyer
Division attached), the 4th Carrier Division ([with] the aircraft carrier Ryūjō), the 12th Sea-
plane Tender Division ([with the ] auxiliary seaplane tenders Kamikawa-maru and Sagara-
maru) and the 22d Air Flotilla ([consisting of] land-based planes) had provided support for
the above, while the main unit (the Chōkai and the 12th Destroyer Division) had provided
overall support.(115, 118) The units had operated as scheduled. The disembarkation operation
at Endau was completed on the 28th.(118) Although two allied destroyers came to attack [the
transport ships] at Endau on the 27th, one was sunk and the other was put to flight.(118)
As previously described, when on the 20th Malaya Unit Staff Officer Tomari had pre-
sented his bombshell motion of a two-week postponement of [Operation] L at Cam Ranh
Bay, Staff Officer Ishii had insisted that “if the Ledo [airfield] were unusable, [the Navy]
should use base(s) in Malaya,” and he again maintained this argument in the Manila Con-
ference held from the 21st through the 23d. While acceding to this idea and considering that
it might have to use the base(s) in Malaya if the Ledo [airfield] was not ready in time, the
Malaya Unit put all efforts into making Ledo ready, and had its Ledo contingent of the 4th
Construction Squad leave Kuching on the 22d and follow the Oka Unit toward Ledo.(145) Hav-
ing been informed about the arrival of the Endau disembarkation unit and the Anambas oc-
cupation unit at their respective destinations on the 26th, as well as the Oka Unit’s seizure of
Ledo on the 27th, [the Malaya Unit] had ordered the 4th Submarine Squadron commander
by Telegraphic Operation Order No. 103 on that day (the 27th) to escort the Fujikawa-maru
(carrying personnel and base matériel for the Genzan Air Group), and the Tatsumiya-maru
(carrying the Kanoya Air Group’s advance personnel and matériel for the Ledo Base).(122)
Little Progress in the Preparation and Repair of the Ledo Base
As previously mentioned, on the next day, the 28th, the staff officers of the First Southern
Expeditionary Fleet, the Sixteenth Army and the Third Air Force had held a conference at
Cam Ranh Bay, where they made arrangements on the air [operations] in Operation L.(34) The
Navy had agreed to deploy two land-based attack plane units, about thirty fighter planes
and six land-based reconnaissance planes to Ledo and Kuching, about thirty land-based at-
tack planes to Kuantan, and about ten planes to Sungai Petani, provided that Ledo was fit
for use. It was also decided upon in the arrangements that if Ledo and Kuching were not fit
for use, the [Navy] aircraft would be deployed to [airfields] in Kuantan, Kahang, Sungai
Petani and Kota Bharu.(96)
After participating in the above-mentioned Anambas operation, three aircraft of the aux-
iliary seaplane tender Kamikawa-maru had advanced to Kuching on the 27th, and reported
the following result of their reconnaissance of Ledo:(130)
Telegram sent on 28 January
1. Spotted a small number of Japanese ground troops in the town of Ledo.
2. The [main] Ledo airfield has been seriously destroyed by landmines. No human figure was
spotted [on the airfield]. The airfield appears unpaved, and [the surface] seems to be red clay.
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3. The bridges on the road from Pemangkat to Singkawang and Ledo have largely been destroyed.
No Japanese troops were spotted on the road.
Telegram sent on 29 January
1. The [main] Ledo airfield is located about five kilometers east of Ledo, with three runways; one
which runs from north to south is about 2,500 meters long, another which runs from east to west
is about 1,200 meters long, and the other which runs in between is about 1,200 meters long.
There are about seventy-nine large and small holes blasted by landmines, which are currently
being repaired by army units. The soil [appears] to be red clay, with some patches of grass; the
ground appears to be in comparatively good condition. No obstacles were found in the perime-
ter.
2. A dozen or more bridges on the road from Singkawang to Ledo have been destroyed. Also a
dozen or more holes probably blasted by landmines were spotted on the road.
3. No Japanese forces were spotted other than large-sized motorized [landing] craft in Pemangkat
and the army in Ledo.
So, on this day (the 29th), First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Staff Officer Terasaki Takaji im-
mediately visited the Southern Army headquarters to request “the cooperation of engineers,
as the road to the Ledo airfields is destroyed.”(23) The Southern Army readily consented and
dispatched Staff Officer Watanabe Tarō together with Second Lieutenant Inagaki (engineer)
to assist in making the Ledo airfield ready for use, in repairing the transportation roads, and
for the operational communications. At the same time, [the Southern Army] also arranged
to dispatch [to Ledo] the Engineer Company of the 4th Independent Mixed Regiment, which
was in northern French Indochina.(23) Further, the army sent on the same day (the 29th) a
telegram to Detachment Commander Kawaguchi, in which it requested a report on the sit-
uation of the roads and transportation facilities to be used by the Navy for the transport of
fuel and ammunition to the Ledo airfield, and also suggested that the working party com-
panies in Miri and Seria be transferred to the Ledo area to be temporarily used as engineers.(23)
However, despite the instructions given to Staff Officer Shiraishi on the 19th and the 20th,
and the telegrams sent to the Kawaguchi Detachment on the 27th and the 29th, Detachment
Commander Kawaguchi had thought in quite an opposite way and took different actions.
That is to say, on the 28th, he advanced to Singkawang from Pemangkat, and ordered the 2d
unit to closely pursue with one element the allied units to Bengkayang and with its main
force to Pontianak. The main force of the 2d unit (accompanied by Commander Kawaguchi)
went southward on thoroughly destroyed roads, seized Mempawah at 2000 on the 28th, and
the equatorial city of Pontianak, at 2000 on the 29th, from where on the 30th the detachment
commander sent the following telegram to Commander in Chief Terauchi:(23)
Kawaguchi Detachment Field Telegram No. 122 (30 January)
1. The detachment is ready to join Operations L and H any time, having made its boats ready as
well, so that the main force of about two battalions will be able to assemble in Pontianak and
vicinity by 1 February [at the latest]. The morale of officers and men is high. I would like your
consideration of the above in the employment of the detachment hereafter.
2. The remaining forces will be sufficient for the present to keep public order in British Borneo.
3. I humbly offer the above as my opinion.
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Note: The order the Southern Army had given to Detachment Commander Kawaguchi was
Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 34 of 6 January, which read, “Detachment Com-
mander Kawaguchi shall promptly seize, mainly by land, the airfields near Bengkayang
and ports in Dutch Borneo which lead to these [airfields].” Since then, no exact orders
had been given, only staff[-level] communications had been wired, and those moreover
in the form of suggestions.
On receiving the telegram from Detachment Commander Kawaguchi, the Southern Army
staff felt that he had totally ignored the situation. In reply, the Southern Army returned the
following telegram:(23)
From: Chief of Staff, [Southern Army,] sent on 30 January
To: Detachment Commander Kawaguchi
We received your telegram No. 122.
We are deeply impressed by the fact that you have fully achieved the objectives of the oper-
ation despite the difficult conditions, and that further you are determined to request a new task
now. Nevertheless, all we expect from your detachment at present is to make the airfields in
Ledo and vicinity ready for use and to complete the accumulation of Navy aviation fuel and
ammunition. Therefore, we earnestly hope that first of all you do everything in your power with
all your forces and boats to achieve this objective.
Note: The battalion left in British Borneo at that time had made efforts to achieve stability and
introduce a military administration over a vast area. One element of the force had sailed
a great distance by boat and seized Tawau (which had many Japanese residents) on the
northeast coast of Borneo on 1 February.
[The Southern Army was impatient because] in five days, the 38th Division would depart
from Cam Ranh Bay and head to Palembang. On that day (the 30th), Southern Army Staff
Officer Watanabe had flown from Saigon to Kuching, and Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Mu-
rakami from Kuching to Pontianak by seaplane, while the Fujikawa-maru and the Tatsumiya-
maru, which carried part of the base personnel (advance party) and matériel of the 22d Air
Flotilla, had left Cap Saint Jacques ([in] French Indochina) at 2000.(119, 130)
On the following day, the 31st, Southern Army Staff Officer Watanabe had flown from
Kuching to Pontianak via Pemangkat by seaplane. Both units of the Kawaguchi Detachment
had begun reconnaissance and repair work, with the 2d unit from the west coast and the 1st
unit from Ledo.
Staff Officers Murakami and Watanabe, along with the officers of the Navy, carried out a
broad and thorough reconnaissance of the transportation routes, from the air (seaplane) as
well as on the ground, and from the 30th onward, every day frequently reported to the South-
ern Army, the [Navy] Malaya Unit and others by telegram.(130) The bridges on the main roads
had been blown up very thoroughly and it was extremely difficult to repair the other roads
so that automobiles could use them for the transport of aviation fuel and ammunition. The
main routes to Ledo were (1) the Pemangkat – Sambas – Ledo Route, (2) the Singkawang –
Monterado – Bengkayang – Ledo Route, (3) the Mempawah – Monterado – Bengkayang
Route, (4) the Mempawah – Sungai Penuh – Tunang – Bengkayang Route, (5) the Pontianak
– Sungai Penuh – Tunang – Bengkayang Route, and (6) the Sambas River (by water up to
Sanggau [Sanggan]) – Ledo Route. In the end, route (2) was being repaired, and route (6)
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was being reconstructed. As for route (2), i.e. the Singkawang – Ledo Route, more than a
dozen bridges had been destroyed, and on 2 February, Staff Officer Watanabe reported that
it was expected to take fifteen days to repair them, while concerning route (6), i.e. the Sambas
River – Sanggau [Sanggan] – Ledo Route, the Kawaguchi Detachment reported on 1 February
that “it is expected to take one week to repair [the road] between Sanggau [Sanggan] and
Ledo.”(23, 122, 130)
For reasons that this route was good, or that one was better, the Fujikawa-maru and the
Tatsumiya-maru (both of which had left Cap Saint Jacques in French Indochina on the 30th)
were sent around from one destination to another. When the Fujikawa-maru arrived in Kuch-
ing on 1 February, following the order on the 31st of the [Navy] Malaya Unit to “head for
Kuching,” she was on the same afternoon again ordered to “sail to Pemangkat.”(122, 130) As for
the Tatsumiya-maru, when she arrived in Pemangkat at 0845 on 2 February following the
order of the Malaya Unit to “go to Pemangkat,” her destination was changed to Pontianak.
Accordingly, she left Pemangkat at 2333 on the same day for Pontianak, where on 4 February
her destination was once again changed to Pemangkat. She left Pontianak at 1200 on the very
day (the 4th) and finally arrived in Pemangkat at 1845.(122, 130) On that day, the warship Kashii
with the above-mentioned Engineer Company of the 4th Independent Mixed Regiment on
board departed from Cap Saint Jacques in French Indochina for Pemangkat. This was also
the day the 38th Division’s Convoy was to set out from Cam Ranh Bay.(122, 130) These were the
circumstances when on the same day Staff Officer Watanabe sent the headquarters [of the
Southern Army] a telegram in which he reported that “the Kawaguchi Detachment is [fully]
engaged in the road repair work, putting everything available into it, allowing the officers
and men merely a few hour sleep a day.”(23) While putting its best efforts into repairing the
roads, the Kawaguchi Detachment was [also] cooperating in transporting [matériel] by sailing
upriver from Pemangkat to Sanggau [Sanggan] with the steamer and motorized sailing boats
it had brought from Kuching to Pemangkat, and with all of its large- and small-sized motor-
ized [landing] craft.(23) Although on 3 February some Navy medium-sized attack planes had
advanced to Ledo (which was apparently a trial landing; see the previous description), the
amount of fuel they had been able to accumulate in Ledo by 4 February was only two hun-
dred drums, as mentioned earlier. It was on the evening of that day (the 4th) that the three
staff officers of the Sixteenth Army and [Navy] Staff Officer Wakatsuki went to the Southern
Army headquarters to request a two-day postponement of [Operation] L. Staff Officer Waka -
tsuki was a [Navy] staff officer of the Third Fleet (i.e. the Dutch East Indies Unit) seconded
to the Sixteenth Army and not a staff officer of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet (i.e.
the Malaya Unit). In other words, the staff officers of the Sixteenth Army and the Third Fleet
sympathized with the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
Third Postponement of [Operation] L (Four Days)
Just when the Southern Army had unwillingly ordered a two-day postponement of [Opera-
tion] L because of the request of Staff Officer Wakatsuki and his party on 4 February and the
telegram of the [Navy] Southern Task Force of the following day, the 5th, a telegram arrived
from the Malaya Unit, which read: “We will dispatch our Chief of Staff R. Adm. Sawada
Torao (accompanied by Senior Staff Officer Captain Tomari) to Saigon on 6 February to dis-
cuss Operation L.” Even though the Southern Army Staff assumed that “[the Navy] could
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not possibly request another postponement on top of [the two-day postponement],” it in-
wardly feared that this would be the case.(23)
On the afternoon of the following day, the 6th, the Malaya Unit’s Chief of Staff Sawada
and Senior Staff Officer Tomari visited the [Southern Army] headquarters.(23) When asked
about the purpose of their visit, they made a request: “Yesterday on the 5th when [land-
based] medium-sized attack planes and fighter planes landed on [the] Kuching [airfield],
four aircraft were damaged because of bomb craters. We were informed that the repair [of
the airfield] should be completed on the 7th, which we consider very doubtful. As for the
Ledo airfield, on the other hand, the transport routes are long and poor, and the accumulation
of fuel and ammunition has yet to be completed. Furthermore, the Kuantan airfield in
Malaya, to which the [Navy land-based] medium-sized attack planes have advanced, is sur-
rounded by a tall forest, and the trees in an area of two hundred meters wide and three hun-
dred meters deep need to be cut down. However, we have managed to clear only twenty
meters in two days, as many of the trees are enormous. We fear that it will take as much as
ten days [if we continue] at this pace. As the Navy [has decided to] have aircraft maintenance
personnel as well engage in the work of felling the trees, we would like you to approve at
least another four days, that is, in total a postponement of six-days.” Showing deep regret,
Chief of Staff Sawada said, “I am very sorry to make such a request now at [such a late] mo-
ment, but I would like you to somehow understand the situation.” He was so polite that it
made the staff officers of the Southern Army feel sorry.(23) After letting Chief of Staff Sawada
withdraw, Colonel Ishii, Colonel Tanikawa, Lieutenant Colonel Arao and others of the South-
ern Army discussed matters with Captain Tomari and 22d Air Flotilla Staff Officer Com-
mander Kōma Masayoshi. Colonel Takashima, senior staff officer of Section 1 of the Sixteenth
Army was [also] present. It was a serious discussion, which continued until about 2200. The
Southern Army mainly accused the Navy of insufficient preparation.(23) It frankly pointed
out: “When you manage to clear only forty [sic; above it says “twenty”] meters of forest in
two days, and you have 260 meters to go, how can you finish it within a postponement of
four days?” “When you have arrangements in which the Navy is to advance to both the
Kuantan and the Kahang airfields for Operation L if the Kuching and the Ledo airfields are
not fit for use, why have you been neglecting to make [the required] preparations?” “[Don’t
you remember] that in the Memorandum of the Arrangements between the commander in
chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the commander of the Sixteenth Army, and
the commander of the Third Air Force of January 28, it was agreed that:
When the airfields in Ledo and Kuching are unusable, [aircraft] shall be advanced in the fol-
lowing way: 
Kuantan: about 60 land-based attack planes, and part of the fighter planes.
Kahang: about 30 fighter planes; about 30 land-based attack planes may use the airfield as an
advance base for refueling. If the [paratroop] raiding unit should use the airfield, [the Navy
planes shall use the airfield] only until and including day L – 3 or on day L + 1 and onwards.
[Editor’s note: L + 1 is a mistake. The arrangement quoted on p. 265 has L + 7, as does Vol.
34, p. 470.]
Sungai Petani: about 10 land-based attack planes. 
Kota Bharu: about 40 land-based attack planes.”
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“Having concluded this arrangement, the Navy should in any case have conducted sufficient
research on the Kuantan and the Kahang airfields, yet how dare you say now that trees are
obstructing their use?” “If you had told us earlier that the trees would be a hindrance, wouldn’t
we have dispatched engineers or other troops?” “As a matter of fact, when we received your
request concerning Ledo, didn’t we immediately give orders to dispatch an engineer com-
pany of the 4th Independent Mixed Regiment?” Then [the army] proposed: “As a way to
deal with the situation, since there is fuel at the [Kahang] airfield, how about having the land-
based attack planes take off only with bombs, refuel at the Kahang [airfield] and then head
south?” But when the reply was: “We have not inspected the Kahang [airfield] yet,” the talks
sure enough turned ugly. When Colonel Tanikawa reproached Colonel Takashima, senior
staff officer of Section 1 of the Sixteenth Army, the latter retorted, “It’s all because Ledo was
supposed to be ready for use” [editor’s note: the seizure and preparation of Ledo by the
Kawaguchi Detachment was under the direct command of the Southern Army, not the Six-
teenth Army], and the atmosphere instantly turned from bad to worse to such a degree that
Colonel Ishii had to smooth things over.(23) Although in this way no agreement was reached
after all, the Southern Army consented to a postponement for only one day ([to be precise,]
delayed the departure of the convoy of the 38th Division scheduled for the evening of that
day, the 6th, to the evening of the next day, the 7th), while it checked up on the situation at
Ledo. Moreover, they agreed that in any case the clearing of the trees [at Kuantan] had to be
accelerated as quickly as possible. Fortunately, they found a company of the 20th Independ-
ent Engineer Regiment, which was assembling at Kahang and vicinity after it had finished
the disembarkation operation at Endau and been assigned to the Third Air Force. It was de-
cided to have about fifty members, mainly consisting of the cadre of this company, trans-
ported by [Navy land-based] medium-sized attack planes to Kuantan on the following day
the 7th, and have them assist in clearing the trees. Meanwhile, the Navy would arrange to
immediately send approximately three tons of dynamite from Saigon to Kuantan. Thus, the
meeting broke up at 2200, and immediately after that, the Southern Army sent the following
telegram to the Army Department of IGHQ:(23)
From: Chief of Staff, Southern Army, sent on 6 February
To: Vice Chief of Staff
1. Today, we received another request for a further postponement of four days from the First South-
ern Expeditionary Fleet. The main reason for this was that trees in (some) place(s) around the
Kuantan airfield needed to be cut down, and even though the work had been started two days
ago, the amount of work was too much to tell when it would be finished.
2. Although we were frustrated by this request, as it was made after such a long time since the
conclusion of the arrangements for Operation L, we immediately arranged the assistance of
[army] engineers, and [at the same time] based on the concluded arrangements, urged [the
Navy] to use the Kahang airfield and took measures to let [the Navy aircraft] use army fuel, etc.
However, it was decided to determine a new date for day L by tomorrow, the 7th, upon careful
examination of all the factors that the Navy said were still unclear.(23)
The telegram that the Southern Army sent on this night to the Third Air Force, concerning
its assistance in felling the trees around the Kuantan airfield with its engineers, read as fol-
lows:(23)
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Southern Army Staff Section 4 Telegram No. 817 (sent on 6 February from Chief of Staff)
In order to assist [the Navy] in clearing the forest (of about three hectares with many large trees)
surrounding the Kuantan airfield, which the Navy air units have already been working on, we
request you to urgently dispatch to Kuantan about fifty personnel, mainly [consisting of] com-
missioned and noncommissioned officers of the 20th Independent Engineer Regiment (with
equipment to cut down trees and explosives as well). The above is [passed down] by order [of
the commander in chief]. For the purpose of airlifting the personnel and the equipment, about
ten [Navy land-based] medium-sized attack planes shall [be sent and] land at the Kahang airfield
on the afternoon of tomorrow the 7th. We request your urgent preparations [for the dispatch].
In order to have the engineer company commander fully recognize the urgency of the situ-
ation as well as to survey the capacity of the Kahang airfield, Southern Army Section 4 Senior
Staff Officer Colonel Tanikawa left Saigon on the early morning of the following day, the 7th,
and headed for Kluang. In Kluang, he went to the Third Air Force headquarters, where he
was surprised to find that they had received only the [last] part from “The above is [passed
down] by order [of the commander in chief]” onwards of the above-mentioned telegram,
which was sent the previous evening. Consequently, not knowing what to do at all, the Third
Air Force had made no preparations. Colonel Tanikawa immediately explained the situation
and gave instructions as to the preparations to be made. However, in the meantime, the ma-
jority of the Navy medium-sized attack planes, which had come from Kuantan to pick up
the engineer company at Kahang, just went back as there was no sign that the engineer com-
pany would appear. [In the end], about fifteen personnel were transported on the last five
aircraft, and the remainder were transported on the following day, the 8th.(23) On the 7th,
Colonel Tanikawa wired the chief of staff [of the Southern Army] from Kluang as follows:(23)
Third Air Force Staff Telegram No. 62 (Sent on the 7th by the Third Air Force commander)
From Colonel Tanikawa
1. I have dealt with the dispatch of engineers to Kuantan.
2. Kahang is perfectly fit for use as an advance base for [Navy land-based] medium-sized attack
planes. Also the Navy officers dispatched [to the airfield] share this judgment.
3. Preparations have been made in advance so that refueling, use of the airfield and other various
facilities at Kahang will be provided by the Army. Continuous advancement [of forces] will
cause no problems.
4. Based on the above, I find no reason at all to delay the landing [operations] at L any further,
and [consider] it appropriate to issue an order to immediately launch [the operation].
5. I will return on the afternoon of tomorrow, the 8th.
In the meantime, on the 6th, the Combined Fleet headquarters on Hashirajima in the Seto
Inland Sea had learned that the Malaya Unit (First Southern Expeditionary Fleet) and the
Southern Task Force (the Second Fleet) were of different opinions; whereas the former insisted
that there was no option but to delay Operation L until around 18 February because of the
delays in making the air bases in Kuantan, Kuching and Ledo ready for use, the latter de-
manded that the operation be executed for the sake of the whole operation, no matter what
loss be sustained. The Combined Fleet headquarters had wired them: “After also contacting
central command [the Navy Department of IGHQ], we are of the opinion that it would be
better not to make so much haste.”(108)
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On the 7th, the Southern Army received an official inquiry from the [Navy] Malaya Unit,
which stated: “We would like to postpone Operation L for another four days. However, we
would like to start as soon as preparations for the air operations are complete.”(23) At that
time, the situation of each corps was as follows:
1. The Twenty-fifth Army (the Imperial Guard Division, the 5th and the 18th Divisions) was about
to go ashore in Singapore at 2400 on the following day, the 8th. (Note: due to the postponement
of [Operation] L and the preparation of the Twenty-fifth Army, the date was postponed on the
6th from the 7th to the 8th.)
2. The [Navy] air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) had been carrying out attacks against eastern Java
from Balikpapan and Kendari since 3 February.
3. A powerful element of the Sakaguchi Detachment had departed from Balikpapan on 30 January,
and was closing in on Banjarmasin (which was occupied on the 10th [of February]).
4. The Makassar invasion unit of the eastern attack unit ([consisting of] the 1st Base Force as the
core) had departed from Kendari on 6 February, and was approaching Makassar (the landing
was conducted on the 9th).
5. The Eastern Detachment (which would be covered by the [Navy] eastern attack unit after the
latter’s capture of Makassar) was preparing for the landing at Timor scheduled for 20 February,
leaving Ambon on 17 and 18 February.
6. The Kanemura Detachment, which was set to capture Bali, left Lingayen Gulf on 7 February.
[Meanwhile,] the 48th Division was scheduled to depart from the Gulf on the 8th.
7. The convoy of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment had left Gaoxiong in four echelons on
1, 3, 5 and 6 February, and had begun to arrive in Cam Ranh Bay from the 6th onwards.
8. The 38th Division’s scheduled departure date from Cam Ranh Bay had been changed from 31
January to 4 February, then to 6 February, and it was now again being postponed.
The Malaya Unit, [too,] had wired each unit covering the 38th Division at 1022 on 4 February
that “Day L is expected to be postponed for two days. [The postponement] will be decided today
around noon upon deliberation with the Sixteenth Army commander,” which was followed by
a telegram at 1530 on the same day (4 February), announcing that “Day L is expected to be post-
poned for two days,” and again at 0800 on 6 February, that “Day L shall be postponed until
specifically ordered otherwise.”(130, 133)
As the strength of the allied forces was gradually being increased, and it had been considered
advantageous to conduct Operation L before the completion of the capture of Singapore, the
Southern Army felt it extremely regrettable to postpone Day L now to 16 February (the de-
parture from Cam Ranh would then be on 10 February). However, it wired back its approval,
“trusting the sincerity of the Navy.”(24) At 1925 on this day (the 7th), the Malaya Unit wired
the following order:(115)
On the 7th, the following arrangement was made with the [Southern] Army:
Day L will be postponed for another four days. However, [the operation shall be] launched as
soon as the preparations for the air operations are complete.
Then on the following day, the 8th, the Southern Army received a telegram from the [Navy]
Southern Task Force, requesting the following change of schedule:(23)
L: day x + 70
H: day x + 81
I: no later than day x + 81 (to be arranged between the Third Fleet and the Sixteenth Army)
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Note: Before the opening of hostilities, the advance [to Java] along the east side of Borneo was
believed to be faster than that along the west side of Borneo. After the two British battle-
ships were sunk (on 10 December), the advance from the west came to be considered
faster. But now, the advance from the east was again thought faster. The previously indi-
cated factors may be considered as the causes for this latest change; however, we [also]
need to give special attention to the following circumstances: While the [Navy] Dutch
East Indies Unit was in charge of the attack along the east [side of Borneo] all the way to
Java, the Malaya Unit was in charge of the attack along the west [side of Borneo] up to
Sumatra, and would turn over [the attack on] western Java to the Dutch East Indies Unit.
Whereas the main force of the Eleventh Air Fleet had consistently carried out the opera-
tions along the eastern route, with some reinforcements from the 2d Carrier Division (the
carrier unit which had executed the surprise attack on Hawaii), only the units of the 22d
Air Flotilla as the core had carried out the operations along the western route and, what
is more, the forward push of its airfields had been limited. [Moreover,] since the end of
January, the 22d Air Flotilla had focused on advancing [its units] to Kuching and Ledo,
taking into account the coming operation (the Java operation) and the future command
disposition (the flotilla was expected to return under the direct command of the Eleventh
Air Fleet), and it had paid no heed at all to the airfields in Malaya.
The Southern Army had no other option but to accede to this request as well.(23)
The [Navy] Malaya Unit made an earnest effort, which the Southern Army also sincerely
supported. On the afternoon of the 9th, the prospects for the air operations were clear. De-
ciding to shorten the delay by one day, the Malaya Unit issued the following order at 1400
on the 9th, and that evening the units for Operation L departed from Cam Ranh Bay.(130)
Malaya Unit Signal [?] Telegraphic Operation Order No. 18 (1400, 9 February)
1. The date of L is set for 15 February.
2. Each unit shall operate as planned.
As day L was advanced by one day, it must have been possible to likewise advance days H
and I as well. Nevertheless, the Southern Task Force, which had already obtained the consent
of the Southern Army and also understood the views of the Combined Fleet, that night issued
the following order by telegram, in spite of this [possibility]:(117)
Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 96 (2040, 9 February)
The following amendments were made in the target dates for the invasions in the Dutch East
Indies operation:
1. Western Java: day x + 81
2. Eastern Java: no later than day x + 81, depending on the arrangements between the commander
in chief of the Third Fleet and the Sixteenth Army commander.
But how did this all affect the connection between [operations against] Singapore and [Op-
eration] L? Colonel Tanikawa wrote in his journal at that time as follows:
9 February: Successfully crossed Johor Strait. The date of L was fixed: the landing was finally set
for 15 February, and [the units] will depart tonight.
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10 February: The capture of Singapore is making progress hour by hour. From the viewpoint of
strategic exquisiteness, the delay of L was really regrettable.
14 February: Not yet reached the city of Singapore, because of persistent resistance in the area.
With the landing of Operation L a day ahead, it has become the tensest moment of
the southern operation. The [Paratroop] Raiding Group set out at 0900 today, and suc-
cessfully parachuted down at 1126. When considered together with [Operation] L, it
might be said that the delay in the capture of Singapore has rather created a strategic
advantage.
On the 14th, the [Paratroop] Raiding Group parachuted down on the oil refineries and the
airfield of Palembang. On the following day, the 15th, the advance party of the 38th Division
arrived at Palembang. On the same day, the British forces in Singapore raised the flag of sur-
render.
The Subsequent [Situation of] the Airfields and the Land-based Air Units
In the end, the Kuantan airfield was quickly fixed and used, but it was impossible after all
to make use of the Ledo airfield for Operation L, despite the enormous amount of labor and
effort that had been put into it.
As of 17 February, when the 38th Division commander came ashore at Palembang fol-
lowing the landing of the advance party (on the 15th), the following effort had been spent
on the Ledo airfield,(23) but during that time the airfield was only used by three heavily-shot
aircraft, which had made emergency landings on 15 February.(104)
Outline of the progress to ready the Ledo airfield:(23)
1. The work force committed to the airfield work: a total of 8,091 men since 28 January.
2. The number of days they were deployed: 21 days from 28 January to 17 February.
3. The accumulation of fuel and ammunition (as of 1200, 17 February): 1,058 [drums] of 92-octane
gasoline, 1,099 [drums] of 87-octane gasoline, 36 [drums] of mineral oil, 10 No. 25 [250kg] bombs,
680 No. 6 [60kg] bombs, and 30 units of oxygen ([in stock] at the airfield).
276 [drums] of 92-octane gasoline, 128 [drums] of 87-octane gasoline, 120 [drums] of mineral
oil, 320 of No. 6 [60kg] bombs, and 144 units of oxygen ([in stock] at Momong).
The land-based air units of the Malaya Unit for Operation L consisted of (1) the Genzan Air
Group (thirty-six land-based attack planes), (2) the Mihoro Air Group (thirty-six land-based
attack planes), (3) the Yamada Unit (thirty fighter planes and six land-based reconnaissance
planes), and (4) the Kanoya Air Group (twenty-seven land-based attack planes), led by the
commander of the 22d Air Flotilla [R. Adm. Matsunaga Sadaichi], of which the Flotilla com-
mander, the Genzan Air Group and the Yamada Unit launched operations from the Kuching
airfield, the Mihoro Air Group from the Kuantan airfield and the Kanoya Air Group from
the Thủ Dầu Một airfield in French Indochina.(104)
On 12 February, the advance party of the 38th Division was heading south halfway be-
tween Cam Ranh Bay and Palembang. That night, Regimental Commander Oka [of the
Kawaguchi Detachment] sent the Southern Army the following telegram from Sanggau
[Sanggan]. It described that it would take another week to complete a runway with a length
of 1,300 meters, which was necessary for a [Navy] land-based attack plane, and [also] about
one week each for the work to [re-]build the bridge(s) over the Ledo River and those to the
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south of Pemangkat, as well as the road from Ledo to Singkawang. It was on 6 February that
the Engineer Company of the 4th Independent Mixed Regiment had arrived at Pemangkat
in the warship Kashii.(122)
1. As of today, the 12th, in addition to the two runways of 1,100 meters long, a taxiway of 30 meters
wide and 500 meters long, which connects the runways ([and] which was constructed at the re-
quest of the staff of the 22d Air Flotilla) was completed on the airfield. We are extremely deter-
mined to extend one of the runways to 1,300 meters, to be completed in a week from tomorrow,
the 13th, in order to make the airfield ready for the advance of the Kanoya Air Group. I under-
stand that if this extension work is completed, [this airfield] would be [sufficient] enough to
serve as a base for two units of medium-sized land-based attack planes and one Type–1 attack
plane unit, [in total] about ninety aircraft.
2. The bridge building materials sent by the [Southern] Army in Saigon, to the amount of three
trucks, have arrived in Pemangkat. I have arranged that they will be debarked at Sambas, and
distributed in such a way that spikes, etc. will be used by the bridge construction units, and the
engineering tools in the extension work of the airfield.(23)
3. (The rest, concerning the current situation and the outlook for the repair of the roads and
bridges, has been omitted by the author).
The Military Gains of the Kawaguchi Detachment
Despite the tremendous effort made by the Kawaguchi Detachment, the Ledo airfields were
never put into use before the end of the Java invasion. The military achievements of the
Kawaguchi Detachment during its operation in Dutch Borneo (up to 19 February) were as
follows:(23)
1. Operations:
27 January: Seizure of Sanggau [Sanggan], the Ledo airfields, Pemangkat, and Sambas.
28 January: Seizure of Singkawang.
29 January: Seizure of Bengkayang and Pontianak.
16 February: Seizure of Sintang.
2. Military gains: (1) 270 abandoned dead bodies; 182 prisoners of war; (2) Seized
[weaponry and vehicles]: 4 tanks, 2 armored vehicles, 47 motor trucks, 133 passenger
cars, 2 trench mortars, 7 heavy machine guns, 5 light machine guns, 12 (semi-)auto-
matic rifles, 416 rifles, 35 pistols and others.
3. Losses: 19 killed in action; 2 died of wounds; 31 wounded in action.
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(3) Air Operations and the Sailing of the Convoys
The Air Campaign of the 3d Air Division to Destroy the Enemy
I have already described the air campaign of the Third Air Force over Sumatra conducted
until the 23d [inclusive] of January, and the Army-Navy arrangement on the air operations
in [Operation] L (preliminarily arranged on 28 January, and concluded on the 30th), as well
as the Third Air Force order ([issued on] 4 February).
As mentioned earlier, on 5 February, Operation L was postponed for two days. However,
the Third Air Force decided to launch the air operations [for Operation] L from 6 February
onwards in accordance with the plan for [Operation] L that had been passed down in the
order of 4 February, and issued the following order on the 6th:(96)
Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 262
Third Air Force Order Kluang, 1000, 6 February
1. Day x (note by the author: the date to start [the operation to] capture Singapore, previously
[scheduled for] the 7th [of February]) set forth in Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 257
(note by the author: [issued on] 4 February) and day L have been set respectively on 8 and 12
February. The actions of the Twenty-fifth Army, given in separate volume No. 1: The outline of
the cooperation with the Twenty-fifth Army in the operation to capture Singapore will be
changed as set forth in the separate sheet.
2. The commanders of all units involved shall arrange their actions in accordance with the above
changes. However, the 3d Air Division commander shall spot and destroy enemy aircraft in
Palembang and vicinity as soon as possible, regardless of Third Air Force Operation Order A,
No. 257.
Separate Sheet
1. The launch of [the operation to] capture [Singapore] is set for 8 February (day x).
2. On the night of day x – 1, while continuing its diversionary action as before, the Imperial Guard
Division shall have one element make a surprise attack on the western part of Ubin Island (in
the eastern end of Johor Strait) and secure it.
3. On day x at 2300, the 5th and the 18th Division shall have their 1st landing units go ashore all
at once.
Within the Third Air Force, the 3d Air Division was charged with the air operation of Oper-
ation L, which was to be executed simultaneously with the capture of Singapore. On 6 Feb-
ruary, the division started its campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Palembang
sector based on the above two orders. During the period up to the 8th, the campaign was
carried out three times, and [the division successfully] destroyed the major part of the allied
air forces in this sector. The outline [of the attack] was as follows:(96)
[February]
6th: The aircraft of the 59th, the 64th, the 75th and the 90th Air Groups, sixty-six in total, took off
from the Kluang and the Kahang airfields, attacked the Palembang [airfield] with their main
force, and the Mentok airfield with an element. After bringing down fifteen [enemy] aircraft
and destroying eleven on the ground, all aircraft returned to their bases. 
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7th: The aircraft of the 59th, the 64th and the 90th Air Groups, thirty-seven in total, attacked the
Palembang airfield, destroyed twenty [enemy] aircraft on the ground, and brought down
most of the dozen or more which fought back. Two Japanese aircraft did not return to their
base.
8th: The aircraft of the 59th, the 64th and the 90th Air Groups, forty-two in total, attacked the
Palembang airfield, brought down two [enemy] aircraft and destroyed nine on the ground.
On 9 February, when the major part of the [enemy] air forces in the Palembang area was de-
stroyed as detailed above, the date of L was changed to the 15th. Therefore, on the 10th, the
Third Air Force commander passed down the following order:(96)
Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 268
Third Air Force Order Kluang, 0930, 10 February
1. Day L was again changed, and set for 15 February. The outline of actions of the 38th Division as
well as its scheduled sailing route is as shown in the separate volume. (Omitted by the author)
2. The commanders of all units involved shall arrange their actions in accordance with the date
set in the previous item, regardless of Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 262.
3. The 3d Air Division commander shall keep watch on the Palembang airfield and destroy enemy
aircraft at a good opportunity. He shall bring the 64th Air Group under his command from 2000,
11 February onwards.
4. The 7th Air Division commander shall put the 64th Air Group under the command of the 3d
Air Division commander from 2000, 11 February onwards.
5. The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander and the 98th Air Group commander shall use
the Kahang and the Kluang airfields for the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit and the 98th Air Group
respectively as the first takeoff base, regardless of Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 257
separate volume No. 4.
Accordingly, on the 13th (one day prior to the drop of the paratroopers), the 3d Air Division
([consisting of] the 59th, the 64th, the 75th and the 90th Air Groups) attacked Palembang
with thirty-five aircraft, brought down five [enemy] aircraft, and destroyed another four. On
the Japanese side three aircraft did not return to their base.(96)
The Air Operations of the [Navy] Malaya Unit
The air unit of the Malaya Unit (the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet) consisted of the 1st
Air Unit (a land-based air unit, [consisting of] the 22d Air Flotilla as the core), the 2d Air Unit
(the auxiliary seaplane tenders Kamikawa-maru and Sagara-maru, from 1 February onwards),
and the 3d air unit (the aircraft carrier Ryūjō).(110) In early February, the Sagara-maru took up
position at the Anambas Islands, while the Kamikawa-maru and the Ryūjō were in Cam Ranh
Bay, and [both] mainly carried out patrolling and guarding [duties] against submarines in
the Anambas Islands and the Ledo areas.(130, 133)
On concluding the already mentioned arrangement for the air operations [in Operation]
L, on 31 January, the Malaya Unit had passed down the following order to the commander
of the 1st Air Unit (the commander of the 22d Air Flotilla).(104)
1. Advance the Genzan Air Group and the Yamada Unit to the Kuching [airfield] on 3 and 5 Feb-
ruary respectively, and further advance them to the Ledo [airfield] when it is ready for use.
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2. Advance the Mihoro Air Group to the Kuantan [airfield] on 6 February.
3. Swiftly advance the Kanoya Air Group to the Kuantan [airfield], and to the Ledo [airfield], as it
is made ready for use.
The aforementioned Fujikawa-maru and the Tatsumiya-maru had left Cap Saint Jacques on 30
January, with the Fujikawa-maru arriving at Kuching on 1 February, and the Tatsumiya-maru
at Pemangkat, the port finally decided as its destination, on the night of 4 February.(122) The
Genzan Air Group and the Yamada Unit had advanced to the Kuching [airfield] as ordered,
but they could not advance [further] from Kuching, because not much progress had been
made in the preparation of the Ledo base.(104)
The Mihoro Air Group had [also] advanced to the Kuantan [airfield] on 6 February as or-
dered. However, the trees surrounding [the airfield] had prevented aircraft with a full load of
fuel and ammunition from taking off. [For this reason,] on the same day, First Southern Expe-
ditionary Fleet Chief of Staff Sawada and Captain Tomari had hurriedly visited the Southern
Army headquarters to request a four-day postponement of [Operation] L. When the Southern
Army had suggested the idea of “How about [the Navy aircraft] using the Kahang [airfield],
one of the airfields [mentioned] in the arrangement for the air operation [in Operation] L, as
a relay base, and having them fill up [their fuel tanks] there,” the 22d Air Flotilla staff officer
had answered, “We have not inspected the Kahang [airfield] yet,” which had infuriated the
Southern Army, as previously described.(23) On the same day, the [Army] Third Air Force had
launched its air campaign [in Operation] L to destroy the enemy air power.(96)
Because of the state of affairs at the Ledo, Kuantan and Kahang airfields, the Kanoya Air
Group had no opportunity to advance from its base in Thủ Dầu Một in French Indochina.(104)
On 8 February, the previously mentioned reinforcements from the 20th Independent En-
gineer Regiment began their work of blowing up the dense forest surrounding the Kuantan
[airfield].(104) Also on this day, the 22d Air Flotilla advanced its headquarters from Saigon to
Kuching.(104)
On 9 February, it became feasible to put into practice the idea of having aircraft take off
light [i.e. without a full load of fuel] from the Kuantan [airfield], rushing to the Kahang [air-
field] to fill up [their fuel tanks] and carrying out the attack, as the Southern Army had sug-
gested. Consequently, the date for L was set for the 15th, and the convoy [of the advance
party] departed from Cam Ranh Bay on the evening of the 9th. The Kuching unit [i.e. the air
unit which used the Kuching airfield, also] began its attack operations [in Operation] L on
the same day.
On 10 February, the Kuantan unit (the Mihoro Air Group) advanced to the Kahang [air-
field] and started its attack operations on the 11th, taking off from there. However, as it be-
came possible to take off with a full load of fuel from the Kuantan [airfield] from 12 February
onwards, the unit conducted the attacks from Kuantan from then on.
[However,] as the Ledo airfields were eventually of no use at all for the whole period of
Operation L, and the state of the Kuantan [airfield] was as previously described, the Genzan
Air Group and the Yamada Unit ended up operating from Kuching, the Mihoro Air Group
from Kuantan (except for the two days when it used Kahang as a relay base), and the Kanoya
Air Group from Thủ Dầu Một from beginning to end.(104)
Note: Even though it might be [correct to] say that the Kuching airfield was used, due to the
difficulties in getting the airfield ready for use, the aircraft had throughout to limit the
amount of fuel to half [a tank], when taking off from the airfield.
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The attack targets were mainly enemy aircraft in western Java and enemy warships in the
waters off Singapore, Sumatra and western Java.(104) An outline of the attacks was as fol-
lows:(103, 104)
[February]
1st: Reconnaissance and attack with eleven aircraft; one [enemy] merchant ship sunk.
2d: Search and attack with sixteen aircraft.
3d: Search and attack with twenty-seven aircraft; three [enemy] merchant ships sunk.
4th: Search and attack with sixteen aircraft; one [enemy] merchant ship and one [enemy] small
escort warship sunk.
5th: Search and attack with fourteen aircraft.
6th: The Army launched its air operation [in Operation] L, but the Navy not [yet]. 
7th: Same as above.
8th: Search and attack with seven aircraft; one [enemy] merchant ship sunk.
9th: Attack mainly on Batavia with twenty-four aircraft; twelve [enemy] aircraft brought down,
eight aircraft destroyed on the ground.
10th:
11th: Attack with forty-three aircraft; one [enemy] light cruiser hit directly and two [enemy] mer-
chant ships destroyed.
12th: Attack with approximately eighty to ninety aircraft; eight [enemy] aircraft in the Batavia
area brought down, one [enemy] cruiser and one [enemy] auxiliary ship hit directly, and
one [enemy] merchant ship heavily damaged.
13th: Attack with ninety-five aircraft; one [enemy] merchant ship sunk.
The above was the general situation until the day before the paradrop operation on Palem-
bang.
The Judgment on the Enemy Movements, the Sailing of the Convoy and the
Fleet, and a Naval Engagement
On February 9 at noon the Malaya Unit decided and issued the order “to start this evening.”
The judgment on the enemy movements made at that time was in summary as follows:(115)
1. The [sea] traffic of allied warships and transport ships between Singapore and Java was most
frequent during the period after the capture of Johor Bahru ([on] 31 January) until about the 5th
of February [inclusive]. Although it has gradually become less frequent since the 6th, the coming
and going of transport ships escorted by light cruisers, destroyers and others still continues. As
two warships, supposedly battleships, were spotted at Batavia on the 8th, there is a very high
probability of encountering allied surface units in the Bangka area.
2. As the Twenty-fifth Army has landed on Singapore Island this morning, it is likely that we can
capture units trying to flee from the island.
3. Counter offensives by the allied air forces are expected to be small.
4. It is highly necessary to be on guard against the allied submarines.
5. It is necessary to be on a strict alert against the underwater mines in the whole Bangka and
Palembang area.
6. Whereas strong resistance is not expected [during the operation to] capture Bangka Island, it is
expected that the operation to go upriver toward Palembang for dozens of nautical miles will
meet with considerable resistance.
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The 38th Division’s Marching Order and Departure
After its arrival in Cam Ranh Bay on 24 January, the departure date of the 38th Division had
been successively changed from 31 January to 4 February, then to the 6th and then again to
the 10th, but it [finally received the order] to “depart on the evening of today, the 9th.” Ac-
cordingly, the division issued the following order:(69)
NUMA [38th Division] Operation Order A, No. 110
38th Division Order Gin’yō-maru, at Cam Ranh, 1200, 9 February
1. The date for L, set forth in NUMA [38th Division] Operation Order A No. 101, is set for 15 Feb-
ruary.
2. The advance party, based on the memorandum of arrangements with the First Southern Expe-
ditionary Fleet and the 3d Destroyer Squadron, shall depart from Cam Ranh Bay at 1900 today,
the 9th, and advance in convoy according to the distribution set forth in the separate sheet.
3. The main force of the division, based on the memorandum of arrangements with the First South-
ern Expeditionary Fleet and the 3d Destroyer Squadron, shall depart from Cam Ranh Bay at
1800 two days later on the day of celebration of the founding of the state, the 11th, and advance
in convoy according to the distribution set forth in the separate sheet.
4. This is the time to demonstrate the ability of the division as well as the true form of the Imperial
Army. All officers and men must make a great and determined effort.
5. I shall be on board the Gin’yō-maru. [I shall] depart from Cam Ranh Bay along with the main
force in the evening of 11 February, and advance toward Palembang.
The advance party set off at 1900 on the 9th. The distribution of the convoy was as follows:(69)
1st Section: the Tajima-maru (6,995 tons, Lieutenant Colonel Iwabuchi), the Tacoma-maru (5,772
tons, Lieutenant Colonel Nagahata), the Mansei-maru (7,770 tons, Lieutenant Colonel Satō),
the Ōyō-maru (5,458 tons, Major Miyazawa)
2d Section: the An’yō-maru (9,256 tons, Captain Orita), the Alaska-maru (7,378 tons, Captain Sumi -
hara), the Kinugawa-maru (6,936 tons, Colonel Tanaka), the Sado-maru (7,180 tons, air defense
ship, Lieutenant Colonel Fujimoto)
The main force of the division set off at 1800 on the 11th. The distribution of the convoy was
as follows:(69)
3d Section: the Alpen-maru [Argun-maru?] (6,661 tons, First Lieutenant Okada), the Singapore-
maru (5,859 tons, Lieutenant Colonel Yabuta), the Shinkyō-maru (5,139 tons, Major Kem-
motsu), the Rakuyō-maru (9,418 tons, Colonel Kanki), the Lima-maru (6,989 tons, Lieutenant
Colonel Furushō), the Gin’yō-maru (8,613 tons, Lieutenant Colonel Endō), the Tsushima-maru
(6,754 tons, Major Kashiwabara)
4th Section: the Meigen-maru (5,435 tons, First Lieutenant Hirano), the Buyō-maru (5,446 tons,
Captain Koide), the Kenzui-maru (4,156 tons, First Lieutenant Narihira), the Makassar-maru
(4,026 tons, Captain Kusakabe), the Shinsei-maru No. 1 (5,879 tons, Major Ōneda), the Fusō-
maru (8,196 tons, hospital ship), the Hirokawa-maru (6,872 tons, air defense ship, Lieutenant
Colonel Okuzaki)
Note: the officers whose names are given within parentheses were the transport commanders.
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Departure of the Malaya Unit and its Engagements (See Illustration No. 25)
As we have seen, the outline of the disposition of the forces of the Malaya Unit for Operation
L was the main unit ([consisting of] the Chōkai, the 7th Cruiser Division, five destroyers of
the 3d Destroyer Squadron), the 1st escort unit ([consisting of] the 3d Destroyer Squadron
(minus eight destroyers) as the core), the 2d escort unit ([consisting of] the Yura, the Shimushu,
two destroyers of the 3d Destroyer Squadron as the core), the 1st Air Unit (land-based air
[unit]), the 2d air unit ([consisting of] the auxiliary seaplane tenders Kamikawa-maru and
Sagara-maru), the 3d air unit ([consisting of] the aircraft carrier Ryūjō, one destroyer of 3d De-
stroyer Squadron), the river-ascending unit [toward] Palembang (the 9th Base Force with the
Hatsutaka as the core), and others.
On 9 February, the Sendai (light cruiser), the flagship of the 3d Destroyer Squadron ([led
by] R. Adm. Hashimoto Shintarō), and four destroyers (the Hatsuyuki, the Shirayuki, the
Fubuki and the Asagiri) departed from Cam Ranh Bay at 1900, escorting the advance party.(118)
On the following day, the 10th, Commander in Chief Ozawa sallied forth from Cam Ranh
Bay with the main unit,(102) accompanied by the 3d Air Unit. In the main unit were the flagship
Chōkai (heavy cruiser), the Kumano, the Suzuya, the Mikuma and the Mogami (all heavy cruis-
ers) of the 7th Cruiser Division, the flagship of the 5th Submarine Squadron the Yura (light
cruiser), and the Ayanami, the Isonami and the Shirakumo (all destroyers) of the 3d Destroyer
Squadron. The destroyers the Uranami and the Murakumo, which on the 9th had discontinued
their support for the transport to Ledo, were [also] to join [the main unit] near the Anambas
Islands on the 12th. On the 8th, Commander in Chief Ozawa had decided to reassign the
Yura (light cruiser) to the main unit [from the 2d escort unit] and the Kashii (training cruiser)
of the Anambas base unit to the 2d escort unit instead, considering that there was a strong
probability in this operation that [the main unit] would encounter a powerful allied fleet.
The destroyer Shikinami of the 3d Destroyer Squadron was attached to the 4th Carrier Divi-
sion (the Ryūjō) of the 3d air unit, and accompanied it.(102)
At 1800 on the following day, the 11th, the Kashii (training cruiser), the Shimushu (coastal
defense ship), and the Yūgiri and the Amagiri (both of which were destroyers of the 3d De-
stroyer Squadron) departed, escorting the main force of the 38th Division.(102)
The 1st Air Unit (the 22d Air Flotilla) was conducting the [air] campaign from the Kuch-
ing, the Kuantan (the Kahang) and the Thủ Dầu Một [airfields], and the 2d Air Unit ([sea-
planes of] the auxiliary seaplane tenders) was carrying out patrols with the Kamikawa-maru
at Cam Ranh Bay and the Sagara-maru at the Anambas Islands.(130, 133)
On the following day, the 12th, the convoy continued to advance southward, while the
destroyers with a short cruising distance alternately refueled at the Anambas [base].(102) Hav-
ing learned that allied warships were fleeing from Singapore, Commander in Chief Ozawa
on that day at 1630 gave orders to catch and destroy them.(118) On that day, the Hatsutaka, the
flagship of the commander of the 9th Base Force, which had been reassigned from the Anam-
bas base unit to the river-ascending unit [towards] Palembang, joined [the main unit] from
Anambas and headed southward.(102)
On the next day, the 13th, the main unit crossed the equator at 0600. Acting in concert
with the aircraft, the units engaged in the campaign to catch and destroy the warships fleeing
from Singapore in the sector east of Lingga Island.(102, 115, 118) The 3d Destroyer Squadron sank
one ship, which seemed to be an auxiliary cruiser, and also one minelayer and one commer-
cial ship, etc., with its flagship the Sendai, and others.(118) [Meanwhile,] the convoy of the ad-
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vance party continued to advance southward under the escort of minesweepers and oth-
ers.(118) On the same day, one allied aircraft came close for scouting and five for an attack, but
no loss was sustained on the Japanese side.(118)
On the following day, the 14th (the day of the first drop of the paratroopers), the 3d De-
stroyer Squadron headed southward while intensifying its direct escort. The squadron as
well as the other units still successfully caught and destroyed the allied ships fleeing [from
Singapore].(102) At 0830 the convoy of the advance party came under attack from three allied
aircraft, but no loss was sustained. Japanese fighter planes provided air cover between about
1000 and 1545, during which period six allied aircraft came for an attack at approximately
1230, another four at approximately 1450, but they caused no loss on the Japanese side. At
2100 the convoy of the advance party began its entry into the Mentok anchorage.(118)
Between 0010 and 0100 on the next day, the 15th, the ships entered the Mentok anchorage
and moved to prepare for the landing operation at Mentok and the river-ascending operation
toward Palembang.(118) However, at 0938, a reconnaissance seaplane of the Chōkai transmitted
that “three enemy cruisers and five destroyers are heading northward through the Gaspar
Strait,” and then at 0950, “the enemy seems to have six destroyers as direct escort accompa-
nying one battleship.” At that time, the convoy of the main force of the 38th Division was
sailing [the waters] northeast of Lingga Island, heading southward.(118) At 1240, Commander
in Chief Ozawa judged that “the main force of the enemy [must] consist of one battleship,
three cruisers and eight destroyers.”(104) At that point, the 1st Air Unit (the 22d Air Flotilla)
was still based in Kuantan, Kuching and Thủ Dầu Một. As for the 2d Air Unit, the Sagara-
maru was still at its base in Anambas Island, while the Kamikawa-maru, which had departed
from Cam Ranh Bay on the 14th, was steaming southward.(104, 130, 133) Commander in Chief
Ozawa made up his mind to first direct a concentrated air attack, while having the convoy
temporarily evacuate from the area, and then attack the allied fleet with all the warships he
could employ. At 1035, he ordered the 1st Air Unit to prepare for an attack with the full force
of its land-based attack planes. Then he successively gave the following orders: at 1045, he
ordered: “(1) The main unit shall advance to the southeastern waters to destroy the enemy
fleet; (2) the 1st and the 3d Air Units shall repeatedly attack the enemy with full force; and
(3) the 2d Air Unit shall get close to the enemy fleet for scouting.”(118) Then at 1125: “The 2d
escort unit ([and] the convoy of the main force of the 38th Division) shall temporarily evac-
uate to the north.”(118) Further at 1330: “The main unit shall try to engage the main force of
the enemy in a decisive battle, after the attacks by the 1st and the 3d air units on the latter.”
And at 1330: “[(1)] The Sendai, the Yura, the 11th Destroyer Division (note by the author: the
Hatsuyuki, the Shirayuki and the Fubuki) and the Asagiri shall join the main unit; (2) the main
unit shall sail to the waters southeast of Cape Jang; (3) the remaining element of the 1st escort
unit (note by the author: [the element and] the convoy of the advance party of the 38th Divi-
sion) shall enter into the anchorage in the mouth of the Musi River.”(118) However, as the allied
fleet reversed its course at 1417, the 2d escort unit (and the convoy of the main force of the
38th Division) [also] turned around at 1700, and headed for the mouth of the Musi River.(118)
At 1700 [the commander in chief] ordered the 1st escort unit that “the commander of the 1st
escort unit shall return to his original mission when convenient.” At 1710, Commander in
Chief Ozawa reported to the Combined Fleet and the Southern Task Force: “Against one
Malaya-type battleship, seven cruisers and five destroyers heading northward, I had the air
units start their attack around 1330 and onwards, intending to conduct a decisive battle after
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having the air units destroy the
enemy main force. But around 1400
the allied fleet reversed its course.”(118)
The engagement had ended with no
enemy ships sunk by the air attacks
and no [direct] encounters between
the surface units. 
The Sailing of the Advance Party
The conditions during the passage of
the An’yō-maru, which was the head
of the left file of the advance party
([sailing in] double file, with four
ships each) were as follows:(69)
[February]
9th: Departed from Cam Ranh at 1900.
Everything all right.
10th: Clear. Spotted something that
looked like an allied submarine on
the port bow.
11th: Clear. Everything all right.
12th: Spotted something that looked like
an allied submarine on the port
bow at 0730. At 0915, strict alert
against submarines. At 1000, (an)
escort ship opens fire on the port
bow.
13th: Clear. Everything all right.
14th: Clear. At 0845, one allied aircraft
approached, but was repelled. Next, some more approached, but were repelled. Then, strict
alert against floating mines. At 1230, (an) escort ship destroyed mines ahead. At 1245, five
allied aircraft approached, were intercepted by two Japanese aircraft, which brought down
two of the allied aircraft at 1250. At 1330, three allied aircraft approached, [but] were repelled.
At 1920, twelve allied aircraft approached, [but] were repelled. At 2330, entered the Mentok
anchorage, dropped anchor at 2435, started transferring to landing craft at 2445, which was
completed at 0200.
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Illustration No. 25—Routes of Sailing and Entry into Anchor-
age of Operation L
Advance party: safely entered anchorage.
Main force of the division: entered anchorage after once having
reversed its course at the approach of the enemy fleet coming for
an attack.
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(4) The Paratroop Drop 
[Paratroop] Raiding Group Order
Having on 4 February received the aforementioned Third Air Force Order, Colonel Kume,
the commander of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group, drew up an attack plan as well as an
outline of the raid, and on the 11th he passed down the following order:(96)
1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group Operation Order A, No. 32
1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group Order 11 February
1. Details concerning the enemy movements and the situation of our own troops will be provided
separately.
2. Based on the attack plan in the separate volume, at 1130 on day L – 1 as the set time and date,
the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall execute a raid against the airfield and the oil refineries
of Palembang and their vicinity, seize and secure them, while facilitating the operations of the
Third Air Force and the 38th Division as well. The 12th Transport Squadron shall temporarily
be put under my command until the completion of Raiding Operation L. The 3d Air Division
and the 81st and the 98th Air Groups shall provide cooperation when the [paradrop] raid is car-
ried out, of which the 98th Air Group shall follow my command with respect to the details of the
raiding operation. The paratroop as well as the [crash-] landing units shall come under the com-
mand of the Sixteenth Army commander when the main force of the 38th Division arrives in
Palembang. The remaining units under the command of the group shall return to their original
command on completion of Operation L without separate orders.
3. The airfield raiding unit shall act as follows:
(1) The main force shall parachute down in a sector southeast of the airfield and one element in
a sector west of the airfield, attack and seize the airfield. While having the necessary forces
secure the airfield, the main force shall attack and seize [the city of] Palembang. Particular
attention must be paid to keeping an eye on the main road to Jambi. After the drop and until
the troops have collected and readied their equipment, [air] cover by means of ground at-
tacks by [our] fighter planes shall be provided. In the attack on the airfield, it is necessary to
stay in close contact with aircraft that performs an emergency or crash-landing.
(2) Upon seizing the airfield, [the unit] shall start to work on repairing the airfield, so that it
will first of all be fit for use by fighter plane units, and secondly by large aircraft.
(3) Once Palembang is seized, [the unit] shall make efforts to get hold of facilities related to the
oil refineries, and to seize as many means of transport as possible for the sake of the main
force of the 38th Division.
(4) After the drop, [the unit] shall take the oil refineries raiding unit under its command.
(5) The advance party of the 38th Division, consisting of one and a half infantry battalions as
the core and led by Colonel Tanaka, is scheduled to sail upriver to Palembang on day L.
4. The oil refineries raiding unit shall parachute down in the vicinity of the location, and first seize
key parts of the refineries by means of a sudden attack. It shall try to frustrate the enemy’s plan
to destroy [the facilities] and secure the premises upon seizing them. [The unit] shall need to be
particularly on guard against enemy maneuvers conducted from the west or from upriver. After
the drop, the unit shall return under the command of the regimental commander, and therefore
shall swiftly establish radio contact.
5. The 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment commander shall secure the targets to be seized until the
arrival of the main force of the 38th Division (scheduled for day L + 2).
6. The [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit shall enplane the paratroop units, and raid Palembang and
vicinity at 1130 on day L – 1 as the set time and date.
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7. The cooperating heavy bomber group shall take on board important arms and matériel, and fly
ahead to Palembang and vicinity while providing cover against antiaircraft fire for the [Para-
troop] Raiding Air Unit. The outline of cooperation to be provided by the 81st, the 64th, the 59th
and the 90th Air Groups shall be arranged separately.
8. The outline of the paradrop raid conducted by the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit and the coop-
erating air group of heavy bombers shall be given in separate order(s).
9. The ground units of the second raiding unit shall be in Sungai Petani and make preparations so
that the [2d paradrop] raid can be executed on day L, which shall be separately ordered.
10. As for quartering, provisions and medical supplies after the drop, you must depend on what
you can get from the enemy, [nevertheless] you must be fully determined to carry on. [Only]
indispensable matériel may be supplied by air transport.
11. I shall be with the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment.
Separate volume: Palembang [Paratroop] Attack [Operation] Plan
4 February 1942, 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group Headquarters
1. Mission
On day L – 1 (9 February), the first [paradrop] raid shall be executed. The paradrop shall be con-
ducted at 1130 of the same day the main force shall make a sudden attack on the Palembang
airfield, seize and secure it, after which [the force] shall attack and seize [the city of] Palembang.
Simultaneously, an element shall parachute down in the vicinity of the oil refineries, make a
sudden attack [on the facilities], seize and secure them.
On day L, a second [paradrop] raid shall be executed to reinforce our fighting power. By acting
in close connection with the cooperating air units, we expect to carry out an integrated air and
ground [attack] and maintain perfect security [to keep the enemy unaware].
2. Outline
(1) The cooperation in the operations and the raiding operation schedule of the air units (except
that of the air groups that drop equipment) are as shown in Attachment 1.
(2) Deployment to the launching bases:
By the evening of day L – 2 (8 February), the airfield raiding unit and the cooperating air
units shall be deployed to the Kahang [airfield], and the oil refineries raiding unit and its
cooperating air units to the Kluang [airfield]. [Both] shall complete the preparations for the
raid.
(3) Outline of the flight
(a) The departure from the launching bases shall be set at such a time that the paradrop can
be executed at 1130 on day L – 1.
(b) The [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander shall decide the details of the flight forma-
tion, after consulting the commanders of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment, the [Para-
troop] Raiding Air Unit, and the 98th Air Group. 
(c) If during the flight and before the execution of the drop it becomes by any means in-
evitable to change decisions due to the situation in the air, the [Paratroop] Raiding Group
commander shall make that decision.
(4) Execution of the paradrop operation
(a) The [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander shall decide upon the direction of approach,
the formation, the altitude of the paradrop and the mid-air assembling, after consulting
the commanders of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit, the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regi-
ment and the 98th Air Group.
(b) Although the air units will signal the moment to conduct the paradrop, the paratroop
units shall decide on the execution of the paradrop. 
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(c) Even if the direction of the first approach or other factors should prevent the drops, the
flight shall be resumed for the next attempt as long as circumstances permit.
(5) Launching of the attack
(a) The paratroop unit [to be dropped near] the airfield shall have its main force parachute
down on the sector east of the airfield, and one element on the sector west of the airfield.
[The unit] shall carry out a sudden attack on the airfield and seize it, and while securing
it with the necessary forces, have its main force attack and seize [the city of] Palembang.
[Meanwhile, the unit] shall stay in close contact with aircraft that perform a forced land-
ing. In particular it is necessary to keep an eye on the main road to Jambi. Once Palem-
bang is seized, it shall try to seize as many means of transport as possible, and
simultaneously it shall repair the airfield so that it will first of all be fit for use by fighter
plane units, and secondly by large aircraft. The advance party of the 38th Division, con-
sisting of one and a half infantry battalions as the core and led by Colonel Tanaka, is
scheduled to sail upriver to Palembang on day L.
(b) The paratroop unit [to be dropped near] the oil refineries shall, [after] parachuting down
in the vicinity of the location, first seize the key parts of the oil refineries by means of a
sudden attack, try as much as possible to frustrate the enemy’s plan to destroy [the fa-
cilities], and secure the premises upon seizing them. 
(c) The two [paratroop] raiding units shall try to maintain contact with each other. After the
drop, the oil refineries raiding unit shall come under the command of the regimental
commander.
(d) Both units shall secure the targets to be seized until the arrival of the main force of the
division. They shall be put under the command of the Sixteenth Army commander upon
arrival of the main force of the 38th Division. The arrival of the main force of the 38th
Division in Palembang is scheduled for day L + 2.
(6) Actions of the air units after the execution of the paradrop
[They shall] assemble and return to their bases as soon as possible; the 98th Air Group shall
[directly] head back to its base, and the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Units shall head back to
their base after refueling at the Kluang or Kahang airfields.
(7) Execution of the second [paradrop] raiding [operation]
(a) The second [paradrop] raiding operation shall be executed at 1500 on day L. The forces
to parachute down shall be one hundred men led by a company commander. [The unit]
shall depart from the Sungai Petani [airfield] and refuel at the Kluang or the Kahang air-
field, after which it shall carry out the paradrop. It shall have the main force [of the unit]
parachute down on the airfield and the sector along the Palembang Road, and about one
platoon on the oil refineries and their vicinity. The units on the ground shall mark the
drop zones.
(b) If the 12th Transport Squadron is available for employment, [only] the preparation for
this [paradrop] operation shall be conducted, and the launching [of the operation] shall
be ordered separately.
3. The disposition of the forces (the number of men given in parentheses applies in the event the
12th Transport Squadron is employed)
Ground units of the first raiding unit
Airfield raiding unit:
Commanding officer: 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment Commander Maj. Kōmura
Takeo
[Consisting of] 1 [paratroop] infantry company (minus 1 platoon and 1 element), 1
[paratroop] engineer company (minus 1 platoon and 1 element), 180 men in total
Oil refineries raiding unit:
Commanding officer: First Lieutenant Hirose
318 Chapter VII     /     The Capture of Java’s Dehors
[Consisting of] 1 [paratroop] infantry company (minus 1 platoon and 1 element), a
small number of specialists, 1 element of a signal unit, 70 men in total
Ground units of the second raiding unit
Commanding officer: First Lieutenant Morisawa
[Consisting of] 1 [paratroop] infantry company (minus 1 element), 100 men in total
[Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit
Commanding officer: [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit Commander Maj. Niihara Sueto
[Consisting of] the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit
98th Air Group (unit under command)
Commanding officer: 98th Air Group Commander Lt. Col. Ōsaka Junji
[Consisting of] the 98th Air Group
4. Signal communications
The rules for signal communications regarding the [paradrop] operation are as shown in sepa-
rate volume. (Omitted by the author.)
5. Supplies for the paratroop units
Supplies of weapons, ammunition and other matériel necessary after the drop shall be provided
by air transport upon request.
Attachment 1
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Rough overview of the scheduled actions of cooperating air units in the
Palembang [paradrop] raiding operation
Date Outline of forces Operational objectives (tasks) Outline of actions
Day L – 4 
through 
Day L – 2
Fighter planes of the 3d Air Di-
vision (including units brought
under the command of the divi-
sion)
To destroy enemy aircraft on
the Palembang airfield.
Attacks shall be made at a good
opportunity. The launching
bases will be the Kluang and
Kahang airfields.
The necessary forces of the 12th
Air Division
To take command of the air
over the Singapore sector; to
watch on the Pekanbaru air-
field; and to destroy enemy air-
craft on the airfields, if
required.
Attacks shall be made at a good
opportunity. The launching
base will be Batu Pahat.
Day L – 2
The first operation unit of the
[Paratroop] Raiding Group, the
98th, the 59th, the 64th Air
Group
Three aircraft of the 81st Air
Group 
One air group of light bombers
of the 3d Air Division
For the first [paradrop] raid,
each echelon will assemble by
evening at the Kluang or the
Kahang [airfield], to prepare for
departing on day L – 1.
1. The first raiding unit of the
[Paratroop] Raiding Group
will depart from Sungai
Petani and advance to the
Kluang and the Kahang [air-
field].
2. The 98th Air Group shall de-
part from the Ketil [airfield],
assemble two squadrons at
the Kahang [airfield], and an-
other at the Kluang [airfield].
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Day L – 1 
(9 Feb.)
First raiding unit
–Airfield raiding unit: 180 men
(260 men) of the 2d [Para-
troop] Raiding Regiment
[transported by] about two
squadrons of the [Paratroop]
Raiding Air Unit (20 aircraft). 
About two squadrons of the
98th Air Group 
The 64th Air Group 
One aircraft of the 81st Air
Group (accompanying).
–Oil refineries raiding unit: 70
men (130 men) of the 2d
[Paratroop] Raiding Regiment
[transported by] about one
squadron of the [Paratroop]
Raiding Air Unit (7 aircraft). 
One squadron of the 98th Air
Group 
The 59th Air Group 
One aircraft of the 81st Air
Group (accompanying). 
Separately: Another aircraft of
the 81st Air Group (to go in
advance)
1. Airfield raiding Unit: To exe-
cute the [paradrop] raid at
the Palembang airfield and
its vicinity, secure the air-
field, and quickly make it
ready for use by Type–97
fighter planes; after that at-
tack [the city of] Palembang.
2. Oil refineries raiding unit: To
execute the [paradrop] raid
at the oil refineries in Palem-
bang and their vicinity, seize
and secure these refineries
before destruction by the
enemy. 
3. The 98th Air Group shall
transport the weaponry and
matériel respectively for
each transport squadron of
both raiding units, and [also]
provide cover against anti-
aircraft fire at the rear of the
transport squadrons. 
4. The air groups of fighter
planes shall provide the di-
rect cover for each, and also
attack the airfield facilities
while the Paratrooper units
are [collecting and] putting
on their equipment ([for] 5 to
10 minutes). 
5. The command reconnais-
sance units shall conduct re-
connaissance just before and
during the time of operation,
and provide guidance.
1. Execution of the [paradrop]
raid shall be at 1130. 
2. The airfield raiding unit will
depart from the Kahang, and
the oil refineries raiding unit
from the Kluang base. 
3. [All units] shall return to
their advance base(s). How-
ever, units that have suffi-
cient flight range shall
directly return to their origi-
nal base. 
4. The transport aircraft are
planned based on the as-
sumption that the 12th
Transport Squadron will not
be employed.
One element of the light
bomber unit(s) of the 3d Air
Division
Attacks against the barracks in
the city of Palembang.
1. [The operation] shall be con-
ducted right before the exe-
cution of the first [paradrop]
raid. [The element] shall op-
erate along with one of the
raiding units as long as it
can. 
2. [It] shall depart from the
Kluang base.
One element of the fighter
plane unit(s) of the 3d Air Divi-
sion (including units brought
under the control of the divi-
sion)
Air cover for the convoy of the
38th Division.
After returning from [the task]
to cover the first [paradrop]
raid, it shall swiftly go to the
air above the convoy, to pro-
vide cover from roughly 1700
onwards.
The Collaboration of the Different Air Units
At noon on 9 February, as we have seen, it was finally decided to “set day L for 15 February.”
Having learned this on the night of the 9th, Third Air Force Commander Lieutenant General
Sugawara, as previously told, issued at 0930 on the following day, the 10th, the order regard-
ing the execution of Operation L by which he reassigned the 64th Air Group to the 3d Air
Division from the 11th onwards. Meanwhile, the Twenty-fifth Army, which had landed on
Singapore Island on the night of the 8th, was in the middle of a fierce battle, while the ad-
vance party of the 38th Division had departed from Cam Ranh Bay on the 9th, and its main
force on the 11th. It is an old rule in war that when the enemy is having a hard time, we are
as well. When the allied forces were desperately putting up resistance in Singapore, the
Twenty-fifth Army was [also] having a hard time sustaining its attack. And then right in the
middle of all this, Operation L was about to be executed. As complaints were heard from the
Twenty-fifth Army, the Southern Army ([to be precise] the Third Air Force) for its part [knew
it needed to] rack its brains to determine the distribution of forces. For this very reason, and
prior to the execution of Operation L, Commander in Chief Terauchi had specifically dis-
patched Chief of Operations Arao to the Twenty-fifth Army.(28) In the end, the following dis-
tribution of [air] forces between Operation L and the Singapore operation was made.(96, 103, 104)
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Day L
Second raiding unit
100 men  of the 2d [Paratroop]
Raiding Regiment [transported
by] about one squadron of the
[Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit. 
About one squadron of the
98th Air Group, half of the
fighter plane units of the 3d Air
Division (including those
brought under the control of
the division) 
One aircraft of the 81st Air
Group 
1. To execute the [paradrop]
raid at the airfield and oil re-
fineries of Palembang and
their vicinities, to reinforce
the first raiding unit. 
2. The tasks for the air units to
cooperate [in the above oper-
ation] shall be the same as on
the previous day. 
1. The Kluang airfield shall be
used as the launching base. 
2. Execution of the [paradrop]
raid is scheduled at 1500. 
3. If the 12th Transport
Squadron is available for
use, [only] the preparation
for this [paradrop] operation
shall be conducted, and the
launching [of the operation]
shall be given by separate
order.
Elements of the 3d and the 7th
Air Division
Support the ground combat in
Palembang and its vicinity, if
required.
An Element of the 12th Air Di-
vision
Advance to the Palembang air-
field as the airfield is [tem-
porarily] made ready, and
prepare to undertake [the tasks
of] the air defense of Palem-
bang and its vicinity.
Batu Pahat will be used as the
launching base.
Day L – 1 
Day L
Command Reconnaissance
Unit of the 3d Air Division
To conduct surveillance of the
battle site at appropriate mo-
ments after the drop of the
[paratroop] raiding group
Comments The advancement of forces from day L onwards shall be announced by separate order(s).
Navy (about 180 aircraft)
Shall operate on and to the east of the line connecting Palembang and Mentok.
1st Air Unit (22d Air Flotilla) 
[Shall operate from the airfields in] Kuantan (Kahang), Kuching and Thủ Dầu Một in
French Indochina (as explained previously).
2d Air Unit (the Kamikawa-maru, and the Sagara-maru)
[Shall operate from] the Anambas Islands and Cam Ranh (as explained previously).
3d Air Unit (the Ryūjō)
Shall basically accompany the convoy(s).
Army (Third Air Force)
Units under the direct command of the Third Air Force
81st Air Group (command reconnaissance): shall cooperate in Operation L with one ele-
ment (reconnoitering).
98th Air Group (heavy bombers): shall accompany the [Paratroop] Raiding Group and
drop equipment.
1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group
Group headquarters, the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment and the [Paratroop] Raiding
Air Unit shall participate in Operation L. (About three companies shall descend on day 1,
and about one company on day 2.) 
7th Air Division (a bomber division, consisting of the 12th and the 60th Air Groups and the 51st
Independent Squadron): shall cooperate in the capture of Singapore.
12th Air Division (a fighter plane division, consisting of the 1st and the 11th Air Groups and the
47th Independent Squadron): shall cooperate in the capture of Singapore. However, one
squadron of the 11th Air Group shall escort the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group’s advance
from Sungai Petani to Kluang, and Kahang.
3d Air Division: shall cooperate in Operation L with its main force, and in the capture of Singa-
pore with one element.
So, the question arises how 3d Air Division Commander Major General Endō allocated his
forces between Palembang and Singapore. Major General Endō allocated his forces in the
following way (from the 11th onwards):(96)
15th Independent Air Unit (headquarters and one reconnaissance squadron): shall mainly co-
operate in Operation L from Kluang.
59th Air Group (fighter planes): shall participate in Operation L with its main force (two
squadrons) from Kluang.
64th Air Group (fighter planes): shall participate in Operation L with its full force from Kahang.
75th Air Group (light bombers): [shall engage in] the Singapore operation.
90th Air Group (light bombers): shall participate in Operation L from Klu-
ang.
27th Air Group (light bombers): [shall engage in] the Singapore operation.
Third Air Division Commander Endō cooperated in the fierce battles in
Singapore to such an extent that the Twenty-fifth Army, which was fight-
ing a hard battle, was deeply grateful.(98) In fact, as previously described,
after having conducted an air campaign for [Operation] L from the 6th
through the 8th of February, Major General Endō carried out air strikes
for [Operation] L for only one day on the 13th, one day prior to the drop
of paratroopers.
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3d Air Division
Commander, Maj. Gen.
Endō Saburō
On the 1st day of the drop of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group, the number of aircraft
which took off with paratroopers or equipment on board was sixty-one [in total] ([consisting
of] twenty-five transport aircraft of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit, nine MC aircraft of the
transport squadron, and twenty-seven heavy bombers of the 98th Air Group). They were
supported by the aforementioned 3d Air Division’s forces for Operation L, which made a
total of more than one hundred aircraft when they took off.(39, 96)
The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group, in accordance with the aforementioned Third Air
Force order of the 10th of January [editor’s note: probably the order of 10 February is meant
(p. 309)], concluded the “Outline of raiding [operations] of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit
and cooperating air groups,” and at 1700 on the 11th passed it down as a written instruction
at Sungai Petani.(96) In summary the contents were as follows:(96)
1. The [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit shall advance from Sungai Petani to Kahang by 1900 of day
L – 2. The 98th Air Group shall advance to Kluang.
2. Takeoff shall start at 0830 on day L – 1. At 0900, the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit and the 64th
Air Group shall depart from Kahang and join the 58th [editor’s note: misprint for 59th] and the
98th Air Groups in the skies over Kluang. At 0920, they shall put the formation in order over
Batu Pahat, and fly ahead at an altitude of 3,000 meters.
3. The aircraft carrying paratroopers and those carrying their equipment (the [Paratroop] Raiding
Air Unit and the 98th Air Group) shall fly in [the following] formations, with the number of air-
craft [in each formation] from the front as nine – nine – nine – seven – nine – nine – nine (sixty-
one aircraft in total).
4. Three plans shall be prepared, with an approach from the mouth of the Musi River and along
[the river] as plan No. 1.
5. The drop will be set at 1130, and shall be executed as follows:
[On a zone] between the airfield and the city of Palembang: the aircraft with the group com-
mander on board shall make a belly landing.
[On a zone] 1,200 meters southeast of the airfield: eighteen aircraft carrying paratroopers and
fifteen aircraft carrying equipment.
[On a zone] 200 meters southwest of the airfield: six aircraft carrying paratroopers and three
aircraft carrying equipment.
[On a zone] 700 meters south of the oil refineries: three aircraft carrying paratroopers and three
aircraft carrying equipment.
[On a zone] 500 meters southwest of the oil refineries: six aircraft carrying paratroopers and six
aircraft carrying equipment.
6. The fighter plane unit (the 59th and the 64th Air Group) shall provide direct escort during the
flight and while [the paratroop units] are descending and collecting their equipment. After that,
one element shall continue providing direct escort for the units in the air.
7. The light bomber unit shall make bombing raids against ground fire from the airfield, the bar-
racks and other [targets].
8. On day L – 1 the command reconnaissance unit (the 81st Air Group) shall conduct reconnais-
sance prior to the drop with one aircraft, and with another two aircraft provide guidance and
reconnoiter the situation after the drop.
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Takeoff, Drop and Occupation
The Units to be Dropped and their Strength
In the end, it was decided to employ the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment for the drop. The
final deployment was set as follows:(96)
First unit to be dropped and its strength ([execution] on the 14th)
Aircraft to make a belly landing (one aircraft): [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander
Kume, Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Itoda, Captain Ueda (signal communications), Group
Adjutant Inagaki, interpreter Saitō, press corps member Araki, and one antitank gun.
Southeast side of the airfield: seventeen men of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment
headquarters (i.e. Regimental Commander Kōmura and his men), thirty men of the
signal squad, ninety-seven men of the 4th Company (Company Commander First
Lieutenant Mitani and his men), thirty-six men of the 3d Platoon of the 2d Company,
a total of 180 men.
Southwest side of the airfield: sixty men of the 2d Company (Company Commander First
Lieutenant Hirose and his men).
South side of the east oil refinery: Second Lieutenant Hasebe and his men, thirty-nine
men [in total].
West side of the west oil refinery: sixty men of the 1st Company (Company Commander
First Lieutenant Nakao and his men).
Second unit to be dropped and its strength ([execution] on the 15th): ninety men of the 3d
Company (Company Commander First Lieutenant Morisawa and his men).
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Instructions Right Before the Launch of the Palembang Paratroop Operation
(at the Kluang Airfield)
Takeoff
On the 13th at 1500, the first raiding unit completed its deployment to the Kahang and the
Kluang airfields, and it stood ready for action in the following way. The second raiding unit
stood by at Sungai Petani.
Kahang airfield: [Paratroop] Raiding Group headquarters, 330 men of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding
Regiment, two transport squadrons (thirty-four Lockheed–type aircraft), the 64th Air Group
(three squadrons of Type–1 fighter planes).
Kluang airfield: 98th Air Group (aircraft to carry equipment; two squadrons of Model-II aircraft),
the 90th Air Group (one squadron of light bombers), the 59th Air Group (two squadrons of
fighter planes), the 15th Independent Air Unit (one squadron of reconnaissance planes), the
81st Air Group (three command reconnaissance planes).
At 1700, Third Air Force Commander Sugawara gave instructions, which were attended by
the Southern Army Vice Chief of Staff Sakaguchi Yoshitarō and others. On that day, the 3d
Air Division had attacked Palembang with its main force for the first time in five days, while
cooperating with the Twenty-fifth Army in its attack on Singapore, as mentioned previously.
On the following day, the 14th in Malaya, it was clear or lightly clouded with a slight
wind, a cloud ceiling of 1,000 meters, and visibility of 10 to 20 kilometers. The first raiding
unit left the Kluang and the Kahang airfields at 0830, assembled above Batu Pahat, and flew
straight toward the Musi River at an altitude of 3,000 meters, in the order of the first and the
second echelons under the direct escort of the fighter plane unit. At that time, the advance
party of the 38th Division, which had left Cam Ranh Bay in the evening of the 9th, was head-
ing southward, aiming to reach the Mentok anchorage that night. The main force of the di-
vision, which had left [the bay] on the 11th, followed in its wake.(96, 118)
One element of the reconnaissance unit had flown ahead of the raiding unit, and recon-
noitered the weather, the atmospheric conditions and the enemy movements in Palembang
and the vicinity. The command reconnaissance [element], which had flown ahead, reported
the presence of ten large and thirty small aircraft on the Palembang airfield. In the Sumatra
area, there were signs that the weather was gradually worsening; Palembang was covered
with thick cloud with a ceiling of 200 meters. Further, due to the fires at Singapore, a sooty
smoke was hanging over the mouth of the Musi River, and rendered the visibility extremely
poor. These adverse weather conditions made the flight of the raiding unit difficult, but they
[also] helped the unit to carry out a surprise attack.(96)
The Drop (See Illustration No. 26)
Around 1120, the unit reached the sky over the mouth of the Musi River, where it divided
[into echelons] to head toward their own drop zones; the first echelon approached the air-
space above the airfield and the second echelon the airspace above the oil refineries. The al-
lied forces opened fire simultaneously with antiaircraft guns, antiaircraft machine guns and
other [arms]. However, the [paratroop] raiding units defied the fire and started parachuting
down. The airfield raiding unit completed its drop at 1126, and the oil refineries raiding unit
at 1130.(96)
Without missing an opportunity, the 98th Air Group dropped weapons, ammunition and
other equipment, while strafing [the sources of] the antiaircraft fire. Meanwhile, the 90th Air
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Group (light bombers) bombed the [enemy] ground units, suppressed them, and so helped
the paratroopers to collect their weapons and ammunition and, after that, fight the enemy.
In this fight, one aircraft of the 90th Air Group crashed itself [editor’s note: according to Vol.
34, p. 500, it was a plane of the 98th Air Group]. When providing cover for the paratroop
units about 800 meters above the airfield, the 64th Air Group spotted five allied fighter planes
which came to attack the air group of heavy bombers dropping equipment. It brought down
one [allied] aircraft and drove back the others. Then, at 1205, when providing cover at an al-
titude of about 2,000 meters, the group spotted about ten allied fighter planes approaching
from the direction of Palembang, intercepted them, brought down one, and drove back the
others. It was 1217. The 59th Air Group [at first] had been charged with the cover for the
paratroop unit above the refineries, but seeing no allied aircraft it [changed the plan and]
strafed the antiaircraft positions in the oil refineries, suppressed them, and provided support
to the paratroop unit in its operation. From around 1210 onwards, and after confirming the
situation of the paratroop units, these supporting air units started leaving the battle site one
after another to head back to their bases.(96)
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Illustration No. 26 — The Palembang Area
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Operations of the Unit Dropped near the Airfield (See Illustration No. 27)
The airfield raiding unit carried out the drop as scheduled, with the main
force ([consisting of] two platoons of the 2d Company and the 4th Com-
pany (minus one platoon) of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment as the
core (180 men, including and led by Regimental Commander Kōmura))
at 1126 [on a zone] some three kilometers southeast of the airfield, and
with one element ([consisting of] the 2d Company (minus two platoons)
as the core (sixty men including and led by Company Commander Hi-
rose)) at 1130 on the southwestern side of the airfield. Striving to bring
the unit back under command, the airfield raiding unit began its actions
and advanced toward the airfield under cover of the supporting air units.
After the drop, Regimental Commander Kōmura immediately headed
toward the southeastern corner of the airfield. Around 1200, taking com-
mand of ten men of his [unit], he pushed his way through the dense jungle, to find around
1330, in a hollow about two kilometers southeast of the airfield, 4th Company Commander
First Lieutenant Mitani and his men, twenty-four in total, who were reconnoitering the
enemy, and brought them under his command. On this occasion he also learned about the
actions of First Lieutenant Okumoto and his men (which will be described later). Fearing
that allied reinforcements from Palembang city to the airfield might arrive quicker than ex-
pected, Regimental Commander Kōmura decided to swiftly advance to the Jambi Road and
cut off the allied reinforcements. He put five of his men under the command of First Lieu-
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2d [Paratroop] Raiding
Regiment Commander,
Maj. Kōmura Takeo
Actual Situation of the Palembang Paradrop Operation (Taken from a Hayabusa [Type–1 Fighter Plane])
tenant Mitani, and ordered them to
go to the road connecting Palem-
bang city and the airfield, attack and
advance along the road toward the
airfield office. First Lieutenant Mi-
tani put an advance party of twenty
men, led by Platoon Commander
First Lieutenant Ōki, in the armored
cars which First Lieutenant Oku-
moto had seized earlier, but while
they advanced, they encountered an
allied unit of some three hundred
men approaching from the airfield.
After a fierce battle they defeated
the allied unit, and at 1820 occupied
the airfield office. However, First
Lieutenant Ōki was severely injured
in this battle. [Meanwhile,] Regi-
mental Commander Kōmura, lead-
ing five men, had set out after
Company Commander Mitani, but
due to the thick jungle, [Kōmura] fi-
nally lost contact with the company.
After engaging in battle with an al-
lied unit of about 100 men around 1400, [Kōmura and his men] reached the east side of the
airfield at 1800. There, the regimental commander found and took command of a total of
twenty-five men, including First Lieutenant Komaki. At 2100 they reached the airfield office,
where [Commander Kōmura] took command of the units which had already assembled, as
well as the officers and men, who were coming in one after another.(93)
Prior to this, First Lieutenant Okumoto, platoon commander of the 4th Company, and
four men, who had landed in the zone along the road connecting the airfield and Palembang
city, had engaged around 1200 an allied unit of some two hundred men with two light-ar-
mored cars, seized one armored car and three trucks, and cut off reinforcements to the air-
field.(93)
In the meantime, First Lieutenant Hirose, commander of the 2d Company, who had
landed in the zone west of the airfield, advanced with the two men he had brought under
his command. Around 1400 he approached the front of the barracks on the west side of the
airfield, where he discovered an allied unit of about 350 men. The first lieutenant withdrew
for the moment, brought another man under his command, and at 1700 he stormed the bar-
racks along with two of his men, and seized them. Earlier, First Lieutenant Gamō, platoon
commander of the 2d Company, had brought sixteen men under his command right after
the drop. However, [he and his men] were not able to collect their weapons and ammunition
as they had expected, and what is more, they came under point-blank fire of antiaircraft guns
and machine guns of an antiaircraft position near the barracks. Intending to suppress the
enemy fire, they moved forward with [only] hand grenades and pistols, set fire to the bar-
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Illustration No. 27 — The Engagements at the Airfield
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racks and burned them down. However, [during the action] First Lieutenant Gamō was killed
by a direct hit from an antiaircraft machine gun that had suddenly opened up. After this,
Sergeant Major Yoshinaga took over the command of the platoon, and at 1820 [Sergeant Major
Yoshinaga and his men] advanced to [the area at] the northwest end of the airfield.(93)
Thus, the Kōmura Unit occupied the airfield, and with all the forces that had assembled
by midnight kept a strict guard until morning. Despite hearing some intermittent rifle reports,
there was no counterattack from allied units that night.(93)
The Occupation of the Oil Refineries (See Illustration No. 28)
At 1130, the oil refineries raiding unit had its main force ([consisting of] the 1st Company of
the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment as the core (sixty men including and led by First Lieu-
tenant Nakao)) descend on the west side of the west oil refinery, and one element (thirty-
nine men including and led by Second Lieutenant Hasebe) on the south side of the east oil
refinery, as scheduled. Under cover of the air units, [both] strove to collect their weapons
and ammunition, while trying to assemble the troops.(93)
First Lieutenant Tokunaga, a platoon commander of the 1st Company, who had landed
at the west side of the west oil refinery, launched an attack against a pillbox position at the
southwest side of the refinery at 1140, leading the six men he had gathered. They daringly
charged the pillbox position, seized it, and further headed north along the road lined by com-
pany houses, where they encountered an allied unit of some sixty men with two light ma-
chine guns and one heavy machine gun. [First Lieutenant Tokunaga and his men] immediately
attacked them and, at the same time, he ordered the Ogawa and the Yoshioka Squads (each
[made up of] six men including the commanders), both of whom had just then caught up
[with Tokunaga], to pursue the defeated enemy and charge into the premises of the refinery
to secure all distillation units. Both squads entered the premises, secured the central distilla-
tion unit, and flew the flag of the Rising Sun on its tower. It was 1330. In the meantime, with
only a small number of men at his disposal, First Lieutenant Tokunaga had defeated the gar-
rison that had put up a fierce resistance. On seeing the Rising Sun flag being raised on the
central distillation tower at 1310, he immediately started moving toward the distillation unit.
At that moment, Company Commander Nakao showed up and assumed command. While
defeating an allied unit of some thirty men armed with two light machine guns on their way,
they entered the central distillation unit at 1410. Bringing the Ogawa and the Yoshioka Squads
back under his command, Commander Nakao and his men closed the pipe cocks in the oil
refinery, and put out the fire in the boilers in order to prevent destruction of the facilities by
fire. The allied units, taking advantage of the fact that the Japanese troops were few in num-
ber, launched a fierce counterattack and approached as close as forty to fifty meters. As the
bullets of both sides flew all over the place, oil began to gush out of the tanks and pipes.
Company Commander Nakao ordered the Tokunaga Platoon to make a counterattack, which
drove back the enemy, and [the platoon] advanced to an area northeast of the company
houses. [Meanwhile,] the allied unit opened fire with mortars; the pipes directly hit by the
shells caught fire and black smoke filled the air. The company commander assembled the
unit, and took shelter in an air-raid shelter fifty meters south of the distillation unit. When
night fell, an allied unit of some two hundred men closed in [on the Japanese] from three
sides, threw hand grenades, and persistently repeated their counterattacks all night. But
every time, [Commander Nakao’s] company beat them back.(93)
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In the meantime, the Hasebe Platoon, which had descended on the zone south of the east
oil refinery, began its advance at 1230 towards the refinery, after collecting its weapons and
ammunition. Two men, Corporal Ikeno and Private First Class Yamashita, who had dropped
right in front of an outpost position and came under fierce fire from the allied troops, bravely
fought back only with their hand grenades and pistols and defeated eight men. They further
advanced in pursuit of the defeated enemy, but heavy fire from somewhere near the barracks
injured Private Yamashita. Carrying the private on his back, Corporal Ikeno pulled back,
joined the main force of the platoon, and reported the immediate situation of the enemy to
Platoon Commander Hasebe. Learning that the only way through was the road leading
through the barracks, the platoon commander began to move ahead along both sides of this
road, while making it passable. Despite the fierce fire [from the enemy], at 1500 [he and his
men] closed in to a point about one hundred meters from the enemy, where Second Lieu-
tenant Hasebe was killed. Sergeant Major Niwa took his place and led the platoon. With the
casualties gradually increasing and the advance getting difficult, at 1600 the sergeant major
dispatched a scout in an effort to find an alternative route, but without success. He came to
a decision to carry out a night attack, and made preparation for it, while fortifying his posi-
tion. At 2300 the platoon executed a night attack on a pillbox position at the southeast of the
barracks, [successfully] seized it, and continued its attack to occupy all the distillation units
at 0100 on the 15th.(93)
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Illustration No. 28 — The Engagements at the Oil Refineries
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The Situation from the 15th Onwards
The Airfield
As one aircraft of the reconnaissance unit (15th Independent Air Unit Commander Lt. Col.
Nakahama Gosuke) had landed [at the airfield] at 1030 on the 15th, it communicated the sit-
uation including the fact that most of the dropped weapons and ammunition were yet to be
collected. Third Air Force Commander Sugawara immediately dispatched by transport air-
craft personnel, weapons and ammunition which belonged to the airfield battalion stationed
at the Kahang airfield, and simultaneously had one element of a fighter plane unit rapidly
advance to the Palembang airfield and charged it with the task of providing cover for the
raiding unit. At 1130, [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander Colonel Kume reached the
airfield and assumed overall command from then on. The fact was that the colonel had exe-
cuted a forced landing at 1130 on the 14th about ten kilometers south of the airfield and at-
tempted to move toward the location of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment headquarters,
but he had been obstructed by the allied forces and the terrain, and been unable to advance
as planned. At 1300, all men of the third echelon (the second raiding unit), that is, the 3d
Company (ninety men including First Lieutenant Morisawa) descended safely on the airfield,
reinforcing the [raiding unit’s] fighting strength. At 1600, the raiding group commander or-
dered the Adachi Platoon of the Morisawa Company to scout the city of Palembang. At 1730,
the platoon entered the barracks in the city of Palembang without meeting any resistance,
spotted allied armored craft going down the Musi River, fired at them, and caused one of
them to run aground. At 1930, learning the situation of the Adachi Platoon, the raiding group
commander immediately advanced into the city of Palembang, and started mopping up [the
enemy]. On the following day, the 16th, contact was established with the oil refineries raiding
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The Aircraft of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander After its Forced Landing (14 February)
unit. From around 2100 on the same day, in joint action with the Tanaka Advance Party of
the 38th Division (which had started to arrive in Palembang one after another from 1900 on-
wards on the 15th), [the group] secured the airfield and the city of Palembang. On the 20th,
guard duty [of the places] was taken over by a unit of the 38th Division.
After the battle it was found that the [enemy] unit which had defended the airfield had
consisted of British, Dutch and Australian soldiers, some 530 men in total, led by a Dutch
colonel, and that it had possessed a large number of trucks and light-armored cars. Further,
it had set up a small number of pillbox positions around the airfield, where it had installed
thirteen antiaircraft guns and five antiaircraft machine guns.(93, 96)
The Operations at the Oil Refineries
As the counterattacks of the allied unit had gradually become sluggish toward daybreak on
the 15th, the west oil refinery attack unit, after having returned to the drop zone and collected
equipment, assembled at the company office in three trucks at 0830. Meanwhile, at the east
oil refinery, [the attack unit] secured the distillation facilities all through the night, and
mopped up [the enemy in] the neighborhood at dawn on the 15th. At 0600, there was a sud-
den explosion at the NKPM oil refinery with a deafening sound (which was [later] judged to
be caused by a time bomb), and [the refinery] was instantly enveloped in flames, but no [fur-
ther] damage was found to the distillation and the cracking facilities. Around noon of the
15th, the oil refinery raiding unit had completed mopping up [the enemy] and secured the prem-
ises. On the 20th, their guard duty was taken over by an element of the 38th Division.(93)
After the battle it was found that the [enemy] unit that had defended the oil refineries
had been some 550 men in total, led by a captain. It had set up a small number of pillbox po-
sitions, where it had installed ten antiaircraft guns and five antiaircraft machine guns.(93, 96)
Results
As we have seen, the Army’s first ever paratroop unit had occupied Palembang and seized
250,000 tons of oil, a small number of British and U.S. aircraft, and various types of weapons
and matériel.(23)
The number of casualties sustained on the 14th among the 329 men dropped was as fol-
lows:(23)
Killed in action: two officers, seventeen noncommissioned officers and twenty soldiers, a
total of thirty-nine men.
Wounded and hospitalized: three officers, eighteen noncommissioned officers and sixteen
soldiers, a total of thirty-seven men.
Wounded but remaining in the unit: four noncommissioned officers and seven soldiers,
in total eleven men.
Note: Also included in the number of those killed in action are two men whose parachute did
not open.
Commander in Chief Terauchi conferred a citation of merit on the Kume Paratroop Unit and
the units that had directly cooperated, which read: “As the vanguard of the Southern Army,
you have skillfully taken advantage of the opportunity for battle, and divided the Dutch East
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Indies and Malaya areas, as well as secured the key for the coming operations of the entire
army.”(13, 93)
Third Air Force Commander Sugawara [also] conferred a citation of merit on five men:
First Lieutenant Okumoto Minoru, Sergeant Kawahara Masao, Senior Private Katano Saburō,
Senior Private Tsushima Shūsuke and Paymaster Sergeant Major Kikuchi Kiyoji. The citation
of merit read as follows:(13, 93) “Right after descending, you encountered a motor vehicle unit,
which suddenly appeared, speeding ahead from the direction of the airfield, boldly attacked
and disarmed it, during which you happened to spot an enemy unit of some 150 men in four
trucks with a light-armored car in front, heading northward to reinforce the airfield from the
city of Palembang in response to an emergency. [Immediately] shifting your position and
without missing an opportunity, you attacked [these trucks] with pistols and hand grenades.
Once [you saw] the enemy step out of the vehicles, you bravely rushed the enemy without
fearing death or injury, and finally put the enemy to rout, leaving many weapons and dead
bodies behind. [You] aggressively and steadfastly forestalled the enemy with a small number
of men by cutting off the reinforcement to the airfield at the critical moment when the main
force of our unit was not yet fully prepared, and frustrated the intention of the enemy, which
brought about the success of this operation.”
An outline of the organization of the [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment has already been
given, but a more detailed description would run as follows.(93) Due to the limitation on the
number of aircraft in this operation, however, not all [of the regiment] was able to partici-
pate.
The regiment consisted of the regimental headquarters and four companies. 
The 1st, the 2d and the 3d Companies consisted of a command team, three platoons and one
machine gun platoon. [Each] platoon consists of three rifle squads ([equipped] with one light
machine gun for each) and one grenade squad ([equipped] with two to three grenade launchers).
The machinegun platoon was equipped, in addition to two heavy machine guns, with either a
37-mm. antitank gun, a 20-mm. antitank rifle, or a Type11 infantry gun.
The 4th Company was organized in the same way as the 1st, the 2d and the 3d Companies, but
the rifle platoons [also] possessed engineer skills, and were equipped with two flamethrowers.
Each company consisted of some 160 men, and each platoon about 34 men.
(5) The 38th Division’s Invasion of Southern Sumatra
The convoy of the advance party entered the Mentok anchorage on the night of 14 February.
The main force of the advance party headed for the mouth of the Musi, the Telang and the
Saleh Rivers in landing craft, while the Orita Battalion headed for Bangka Island. On the
morning of the 15th, the battalion went ashore at Mentok, seized the airfield, and by the 18th
it had occupied the entire island of Bangka. [Meanwhile,] on the morning of the 15th the ad-
vance party had set out to ascend the three rivers [mentioned], and on the evening of the
same day, the center column unit reached Palembang. The left column unit seized the Mar-
tapura airfield on the morning of the 19th. The main force of the division got to the mouth
of the Musi River on the evening of the 16th, and reached Palembang on the evening of the
20th. The division commander had arrived in Palembang on the afternoon of the 17th ahead
of [the main force], and sent the main force of the advance party, designated as the Tanaka
Detachment, southward. This detachment seized Tanjungkarang on the 20th. Furthermore,
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after assigning the Tanaka Detachment, he assigned the Kanki Detachment to rush westward.
This detachment seized Lahat on the 22d and Bengkulu on the 24th. Having dealt with the
dispatch of the Tanaka and the Kanki Detachments, he diverted the main force of the Orita
Battalion from Bangka Island and sent it northward. This battalion and other units seized
Jambi on 4 March, which completed [the operation to] occupy all key locations in southern
Sumatra. In the meantime, the disembarkations at Mentok and at Palembang had been com-
pleted respectively on 21 February and on 28 February.
Although the main force of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group had parachuted down at mid-
day on the 14th and one element on the morning of the 15th, it was not until the night of the
15th that they shook hands with the advance party of the 38th Division. On the afternoon of
the 17th, the [Paratroop] Raiding Group came under the command of the 38th Division Com-
mander. The air units of the Third Air Force advanced one after another to the Palembang
airfield without missing an opportunity: the 2d Squadron of the 11th Air Group (fighter
planes) of the 12th Air Division had advanced to the Palembang [airfield] on the morning of
the 15th, the headquarters and the 1st Squadron of the air group and one squadron of fighter
planes of the 3d Air Division in the afternoon, the 3d Squadron of the 11th Air Group on the
16th, the headquarters of the 3d Air Division, the 27th Air Group (the headquarters and the
1st Squadron), as well as the 2d Squadron of the 64th Air Group on the 17th. It was followed
by the remaining units of the 3d Air Division, the headquarters of the 12th Air Division, and
also the 3d Squadron of the 1st Air Group on the 19th. [These units] took charge of the air
defense over Palembang and carried out air campaigns over Java, while cooperating with
the 38th Division in its operation.(96)
Judging on 18 February [according to p. 439, 16 February] that Operation L had for the
most part been completed, [Navy] Malaya Unit Commander Ozawa started on his way back
on the morning of the same day with his main unit. It was decided that the unit would trans-
fer one of its elements to the Dutch East Indies Unit for the Java operation, while having an-
other element take charge of the sweeping of the sea off Singapore and in the Strait of
Malacca.(118) The Hatsutaka, the flagship of the river-ascending unit commander (9th Base
Force commander), started on the 18th for the Singapore area, while the Sendai, the flagship
of the escort unit commander (3d Destroyer Squadron commander), left the Mentok anchor-
age on the 25th.(118, 126)
The Capture of Mentok (See Illustration No. 29)
The advance party consisted of the 229th Infantry Regiment (minus the 3d Battalion), led by
Regimental Commander Col. Tanaka Ryōsaburō, the divisional armored car company, the
2d Battalion (minus one battery) of the 38th Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 38th Engineer
Regiment (minus one company and one platoon), one divisional radio platoon, and the main
force of the divisional medical unit.(68) At 0100 on the 15th, the convoy ([consisting of] the
previously-mentioned eight ships) completed its entry into the Mentok anchorage, after
which the main force of the advance party and the Orita Unit started switching to their land-
ing craft, respectively for going upriver and for going ashore at Mentok.(69) The Orita Unit
included the 1st Battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment ([with] the 1st and the 2d Compa-
nyies of the regiment as its core), led by Battalion Commander Capt. Orita Masaru, one pla-
toon each of the regimental artillery and engineers, one antiaircraft battery, and the 33d
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Airfield Company.(69) The operation plan of the unit (the Bangka invasion unit) made by the
division was that(66) “The Bangka invasion unit shall have one platoon land near the Mentok
pier around 0300 and simultaneously the main force shall go ashore two kilometers southeast
of Mentok. After the landing, the main force shall immediately attack the Mentok airfield
from the east, and one element from the direction of the city. [Once it is seized, the unit] shall
mop up [the enemy] in the neighborhood, after which the battalion shall move on to Palem-
bang, leaving one company behind. The company that stays behind shall swiftly seize
Pangkal pinang.”(66) At 0225, the [Orita] Unit reached the shore, with the main force in four
large and one small-sized motorized [landing] craft and one element in two small-sized mo-
torized [landing] craft. At 0730 the unit seized the lighthouse and at 0830 the city and the air-
field of Mentok.(69) At the shore there were no obstacles nor were there any gun positions.
Although there were some 2,500 people, officers and men of the allied forces as well as citi-
zens of enemy countries, who had fled from Singapore, they were taken prisoner without
resistance.(69) The battalion occupied Pangkalpinang on the 18th, and by the 19th it had com-
pletely cleaned up the entire island.(66) The landing of the Orita Battalion was followed by
the disembarkation of the 33d Airfield Company, and airfield-related matériel from the ships
that carried the [Orita] Unit. Of the two ships, the An’yō-maru finished disembarkation on
the 20th, and the Alaska-maru on the 21st.(69) Then, in conformity with the division order,
which will be mentioned later, Battalion Commander Orita left 1st Company Commander
Takeuchi and his men behind on Bangka Island and successively departed with the rest of
his unit from Mentok and headed for Palembang from 23 February onwards.(69)
As for the Mentok airfield, on 19 February it was reported: “As of 1800 on the 18th, [the
airfield is] 200 meters wide and 800 meters long. [With] the disembarkation of matériel com-
pleted, [the airfield will be] expanded to a width of 200 meters and a length of 1,020 meters
by the 21st.”(118)
The Landing at Palembang (See Illustration No. 29)
The ascent of the rivers by the main force of the advance party and its subsequent operations
had been planned as follows:(66) “After switching to the landing craft at the Mentok anchor-
age, the party shall be divided into the right column unit (the Telang River ascending unit:
[consisting of] one half infantry battalion as the core, led by Maj. Miyazawa Shigezō, com-
mander of the 2d Battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment), the center column unit (the Musi
River ascending unit: [consisting of] three companies and one platoon as the core, led by
229th Infantry Regimental Commander Col. Tanaka Ryōsaburō), and the left column unit
(the Saleh River ascending unit: [consisting of] the main force of the 38th Engineer Regiment
and one infantry company as the core, led by Regimental Commander Lt. Col. Iwabuchi Tsu-
neo). Around 0300 they shall depart from the anchorage to go upriver. The right column unit
shall ascend the Telang River and in cooperation with the main force (the center column unit)
advance toward Palembang, where, in joint action with the [Paratroop] Raiding Unit, they
shall capture the city. The left column unit shall move toward the rear of Palembang to facil-
itate the advance of the main force. If the city has already been captured [by then], the left
column, without moving into Palembang, shall swiftly move on to Martapura to cut off the
escape route of the allied forces. After the capture of Palembang, the advance party shall
make preparation for heading south towards Tanjungkarang.”
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Around 0300 (on the
15th), after confirming that
the Orita unit had success-
fully landed on Mentok,
advance party commander
Colonel Tanaka ordered
each ascending unit to set
out.(68) Around 0600 (0640
for the left column unit),
the river ascending units
each reached the mouths of
their [respective] rivers
under the guidance of
Navy warships.(69) Around
0800, each of the units left
the mouths of their rivers,
and started going up-
stream.(68) They dashed up
the rivers which had yet to
be cleared [of mines] by
the Navy. Because on this
day, as explained earlier,
the Malaya Unit was focus-
ing on its operation against
the allied fleet and the
Third Air Force was in the
middle of the second
paradrop operation on
Palembang, no support by
Japanese aircraft during
their ascent could be given.
However, despite suffering
five successive attacks by
allied aircraft during the
ascent, the ascending units
fortunately sustained only
minor losses.(68)
From the evening of the
15th onwards, the right
column unit moved into
the vicinity of the Palem-
bang airfield and estab-
lished contact with the paratroop unit. On the early morning of the following day, the 16th,
[the unit] left the neighborhood of the airfield to join the main force in the city of Palembang.
It then crossed the Musi River to assemble in preparation to head southward.(68)
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Illustration No. 29 — The Bangka and Palembang Operations of the 
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The left column unit, without entering Palembang, headed for Mar-
tapura from midnight of the 15th onwards by landing craft and further
by marching on foot.(68)
[Meanwhile,] from 1900 on the 15th onwards, the center column unit
had started disembarkation in the Palembang area ([to be precise,] the
4th Company at the western end of the urban area on the south bank of
the Musi River, the 6th Company at the eastern end of the urban area on
the south bank of the Musi River, and the main force ([consisting of] the
3d Company as the core) at the eastern part of the urban area on the
north bank of the Musi River). Colonel Tanaka disembarked on the pier
at 2000,(68) and was immediately able to contact [Paratroop] Raiding
Group Commander Kume on the north bank (note: a unit of the [Para-
troop] Raiding Group, which had advanced south from the airfield, had been entering the
city from 1730 onwards).(93) However, he did not succeed in making contact with the para-
troop units which had occupied the oil refineries on the south bank. It was only around 1100
on the following day, the 16th, that the 6th Company, which had landed on the south bank
near the eastern end near the oil refinery, [finally] established contact with the paratroop
units that had seized the oil refineries.(68)
As soon as he had established contact with the [Paratroop] Raiding Group, Colonel
Tanaka secured Palembang without missing an opportunity and at the same time decided
to make preparations for the advance southward. First, he had one infantry platoon on bicy-
cles leave Palembang southward to reconnoiter, and next around 1700 he had the 4th Com-
pany (minus one platoon) [also] head southward in motor vehicles, which had been
collected.(68)
The Capture of Tanjungkarang (See Illustration No. 30)
The [38th] Division’s Order
At precisely that time, the convoy of the main force of the division was entering the mouth
of the Musi River.(118) Prior to this, at 1320 on the previous day (the 15th), [Navy] Commander
in Chief Ozawa, who had intended to fight a decisive battle with the allied fleet as mentioned
earlier, had given the order that “the convoy of the advance party shall evacuate and anchor
at the mouth of the Musi River.” In conformity with the order, leaving three ships, i.e. the
Tajima-maru, the An’yō-maru and the Alaska-maru, behind at the Mentok anchorage, the re-
maining five ships of the convoy [of the advance party] had weighed anchor at the Mentok
anchorage at 1500 of the same day (the 15th), and entered the anchorage at the mouth of the
Musi River at 1740, where they had waited for the Navy to finish the clearing of the river.(69)
The convoy of the main force of the division entered the anchorage at the mouth of the Musi
river at 1845 on the 16th.(118) Right before that, Division Commander Sano had issued the fol-
lowing order:(69)
38th Division Order Gin’yō-maru on the waters east of Sumatra, 1600, 16 February
1. Yesterday, on the 15th at 0235, one element of the advance party successfully landed on Bangka
Island and seized the Mentok airfield at 0640. The main force of the party had its left river as-
cending unit at 0640, and its right and center river ascending units … advance to the mouth of
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229th Infantry
Regiment Commander,
Col. Tanaka Ryōsaburō
the Musi river, where each unit respectively started ascending the [designated] river. In the
meantime, at 1126 of the day before yesterday, the airborne [Paratroop] Raiding Group com-
pleted its drop on the Palembang airfield, the oil refineries and their vicinities. Further, around
1300 yesterday, the 15th, one squadron of the fighter planes of the Third Air Force rapidly ad-
vanced to the Palembang airfield. It seems that the convoy of the advance party and the river
ascending units came under repeated attacks from formations of enemy aircraft.
2. The plan of the division remains the same as it was. The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall be
newly put under my command upon the arrival of the division in Palembang, and the 2d Sea
Transport Supervisory Unit upon its arrival in Mentok.
3. The advance party shall henceforth become the Tanaka Detachment and, in cooperation with
the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group, leave one element in the vicinities of Palembang, Limau and
[Talang] Abab, and send the main force forward toward the south as swiftly as possible to seize
the airbases of Martapura and Tanjungkarang and make them ready for use, while mopping up
the enemy naval bases along Lampung Bay in order to facilitate the Java invasion of the army.
In this operation, it is required to have an especially powerful unit ascend the river(s) between
Palembang and Martapura by landing craft to quickly advance to the latter to capture the enemy.
The following person(s) and units shall newly be put under the command of the detachment
commander upon their arrival in Palembang (the rest omitted by the author).
Staff Officer Oyadomari
3d Battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment
2d Squadron of the 4th Tank Regiment (with one-third of the regimental train attached)
45th Independent Motor Transport Battalion (minus two companies)
4. The Chief of Staff, Staff Officer Oyadomari, Adjutant Yamamoto and part of the division head-
quarters shall ascend the Musi River in extra-large motorized [landing] craft this evening, when
the convoy of the main force arrives at the mouth of the river, ahead [of the rest of the force] to
Palembang. The ascending [of the river] and the disembarkation [of this party] shall be assigned
to the disembarkation working unit. (The rest [of this item] and items 5 to 8 are omitted by the
author.)
9. The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall secure the airfield and the oil refineries of Palembang.
The Tanaka Detachment shall cooperate with the group in these tasks.
10. The Orita Unit shall henceforth come under my direct command and still continue its present
tasks (the rest omitted by author).
11. The 3d Battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment (note by the author: with Maj. Kemmotsu
Heishichi as battalion commander) shall come under the command of Detachment Commander
Tanaka upon its arrival in Palembang. For this purpose, the battalion headquarters and about
one company shall advance to Palembang in extra-large motorized [landing] craft on this
evening when the convoy of the main force arrives at the mouth of the Musi River (the rest omit-
ted by the author).
12. The 2d Squadron of the 4th Tank Regiment (with one-third of the regimental train attached)
shall come under the command of Detachment Commander Tanaka upon its arrival in Palem-
bang. For this purpose, about six light tanks shall advance to Palembang in extra-large motor-
ized [landing] craft on this evening when the convoy of the main force arrives at the mouth of
the Musi River.
13. The 45th Independent Motor Transport Battalion (minus two companies) shall, upon its arrival
in Palembang, come under the command of the advance party commander.
14. The Disembarkation Working Unit shall still continue its present tasks, in such a way that the
unit shall this evening take charge of the river ascending operation of most of the division head-
quarters, the Kemmotsu Battalion and one element of the tank squadron from the mouth of the
Musi River to Palembang in the six extra-large motorized [landing] craft that accompanied the
convoy of the main force. [The unit] shall [also] take charge of the disembarkation work at Palem-
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bang and, by means of the required number of large- and small-sized motorized [landing] craft,
small cargo ships and fishing boats, simultaneously take charge of the river ascending operation
of the necessary units in the convoy of the main force, which are to go upstream ahead [of the
other units].
15. – 21. (Omitted by the author.)
22. I shall this evening leave the mouth of the Musi River and advance toward Palembang along
with part of the division headquarters in extra-large motorized [landing] craft.
As previously mentioned, on the afternoon of the 16th, Commander Tanaka of the advance
party had already sent the 4th Company southward. Following the aforementioned division
order, he [then] assigned two companies to stay behind to guard Palembang, reassigned the
main force of the remaining unit as the Tanaka Detachment and ordered it to charge toward
Tanjungkarang. First, on the afternoon of the 17th, the Miyazawa Battalion (the former right
column unit) departed from Palembang by collected vehicles (busses, trucks, and automo-
biles).(68) Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Itoda, and 38th Division Staff Officer Oyadomari ac-
companied the unit.(68, 39) After having seized the Talang Jimar oil field [editor’s note: the text
has Talang Jur, which is a misreading], the Miyazawa Battalion had one element [stay and]
keep a watch on the direction of Lahat, and advanced southward with its main force. When
a non-commissioned officer and his underling (both with a railroad background and capable
of operating locomotives), who were under the direct command of the detachment com-
mander and accompanied the advance party, found a serviceable switch engine at the Talang
Jimar station [editor’s note: probably a station near Talang Jimar is meant], [the battalion com-
mander] immediately put this to use, created a temporary armored train unit with one in-
fantry platoon and one regimental gun, and had [the unit] pursue the enemy.(68) Detachment
Commander Tanaka had been fretting about the fact that there were no motor vehicles avail-
able for the main force of the detachment, but at 1200 on the 18th, the motor vehicles of the
45th Independent Motor Transport Battalion were finally unloaded. Losing no time, the de-
tachment instantly left Palembang and reached the Martapura airfield at 0500 on the 19th.(68)
Earlier, the left column unit, which had headed to Martapura [partly] in landing craft, and
[partly] on foot from midnight of the 15th [editor’s note: apparently by way of the Komering
River], had reached the Martapura airfield a little after 0400 on this morning (of the 19th),
and had seized the airfield after a minor engagement. This was followed by the arrival of
the Miyazawa Battalion in Martapura.(68) At 0600 (on the 19th) the Miyazawa Battalion left
Martapura, which was followed by the main force of the detachment (including the former
left column unit, and the armored car unit of the division, which had caught up [with the
main force]). It left Martapura at 0200 the next day (the 20th). Both rushed ahead, crossing
rivers at Kutoraja [editor’s note: probably a misreading for Kotabumi] and Mandah by using
improvised materials because the bridges there had been destroyed by the allied forces. By
dawn on the 20th, [the battalion] reached Tanjungkarang (the main force at 1000), after which
it further advanced to the coast. At 1200, while briskly shooting at the [Japanese] troops with
two gunboats, the rear guard of the allied unit left the jetty of Telukbetung. As the artillery had
not yet caught up with the detachment, it had to vainly let [the enemy] escape. The total dis-
tance the detachment had covered in these two days and nights was some 500 kilometers.(67, 68)
On the following day, the 21st, with considerable effort, Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Itoda
found the Tanjungkarang airfield.(39) Against all expectations, the airfield was far from com-
plete, with [a runway of] a mere 700 meters. The Tanaka Detachment immediately began
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construction work. Working around the
clock, it completed a runway of 25 meters
wide and 800 meters long by the 25th.(39, 68)
On the afternoon of the same day, the
fighter planes of the 3d Air Division rap-
idly advanced to the airfield and launched
the operation against Java on the opposite
shore.(96)
After having made a belly landing to-
gether with [Paratroop] Raiding Group
Commander Kume on a clearing within a
stretch of swampy jungle four kilometers
[according to p. 331, ten kilometers] south-
east of the Palembang airfield, Sixteenth
Army Staff Officer Itoda directed [opera-
tions] in the Palembang sector and the
preparation of Tanjungkarang airfield. On
the 17th, he had reported the following
from Palembang to the Sixteenth Army:(23)
1. As of 2100 on the 15th, the right and the cen-
ter column units of the advance party of the
38th Division have been working hard
policing and restoring public order in key
locations at Palembang. Around 1700 on the
16th, about one company [of the party] was sent off towards Tanjungkarang. The left column
unit departed from [a place] east of Palembang at 0900 on the 16th for Martapura. At 2400 on
the 16th, part of the aviation fuel arrived. There are no impediments to the operations of the
fighter planes based in Palembang.
2. Policing and the restoration of public order in Palembang are appropriately carried out under
the unified command of Colonel Kume. There are a few defeated troops in the vicinity, but the
people mostly remain [in their places]. Electricity and water is supplied as usual; only the tele-
phone is out of service.
3. Although I chose a landing spot slightly far from the airfield where enemy [troops] were
sparsely deployed, due to the difficult terrain, I arrived at my present position [only] at 1800 on
the 15th. I [hereby] apologize for the delay in sending my report. I will give the necessary in-
structions to the commander of the airfield company which arrived on the 17th, and advance
to Tanjungkarang.
4. The brave and hard fighting of all the officers and men of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group in this
operation cannot be related without tears. Those who did not participate in this battle make up
no more than a [small] part of each company of the 2d Regiment, [which means that] if one in-
tends to use [the paratroopers] for the Cilacap [operation], one will have no choice but to rely
on those who fought in Palembang. Having seen the battle with my own eyes, I do not have the
heart to drive them into another hardship, and I offer as my opinion that [the idea of] using the
[Paratroop] Raiding Group in the Cilacap [operation] should be given up.
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Illustration No. 30 — The 38th Division’s 
Southern Sumatra Operations
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Delay in the Upriver Ascent of the Convoy of the Main Force
Earlier, on the 15th, the Tanaka advance party had started ascending the rivers in motorized
landing craft at 0830, but it was not until two hours later at 1030 that the Navy started clearing
the Musi River.(102) At 1030 the Navy river-ascending unit commander (i.e. the 9th Base Force
commander) had his units start going upriver, in the order of: (1) the 1st Explosives Sweeper
Unit ([consisting of] nine large and small motorized [landing] craft), the 2d Explosives
Sweeper Unit ([consisting of] eight auxiliary cutters), and the 3d Explosives Sweeper Unit
([consisting of] four fishing boats) (the units above were generically referred to as the Explo-
sives Sweeper Units); (2) the Minesweeper Unit ([consisting of] the Otowa-maru and the
Rumoi-maru); and (3) the main unit (the Hatsutaka).(102) However, due to twelve bombing raids
and strafes by an aggregate number of thirty-nine allied aircraft, and the frequent parting of
the minesweeping ropes caused by the many obstacles on the sea/[river]bed, the mine
sweeping operation was given up at 1300 after sweeping only ten nautical miles. The units
returned to the mouth of the river at 1500.(102) Commander in Chief Ozawa then transferred
three minesweepers from the Escort Unit to the river-ascending unit.(102) On the same day
(the 15th), the five ships of the convoy of the advance party, which had been ordered to
change their anchorage [in preparation] for the aforementioned decisive fleet battle, had left
the Mentok anchorage for the anchorage at the mouth of the Musi River, and arrived there
at 1740.(118) At 0800 on the following day, the 16th, the Navy river-ascending unit [again]
began clearing the river while sailing upstream reinforced by the three minesweepers men-
tioned earlier, and by 2030 roughly finished clearing [the river] up to Palembang.(102) At 1845
of that day, the fourteen ships of the convoy of the main force of the 38th Division arrived at
the mouth of the Musi River, and entered the anchorage.(118)
On the following day, the 17th (the day when the Miyazawa Battalion started its advance
to the south), the Shimushu (a coastal defense ship of 400 tons) started ascending the [Musi]
river with the 38th Division headquarters on board, which had been transferred from the
Gin’yō-maru. [Editor’s note: the Shimushu-class coastal defense ships had a displacement of
860 tons; the 400 tons mentioned here are presumably gross registry tons.] Following [the
Shimushu], the army convoy of nineteen ships ([of which] five belonged to the former advance
party and fourteen to the main force of the division) left the anchorage at the mouth of the
Musi River.(102) However, at [a point] three nautical miles upriver from Borang Island, [the
convoy] encountered a mine barrier that was yet to be cleared and was forced to anchor tem-
porarily . Only the Shimushu kept sailing on alone, reached Palembang at 1435 (on the 17th),
and disembarked the division headquarters.(102)
At 1830 on the 19th, [the operation of] clearing the river was completed; twenty-eight
mines were dealt with. At 0800 on the 20th, the convoy departed from its temporary anchor-
age guided by the Shimushu, and arrived in Palembang around 1500 on the same day, where
it started disembarkation. The disembarkation was completed on the 28th.(102)
The Capture of Bengkulu
Division Commander Lt. Gen. Sano Tadayoshi, who had arrived in Palembang at 1435 on
the 17th on the Shimushu ahead [of the rest of the convoy] as mentioned previously, on the
night of the 19th issued the following order concerning the preparation for the seizure of
Lahat and Bengkulu.(69) [At that time] the convoy was [still] stuck near Borang Island.(102)
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NUMA [38th Division] Operation Order A, No. 114
38th Division Order Palembang, 2400, 19 February
1. As of 0850 today the 19th, the Tanaka Detachment has seized Martapura driving off weak enemy
forces and continues its dash towards Tanjungkarang. The Orita Battalion completed the capture
of Bangka Island on the 18th. The 3d Air Division has been supporting the offensive of the
Tanaka Detachment with the Palembang airfield as its base. The people of Yukasuka (a place
approximately 130 kilometers west of Palembang) have come to show their allegiance to us.
[Editor’s note: “Yukasuka” could not be identified. It might be a misspelling/misreading for
Bungamas, between Lahat and Tebingtinggi.] The convoy of the main force is expected to come
to Palembang and start disembarking here tomorrow the 20th.
2. The plan of the division remains the same as it was.
3. The Ōneda Unit (note by the author: 3d Battalion, 230th Infantry Regiment) shall put its Obata
Platoon under my direct control at Palembang, let its main force first advance to Prabumulih (a
three-forked railroad junction southwest of Palembang) and vicinity, seize the location, and pre-
pare for the advance toward Lahat and Bengkulu. [The unit] shall come under the command of
unit commander Kanki (note by the author: the artillery regiment commander) upon his arrival
at Prabumulih. Further, [the Ōneda Unit] shall put the 10th Company (minus one platoon) under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Nagahata, the commander of the Division Oil-drilling Unit,
upon his arrival at the location.
4. The Obata Platoon shall advance to Sekayu and vicinity, and secure the location, after which it
shall prepare for the advance against Jambi. [The platoon] shall also investigate the condition
of the oil fields in the vicinity.
5. The Orita Unit shall assign a unit consisting of about one infantry company and one machine
gun platoon as the core for guarding the entire island of Bangka, and assemble its main force in
the vicinity of Mentok, so that it can be redeployed to Palembang at any time (the rest omitted
by the author).
6. After disembarkation, the Kanki Detachment shall successively advance to Prabumulih and
prepare for the capture of Lahat and Bengkulu (the rest and item 7 omitted by the author).
8. The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall assemble in the Palembang barracks and prepare for
the next operation. The group shall turn over the guard duty of the oil refineries and their vicin-
ity to the disembarkation working unit at 0900 on the 20th (the rest omitted by the author).
When the disembarkation started, Division Commander Sano ordered Col. Kanki Takekichi to
seize the oil fields and the airfield in Lahat, and [the towns of] Lubuklinggau and Bengkulu.(66)
On 21 February, the Kanki detachment ([consisting of] the 38th Mountain Artillery Regi-
ment headquarters and one mountain battery with Colonel Kanki as regimental commander,
the main force of the 3d Battalion of the 230th Infantry Regiment with Maj. Ōneda Yasuhei
as battalion commander, one squadron of the 4th Tank Regiment, one element of the divi-
sional signals unit, one element of the divisional medical unit and others), left Palembang
and advanced while commandeering motor vehicles. The detachment captured Lahat on the
22d, Lubuklinggau on the 23d and, after crossing a mountain range, Bengkulu on the west
coast on the 24th.(70, 71, 72) No allied units were seen in this area, and the locals lent their active
cooperation to the operation of the detachment.(70, 71, 72) Col. Abe Yoshimitsu, chief of staff of
the division, who accompanied the detachment, gave directions particularly concerning the
occupation of the oil fields in Lahat and the disposition of the oil production unit.(66)
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Occupation of the Jambi Oil Fields and Gelumbang
Following the assignments concerning the operations in Tanjungkarang (the Tanaka Detach-
ment) and in Bengkulu (the Kanki Detachment), Division Commander Sano decided to re-
deploy the main force of the Orita Battalion, which was still in Bangka, for carrying out the
operation to occupy the oil fields in Jambi, and on the evening of the 21st he passed down
the following order:(69)
NUMA [the 38th Division] Operation Order A, No. 119
38th Division Order Palembang, 1800, 21 February
1. Yesterday the 20th, the Tanaka Detachment completely occupied Tanjungkarang and Telukbe-
tung and destroyed the enemy naval base(s) in Lampung Bay. [Editor’s note: Tanjungkarang
and Telukbetung are now together known as Bandar Lampung.] The rear guard unit of the
enemy escaped from Lampung Bay on a gunboat at 1200 yesterday the 20th. Without a break,
the Tanaka Detachment mopped up the enemy along Semangka Bay and is now making the
Tanjungkarang airfield ready for use. The Orita Unit has completed its capture of Bangka Is-
land.
2. The plan of the division remains the same as it was.
3. The Tanaka Detachment shall send Staff Officer Oyadomari back to Palembang to return him
to my command.
4. The Orita Unit shall put [a unit consisting of] about one company and one machine gun platoon
as the core under my direct control as the Bangka Island occupation unit, turn over its current
duty to this unit, and head for Palembang with the main force of the remaining unit. The dis-
embarkation unit commander shall be in charge of the transport.
5. The Bangka Island occupation unit shall hereafter come under my direct control and take over
the current duty of the Orita Unit (the rest omitted by author).
The redeployed element of the Orita Unit consisted of the battalion headquarters, the 2d
Company, one machine gun company and one regimental gun section as the core and de-
parted from Mentok [one after another] by small cargo ships between 23 February and 1
March.(69) During that time, Mentok suffered a number of air strikes: [one air strike] by one
aircraft on the 22d, two strikes by one aircraft each time on the 23d, again two by one aircraft
each time on the 26th, then two strikes by one aircraft and one by four aircraft on the 27th.(69)
As mentioned previously, the division commander had earlier (on the 19th) dispatched
the Obata Platoon to Sekayu, partly in preparation for the operation against Jambi. Also, in
order to occupy the oil fields in Jambi and the vicinity, at the time of the redeployment of the
Orita Battalion he gave the order to a unit consisting of one infantry company and one ar-
tillery section as the core, led by Battalion Commander Captain Orita, to prepare at Lubuk-
linggau and capture Jambi. He also had Colonel Abe, the chief of staff of the division,
accompany the unit and give directions to it. Separately, [the division commander] had one
infantry company head for Jambi from Palembang (in northwesterly direction).(66) The Orita
Unit, which [had been redeployed] from Bangka Island to assemble in Lubuklinggau via
Palembang and made preparations for further advance, departed from the city on 23 Febru-
ary and headed for Jambi. On its way, the unit had two minor engagements with the enemy
and [was held up] at a bridge that had been destroyed. Nevertheless, [the unit] dashed [to-
ward Jambi] and, on 4 March, seized the place without engaging in combat. In the meantime,
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the company that had headed for Jambi from Palembang was delayed by the bad condition
of the road and finally arrived in Jambi on the following day, the 5th.(66)
With the occupation of the Jambi oil fields, the main part of the southern and central
Sumatra operations of the 38th Division was completed.
[In the meantime,] it was decided that the Navy would use the airfield of Gelumbang
(fifty kilometers southwest of Palembang; discovered on 16 February) for the Java operation.
On 23 February, the Southern Army sent a telegram to the 38th Division to instantly give full
support to the Navy’s preparation of the Gelumbang airfield (including the transport of fuel
and ammunition).(23) Thanks to the cooperation of the 38th Division, from the 24th onwards,
a powerful unit of the 22d Air Flotilla was deployed at this airfield, which will be mentioned
later in detail.
Oil and the [Paratroop] Raiding Group
Whereas about eighty percent of the eastern oil refinery of Palembang (NKPM) had been lost
due to deliberate detonation by the allied forces on the early morning of the 15th, only four
gasoline tanks had been destroyed by fire at the western oil refinery (BPM) at the time right
after the seizure. [Editor’s note: NKPM, or Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatschap-
pij, was a subsidiary of the American Standard Vacuum Oil Company; BPM, or Bataafsche
Petroleum Maatschappij was a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell.] The situation until 18 Feb-
ruary was as described in the following [telegrams]:(23)
From: 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander, at Palembang, on 18 February
The situation of the refineries according to the subsequent investigation conducted by [Southern]
Army Staff Officer Satō Hiroo, and his comments:
1. As it is expected that at least approximately 150,000 tons of crude oil and approximately 400,000
tons of refined oil (the precise breakdown of the contents is still under investigation) that re-
mained at the BPM Oil Refinery can be secured, I request that tankers be allocated and that
preparations be made so that [the oil] can successively be sent to the homeland.
2. At the BPM Refinery, only about three fires are still burning. Although one tank has already
been destroyed by fire (each tank contains 10,000 tons), the others remain intact with almost no
fear that the fire will spread.
3. It is required to urgently dispatch a large number of engineers who can handle the distillation
and cracking installations because all the main Dutch engineers have fled.
4. The NKPM Refinery is still on fire to such an extent that there is no prospect of when the fire
will be extinguished. There are more or less ten tanks, which are in lesser danger of catching
fire; it is expected that 70,000 to 80,000 tons of refined oil can be secured.
5. The two tankers seized at the refineries belong to the 300-ton class. We are searching for more
[tankers] to the best of our abilities.
6. As such is the situation, I am of the opinion that it would be better if fuel for operations and
other needs during the southern operation be supplied from Palembang as a base, so that the
supply [of oil] from the homeland can be reduced as much as possible.
From: Chief of Staff, 38th Division, at Mentok, on 20 February
1. Apart from the oil tanks and pipes destroyed by fire, the BPM Refinery is for the most part
intact. Further, it has a facility to process gasoline for aviation as well. Its loading facility is also
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intact. The capacity of the remaining oil tanks (excluding smaller processing oil tanks) is some
500,000 tons.
2. The NKPM Refinery was blown up at the time of our occupation and is difficult to repair.
Note: this telegram was sent on the 20th, but reports the situation on the 18th.
However, allied aircraft, which infiltrated [the area] from the 19th onwards, brought an un-
expectedly heavy loss.
As mentioned previously, [Japanese] fighter plane unit(s) had started to arrive from 15
February onwards at the Palembang airfield. These were followed by the 3d Air Division
headquarters, which had advanced on the 17th, and by the 12th Air Division headquarters,
which had advanced on the 19th. From the 19th onwards, [these units] launched air strikes
against Java. However, the allied air forces managed to infiltrate the area with a small number
of aircraft in the way described below:(99)
[February]
15th: Three attacks were made on the airfield by a total of four aircraft. [The Japanese]
brought down two of them. [The enemy aircraft] did not come to the refineries.
16th: Five attacks were made on the airfield by a total of nine aircraft. [The Japanese]
forced one of them to make an emergency landing. No attacks were made on the oil
refineries.
17th: More than dozen aircraft came to attack the airfield. [The Japanese] brought down
three of them. No attacks were made on the oil refineries.
18th: No attacks were made on the airfield or the oil refineries.
19th: Three attacks were made on the airfield by a total of three aircraft. There was also
an attack on the oil refineries, which set fire to the tanks of the BPM plant.
20th: One aircraft came for an attack on the refineries, and enlarged the number of tanks
destroyed by fire.
21st: One aircraft came for an attack on the refineries, and destroyed one distillation and
one cracking installation. This aircraft was brought down by [Japanese] fighter
plane(s).
Since its seizure, they had worked all day and night until finally the fire was extinguished
on the night of the 17th, and the refinery was brought in the condition of the 18th described
in the telegrams above, but then this refinery was [again] enveloped in flames from the 19th
onwards as related above, which moreover not only destroyed nearly thirty tanks, including
all of the most important 100-octane gasoline tanks, but also put one each of the distillation
and cracking installations out of commission. This could happen because [the Japanese] had
been taken off guard during their air attack operation against Java and because the antiair-
craft artillery had arrived late due to the mine barrier which had held up the convoy [at a
point] three nautical miles upriver from Borang Island until the 20th.(99, 102)
For the [Paratroop] Raiding Group, which had occupied the refineries, this was a bitter
pill to swallow.
By Southern Army Order of 22 February, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group returned from
the Sixteenth Army (the 38th Division) command to the command of the Third Air Force
commander. Then, at 2400 on 1 March, it was brought back under the direct control of the
Southern Army from the command of the Third Air Force commander.(23)
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5. The Capture of Balikpapan and Kendari (See Illustration No. 31)
The Balikpapan and Kendari landing operations were launched on the day (24 January) when
the participants of the Manila Conference went on their way back after the conference, which
had been held between the Southern Army and the [Navy] Southern Task Force to discuss
the invasion schedule, and between the Sixteenth Army and the [Navy] Dutch East Indies
Unit to make arrangements for the Java operation.
Balikpapan was a key resource location: oil, which was transported through pipelines
from the oil fields in the Samarinda and Sanga Sanga areas located northwest of Balikpapan,
was stored and refined there, and shipped from there as well. Besides, [the city] had an air-
field, from which air attacks against eastern Java could be conducted. Kendari, on the other
hand, was a strategic place, which would enable [Japanese] naval aircraft to conduct air at-
tacks on eastern Java, while gaining command of the air over a vast area in the east and south-
east, stretching from Ambon and Kupang to Bali Island. At the same time, it was an ideal
place for establishing a naval base.
Whereas the capture of Balikpapan was to be conducted by both the Army and the Navy
in conjunction, that of Kendari was to be carried out solely by the Navy.(1)
In accordance with the Southern Army order of 20 November, the Sixteenth Army had
ordered the Sakaguchi Detachment to capture Balikpapan.(36)
The [Navy] Southern Task Force (i.e. the Second Fleet) had issued the order to shift to
phase-two operations on 26 December, and [thereby] ordered the Dutch East Indies Unit to
carry out the operations to capture Balikpapan and Kendari (which belonged to the phase-
two operations of the Southern Task Force). It had also ordered its air unit (i.e. the Eleventh
Air Fleet) to cooperate [in the operations].(110) The chief task of the Southern Task Force in the
phase-two operations was the escort of the transport of the main force of the Twenty-fifth
Army [to Malaya].(102) [To that end,] after the escort of the transport of the main force of the
Fourteenth Army [to the Philippines], the Southern Task Force had diverted the 5th Destroyer
Squadron and others from the Philippines Unit (Dutch East Indies Unit, i.e. the Third Fleet)
to the Malaya Unit (the Southern Expeditionary Fleet) and positioned the main force of the
Southern Task Force in Cam Ranh Bay.(102) As support for the Dutch East Indies Unit, Southern
Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō had formed the Eastern Support Unit ([con-
sisting of] the battleship Haruna, the heavy cruiser Maya and two destroyers) with an element
of the main force (the order was given on 23 December), and separately sent the unit to the
waters southeast of Davao.(102) As soon as the outlook for [the completion of] the escort of
the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army became clear, Vice Admiral Kondō left Cam Ranh
Bay on 8 January with the main unit of the Southern Task Force, advanced to Palau on 18
January, and took command of the Eastern Support Unit.(102)
[Meanwhile,] on 28 December, Vice Admiral Takahashi, commander of the Dutch East In-
dies Unit, had in outline made the following disposition of forces (for the phase-two opera-
tions):(110) [In this disposition,] the Western Attack Unit (after carrying out the landing
operation on Tarakan on 11 January) would conduct the Balikpapan operation, and the East-
ern Attack Unit (after conducting the operation to capture Menado on 11 January) would
conduct the Kendari operation, while the main unit remained positioned in Davao.(102)
Main Unit: directly led by the Vice Admiral Takahashi; the main force of the 16th Cruiser Division
(the heavy cruiser Ashigara).
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Western Attack Unit:
1st Escort Unit: the 4th Destroyer Squadron (minus the 4th Destroyer Division) as its core
2d Base Unit: the light cruiser Kuma (note: she belonged to the 16th Cruiser Division [at that
time] and was transferred to the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet on 3 January) and most
of the 2d Base Force. 
1st Air Unit: the auxiliary seaplane tenders San’yō-maru and Sanuki-maru as the core. [Editor’s
note: the Japanese text says “2d Air Unit,” which is a misprint.]
Eastern Attack Unit:
Support Unit: the 5th Cruiser Division (the heavy cruisers Myōkō, Haguro and Nachi (note: the
Myōkō was damaged on 4 January and moved to the mainland for repair)) and two destroy-
ers.
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Illustration No. 31 — Balikpapan and Kendari Operations, and the General Situation at that Time
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2d Escort Unit: the 2d Destroyer Squadron (minus the 18th Destroyer Division) as its core.
1st Base Unit: the light cruiser Nagara (note: she belonged to the 16th Cruiser Division) and most
of the 1st Base Force.
2d Air Unit: the 11th Seaplane Tender Division (the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho).
Of the [naval] air unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet), the 23d Air Flotilla (the 2d Air Raid Unit)
headquarters had advanced to Jolo Island on 3 January, and the 21st Air Flotilla (the 1st Air
Raid Unit) headquarters to Menado on 16 January.(102) The headquarters of the Eleventh Air
Fleet (V. Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō) had been positioned in Davao since 7 January.(102) The dis-
position of forces of the Eleventh Air Fleet as of 31 December was as already described, how-
ever, as of 20 January the disposition of forces of the 23d Air Flotilla was that it had its
headquarters and twenty-four aircraft in Tarakan, fifty-five in Jolo, and twenty in Gaoxiong.(143)
The attacks on Balikpapan and Kendari were to be launched from Tarakan and Menado
respectively.(110)
Although [the operations to] capture Balikpapan and Kendari had been scheduled for
day x + 43 (20 January) in the Cam Ran Agreement (on 1 January), they were postponed on
6 January for one day due to the delay in the capture of Davao and Jolo Island, the bad con-
dition of the airfields, and the fact that the Philippines Unit (the Dutch East Indies Unit) as
well as the air unit had been late in shifting to the Dutch East Indies operation. Then, on 16
January after the capture of Tarakan and Menado, [the operations] were [again] postponed
for another three days, due to the mines laid in [the waterways of] Tarakan, the condition of
its airfield, and information on [enemy] submarines in the Molucca Sea, finally resulting in
a postponement of four days in total, and [the operations] came to be carried out on 24 Jan-
uary, as mentioned previously. 
(1) The Capture of Balikpapan
The Scheme to Occupy [Balikpapan] Intact and the Plan for a Surprise
Attack (See Illustrations No. 32 and No. 33)
As we have seen, the arrangement of 16 November between the [Navy] Dutch East Indies
Unit and the Sixteenth Army stipulated: “The Sakaguchi Detachment shall have its main
force land near the Balikpapan pier and parts of the detachment near the Baru and Sepuluh
batteries each (note by the author: the specific locations are unclear).” [Editor’s note: the Baru
battery was located north of the harbor front, the Sepuluh battery south of the harbor front
near the residential area of Klandasan.] Also the contents of the arrangement between the
Army and the Navy, which [Sixteenth Army] Vice Chief of Staff Harada Yoshikazu had con-
veyed when he had flown into Palau at the end of November, stipulated the same.(88) Having
left Palau and captured Davao, the Sakaguchi Detachment held a preliminary meeting with
the 4th Destroyer Squadron on [the operations to] capture Tarakan and Balikpapan on 2 Jan-
uary, as soon as the squadron had advanced to Davao on that day,(119) after completing its es-
cort of the main force of the Fourteenth Army. At the meeting, Yano Tsuneo, staff officer of
the detachment, made a proposal, after pointing out that an assault on the strongest front
where the enemy was well prepared should be avoided. On 5 January, the 4th Destroyer
Squadron (led by R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji) prepared, based on this proposal, [a draft]
“Arrangement between the 1st Escort Unit of the Navy and the Sakaguchi Detachment of
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the Army,” which both commanders signed the same day. The arrangement stated in outline
the following:(88)
Landing points: Plan No. 1 was to have the main force land in the area north of the Balikpapan
airfield and one element in the area south of the airfield. Plan No. 2 was to have the main
force land in the area south of the Balikpapan airfield and one element in the area north of
the airfield.
Disposition of the landing forces: the main force shall consist of two battalions, and an element
of one battalion (minus two companies).
No particular reconnaissance of the landing points will be made; a surprise landing will be con-
ducted at 2200 on 19 January. A naval bombardment shall be provided at the request of the
landing unit commander(s).
The Sakaguchi Detachment had landed on Tarakan Island before dawn on 11 January and
made the commander of the Dutch garrison on the island surrender the next day, the 12th.
The fierce firepower concentrated like hail at the front and the destruction of the oil resources
by fire in that operation had taught Detachment Commander Sakaguchi and Staff Officer
Yano a big lesson, which they applied in [planning] the coming operation to seize Balikpa-
pan.(87)
On 15 January, the Matsumoto Battalion arrived in Tarakan after completing the capture
of Jolo Island.(119) At 1800 on that day, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi passed down or-
ders to start the embarkation and the changing of ships the next day, the 16th, and complete
it on the morning of the 17th. He also announced that he would board the Teiryū-maru at
1800 on the 16th.(88) At that time, the plan was that the detachment would leave Tarakan on
the 18th.(88) [However,] the preparation of the Tarakan airfield was terribly delayed, and it
was not ready for use for either the 23d Air Flotilla or the Navy 1001 Unit (the naval paratroop
unit that was to parachute down on Balikpapan).(119) On that day (the 15th), after conferring
with Detachment Commander Sakaguchi, Rear Admiral Nishimura wired the [Navy] Dutch
East Indies Unit commander that an arrangement had been made to “postpone the landing
in Balikpapan scheduled for the 21st until the 24th.” (See the previous description.) On the
next day, the 16th, the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit commander, Vice Admiral Takahashi,
approved the wired report from Rear Admiral Nishimura, and ordered by telegram to
“change the date of landing in Balikpapan from the 21st to the 24th.”(119) However, about the
[progress of] readying the Tarakan airfield one could only be pessimistic. Although the
Asama-maru carrying the officers and men of the Navy 1001 Unit had arrived in Tarakan at
0930 on that day (the 16th), due to the judgment that the three-day postponement would not
be sufficient to make the airfield ready for use by the transport plane unit (twenty-eight to
thirty-nine planes) required for the 1001 Unit to take off and land, it was decided to cancel
the parachute drop [of the unit] on Balikpapan and to use [the unit] for Banjarmasin in-
stead.(103) 
The Sakaguchi Detachment had continued the operation to mop up [the enemy] until the
14th, and on the 15th it passed down the order of embarkation in conformity with the previ-
ously mentioned arrangement of 5 January, while hurriedly carrying out various measures,
reorganizations, and the transfer of control.(88) Then, [the detachment] faced two new situa-
tions: (1) the three-day postponement of the schedule, and (2) the cancellation of the paradrop
of the paratroop unit.
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Lieutenant Colonel Yano, staff officer of the detachment, immediately shaped some clever
plans. One of them was a way to keep the Dutch East Indies forces from destroying and burn-
ing down the oil resource facilities, and another was a way to occupy Balikpapan by com-
pletely taking the Dutch East Indies forces by surprise.(87)
Prior to that, the 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion Commander Maj. Takagi Takeo
had offered an idea of sending Captain Colijn, son of the former Governor-General of the
Dutch East Indies, manager of BPM, and adjutant of the Tarakan garrison, and Captain Rein-
derhoff, staff officer of the garrison (both of whom had been taken prisoner at the time of the
capture of Tarakan), to the Balikpapan garrison headquarters to have them transmit the mes-
sage that the resources and equipment in the whole area of Balikpapan should not be de-
stroyed.(88) [Editor’s note: Captain Colijn was the son of the prewar prime minister and
minister of the colonies Hendrik Colijn, who has never been Governor-General.] Staff Officer
Yano had [once] turned down the idea. However, being allowed three extra days [before the
Balikpapan operation], he began considering its implementation. At once, [Staff Officer Yano]
drew up a plan to infiltrate [two] guides along with those military messengers, have a pow-
erful unit led by a battalion commander secretly ascend the river in front of the city of Balik-
papan to deeply advance into the rear of the city after landing at a point far upriver from the
urban area under the guidance of the guides, take control of the weak points of the Balikpa-
pan garrison at a stroke by seizing the water supply area, cutting off the escape route, and
surrounding the shelter for Dutch noncombatants (families of the troops in particular), etc.,
and make the garrison surrender at an early stage.(87) Although Regimental Commander Ya-
mamoto and three battalion commanders were against the proposal to detach a battalion to
secretly ascend the river, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi approved Staff Officer Yano’s
entire plan.(87)
On the next day, the 17th, the detachment proposed it at the meeting with the Navy. As
the Navy agreed with it, the arrangement of 5 January was nullified, and the new plan was
arranged.(119)
The next day, the 18th, the military messengers together with the guides left the port [of
Tarakan].(88)
The following day, the 19th, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi assembled the com-
manders of each unit on the Teiryū-maru to give them instructions and explain the new op-
eration plan, the scheme [to send the messengers], etc. He [also] carried out test maneuvers
in cooperation with the Navy that night.(88) The test maneuvers were for verifying whether
the aforementioned secret unit led by a battalion commander would be able to go upriver in
front of the city of Balikpapan [even] in the beams of the searchlights of the Dutch East Indies
forces. The experiment was carried out by navigating a camouflaged [landing] craft at a dis-
tance of 500 meters from the side of a destroyer, which turned a searchlight on the craft. [The
result] was reassuring.(87)
A summary of the instructions given by Detachment Commander Sakaguchi on that day
was as follows:(88) “The detachment’s operations have made steady progress and [the detach-
ment] is just about to cross the equator to advance further southward. (Part omitted by the
author.) (1) Consider carefully once again the peculiarity of the coming operation. The main
purpose of the coming operation is to secure resources. (Part omitted by the author.) (2) Make
good use of your experience in the past battles. As shown in the history of war, errors will
occur in battles one after another. What lets you turn these errors and mistakes into achieving
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a brilliant victory is actually nothing but the unflagging, diehard effort and the strong spirit
of unanimous cooperation shown by the commanding officers and their men. All units are
required to maintain an ever closer contact with each other, push forward with their tasks
with high morale, always foster a fresh and keen sense for opportunities, and have the grit
to turn even mistakes into a key to victory. (3) Military discipline and morals: As the areas of
the coming operations are places where the detachment will itself establish a military ad-
ministration after the battles, it also makes both the method and the spirit of conducting the
operations different from the traditional battles so far. Officers and men are required to ever
more firmly stick to their principles, and exercise further self-control and self-discipline. (4)
Preparation for the subsequent operations: The capture of Balikpapan does not mean that
the detachment will stop at that place. The transport ships shall be replenished with water
and coal, and part of [the detachment] will depart to further attack Banjarmasin. (Part omitted
by the author.) (5) Provisions. (Part omitted by the author.) (6) Reporting. (Part omitted by
the author.) Concluding remarks.”
On the next day, the 20th, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi issued the following SAkA
[Sakaguchi Detachment] Operation Order A, No. 19.(88)
Sakaguchi Detachment Order Teiryū-maru, 0800, 20 January
1. The enemy in Balikpapan is a unit consisting of the 6th Infantry Battalion as the core, led by
Lieutenant Colonel Van Den Hoogenband. It has not yet destroyed resources, plants and other
facilities in the area. Our Navy air unit shall cooperate in our operation with its main force using
the Jolo airfield as its base, and one element of fighter planes using the Tarakan airfield as its
base.
2. At 1700 tomorrow, the 21st, the detachment shall leave the port of Tarakan, go ashore in Balik-
papan and vicinity under the escort of naval vessels and air units, mop up [the enemy] in Ba-
likpapan and key areas in the neighborhood, and secure the air base and the oil resource plants.
3. All units involved shall be charged with the capture of Balikpapan, the airfield, and other key
locations, in accordance with separate volume No. 1 “Outline of the capture of Balikpapan,”
and separate volume No. 2 “Balikpapan landing plan.”
At 1700 on the next day, the 21st, the convoy left the port of Tarakan, and headed for Balik-
papan.
The Operation Plan of the Sakaguchi Detachment (See Illustration No. 32)
The Sakaguchi Detachment was to make its way from Tarakan under escort of the Western
Attack Unit and the 23d Air Flotilla to occupy the Balikpapan sector.
The Western Attack Unit consisted of the following strength, while it was supported by
the main unit ([with] the heavy cruiser Ashigara) directly led by the commander of the Dutch
East Indies Unit with Davao as its base:(118)
1st Escort Unit: the light cruiser Naka, the 24th Destroyer Division, the 9th Destroyer Division
(minus the Yamagumo), and the 2d Destroyer Division (minus the Murasame) of the 4th De-
stroyer Squadron as the core, led by the squadron commander.
2d Base Unit: most of the 2d Base Force. 
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1st Air Unit: the auxiliary seaplane tenders the San’yō-maru and the Sanuki-maru with about
twenty planes in total. [Editor’s note: the Japanese text has “2d Air Unit,” which is a mis-
print.]
The 23d Air Flotilla was going to provide support with its main force from Jolo, and with
one element from Tarakan.(104)
The Sakaguchi Detachment had made a plan in which it would sail ahead supported by
the air and naval forces mentioned above, enter the anchorage on the afternoon of the 23d,
and have one element of the detachment (a unit led by Battalion Commander kanauji) ascend
the river in front of Balikpapan after sunset, make a detour and raid [the city] from the north;
at the same time it would have the main force [of the detachment] make a surprise landing
on the coast to the north and the south of the airfield located on the coast northeast of Balik-
papan; [then] one element of the main force (a unit led by Battalion Commander kume)
would make a sudden attack on the airfield as well as Samboja, while the main force ([con-
sisting of] the Matsumoto Battalion led by Regimental Commander Yamamoto, and later
joined by the main force of the kume Battalion) would assault Balikpapan from the east and
capture [the city].(88)
The disposition of forces was determined as follows:(88)
Raid Unit    
Commanding officer: 2d Battalion Commander Maj. kanauji ken’ichi
2d Battalion (minus the 7th Company)
One regimental gun squad
Three radio squads
One engineer platoon
One element of the medical unit
Airfield Seizure Unit   
Commanding officer: 1st Battalion Commander Lt. Col. kume Motozō
1st Battalion (minus the 2d and the 4th Companies)
One radio squad
One armored car platoon (until the seizure of the airfield)
One field artillery battery (one section will be removed after the seizure of the airfield)
Assault Unit   
Commanding officer: 146th Infantry Regiment Commander Col. Yamamoto kyōhei
146th Infantry Regiment (minus the 1st Battalion {minus the 4th Company}, the 2d Battalion,
one regimental gun squad, and four radio squads)
Armored car unit (minus one platoon)
1st Field Artillery Battalion (minus one battery)
One engineer platoon
One platoon each from the airfield seizure unit and the Samboja seizure unit shall be addi-
tionally attached after the seizure of the airfield and Samboja respectively.
Samboja Seizure Unit
2d Infantry Company (one armored car platoon and one artillery section shall be attached
after the seizure of the airfield.)
Battlefield Resources Salvage Unit
Units under the direct command: headquarters, the 7th Company, the antiaircraft artillery bat-
talion, and others
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The outline for the capture of Balikpapan (Separate volume No. 1 of the SAkA [Sakaguchi
Detachment] Operation Order A, No. 19) was as follows:(88)
Outline for the Capture of Balikpapan 19 January, 1942
1. Mission
(1) The detachment shall have one element make an unexpected surprise attack from the area
north of Balikpapan and have the main force go ashore on the coast to the east and west of
the airfield and advance while destroying the [enemy] positions east of Balikpapan one by
one to occupy the urban area.
(2) After the capture of Balikpapan, [the detachment] shall salvage the resources, set up a base,
and prepare for subsequent operations while maintaining a strict antiaircraft guard.
2. Directives
(3) At 1700 on 21 January, the detachment shall leave the port of Tarakan and head straight to
the sea off the coast of Balikpapan in Dutch Borneo under the escort of naval vessels and
aircraft while itself maintaining a strict watch on [enemy] submarines in particular.
(4) After sunset on 23 January, the Raid Unit shall transfer to [landing] craft at the anchorage
south of the [coral] reef fifteen kilometers southwest of Balikpapan and, while hiding the
scheme in every possible way, thread its way camouflaged through the enemy searchlights
along the coast and secretly go up the Wain River at high tide. After seizing and securing
the water-pumping station, it shall storm, without missing an opportunity, at a stroke the
headquarters of the command center of the Balikpapan garrison by way of the enemy’s evac-
uation shelter while using the vehicles on site. Then, it shall launch surprise attacks on every
barracks and battery to throw the enemy into confusion and prevent the destruction by fire
of the resources. 
(5) Before daybreak on 24 January, the Airfield Seizure Unit shall transfer to [landing] craft at
the anchorage east of the airfield and go ashore in the area about eight kilometers northeast
of the airfield. At daybreak, following closely on the heels of the artillery bombardment, it
shall storm into the airfield, seize and secure [the facility], after which [the unit] shall come
under the command of the Assault Unit commander and leave a force of about one platoon
at the airfield in charge of guarding [the facility]. 
(6) The Assault Unit shall transfer to [landing] craft at the anchorage east of the airfield and go
ashore about four kilometers southwest of the mouth of the Manggar River. While cooper-
ating in the seizure of the airfield with one element of its force, its main force shall, after get-
ting ready near the landing point [for the assault], storm and break through the [enemy]
positions on the way to Balikpapan and rush into [the city]. [There] it shall assume the com-
mand of the Raid Unit as well and secure the resources and guard Balikpapan. Once the air-
field is seized, it shall also bring the Airfield Seizure Unit under its command.
(7) The Samboja Seizure Unit shall [also] go ashore at the [same] landing point as the Airfield
Seizure Unit. After the seizure of the airfield, it shall advance toward Samboja through the
areas along the coastal road and promptly seize and secure Samboja. After that, its main
force shall return to its original command, leaving about one platoon there behind.
(8) The Battlefield Resources Salvage Unit shall ... (the rest omitted by the author).
(9) The detachment headquarters shall act along with the Assault Unit.
(10) The Prisoner Internment Unit shall ... (the rest omitted by the author).
(11) After the seizure of Balikpapan and Samboja, the Armored Car Unit shall assemble in one
place, and ... (the rest omitted by the author).
(12) After the seizure of Balikpapan, the artillery unit shall assemble ... (the rest omitted by the
author).
(13) (Omitted by the author.)
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(14) The engineer unit shall be in charge of repairing the disembarkation facilities for heavy ma-
terials near the airfield and the road and the bridges between the airfield and Balikpapan
and make them ready for use. After that, it shall assemble in Balikpapan. (Part omitted by
the author.)
(15) – (19) (Omitted by the author.)
(20) After completing [the operation] to mop up [the enemy] in Balikpapan and vicinity, the
Samarinda Seizure Unit ([consisting of] about one infantry battalion, one armored car pla-
toon and one artillery battery as the core) shall be sent to mop up [the enemy] in Sanga
Sanga, Samarinda, and Tenggarong and vicinity.
In the Balikpapan landing plan (separate volume No. 2 of the SAkA [Sakaguchi Detachment]
Operation Order A, No. 19 drawn up on 20 January), which the Sakaguchi Detachment had
arranged with the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander, the noteworthy points were roughly
as follows:(88)
1. No reconnaissance of the landing points shall be conducted in advance.
2. The Raid Unit shall drop anchor at the 2d anchorage at 2100 on the 23d, and start ascending the
river at 2230.
The main force of the detachment shall drop anchor at the 1st anchorage at 0230 [0100, see Vol.
26, p. 190] on the 24th and start landing at 0230.
3 Division of the Convoy (notes: B [in front of the name of ships] indicates a Navy transport ship.)
1st Section: Tsuruga-maru, Liverpool-maru ([with] the regimental commander [on board]), Nis-
shō-maru [Hiteru-maru], Ehime-maru, B Asahisan-maru, B Nittei-maru, [B] Kumagawa-maru, and B
Sumanoura-maru
2d Section: Havana-maru, Hankow-maru, Teiryū-maru ([with] the detachment commander [on
board]), Kuretake-maru, B Kanayamasan-maru [Kayamasan-maru], B Tōei-maru, B Tatsugami-maru,
B Nan’a-maru (note: the Havana-maru and the Hankow-maru shall use the 2d anchorage.)
4. The Naval Landing Force ([consisting of] two platoons) shall come under the command of De-
tachment Commander Sakaguchi as far as ground operations are concerned from the time of
landing until [the completion of] the operation to mop up [the enemy] in key areas of Balikpapan
and guard the airfield after its seizure.
5. [Landing] craft to be used at the start of landing.
The Assault Unit: five large and five small motorized [landing] craft. 
The Raid Unit: four large and six small motorized [landing] craft.
The Airfield Seizure Unit: five large and five small motorized [landing] craft.
Dispatch of the Messengers and Guides (See Illustration No. 34)
In order to prevent the oil and other resource facilities in Balikpapan from being destroyed
and burnt down, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi had decided to send Captain Reinder-
hoff, a staff officer of the Tarakan garrison, and Captain Colijn, the adjutant of the garrison,
and had them take a written notice addressed to the Balikpapan garrison commander, as
mentioned previously.(88)
Also, he had selected two indigenous police officers, who had been transferred from Ba-
likpapan to Tarakan about two months before, as guides for the kanauji Raid Unit, which
would go upriver and come ashore [at a point] north of Balikpapan. He then added three
Japanese interpreters to the above party of four, and had them leave Tarakan at 1535 on 18
January by a seized small gasoline boat to go southward.(87, 139)
354 Chapter VII     /     The Capture of Java’s Dehors
On the morning of the 20th [at a point] off Samarinda, the party was spotted by a Dutch
flying boat, which picked up the two [Dutch] captains, [sent as] messengers, and left.(87, 139)
The remaining five members of the party kept going southward and reached [a point] off
Samboja around 1600 on the same day, where they temporarily anchored to wait for the reply
from the commander of Balikpapan [garrison]. Around 1800, a messenger came to the boat
displaying a flag of truce with a letter from the Balikpapan [garrison] commander, which
read: “The key facilities have already been burned down on the 18th before the message from
the Japanese army was delivered.” The scheme to prevent the destruction [of the facilities]
by fire before the fact came too late. While the two indigenous police officers, who acted as
guides and the interpreters went ashore near Samboja by canoe at 0200 on the 21st, the gaso-
line boat headed back. Around noon on the 22d it met the convoy of the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment, and returned to Tarakan on the evening of the 23d. On the 21st, the party of the guides
and the others, who had landed near Samboja, headed for [the area] north of Balikpapan
while crossing the mountains on foot. They passed through the minefields in the northern
suburbs of Balikpapan on the morning of the next day, the 22d, and reached the Sumber
River around 1500, where they rented a boat for fifty yen and went down the river. They
stood by at the mouth of the river until the evening of the 23d. From around 2130 that night
with their lamps lit, they waited for the kanauji Raid Unit to appear at the mouth of the
river.(87, 139)
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Illustration No. 32 — Information on Balikpapan, and Schematic Map of the Capture [Operation]
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The Sailing of the Convoy and the
Surprise Attacks on the Anchor-
age
(See Illustrations No. 33 and No. 34)
The convoy of a total of sixteen ships, [con-
sisting of] eight ships with the Sakaguchi
Detachment [on board] and eight transport
ships of the Navy, had left the port of
Tarakan at 1700 on the 21st and headed
south ward under the escort of one light
cruiser (the Naka), nine destroyers, four
mine sweepers, three submarine chasers,
and three patrol boats, led by 1st Escort Unit
Commander ([and also] the 4th Destroyer
Squadron Commander) Rear Admiral
Nishimura.(119)
What was known about the situa-
tion in the air and at sea at that time was
roughly as follows:(119)
1. Whereas the allied naval surface forces have
been moving southward one after another
out of reach of our air power and are staying
in the Java Sea showing little fight, one ele-
ment of the force seems to be maneuvering
in the Makassar Strait.
2. A couple of submarines are spotted between
Tarakan and Balikpapan every day, in addi-
tion to those that constantly appear off
Tarakan.
3. There seem to be some destroyers, patrol ves-
sels, minelayers, and torpedo boats in Balik-
papan.
4. Dutch planes have been launching fairly ag-
gressive counterattacks from airfields in var-
ious places, especially from secret airfields unknown [to us]. [Editor’s note: The airfield
Samarinda II, which the Japanese did not discover until 24 January and did not occupy until
early March after the Dutch capitulation.]
5. Our reconnaissance from the air on the 20th spotted fires and explosions everywhere at Balik-
papan, Samarinda and other places.
On the 21st, nothing happened at sea.(119)
On the 22d, nothing happened during the morning. Around noon, the detachment en-
countered the boat that was (on its way back) [from] having taken the previously mentioned
messengers and guides, and was briefed [on the situation]. Around 1800, the Havana-maru
and the Hankow-maru with the kanauji Raid Unit on board were separated [from the convoy]
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Illustration No. 33 — Outline of the [Operations] to
Capture Balikpapan
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and started advancing [ahead of the other ships] under the escort of two destroyers. Around
2300 the convoy crossed the equator.(119)
At 0005 on the 23d, the convoy of the kanauji Raid Unit came under torpedo attack from
an [enemy] submarine (four torpedoes [were launched]). At 1050, three allied aircraft flew
in above the main convoy. From 1220 onwards, one allied aircraft reconnoitered the main
convoy. [Then] at 1625, nine heavy and four light bombers of the allied forces came for an at-
tack on the main convoy and did minor damage to the Tatsugami-maru (a naval munitions
ship). In the meantime, at 1602 nine heavy and six light bombers strafed the kanauji Raid
Unit. At 1720, Rear Admiral Nishimura ordered minesweeping. However, around that time,
one twin-engine aircraft came for an attack and caused a fire on the Nan’a-maru (a transport
ship of the Eleventh Air Fleet), which [eventually] stalled the ship. At 2045, the convoy of
the kanauji Raid Unit (the Havana-maru and the Hankow-maru) completed entering into the
anchorage. At 2230, the Raid Unit left the anchorage and started ascending the river in [land-
ing] craft ([to be precise] four large and six small motorized [landing] craft, camouflaged
with mangroves). As already described, the guides, consisting of the [two] indigenous police
officers and others, were waiting [for them] from around 2130 with their lamp(s) lit. The Ha-
vana-maru and the Hankow-maru left the anchorage along with the two destroyers to join the
main convoy (which was expected at 0900 on the 24th). Meanwhile, the main convoy also
came under attack from [enemy] submarine(s) at 2040, but [the convoy] completed entering
the anchorage at 2330.(119)
On the 24th at 0030, one small allied naval vessel appeared in the [anchorage] of the main
force, and at 0040 the Tsuruga-maru (6,987 tons; with the Field Artillery Battalion headquar-
ters, one field artillery battery, the Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion headquarters, the main
force of the 2d Battery of the Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, the main force of the medical
unit, etc. on board(88)) was sunk by torpedo(es).(119) At that time, the transport ships were an-
chored in the following order:(119)
Sumanoura-maru 
Kumagawa-maru 
Nittei-maru
Coast Asahisan-maru Tatsugami-maru
Ehime-maru (Army) Tōei-maru
Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru] (Army) Kanayamasan-maru [Kayamasan-maru]
Liverpool-maru (Army) Kuretake-maru (Army)
Tsuruga-maru (Army) Teiryū-maru (Army)
After a little while at 0140, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi ordered “the departure of
the units to seize the airfield and the bridges.”(119) The kume Battalion (the Airfield Seizure
Unit, in five large and five small motorized [landing] craft) and the main force of the Ya-
mamoto Regiment (the Assault Unit, in five large and five small motorized [landing] craft)
launched the landing [operations] all at once, and the first wave succeeded in landing at
0240.(88, 119) Following them, the shuttle operation to land [the rest of the troops] was started.
However, between 0420 and 0500, in the middle of the operation, allied naval vessels, which
were judged to be three or four destroyers and one or two cruisers, appeared out of nowhere
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like phantom killers, wreaked havoc in the dark, and disappeared like the wind.(119) In an in-
stant, the following loss was caused on our [Japanese] side:(119)
Sunk:
The Sumanoura-maru (auxiliary torpedo- and submarine-net layer and mine layer/oiler)
The Tatsugami-maru (munitions ship)
The Kuretake-maru (5,175 tons; with the 3d Battalion headquarters, the 12th Company,
the 3d Machine Gun Company, and others on board)
Badly damaged:
Patrol boat No. 37
The Asahisan-maru
Slightly damaged:
The Kumagawa-maru
Note: The raiding [allied] naval vessels were four U.S. destroyers (the USS [John D.] Ford, Pope,
Parrott and Paul Jones). On the 20th, having learned that the convoy of the Sakaguchi Detachment
was heading southward, the joint headquarters of the United States, Britain, the Netherlands
and Australia had six U.S. submarines and two Dutch submarines advance to the waters of Ba-
likpapan from Surabaya as well as from the South China Sea, and [also] dispatched a task force
([consisting of] two light cruisers and four destroyers), which was refueling at Timor Island, to
carry out a hit-and-run mission. Of this task force, the two light cruisers had troubles on the
way, and [the remaining] four destroyers carried out the hit-and-run attack.(51, etc.) For the four
stealthily approaching destroyers, [the Japanese] convoy in the middle of the disembarkation
operation against the backdrop of the land blazing with oil fires was of course an easy target.
At that time, the 1st Air Unit’s San’yō-maru (with six Type-0 Observation Seaplanes and two
Type-0 Reconnaissance Seaplanes) had left Tarakan on the 23d and was scheduled to reach
Balikpapan on the 26th, while the Sanuki-maru (with six Type-0 Observation Seaplanes and
two reconnaissance seaplanes) was to leave Tarakan on the 24th to reach Balikpapan on the
27th.(131, 132) Furthermore, the main force of the 23d Air Flotilla (the 2d Air Raid Unit) was
[still] in Jolo Island because the Tarakan airfield was not yet ready.(104, 132) In the meantime,
the operation to capture kendari was going on in the east, simultaneously with the operation
to capture Balikpapan. At 0930, Rear Admiral Nishimura received a telegram from the com-
mander of the Dutch East Indies Unit, which said: “The main unit is hurrying to Balikpapan
and will arrive there on the evening of the 24th.”(119)
Occupation of the Balikpapan Sector
(See Illustration No. 34)
Although the Sakaguchi Detachment had two of its ships, the Kuretake-maru and the Tsuruga-
maru, torpedoed and sunk as mentioned previously, no more than thirty-nine men were killed
in the sinking.(53) At 0240, the kume and the Yamamoto Units succeeded in landing without
meeting any resistance, seized the airfield and the bridges at daybreak as planned, and went
on with their subsequent operations as scheduled.(87, 119) The southwestward advance of the
Yamamoto Unit (the Assault Unit) was hindered by the destroyed bridge(s) on the coastal
road, but [the unit] managed to reach the north end of the city of Balikpapan at night.(87) As
the Dutch East Indies garrison had already retreated from their positions, the Assault Unit
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entered the city of Balikpapan at 0400 on the 25th
with no engagements at all.(87, 119)
The Raid Unit led by Battalion Commander ka -
nauji left its anchorage at 2230, and headed toward
the prearranged waterway, keeping a distance of
about 500 meters between its craft.(87, 119) When pass-
ing in front of the Balikpapan stronghold, they were
illuminated by searchlights as bright as daylight, but
they managed [to pass] without being found out after
all.(87) At 0330 on the 24th, the Raid Unit [successfully]
got to the mouth of the Wain River, where the indige-
nous police officers were holding up signal lamp(s).
One large motorized [landing] craft ran aground
there, which threw the formation in disorder, and the
vessels ascended the Wain River in disorderly fash-
ion. However, at 1730 on the 24th, the main force
reached the predetermined landing point under the
guidance of the indigenous police officers.(119) Early
on the morning of the 25th, the Raid Unit Com-
mander kanauji sent one element of the force to seize
the water-pumping station, had another powerful el-
ement advance toward Balikpapan on a path along the water pipeline, and had the rest of
the main force advance on the road between Batu Ampar and Balikpapan.(87) At 1440 when
the main force of the Raid Unit advanced into Batu Ampar and was about to go on south-
ward, it encountered the Dutch East Indies garrison commander and his men moving to-
wards them in about one hundred vehicles with an armored car in front.(87) The kanauji Unit
defeated them, went [on] southward, and entered the city of Balikpapan.(87) By an investiga-
tion of the prisoners, it was learned that the Dutch East Indies garrison had had no idea at
all about the detour of the kanauji Raid Unit.(87)
The detachment headquarters had landed after the Assault Unit and advanced behind
the unit to enter Balikpapan on the morning of the 25th.(119)
On the 25th, the Sakaguchi Detachment completed occupying the whole urban area of
the city. On the 26th, it started mopping up [the enemy] in the whole neighborhood and es-
tablished a military administration. At the same time, it cooperated with the Navy in setting
up the airfield.(87) Lt. Col. kume Motozō became commander of the kume Detachment, com-
manding the 1st Battalion and others. Having one element advance on the road between Ba-
likpapan, Batu Ampar and Samarinda, and his main force on the road between Balikpapan,
Samboja and Samarinda, he seized the oil fields in the whole area of Sanga Sanga and vicin-
ity.(87)
The loss sustained by the Sakaguchi Detachment in the operation to capture Balikpapan
was eight men killed on land and thirty-nine at sea (most of the latter were missing).(53)
After that, the Sakaguchi Detachment had its main force stationed in Balikpapan and
vicinity, and the kume Detachment in the Sanga Sanga area; while implementing the military
administration, it also gathered information for the capture of Banjarmasin.(88)
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Obstacles Along the Coast in Front of 
Balikpapan
As for the anchorage, on the 24th after the allied destroyers had gone, one [allied] heavy
bomber came for an attack at 0812, which was followed by one [allied] flying boat at 0925,
ten [allied] heavy bombers at 0950, seven [allied] heavy bombers at 1040, one [allied] flying
boat at 1205, and eleven [allied] heavy bombers at 1710. On the next day, the 25th, ten [allied]
heavy bombers came for an attack at 1000, which was [again] followed by seven [allied]
heavy bombers at 1305, but they caused little damage.(88, 119) The 1st Air Unit (the auxiliary
seaplane tenders San’yō-maru and Sanuki-maru) arrived in Balikpapan on the 26th, and on
the same day, the 2d Base Force (which had left Tarakan on the 24th), arrived as well.(125, 131,
132) On the 28th, nine fighter planes of the 23d Air Flotilla advanced [to Balikpapan] and its
headquarters [also] advanced there on the 30th.(104, 143) The 2d Base Force removed fifty-seven
mines by 5 February.(125) The main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit turned around on the
evening of the 25th and returned to Davao on the evening of the 26th.(103)
The 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion ([consisting of] two batteries) reported that
it had fired 180 shells from its ship at fifty-two Douglas B–18A and forty-six Boeing B–17
bombers during the period from 23 January to 3 February and caused damage to three
planes.(88)
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Illustration No. 34 — The Sakaguchi Detachment’s Operation to Capture Balikpapan
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(2) The Capture of kendari
Simultaneously with the operation to capture Balikpapan, the operation to capture kendari
was carried out independently by the Navy. The strategic significance of kendari and the
change in the invasion schedule have previously been related.
The operation to capture kendari was carried out by R. Adm. Takagi Takeo, commander
of the Eastern Attack Unit ([and] the 5th Cruiser Division), with the following disposition of
the forces:(114)
Support unit: [consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Division ([with] the heavy cruisers Haguro and
Nachi) and one section of the 6th Destroyer Division; assigned for general support.
1st Base Unit: led by the 1st Base Force commander; [consisting of] the light cruiser Nagara,
the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Divisions, the main force of the 1st Base Force, and the
main force of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force as the core; assigned for the
capture of kendari.
2d Escort Unit: [consisting of] the light cruiser Jintsū and the 8th Destroyer Division, led by
the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander, assigned to cooperate with the 1st Base Unit.
2d Air Unit: [consisting of] the 11th Seaplane Tender Division (the seaplane tenders Chitose
and Mizuho), assigned to cooperate with the 1st Base Force in its antisubmarine guarding
and its landing operation.
The invasion unit departed from the Bangka anchorage on 21 January, came ashore in
kendari at 0428 on the 24th, and seized the airfield at 1700 on the same day.(117) The support
unit, which had departed from Davao on the 22d, kept guard [against enemy]. However
there were no counterattacks by the allied navy, and it returned to Davao on the 26th.(114)
The 21st Air Flotilla (the 1st Air Raid Unit) had supported the operation from Menado,
and as early as on the 25th, thirty planes advanced to the kendari airfield.(143)
The Chitose and the Mizuho had left the Bangka anchorage on the 21st and advanced to
Salabangka Channel (north of kendari) on the 24th [for the operation], but the Chitose left
there on the 26th and returned to the Bangka anchorage on the 27th.(117)
6. The Capture of Ambon
Changes in the Plan to Capture Ambon
The Eastern Detachment landed on Ambon Island on 31 January in conjunction with the
Navy. Being a historically famous place, Ambon was of strategic importance as well. Ambon
was the foremost island of the Spice Islands (the Moluccas) and had served as the center of
politics, the economy, and military affairs of the northeastern waters of the East Indies ever
since the Dutch built their base in Ambon in 1599. The port, being [originally] a volcanic
crater, was a deep-water inlet with deeply inward curving shorelines, while the peninsulas
on both sides formed a natural stronghold, which made it a natural naval port. With the port
as its center, further fortifications had been built. Added to that, there was a good air base.
Together with kupang, Ambon was an outpost of the Australian forces and it was an area
that could become an offensive base for the U.S. and Australian forces.
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As related previously, before the opening of hostilities, the plan to capture Ambon was
very vague due to many uncertain factors. However, after the opening of hostilities, the de-
cisive conditions [for the operation] were all of a sudden satisfied in less than a few days.
The first was the success in the surprise attack on Hawaii, the second was the results in the
battle off the coast of Malaya (in which two British battleships were sunk), and the third was
the progress in the Hong kong operation. The Eleventh Air Fleet, which had paid close at-
tention to the British fleet (in the Malaya area), now could turn its attention to Ambon and
so did the Combined Fleet. [The fleet] issued an order to dispatch the 2d Carrier Division
([consisting of] the aircraft careers Sōryū and Hiryū), which had returned from the air strikes
on Hawaii [to the area]). In concert [with the Navy], the Southern Army, for its part, decided
to employ Detachment B instead of the South Seas Detachment and also increased the
strength [of the detachment] from two battalions to three. Then, in the Cam Ranh Agreement
(of 1 January), it was stipulated to “capture [Ambon] on 25 January.”
However, due to the delay in the [Navy’s] shift from the Philippines operation to the
Dutch East Indies operation, the schedule was postponed for one day on 6 January, then for
another three days on 15 January due to reports on [enemy] submarines in the Molucca Sea,
and [again] for another two days on 19 January. In the end, it was decided to carry out [the
operation] to capture [the island] on 31 January. The reasons for the two-day postponement
on 19 January were related to the redeployment of the forces assigned to the capture of
kendari, the transport of the 1st kure Special Landing Force and the 6th [3d on p. 367] Con-
struction Squad, which were to advance into Ambon, [the situation of] the transport ship(s)
for the air base materials of the Eleventh Air Fleet, the current situation of the air raids against
Ambon, and others. The change in the schedule was decided in such a way that the Sixteenth
Army [simply] agreed to the proposals made by the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit. Having
learned about the change, the Southern Army admonished the Sixteenth Army that the latter
“must obtain the approval of the Southern Army before making such a significant change.”(23,
24)
[The Ambon Operation] in Relation to the Navy’s Shift to Phase-Three
Operations
As we have seen, in the operational phases of the Navy, phase-two operations covered basi-
cally the period until the moment [the Navy] put ashore the main force of the Malaya inva-
sion army.
The Combined Fleet had issued the order that “the shift to phase-three operations shall
take effect as of 1200 on 24 January.”(117) What was so significant about 24 January? It was the
day when the staff officers of the Southern Army and the Southern Task Force, and the officers
concerned of the Sixteenth Army and the Dutch East Indies Unit started on their way back
from Manila, where the former had discussed the changes in the invasion schedule, and the
latter had made arrangements for the Dutch East Indies operation. It was also the day when
the landing [operations] in Balikpapan and kendari were carried out. And, one week earlier
(on 17 January), the Endau and Mersing landing operation (which was assigned to the 56th
Division in the original plan, but which was later reassigned to the 18th Division instead)
had been cancelled, and two days before that day (on 22 January), the 18th Division had
launched its operation to land in Singora.(23)
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Although the Combined Fleet had passed down the order to shift to phase-three opera-
tions on 24 January, the units on site were still in confusion. This was first of all because of
the already described issue that the word “around” was attached to the dates in the invasion
schedule; secondly because of the previously mentioned issue of the capture of Banjarmasin;
and thirdly because of the fact that changes were made in the schedule of the operations cur-
rently under way. Above all, the Banjarmasin issue was the biggest issue. Whether the oper-
ation to capture the city was to be conducted [both] by the Army and the Navy in conjunction
or not would affect the employment of the fleet. As we have seen, the schedule informally
set at the Manila Conference was officially fixed on the day when the Banjarmasin issue was
settled, which was 28 January. Consequently, the employment of the fleet was not fixed until
after that date.
It was in such a period of transition [from one operational phase to the other] that the
unit [assigned] to capture Ambon left Davao and carried out the landing in Ambon.
Departure of the Eastern Detachment from Hong kong and Its Arrival in
Davao
On the 30th [of December], Lt. Gen. Sano Tadayoshi, commander of the 38th Division, who
had launched the attack on Hong kong on 8 December, forced its surrender on the 25th, and
had a triumphal entry on the 28th, received the order of the Twenty-third Army to organize
the Eastern Detachment and prepare for its dispatch.(76) As already described, the Cam Ranh
Agreement was [informally] reached between the Southern Army and the Southern Task
Force the day before (on the 29th).
As mentioned previously, on 3 January at Guangdong, Sixteenth Army Commander Ima-
mura met the staff officers of the 38th Division which, on the next day, the 4th, was trans-
ferred to the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army. The next day, the 5th, the Southern Army
ordered the Sixteenth Army to capture Bangka, Palembang, Ambon and kupang. Sixteenth
Army Commander Imamura (i.e. 38th Division Commander Sano) had organized the Eastern
Detachment, which was assigned to capture Ambon and kupang, as follows:(76)
Eastern Detachment 
Commander: 38th Infantry Group Commander Maj. Gen. Itō Takeo 
38th Infantry Group headquarters
228th Infantry Regiment
Light-armored Car Unit
2d Battalion of the 38th Mountain Artillery Regiment
3d Company of the 38th Engineer Regiment (minus one platoon)
One element of the 38th Divisional Signal Unit
One platoon of the 38th Transport Regiment
One element of the 38th Divisional Medical Unit
38th Divisional 1st Field Hospital (minus one half)
One element of the 38th Divisional Sick Horse Depot
3d Battery of the 23d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
1st Battery of the 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
2d Battery of the 2d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion
One independent engineer company
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Commander of the 38th
Infantry Group
Maj. Gen. Itō Takeo
Water supply and purification department
One element of the anchorage headquarters
Maj. Tosaka Susumu, staff officer of the 38th Division, was attached to the detachment. The
detachment, which was expected to depend mainly on packhorses but also to use motor ve-
hicles, consisted of 5,300 men, 400 horses, and 110 motor vehicles, and for the operation car-
ried ammunition for about half a campaign, and provisions and fodder, and other supplies
for about half a year.(76)
On 30 December, the Southern Task Force (the Second Fleet) issued an order to escort the
Eastern Detachment to Davao with one section of the 8th Destroyer Division (of the 2d De-
stroyer Squadron; it had originally been assigned to the main unit of the Southern Task Force
and then transferred to the Malaya Unit to escort [the units of] the second landing of the Fif-
teenth Army in southern Thailand).(117) The section arrived in Hong kong on 4 January. On
that day, the Southern Task Force gave an order to also commit the 2d section of the destroyer
division [to the task].(117)
However, the arrival of the army radio unit and others, which were being brought to-
gether from afar to be transferred to the Eastern Detachment, had been delayed and so had
the preparation of matériel, about which Sixteenth Army Staff Officers Saiki, Nishiura and
others had racked their brains, as previously described. [Editor’s note: Apart from the general
description of the shipping problems in Chapter V, no specific description concerning the
Eastern Detachment was found.] [Eventually,] the [scheduled] departure date (of 9 January)
was inevitably postponed until the 12th. On 6 January, in conformity to the arrangements
between the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army of that day (which was men-
tioned earlier), Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi transmitted an
order that “the 8th Destroyer Division commander shall escort the Itō Detachment to Davao
by 18 January, leaving Hong kong on 12 January; arrangements shall be made with Detach-
ment Commander Itō at Hong kong on the 11th.”(117)
The situation at the time of the arrangements was as described previously. Being sent off
by Colonels Takashima Tatsuhiko and kitamura Yoshifuto, who were specially dispatched
[there] by [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura, the Eastern Detachment departed from
Hong kong on the 12th and first headed for Davao under escort of the 1st Section of the 8th
Destroyer Division (the Ōshio and the Asashio).(34, 117) The 2d Section (the Michishio and the
Arashio) left Magong on the 13th and joined the convoy [at a point] south of Taiwan on the
same day.(117) The Eastern Detachment had embarked on the following ships:(76)
Miike-maru (12,000 tons): headquarters, and the units under direct control.
Africa-maru (9,000 tons): regimental headquarters, and the 3d Battalion.
Ryōyō-maru (6,000 tons): main force of the Artillery Battalion and one element of infantry.
Zen’yō-maru (6,000 tons): 1st Battalion as the core.
Yamaura-maru (6,000 tons): 2d Battalion as the core.
Apart from the Ryōyō-maru, the other four ships arrived in Davao at 1115 on 18 January under
the escort of the Ōshio and the Michishio, as they were fast ships and could sail at a speed of
twelve knots or over. The Ryōyō-maru arrived in Davao at 1930 on the next day, the 19th,
under the escort of the Asashio and the Arashio.(117)
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Operation Plan (See Illustrations No. 35 and No. 36)
Detachment Commander Itō, who arrived in Davao on 18 January, put under his command
the antiaircraft artillery battery which had been left there by Detachment Commander Saka -
guchi,(88) and immediately set about making arrangements with the Navy side.
At that time, the situation in the eastern area of the Dutch East Indies was roughly as fol-
lows: On the 11th, the Sakaguchi Detachment and the Western Attack Unit had conducted
the landing operation in Tarakan, and the Eastern Attack Unit in Menado, while the com-
mander of the 2d Destroyer Squadron had returned to Davao the day before (on the 17th),
after having completed its support of the Menado landing operation. While the Western At-
tack Unit was making preparations to carry out the coming Balikpapan landing operation
(on the 24th) in conjunction with the Sakaguchi Detachment, the Eastern Attack Unit was
preparing for the coming operation to capture kendari (on the 24th), which would mainly
be conducted by the 1st Base Unit. [The Eastern Attack Unit] was also about to start prepa-
rations for the subsequent operation to capture Ambon, which would mainly be carried out
by the 2d Destroyer Squadron ([though the operation] which had been scheduled for the
29th, was on the 19th postponed until the 31st).(102) The headquarters of the 21st Air Flotilla
(the 1st Air Raid Unit) had advanced from Davao to Menado on the 16th.(104) The main unit
of the Dutch East Indies Unit was positioned in Davao to support the operation to capture
Balikpapan.(103) The main unit of the Southern Task Force, which had shifted its position from
Cam Ranh Bay via Magong to support the operations in the eastern area of the Dutch East
Indies, arrived in Palau that day (the 18th).(103) The 2d Carrier Division (the aircraft carriers
Sōryū and Hiryū) assigned to support the Ambon invasion operation had left the Bungo
Channel on the 13th and were heading southward.(103)
Considerable difficulties were expected in the operations to capture kendari (landing to
be executed on 24 January) and Ambon (on 31 January), in view both of their location and
the situation of the allied forces. Eventually, it was decided that those operations should be
conducted in the following way:(114)
Eastern Attack Unit (led by the 5th Cruiser Division commander)
Support Unit: 5th Cruiser Division (the heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi), and the 2d Section of
the 6th Destroyer Division, assigned to support [the operations to] capture kendari and then
Ambon.
1st Base Unit: the light cruiser Nagara, the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Divisions, and the 1st
Base Force shall capture kendari from Bangka. After the capture, the 16th and the 15th De-
stroyer Divisions shall head for Ambon, the 16th Destroyer Division from the Bangka an-
chorage after [once] returning there, and the 15th [directly] from kendari.
2d Escort Unit: The commander, [i.e.] the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander, shall support the
1st Base Unit in [the operation to] capture kendari with the light cruiser Jintsū and the 8th
Destroyer Division (which had returned to his command after escorting the Eastern Detach-
ment from Hong kong to Davao) while preparing for the capture of Ambon. After complet-
ing the operation to capture kendari, he shall execute [the operation to] capture Ambon also
employing the 16th Destroyer Division ([which will join from] the Bangka anchorage) and
the 15th Destroyer Division ([from] kendari), both of which will have returned to his com-
mand as mentioned above.
2d Air Unit (the 11th Seaplane Tender Division): After supporting the operation to capture
kendari, the seaplane carrier Chitose shall return to the Bangka anchorage, and the Mizuho
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to the Salabangka Channel (north of kendari), and both shall take part in the operation to
capture Ambon from these anchorages.
On the 18th, when Detachment Commander Itō arrived in Davao, and on the next day, the
19th, the staff officers of the Southern Task Force and the Dutch East Indies Unit held meet-
ings with the commanders and staff officers of the 5th Cruiser Division and the 2d Destroyer
Squadron to discuss the plans.(114, 117) On that day, the 19th, the operation to capture Ambon
scheduled for the 29th was postponed until the 31st for the reasons previously described.
On the next day, the 20th, Detachment Commander Itō and R. Adm. Tanaka Raizō, com-
mander of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, made a [draft] arrangement, which was signed on the
next day, the 21st.(117) On that day (the 21st), Rear Admiral Tanaka [also] made arrangements
with the 21st Air Flotilla, and on the following day, the 22d, he gathered his commanding of-
ficers in Davao and passed down the 2d Escort Unit order.(117) Around the same time, De-
tachment Commander Itō also issued his detachment order.
At that time, the situation known about Ambon Island was roughly as follows:(128)
1. The strength of the Dutch East Indies garrison guarding Ambon Island was estimated at about
one thousand troops, but it seems that it has recently been reinforced by about two thousand
Australian troops.
2. Mines are laid at the entrance of Ambon Bay and at Baguala Bay.
3. There seem to be coastal batteries on the shores both north and south of the entrance to Ambon
Bay. It is certain that there are antiaircraft battery positions [around] the sea[plane] base in Ha-
long as well as at the Laha airfield.
4. Taking all information into account, it seems that the whole of Ambon Island has been turned
into a stronghold, and that particularly strong defense facilities have been built in the neigh-
borhood of the city of Ambon and to the west of the Laha airfield with the area of Ambon Bay
serving as the front gate defense and the Baguala Bay area as the back gate defense.
The Eastern Detachment was merely provided with several maps that were no better than
rough sketches apparently taken from intelligence survey maps.(78) Although it was [also]
provided with some aerial photographs taken by navy aircraft, needless to say, these could
never clearly show the terrain and the disposition of the [enemy] garrison in detail.(78) Judging
that the allied forces on the island would defensively try to secure strategic points near the
city of Ambon, the Eastern Detachment decided to land on the east coast of the southeastern
peninsula, where the defense was considered weak, so that it could catch and destroy the
main force [of the enemy] on the southeastern peninsula and promptly seize the strategic
points on Ambon.(78) It was decided that ammunition, provisions and fodder required in the
early operations after the landing should be carried along, and that the rest should be un-
loaded and supplied by the transport ships which would be brought around to Ambon Bay
after the capture of Ambon. And it was [also] decided that the landing should be carried out
before daybreak on 31 January from the drifting transport ships.(78) [Editor’s note: The sea
was apparently too deep to anchor.] [Further] it was decided that the Navy should have the
1st kure Special Landing Force go ashore from the Hitu-lama anchorage and head for the
Laha airfield.(128) From the Army, 1st Lt. Wakabayashi Tōichi’s company was attached to the
[naval] landing force,(78) making the force a total of 745 men.(128)
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R. Adm. Takagi Takeo, commander of the Eastern Attack Unit ([and] 5th Cruiser Division
commander), deployed his force in the following way:(114) The 2d Destroyer Squadron prop-
erly consisted of the Jintsū (a light cruiser), and the 8th, the 15th, the 16th and the 18th De-
stroyer Divisions (four destroyers each), but the 18th Destroyer Division had been assigned
to the Carrier Task Force.(117)
Support Unit: [consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Division (the heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi) and
the Ikazuchi of the 6th Destroyer Division; [assigned to] support all the operations.
2d Escort Unit: [consisting of] the light cruiser Jintsū, the 8th, the 15th, and the 16th Destroyer
Division, the main force of the 1st kure Special Landing Force, and the 3d [6th on p. 362]
Construction Squad as the core, led by the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander; [assigned
to] (1) escort the units to capture Ambon, (2) capture Ambon in conjunction with the Army,
and (3) seize the Ambon air base and make [the airfield] ready for use.
1st Base Unit: [consisting of] the main force of the 1st Base Force, the Nagara (a light cruiser of
the 16th Cruiser Division), the 21st Destroyer Division (minus the Hatsuharu), and the Sasebo
Combined Special Landing Force as the core; [assigned to] prepare for the capture of Makas-
sar, and other tasks.
The 2d Air Unit: [consisting of] the 11th Seaplane Tender Division (with the seaplane tenders
Chitose and Mizuho) as the core; [assigned to] (1) support the 2d Escort Unit, (2) guard against
[enemy] submarines and aircraft, while supporting the ground combat.
It was decided that the 2d Escort Unit commander should escort the 1st echelon ([consisting
of] the Itō Detachment) from Davao to Ambon with the [Navy] 1st detachment ([consisting
of] the 8th Destroyer Division as the core), and the 2d echelon ([consisting of] the landing
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A View of the Landing Beach on Ambon
force, construction squad and other units) from the Bangka anchorage to Ambon with the
[Navy] 2d detachment (i.e. the 2d Section of the 16th Destroyer Division); that he should
have the cover unit ([consisting of] the 15th Destroyer Division) advance eastward from
kendari for the cover [operation], and that he himself would form the main unit, directly
leading the light cruiser Jintsū and the 1st Section of the 16th Destroyer Division and depart
from the Bangka anchorage.(117)
Sailing, Landing and Capture (See Illustration No. 36)
As already described, on 21 January, the units to capture Balikpapan and kendari departed
from Tarakan and Menado respectively and started landing on the 24th. On that day (the
24th), the 2d Carrier Division (the Sōryū and the Hiryū, which had departed from the Bungo
Channel on the 13th and been brought under the command of the commander in chief of the
Eleventh Air Fleet) conducted an [air] strike on Ambon Island with their carrier aircraft, but
having found no allied naval vessels or aircraft they mainly made the batteries and [military]
facilities their target.(103) On the next day, the 25th, the 1st Air Raid Unit (the 21st Air Flotilla)
had already advanced thirty aircraft to kendari. The 21st Air Flotilla headquarters also ad-
vanced there from Menado on the 27th,(143) which completed [Japanese] preparations. Al-
though the allied naval surface forces seemed to have escaped to the south of Timor Island
and to the west of Makassar, [enemy] submarines were judged to be in the Molucca Sea.(117)
At 1530 on the 27th, the Eastern Detachment (the 1st echelon, [consisting of] the previ-
ously-mentioned five ships) departed from Davao under the escort of the [Navy] 1st detach-
ment ([consisting of] the 8th Destroyer Division and minesweepers).(117)
On the 28th, the 1st Section of the 15th Destroyer Division departed from kendari and
headed for the east, while the Jintsū and the 2d Section of the 15th Destroyer Division left
the Bangka anchorage.(117)
On the 29th, the 2d echelon ([consisting of] six navy transport ships) left the Bangka an-
chorage under escort of the 16th Destroyer Division.(117) On that day, the seaplane tender Chi-
tose left the Bangka anchorage, while the Mizuho left the Salabangka Channel.(103) On the same
day, the 1st echelon detected allied submarine(s) for the first time, but they were not at-
tacked.(117)
On the 30th, the Support Unit (which had departed from Davao on the 29th) advanced to
the Bangka anchorage.(114) One [enemy] bomber approached the convoy at 0745 and [another]
at 1320, but they conducted no air attacks.(117) The 2d echelon came under a torpedo attack of
[enemy] submarine(s) at 2216, but sustained no damage. It entered the Hitu-lama anchorage
at 2300.(117) The 1st echelon entered the Rutung anchorage in the middle of the night (at 0020
on the 31st) without being attacked by [enemy] submarine(s) at all.(117) Command of the air
and the sea was in [Japanese] hands.
At 0030 on the 31st, the Eastern Detachment completed its entrance into the anchorage,
and at 0215 completed its shift to the [landing] craft. Without encountering major resistance,
the detachment successfully came ashore in the area east of Rutung in front of the enemy.
The right attack unit ([consisting of] the 2d Battalion (minus the 7th Company) of the 228th
Infantry Regiment as the core) landed at 0240, and the left attack unit ([consisting of] the
228th Infantry Regiment (minus the 2d Battalion and the 10th Company), an antitank gun
unit, and a light-armored car unit) landed at 0250.(76) Major General Itō sent a telegram [to
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the Navy] to express his gratitude, saying,
“Thanks to your support, we have succeeded in
landing. We sincerely appreciate the escort which
you so devotedly provided.”(117)
Following the landing, both attack units of the
Eastern Detachment single-mindedly pushed
ahead and advanced toward the city of Ambon
braving the heavy rains and steep mountains.(76)
The right attack unit ([with] 2d Battalion Com-
mander Maj. kimura Eijirō as its commander)
seized the strong position near Paso, which was
fortified with several lines of obstacles and pill-
boxes, after which it charged into the city with
one element at 2030, and into Halong with its
main force at 0500 on 1 February.(76) The main
force of the left attack unit ([with] Regimental
Commander Col. Doi Sadashichi as its com-
mander) defeated some scattered allied units and
charged into the city of Ambon at 1700 on the
31st.(76) The allied units positioned in the Paso and
the Halong area got hemmed in between the
[Japanese] right attack unit, which had been ad-
vancing [into Paso and Halong], and the left attack unit, which had captured the city of
Ambon. First of all, Lieutenant Colonel kapitz, the Dutch East Indies garrison commander
and his men, about 800 in total (including indigenous troops), laid down their arms at 0230
on 1 February.(76)
In the Hitu-lama area, the 1st kure Special Naval Landing Force had departed in its [land-
ing] craft at 0120 and tried to go ashore around 0200, but it encountered fierce resistance from
allied units and did not succeed in landing until 0320. Following the seizure of Hitu-lama, it
rushed toward the Laha airfield, advanced to the front of the airfield at 1530, and launched
an attack at 1600. However, it could not move at all due to concentrated mortar fire. At night-
fall, the commander of the landing force requested bombardments on the next day, the 1st.(128)
[Then,] 1st Lt. Wakabayashi Tōichi, commander of the 10th Company of the 228th Infantry
Regiment, which was attached to the [naval] landing force (he had graduated from the Im-
perial Japanese Military Academy with distinction and received citations of merit for [his
contribution in] the previous Hong kong operation and the subsequent Guadalcanal opera-
tion; Detachment Commander Itō and Regimental Commander Doi had expressly selected
his company to be attached to the Navy) proposed [to outflank the enemy]. He went into the
jungle with his company in the dark night (at 2100 on the 31st) in order to seize the highlands
north of the Laha airfield in a surprise attack by making a detour through the jungle.(76, 128)
On 1 February, the naval landing forces in front of the Laha airfield repeatedly wired re-
quests for air strikes at around 0600, around 0900 and around 1200.(117) The telegrams said:
“There are four rows of barbed wire entanglements, and twenty or more pillboxes at the
front; besides the mortar fire from the front, [we are] exposed to lateral shelling, fired from
the battery in front of the Doi Regiment; [what is more] the Wakabayashi Company’s move-
Detachment Commander Itō and Staff Officer
Tosaka [at] the Eastern Detachment Headquarters
Right After the Landing on Ambon
ments are unknown; we request air strikes.”(117) [Editor’s note: the so-
called Nona battery, a coastal battery to the southeast of Ambon city,
could not be turned to the direction of Ambon but was employed to fire
by the map across the bay at the Laha airfield and the road leading to
it.]
Because he had split the allied forces in a northern and southern
group through his seizure of [the city] of Ambon on the previous evening
(the 31st), and moreover had forced the surrender of the commander of
the Dutch East Indies garrison at Halong at daybreak the following
morning, Detachment Commander Itō expected that he could seize the
stronghold in the southern part of the peninsula by the end of the day.
So, from early morning, he sent the left attack unit southward and had
the right attack unit mop up [the enemy] in Halong and Paso.(76) On seizing the highlands
east of Ambon at 0800 that day (the 1st), the left attack unit commander, Col. Doi Sadashichi,
immediately headed southward and launched an attack at 1100, positioning the 3d Battalion
(commander: Maj. Nishiyama Haruka) and the 1st Battalion (commander: Maj. Hayakawa
kikuo) at the right and the left front lines respectively.(76) However, the [enemy] unit they were
facing was a strong Australian force, and [what is more,] apart from several lines of barbed
wire entanglements and many pillboxes, there was a gun battery and the terrain was steep.
The [Japanese] attack had made little progress by the time night fell. Detachment Com-
mander Itō wired the Navy: “The enemy is putting up stubborn resistance with [only] one
small caliber gun. [As] we intend to seize Highland [of] 514 [meters high] tonight, we request
air strikes and shelling of the southern side of Highland 514 (exclusive of the highland itself)
tomorrow, the 2d.”(117)
On the next day, the 2d, at the Laha airfield, the naval landing force charged into a corner
of the airfield at dawn. However, the attack made little progress after that, and it seemed
that the commander of the force, Cdr. Ieki kōnosuke, had been killed as well.(117) Requests
for air strikes were repeated by the landing force.(117) At 1030, 2d Destroyer Squadron Com-
mander Rear Admiral Tanaka requested Major General Itō to send Army reinforcements.(117)
They tried to bring [landing] craft [into Halong] and take [the reinforcements] across Ambon
Bay from Halong to the Laha airfield and put them ashore, but it was impossible to bring
the [landing] craft into Halong.(117) At 0800 on that day, Rear Admiral Tanaka ordered to sweep
mines in the bay for the first time, and under cover of the 15th Destroyer Division, which, at
1045, had begun firing (eighty shells) at the [enemy] battery and the airfield, the 21st
Minesweeper Division ([consisting of] five minesweepers) started minesweeping. However,
between 1330 and 1400, one of them was sunk and two of them were heavily damaged, which
led to the order to suspend the minesweeping at 1445.(117) Major kimura, commander of the
right attack unit, who had been mopping up [the enemy] in the Halong and the Paso areas,
had assembled the 2d Battalion (minus two companies) and waited for the [landing] craft to
arrive. However, having learned that the craft would not come, he left Halong at 1600, and
headed for Laha on the road along the inner edge of the bay.(76) [In the meantime,] at 1230 on
that day, the Wakabayashi Company was heading southward after repelling some twenty
enemy troops carrying machine guns in the highlands north of Laha, and was preparing to
make a surprise attack on the airfield in the early morning of the next day, the 3d.(76) On that
day, the 11th Seaplane Tender Division ([with] the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho) sup-
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Commander of the
228th Regiment, Col.
Doi Sadashichi
ported the ground combat with their
full force.(117)
On the next day, the 3d, at 0600, the
Wakabayashi Company charged into
the airfield from the rear.(76) At 0630, the
garrison unit in Laha raised the white
flag. The 1st kure Special Landing
Force reported to Rear Admiral Tanaka:
“At 0630 on the 3d, we charged into the
airfield again and completely seized it.
The Laha airfield [has a runway of]
1,300 meters long and 60 meters wide,
and … will be completely ready for
Type–0 fighter planes and land-based
medium-sized attack planes to land
this morning.”(117) At the time of charg-
ing into the airfield, Company Com-
mander Wakabayashi had sent one
element of his force to the river in the
west in order to cut off the [enemy’s]
escape route.(76) In the afternoon, the
naval landing force reported: “The
Wakabayashi Unit experienced considerable difficulties due to the fact that the jungle was
denser than expected, but all reached the airfield in safety at noon today.”(117) The fact was
that the [enemy] garrison in Laha had raised the white flag because the main force of the
Wakabayashi Company had charged into the airfield from the rear, but the ranking com-
manders of the Army did not talk much about it [in order to avoid disputes with the Navy].
The right attack unit had moved from Halong [to the airfield] in rapid night marches, but
it was 0800 when it [finally] reached Suakodo east of Laha. By then the [enemy] garrison at
the Laha airfield had already surrendered.(76) The garrison at the Laha airfield was made up
of some four hundred Australian and Dutch troops.(76) Major kimura reincorporated the
Waka bayashi Company and in conjunction with the [naval] landing force mopped up [the
enemy] in the vicinity, after which he returned to Halong at 0045 on 6 February.(76)
After continuously attacking, the left attack unit ([consisting of] the main force of the
228th Infantry Regiment) seized Highland 514, the peninsula’s strategic point, and got close
to the southern tip of the peninsula on the 3d. At 1530 [on the 3d], the Australian main force
(including indigenous troops), consisting of Lieutenant Colonel Scott and his men, some
1,500 troops in total, surrendered at last.(76)
After the surrender of the main force of the Dutch and Australian forces near the Laha
airfield and on the southeastern peninsula, the Eastern Detachment assumed the task of mop-
ping up [the enemy] on the whole island and of implementing a military administration.
However, as the [Navy] 24th Special Base Force ([with] R. Adm. Hatakeyama kōichirō as
commander) was organized on 5 February,(127) [the Eastern Detachment] transferred this task
to the latter as of that day and started preparing for the next operation to capture Timor.(76,
127) Due to the delay in the minesweeping of Ambon Bay, it was not until 8 February that the
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Illustration No. 35 — The Invasion of Ambon
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five transport ships of the Eastern Detachment, which had been drifting off the coast of Ru-
tung, were able to enter the port of Ambon.(117)
The number of allied troops the Eastern Detachment had engaged was about 3,000 ([con-
sisting of] some 1,200 Australian troops, some 400 Dutch troops, and some 1,400 indigenous
troops). The loss the detachment had sustained was fifty-five killed in action (including five
officers), 135 wounded in action (including five officers), one horse killed, and four wounded.
The military gains were as follows:(76)
Abandoned dead bodies (confirmed): 340
Prisoners of war: 2,182 (782 Australian troops, 334 Dutch troops, and 1,066 indigenous troops)
Seized [weaponry, vehicles and aircraft]: two bombers, three flying boats, one 24-cm. how-
itzer, four 15-cm. guns, eight field guns ([with] 1,520 shells), two mountain guns ([with]
1,240 shells), six armored cars, two antitank rifles ([with] 235 bullets), four antiaircraft
guns ([with] 168 shells), two tank guns ([with] 108 shells), five mortars ([with] 4,904
shells), six antiaircraft machine guns ([with] 13,990 shells), thirty-one machine guns
([with] 1,085,844 bullets), 261 light machine guns ([with] 31,900 bullets), 2,365 rifles ([with]
3,662,000 bullets), 128 motor vehicles, and others.
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Illustration No. 36 — The Operation to Capture Ambon
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7. The Capture of Banjarmasin, Makassar, Bali and Timor
(1) Politico-Strategic Issues and Phase-Three Operations of the Navy
On 31 January, the Twenty-fifth Army advanced to the Johor Strait, landed on Singapore [Is-
land] on the night of 8 February, and forced its surrender on the 15th. The day before (the
14th), the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group had conducted its drop on Palembang, while the
38th Division launched its landing operation on Sumatra on the 15th and seized Tan-
jungkarang on the 20th. Meanwhile, in the east the Eastern Detachment landed on Ambon
on 31 January, the Yamamoto Unit (a powerful element of the Sakaguchi Detachment), which
had left Balikpapan on 30 January, seized Banjarmasin on 10 February, and the Naval unit,
which left kendari on 6 February, seized Makassar on the 9th. Then, on 17 and 18 February
the Eastern Detachment left Ambon and landed in kupang and Dili on Timor Island on the
20th, while the kanemura Detachment ([consisting of] one battalion of the 48th Division as
the core) left Makassar on 18 February and landed on Bali on the 19th. [In the meantime] on
the 19th, the Carrier Task Force (i.e. the First Air Fleet) conducted an air strike on Port Darwin
in northwestern Australia. After that, on the 25th the main force of the Southern Task Force
(directly led by the commander in chief of the Second Fleet) and the Carrier Task Force left
Staring Bay and advanced into the sea south of Java. The Sixteenth Army carried out the Java
landing operation on 1 March with the support of the Dutch East Indies Unit (i.e. the Third
Fleet) and the air unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet), and the cooperation of the Malaya Unit
(i.e. the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet). The capture of these key locations in the east
took place against the following political and strategic background.
The Strategic Background and the Major Strategic and Tactical Issues
The major strategic and tactical changes in the plans to capture key areas east of Borneo and
their implementation were in [chronological] outline as follows:
1. On 6 January, IGHQ replied to a question [by the Emperor] about the conduct of the
phase-two operations by stating: “The matter of isolating Australia from the United
States and the operations in the Indian Ocean are still being studied.”(10) On 10 January,
concerning the immediate measures against Australia and New Zealand, the Liaison
Conference between IGHQ and the Government decided: “To strive to cut Australia
loose from its ties with the United States and Britain, while intensifying the pressure
on Australia through the progress of the southern operation and the cutting-off of its
communications with the United States and Britain.”(3)
On 8 January, the main force of the Carrier Task Force (which had returned on 24
December to the Inland Sea after the air strikes on Hawaii) left the Inland Sea in order
to support the Rabaul and the kavieng landing operations, which were to be con-
ducted both by the South Seas Detachment and the South Seas [Pacific Islands] Unit
(i.e. the Fourth Fleet) in conjunction. Only the 2d Carrier Division (with the aircraft
carriers Sōryū and Hiryū) headed for Ambon.(53, 103)
2. At the Manila [conference] from 21 to 23 January, the Southern Task Force requested a
ten to fourteen day postponement of the operation to capture the Dutch East Indies,
but the Southern Army only approved a five day postponement for the western Java
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[operation] and a seven day postponement for the eastern Java [operation].(23) At that
time, the 21st and the 23d Air Flotillas were heading southward along Celebes and the
east coast of Borneo respectively, and the 2d Carrier Division, which was additionally
deployed above and beyond the [original] plan, was sailing southward towards
Ambon. At that time, as the Southern Task Force (the Dutch East Indies Unit in partic-
ular) was painfully aware of the shortage of escort ships due to the shortened invasion
schedule, it was informally agreed that the capture of Banjarmasin by both the Army
and the Navy in conjunction should be cancelled, and that the Bali airfield should be
seized right before the Java landing operation [instead].(23)
3. On receiving a report of the above-mentioned draft agreement, the Army Department
of IGHQ, which considered the plan of the Southern Army and the Southern Task
Force to be risky, repeatedly wired the Southern Army from the 24th onwards to re-
quest the capture of Banjarmasin prior [to the Java operation] and [also] asked the
Navy Department to let the Carrier Task Force cooperate in [the operation to] capture
Java.(23)
4. However, the Combined Fleet had already turned its interest to the northeastern part
of Australia. On the 25th, on learning the views on subsequent operations from the
Fourth Fleet, which had conducted the operations to land in Rabaul and kavieng on
23 January, and the Carrier Task Force, which had supported these operations, the
Combined Fleet approved of their views. On the 26th, [the Fleet] presented the plan
“to have the Fourth Fleet capture Lae, Salamaua and Port Moresby in conjunction with
the South Seas Detachment and have the Carrier Task Force carry out operations on
the eastern part of Australia while cooperating in the [above operations].”(100, etc.)
After completing the support for the landing operations in Rabaul and kavieng,
the Carrier Task Force returned to Truk on the 27th and set about preparing for the
subsequent operation, expecting that “the next operation [would be] the implementa-
tion of the operation against the eastern part of Australia in mid-February.”(123) On the
29th, the Shōkaku, an aircraft carrier of the 5th Carrier Division, left Truk for the main-
land to replenish its aircraft.(116)
5. On the 29th, having approved the plan of the Combined Fleet regarding the capture
of key locations in the southeastern area, the Navy Department of IGHQ issued IGHQ
Navy Department Instruction No. 47, in which it gave directions “to capture Lae and
Salamaua in eastern New Guinea, and Tulagi in the Solomon Archipelago, with a force
[consisting of] the Fourth Fleet as the core, in conjunction with the South Seas Detach-
ment and, if possible, [also] capture Port Moresby in southeastern New Guinea.”(1)
6. Although the Navy Department of IGHQ had given clear directions as to the employ-
ment of the Fourth Fleet, as in the above-mentioned IGHQ Navy Department Instruc-
tion of the 29th, at that time another employment plan for the Carrier Task Force
emerged at the Navy Department of IGHQ, which was different from the Combined
Fleet’s view of the 26th. This plan was partly the result of the previously described
[IGHQ] Army Department’s request for the [Navy’s] cooperation in the Java operation
and partly the result of the 2d Carrier Division’s proposal that the Carrier Task Force
should conduct an operation against Port Darwin. Other considerations were that the
landing operation on Bali, which was within a stone’s throw from Surabaya, was risky
[if only] under the cover of the Eleventh Air Fleet, whose losses would not have been
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sufficiently replenished; that the military gains for the Carrier Task Force might be big-
ger if it participated in the operation to capture Java; and that on 24 January a detailed
report had been received on the sinking of the U.S. aircraft carrier Lexington, [which
was regarded as certain, and which diminished the need for the Task Force’s presence
in the southeastern area].(100, 108)
7. On 28 January, the Army Department of IGHQ wired the Southern Army, saying: “Al-
though there were various arguments about the seizure of Banjarmasin, we learned
from OSAMU [Sixteenth Army] Operation Order A, No. 119 that the army planned to
seize the airfield on its own and make it ready for use by early February. Since it be-
came clear to us that you also intended to attach great importance to the place for the
Java operation, we approved everything.”(23) [Editor’s note: The quotations on p. 226
and p. 389 in the Japanese text have slightly different redactions.] It was at this juncture
that the policy inside the Navy Department of IGHQ as to the employment of the Car-
rier Task Force came to a turning point.(147)
On the next day, the 29th, the Carrier Task Force, with the operations against the
eastern part of Australia in mid-February in mind, sent the aircraft carrier Shōkaku
from Truk to the mainland to replenish its aircraft,(123) but the order which the Navy
Department of IGHQ issued on that day (the 29th) regarding the operations in the
southeastern area was only an order for the unit [consisting of] the Fourth Fleet as the
core [and not for the Carrier Task Force].(1)
Notes:
As we have seen, on receiving a telegram from the Southern Army that the capture of Ban-
jarmasin would be omitted, the Army Department of IGHQ wired back on 24 January, say-
ing, “we are deeply concerned about … in a situation where the cooperation of the aircraft
carriers cannot necessarily be expected,” and again sent another [reply] telegram to the
Southern Army on the 26th, “we have also been negotiating about the cooperation from air-
craft carriers in the Java operation. However, at present it cannot be expected for sure, as
the Navy is extremely cautious about sending them to a dangerous sea where the enemy air
force is [still] strong.” [Editor’s note: In Army General Staff Telegram No. 591, cited on p.
217, the word “dangerous” is absent.]
We have already explained the power of the B–17s, which raided Menado at that time,
and the fact that the Southern Army had to give priority to the Palembang airfield in the
paradrop operation for fear of the B–17s. According to the action report of the 44th Field An-
tiaircraft Artillery Battalion, B–17 super heavy bombers with a flying range of 1,680 kilome-
ters raided Balikpapan on 24 January in four waves of seven, two, nine and three aircraft at
a time (twenty-one aircraft in total). After dropping some forty bombs, all of them flew away
in no hurry. [So,] in one view one could argue that “[the Navy] has to be cautious about
sending the Carrier Task Force because the sea where the [enemy] B–17 [bombers] had com-
mand of the air was dangerous,” but on the other hand, one could argue the view that “Port
Darwin has to be attacked with the Carrier Task Force in order to contain the power of the
B–17s.”
8. By the morning of the next day, the 30th, the Army and Navy Departments of IGHQ
had prepared the groundwork, so that Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama and
Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano could meet and the former could make the
request which will be mentioned later.(147)
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On that day (the 30th), kusaka Ryūnosuke, chief of staff of the First Air Fleet (i.e.
the Carrier Task Force), who had been summoned from Truk (accompanied by Staff
Officer Genda Minoru), held talks with the staff officers of the Navy Department of
IGHQ and those of the Combined Fleet. [Editor’s note: According to Vol. 80, p. 170,
they just happened to be there.] As a result, it was decided that the entire force of the
Carrier Task Force and one element of the Submarine Fleet (i.e. the Sixth Fleet) should
participate in the Java operation.(108)
As described previously, on that day (the 30th), Chief of the Army General Staff
Sugiyama met with Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano. Chief of the Army Gen-
eral Staff Sugiyama requested the cooperation [from the Navy] in the Burma operation
and in the following words asked for cooperation in the Java operation as well, while
[also] giving his view on the future conduct of the war:(2)
Request to Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano (30 [January])
(First part omitted by the author)
Needless to say, the Java operation is very difficult. [In fact,] in the light of the results of pre-
vious studies such as war games and others, the operations against Malaya and Java were
deemed the most difficult. This can be said in particular about the air operations. As it is, in
the Malaya operation, owing to divine aid and the close cooperation between the Army and
the Navy, we were able to achieve brilliant military gains by conducting a surprise attack
on the enemy. However, as for the Java operation that we will conduct shortly, we must ex-
pect that it will be extremely difficult compared to the Malaya operation, owing to the facts
that the enemy has rapidly been reinforcing its defense in the area these days, that it is more
difficult to make a surprise attack on Java than on Malaya, and that the enemy is getting fa-
miliar with our ways of conducting landing operations, and so on. In view of these charac-
teristics of the Java operation, the Army is determined to accomplish the operation after
thorough preparations. We sincerely hope that the Navy will also closely cooperate [with
the Army] in various operations, in air operations in particular, so that we can fully demon-
strate the essence of cooperation between the Army and the Navy in the final stage of the
southern operation. [Editor’s note: This paragraph was also quoted on p. 127 in a slightly
different redaction. We have kept to the redaction given on p. 127]
The cutting-off of U.S. and British reinforcements
The situation of U.S. and British reinforcements [for the allied forces] in East Asia is as shown
in the separate table and the sketch map on the separate sheet; we may assume that the
greater part will be transported by ship and a part by air. We consider it most advantageous
if it is possible to catch and destroy them in the middle of their transport. Although the Navy
has [also] been paying attention to it and has allocated some submarines and other forces,
we hope you will pay as much attention as before to the cutting-off of reinforcements to the
enemy, particularly to its forces in the Burma and Java areas.
The conduct of the war after [the southern operation]
We are now studying the conduct of the war after [the southern operation.] When the south-
ern operation is almost wrapped up, we shall of course make every effort to carry out the
operations necessary to speed up the ending of the war. However, we must attach great im-
portance particularly to increasing the flexibility of our defensive strength as well as to
promptly establishing a condition in which we are self-sufficient and ready against all pos-
sible attacks. As for the places to be captured from now on, we think that for now we should
take the above into account and give careful thought to the limits [of our expansion], so as
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not to bring about a disadvantageous war of attrition. Furthermore, we consider it extremely
important to conduct the first stage, that is, the operation against the south, always with an
eye on the situation in the north. Because among our war aims great importance is attached
to the surrender of Britain, the operations against the Indian Ocean are especially critical.
Moreover, considering the above-mentioned U.S. and British reinforcements, we particularly
hope that the Navy will concentrate its strength in that area. We will make efforts to frankly
exchange opinions with the Navy on the detailed measures for these issues as soon as pos-
sible, so that we can draw up a definite plan.
9. On the next day, the 31st, the Combined Fleet issued Telegraphic Operation Order No.
54, by which it assigned the entire force of the Carrier Task Force and one element of
the Sixth Fleet to the Southern Task Force as of 3 February, and had the latter conduct
carrier operations during the Java operation.(123) It was the day when the Twenty-fifth
Army had advanced to the Johor Strait, while the Eastern Detachment had landed in
Ambon.
However, on the next day, 1 February, a U.S. Carrier Task Force raided the Marshall
Islands. The Japanese Carrier Task Force immediately departed from Truk and headed
eastward. However, judging that the U.S. Task Force had already gone far away, it
turned around and headed for Palau before daybreak on the 3d, expecting to arrive
there on the 8th [to join the Java operation].(116)
The above-mentioned air raid on the Marshall Islands on the 1st was the first air
strike by a U.S. Carrier Task Force that [the Japanese] had experienced since the open-
ing of hostilities. The Combined Fleet was forced to change its policy. It issued Tele-
graphic Operation Order No. 63 on 5 February as a first step, by which it removed
twenty-one aircraft of the Gaoxiong Air Group (which had returned from Jolo to Gaox-
iong at that time) from the Southern Task Force and transferred them to the South Seas
[Pacific Islands] Unit (i.e. the Fourth Fleet). Then, it decided to cancel the deployment
of the entire force of the Carrier Task Force to the Java area, to reserve the 5th Carrier
Division (the aircraft carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku) in the mainland, and to assign the
main force of the remaining force ([consisting of] the 1st Carrier Division, with the air-
craft carriers Akagi and Kaga as the core) to the Southern Task Force [instead]. On 8
February, it issued Telegraphic Order No. 64, by which it revised the previous order,
and ordered: “The Carrier Task Force (minus the 5th Carrier Division and the 2d Sec-
tion of the 18th Destroyer Division) and the 2d Submarine Squadron shall be trans-
ferred to the Southern Task Force.”(116, 123)
In the meantime, the air unit of the Southern Task Force (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet)
had achieved great military gains in Operation Z (a large air campaign carried out
from 3 through 5 February against eastern Java from Balikpapan and kendari with
the force of the 2d Carrier Division and the 21st, and the 23d Air Flotilla) and destroyed
allied aircraft and naval vessels in eastern Java.
10. The operation to capture Makassar by a Navy unit (which departed from kendari on
6 February and landed in Makassar on the 9th) was conducted just after Operation Z,
making use of the military gains of the latter.
11. The commander of the Southern Task Force, to which the Carrier Task Force had been
transferred, brought the 2d Carrier Division (the Sōryū and the Hiryū) back under the
command of the latter. He gave an order to the Carrier Task Force to carry out air
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strikes on Port Darwin the day before the landing of the Eastern Detachment on Timor,
and then to leave Staring Bay on the 25th after replenishing and advance into the sea
south of Java to conduct carrier operations. Furthermore, he gave orders to the air unit
(i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) and the Dutch East Indies Unit (i.e. the Third Fleet) to co-
operate in the operations of the Carrier Task Force with part of their forces.(117)
While the Eastern Detachment left Ambon for Timor on 17 and 18 February, the
21st Air Flotilla headquarters (in kendari) took up position in Ambon during the pe-
riod from the 11th to the 17th to take charge of directing the air operations in this
area.(134) The Carrier Task Force had left Palau on the 15th to carry out air strikes on
Port Darwin on the 19th.(116) The Eastern Detachment went ashore on Timor on the
next day, the 20th, with little interference from [enemy] air or naval [forces].
12. Although the air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) carried out air strikes (Operation Z) on
eastern Java from 3 [through 5] February as mentioned previously, it could not make
sufficient [military] gains due to bad weather and other reasons after Operation Z. The
kanemura Detachment of the 48th Division ([consisting of] one battalion as the core)
had left Lingayen on 7 February, advanced to Makassar on the 14th [the 15th according
to p. 400], and then left Makassar on the 18th under the escort of only a few naval ves-
sels and launched the landing [operation] on Bali on the night of the 19th [actually at
0100 on the 19th, see p 401]. At that moment, a strong allied fleet raided [the anchorage]
and created a situation that terrified the Dutch East Indies Unit headquarters.
As reasons [for the panic], the following issues concerning the invasion schedule
have to be taken into account, apart from the insufficient results of the air operations
and the shortage of escort vessels.
13. As we have seen, the unofficial agreement at the Manila Conference was officially con-
cluded on the day when the Banjarmasin issue was settled, that is, 28 January, and [on
that day] the Dutch East Indies Unit officially passed down the disposition of forces
and the outline of the phase-three operations. Although the Combined Fleet and the
Southern Task Force (i.e. the Second Fleet) had already passed down the shift to phase-
three operations on 24 January, the Dutch East Indies Unit was not able to decide the
disposition of its forces until the Banjarmasin issue was settled.
Consequently, the arrangement between the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Six-
teenth Army, which had informally been made in Manila on 23 January, was [finally]
concluded on the 30th. This agreement stipulated that “the landing on Bali [shall be
made] no later than day I – 2.” On the other hand, the agreement between the Southern
Army and the Southern Task Force, concluded on 28 January, had stated [the landing]
as “around day I – 2.” Day I indicated the [scheduled] date of landing on eastern Java,
which was day x + 77 (23 February). At that time, the scheduled date of landing on
western Java (day H) was day x + 75 (i.e. 21 February, which was day I – 2). The idea
then was to conduct the capture of Bali within the main flow of the Java landing op-
erations.
However, as described earlier, the Malaya Unit requested postponement of [the
day to conduct Operation] L for two days on 4 February and for another four days on
the 6th. The Southern Task Force considered it inevitable to put off L ([scheduled for]
day x + 64) for six days in total, and consequently, a six-day postponement of [the day
to conduct Operation] H ([scheduled for] day x + 75 [to be carried out in] western
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Java). On 8 February, [the Southern Task Force] discussed these matters with the South-
ern Army, and upon the approval of the latter on that day, it transmitted at 2040 on
the next day, the 9th, the following order by Telegraphic Order No. 96.(117) [The text is
given on p. 305.]
The following amendments were made in the target dates for the invasions in the Dutch
East Indies operation:
1. Western Java: day x + 81  (Note by the author: 27 February)
2. Eastern Java: no later than day x + 81, depending on the arrangements between the com-
mander in chief of the Third Fleet and the Sixteenth Army commander.
The Southern Task Force considered it regrettable that the Malaya Unit had requested
the postponement of L. Therefore, as for Java, it decided to stick to the previous plan,
and ordered that the landing on eastern Java [should be executed] no later than day x
+ 81.
As we have seen, before the Southern Task Force transmitted the above order, the
prospect of when the kuantan airfield would be ready for use had become certain
around noon on that day (the 9th), and the advance unit of the 38th Division had left
Cam Ranh Bay in the evening of that day; as a result, L was advanced by one day.
Based on this and the above-mentioned telegraphic order of the Southern Task Force,
the Dutch East Indies Unit, which had made the arrangements with the Sixteenth
Army, transmitted the following telegraphic order at 1150 on the 11th:
The schedule for the Dutch East Indies invasion shall be revised as follows:
(a) Batavia and Surabaya: 26 February
(b) kupang and Dili: 20 February
(c) Bali: 18 February (as scheduled)
[This meant] that [the unit] advanced the date [stipulated in the telegraphic order of
the Southern Task Force] from day x + 81 to day x + 80. Apart from this, [the order of
the unit] had three remarkable points: First, it set the [scheduled] dates of landing on
[both] eastern and western Java on the same day despite the intention of the tele-
graphic order of the Southern Task Force. This was because it was the fixed opinion of
the Sixteenth Army to simultaneously conduct [the landing operations] in [both] east-
ern and western Java. Secondly, Dili was added [to the targets to capture,] which will
be explained later. Thirdly, [the date of the landing operation on] “Bali [shall be] 18
February as scheduled.” This means that the date of the landing on Bali, which had
been changed from around day I – 2, set in the order of the Southern Task Force, to
day I – 5 by the Dutch East Indies Unit, was [further] changed to day I – 8 this time.
The reason [for this] will also be described later.
On the 16th, the [scheduled] date of the landing on Bali was postponed [again] for
one day due to circumstances that will be described later. However, [in the meantime,]
the [scheduled] date of landing on Java was postponed for two days on the 23d, and
again for one more day on the 27th due to circumstances that will [also] be described
later. In the end, the [scheduled] date of the landing on Bali, which had been set as
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around day I – 2, ended up as day I – 10, which eventually presented the allied forces
with an opportunity to smash the Bali invasion units one by one.
14. Earlier, for the seizure of Makassar (on the 9th), the unit had left the Bangka anchorage
(north of Celebes) on the 2d and kendari on the 6th. It had crossed [the sea] north of
the Lesser Sunda Islands right in front of the enemy. 
The reasons why this course had been taken boiled down to the shortening of the
schedule to capture Java and the shortage of naval escort vessels. To be precise, it was
because the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron, which had been positioned in
Balikpapan, had headed north for the Philippines to escort the 48th Division, and be-
cause it was further decided that the naval vessels that had participated in the opera-
tion to capture Ambon (the landing was launched on 31 January), would [afterwards]
join to provide support [to the Makassar landing], leaving Ambon on the 4th.
15. The unit to capture Timor left Ambon on 17 and 18 February, while the unit to capture
Bali left Makassar on 18 February. It (the 18th) was [also] the day when the unit to land
in central western Java departed from Cam Ranh Bay. The 48th Division left Jolo and
headed for eastern Java on the next day, the 19th.
The Issue of Seizing Dili
As mentioned previously, Dili was the seat of the governor-general of [Portuguese] Timor, a
territory of neutral Portugal. On 7 February, IGHQ endorsed the seizure of the city, the details
of which were as follows:
At the time of the opening of hostilities, Dutch Timor was included in the [invasion] plan
as one of the areas to be captured, but how to deal with Portuguese Timor had not been de-
cided.(1, 23) The stance of IGHQ was to avoid a [Japanese] advance into Portuguese Timor in
every possible way, because [the advance] might make Portugal join the allied forces.(16)
At the beginning of January 1942, the Southern Army obtained information that a total of
about 1,000 Dutch East Indies and Australian troops had intruded into Portuguese Timor.(23)
On 5 January, while giving the Sixteenth Army the order to capture Ambon and kupang, as
mentioned previously, the Southern Army, which regarded the issue as troublesome, wired
IGHQ on the same day as follows:(23) “(1) In consequence of our order [to launch] the kupang
operation, we believe that it is a reasonable action in terms of both international law as well
as our strategy that we will possibly conduct air and ground attacks as needed, if the enemy
forces should use the Portuguese territory on Timor. (2) Further, we would like your consid-
eration to strictly keep the launch of the landing [operation] secret because considerable dif-
ficulties are anticipated in conducting this landing operation. (3) We inform you in advance
of these two matters just to make sure. [Also,] we would like you to kindly send us as soon
as possible actual proof that the enemy forces are using Portuguese territory.” [However, the
Southern Army] did not receive a reply on this matter from IGHQ until early February.(23)
Meanwhile, the Dutch East Indies Unit, which had to provide an escort for the Eastern De-
tachment’s  advance to kupang, was in a serious predicament. At the Manila Conference
(from 21 to 23 January), the senior staff officer of the Third Fleet, Captain Yamaki, had
earnestly explained the difficulties of the kupang operation to Southern Army Staff Officer
Ishii. According to him, “unlike many other landing operations, the kupang operation will
be extremely difficult because it is [necessary to] pass through the [Lesser] Sunda Islands,
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and advance out into the Indian Ocean to carry out [the operation]. Especially, if [our convoy]
should sail to kupang by way of the Ombai Strait, it would be passing through the sea off
Portuguese Timor all day, which is bad if we want to keep our intentions secret. If it is un-
avoidable to go southward passing through [other] narrow channels, we would need con-
siderable minesweeping as well as escorting forces.” Captain Yamaki repeatedly insisted that
simultaneous attacks on kupang and on Dili would make the operation comparatively less
difficult.(23) The Southern Task Force, like the Southern Army, had also suggested to the Navy
Department of IGHQ to attack Dili [along with kupang].(117)
As described previously, on 1 January, an agreement was reached between the Southern
Army and the Southern Task Force to “capture kupang around 11 February.” Having re-
ceived the above-mentioned Southern Army telegram on 5 January, Chief of the Army Gen-
eral Staff Sugiyama reported to the Emperor: “The landing in kupang has to be made in the
face of the enemy. If the enemy enters Portuguese territory, Portugal, as a neutral country,
should rightfully demand their withdrawal, or disarmament. If Portugal neglects that and
sabotages our operations, attack operations must be carried out [as well] against Portuguese
territory.”(4) After that, the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government was held
on 20 January. At the conference, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama told Foreign
Minister Tōgō: “This is the way the Army Department [of IGHQ] thinks about the Portuguese
territory. I request you to make a study on the case of warning them. We will further inform
you about when and how to warn them, etc.”(4) Right after the statement of Chief of the Army
General Staff Sugiyama, Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano demanded: “Allied aircraft,
if any, in the Portuguese territory will certainly attack our convoy at the time of our kupang
landing operation. Therefore, we must attack them before that. In order to avoid such a sce-
nario, we would like you to give a warning.”(4)
As a result of the study which had been made since then, the conclusion was reached that
it was necessary to advance into Dili in Portuguese [Timor] as well as simultaneously into
kupang, because the Australian and Dutch forces had already entered Portuguese territory,
and the neutrality of Portuguese Timor was violated. The [Japanese] government had no par-
ticular objection to this conclusion. However, on 24 January (the day when participants in
the Manila Conference made their way back), a problem arose.(7) While Prime Minister (and
War Minister) Tōjō Hideki maintained that “troops shall be promptly withdrawn from Por-
tuguese territory, once they have achieved the purpose of the operation against it,” Chief of
Navy General Staff Nagano insisted that “Portuguese Timor must be secured for operations
against Australia, even after the mopping up [of the territory is over.]”(7) The intent of Prime
Minister Tōjō was to strictly prevent the expansion of the number of countries against which
[Japan] was waging war.
On 27 January, the following draft was drawn up between the chief staff [officers] in
charge:(7)
Measures to be taken against Portugal at the time of operations against Dutch Timor
1. In carrying out the operations against Dutch Timor, it is possible that the Empire [of Japan] may
conduct operations against Portuguese Timor for self-defensive purposes. However, after mop-
ping up the British, Australian and Dutch forces on Portuguese territory,
(Plan A) the Imperial Japanese forces shall withdraw from the area concerned, as long as Por-
tugal ensures its neutrality; or
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(Plan B) whether the Imperial Japanese forces will be withdrawn from the place or will continue
their use [of the place] as an operational base shall be determined depending on the attitude of
the Portuguese and other circumstances at the time.
2. From the viewpoint of keeping our intention secret, diplomatic measures, such as further re-
questing the Portuguese government in advance to have British, Australian and Dutch forces
pull out of Portuguese Timor, shall not be taken.
3. Just before the entry of [Japanese] ground units into Portuguese Timor, a notice shall be timely
given to the Portuguese side, and an offer shall be made that the sovereignty of Portuguese
Timor will be respected, and that “[Japan] intends to promptly pull out its forces once its purpose
of self-defense is achieved, as long as Portugal ensures its neutrality.” The Imperial Japanese
Government shall announce the above intent, just after the entry [of its units into the territory.]
Note 1. As long as Portugal maintains its neutral position, we will maintain our present at-
titude toward Macao.
2. We will timely issue a statement to Germany and Italy as needed.
3. In case the Imperial Japanese forces should enter Portuguese Timor, they shall make
efforts in every possible way so as not to make an enemy of the Portuguese forces.
The next day, the 28th, the subject was brought up for discussion at the Liaison Conference
between IGHQ and the Government, and all of a sudden the argument became heated. For
about an hour, a heated discussion continued between Prime Minister Tōjō, who pressed to
“choose plan A,” and Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano, who insisted to “choose plan
B,” but they failed to come to an agreement.(3, 4, 7)
The tenor of Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano’s argument was as follows:
— According to the talks held on 23 January at Lisbon between Minister Chiba and the vice foreign
minister of Portugal (regarding the additional dispatch of Portuguese troops to Timor), and also
in view of the actual confinement of Japanese [residents] in Portuguese Timor, it may surely be
said that the rightful status of Japan has already been infringed in the territory of a [supposedly]
neutral country. Under such circumstances, it is (1) necessary to secure Portuguese Timor, which
is of great immediate value for operations against Port Darwin, in anticipation of a prolonged
war from now on, in which U.S. and British forces, U.S. aircraft and submarines in particular,
will gather in Australia; and (2) even though [Plan A] says that [the Japanese forces] shall with-
draw [from the territory] as long as Portugal ensures the neutrality of Timor, it is highly doubtful
whether [the territory] will be able to ensure its neutrality on its own in a situation where the
territory has already been invaded. In short, I find it difficult to clearly state our withdrawal
while the Portuguese attitude and the changes in the other circumstances are still far from clear.
Therefore, I prefer to decide this matter after seeing what happens.
— Prime Minister Tōjō regards the Timor operation as a campaign in a limited area, but that is
wrong. When a prolonged war is anticipated, [the territory] is extremely important to check
Australia. Even if Portugal takes sides against the Axis, it will probably not make a big difference
in the war situation in Europe. No matter how seriously we treat the country, if it is incapable
of maintaining its neutrality, in the long run it will never be able to ensure the neutrality [of its
territory] against the pressure of Britain and the United States. It is not necessary to decide upon
our withdrawal now as in plan A.
— I do not agree with deciding at this point matters that are absolutely essential for the implemen-
tation of the Empire’s military operations without seeing first how the situation develops, as
for instance a withdrawal, only because it would be necessary for tactical political reasons.
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The officers in charge racked their brains after the conference was over, but with no success.
On the 30th, the chiefs of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of War [Maj. Gen. Mutō
Akira] and the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry [R. Adm. Oka Takazumi] set out
to settle the issue and reached agreement on the 31st.(7)
On 2 February, the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government made the fol-
lowing decision (as drawn up in the original draft).(3) Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano
did not utter a single word that day.(7)
After mopping up the British, Australian, and Dutch forces on Portuguese territory, the Imperial
Japanese forces shall withdraw from the area concerned, as long as Portugal ensures the neu-
trality [of the territory]. However, if it is inevitable in terms of the attitude of the Portuguese
and the other circumstances of the entire operation, the [Japanese forces] can continue to use
[the place] as a base for operations.
On 4 February, the IGHQ Army Department wired the Southern Army the following message
by way of Army General Staff Telegram No. 741, which was received by the Southern Army
on the 5th:(23)
We were ordered to notify you of the measures to be taken against Portugal at the time of the
operation against Dutch Timor, which were decided at the liaison conference yesterday, the 2d,
in the following way. Concerning the implementation of [operations in conformity with] these
measures, you will be separately instructed.
The measures [against Portugal]
1. In carrying out the operation against Dutch Timor, it is possible that the Empire [of Japan] may
conduct operations in Portuguese Timor for self-defensive purposes. Then, after mopping up
the British, Australian and Dutch forces on Portuguese territory, the Imperial [Japanese] forces
shall withdraw from the area concerned, as long as Portugal ensures the neutrality [of the ter-
ritory]. However, if it is inevitable in terms of the attitude of the Portuguese and the other cir-
cumstances of the entire operation, the [Japanese forces] can continue to use [the place] as a base
for operations.
2. From the viewpoint of keeping our intentions secret, diplomatic measures, such as further re-
questing the Portuguese government in advance to have the British, Australian and Dutch forces
pull out of Portuguese Timor, shall not be taken.
3. Just before the entry of [Japanese] ground units into Portuguese Timor, a notice shall timely be
given to the Portuguese side and an offer shall be made that Japan respects the territorial in-
tegrity of Portuguese Timor and as long as Portugal strictly observes its neutrality, [Japan] in-
tends to promptly pull out its forces once its purpose of self-defense is achieved. The Imperial
Japanese Government shall announce the above intent just after the entry [of its units to the ter-
ritory].
4. If it is unclear before our entry whether the British, [Australian] and Dutch forces have pulled
out, operations shall be conducted as planned for the time being. If the pullout of British, [Aus-
tralian] and Dutch forces is confirmed after our entry, matters shall be handled in accordance
with Item No. 1.
Note 1. As long as Portugal maintains its neutral position, we will maintain our present attitude
toward Macao.
2. Explanations shall timely be given to Germany and Italy.
3. Imperial Japanese forces entering Portuguese Timor shall make every effort so as not to
make an enemy of the Portuguese forces.
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On 5 February (the day when it received the aforementioned Army General Staff Telegram
No. 741), the Southern Army was stunned to unexpectedly receive a telegram sent by the
Southern Task Force on the 4th, which read: “In view of the present situation where both
Australian and Dutch East Indies forces have occupied Portuguese Timor, we would like to
have an element of the Itō Detachment go ashore in Dili (under the escort of the Navy) [at
the time of the operation] to capture Timor almost simultaneously with the landing in ku-
pang and seize the vicinity.”(23) On the same day (the 5th), the Southern Army sent the Army
Department of IGHQ the following telegram:(23)
We duly received Army General Staff Telegram No. 741.
1. As it is said that the operations against Dutch Timor are extremely difficult from the viewpoint
of naval tactics, it would be highly advantageous if it were possible to conduct operations
against Portuguese Timor simultaneously with those against kupang. As we have received an
advisory telegram from the Second Fleet as well, it would be highly appreciated if you could
consider the above and give us instructions immediately.
2. When entering [into Portuguese territory] from the sea, we would appreciate it if you gave
notice to the territory after our entry into the anchorage.
3. We would like [to be notified?] immediately of the time and date of implementation, when fixed,
by telegrams from the fleet. (Note by the author: This item seems to contain some misinterpre-
tations of the code.)
On the next day, the 6th, the Southern Army [further] sent the following telegram to the Army
Department of IGHQ:(23)
1. We would like you to immediately provide instructions, on which to base our operations against
every kind of action from Portuguese forces, before the units to carry out the operations against
Timor depart from the assembly point. The departure of the above units from the assembly point
shall be on 17 February. 
2. Further, in view of the strategic value of the island, it is expected that even if the Portuguese
Army does not put up resistance, we should make considerable demands concerning such mat-
ters as the stationing of troops, guarding and counterintelligence, for the purpose of the defense
of the island. Therefore, we think it highly advantageous if we can immediately induce Portugal
to declare the island a war zone just after the landing of our troops.
On the next day, 7 February, after receiving approval [of the Emperor], Chief of Army General
Staff Sugiyama passed down the following order, and the concomitant instructions:(1)
IGHQ Army Department Order No. 597
Order
1. The commander in chief of the Southern Army can conduct, in conjunction with the Navy, op-
erations against Portuguese Timor for the purpose of self-defense.
2. The chief of Army General Staff shall provide detailed instructions.
7 February, 1942
IGHQ Army Department Instruction No. 1101
Instructions
Based on IGHQ Army Department Order No. 597, the following instructions are given:
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1. The outline of the operations against Portuguese Timor shall be discussed and determined be-
tween the commanders in chief of the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet.
2. When conducting the operations against Portuguese Timor, its sovereignty shall be respected
as much as possible, unless Portugal takes hostile action.
In the meantime, the movements of the naval units on site were as follows: As we have seen,
in giving shape to its phase-three operations, the Dutch East Indies Unit had wished to [in-
clude operations to] capture Dili and kupang simultaneously, but it gave up [the plan] be-
cause central command [the Navy Department of IGHQ] gave no directions. Meanwhile on
27 January at central command [IGHQ], the aforementioned policy on measures against Por-
tugal was informally agreed and expected to be approved at the Liaison Conference between
IGHQ and the Government on the 28th. At 1000 on that day, the 28th, the Southern Task
Force wired the Dutch East Indies Unit and the unit to capture Timor (i.e. the Eastern Attack
Unit, led by the 5th Cruiser Division commander): “If you have drawn up a plan to go ashore
on Portuguese Timor (in Dili and vicinity) in the operation to capture Timor, we would like
you to promptly inform us of the outline.”(117) As already described, central command [IGHQ]
failed to reach agreement at the liaison conference on the 28th. On 1 February, the Dutch East
Indies Unit wired back to the Southern Task Force that for reasons of the airfield in Dili being
poor with a runway of [a mere] 800 meters, and the construction squad having no extra
strength to spare, “[the unit] has decided to concentrate its full force on kupang, but [also]
plans to take appropriate measures without an missing opportunity should the enemy take
advantage of Dili.”(117) It may look odd that this telegram was sent by the Dutch East Indies
Unit, whose Senior Staff Officer Yamaki had so ardently appealed to Ishii, [senior] staff officer
of the Southern Army, for capturing Dili simultaneously with kupang. It seems that the main
factor [in this change of heart] was that the unit had taken the views of the Sixteenth Army
seriously. The Sixteenth Army felt it risky to disperse the strength of the Eastern Detachment
in the operation to capture Timor, which was receiving reinforcements from Australian
forces.(23) Later, on 8 February, when Southern Army Staff Officer Ishii had just received ap-
proval to issue the Southern Army Order that “the Sixteenth Army commander shall conduct
operations against Portuguese Timor in conjunction with the Navy, for the purpose of facil-
itating the operations against Dutch Timor,” and was about to arrange the transmission of
the order, Colonel Takashima, senior staff officer of Section 1 of the Sixteenth Army presented
himself. On receiving an explanation about [the operation to] capture Dili from Staff Officer
Ishii, [Takashima] expressed his disapproval and strongly insisted that the Sixteenth Army
intended to concentrate as much of its power as possible in one place in view of the case of
Ambon (where the unit heading from Hitu-lama for the Laha airfield separately [from the
other troops] had faced an uphill battle). He would not yield and in the end Staff Officer Ishii
had to go so far as saying that “it has already been sent to the Second Fleet in reply, and has
[also] been approved by [the commander in chief of the Southern Army],” in order to over-
come his opposition.(23) However, on the 2d, the day after the Dutch East Indies Unit had sent
the aforementioned reply [to the Southern Task Force], the policy on measures against Por-
tugal was decided at central command [IGHQ], as mentioned previously. Learning about
the decision, the Dutch East Indies Unit changed its mind [again], and sent the following
telegram on the 4th:(117)
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To Chief of Staff, Second Fleet
From Chief of Staff, Third Fleet, sent at 1530 on 4 February
Regarding IGHQ Navy Department Classified Telegram No. 638, we would like you to negotiate
with the [Southern] Army about occupying Dili with one element of the Itō Detachment (the
naval landing forces have no extra strength to cooperate in this [operation]) simultaneously
with [the operation] to capture kupang. As the schedule [is drawing near], we are going to pro-
ceed with the preliminary negotiations with the Sixteenth Army, based on the above scheme.
The developments after that were as previously described.
On 17 and 18 February, the Eastern Detachment left Ambon under the escort of the Navy,
and went ashore in kupang and Dili on the 20th. [Also] on the 20th, the [Japanese] govern-
ment issued the following statement:(3, 13)
On 17 December last year, British and Dutch forces took the step to invade Portuguese Timor
despite the refusal of the Governor-General of the territory [to let them in] and occupied it. Since
then, negotiations for withdrawal have been started between Britain and Portugal, and although
the Portuguese government seems to be making efforts to improve the situation, it has remained
unchanged until today. Now, with the advance of our operations towards Dutch Timor, the Im-
perial Japanese Army has come to a point that it is compelled to drive off the British and Dutch
forces in Portuguese Timor for the purpose of self-defense. As the Empire of Japan fully under-
stands the position of Portugal, which came to be greatly troubled by the actions of Britain and
the Netherlands in disregard of international good faith, the Imperial Japanese government will
ensure the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor. And as long as the Portuguese government
maintains its neutral attitude, it shall promptly withdraw its forces after attaining its purpose
of self-defense. The Empire of Japan hereby declares that it has no other intentions against Por-
tugal.
Phase-Three Operations of the Naval Units
The Southern Task Force
On 24 January, the Combined Fleet had ordered the Southern Task Force to shift to phase-
three dispositions, as mentioned previously. That was the day when the participants in the
Manila Conference started on their way back, and when the landing operations in Balikpapan
as well as in kendari were carried out. It was also the day when the two ships to disembark
[air units, fuel and ammunition] at Endau and the unit to occupy the Anambas Islands de-
parted from the Gulf of Thailand sector. On the same day, the Southern Task Force transmit-
ted an order to switch to phase-three operations with the current disposition of forces.(117) An
outline of the phase-three operations of the Southern Task Force as of that day was roughly
as follows:
1. [The Southern Task Force] shall continue the operations to capture Ambon, Makassar and ku-
pang with the Dutch East Indies Unit. If IGHQ approves, [the operation] to seize Banjarmasin
shall be omitted, and [the operations to seize] Bali and Dili shall be included [instead].
2. Air campaigns against eastern Java from Balikpapan and kendari shall be carried out as pre-
liminary operations for the invasion of Java.
3. It shall conduct the operation to capture southern Sumatra with the Malaya Unit.
4. Just before the landings on Java, it shall capture Bali and advance air units there.
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5. It shall have the 2d Carrier Division attack Port Darwin first in concert with [the operation to]
capture Timor.
6. It shall have the Dutch East Indies Unit escort the main force of the Sixteenth Army to eastern
and western Java. For this [operation], it shall transfer the necessary vessels to the Dutch East
Indies Unit from the Malaya Unit and return the 22d Air Flotilla to its original control (the
Eleventh Air Fleet).
7. It shall deploy submarine units in the sea near Java to provide support.
8. After the capture of Singapore, it shall prepare for the northern Sumatra operation.
On 28 January, the cancelation of the operation to capture Banjarmasin by way of the sea was
[officially] decided, and [consequently] the new schedule for the invasion operations set at
the Manila Conference was fixed on the same day. Around that time, through the good offices
of the Combined Fleet, the Southern Task Force had made efforts to successively increase
[the number of] destroyers of the Dutch East Indies Unit, as already described [p. 235].
On 31 January, [the Southern Task Force] received a telegraphic order from the Combined
Fleet to transfer, as of 3 February, the entire force of the Carrier Task Force and one element
of the Sixth Fleet to the Southern Task Force.(116) However, [the order] was revised on 8 Feb-
ruary, and on the same day, it [again] received a telegraphic order that “[the Combined Fleet]
will transfer the Carrier Task Force (minus the 5th Carrier Division and the 2d Section of the
18th Destroyer Division) and the 2d Submarine Squadron to the Southern Task Force.”(116) By
this [order], the [aircraft carriers] Akagi and Kaga (of the 1st Carrier Division) were added to
the Sōryū, the Hiryū (of the 2d Carrier Division), and the Ryūjō (of the 4th Carrier Division).
Also, the 2d Submarine Squadron was added to the submarine unit [consisting] of the 4th,
the 5th, and the 6th Submarine Squadrons, and the battleships Hiei and Kirishima (both of
the 3d Battleship Division) were added to the battleships Kongō and Haruna.
On the next day, the 9th, the Southern Task Force drew up the outline of the carrier and
submarine operations:(117)
1. The Carrier Task Force (which has brought back the 2d Carrier Division under its command)
shall depart from Palau, conduct a surprise attack on Port Darwin the day before [the operation
to] capture Timor, and enter [the anchorage] at Staring Bay (this operation will be called the first
carrier operation). After that, in concert with the Java operations, it will depart from Staring Bay
and conduct carrier operations for five days against the area south of Java. (This will be called
the second carrier operation.)
2. The Air Unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) shall cooperate in the above operations in addition to
its cooperation in the operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit.
3. Besides carrying out its predetermined operations, the Dutch East Indies Unit shall [also] coop-
erate in the operations of the Carrier Task Force by sending a force, consisting of the 5th Cruiser
Division as the core, to the Banda Sea in the first carrier operation and to the southwest of Timor
in the second carrier operation.
4. As for the submarine units, Submarine Unit A (the 4th and the 6th Submarine Squadrons) shall
be in charge of the sea east of Java (including the island), Submarine Unit B (the 5th Submarine
Squadron) of the sea west of Sumatra (including the island), and Submarine Unit C (the 2d Sub-
marine Squadron) of the Java and the Lesser Sunda [Islands] areas.
5. The main force of the Southern Task Force shall leave Palau on 18 February and advance to the
south of Java via Staring Bay.
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The air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) launched an air campaign against eastern Java on 3 Feb-
ruary, and the Malaya Unit against western Java on 9 February. Makassar was seized on 9
February, and Banjarmasin on the 10th, and [the operation to] land in Bangka and Palembang
was carried out on the 15th. On the 17th (the day before the departure of the main force of
the Sixteenth Army from Cam Ranh Bay), the Southern Task Force issued an order to transfer
one light cruiser, five destroyers and other ships from the Malaya Unit to the Dutch East In-
dies Unit. It also ordered the return of the 22d Air Flotilla from the Malaya Unit to the air
unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet), etc.
The Air Unit
On 26 January, the air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) deployed nine carrier aircraft and twenty-
eight carrier aircraft of the 2d Carrier Division ([consisting of] the aircraft carriers Sōryū and
Hiryū), which had completed attacks on Ambon (on 24 January), respectively in Balikpapan
and kendari. [Editor’s note: Date and number of aircraft differ in the description in Vol. 26,
p. 231.]
On 28 January, along with the cancellation of the operation to capture Banjarmasin by
way of the sea, [the unit] changed its lines of operation as follows:(143)
The 1st Air Raid Unit (the 21st Air Flotilla)
Ambon 
➚ ➘
Davao ➞ Menado kupang
➘ ➚
kendari 
The 2d Air Raid Unit (the 23d Air Flotilla)
Makassar ➞ Bali
➚
Jolo ➞ Tarakan ➞ Balikpapan 
➘
Banjarmasin
On 30 January the air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) passed down the order concerning the air
campaign against eastern Java and conducted a massive air campaign from the bases in
kendari and Balikpapan from 3 through 5 February.(143) On the 3d, thirty-seven land-based
medium-sized attack planes and fifty-nine fighter planes carried out an air strike and re-
ported a military gain of bringing down forty-eight [enemy] aircraft and destroying thirty-
six. On the Japanese side, [the number of] aircraft which had crashed [themselves] on the
enemy or did not return reached five. On the 4th, the unit attacked four allied cruisers and
seven destroyers off the coast of Java with sixty land-based medium-sized attack planes and
reported a military gain of sinking two cruisers and causing substantial damage to the two
other cruisers.(100)
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The 2d Carrier Division returned to [the command of] the Carrier Task Force (the First
Air Fleet) from the command of the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) by the Southern Task
Force order of 9 February.(117)
The 21st Air Flotilla headquarters (in kendari) was positioned in Ambon from 12 through
17 February.(135) (As already mentioned, on 15 February, the Carrier Task Force had left Palau
to head southward.)
The 23d Air Flotilla headquarters advanced from Balikpapan to Bali on 26 February.(104)
Since 9 February, the 22d Air Flotilla had been launching an air campaign over western
Java from kuching with its main force under the command of the Malaya Unit. After that, it
rapidly advanced into southern Sumatra,(104) and returned to the direct control of the Air Unit
(i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) on the 19th by the Southern Task Force order of 17 February.(120)
The air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) shifted its force to phase-three dispositions on and after
that day (the 19th).(102)
The Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters advanced from Davao to kendari on 21 February.(143)
The Carrier Task Force
The Carrier Task Force ([consisting of] the 1st and 2d Carrier Division, namely the aircraft
carriers Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, and Hiryū) left Palau on 15 February, carried out the air strike on
Port Darwin on the 19th (the day before the landing of the Eastern Detachment on Timor),
and entered the anchorage at Staring Bay on the 21st.(116)
The main force of the Southern Task Force, which had left Palau on 18 February, also ar-
rived in Staring Bay on the same day (the 21st).(103)
Both of them were to leave Staring Bay on the 25th, to advance into the waters south of
Java.
The Dutch East Indies Unit
As we have seen, after the Dutch East Indies Unit had made draft arrangements with the
Sixteenth Army in Manila on 23 January, the Banjarmasin issue was settled on the 28th, and
a new schedule for the Java operations was set on the same day. Further, in order to fill the
shortage of escort forces of the Dutch East Indies Unit, the following units had been assigned
or preliminarily assigned by then:
1. Orders [were given] to add the 21st Destroyer Division ([consisting of] four destroyers)
[to the Dutch East Indies Unit] on 21 January, and [again] the 7th Destroyer Division (three
destroyers) and the 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division (two destroyers) on the
28th.(114)
2. Informal arrangement to transfer the 2d Section (two destroyers) [probably the 1st Section
is meant, see p. 235] of the 6th Destroyer Division [to the Dutch East Indies Unit] from the
air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) on the 30th.
3. Informal arrangement to transfer the light cruiser Yura, and the 11th Destroyer Division
(three destroyers) and the 12th Destroyer Division (two destroyers) of the 3d Destroyer
Squadron [to the Dutch East Indies Unit] from the Malaya Unit in tandem with the
progress of the southern Sumatra operation.
Then, the commander of the Dutch East Indies Unit was able to determine the outline of
the phase-three operations on the 28th and passed down Order No. 9 on the same day.(117)
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The plan of the phase-three operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit was to capture
Makassar, Bali and kupang (and Dili, which was included on 7 February) with the Eastern
Support Unit, the 2d Escort Unit and the 1st Base Unit, after the operation to capture Ambon
(the landing on the island was executed on the 31st), as well as to escort the 48th Division
(which was joined by the Sakaguchi Detachment on 16 February) to eastern Java with the
1st Escort Unit, the 1st Base Unit [2d Base Unit?], and the 2d Air Unit, and also to escort the
main force of the Sixteenth Army to western Java with the 3d Escort Unit and the 1st Air
Unit. The disposition of the forces was roughly as follows:(117, 119, 131) [Editor’s note: The author
seems to have mixed up the “1st Base Unit” with the “2d Base Unit.”] 
Main Unit: [consisting of] the 16th Cruiser Division (minus the Nagara, so only the heavy cruiser
Ashigara) and two destroyers, shall support the operations mainly in the Makassar Strait,
Bali, and Surabaya areas from Davao.
1st Escort Unit: [consisting of] the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron (i.e. the light cruiser
Naka, and a total of nine destroyers of the 2d, the 9th and the 24th Destroyer Divisions) as
the core, shall escort the 48th Division (which was later joined by the Sakaguchi Detachment),
to eastern Java after reversing course from Balikpapan. (However, one powerful element of
the force shall first cooperate with the 1st Base Unit in its operation to capture Makassar and
reverse course after that). 
2d Base Unit: [shall conduct operations in] the Makassar Strait area from Balikpapan.
2d Air Unit: [consisting of] the 11th Seaplane Tender Division (with the seaplane tenders Mizuho
and Chitose), shall first support [the operations] to capture Ambon, then Makassar, and [sub-
sequently] for the most part cooperate with the 1st Escort Unit and the 2d Base Unit.
3d Escort Unit: [consisting of] the 5th Destroyer Squadron (the light cruiser Natori and a total of
eight destroyers of the 5th and the 22d Destroyer Divisions) and [also] one section of the 6th
Destroyer Division (two destroyers), which will later be joined by the light cruiser Yura and
the 11th and 12th Destroyer Divisions (five destroyers in total) of the Malaya Unit, shall es-
cort the main force of the Sixteenth Army to western Java.
1st Air Unit (the auxiliary seaplane tenders Kamikawa-maru and San’yō-maru): shall cooperate
with the 3d Escort Unit.
Eastern Support Unit: [consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Division (the heavy cruisers Haguro and
Nachi (note: the Myōkō was under repair in the mainland)), one section of the 6th Destroyer
Division (two destroyers), and the 7th Destroyer Division (three destroyers), shall support
the 2d Escort Unit and the 1st Base Unit.
2d Escort Unit: [consisting of] the main force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron (i.e. the light cruiser
Jintsū and a total of twelve destroyers of the 8th, the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Divisions),
shall cooperate with the Eastern Detachment in its operations to capture Ambon, kupang
(and [also] Dili, which was included later).
1st Base Unit: [consisting of] the main force of the 1st Base Force, the light cruiser Nagara (which
belonged to the 16th Cruiser Division), and four destroyers of the 21st Destroyer Division,
which shall be joined by the 8th and the 15th Destroyer Divisions (eight destroyers in total)
of the 2d Destroyer Squadron at the time of the operation to capture Makassar, and by the
8th Destroyer Division (with four destroyers) at the time of the operation to capture Bali,
shall support the operations to capture Makassar and Bali.
Special mention should be made of the following points concerning the operations of the
Dutch East Indies Unit.
The first point is the previously mentioned clockwise route in [the operation to] capture
Makassar. When the Dutch East Indies Unit ordered [the operation] on 28 January, the unit
390 Chapter VII     /     The Capture of Java’s Dehors
to capture Makassar was assembling in the Bangka anchorage, planning to sail counterclock-
wise [toward the city], while the Eastern Detachment had left Davao the day before (on the
27th) and was on its way to Ambon. On that day (the 28th), after confirming that the opera-
tion to capture Banjarmasin by sea was cancelled and that the new schedule set at the Manila
Conference [was adopted], the Dutch East Indies Unit immediately ordered the main force
of the 4th Destroyer Squadron to head northward to Luzon from Balikpapan (in order to
make arrangements with the 48th Division, that is, to escort the transport of the division).
[The Dutch East Indies Unit also] ordered the Makassar invasion unit to conduct the opera-
tion by a clockwise route, by which it intended to reinforce or support the Makassar invasion
unit with the forces that were to be temporarily left in Balikpapan by the 4th Destroyer
Squadron, and the forces that were to be diverted from the Eastern Attack Unit after its op-
eration to capture Ambon (the landing on the island was scheduled for the 31st).(114, 117) At
that time, the 21st Air Flotilla headquarters had advanced into kendari the day before (on
the 27th),(134) while the 2d Carrier Division had carried out an air strike on Ambon on the
24th.
The second point is [the emergency situation during] the operation to capture Bali. At the
time of the operation to capture Bali, the 1st Base Unit had the Nagara, and the 8th and the
21st Destroyer Divisions as its components, but due to various circumstances, merely two
destroyers were in charge of the direct escort of the kanemura Detachment. A number of al-
lied cruisers and other vessels raided the anchorage. At that time, the commander of the
Dutch East Indies Unit was in Balikpapan where he heard about the emergency and hurried
southward with the main unit.
The third point is [the change in] the employment of the 5th Cruiser Division. As we have
seen, before the Combined Fleet transmitted the order to transfer the Carrier Task Force [to
the Southern Task Force] (on the 8th), the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) had [already] car-
ried out a massive air campaign on eastern Java (since 3 February). Therefore, along with the
order concerning the operation of the Carrier Task Force on 9 February, the Southern Task
Force had ordered that the 5th Cruiser Division should advance towards the sea southwest
of Timor and cooperate with the Carrier Task Force in the second carrier operation.(117) How-
ever, due to the weather and other factors, the Air Unit did not achieve satisfactory results,
and when the convoy of the 48th Division entered the Java Sea, a powerful allied fleet was
still very active in the Surabaya area. This brought about the necessity to resume the air at-
tacks. Furthermore, the allied fleet came for an attack and the convoy of the 48th Division
and the Sakaguchi Detachment were made to stand by at sea for three days. As a result, it
was decided to cancel the cooperation of the 5th Cruiser Division with the Carrier Task Force,
and to have the division take part in the battle off the coast of Surabaya [instead].
(2) The Seizure of Banjarmasin (See Illustration No. 37)
Preparations for the Seizure
When Detachment Commander Sakaguchi, who had landed in Balikpapan on 24 January
and seized the city on the 25th, was implementing a military administration and was about
to mop up the enemy in the areas of Samarinda and Sanga Sanga with a force [consisting of]
the 1st Battalion as the core led by Lt. Col. kume Motozō, he received the aforementioned
Sixteenth Army order (of the 25th) regarding the seizure of Banjarmasin [p. 220].
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As the Sakaguchi Detachment had been studying [the possibility of] an overland attack
as well, the order came as no surprise. However, [the problem was that] the issue of an attack
by sea [in conjunction with the Navy] was not settled until the 28th.
On the 28th, it was [finally] decided to cancel the joint Army-Navy operation to seize the
city by sea. The next day, the 29th, the Dutch East Indies Unit ordered the commander of the
4th Destroyer Squadron to head for Manila [i.e. Lingayen]. He left Balikpapan on the 30th
with the light cruiser Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division.(119) On that day (the 30th), Detach-
ment Commander Sakaguchi had the unit for the Banjarmasin operation depart from Balik-
papan on the Ehime-maru and the Liverpool-maru.
Detachment Commander Sakaguchi planned to have the unit for the Banjarmasin oper-
ation rapidly advance toward the city with the main force by going ashore at Tanahgrogot
and rushing toward the city overland, and one element by maneuvering from Balikpapan
along the coast in small boats. The outline of his operation plan was as follows:(88)
1. Mission
(1) With the purpose of promptly seizing the airfield so that it can be used [in the operation to]
capture Java, the unit shall make a surprise attack on the area of Banjarmasin and seize it,
with its main force going by land after landing near Tanahgrogot and one element by landing
in the area south of Banjarmasin after maneuvering along the coast in small boats.
(2) The transport of the troops and the maneuvering at sea shall be conducted only at night in
order to keep the plan secret.
2. Disposition of forces
The overland task force
Commander: 146th Infantry Regiment Commander Col. Yamamoto kyōhei 
146th Infantry Regiment (minus the 1st and the 2d Battalions)
One artillery battery
One engineer company (minus one platoon)
One radio platoon
Medical unit
One transport company
The seaborne task force
One infantry company
One engineer platoon
One independent engineer platoon
3. Outline of Operations
(1) Operations of the overland task force
(a) The unit shall leave Balikpapan on the evening of 30 January, land in Tanahgrogot before
daybreak of the 31st, and immediately make preparations for traversing the jungle and
the mountains.
(b) When pushing its way through the jungle, the unit shall have one element of its force
move ahead in the sector south of the main force in order to facilitate engagements after
advancing into the Banjarmasin plain.
(c) Once emerging from the jungle, it shall start southward at once without waiting for the
entire unit to gather. It shall rapidly advance, particularly in order to make it difficult
for the enemy to destroy bridges while retreating.
(d) When seizing Banjarmasin, it shall make efforts to bring the seaborne task force [back]
under its command.
(e) Provisions shall be procured on site as much as possible, but rations for nine days shall
be carried along.
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(2) Operations of the seaborne task force
(a) The unit shall leave Balikpapan a few days earlier than the overland task force and seize
Banjarmasin in close cooperation with the latter.
(b) It shall only use large and small motorized [landing] craft for the maneuver, and pay ut-
most attention to keeping the plan secret. [For that purpose,] no daytime actions are al-
lowed until the end of the seaborne operation.
(c) When suspending operations during daylight, it shall go upriver at some distance from
the mouth of rivers, moor the craft at the riverbank, and take a rest in the forest so as
never to be spotted by [enemy] air reconnaissance.
(d) In order to make it safe to sail through the channel west of Laut Island, and facilitate the
supply of provisions for the task force, it shall conduct a night raid on kotabaru on the
island to obtain supplies and collect information.
(e) After the landing, it shall rush toward the Martapura airfield.
(f) For provisions after landing, the unit shall depend on the resources on site.
(3) Operations after the seizure of Banjarmasin
(a) The commander of the overland task force shall bring the seaborne task force back under
his command as soon as possible.
(b) It shall do its utmost to make the airfield ready while mopping up the remaining enemy.
(c) When the naval units arrive, it shall turn over the guarding, seized supplies and other
matters to these units, and assemble in Banjarmasin.
The Seizure
The seaborne task force embarked on four large and two small motorized [landing] craft and
left Balikpapan on the night of 30 January, loaded with fuel and ammunition from the Navy.
It reached Tanahgrogot at daybreak on the 31st and continued its southward advance. A
naval officer was attached as pilot. They sailed only at night; during the day they brought
the craft into mangrove forests at the river mouths and camouflaged them. As they avoided
using the radio, naval aircraft were sent to contact them, but every time these returned in
vain without finding them. The unit operated in accordance with the orders, seized kotabaru
at the northern end of Laut Island on 10 February, further advanced, and went ashore at the
coast southeast of Martapura. However, as the surprise attack of the overland task force had
already scattered the enemy, they entered Martapura without a fight.(87, 115)
The advance party of the overland task force had left Balikpapan on the morning of 31
January, reached Adang Bay at 2000 of the same day, and seized Tanahgrogot at 1030 on 1
February, while the main force left Balikpapan on the next day, the 2d, landed in Tanahgrogot
on the 3d, and started its overland trek. There were no roads in the jungle, let alone bridges.
[The unit] advanced and while being attacked by swarms of mosquitoes, land leeches and
other insects, they clambered up steep mountains and threw temporary log bridges over
deep gorges. They had abandoned their motor vehicles soon after departure. Although they
[also] brought along 600 bicycles, only one soldier of the engineer unit carried his all the way
through with an indomitable spirit. Just after they narrowly managed to make their way
through the jungle-covered mountain range, they came across a Dutch East Indies army unit
moving northward, which the Yamamoto (kyōhei) Unit drove off after a minor battle. The
Yamamoto Unit tried to hotly pursue the [enemy] unit toward Martapura, but it was not easy
to assemble the entire unit and make it advance due to the fatigue from making its way
through the jungle. However, the advance company led by Captain kataoka, vying with the
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engineer company to be the first,
chased [the enemy]. As the unit ad-
vanced, it gained more cooperation
of the indigenous people. While ob-
taining bicycles, vehicles and provi-
sions, the unit rushed forward and
at 0900 on 10 February, the engineer
company and the advance company
seized the Martapura airfield.(87)
The overland travel distance in
this operation was some 400 kilome-
ters, of which the jungle covered
some 100 kilometers. The loss sus-
tained in this operation was nine
men killed by malaria. About 80% of
the officers and men of the overland
task force caught malaria.(87)
A unit in fishing boats loaded
with the base matériel of the
Eleventh Air Fleet left Balikpapan
on 9 February and arrived at the
Martapura airfield around 20 Febru-
ary.(139) On 25 February, one element of the 23d Air Flotilla advanced to the airfield,(104) which
was used as a relay base for the naval aircraft to advance to Bali.
(3) The Seizure of Makassar (See Illustration No. 38)
We have described the strategic significance of Makassar. The operation to seize Makassar
was to be executed solely by the Navy and the date was [at first] arranged as day x + 45 on
10 November. However, it was rescheduled for day x + 53 on 1 January, due to the delay in
the capture of Davao, [again] postponed to day x + 60 on 6 January due to the delay in prepa-
rations for launching the Dutch East Indies operation, and [further] postponed to day x + 63
(9 February) on 28 January due to the delay in making the Tarakan airfield ready and other
reasons. 
The seizure of Makassar was carried out by sailing from kendari and crossing in front of
the Lesser Sunda Islands, in front of the enemy. This came about because of the following
circumstances.
Shortly before the Manila Conference (from 21 to 23 January), the Dutch East Indies Unit
had the idea that it would have a ten-day-or-more postponement of the date of the Java land-
ing operations approved, and that [then] the 1st Base Force, which was to [conduct the op-
eration] to seize kendari on 24 January, would [also] seize Makassar around 8 to 9 February,
by sailing counterclockwise via Bangka and the Makassar Strait, along with the Sasebo Com-
bined Special Landing Force, the 21st Destroyer Division, which would be transferred from
the Combined Fleet, and one destroyer division, which would be brought in after the capture
of Ambon (scheduled for 31 January). The 4th Destroyer Squadron would then conduct [the
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operation to] seize Balikpapan on 24 January and escort with its main force ([consisting of]
two destroyer divisions) “a force [consisting of] one battalion of the Sakaguchi Detachment
as the core to carry out the landing [operation] in Banjarmasin around 11 and 12 February.”
[Meanwhile,] the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit would then support and direct this
operation from the Makassar Strait with the other forces in the areas of Davao and the Makas-
sar Strait (including part of the 4th Destroyer Squadron, which would not participate in [the
operation to] seize Banjarmasin). The Eastern Attack Unit ([consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Di-
vision and the 2d Destroyer Squadron) would then act in concert with [this operation], while
preparing for the coming [operation to] capture Timor.(117)
However, only a seven-day postponement was approved for the Java landing operation
as a result of the Manila Conference, and the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron had
to head northward for Luzon earlier to escort the transport of the 48th Division. Therefore,
[the operation to] seize Banjarmasin by sea [in conjunction with the Navy] was cancelled.
These matters were decided on 28 January, and the Southern Task Force transmitted order(s)
concerning them on the same day. Then, based on the order of the Southern Task Force, the
Dutch East Indies Unit sent a telegram at 1930 on the same day to change the operation to
seize Makassar so as to be carried out by sailing clockwise.(114) Because at that time, the unit
[for the operation] to seize Makassar had already left kendari the day before and had started
northward for Bangka(117, 124) to seize Makassar by sailing counterclockwise, it ended up by
having to turn around at Bangka to conduct the operation by sailing clockwise. On 29 Janu-
ary, the Dutch East Indies Unit ordered the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander to leave Ba-
likpapan for Manila [i.e. Lingayen] with one destroyer division.(119) It was [also] decided that
the remaining forces of the squadron, which were left in Balikpapan, should sail northward
for Jolo to escort the 48th Division, after cooperating in the Makassar [operation]. Further,
on the same day, [the Dutch East Indies Unit] gave order(s) to increase the force to be diverted
to the Makassar operation from Ambon after the capture of the island to two destroyer divi-
sions by adding one more destroyer division.(119)
On 31 January, the Eastern Attack Unit launched the Ambon landing operation. As it was
not until [later] on 4 February that the previously mentioned issue of a postponement of [Op-
eration] L arose, a postponement of the [invasion] schedule was at that time as yet unthink-
able. On receiving a report on the success of the Ambon landing [operation], the commander
of the Dutch East Indies Unit, who felt sorry that the landing on eastern Java was scheduled
for 23 February whereas that on western Java was scheduled for 21 February, immediately
(on the same day) requested the Eastern Attack Unit to bring forward the Makassar operation.
And on the next day (1 February), learning that the Eastern Attack Unit had no objections,
the commander of the Dutch East Indies Unit passed down an order to advance the schedule
by one day.(114) However, as we have seen, the capture of Ambon and the minesweeping [of
the bay] were confronted with unexpected difficulties. The next day, the 2d, the Dutch East
Indies Unit withdrew the above order of the previous day and the date of [the operation to
seize Makassar] was restored to 9 February as in the [previous] plan.
The units of the 1st Base Unit, which had left kendari and had headed northward to
Bangka since 27 January based on the original plan of the Dutch East Indies Unit to seize
[Makassar by sailing] counterclockwise, made a U-turn and left Bangka on 2 February for
kendari at the change [to the new operation plan] to seize [Makassar by sailing] clockwise.
Including the reinforcements [diverted] from the Ambon area, they left kendari on 6 Febru-
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ary, conducted the Makassar landing operation on 9 February, and seized the city on the same
day.(124)
The disposition of forces of the Eastern Attack Unit (commander: the 5th Cruiser Division
commander) was in outline as follows:(114)
Eastern Attack Unit
Support Unit: [consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Division (with the heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi
(note: the Myōkō was still under repair in the mainland)), and the Akebono of the 7th Destroyer
Division shall provide support, leaving Davao on 6 February.
1st Base Unit: [consisting of] the light cruiser Nagara ([of] the 16th Cruiser Division, shall leave
Bangka on 2 February and [then] kendari on the 6th); the 21st Destroyer Division (the Wak-
aba, the Nenohi, and the Hatsushimo shall operate in the same way as the Nagara); the 15th
Destroyer Division (the Natsushio, the Kuroshio, the Hayashio, and the Oyashio shall arrive in
kendari on the 4th from Ambon and leave there on the 6th); the 8th Destroyer Division (the
Arashio, the Michishio, the Asashio, and the Ōshio shall arrive in kendari on the 5th from
Ambon and leave there on the 6th); the auxiliary seaplane tender Sanuki-maru (which had
been damaged and was positioned in Balikpapan, and which was transferred to the 1st Base
Force to use her seaplanes), and the main force of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing
Force (shall leave Bangka on the 2d, arrive in kendari on the 4th, and leave there on the 6th),
shall [carry out the operation to] seize Makassar on the 9th, leaving kendari on the 6th,
under the command of the 1st Base Force commander.
2d Escort Unit: [consisting of] the light cruiser Jintsū, the 16th Destroyer Division (the Hatsukaze,
the Amatsukaze, the Tokitsukaze, and the Yukikaze), and the main force of the 7th Destroyer
Division (the Sazanami and the Ushio; this division was transferred by the Combined Fleet
order of the 28th to the Dutch East Indies Unit as of 31 January) under the command of the
2d Destroyer Squadron commander, shall support the operation to seize Makassar, while
continuing the Ambon operation.
2d Air Unit: [consisting of] the seaplane tenders Mizuho and Chitose of the 11th Seaplane Tender
Division, shall support [the operation to] seize Makassar by winding up its support for the
Ambon operation and advance westward toward the area southeast of Makassar.
While the operation to seize Makassar was conducted by the Eastern Attack Unit, the
tasks of the units which had formerly belonged to the Western Attack Unit (under the com-
mand of the Dutch East Indies Unit commander), such as cooperating with the 48th Division
and with the operation [to seize] Banjarmasin and Makassar, were in outline as follows:
The main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit: [consisting of] the heavy cruiser Ashigara (of the
16th Cruiser Division), and the 1st [2d?] Section of the 24th Destroyer Division (the Suzukaze
and the Yamakaze), shall support from Davao.
The 4th Destroyer Squadron commander shall leave Balikpapan on 30 January for Manila [Lin-
gayen] with the light cruiser Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division (the Harusame, the
Murasame, the Samidare and the Yūdachi).
The 2d Base Force commander shall assume command of the force, which was left in Balikpapan
by the 4th Destroyer Squadron, as well, and:
1. Transport base personnel and matériel of the Eleventh Air Fleet from Balikpapan to Ban-
jarmasin by fishing boats, and
2. Leave Balikpapan on 8 February with the 9th Destroyer Division (the Natsugumo, the
Minegumo, and the Asagumo; the Yamagumo was under repair at Lingayen Gulf) and the
1st Section of the 24th Destroyer Division (the Umikaze and the Kawakaze), and advance
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off the coast of Makassar on the 9th to support [the operation to] seize Makassar, after
which he shall head northward to Jolo to join the escort of the 48th Division.
Note: Of the 1st Air Unit (i.e. the auxiliary seaplane tenders San’yō-maru and Sanuki-maru), which
had taken part in the seizure of Balikpapan, the San’yō-maru was diverted toward Cam Ranh
Bay to escort the main force of the Sixteenth Army. The Sanuki-maru was deployed as men-
tioned above.
The organization of the 2d and 4th Destroyer Squadrons was as follows:
The 2d Destroyer Squadron: the light cruiser Jintsū and the 8th, the 15th and the 16th Destroyer
Divisions. (The 18th Destroyer Division had been transferred to the Carrier Task Force since
before the opening of hostilities.)
The 4th Destroyer Squadron: the light cruiser Naka and the 2d, the 9th and the 24th Destroyer
Divisions. (The 4th Destroyer Division had been transferred to the main force of the Southern
Task Force since before the opening of hostilities, but was [temporarily re-transferred] to the
2d Carrier Division during early February.)
The unit [for the operation] to seize Makassar departed from kendari on 6 February.(124) Each
unit concerned operated as planned.(114) The air unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) had launched
a massive air campaign against eastern Java since 3 February, as mentioned previously. There
was [almost] no interference [by the enemy] in the air as well as at sea, except some by allied
submarines. Although some 1,000 Dutch East Indies troops were said to be [stationed] in
Makassar, [the Japanese] easily seized the city on 9 February.(102, 114, 124)
The only loss sustained was the destroyer Natsushio, which was torpedoed and sunk on
9 February.
After the successful landing in Makassar (on the 9th), each unit operated in the following
way:(114, 117, 119, 124)
1. The 15th Destroyer Division and the seaplane tender Mizuho turned around for the com-
ing operation to capture Timor.
2. The seaplane tender Chitose headed for Jolo to escort the 48th Division.
3. The 8th Destroyer Division headed for Jolo to escort the unit for [the operation to] capture
Bali (the kanemura Detachment).
4. The Nagara and the 21st Destroyer Division made preparations for the coming [operation
to] capture Bali while taking charge of maintaining stability in Makassar and the vicinity.
5. The 9th Destroyer Division and the 1st Section of the 24th Destroyer Division, which had
departed from Balikpapan, turned around on the 10th and headed northward for Jolo to
escort the 48th Division.
6. The 5th Cruiser Division (which had left Davao on the 6th) entered Staring Bay on the
10th to make preparations to support the coming operation to capture Timor.
(4) The Capture of Bali (See Illustration No. 39)
We have seen that [the operation] to occupy Bali, which had been agreed on at the Iwakuni
Conference for the first time, automatically disappeared [from the plans] after the Cam Ranh
Agreement due to the moved-up schedule of the Java operation, but that it [again] came up
for discussion in connection with the Banjarmasin issue at the Manila Conference; that in the
middle of that conference, the chief of staff of the 48th Division, kawagoe Moriji, visited the
Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters in Davao and made arrangements [for the operation]; that
Chapter VII     /     The Capture of Java’s Dehors 397
in the draft arrangements between the Sixteenth Army and the Dutch East Indies Unit on 23
January, it was agreed to schedule it no later than day I – 2, and that on the 25th, the Southern
Task Force sent the Southern Army a telegram to propose a date around day x + 75 (day x +
75 was [at that time] equivalent to day I – 2, that is, 21 February); and that although the exe-
cution of [the operation to] capture Bali and the schedule (around day x + 75) was [finally]
decided on 28 January, the Sixteenth Army had already passed down an order to capture
Bali to the 48th Division earlier on 24 January.
As soon as capture of Bali was [officially] decided on 28 January, the commander of the
Dutch East Indies Unit in Davao made up his mind to have the 1st Base Force commander
conduct the Bali operation on the heels of [the operation to] capture Makassar, employing a
force [consisting of] the Nagara (a light cruiser of the 16th Cruiser Division) and the 8th and
the 21st Destroyer Divisions. On the same day, he ordered the 8th Destroyer Division (which
was at that time sailing southward, escorting the Eastern Detachment for the operation to
capture Ambon) to go to Jolo by 10 or 11 February in the wake of the capture of Ambon (on
the 31st) and the capture of Makassar (on 9 February) and [then again] sail southward to es-
cort the kanemura Detachment.(117)
On 30 January, Commander in Chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet Tsukahara passed down
order(s) in Davao concerning Operation Z (the massive air campaign over eastern Java to be
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launched from 3 February onwards).(143) We have already related how surprised Chief of Staff
kawagoe of the 48th Division was about the great enthusiasm of Commander in Chief Tsuka-
hara, when he previously (on the 23d) visited him in Davao, but at that time, the morale of
the Eleventh Air Fleet was indeed sky-high.(136) In line with the enthusiasm of the air fleet,
Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet Takahashi, in Davao, decided to bring forward the
operation to capture Bali by three days and ordered the 1st Base Force commander to [con-
duct the operation] on 18 February (day I – 5); (the latter was at the Bangka anchorage at that
time, directing the clockwise change [in the operation] to capture Makassar).(117)
As previously related, in contrast to the order of Third Fleet Commander in Chief Taka-
hashi to bring forward the [operation to capture] Bali by three days, Ozawa, commander in
chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, proposed a postponement of [Operation] L
for two days on 4 February and for another four days on the 6th (six days in total). Conse-
quently, [the operation to] capture Bali became a stand-alone operation, separated from the
Java landing operations in terms of schedule, which ended up increasing the risks, along
with the bad weather (which hindered a satisfactory air campaign). 
As previously related, on the 30th, Commander in Chief Takahashi gave orders to launch
the operation “to capture Bali on the 18th [of February],” and at the same time he [also] gave
instructions to advance [the operation] to seize Makassar. [Editor’s note: Actually, the orders
for Makassar were issued on 1 February.] As of that day [the 30th], the Combined Fleet had
not yet issued orders to have the Carrier Task Force take part in the Java operation. 
On 3 February, the air unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) launched a massive air campaign
over eastern Java (Operation Z).(134) On that day, the Nagara and the 21st Destroyer Division
under the command of the 1st Base Force commander were sailing southward to kendari
from Bangka to seize Makassar by a clockwise route, and the 8th Destroyer Division was still
in the middle of the operation to capture Ambon.(117, 124) On that day (the 3d), Maj. kanemura
Matabē, commander of the 3d Battalion of the 1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment, received in
Manila the 48th Division’s order concerning [the operation to] capture Bali, which was in
outline as follows:(85)
The force consisting of the 3d Battalion (minus one company) of the 1st Taiwan Infantry Regi-
ment, one mountain artillery section, and one independent engineer platoon as the core, led by
Major kanemura, commander of the battalion, shall be called the kanemura Detachment.
The kanemura Detachment shall leave Lingayen on the 5th, and assemble in Jolo on the 8th,
where it shall make arrangements with the Navy and embark naval air [units’] matériel. [Then
it shall] leave Jolo on the 13th, arrive in Makassar on the 15th, and go ashore on the coast east
of Denpasar in Bali at midnight of the 18th, after which it shall seize the kuta airfield (four kilo-
meters southwest of Denpasar) and make it ready for use. It shall send out the empty ships on
the night of the 19th and transfer the personnel and matériel of the independent engineer unit
to the convoy of the main force of the division at the Makassar Strait.
At that time, Battalion Commander kanemura had obtained the following information: There
was about one battalion (some 600 troops) in Bali under the command of the eastern Java
territorial commander, of which the main force was stationed in Singaraja, while one infantry
company with armored cars was stationed in Denpasar and was guarding the kuta airfield
there. [Editor’s note: There were no Dutch East Indies Army units stationed on Bali. The gar-
rison consisted of local Balinese auxiliary troops led by a few European officers.] Four fortress
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guns were deployed along the Lombok Strait. Mountains stretched close
to the shorelines, and many petrified reefs and narrow channels made it
difficult to carry out landing [operations] on Bali, but Sanur beach in the
southeastern part of the island was sandy and suitable for the operation.
Even then, the current in the Lombok Strait was so strong that it could
reach five knots at its fastest. Although palm forests, dense forests and
paddy fields were all around Denpasar and kuta, the roads were well
developed, etc.(85)
On the 7th, the fast ships Sasako-maru and Sagami-maru (how they
were selected and brought around [for this operation] has been previ-
ously described) with the kanemura Detachment on board left Lingayen
plowing the waves and arrived in Jolo as early as on the 10th.(85)
The 8th Destroyer Division, which had left Ambon on the 4th and
took part in the Makassar landing operations on the 9th, [also] arrived in Jolo at 1600 on the
10th.(117)
On the next day, the 11th, the Dutch East Indies Unit ordered the 1st Base Force to have
the 21st Destroyer Division escort the transport ships loaded with matériel required for the
Bali airfield and the like from Balikpapan and to have them arrive in Bali by the 24th.(117) Ac-
cordingly, on the 13th, the 1st Base Force commander issued the following order:(102, 114, 124)
1st [phase]: Raiding Operation
The attack unit ([consisting of] the 8th Destroyer Division) shall leave Makassar on the 17th, es-
cort the kanemura Detachment (the Sasako-maru and the Sagami-maru), put [the detachment]
ashore on Bali on the 18th, and leave Bali on the 19th to head back. After escorting the Sasako-
maru and the Sagami-maru to Makassar, the 8th Destroyer Division shall return to its original
unit (i.e. the 2d Destroyer Squadron).
The support unit ([consisting of] the Nagara and (three destroyers of) the 21st Destroyer Division)
shall leave Makassar on the 17th and take timely action to provide support.
2d [phase]: Transport Operation
The transport ships shall leave Balikpapan on the 20th and arrive in Makassar on the 22d under
the escort of submarine chasers. The Nagara and the 21st Destroyer Division (three destroy-
ers) shall leave Makassar on the evening of the 22d accompanying the transport ships and
arrive in Bali on the 24th.
On that day (the 13th), the kanemura Detachment and the 8th Destroyer Division left Jolo
and advanced to Makassar on the 15th to stand by.(114, 124) On that day (the 15th), the Nagara,
which had returned to Staring Bay after [the operation to] seize Makassar, left the bay and
advanced to Makassar on the 16th.(124)
As previously related, on 3 February the air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) had launched
Operation Z. However, the weather had been bad since 10 February. The attacks had not yet
caused major damage to the allied air and naval forces, the surface forces in particular, in
and around the Greater and Lesser Sunda Islands, and [what is more], the [real] situation
was totally unknown due to the bad weather. On the 14th, the commander of the Eastern At-
tack Unit (i.e. the 5th Cruiser Division commander) expressed concern about [the situation]
and requested to carry out an adequate air campaign in advance.(114) The Dutch East Indies
Unit commander agreed and on the 15th requested the air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) to do
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so.(114) [However,] the weather still remained bad. On the 16th, the Dutch East Indies Unit
commander passed down the order to postpone [the operation to] capture Bali by one day.(114)
On that day, the 21st Destroyer Division left Makassar for Balikpapan for replenishment.(124)
The next day, the 17th, the weather was still bad. The main unit of the Dutch East Indies
Unit (the heavy cruiser Ashigara and the destroyer Yamakaze), which had left Davao on the
13th and advanced to Jolo on the 14th, left Jolo on that day to advance southward.(103) The
support unit of the Eastern Attack Unit (the heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi and the de-
stroyer Akebono), which had been positioned in Staring Bay since 10 February, left the bay on
that day (the 17th) to support the Eastern Detachment in [its operation to] capture Timor.(114)
At 0100 on the next day, the 18th, the 8th Destroyer Division and the kanemura Detach-
ment ([on board] the Sasako-maru and the Sagami-maru) left Makassar for Bali.(102) Ten minutes
before [departure], the Dutch East Indies Unit commander wired: “[The detachment shall]
turn back if the 1st Base Force commander judges the weather on the early morning of the
18th to be not suitable [for navy aircraft] to make a flight. In such a case, the Bali operation
shall be postponed for another day.”(114) However, the 1st Base Force commander decided to
push ahead [regardless of the weather].(114) Fortunately the weather improved. The seaplanes
of the Sanuki-maru in Makassar and the fighter plane unit of the 3d [Naval] Air Group of the
23d Air Flotilla from Balikpapan provided cover for the convoy. Twenty-seven land-based
attack planes and eight Type–0 fighter planes of the air unit advanced over Surabaya, and
conducted attacks on six destroyers, more than a dozen transport ships and other [vessels of
the enemy] in port while engaging twenty [enemy] planes [in the air].(100) On that day, the
kanemura Detachment, which was only approached by one [enemy] flying boat coming for
reconnaissance, sailed at high speed without being attacked by other enemy aircraft or vessels
at all, entered the Sanur anchorage at 0015 on the 19th, and successfully went ashore at
0100.(102)
Upon landing, the kanemura Detachment headed westward, taking advantage of the
darkness of the night and the heavy rain, seized the Denpasar barracks in a surprise attack,
and [also] seized the kuta airfield at 1130, clearing away resistance from a Dutch East Indies
unit.(85)
On that day (the 19th), allied aircraft began a relentless bombardment [on the anchorage]
from daybreak onwards, and their attacks lasted into the evening.(117) The bombardment
caused the Sagami-maru so much damage that she could only navigate with one screw, and
it also caused some damage to the Sasako-maru.(117) The disembarkation was continued amid
the bombardment and submarine torpedo attacks.(117) After completing the disembarkation,
the Sagami-maru left the anchorage at 1725, and started on her way back under the escort of
the 2d Section (the Michishio and the Arashio) [of the 8th Destroyer Division].(117) The Sasako-
maru stayed at [the anchorage] under the escort of the 1st Section (the Ōshio and the Asashio)
to collect the [landing] craft. After the completion of collecting and loading the craft at 2350,
she was about to start on her way back(117) when allied naval vessels came for a raid, and an
engagement began at 0000.(117) The allied fleet came in for an attack one after another. The
destroyers Ōshio and Asashio bravely fought with the dominant allied naval vessels four times
in some three hours* and sank one Dutch destroyer.(117)
*Note: According to U.S. and Dutch military history books, the first engagement [was with] two
Dutch cruisers, one Dutch destroyer and two U.S. destroyers; the second through the 4th
engagement [were with] one Dutch cruiser and four U.S. destroyers.
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Later in the engagement, the 2d Section (the Michishio and the Arashio) came across allied
naval vessels at the east end of the [Badung] strait and for an instant fought with them. In
the fight, the Michishio was hit in the engine room and got stalled at sea.(117)
The light cruiser Nagara and the 21st Destroyer Division (the Wakaba, the Nenohi and the
Hatsushimo), which were standing by for support on the sea east of Sepanjang Island, hurried
to the battle area, but the allied naval vessels had already gone. Also the main unit of the
Dutch East Indies Unit ([consisting of] the heavy cruiser Ashigara and the destroyers Kawakaze
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and Yamakaze, which had left Jolo on the 17th and advanced to Balikpapan on the 18th)
learned about the emergency, left Balikpapan at 0300 on the 20th, and sailed southward at
full speed, but as a matter of course they were too late. The Nagara, the 21st and the 8th De-
stroyer Division (of which the Michishio was towed by the Arashio) headed back, beating off
attacks by allied aircraft, and returned to Makassar on the night of the 21st. The main unit of
the Dutch East Indies Unit left for Staring Bay.(102, 117)
After seizing the kuta airfield and while guarding and making it ready for use, the kane-
mura Detachment [also] seized Singaraja on the 27th.(85)
Considering the situation during the first [phase] of the raiding operation, the Dutch East
Indies Unit commander revised the former order concerning the transport and landing op-
erations in the second [phase].(117) On the 23d, five transport ships carrying personnel and
matériel related to the [naval] air [units] left Makassar and debarked them at Bali on the night
of the 24th [editor’s note: actually the morning of the 25th, see Vol. 26, pp. 335-337] under es-
cort of the Nagara and the 8th Destroyer Division (the Asashio and the Arashio) and the 21st
Destroyer Division (the Wakaba, the Nenohi and the Hatsushimo).(102) The main unit of the
Dutch East Indies Unit (the heavy cruiser Ashigara and the destroyers Kawakaze and Yamakaze)
left Staring Bay on the 23d to support the above [operation].(103) At that time, the 48th Division,
which was to land on eastern Java (and had left Jolo on 19 February), was in the southern
part of the Makassar Strait.
Thirty aircraft of the 23d Air Flotilla advanced to the Denpasar (kuta) airfield as early as
on the 20th, the day when the kanemura Detachment had seized it, and the 23d Air Flotilla
headquarters also advanced to Bali from Balikpapan on the 26th.(103)
The landing on Java, which had been scheduled for 26 February, was changed on the 23d
to the 28th and again changed on the 27th to 1 March and carried out on that day.
(5) The Capture of Timor (See Illustrations No. 40 and No. 41)
Preparations for the Operation
We have seen that in the plan before the opening of hostilities, kupang was to be seized by
the South Seas Detachment at the first opportunity; that after the opening of hostilities the
desire grew to take advantage of the general war situation and concretely plan operations in
the Banda Sea area, which led to the additional dispatch of the 2d Carrier Division; that on
1 January it was agreed that the Eastern Detachment would seize kupang on 11 February in
the wake of the capture of Ambon; that on 5 January the Southern Army issued an order to
seize kupang, while proposing IGHQ to seize Dili; that on 28 January the date [to carry out
the operation to] seize kupang was postponed to 20 February; that the Southern Army, which
had received no reply about Dili from IGHQ yet, suddenly received instead a telegram on 5
February from the Southern Task Force proposing [an operation against Dili], and after re-
ferring the matter to IGHQ, [finally] received the IGHQ Army Department Order of 7 Feb-
ruary [approving the operation against Portuguese Timor]; and that on the next day, the 8th,
the Southern Army gave an order to seize Dili as well, turning down the view of the Sixteenth
Army [which wanted to concentrate on kupang].
The order passed down by the Southern Army on 8 February was as follows:(23)
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Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 54
Southern Army Order Saigon, 8 February
1. The Sixteenth Army commander shall conduct operations against Portuguese Timor in conjunc-
tion with the Navy for the purpose of facilitating the Dutch Timor operation. The agreement
between the Southern Army and the Second Fleet is as shown on the separate sheet.
2. If Portugal does not take hostile action or ceases such action at the time of the above operations
[of ours], its sovereignty shall be respected as much as possible unless it affects the operations.
In such a case, the measures which we will demand Portugal takes in defending Timor shall be
given in a separate order. However, matters urgently required in terms of the operations can be
demanded from Portugal, according to circumstances.
Separate Sheet
In view of the current situation where Australian and Dutch East Indies troops have occupied
Portuguese Timor, one element of the Itō Detachment shall land in Dili when invading Timor
(under the escort of the Navy) and seize the airfield in the vicinity almost simultaneously with
the landing in kupang.
As mentioned previously, the Southern Army had on 5 February received a telegram from
the Second Fleet proposing the aforementioned agreement and wired back its approval on
the 7th upon receiving the IGHQ Army Department Instructions.(23)
[Meanwhile,] the Navy Department of IGHQ gave directions to the Combined Fleet on
the same day as the Army (on the 7th) with IGHQ Navy Department Order No. 14 and IGHQ
Navy Department Instructions No. 51 that “operations can be conducted in Portuguese
Timor.” At 1120 on the same day (the 7th), the Dutch East Indies Unit (i.e. the Third Fleet)
wired the Sixteenth Army the following proposal:(117)
Based on the instructions of central command and the commander of the Southern Task Force,
we would like to discuss the following items regarding the operation to capture Timor:
1. Almost simultaneously with [the operation to] seize kupang, one element of the Itō Detachment
(for which adequate escort shall be provided) shall be put ashore in Dili and vicinity in Por-
tuguese territory in order to seize the city (with seizing the airfield as the main purpose).
2. Depending on the situation after seizing kupang, the Itō Detachment shall seize the kolbano
airfield (note by the author: presumably the Penfui airfield, which will be mentioned later) and
make it ready for use.
Details shall be decided after consultation between Detachment Commander Itō and the 2d De-
stroyer Squadron commander.
In response to the telegram, the Sixteenth Army wired back on 11 February that it had no
objections.(114) On the same day (the 11th), the Dutch East Indies Unit ordered the command-
ers of the 5th Cruiser Division and the 2d Destroyer Squadron to make arrangements with
Detachment Commander Itō and the 21st Air Flotilla commander, and carry out the Dili and
kupang landing operations before daybreak on the 20th.(114)
On 13 February, Detachment Commander Itō discussed the arrangements with the Navy
side in Ambon and concluded them on 14 February.(117) He decided to have a force [consisting
of] one battalion as the core led by Col. Doi Sadashichi, commander of the 228th Infantry
Regiment, land in Dili, while he himself would land in kupang leading the remaining
forces.(78)
Around that time, the Navy side was dealing with the following problems:
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First of all, there was the issue of [a shortage of] destroyers. The destroyer divisions, which
the Eastern Attack Unit was able to employ in the operation to seize kendari, were the 8th,
the 15th and the 16th Destroyer Divisions. The Combined Fleet and the Southern Task Force
took various measures to help the Dutch East Indies Unit, which was suffering from a short-
age of destroyers. The Combined Fleet added the 21st Destroyer Division, which the Dutch
East Indies Unit and the Eastern Attack Unit employed for the kendari [operation]. As the
Eastern Attack Unit had to carry out in an extremely short period of time the operations to
seize kendari (on 24 January), then Ambon, then Makassar, and then again Timor, the South-
ern Task Force landed the carrier aircraft of the 2d Carrier Division (with the carriers Sōryū
and Hiryū), which had returned to Davao on the 27th [according to Vol. 26, p. 231, the 25th]
after conducting air strikes on Ambon on 24 January, onto land bases (in kendari and Balik-
papan), suspended the carrier operations, and added the 7th Destroyer Division, which had
been attached to the 2d Carrier Division, to the Dutch East Indies Unit. It was decided that
the 21st Destroyer Division would prepare for [the operation to] seize Makassar while oper-
ating off eastern Celebes; whereas the 8th, the 15th, the 16th and the 7th Destroyer Divisions
would take part in [the operation to] capture Ambon (on 31 January). [Meanwhile] on 28 Jan-
uary, [the operation to] capture Bali was newly included. [Accordingly,] the Eastern Attack
Unit assigned the 21st Destroyer Division in Celebes to the operations to seize Makassar, and
then Bali, from kendari. It also arranged that among the destroyer divisions which had par-
ticipated in the Ambon [operation], the 8th Destroyer Division would [further] take part in
[the operation to] seize Makassar and then Bali, that the 15th Destroyer Division would re-
verse course [for the operation to] capture Timor after taking part in the Makassar [operation],
and that the 7th and the 16th Destroyer Divisions would prepare in Ambon for [the operation
to] capture Timor. However, the Southern Task Force decided to have the 2d Carrier Division
(with aircraft carriers) conduct an air strike on Port Darwin prior to [the operation to] capture
Timor, and issued an order on 5 February that the 7th Destroyer Division should return to
the 2d Carrier Division.(112) The Eastern Attack Unit was perplexed; it immediately wired [to
the Southern Task Force] the request to let it continuously employ the 7th Destroyer Divi-
sion.(112) Just at that time (on 7 February), the unit was ordered to further [carry out the oper-
ation to] seize Dili as well, which made the situation even more serious. The Eastern Attack
Unit and the Dutch East Indies Unit repeatedly wired requests [to the Southern Task Force
to keep the 7th Destroyer Division]. On 12 February, the Southern Task Force sent a reply
that the employment [of the 7th destroyer division] could be continued.(112) [It was because]
before that, on 9 February, the Southern Task Force had dropped the idea of carrying out the
air strike on Port Darwin solely with the 2d Carrier Division, and issued an order to have
the 2d Carrier Division return to the Carrier Task Force.
The second problem was the order of the Combined Fleet to additionally deploy the Car-
rier Task Force (the First Air Fleet) [to the southern operation]. On 31 January, the Combined
Fleet had issued an order to transfer the entire force of the Carrier Task Force [to the Southern
Task Force] but revised it on 8 February so that the 5th Carrier Division was excluded.(116, 123)
[As such] it was helpful for the Timor invasion units that the Carrier Task Force would attack
the Port Darwin area. However, it meant that the 5th Cruiser Division got the additional task
of cooperating in the operations of the Carrier Task Force, as mentioned previously.
The third problem was [the deployment of] the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho. Both
had participated in the operation to seize Makassar after the Ambon operation, and the for-
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mer had headed for Jolo to escort the 48th Division, while the latter was in Staring Bay, an-
ticipating possible participation in the eastern Java operation. The units concerned [now] re-
quested the participation of the Mizuho [in the operations against Timor], insisting it would
be necessary to have a seaplane tender to accompany and escort the convoy. [As a result,] on
16 February the Dutch East Indies Unit issued an order to have the Mizuho join in [the oper-
ation to capture] Timor.(114, 117)
The fourth problem was the deployment of the 21st Air Flotilla. Its deployment was af-
fected by that of the 2d Carrier Division and of the Carrier Task Force, the cancellation of
[the operation to] capture Banjarmasin by sea [by the Navy in conjunction with the Army],
and other [factors]. The 21st Air Flotilla commander, who had his headquarters in kendari,
was positioned in Ambon between 12 to 17 February and while directing air operations
against this area, made arrangements for the Timor operation.(143)
The fifth problem was the [issue of] naval units to be employed for ground operations. It
was decided not to use them for Dili, because the strength of the landing force would not be
sufficient. [Instead,] it was decided that the main force of the 3d Yokosuka Special Landing
Force (a paratrooper unit), whose paradrop operation on Balikpapan had been called off,
would conduct a parachuting operation in the kupang area, and the [remaining] element of
the force and two platoons of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force ([stationed in]
Makassar) would conduct landing operations against kupang along with the Itō Detach-
ment.(114, 117)
[Sorting out] these problems, the Navy made decisions on the major issues by 16 February,
and its plan was in outline as follows.(113, 117) At that time, the 1st Base Force was preparing
for [the operation to] capture Bali along with the light cruiser Nagara and the 8th and the 21st
Destroyer Divisions, in conjunction with the [Army] kanemura Detachment, as already de-
scribed. Meanwhile, the Carrier Task Force, which had left Palau the day before (on the 15th),
was sailing southward to attack Port Darwin. In the western [theater of the Dutch East Indies
operation], the Bangka and Palembang landing operations were conducted on the 15th.
The Support Unit, [of the Dutch East Indies Unit, consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Division (the
heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi) and the destroyers Akebono and Ikazuchi (the former from
the 7th Destroyer Division and the latter from the 6th) shall support [the operation to] cap-
ture Timor as well as to cooperate with the Carrier Task Force, by leaving Staring Bay on the
17th (the 18th for the Ikazuchi) and sailing southeastward.
The 2d Escort Unit (led by the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander)
The Main Force, [consisting of] the light cruiser Jintsū and the destroyer Hatsukaze, shall
leave Ambon for the kupang area on the 17th and support all operations.
The Cover Unit, [consisting of] the 15th Destroyer Division (the Kuroshio, the Hayashio and
the Asashio [Oyashio?]), shall leave Ambon on the 17th and cover the kupang area.
The 1st Detachment, [consisting of] the 16th Destroyer Division (minus the Hatsukaze, that
is, the Yukikaze, the Tokitsukaze and the Amatsukaze), is to leave Ambon on the 17th and
escort the kupang landing units.
The 2d Detachment ([consisting of] the 1st section (the Ushio and the Sazanami) of the 7th
Destroyer Division) shall leave Ambon on the 18th and escort the unit for seizing Dili.
Two platoons of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force shall be assigned to the kupang
area.
The Mizuho (seaplane tender) shall move to the kupang area, leaving Staring Bay on the
17th.
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The 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force (under the command of the 21st Air Flotilla) shall para-
chute down in the kupang area on the 20th and the 21st.
It was decided that the main force of the Eastern Detachment, directly led by Detachment
Commander Major General Itō, would leave Ambon on the 17th, and one element of the de-
tachment, led by Regimental Commander Doi, would leave Ambon on the 18th, and land in
kupang and Dili respectively before daybreak on the 20th.(76) The [information on] the situ-
ation obtained before departure and the operation plan will be described later.
The Carrier Task Force’s Air Strike on Port Darwin
As already mentioned, the commander of the Southern Task Force (he had been positioned
in Palau since 18 January) received on 8 February the Combined Fleet’s order concerning the
transfer of the Carrier Task Force to his command and on the same day issued his orders re-
garding the advance of the Carrier Task Force to Palau, the 2d Carrier Division’s return to
the Carrier Task Force (from Davao, from the command of the Eleventh Air Fleet), and others.
On the next day, the 9th, he [also] gave orders regarding the first carrier operation (the attack
on Port Darwin just before the landing [operation] on Timor), and the second carrier opera-
tion (the operations in the Indian Ocean at the time of the Java landing operations). On that
day (the 9th), the enemy position was judged to be as follows:(117)
Through our air raids at the beginning of February, the enemy based on Java has lost most of its
air and naval forces, and as our invasion operations progress, it is highly likely that the remain-
ing forces will attempt to escape to Australia, India and South Africa; it is also quite likely that
British, U.S., Dutch and Australian naval forces will appear in the eastern part of the Indian
Ocean to pick them up. Further, it seems that part of the enemy forces have already escaped to
Port Darwin and vicinity; there is information that part of the U.S. air reinforcements have been
operating in concert with part of British and Australian forces, using [Port Darwin] as a base.
The plan was that the Carrier Task Force (commander, V. Adm. Nagumo Chūichi, com-
mander in chief of the First Air Fleet) would depart from Palau on 15 February, return to
Staring Bay after the first carrier operation, and [then] launch the second carrier operation;
the main unit of the Southern Task Force would leave Palau on 18 February, advance into
Staring Bay, and launch the second carrier operation. The forces, which had assembled in
Palau by the 15th, were in outline as follows:(103, 116, 123)
The aircraft carriers Akagi and Kaga of the 1st Carrier Division.
The aircraft carriers Sōryū and Hiryū of the 2d Carrier Division.
The battleships Hiei, Kirishima, Kongō and Haruna of the 3d Battleship Division.
The heavy cruisers Maya, Takao and Atago of the 4th Cruiser Division (note: the Atago was the
flagship of the Southern Task Force, and the Chōkai of this division was the flagship of the
Malaya Unit).
The heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma of the 8th Cruiser Division.
The light cruiser Abukuma, the 17th Destroyer Division, and the 2d Section of the 27th Destroyer
Division of the 1st Destroyer Squadron.
The 4th Destroyer Division (of the 4th Destroyer Squadron), the 18th Destroyer Division (minus
two destroyers), and the Akigumo.
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Of the above, the Atago, the 3d Battleship Division and the 4th Destroyer
Division (the Arashi, the Nowaki, the Hagikaze and the Maikaze) were to
leave Palau for Staring Bay on the 18th as the main force of the Southern
Task Force, while the others left Palau on that day (the 15th) as the Strike
Force for the attack on Port Darwin.(103, 116, 123) In the western [theater of
the Dutch East Indies operation], the Bangka and Palembang landing
operations were carried out on the same day, while the Malaya Unit was
engaging an allied fleet that [attempted] a counterattack in a sea battle.
On the 19th (the day before the Timor landing operations), the Car-
rier Task Force reached the waters about 220 nautical miles north-north-
west of Port Darwin and launched an attack on Port Darwin with the
full force of its aircraft (namely, thirty-six fighter planes, seventy-one car-
rier-based bombers, and eighty-one carrier-based attack planes). On that day, in concert [with
this attack], the 21st Air Flotilla, [then] based in kendari and Ambon, also attacked Port Dar-
win with the full force of its land-based attack planes. They reported the military gain of
bringing down ten small and one large [enemy] aircraft in the air and sinking two destroyers
and ten transport ships at sea, and that the allied forces in Port Darwin were wiped out.(103,
116, 123)
The Seizure of kupang
On the same day, the Eastern Detachment was approaching kupang and Dili.
That is, the Miike-maru (with Detachment Commander Itō on board), the Africa-maru, the
Ryōyō-maru, and the Zen’yō-maru carrying the main force of the Eastern Detachment, which
had left Ambon at 0500 on the 17th and had passed through the Alor Strait on the night of
the 18th, were making a detour at sea west of Timor on that day [the 19th] to sail toward the
south of kupang. Meanwhile, the Yamaura-maru carrying Regimental Commander Doi and
his men, who were to [conduct the operation to] seize Dili, had left Ambon at 0230 on the
18th and was approaching Dili on that day [the 19th]. The Navy was escorting the convoys,
operating as in the previously described plan.
The Eastern Detachment commander was only provided with maps on a scale of
1:2,000,000 for Timor and aerial photographs of kupang and the vicinity. He understood that
some 3,000 troops were stationed near kupang and some 1,000 near Dili. He had also heard
that there were entrenched positions and gun batteries near kupang, that mines were laid in
the coastal waters, and that most of the allied aircraft in kupang had been destroyed.(78)
As for the kupang area, the Eastern Detachment planned to seize the city from the south
after landing on the south coast, where the defenses were considered weak. At this time, one
element of the force was to advance northeastward to cut off the road that ran eastward from
kupang; another element of the force was to cooperate with the naval paratrooper unit in
seizing the Penfui airfield, and yet another element of the force was to seize the coastal bat-
teries.(78) The Navy planned to have some 300 paratroopers of the 3d Yokosuka Special Land-
ing Force, carried by twenty-eight transport aircraft, seize the Penfui airfield by parachuting
at 1030 on the 20th onto a pasture four kilometers northeast of Babau, [then] to have rein-
forcements parachute in on the 21st in the same way as on the 20th, and to have the remaining
118 men of the landing force and two platoons of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force
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go ashore with the main force of the Eastern Detachment and advance toward the Penfui air-
field.(102, 103)
The Eastern Detachment, assuming that the main force would land in the kupang area
and one element of the force in the Dili area before daybreak on the 20th, planned its opera-
tions as follows:(76, 78)
1. Main force of the detachment
Right Attack Unit [consisting of] the 2d Company, one machine gun platoon, a battalion gun
platoon (with one gun), one radio squad, and one element of the medical unit, led by the 2d
Company Commander 1st Lt. kambe Masaji, after landing on the coast east of Cape Benini,
shall promptly advance to Oesau and vicinity by way of the road connecting Baun – Oekahiti
– Oesau and while defeating the enemy along [the road], it shall secure the neighborhood
of the location and cut off the escape route of the enemy. During the advance up to Baun, it
shall generally position itself behind the advance company of the center attack unit.
Center Attack Unit [consisting of] the 3d Battalion, one antitank gun company, and one moun-
tain artillery battery (minus one section) as the core, led by the 3d Battalion Commander
Maj. Nishiyama Haruka, shall land on the coast between Cape Benini and Cape Mali, ad-
vance from Baun to the area southeast of kupang by way of the road connecting Highland
385 – kupang and while defeating the enemy along [the road], prepare for the subsequent
attack on kupang. It shall seize the Penfui airfield with one element of its force.
Left Attack Unit [consisting of] the 1st Battalion (minus two companies, one machine gun pla-
toon, and the main force of the battalion artillery), a light-armored car company, one antitank
gun platoon and one mountain artillery battery as the core, led by 1st Battalion Commander
Maj. Hayakawa kikuo, shall land on the coast northwest of Cape Mali, promptly seize the
battery near Oilalus, advance into the area south of kupang by way of the road connecting
Cape Mali – Oilalus – kupang, and while defeating the enemy along [the road], prepare for
the subsequent attack on kupang.
Artillery Unit [consisting of] the 2d Battalion of the 38th Mountain Artillery Regiment (minus
two batteries), shall land on the coast east of Cape Mali, follow the rear of the center attack
unit, and cooperate in the operations of the latter as needed.
Reserve Unit [consisting of] one company of the 1st Battalion, shall land on the east coast of
Cape Mali following the main units and operate along with the detachment headquarters.
The detachment headquarters shall land on the coast east of Cape Mali and proceed at the rear
of the center attack unit.
2. Dili attack unit [consisting of] the 2d Battalion as the core, led by 228th Infantry Regiment Com-
mander Col. Doi Sadashichi, shall land on the coast west of Dili and promptly seize the airfield.
The unit for seizing kupang sailed without being attacked by allied air or naval forces. Its
right, center and left attack units went ashore on the coast east and west of Cape Mali between
0235 and 0315 on the 20th and immediately started their advance. On that day, while the
right and center attack units advanced to Highland 363 and Highland 385 respectively, the
left attack unit rushed into kupang as early as at 1900. [Also] on that day, the commander of
the Yokosuka Special Landing Force and his men, a total of 308 paratroopers, parachuted
down onto a pasture four kilometers northeast of Babau at 1045 meeting with no resistance
and seized Babau by evening.(76, 103)
On the next day, the 21st, the right attack unit advanced into Oesau at 1730, eliminating
weak resistance, and set about occupying the position so as to cut off the eastward escape
route of the allied units. On that day, the center attack unit entered kupang at 0900, elimi-
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nating weak resistance. The 9th Company of the center attack unit had separated [from the
main unit] at Highland 385, seized the Penfui airfield at 1400 on that day and handed over
[the airfield] to the already-mentioned navy unit that had landed east of Cape Mali and fol-
lowed [the army units]. At 1015 on that day, 323 men of the 2d Paratroop Unit of the Yokosuka
Special Landing Force parachuted down onto the aforementioned pasture. The unit which
had parachuted down the day before was not yet able to reach the Penfui airfield on that day
due to destroyed bridges and obstruction by allied units. [In the meantime,] the detachment
headquarters entered kupang at 1700.(76, 103)
On the next day, the 22d, the paratrooper unit of the Yokosuka Special Landing Force [fi-
nally] got to the Penfui airfield at 0600.(102, 103)
On that day (the 22d), Detachment Commander Itō, who was [positioned] in the city of
kupang, learned around 1030 that the right attack unit in Oesau had come under attack of
some 1,000 allied troops trying to envelop them from the west with more than a dozen guns
and armored cars. The detachment commander immediately dispatched the Murase Unit (a
unit [consisting of] the 9th Company, the main force of the machine gun company, and one
antitank gun platoon as the core, led by Capt. Murase Jishichirō, commander of the 3d Ma-
chine Gun Company) from Pasir Panjang (about twenty-two kilometers west-southwest of
Oesau) and requested the cooperation of naval aircraft. [Editor’s note: The text has “keshiru,”
which could not be identified. Based on the location, it was most likely Pasir (Panjang).] Then
he [also] sent the Hayakawa Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the 1st Battalion of the
228th Infantry Regiment, two batteries and a light-armored car company, led by 1st Battalion
Commander Maj. Hayakawa kikuo). The Murase Unit left Pasir Panjang at 1200, and the
Hayakawa Unit left kupang by motor vehicles at 1430. The main force of the 3d Battalion
was assigned to guard the kupang area.(76, 14)
Since around 0700 on that day, the right attack unit, led by First Lieutenant kambe (a total
of 206 men at the Oesau position; see the previous description for its formation) had been
under attack from the above-mentioned allied unit. By 1430, the ammunition of its grenade
launchers ran out and only ten shells were left for the battalion gun. Losses were incurred
one after another, and First Lieutenant kambe also got injured at 1600. However, around
1700 a naval aircraft unit in a nine-plane formation dropped bombs at the rear of the allied
unit, and around 1800 artillery was [also] heard from the rear of the allied unit. [It was] the
Murase Unit, which had arrived there and started attacking the enemy from the rear. Then,
the Hayakawa Unit [also] arrived and launched attacks, taking the Murase Unit under its
command. The allied unit fiercely intensified its attacks, trying to break through the position
of the kambe Unit and escape eastward. By around 1830, the platoon positions in the right
front line (north of the main road) and in the left rear were overrun, and only the position in
the left front line remained. The ammunition ran out. The allied unit picked up the dead and
the injured, broke through the [road] blocks at the east end of Oesau, and left eastward in
over a hundred motor trucks. It was judged that their total strength was 1,500 troops and the
number of casualties 500. As for the kambe Unit, sixty-seven men were killed, and thirty-
four were wounded in the battle. Seeing the allied unit retreat, First Lieutenant kambe fol-
lowed, leading the remaining troops from the platoon positions in the left front line and in
the left rear, but they constituted only nine men.(76, 14)
After that, Major Hayakawa, bringing the right attack unit under his command as well,
started pursuing the enemy, caught them in the area east of Naibonak at daybreak of the 23d,
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Illustration No. 40 — The Operation to Seize Kupang
Landing in Kupang in the face of the enemy (20 February)
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and at 1000 on the same day, he finally made some 1,000 troops (with about 100 light-armored
cars and other vehicles) surrender.(76, 14)
According to a later study by the Eastern Detachment, the main force of the allied unit,
which was positioned near kupang at the beginning, started its retreat eastward before the
advance of the main force of the Eastern Detachment into kupang and [further] retreated by
breaking through the positions of the right attack unit in Oesau. The [allied] force, which
fought with the Eastern Detachment in the kupang area consisted of about 1,940 troops (some
1,500 Australian troops (including some 150 British), some 240 Dutch East Indies troops and
some 200 indigenous troops); 296 abandoned bodies were confirmed, and 1,136 men (179
British, 934 Australian and 23 Dutch) were taken prisoner.
The detachment sustained a loss of sixty-seven men killed and fifty-six wounded in action.
However, it seized seven tanks, five armored cars, two 15-cm. cannon (with 287 shells), eight
mortars (with 3,000 shells), four antitank guns, six 37-mm. antiaircraft automatic guns (with
3,282 shells), eighteen 13-mm. antiaircraft machine guns, forty-five heavy machine guns (with
47,100 bullets), thirty-six [semi-]automatic rifles (with 4,400 bullets), 756 rifles (379,760 bul-
lets), and others.(76)
[Later] on 10 May, [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura conferred a citation of merit
on the 2d Company of the 228th Infantry Regiment and the units attached to it, led by the
company commander, First Lieutenant kambe, and proclaimed their distinguished military
service to the entire army. It read: “You landed in the face of the enemy on the coast at the
southwestern end of Timor on 20 February, forced your way through mountains and the jun-
gle and while everywhere destroying the enemy, advanced into Oesau and vicinity on the
21st and cut off the escape route of the enemy in kupang and vicinity. Then on the next day,
the 22d, at the attack of over 1,000 enemy troops with mechanized units, you first fought
back the relentlessly repeated attacks by a group of tanks, held your position well with a
small force by charging again and again toward all fronts against the enemy, which stormed
into your position with tanks at the head while gradually enveloping [the position], and fi-
nally enabled the main force of the detachment to catch the enemy on the next day, the
23d.”(14)
Eleven aircraft of the 21st Air Flotilla advanced into the kupang (Penfui) airfield as early
as on the 23d.(103)
Minesweeping of the sea near kupang was relatively easy. Transport ships changed their
anchorage [first] to one in the northwest, another in the north, and then another in the east
[approaching kupang], and disembarked most of the munitions at the city of kupang.(117)
As mentioned previously, although no allied fleets were seen in Timor, strong fleet(s) still
remained in the Surabaya area. [Consequently,] the 5th Cruiser Division’s cooperation in the
second carrier operation was canceled. It was decided that only the 15th Destroyer Division
would take part in the second carrier operation, and that all the other ships would hurry
westward to cooperate in the eastern Java landing operation of the 48th Division and the
Sakaguchi Detachment.
The Seizure of Dili (See Illustration No. 41)
The strength of the unit to seize Dili consisted of the 228th Infantry Regiment (minus the 1st
and the 3d Battalions and the main force of the signal company), one independent engineer
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platoon (minus two squads), and one element from each of the divisional signal, transport,
and medical and other units, led by Regimental Commander Colonel Doi.(76)
The mission of the unit to seize Dili was to go ashore in the area west of Dili, advance
eastward and seize the Dili airfield.(76, 77, 78)
The situation in Dili and vicinity was almost unknown. There were many issues to be
considered, such as the whereabouts of some 1,000 British, Australian and Dutch troops,
which had reportedly entered Portuguese territory, whether [the unit] should also attack Por-
tuguese forces if they should put up resistance, and how to identify friend or foe in the dark-
ness after the night landing.(77)
The time of the landing of the unit was set for 0000 on the 20th. It entered the anchorage
(one kilometer northwest of Dili) under escort of the Ushio and the Sazanami ([of] the 7th De-
stroyer Division) and started shifting to [landing] craft, when it came under the fierce fire of
artillery and machine guns. [In response to] the inquiry from the Ushio about whether to pro-
vide cover fire, Regimental Commander Doi requested to give it. The Ushio and the Sazanami
opened fire. Avoiding the gunfire, the unit moved the craft westward and went ashore at the
mouth of the Comoro River at 0218.(77, 117)
The unit headed eastward, groping in the dark and being obstructed in places by walls
of cactuses as high as the height of the troops, it made an attack on a position, [guarded] with
a couple of lines of barbed wire entanglements and landmines. After that, it seized the airfield
and the city of Dili by around 1300 and rescued thirty Japanese [residents] kept in confine-
ment.(77)
The number of the allied troops who put up resistance was about 1,300 men (some 300
Australian, some 400 Dutch East Indies and some 600 indigenous troops). Most of them es-
caped into the mountains except thirty-three who were captured. The loss sustained [by the
Japanese] was seven men killed in action. The unit seized thirteen mountain guns (with 348
shells), one machine gun (with 5,000 bullets), 1,804 rifles (with 3,000 bullets) and others.(76)
The airfield had been destroyed to such a degree that ten days of restoration work was
required before it could hold about twenty fighter planes.(117) Only the Australian troops had
offered resistance when the unit to seize Dili landed in the Dili area, whereas the Portuguese
troops had not resisted. Furthermore, the Portuguese authorities had not evacuated [from
Dili] and were [still] stationed in the city. The unit that seized Dili carefully respected [Por-
tuguese] sovereignty by using the barracks of the Australian troops.(117)
After that, the Eastern Detachment gradually expanded the area to mop up the enemy
from both kupang and Dili and completed clearing almost the entire island in mid-April.(76)
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Illustration No. 41 — Overview of the Timor Invasion Operations
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Viewing the City of Dili
416
Balloons in the Sky over Batavia, Flown by the Propaganda Group at the Time of the Java Invasion
The Brightly Colored Letters Read “Long Live Greater Asia!”
Chapter VIII The Invasion of Java
1. Progress of the Preparations for the Invasion of Java
Thus were southern Sumatra, southern Borneo, southern Celebes and Bali captured,and Java was completely encircled. In the eastern [theater of the southern operation],Timor and, still further east, Rabaul were captured. In the western [theater], the Malay
Peninsula was completely under [Japanese] control, and the advance on Rangoon had been
set in motion.
In addition to such a strategically dominant position, [Japanese] air and naval forces were
overwhelmingly superior [in number]. The air strength, which had been allotted to the Java
invasion was 179 aircraft of the Third Air Force, 50 of the Dutch East Indies Unit and 190 of
the Eleventh Air Fleet, which made a total of 419 aircraft. It was further increased by some
190 aircraft of the main force of the First Air Fleet led by Vice Admiral Nagumo, as well as
by [the aircraft of] the 4th Carrier Division of the Malaya Unit, and others. The air power
was overwhelming, and so was the power of the fleet. The [Japanese] naval vessels that op-
erated against the moribund allied fleet in the Java area, which consisted of several light
cruisers and lesser ships, were the battleships Hiei, Kirishima, Kongō and Haruna, the heavy
cruisers Maya, Takao, Atago, Myōkō, Haguro, Nachi, Tone, Chikuma and Ashigara, and if we also
count the light cruisers, destroyers, submarines and other vessels, we reach a truly large
number of ships. What was more, in the middle of the operation to advance [on Java], the
Malaya Unit had enough strength to spare to not only make a grand triumphal entry into
the port of Singapore with the heavy cruiser Chōkai and other ships, but also to send the
heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma and Mogami, and other ships to support the advance
[on Java].
However, due to [the appearance of] an allied fleet, the unit to land in western Java, which
had left Cam Ranh Bay on the 18th, and the unit to land in eastern Java, which had left Jolo
on the 19th, temporarily reversed course on the 22d [and the next day] (which delayed the
scheduled date of landing by two days) and again on the 27th (which delayed the date by
another day). Furthermore, things reached such a state that the ship carrying [Sixteenth]
Army Commander Imamura was sunk on the day of landing and he had to be rescued from
the water. [The situation looked so serious that] during the course reversal, the Sixteenth
Army staff officers even seriously discussed a plan to go ashore in Sumatra and then land
on Java from Sumatra using [landing] craft. 
I will describe the progress of the preparations for the invasion of Java below, focusing
on how things came to this pass.
The General Situation Until Mid-February
On 1 January, the Southern Army, which sought to bring forward the Java operation, made
agreements with the Southern Task Force and settled on 10 January for the landings on
Menado and Tarakan, on 20 January for Kendari and Balikpapan, on 25 January for Ambon,
on 30 January for Makassar and Banjarmasin, on around 6 February for Bangka and Palem-
bang, on around 11 February for Kupang, and on around 16 February for Java.(23)
On 5 January, the Southern Army ordered the Sixteenth Army to seize Bangka, Palem-
bang, Ambon and Kupang.(23) The seizure of Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin had al-
ready been ordered to the Sixteenth Army before the opening of hostilities.(23)
[As for the Navy,] the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) [or-
dered] the shift to phase-two operations respectively on 28 December(117) and 2 January,(117)
but due to the delay in capturing Davao and Jolo, and because of the shortened schedule,
the shift was not easy. After making arrangements with the Sixteenth Army on 6 January, the
Dutch East Indies Unit postponed the [above] dates by one day each.(117)
Although the landings on Tarakan and Menado were carried out on 11 January,(117, 119) it
was not easy to sweep the mines in Tarakan and make the airfield ready. In addition, an im-
pending attack by quite a number of [allied] submarines from the direction of Ambon was
reported. On 15 January, the Dutch East Indies Unit issued an order to postpone [the opera-
tion to] seize Kendari and Ambon until 24 and 29 January respectively,(114) and on the next
day, the 16th, it issued another order to postpone [the operation to] seize Balikpapan until
24 January as well.(119)
By 20 January, the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) made
a request to postpone the [entire] schedule for about two weeks, and the Malaya Unit also
requested a two-week postponement, emphasizing the difficulty of [readying] the Kuching
and the Ledo airfields.(23)
Although the Southern Army was aware of these requests, it [nevertheless] issued on 20
January an order to the Sixteenth Army to “capture Java in accordance with the agreement
of 1 January,” and held talks with the Navy side in Manila from the next day, the 21st, through
the 23d.(23)
The draft of the Manila Agreement was concluded on 28 January,(119) and it was decided
that Banjarmasin was to be seized by land, and that the operation to capture Bali was to be
newly included.(23) It was also agreed to set the invasion dates for Makassar on 9 February,
for Bangka and Palembang on 10 February, for Kupang on 20 February, for Bali on 21 Febru-
ary, for western Java on the same day (the 21st), and for eastern Java on 23 February.(23)
In the meantime:
1. Due to the circumstances in the Molucca Sea area, the Dutch East Indies Unit made
arrangements on 19 January with the Sixteenth Army to postpone the date to launch
the Ambon [operation] by another two days till 31 January.(117)
2. The 2d Carrier Division, which was newly added [to the Southern Task Force] on 8
January, conducted an air raid on Ambon on 23 January.(103)
3. Landing operations were conducted in Balikpapan and Kendari on 24 January. In Ba-
likpapan, four allied destroyers raided [the anchorage] and caused damage to the
Japanese ships. Kendari could easily be seized, and it turned out to have a large air-
field.(117, 119)
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4. With the progress in the transport operations in the Malaya area, the Southern Task
Force gave the order to “switch to phase-three operations with the current disposition
of forces” on 24 January.(117)
5. On the 26th, the Malaya Unit carried out the disembarkation at Endau and the occu-
pation of the Anambas [Islands].(118, 126)
6. On the 27th, the Kawaguchi Detachment seized the Ledo airfield.(23)
Late in January, the Twenty-fifth Army was closing in on the Johor Strait. The next major
operations were the Twenty-fifth Army’s operation to seize Singapore, and the Sixteenth
Army’s southern Sumatra and Java operations.
Regarding the operation to capture southern Sumatra, preliminary arrangements were
made between the Sixteenth Army and the Malaya Unit on 12 January(32, 120) and they were
concluded on the 15th. However, they were reconsidered at the Manila Conference. On 28
January, preliminary arrangements were made between the Sixteenth Army, the Malaya Unit
and the Third Air Force,(34) and the arrangements were concluded on the 30th.(135) It was de-
cided that the air force to be employed would consist of 176 naval aircraft and 138 army air-
craft, which made a total of 314 aircraft.(96)
As for the Java invasion operation, preliminary arrangements were made between the
Sixteenth Army, the Third Air Force and the relevant naval units at the Manila Conference
on 23 January,(32) and they were concluded on 30 January.(135) The air force to be employed
consisted of a total of 419 aircraft, with the following breakdown:(96)
Eleventh Air Fleet: 115 land-based attack planes, 70 Type–0 fighter planes, and 5 land-
based reconnaissance planes.
Third Fleet: 50 reconnaissance seaplanes.
Third Air Force: 15 command reconnaissance planes, 4 army reconnaissance planes, 90
fighter planes, 20 assault planes, 20 light bombers, and 30 heavy bombers.
At that time (the end of January), the Southern Army judged the enemy position to be in out-
line as follows:(23) [See also pp. 256-257.]
1. Burma area
Apart from reinforcements of at least one division and other technical units of the [British] Indian
Army, also Chiang [Kai-shek]’s Sixth Army has moved up close to the border, of which two
corps have [already] entered Burma for certain. It appears that the remainder is also taking the
route to enter [Burma].
It appears that the air force has been reinforced by some fifty aircraft.
2. Malaya area
An increase of one brigade of Indian troops [is known] for sure, apart from [this,] an increase of
about one division of Indian troops as well as elements of British and Australian troops must
be assumed.
Further, the increase in air [forces] should be over two hundred aircraft (however, a part [of
them] must have been deployed in Sumatra).
3. Dutch East Indies area
Apart from a reinforcement of an estimated two ([or] three) battalions to Sumatra, [the detailed
situation] is still unknown. However, up to now the arrival of large troop numbers is unthink-
able.
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Further, as for air force units, U.S. equipment and training personnel must have arrived in con-
siderable numbers, but [details] remain unknown. However, the current number of aircraft is
estimated to have reached about five hundred.
This information is based on the following:
1. Three thousand U.S. air personnel arrived in Java (information of 28 January and Cheng Jiemin
report, degree of certainty C).
2. According to a statement of a Dutch East Indies POW pilot, the current number of aircraft in
the Dutch East Indies is some seven hundred, and they are dispersed over every airfield (degree
of certainty C).
The previously-mentioned Manila Conference was held from 21 to 23 January, and at that
time both the Army and the Navy Departments of IGHQ and the Combined Fleet were of
the same opinion as the Southern Army that a postponement [in the operation schedule]
would allow Java to receive reinforcements, which would make the defense [of the island]
all the stronger. The Navy Department of IGHQ and the Combined Fleet requested the South-
ern Task Force to not postpone the [invasion] date.(23) The Southern Task Force, which held
the same view on the situation as the Southern Army, and which also felt responsible as a
signee of the agreement of 1 January with the Southern Army, did not want to postpone the
schedule either.(23) As we have seen, the two-week postponement requested by the Dutch
East Indies Unit, the Malaya Unit, and the Air Unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) eventually
resulted in a postponement of [merely] five days for the operation against western Java and
seven days for the operation against eastern Java.(23)
Since 18 January, when the above issue of the request for a two-week postponement arose,
the Southern Task Force had done everything possible, seeking to reinforce the Dutch East
Indies Unit. So had the Combined Fleet; on 19 January it issued an order to add [to the unit]
the 21st Destroyer Division,(114) which ([consisting of] four destroyers) was employed on the
Kendari – Makassar – Bali line [of operations]. During the Manila Conference, the Southern
Task Force informally decided to later on transfer the Yura, the 11th Destroyer Division (three
destroyers), and the 12th Destroyer Division (two destroyers) to the Dutch East Indies Unit
[as well].(96) It also moved the carrier aircraft of the 2d Carrier Division onto land bases as
soon as the division returned to Davao on the 25th after completing the air strike on Ambon
on 24 January, and issued an order on the 28th to add the 7th Destroyer Division (three de-
stroyers [of the Carrier Division]) [to the Dutch East Indies Unit as well].(114) This destroyer
division joined the Ambon – Kupang line [of operations]. On the same day, it also issued an
order to transfer the 1st Section (two destroyers) of the 6th Destroyer Division of the Air Unit
(the Eleventh Air Fleet).(120) This section joined the Cam Ranh Bay – western Java line [of op-
erations].
As mentioned previously, on 28 January it was decided to cancel [the operation to] seize
Banjarmasin by sea, but to seize Bali [instead], and a new schedule was fixed on the same
day.(119) For the Navy, which had believed and before the opening of hostilities had all the
time insisted that [the operation to] capture Java by a clockwise route would be quicker than
that by a counterclockwise route, it was unbearable to conduct the landing [operation] on
eastern Java two days later than the landing on western Java, even though the current situ-
ation was the inevitable consequence of circumstances from the time right before the war.(136)
Especially for the Dutch East Indies Unit, which had been urged on and additionally been
provided with quite a number of destroyer divisions etc. by higher headquarters, and which,
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moreover, had [the operation to] seize Banjarmasin by sea called off, it was intolerable.(136)
Although [the operation against] Bali [was included] instead of that against Banjarmasin, it
was to be conducted on the same day as the landing on western Java, so it was just a part of
the operations to capture Java.(136)
The Dutch East Indies Unit made efforts to bring forward the date [of the landing opera-
tion on] eastern Java to the same day as that on western Java. In concert with the Dutch East
Indies Unit, the Eleventh Air Fleet also studied [the possibility of] advancing the operation.
On 28 January, the Dutch East Indies Unit issued an order to change the Makassar operation
to a clockwise route. On 31 January it requested the 5th Cruiser Division to bring forward
the date of the Makassar [operation].(114) On 1 February, the Dutch East Indies Unit ordered
to conduct [the operation to] seize Makassar on 8 February by advancing it by one day,(114)
and [the operation to] capture Bali on 18 February by moving it up by three days.(119) [The
unit thought that] these changes would enable it to carry out the landing [operation] on east-
ern Java on the same day as that on western Java (21 February).
In the meantime, the landing [operation] in Ambon was carried out on 31 January.(117)
Also, the Combined Fleet passed down the order to transfer the Carrier Task Force to the
Southern Task Force on the same day (the 31st).(116, 123)
The day before the Combined Fleet issued the order to transfer the Carrier Task Force
(that is, the 30th), the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) issued the order for Operation Z and
launched a full-scale air campaign on eastern Java from 3 February onwards.(143) It was six
days before the Malaya Unit’s air campaign on western Java. As of 1 February, the forces that
the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) deployed in the front line were 138 aircraft in Kendari,
thirty-three in Balikpapan and seventeen in Menado.(143, 134)
On 4 February, the second day of Operation Z, the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) made
an attack on an enemy fleet in the Java Sea and reported to “have attacked an enemy fleet of
seven cruisers and five destroyers and sunk three cruisers.”(134, 143)
However, on that day, an ironical reversal [of the situation] occurred. For on that day,
while the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet), which regretted
that “the landing [operation] on eastern Java was to be conducted two days later [than that
on western Java],” had revised their plans and were steadily achieving results [in advancing
their schedule], the Malaya Unit actually proposed a two-day postponement of L (the Bangka
and Palembang operation).(23) [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura, who had arrived in
Cam Ranh from Gaoxiong on that day (the 4th), held talks with [First Expeditionary Fleet]
Commander in Chief Ozawa, accepted the latter’s request, and sent Staff Officers Takashima,
Kitamura and Oda, and Navy Staff Officer Wakatsuki [seconded to the Sixteenth Army] to
the [Southern Army] headquarters to have them request a two-day postponement of [Oper-
ation] L.(23, 32, 34)
On 6 February, again a postponement of [Operation] L by another four days was re-
quested.(23) Chief of Staff Sawada and Staff Officer Tomari of the Malaya Unit, Sixteenth Army
[Senior] Staff Officer Takashima, and others visited the [Southern Army] headquarters to
make the request.(23) The last time the issue was the Ledo airfield, but this time it was the
Kuantan airfield.(23)
A postponement of L by a total of six days would inevitably lead to a postponement of
[the operation against] western H (Java). Because the airfields were in such [bad] condition,
the Malaya Unit had yet to launch its air campaign against Java. For the Air Unit (the
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Eleventh Air Fleet), which had conducted Operation Z from the 3d through that day (the
6th), and the Dutch East Indies Unit, which on that day had dispatched from Kendari the
unit to seize Makassar, the postponement could only have been totally unexpected. The Air
Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) decided to shift the focus of its air campaign to the Banda Sea
area.(143)
On 8 February, the Combined Fleet revised its previous order (for the already-mentioned
reasons) and passed down a [new] order to transfer the Carrier Task Force (minus the 5th
Carrier Division) and the 2d Submarine Squadron to the Southern Task Force.(116, 123)
Before that, on 5 February, the Southern Task Force had presented a plan to have the 2d
Carrier Division conduct an air strike on Port Darwin on 17 February (the first carrier oper-
ation) and have the Carrier Task Force leave Palau on 18 February and then Staring Bay on
the 23d to conduct a carrier operation in the Indian Ocean and to return to Staring Bay on 3
March after a five-day operation on the high seas (the second carrier operation), and it or-
dered a study of its feasibility.(116) At that time, the postponement of [Operation] L was ex-
pected to be two days, and thus [the landing on] western H [Java] was also expected to be
postponed by two days (that is, [the landing operations against] both eastern and western
[Java] would be on the 23d.)
On receiving the aforementioned order of the Combined Fleet on 8 February, the Southern
Task Force issued an order on the 9th, changing its former plan.(117) By that time, it was as-
sumed that in consequence of the request of the Malaya Unit (on the 6th) to postpone [Op-
eration] L by another four days (six days in total), [Operation] H would inevitably be
postponed by six days as well. In this order, the plan was that the entire Carrier Task Force
(including the 2d Carrier Division) should be employed for the carrier operations from the
beginning; that as the first carrier operation, an air strike on Port Darwin should be conducted
on 19 February; and that the second carrier operation should be a five-day carrier operation
in the Indian Ocean to be conducted by leaving Staring Bay at the right moment. On the day
before (the 8th), based on the request of the Malaya Unit (on the 6th) to postpone L by a total
of six days, the Southern Task Force had sent the Southern Army a telegram to propose to
“conduct [Operation] L on day x + 70 (16 February), [the landing operation on] western Java
on day x + 81 (27 February), and that on eastern Java no later than day x + 81, all depending
upon the deliberations between the Third Fleet and the Sixteenth Army.”(23)
The Southern Army had no option but to wire back its consent.(23) In this way, the [tem-
porary] situation in which a counterclockwise advance had been quicker [to reach Java] was
restored to [the original] situation in which the clockwise route was quicker. The reasons for
this reversal were as already described respectively in terms of the Malaya Unit, the Dutch
East Indies Unit and the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet).
On the night of the 9th (the day when it passed down the orders on the carrier operations),
the Southern Task Force issued the following order by telegram:(117) [See pp. 305 and 379.]
Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 96 2040, 9 February
The following amendments were made in the target dates for the invasions in the Dutch East
Indies operation:
1. Western Java: day x + 81.
2. Eastern Java: no later than day x + 81, depending on the arrangements between the commander
in chief of the Third Fleet and the Sixteenth Army commander.
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However, in the afternoon of that day (the 9th), before the telegraphic
order was transmitted, the prospects for the preparation of the bases and
deployment of its aircraft became clear for the Malaya Unit, and it issued
an order to set [Operation] L for 15 February. [Accordingly,] the units to
land in southern Sumatra left Cam Ranh Bay on that evening.(118) The
Third Air Force had [already] launched its air operations [for Operation]
L on 6 February.(96) On that day (the 9th), the air unit of the Malaya Unit
launched its air operations [for Operation] L, including [air] assaults on
western Java.(104)
On the 10th, the units to land in western Java completed their assem-
bly in Cam Ranh Bay.(120) On that day, the Sakaguchi Detachment seized
Banjarmasin.(87) Makassar (its capture date was rescheduled on 2 Febru-
ary to the 9th), had been seized the day before (the 9th).(124) The 48th Di-
vision was under sail and scheduled to arrive in Jolo on the 12th.(119)
The Dutch East Indies Unit, which had made arrangements with the Sixteenth Army
based on the telegraphic order of the Southern Task Force, transmitted the following order
on the 11th:(117) [See p. 379.]
Third Fleet Classified Telegram No. 272 sent at 1150 on the 11th
1. The schedule for the Dutch East Indies invasion shall be revised as follows:
1. Batavia and Surabaya: 26 February.
2. Kupang and Dili: 20 February.
3. Bali: 18 February (as scheduled).
2. Each unit shall conduct operations in line with the outline given in the Dutch East Indies Unit
Classified Order No. 9 (note by the author: the order issued on 28 January), so as to meet the
above schedule.
Three days earlier, Lt. Gen. Tanaka Shin’ichi, chief of the 1st Bureau (Operations Bureau) of
the Army Department of IGHQ, had sent the following telegram from Saigon:(22)
To: Vice Chief, Army General Staff
From: Chief, 1st Bureau (sent on 8 February)
1. The Sixteenth Army has completed the preparations for its plans and has an extremely high
morale, which, along with the consideration of our military power as well as the enemy’s shown
in the engagements in the early stages of the war, has made the army highly confident about
Operation H.
2. The Banjarmasin operation is progressing so smoothly that it is expected to achieve its aim by
the 12th (note by the author: it was achieved on the 10th). [Banjarmasin] shall almost certainly
be available as an air base by the time of H.
3. The seizure of Tanjungkarang in southern Sumatra is planned around five days before [Opera-
tion] H, and it is also expected that the aim will be achieved concerning Bali. Combined with
the seizure of Banjarmasin, these will greatly facilitate the air operations,.
4. In the end, L was set on day x + 70, H on day x + 81 for both the eastern and western parts, and
Bali around day x + 76 (note by the author: 22 February).
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Chief of the 1st Bureau,
Army General Staff Of-
fice, Lt. Gen. Tanaka
Shin’ichi
That is to say, despite the telegram of the Southern Task Force on 9 February, which said
“Western Java on the 27th [i.e. x + 81] and eastern Java no later than the 27th,” the Dutch
East Indies Unit fixed [the date for the landing operation] on western Java for the 26th, ac-
cording to the moving up of [Operation] L by one day, and also fixed [the date for the landing
operation] on eastern Java for the 26th, endorsing the opinion of the Army, the Sixteenth
Army in particular, that simultaneous landings on the eastern and western parts would be
appropriate in terms of strategy.
The noteworthy points here are (1) that although the Army considered on 8 February that
“[Operation] H [should be launched] on day x + 81 for both the eastern and western parts of
Java,” the Southern Task Force ordered on the next day, the 9th, that “[the operation on] the
eastern part of H [should be launched] no later than day x + 81;” (2) that although the Army
also considered that [the landing operations on] Bali [should be conducted] around the 22d,
the Dutch East Indies Unit fixed [the landing operations on Bali] “on 18 [February] as sched-
uled.” This indicated the Navy’s good faith. [However, because of that,] the operation to cap-
ture Bali became detached from the Java invasion operations in terms of timing, which ended
up increasing the risks.
The reasons why the Dutch East Indies Unit decided [that the landing operations on Bali
should be conducted] “on 18 [February] as scheduled” might have arisen from the circum-
stances that [the seizure of the Bali airfield] had been encouraged since 18 January, that the
unit was reluctant to change an already issued order, or that in response to the eagerness of
the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet), it hoped to enable the air unit to use the Bali airfield
sooner and more effectively. Apart from that, it seems that [the Dutch East Indies Unit] had
a [false] sense of security that it would be able to capture the island as easily as Makassar,
overestimating the military gains of Operation Z.(136)
On the 9th (the day of the seizure of Makassar), the Southern Task Force issued an order
concerning the operations of the Carrier Task Force, as mentioned previously. The order con-
tained the following information:(117) [See also p. 407. A minor difference in redaction has
been ignored.]
Through our air raids at the beginning of February, the enemy based on Java has lost most of its
air and naval forces, and as our invasion operations progress, it is highly likely that the remain-
ing forces will attempt to escape to Australia, India and South Africa; it is also quite likely that
British, U.S., Dutch and Australian naval forces will appear in the eastern part of the Indian
Ocean to pick them up.
Note: It was reported that the air operations off the coast of Java on 4 February had produced a
[military] gain of sinking three cruisers. However, according to allied military history
sources, no ships were sunk.
On 10 February, the Navy Department of IGHQ transmitted the following telegram to each
fleet,(117) but [despite this telegram] the units on site did not pay much attention to [the situ-
ation in] Java itself.(136)
From: Chief, 1st Bureau, Navy Department, IGHQ (received at 1920 on the 10th)
JC (Bandung) sent the following report to Chongqing (sent on 6 February): [Editor’s note: Un-
clear whether this refers to a report from the ABDA Joint Command in Bandung, or to something
else, which was intercepted by the Japanese.]
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1. Allied air force
(1) Singapore: One squadron of British pursuit aircraft.
(2) Southern Sumatra: Four squadrons of British bombers and three Hurricane squadrons.
(3) Java: Forty Dutch East Indies bombers and two squadrons of pursuit aircraft, two U.S.
squadrons of flying fortresses and two squadrons of pursuit aircraft; thirty reconnaissance
aircraft and fifteen transport aircraft.
(4) One squadron consists of eighteen aircraft.
(5) Total: 190 bombers and 200 pursuit aircraft.
(6) Reinforcements: Two bombers [fly in] every day, and two squadrons of pursuit aircraft fly
in every week after having been serviced in Australia.
2. One element of the Australian forces to be transferred to Java from the Middle East has already
arrived and started reconnaissance of the terrain; the main force is expected to arrive within
three or four weeks.
[However,] the attention of the [naval] units on site had mostly shifted to the Timor area.(136)
On the 11th, the Dutch East Indies Unit passed down order(s) concerning the outline of the
Timor and the Bali operations.(114) On the 12th, the 21st Air Flotilla headquarters moved east-
ward to Ambon from Kendari.(143) The Carrier Task Force led by Vice Admiral Nagumo, com-
mander in chief of the First Air Fleet, was to leave Palau on the 15th to sail southward to
conduct an air strike on Port Darwin. The Eastern Detachment was to leave Ambon for Timor
from the 17th onwards.
It was not until 14 February that the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Eleventh Air Fleet fi-
nally shifted their focus to Java. It (the 14th) was the day when the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding
Group parachuted down in Palembang. It was inevitable that if the [Japanese] seized Palem-
bang and Bangka (scheduled for the 15th), the allied aircraft that operated in Malaya and
Sumatra would retreat to Java. [Nevertheless,] the stand-alone landing operation on Bali,
which is separated from Java by just a narrow strait, would [still] be conducted on the 18th.
On this day (the 14th), the 5th Cruiser Division commander wired the Dutch East Indies Unit
the following request:(114)
As the Surabaya operation was rescheduled to the 26th, while the Bali operation is supposed to
be conducted as scheduled, the interval between them has increased; and as the tasks of the
transport of the construction squad, base personnel and others, and the guarding of these units
on Bali have also been added, it means that during this period an extremely small force ([con-
sisting of merely] two destroyers and three submarine chasers) will be exposed right in front of
a major base of the enemy. Therefore, we would by all means like to request an arrangement
that before the Bali invasion on the 18th the enemy naval vessels in Surabaya shall be searched
for and attacked, and that the enemy bases on Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, and in the neighboring
areas shall be attacked as well.
On the 15th, the Dutch East Indies Unit sent the following request to the Air Unit (the
Eleventh Air Fleet):(114)
[We] would like your cooperation in the implementation [of the request contained in] the 5th
Cruiser Division Classified Telegram No. 717, to search for and attack the enemy naval vessels
in the Surabaya area, and to attack key places in the neighboring areas before the [scheduled]
surprise attack on Bali.
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It (the 15th) was the day when the Bangka and Palembang landing operations were carried
out and also the day when the Malaya Unit had deployed for a naval and air engagement
with an allied fleet that had sailed northward through the Gaspar Strait.
On the next day, the 16th, the allied fleet, which had reversed its course and left on the
previous day, showed no intention to counterattack. The Tanaka Detachment had already
landed in Bangka and Palembang on the 15th, and the convoy of the main force of the 38th
Division reached the mouth of the Musi River on that day (the 16th). On that day, the Malaya
Unit reported [to the Southern Task Force]: “We have no objections if from the 21st onwards
the Yura, the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Division and others will be transferred to the Java
invasion operation.”(120) [Also] on that day, the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) tried to con-
duct an air raid on eastern Java, responding to the telegraphic request of the day before, but
without success due to bad weather. [Also on that day,] the order for the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment to participate in the Java operation was issued.
On the next day, the 17th, the unit of the Eastern Detachment to land in Kupang left the
port of Ambon. The Carrier Task Force led by Vice Admiral Nagumo was sailing south,
scheduled to attack Port Darwin on the 19th. On the previous day (the 16th), the Dutch East
Indies Unit had ordered the postponement of the Bali invasion by one day, because it had
been impossible to provide air support on the 16th.(114) Accordingly, the unit for capturing
Bali was scheduled to leave the port of Makassar the next day, the 18th.
However, the weather remained bad on that day (the 17th). Besides, the 21st Air Flotilla
headquarters returned on that day from Ambon to Kendari.(103, 134)
The convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army was to leave Cam Ranh for western
Java on the following day, the 18th. [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura had left Saigon
on that day (the 17th), reached Cam Ranh Bay, and embarked on the Ryūjō-maru.(32)
However, the progress of the advance of the aircraft of the Third Air Force to the Palem-
bang airfield was [slow,] as [seen] below:(135)
By the previous day, the 16th: twenty Type–97 fighter planes
By this day, the 17th: twenty Type–97 fighter planes, seven Type–1 fighter planes, and two com-
mand reconnaissance aircraft
The air unit of the Malaya Unit (the 22d Air Flotilla) was in [an even worse] situation: the
Ledo airfield was not fit for use, the poor condition of the Kuching airfield allowed the air-
craft to load [only] half a tank of fuel on take off, while the air groups stationed far behind at
the bases in Kuantan and Thủ Dầu Một in French Indochina were far too far away to be ef-
fectively employed. 
As we have seen, the air unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) had shifted its focus to the eastern
[theater] after conducting Operation Z (from 3 through 5 February), and the air unit of the
Malaya Unit had launched an air campaign against western Java on 9 February. The situation
of the air campaign against [both eastern and western] Java from 9 February onwards was
as follows:(104)
9 February
Eastern Java: Seventeen land-based attack planes of the 23d Air Flotilla conducted a raid on
Malang from Balikpapan.
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Western Java: Sixteen fighter planes and two land-based reconnaissance aircraft of the 22d
Air Flotilla conducted a raid on Batavia and also reconnoitered the city from Kuching.
10 February: No [air] raids were conducted.
11 February
Eastern Java: No [air] raids were conducted.
Western Java: Twenty-seven land-based attack planes of the 22d Air Flotilla took off from
Kuantan with the intention to conduct a raid on Batavia, but they attacked [enemy] war-
ships in Bangka [instead].
12-14 February: No [air] raids were conducted.
15 February
Eastern Java: The 23d Air Flotilla conducted a weather reconnaissance and searched for the
enemy from Balikpapan.
Western Java: The full force of the 22d Air Flotilla from the Kuching, the Kuantan and the
Thủ Dầu Một [airfields] attacked an allied fleet, which launched a counterattack, in the
northern part of the Gaspar Strait.
16 February
Eastern Java: The 23d Air Flotilla conducted a weather reconnaissance from Balikpapan.
Western Java: No [air] raids were conducted.
17 February
Eastern Java: Twenty-five land-based attack planes of the 23d Air Flotilla took off from Ba-
likpapan with the intention to conduct a raid on Surabaya, but they returned due to bad
weather.
Western Java: No [air] raids were conducted. Land-based attack planes of the 22d Air Flotilla
attacked an [enemy] fleet on the sea south of Bangka [Island] off southern Sumatra from
Kuching.
[Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura, who had boarded [the Ryūjō-maru] on that day, had
the following conversation with the chief of the 1st Bureau of the Army Department of IGHQ,
Lt. Gen. Tanaka Shin’ichi, before embarkation:(35) [See also p. 100.]
[Tanaka] “I wonder whether it is possible to dispose of the entire Java invasion [operation]
within fourteen days (two weeks)?”
[Imamura] “At this moment, we have not yet departed [from port], and I cannot tell how many
ships will be able to arrive and disembark while braving enemy torpedoes. What makes you
think that we can complete [the operation] within two weeks?”
“A campaign needs to be ended quickly.”
“I wish in my mind that we can make the enemy surrender within a month, but my conscience
does not allow me to declare that we can [promise to] make it happen.”
“I see. But please, finish it by ‘Shunki-kōreisai’ [the vernal equinox, when the Imperial ceremony
of ancestor worship is held] on 21 March.”
“I will make efforts to end it at the earliest possible date. This is all I can say [now].”
At 1840 on that day (the 17th), the Southern Task Force sent the following telegraphic order
to the Malaya Unit:(120)
1. As of 21 February, the disposition of forces shall be changed as follows:
(1) The Yura, the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions, the 1st Minesweeper Division, the
Kamikawa-maru, two auxiliary submarine chasers, two fishing boats, and the Tsurumi [shall
be transferred] from the Malaya Unit to the Dutch East Indies Unit.
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(2) The 22d Air Flotilla (minus the Mihoro Air Group), a detachment from the 21st Air Flotilla,
and a detachment (minus Type–96 carrier aircraft) from the 23d Air Flotilla [shall be trans-
ferred] from the Malaya Unit to the air unit.
2. The Malaya Unit shall cooperate in the western Java invasion operation, while staying engaged
in its own mission.
By this order, the strength of the escort of the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army,
which was to leave Cam Ranh Bay the next day, the 18th, became two light cruisers, fifteen
destroyers and two auxiliary seaplane tenders from the 21st onwards. Furthermore, the order
let the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) employ the air flotillas [originally under its command]
(the 21st, the 22d and the 23d Air Flotillas) together for the Java operation from the 21st on-
wards.
Although the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army left Cam Ranh Bay on the
18th, the Mentok airfield was not yet available, and neither the airfield in Tanjungkarang nor
in Bali had been seized. Also, the capacity of the Palembang airfield was limited. There was
no prospect yet of advancing naval aircraft to southern Sumatra. The Third Air Force was
still directly cooperating in the Sumatra operation and had not yet launched the air campaign
against Java.
The convoy took its departure neither “after gaining command of the air” nor “when the
deployment of the air force was completed.” It was “a departure taken prior to the seizure
and preparation of air bases.” It meant that both allied aircraft and naval vessels in Java were
still operational at the time of the departure of the convoy.
On the 18th, 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara left Cam Ranh Bay
escorting a large convoy of fifty-six ships carrying the main force of the Sixteenth Army with
one light cruiser and ten destroyers. He wired the Malaya Unit (Vice Admiral Ozawa) on the
same day a request to launch air attacks on enemy naval surface vessels as well as enemy
aircraft on the sea west of Java.(120)
The Advance of the Assembly Points
The unit to land in western Java (the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army with the 2d Division
and the Shōji Detachment as the core) and the unit to land in eastern Java ([consisting of] the
48th Division as the core) had advanced their assembly points respectively from Gaoxiong
to Cam Ranh Bay, and from Luzon to Jolo, which had been carried out roughly in the fol-
lowing way:
The Western Java Landing Unit
On completing arrangements with the Dutch East Indies Unit (i.e. the Third Fleet) in Manila
on 23 January, [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura passed down his orders to the 48th
Division on the next day, the 24th. He returned from Manila to Gaoxiong on the same day,
where, along with the 2d Division commander, Detachment Commander Shōji, and others
he made arrangements with the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander on the 27th, and passed
down his orders to the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army on the 30th. On 3 February, he left
Gaoxiong, flew into Cam Ranh on the 4th, and arrived in Saigon on the same day.(31, 32, 33)
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Of the 5th Destroyer Squadron, which was ordered to return to the Dutch East Indies Unit
from the Malaya Unit for the Java operation, the Natori and the 22d Destroyer Division left
Singora on 9 January and arrived in Magong on the 16th, and the 5th Destroyer Division left
Singora on the 12th and arrived in Magong on the 18th.(120)
The advance of the assembly point of the main force of the Sixteenth Army ([with] the 2d
Division and the Shōji Detachment as the core) from Gaoxiong to Cam Ranh Bay was carried
out under escort of the 5th Destroyer Squadron ([with] one light cruiser and eight destroyers)
in the following way:(120)
First group: twelve transport ships under escort of the Nagatsuki and the Minazuki of the 22d
Destroyer Division
Departed at 1200 on 1 February and arrived at 0900 on the 6th.
Second group: seventeen transport ships under escort of the Harukaze and the Hatakaze of the
5th Destroyer Division
Departed at 1200 on 3 February and arrived at 0900 on the 8th.
Third group: eighteen transport ships under escort of the Fumizuki and the Satsuki of the 22d
Destroyer Division
Departed at 1000 on 5 February and arrived at 0900 on the 10th.
Fourth group: eight transport ships under escort of the Asakaze and the Matsukaze of the 5th De-
stroyer Division, a high speed convoy
Departed at 1200 on 6 February and arrived at 0900 on the 10th.
The plan based on the agreement between the Southern Army and the Southern Task Force
on 1 January was to leave Gaoxiong on 6 February, sail nonstop to Java and land there on the
16th. However, as a result of the Manila Conference, it was changed to advance [first] to Cam
Ranh as described above, depart from the bay on the 13th, and land in Java on the 21st.(23, 96)
The Eastern Java Landing Unit
In the plan based on the agreement between the Southern Army and the Southern Task Force
of 1 January, the unit [consisting of] the 48th Division as the core was to leave Manila on 8
February and sail nonstop to eastern Java and land there on the 16th.(23) However, as a result
of the Manila Conference, the plan was changed so that [the unit] should leave Lingayen on
the 8th, arrive in Jolo on the 12th, leave Jolo on the 16th, and land on eastern Java on the
23d.(96) The reason for the change [of the point of departure] from Manila to Lingayen was
that the Bataan Peninsula, Corregidor Island and other locations had not been seized yet.
Unlike Manila, loading and embarkation were extremely difficult in Lingayen, but there was
no other choice.
As for the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the 2d Base Unit, which had been preparing for
[the operation to] seize Banjarmasin after the seizure of Balikpapan, it was decided that with
the decision to cancel [the operation to] seize Banjarmasin by sea and with the Dutch East
Indies Unit’s shift to phase-three operations, the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander should
sail to Lingayen with the flagship Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division (i.e. the Murasame, the
Samidare, the Yūdachi and the Harusame) and escort the unit to capture eastern Java from Lin-
gayen to Jolo, but that the 2d Base Force commander [R. Adm. Hirose Sueto] should first
support the operation to seize Makassar leading the 9th Destroyer Division (i.e. the Asagumo,
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the Natsugumo and the Minegumo) and the 1st Section of the 24th Destroyer Division (i.e. the
Umikaze and the Kawakaze), and then sail to Jolo to rejoin the 4th Destroyer Squadron.(119)
Rear Admiral Nishimura, commander of the 4th Destroyer Squadron (aboard the Naka),
left Balikpapan on 30 January, arrived in Lingayen on 2 February (the Harusame arrived from
Davao [later] on the 3d), and made the previously mentioned arrangements with the 48th
Division commander in Manila on the 4th.(119) [See pp. 237-240.]
On 8 January, the 48th Division had been relieved on the Bataan front by the 65th Brigade
and was assembling in Manila. Then, on 24 January, the division received the above-men-
tioned order of the Sixteenth Army commander concerning the Java operation, started mov-
ing from Manila to Lingayen Gulf on 26 January, and set about embarking from 30 January
onwards.(31, 79) On 4 February, [48th] Division Commander Tsuchihashi made arrangements
with 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander Nishimura in Manila, left the city on the 5th, em-
barked on the Arizona-maru at Damortis that evening, and passed down his orders concerning
the division’s Java operations on the 6th.(79, 119)
Note: When transferring troops and war matériel [of the division] from Manila to Lingayen by
shuttle motor vehicles, [48th] Division Commander Tsuchihashi transported war matériel
of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet ([assigned to] the Philippines) from Lingayen to
Manila by loading them on the empty return vehicles, which earned him the gratitude of
the Navy.
On the next day, the 7th, the Kanemura Detachment, assigned to [the operation to] capture
Bali, left Lingayen Gulf in the faster ships, the Sasako-maru and the Sagami-maru.(79) As we
have seen, the detachment sailed to Makassar and [further] headed for Bali under the escort
of the 8th Destroyer Division, which had come to Jolo [for the escort] after participating in
the Makassar landing operation in the wake of escorting the Eastern Detachment from Hong
Kong to Ambon by way of Davao.
The convoy of the main force of the 48th Division (its distribution has been given before
[see pp. 237-238]) left Lingayen Gulf on 8 February and arrived in Jolo on the 12th (one ship
lagged behind and arrived on the 13th) under the escort of the light cruiser Naka and the 2d
Destroyer Division (four destroyers) led by Rear Admiral Nishimura.(119) The Kuma of the
Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet also temporarily (from the 8th through the 12th) joined
in the escort [of the convoy] on the way.(119) At Jolo, the 48th Division made the final supple-
mentary preparations for the operations. Although its departure from Jolo had been sched-
uled for the 16th, on the 11th, it was rescheduled for the 19th.(119)
The Decision to Include the Sakaguchi Detachment, the Change in the Oper-
ation Plan of the [Sixteenth] Army, and the Paradrop [Operation] Issue
[Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura advanced to Saigon on 4 February, the main force
of the army completed its assembly in Cam Ranh Bay on the 10th, and the main force of the
48th Division advanced to Jolo on the 12th. During this period (on 10 February), the Sak-
aguchi Detachment seized Banjarmasin.
At that time, the Sakaguchi Detachment was implementing a military administration, sta-
tioning its headquarters and the Kanauji Battalion (the 2d Battalion) in the Balikpapan area
and the Kume Battalion (the 1st Battalion) in the Sanga Sanga and the Samarinda area, while
conducting the Banjarmasin operation with the Matsumoto Battalion (the 3d Battalion) led
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by the commander of the 146th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Yamamoto.(88) On 5 February,
while keeping the Ehime-maru and the Liverpool-maru, which had carried out the transport to
Tanahgrogot for the Banjarmasin operation, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi sent the
other ships (i.e. the Nichiai-maru, the Havana-maru, the Hankow-maru, the Teiryū-maru and the
Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru]) to Palau under the command of the commander of the 44th Field
Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Maj. Takagi Takeo. He ordered Major Takagi to load on the
Teiryū-maru and the Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru] at Palau the remaining troops, horses, and
matériel of the detachment, which had been left there, and lead them back to Balikpapan.(88)
Around the time when the convoy led by Major Takagi departed, Detachment Com-
mander Sakaguchi learned that a decision had been made to put the Navy in charge of the
military administration in Dutch Borneo.(87) The news came as a surprise, as the Sakaguchi
Detachment, which had been specifically requested to implement a proper military admin-
istration by Maj. Gen. Satō Kenryō, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry
before its departure from the mainland, and which [accordingly] had made every kind of
preparation for it, was putting its heart and soul into the implementation of a military ad-
ministration.(87) [Editor’s note: At that time, Major General Satō was still Chief of the Military
Affairs Section.] At that time, the convoys for the Java invasion of the Sixteenth Army, to
which the detachment belonged, were sailing southward one after another from Gaoxiong
and Lingayen. Detachment Commander Sakaguchi immediately wired the Sixteenth Army
a request for participation of his detachment in the Java operation.(87)
The Sixteenth Army headquarters in Saigon received the telegram, but [ignored it because]
it was still closely watching the progress of the Banjarmasin operation. On 10 February, the
report of the seizure of Banjarmasin arrived. The Sixteenth Army immediately (on the same
day) completed a draft order for the Sakaguchi Detachment to participate in the Java opera-
tion and sent (a) staff officer to the Southern Army headquarters to ask for the latter’s ap-
proval. [However,] the 1st Section of the Staff Department of the Southern Army did not
approve.(36) Then, Chief of Staff Okazaki [of the Sixteenth Army] visited Vice Chief of Staff
Aoki [of the Southern Army] to make a [direct] appeal, [but] Vice Chief of Staff Aoki rejected
it, insisting that the 56th Mixed Infantry Group had to be returned to the 56th Division for
the Burma invasion operation and should not incur damage.(36) Chief of Staff Okazaki sought
approval by saying that the Burma invasion operation was to come after the Java invasion,
and that the main force of the Sixteenth Army would [also] take part in the Burma invasion
when the Java invasion was completed. [Even then,] Vice Chief of Staff Aoki was reluctant
to approve it.(36) Whether [the Southern Army] should let the Sakaguchi Detachment partic-
ipate in the Java operation or not was not just a matter of whether to comply with the Sak-
aguchi Detachment’s wish. Whereas the Sixteenth Army hoped that the powerful Saka guchi
Detachment would participate in the Java operation, the Southern Army had to consider the
views of IGHQ as well as [the availability of] ships.
It was on 15 February (three days before the departure of the convoy of the main force of
the Sixteenth Army from Cam Ranh Bay) that the Southern Army finally approved it. On the
16th, Major Takagi (who had left Balikpapan on the 5th and arrived in Palau on the 12th,
leading the convoy [which had been used by the Sakaguchi Detachment]) received a tele-
graphic order from Detachment Commander Sakaguchi in Palau, which said: “Try to return
to Balikpapan by the 21st at the latest with two of the ships, the Teiryū-maru and the Nisshō-
maru [Hiteru-maru].(88) On the 16th, the Sixteenth Army sent the following telegram:(119)
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From: Chief of Staff, Sixteenth Army
To: Chiefs of Staff, Third Fleet, Eleventh Air Fleet, 48th Division, and Commander, 4th Destroyer
Squadron
Sixteenth Army Classified Telegram No. 316, 2100, 16 February
Conform to the purport of Sixteenth Army Telegram No. 297, we would like to have the main
force of the Sakaguchi Detachment assigned to the 48th Division as follows, and have it join the
Dutch East Indies operation roughly in the following manner:
1. The detachment headquarters and about one infantry battalion shall embark in transport
ships at Balikpapan on the 18th, leave the port on the night of the 21st, join the convoy of
the 48th Division off Pamanukan under escort of the Navy, and go ashore in or near Kra-
gan.
2. When the disembarkation of the above unit is completed (around the 27th), the said transport
ships shall immediately be sent to Banjarmasin under escort of the Navy, and embark a unit
[consisting of] about one and a half infantry battalions as the core, and put it ashore in Kra-
gan.
3. The following units shall be left in Borneo for guarding:
The Samarinda area: [A unit consisting of] one infantry battalion (minus two companies) as
the core.
The Balikpapan area: [A unit consisting of] about one infantry company as the core.
In the current state, the above units will be sufficient for maintaining public order.
4. We would like to have the 48th Division commander give directions concerning the escort
of the Sakaguchi Detachment under sail, the outline of the latter’s landing [operation], and
the like. If [all of] you will approve the above, from now on we would like the 48th Division
commander to directly make arrangements with the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander.
5. Our headquarters shall leave Saigon on the morning of tomorrow, the 17th, and be on board
the Ryūjō-maru from the afternoon of that day onwards.
The participation of the Sakaguchi Detachment in the Java operation was brought about after
having gone through the above-described process. The order for its participation, however,
was issued with the 10th as date (note: see the previously description) and read as follows:(31)
Sixteenth Army Order (summary)
1. The 48th Division shall land near Kragan before daybreak on day H.
2. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall go ashore near Kragan in the manner described below, charge
toward Cilacap through the area west of a line which largely connects Mount Lasem (about
twenty kilometers east of Rembang) and Mount Lawu (about forty kilometers east of Surakarta).
It shall seize the city and cut off the enemy’s escape route.
(1) The detachment headquarters and a unit [consisting of] one infantry battalion as the core
shall embark at Balikpapan, and start landing near Kragan around daybreak of day H under
escort of the Navy (if possible, after joining the convoy of the 48th Division off Balikpapan).
(2) Then, it shall immediately send the transport ships to Banjarmasin under escort of the Navy,
and bring the unit [consisting of] about one and a half infantry battalions as the core to Kra-
gan.
(3) After assembling its force in or near Kragan and making the necessary preparations for the
raid, the detachment shall start its operation, charge toward Cilacap all at once, and seize
the city.
3. The 48th Division commander shall make the necessary revisions in the arrangements with the
4th Destroyer Squadron regarding the participation of the Sakaguchi Detachment in the opera-
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tion, and give directions about the escort of the latter under sail, the outline of the latter’s landing
[operation] (landing point(s), the anchorage, and the air defense), and the like. [However,] the
division commander may let Detachment Commander Sakaguchi make the necessary arrange-
ments directly with the relevant naval units concerning the embarkation at Balikpapan, the nav-
igation to the landing point(s), and the move of the Banjarmasin unit.
The 48th Division commander and the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander, who had entered
[the anchorage] at Jolo on 12 February, received the above telegram on the 16th, held talks
and made arrangements on the 17th.(119) Fortunately, the commander of the Dutch East Indies
Unit had left Davao on the 13th with his main unit (the heavy cruiser Ashigara and the de-
stroyer Yamakaze), arrived in Jolo on the 14th, and was preparing for departure (scheduled
for the 17th) for the support of the operation to capture Bali. The 2d Base Force commander,
who had supported the operation to seize Makassar (on the 9th), had also arrived in Jolo on
the 13th.(119) That was why the following decision could be made immediately (on the 17th):(119)
1. The [transport ships] which the Sakaguchi Detachment will board at Balikpapan shall be the
Ehime-maru and the Liverpool-maru, which are [kept] there now. They shall join the convoy of
the 48th Division in the Makassar Strait. The destroyer Kawakaze and the submarine chaser No.
4 shall provide the escort.
2. Regardless of the Sixteenth Army’s order to send the Ehime-maru and the Liverpool-maru back
[to Banjarmasin after disembarkation at Kragan], the faster ships Sasako-maru and Sagami-maru,
which are employed in the Kanemura Detachment’s landing [operation] on Bali on the 19th,
shall be brought to Banjarmasin via Makassar by some time around the 24th, to take the unit
there to Kragan by some time around the 27th. The escort shall be provided by an element of
the 2d Base Unit.
On that day (the 17th), Major Takagi left Palau for Balikpapan, leading the Teiryū-maru and
the Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru].(88)
On the next day, the 18th, Detachment Commander Sakaguchi sent a telegraphic order to
Major Takagi under sail: “The detachment will leave Balikpapan on the evening of the 21st
and join the convoy of the 48th Division on the 22d. The Teiryū-maru and the Nisshō-maru
[Hiteru-maru] shall catch up with it without calling at Balikpapan.”(88) It (the 18th) was the
day when the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army departed from Cam Ranh Bay.
Revision of the Sixteenth Army’s Operation Plan
The operation plan of the Sixteenth Army, which had been drawn up in late December, was
[once] revised in early January due to the moving-up of the Java operation, the return of the
South Seas Detachment [to central command], and other factors. In this revised plan, the
Kanemura Detachment was removed in late January from the eastern Java operation forces
in the part on the Java operation, but now it was decided to include the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment [instead]. In the beginning of mid-February, the Sixteenth Army’s Java operation plan
(including Bali) was revised [again] in the following general way:(36, 40)
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Mission
The [Sixteenth] Army shall land on [both] eastern and western Java before daybreak on 26 Feb-
ruary under cover of the Navy and the Third Air Force and occupy the entire island in a short
period of time.
Directives
1. The 48th Division shall land in or near Kragan under cover of the Navy and seize Surabaya.
The Kanemura Detachment shall capture Bali prior to the landing [operation] of the main force.
2. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall land in or near Kragan almost simultaneously with [the land-
ing of] the 48th Division, charge toward Cilacap, and seize the city.
3. The 2d Division shall land at Bantam Bay with its main force and in or near Merak with one el-
ement. It shall have a powerful element charge toward Buitenzorg and seize the city, while hav-
ing the main force advance toward Batavia and seize the city.
4. The Shōji Detachment shall land in or near Eretan, secure the Kalijati airfield in a surprise attack,
while operating in concert with the main force of the 2d Division.
5. After the seizure of Batavia, the main force of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment shall
attack the Bandung stronghold, lining up side by side to its north.
6. Depending on the circumstances, the detachment charging toward Buitenzorg and the Shōji De-
tachment shall seize Bandung at one fell swoop.
The Issue of the Employment of the Paratroop Unit [for the Operation] Against Cilacap
Once Bali and southern Sumatra were seized, Cilacap was the [only] port where the allied
forces on Java could receive reinforcements or from where they could retreat. The Sixteenth
Army, of course, had noticed this and so had the Southern Army.
The Southern Army studied [the possibility of] a plan to have the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding
Group parachute down in Cilacap and asked for the opinion of the unit that was to execute
it.
As we have seen, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group had carried out the paradrop oper-
ation against Palembang on 14 February. Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel
Itoda, who had descended in Palembang along with the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group ([con-
sisting of] the group headquarters and the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment), had offered,
as already described, his opinion from Palembang on 17 February that [the group] should
not be used for [the operation against] Cilacap.(23)
As described previously, the 38th Division commander had landed in Palembang at 1435
on that day (the 17th). At that very moment, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group had come
under the command of the Sixteenth Army (the 38th Division). Accordingly, the above-men-
tioned opinion had been offered to the Sixteenth Army commander, but was also sent to the
Southern Army by telegram.
On that day (the 17th), the Southern Army was conducting a study on Cilacap, Sabang
(northwest of Sumatra), the Andaman Islands (north of Sabang), and Yenangyaung (an oil
field in Burma) as [prospective] subsequent drop spots for the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group.
On that day, the Third Air Force urged the Southern Army to decide the next drop spot as
soon as possible.(23, 30, 97)
On 20 February, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group reported to the Southern Army its
views on Cilacap, Sabang, Pangkalan Brandan (an oil field in northwestern Sumatra) and
434 Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java
Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java 435
the Andamans. Its opinion was that (1) unless it was to be employed in the [operation against]
Cilacap, it could be employed in [the operations against] Sabang, the Andamans, Pangkalan
Brandan and other areas, but [only] on different days; that (2) if it was to be employed in
[the operation against] the Cilacap stronghold, [the operation] would require the employment
of the full force of the current raiding group and the group could [then] not be employed in
other areas.
On the same day, IGHQ conveyed to the Southern Army its view that the group should
be employed to seize oil resources. On the 24th, the Southern Army decided to employ the
group in [an operation against] the Pangkalan Brandan oil field. However, after [this deci-
sion], it turned out that about 80% of the oil field had been destroyed, so on the 27th–28th
the decision was changed to employ the unit in Burma.(23, 30, 97)
In the meantime, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group had returned under the command of
the Third Air Force by the Southern Army order of the 22d, and then, on 1 March, it was re-
turned to the direct control of the Southern Army, as previously described.
2. The Sailing [of the Convoys]
The Situation of the Enemy as Assessed Just Before the Sailing
The main force of the Sixteenth Army and the 48th Division respectively departed from Cam
Ranh Bay and Jolo on 18 and 19 February and headed for Java. The situation of the enemy
as known at that time was in outline as follows:
1. Air force
At the end of January (when the Twenty-fifth Army advanced to the shore opposite Singapore),
the air force in the Dutch East Indies (mainly on Java and Sumatra) was estimated to be five
hundred aircraft. (See the previous descriptions.) [pp. 256-257, 419-420.]
On 10 February, the Southern Army estimated that “the Dutch East Indies forces [deployed]
a total of about four hundred aircraft.”(23) On the same day, [the Navy Department of] IGHQ
notified that “according to enemy telegrams, the enemy air force in Singapore, Sumatra and
Java consists of 190 bombers and 200 pursuit aircraft as of the 6th, and they are being reinforced
by two bombers every day and thirty-six pursuit aircraft every week.”(117)
Although [the Japanese forces] had seized the Palembang airfield on 14 February, the Lesser
Sunda Islands were still under the control of the allied forces as of 18 February, and the judgment
was that the [enemy] losses were being replenished.
2. Fleet
In the eastern Java area, the whereabouts of the allied fleet, which was [considered to] have re-
treated after having three of its cruisers sunk ([according to the Japanese] judgment at that time)
out of seven cruisers and nine destroyers in the sea engagement off Java on 4 February, were
unknown.(102) Bad weather had hindered aerial reconnaissance.(102)
In the western Java area, the three cruisers and five destroyers, which had retreated after as-
suming a posture of counterattack at the Gaspar Strait at the time of the southern Sumatra land-
ing operation on 15 February, were considered to be near Batavia.(102) On 9 February, the Southern
Task Force wired that “through our air raids at the beginning of February, the enemy based on
Java has lost most of its air and naval forces, and as our invasion operations progress, it is highly
likely that the remaining forces will attempt to escape to Australia, India and South Africa.”(117)
[See pp. 407, 424.] However, the units assigned to capture Bali and those departing for western
Java were concerned because of the above-mentioned counterattacks on 15 February, the day-
in-day-out bad weather in the eastern Java area, the unfinished operations to capture southern
Sumatra, and other reasons.(114)
As mentioned previously, the units involved [in the operation to] capture Bali requested the
Eleventh Air Fleet to search for the enemy and attack them, and on the 18th (the day of departure
from Cam Ranh Bay) the commander of the 5th Destroyer Squadron, Rear Admiral Hara, also
requested the commander of the Malaya Unit, Vice Admiral Ozawa, to launch an air attack on
the allied fleets in the waters west of Java, to have the 7th Cruiser Division accompany the con-
voy of transport ships, and to have the aircraft carrier Ryūjō sail along with them as well if pos-
sible.(120)
3. The army
The strength known in 1941 was as follows:(2, 23)
Time the information was known: End of September Beginning of November 10 November
Java: 50,000
Dutch East Indies in total: 70,000 85,000 100,000
The breakdown of the above 100,000 troops was known to be 75,000 regular troops, 15,000 vol-
unteer soldiers and 10,000 policemen and indigenous units, while the ratios of white men in the
regular troops, the volunteer troops and the police force were 20%, 95% and 10% respectively.
The army strength on Java was known to consist of two divisions as the core.(2, 23)
After the opening of hostilities, the Dutch East Indies Army staff officer who was taken pris-
oner in the [Japanese] capture of Tarakan (11 January) stated that one division had been added
in central Java, which increased the troops in Java to three divisions as the core, and that their
disposition on Java was:(24)
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Army headquarters: Bandung.
Eastern Java: One division ([one unit consisting of] three infantry battalions as the core in
Malang, and [one unit consisting of] one infantry battalion as the core in Surabaya).
Central Java: One division ([one unit consisting of] three infantry battalions as the core in Mage-
lang and [one unit consisting of] one infantry battalion in Surakarta and Cilacap each).
Western Java: One division ([one unit consisting of] three infantry battalions as the core in Ban-
dung, and [another unit consisting of] three infantry battalions as the core in Batavia).
Along with the progress of [the operation to] seize key areas outside Java, the information on
the [enemy] disposition known by the end of January and by 10 February was as shown in Il-
lustrations No. 42 and No. 43.(23) However, it was information on the Dutch East Indies Army
[only]. After the opening of hostilities, the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Com-
mand was established, and it was beyond doubt that Supreme Commander General Wavell
(Britain) had set up his general headquarters near Bandung.(23) There was [also] information
that two or three battalions of the British and Australian armies were additionally sent to Suma-
tra by the end of January.(23) How many [allied] troops would retreat to Java from Singapore and
Sumatra with the operations against southern Sumatra in progress, and how many [allied]
troops had been or would be additionally sent to Java from other countries, was [also] a matter
of concern.
The Start of the Sailing and a Two-Day Postponement of the Landings
(See Illustrations No. 44 and No. 45)
The large convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army [consisting] of fifty-six ships de-
parted from Cam Ranh Bay at 1000 on the 18th,(120) while the convoy of the 48th Division
[consisting] of thirty-eight ships departed from Jolo at 0800 on the 19th.(119)
As of the 19th, the Tanaka Detachment was heading southward from Palembang for Tan-
jungkarang in southern Sumatra. In the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Kanemura Detachment
was from that morning in the middle of its landing [operation] on Bali, while the Eastern De-
tachment was approaching Timor for its landing operation scheduled for the following morn-
ing. The Carrier Task Force (the First Air Fleet) under the command of Vice Admiral Nagumo
was carrying out an air raid on Port Darwin in full force on that day.
On that day (the 19th), the Southern Task Force was escorting the transport of the Six-
teenth Army units, and operated roughly as follows:
Main force of the Southern Task Force with the flagship Atago (a heavy cruiser) [and consisting
of] the 3d Battleship Division (the battleships Hiei, Kirishima, Kongō and Haruna) and the 4th
Destroyer Division (the Arashi, the Nowaki, the Hagikaze and the Maikaze) had left Palau on
the day before, the 18th, and was first advancing toward Staring Bay (southeast Celebes)
with the aim of conducting operations in the waters south of Java at the time of the Java
landing operation (on the 26th).(116)
Carrier Task Force [consisting of] the aircraft carriers Akagi and Kaga (the 1st Carrier Division),
and the aircraft carriers Sōryū and Hiryū (the 2d Carrier Division), the heavy cruisers Maya
and Takao ([of] the 4th Cruiser Division), Tone and Chikuma ([of] the 8th Cruiser Division),
the 1st Destroyer Squadron (the light cruiser Abukuma, the 17th Destroyer Division, and the
2d Section of the 27th Destroyer Division), the 18th Destroyer Division (minus two destroy-
ers), and the Akigumo, was in the middle of the air raid on Port Darwin. It was scheduled to
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Illustration No. 42 — The [Enemy] Disposition as Known by the End of January
Illustration No. 43 — The [Enemy] Disposition as Known by 10 February
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return to Staring Bay on the 21st and then conduct carrier operations on the waters south of
Java.(116, 123)
Malaya Unit:
On the 16th, judging that the escort operations in [Operation] L were for the most part com-
pleted, [First Southern Expeditionary Fleet] Commander in Chief Ozawa had switched the
main force to its next operation. However, on that day, the 19th, the convoy of the main force
of the 38th Division had not yet reached Palembang, and its river-ascending operation was
still going on. [Nevertheless,] the flagship Chōkai (a heavy cruiser), the aircraft carrier Ryūjō,
and the destroyers Shikinami and Isonami returned to Cap Saint Jacques on that day, the 19th.
The light cruiser Yura, the 11th Destroyer Division (the Hatsuyuki, the Shirayuki and the
Fubuki), the 12th Destroyer Division (the Shirakumo and the Murakumo), and the auxiliary
seaplane tender Kamikawa-maru, which were to be transferred to the Dutch East Indies Unit
(the 3d Escort Unit) on the 21st, completed assembly in the Anambas Islands by that day
[the 19th].
The 7th Cruiser Division (the heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma and Mogami), which
was to support the Java landing operation of the main force of the Sixteenth Army ([escorted
by] the 5th Destroyer Squadron), had entered the anchorage in the Anambas Islands on the
17th, and was standing by there.
The 3d Destroyer Squadron commander was continuing Operation L, leading the light
cruiser Sendai (the flagship), a few destroyers and lesser ships.(103, 115, 118, 130)
The 22d Air Flotilla returned under the command of the commander in chief of the
Eleventh Air Fleet on this day (the 19th) ahead of schedule and became the 3d Air Raid
Unit.(104, 135)
Dutch East Indies Unit:
Main Unit, the flagship Ashigara (a heavy cruiser) and the destroyer Yamakaze (accompanied
by the Kawakaze as well) left Jolo on the 17th and advanced to Balikpapan to support the
operation to capture Bali (the Kawakaze was for escorting the Sakaguchi Detachment).(103)
The Bali Invasion [Support] Unit, [consisting of] the light cruiser Nagara and the 8th De-
stroyer Division (the Ōshio, the Asashio, the Michishio and the Arashio) was in the middle
of supporting the landing [operation] on Bali, which had started that morning.(124)
The Timor Invasion [Support] Unit, [consisting of] the heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi of
the 5th Cruiser Division, and the auxiliary seaplane tender Mizuho, the flagship light
cruiser Jintsū of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the destroyers Oyashio, Hayashio and Kuroshio
(of the 15th Destroyer Division), the Yukikaze, the Tokitsukaze, the Amatsukaze, and the
Hatsukaze (of the 16th Destroyer Division), the Ushio, the Sazanami and the Akebono (of
the 7th Destroyer Division), and the Ikazuchi (of the 6th Destroyer Division) was sup-
porting the landing operation on Timor to be conducted on the next day, the 20th.(114, 117)
The unit to escort the 48th Division, [consisting of] the light cruiser Naka, flagship of the 4th
Destroyer Squadron commander, the 2d Destroyer Division (the Murasame, the Samidare,
the Yūdachi and the Harusame), both of which had escorted the division from Lingayen
Gulf, the 9th Destroyer Division (the Asagumo, the Natsugumo and the Minegumo), the
24th Destroyer Division (only the Umikaze; the Kawakaze had departed with the main
unit [of the Dutch East Indies Unit] earlier), the [mine]layer Itsukushima, flagship of the
2d Base Force commander, the seaplane tender Chitose, all of which had sailed north to
Jolo after supporting the Makassar operation, escorted the convoy of the 48th Division
[consisting] of thirty-eight ships (apart from the Satsuma-maru which departed later) from
Jolo.(119)
The unit to escort the main force of the Sixteenth Army, [consisting of] the light cruiser Natori,
flagship of the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander, the 5th Destroyer Division (the Harukaze,
the Hatakaze, the Asakaze and the Matsukaze) and the 22d Destroyer Division (the Nagatsuki,
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the Minazuki, the Fumizuki and the Satsuki), all of which had escorted the force from Gaox-
iong, the 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division (the Akatsuki and the Hibiki, which came
from Davao to Cam Ranh), and the auxiliary seaplane tender San’yō-maru (which had been
diverted to Cam Ranh after the Balikpapan operation) had departed from Cam Ranh on the
day before, the 18th (on the 17th for the San’yō-maru), and was sailing southward, escorting
the convoy of fifty-six ships carrying the main force of the Sixteenth Army. They were noti-
fied that they would be joined by the previously-mentioned 11th Destroyer Division (the
Hatsuyuki, the Shirayuki and the Fubuki), the 12th Destroyer Division (the Shirakumo and the
Murakumo), the light cruiser Yura, and the auxiliary seaplane tender Kamikawa-maru at the
Anambas Islands on the 21st, and that they would be provided with the cooperation of the
7th Cruiser Division ([consisting of] four heavy cruisers).(120)
Submarine Unit, [consisting of] Submarine Unit A (the 4th and the 6th Submarine Squadrons),
B (the 5th Submarine Squadron) and C (the 2d Submarine Squadron) was advancing respec-
tively towards the seas southeast, west, and south of Java.(117)
Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet):
On that day, the 19th, the force under the command of the 22d Air Flotilla commander was
returned from the Malaya Unit. Vice Admiral Tsukahara (with his headquarters in Davao)
[ordered] the shift to phase-three operations with the disposition of the 1st Air Raid Unit
([consisting of] the 21st Air Flotilla as the core, whose headquarters had returned from
Ambon to Kendari on the 17th), the 2d Air Raid Unit ([consisting of] the 23d Air Flotilla with
its headquarters in Balikpapan), and the 3d Air Raid Unit ([consisting of] the 22d Air Flotilla
with its headquarters in Kuching).(135)
Note: The Southern Task Force had issued an order on 18 February and brought forward
the date of transfer of the force under the command of the 22d Air Flotilla commander
from the 21st to the 19th.(135)
On that day (the 19th), the [Army] Third Air Force launched an air assault on western Java
from Palembang.
On the next day, the 20th, the convoy [of the units for the operation] to capture Java
steadily sailed south. As we have seen, allied cruisers and destroyers raided the disembarka-
tion point at Bali before daybreak. The 8th Destroyer Division fought a fierce battle, and the
main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit (the Ashigara, the Kawakaze, and the Yamakaze) rushed
southward on this day, having left Balikpapan at 0300 before daybreak. Fortunately, the sea
battle ended in Japanese favor, and twenty-seven aircraft of the 2d Air Raid Unit advanced
to the Bali airfield as early as that day. In the western [theater], Tanjungkarang was seized
on that day, the 20th, and in the eastern [theater], the landing [operation] on Timor was suc-
cessfully carried out on the same day.
On the next day, the 21st, the convoy kept steadily sailing southward. That morning the
convoy of the 48th Division reached the north end of the Makassar Strait and was sailing
southward off Samarinda in the evening. The commander of the Dutch East Indies Unit trans-
ferred the 8th Destroyer Division, which had engaged in a fierce battle off Bali, to the main
unit on that day and ordered the division to stand by in Makassar.(117) He [also ordered] the
seaplane tender Mizuho, which was in the middle of the Timor operation, to sail westward.(117)
The main unit of the Southern Task Force, which had sailed south from Palau, and the Carrier
Task Force, which had carried out the air raid on Port Darwin, both entered the anchorage at
Staring Bay on that day.(102) The commander of the Southern Task Force issued the following
order on that day:(119)
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Day Z shall be set as the base date of the operation and shall be applied to the Southern Task
Force and the Southern Army as a whole. Day Z shall be 26 February.
In the western [theater], the Yura, and the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions, which had
been transferred to the command of the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander from the Malaya
Unit, joined the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army in the waters about 100 nau-
tical miles north of the Anambas Islands at 0800 on that day. This increased the escort of the
convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army to two cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Apart
from those, the San’yō-maru (which had left Cam Ranh on the 17th and arrived in the Anam-
bas Islands on the 19th) and the Kamikawa-maru (which had been in Anambas since [the ex-
ecution of] Operation L) had been providing direct escort with their seaplanes.(120, 130, 131) (See
Illustration No. 45)
On the next day, the 22d, the convoy was still steadily sailing southward. However,
around 1500 when it reached the waters at the latitude and longitude of 1°24‘ N 107°55‘ E,
the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army reversed its course and began to sail
northward.(130) This was because according to a signal from the Natori, the flagship of the 5th
Destroyer Squadron, “[due to] a powerful enemy fleet spotted in the Java Sea, day H has
been postponed by two days, and the landing [operation] has been changed to the 28th.”(36)
The convoy’s sailing in reverse direction still continued on the morning of the 23d. At the
time of departure from Cam Ranh, [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura had given the
order that “should anything happen to me, [2d] Divisional Commander Maruyama should
take command, and if anything should happen to Divisional Commander Maruyama, Chief
Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java 441
Illustration No. 44 — Situation [of Japanese Forces] on 19 February
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of Staff Okazaki [of the Sixteenth Army] should take command.”(35, 47) On the Ryūjō-maru car-
rying the army headquarters, some staff officers of the army started saying: “Shouldn’t we
land on southern Sumatra and then land on Java by maneuvering [landing] craft [from
there]?.”(44) Others complained that it was a fine kettle of fish that the Chōkai, the flagship of
the Malaya Unit, and the aircraft carrier Ryūjō had stayed at Cap Saint Jacques to prepare for
a triumphal entry into the port of Singapore on the 27th.(36) Around 1400 (on the 23d), the
convoy finally reversed course and resumed its southward sailing. The Dutch East Indies
Unit officially proposed the army to reschedule day H (Z) for the 28th. The [Sixteenth] Army
commander wired back his approval and transmitted it to all the transport ships. Sometime
after 1600, allied submarine(s) were spotted, but the convoy continued sailing southward on
a zigzag course.
In the meantime (on the 22d and the 23d), the general situation had changed roughly in
the following way:
1. The air operations had progressed in the following way since 18 February:(96, 99, 100, 104)
18 [February]
Eastern Java: Twenty-three land-based attack planes and fifteen fighter planes of the 2d Air
Raid Unit conducted an [air] raid on Surabaya from Balikpapan. Six [enemy] destroyers
and sixteen transport ships were spotted in the port.
Western Java: It was impossible to conduct [air] attacks.
19 [February]
It was the day when the Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) shifted to phase-three dispositions,
and when the force under the command of the 22d Air Flotilla commander became the
3d Air Raid Unit. [It was also the day] when the [Army] Third Air Force launched an air
campaign against Java.
Eastern Java: Although eighteen land-based attack planes and twenty-four fighter planes of
the 2d Air Raid Unit took off from Balikpapan to conduct an [air] attack on Surabaya,
they could not enter [over the city] due to bad weather and attacked Bawean Island and
other locations [instead].
Western Java: The [Navy] 3d Air Raid Unit conducted a reconnaissance of Batavia from
Kuching with [a] land-based reconnaissance aircraft. One ship, which was apparently
an [enemy] aircraft carrier, three cruisers and ten transport ships were spotted. The
[Army] Third Air Force carried out an [air] assault on Bandung, Buitenzorg and other
cities from Palembang with a [mixed] force of some sixty fighter planes and bombers,
and engaged with some thirty or more allied planes.
20 [February]
Eastern Java: Twenty-seven fighter planes and three land-based reconnaissance aircraft of
the [Navy] 2d Air Raid Unit advanced into Bali. Twenty-two fighter planes of the 23d
Air Flotilla conducted a raid on Surabaya and Malang.
Western Java: The land-based attack planes of the [Naval] 3d Air Raid Unit searched for the
enemy in Batavia from Kuching and spotted five cruisers, eight destroyers, fifty or more
transport ships, ten flying boats and three reconnaissance seaplanes in Batavia.
The [Army] Third Air Force carried out a raid on Kalijati from Palembang with a [mixed]
force of some fifty fighter planes and bombers.
21 [February]
Eastern Java: Thirteen fighter planes of the 23d Air Flotilla conducted a raid on Surabaya
and vicinity from Bali and Balikpapan. Twenty-one land-based attack planes of the 23d
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Air Flotilla conducted a raid on Surabaya from Balikpapan. One [enemy] cruiser and
thirteen destroyers were spotted in the port.
Western Java: A [mixed] force of some thirty fighter planes and bombers of the [Army] Third
Air Force conducted a raid on Kalijati and Bandung from Palembang.
2. The main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit, which had rushed south from Balikpapan
on the 20th at the report of a naval engagement near the landing point on Bali, entered
the anchorage of Staring Bay on the morning of the 22d and joined the main force of the
Southern Task Force and the Carrier Task Force, which had advanced into the bay the day
before.
The commanders of the Southern Task Force, the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Car-
rier Task Force held talks, examined [the situation], and decided that the air campaign
that had started on the 18th (for eastern Java) and the 19th (for western Java) was not suf-
ficient, and that there seemed to remain five to seven [enemy] cruisers and some ten de-
stroyers in Batavia and two cruisers and about five destroyers in Surabaya.
They also judged that it was necessary to intensify the air campaigns and reinforce the
surface units in the Java Sea area, which would necessitate a two-day postponement of
the date of the landings.(117)
Accordingly, telegrams [to propose] a two-day postponement of the date of the land-
ings, etc. were sent around 1200 on the 22d to the Sixteenth Army and the Southern Army.
Also, the orders to reverse course for the convoys were transmitted, and by evening di-
rections were given about the concentration of surface forces into the Java Sea, etc.
The Dutch East Indies Unit issued the following order concerning the course reversal
of the convoys:(117)
Third Fleet Classified Telegram No. 445 1200, 22 February
The dates to launch the landing of Operation Su and Ya shall be postponed until 28 February.
The unit for Operation Su shall stand by near Balikpapan. The unit for Operation Ya shall
act at the right moment as designated by the commander.
Note: Su indicated eastern Java, and Ya western Java.
The proposal wired by the Dutch East Indies Unit to the Sixteenth Army regarding the
postponement of the schedule read: “In view of the activities of naval vessels and aircraft
of the enemy in the Java area as well as the results of our air campaigns, we propose a
postponement of the date to start landing by two days until 28 February.”At the same
time, the Southern Task Force sent a telegram to the same effect to the Southern Army,
and also requested it to cooperate in the naval air unit(s)’ advance into the Gelumbang
base so that they could destroy [enemy] naval vessels in the western Java area.(24) The Six-
teenth Army wired back its approval on the 23d.(32) On the 23d, the Southern Army replied
to the Southern Task Force: “While requesting no further postponements other than the
above days, we will [provide] ample support to make the Gelumbang airfield ready for
the Navy,” and sent the following telegram to the 38th Division.(23, 24) The reason why it
sent the telegram directly to the 38th Division was that it thought that the Sixteenth Army
had sealed off its radio communications.
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From: Chief of Staff [Southern Army]
To: 38th Division commander [in] Palembang (sent on the 23d)
Southern Army Staff Section 1 Telegram No. 95
1. [This] is to the highest extent relevant to the landing [operation] of the main force for [Op-
eration] H. We would like you to immediately provide the Navy with ample support to
make the Gelumbang airfield ready ([by] transporting fuel and ammunition, etc.).
2. Gelumbang is located about fifty kilometers southwest of Palembang.
3. The warship Shumushu and the Kōchō-maru [probably a misprint for Kōryū-maru] are in
charge of readying the Navy’s airfield and are now in port in Palembang.
As for the concentration of surface forces into the Java Sea and other issues, the Southern
Task Force and the Dutch East Indies Unit decided the following and gave directions by
the night of the 22d:(117)
1. The main force of the Southern Task Force and the Carrier Task Force shall leave Staring Bay
on the 25th and advance to the sea south of Java as formerly planned. The 5th Cruiser Divi-
sion’s advance into the Indian Ocean shall be canceled.
2. The main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit (the Ashigara, the Ikazuchi and the Akebono —
the Yamakaze and the Kawakaze were replaced by the Ikazuchi and the Akebono) shall leave
Staring Bay on the morning of the 23d, first support the second disembarkation operation
at Bali (on the 25th), and then support the unit to land in eastern Java.
3. The Eastern Support Unit ([of the Dutch East Indies Unit, consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Di-
vision, the Ikazuchi and the Akebono, which had returned to Staring Bay on the 22d after sup-
porting the Timor landing operation) shall be reorganized into the 5th Cruiser Division Unit,
which will be made up of the 5th Cruiser Division (the Nachi and the Haguro), the Yamakaze
the Kawakaze, and the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Division (the Ushio and the Sazanami,
which were [at that time] in the middle of the Timor operation). [The unit] shall timely op-
erate around the rear of the 1st Escort Unit (which, with the 4th Destroyer Squadron as the
core, is escorting the unit for the landing in eastern Java), support the unit, and catch and
destroy allied naval vessels. In this operation, the 5th Cruiser Division commander may give
directions to the 4th and the 2d Destroyer Squadron commanders (the latter of whom is con-
ducting the Timor operation, but is supposed to hurry to join [the operation]). The advance
of the 5th Cruiser Division to the Indian Ocean shall be canceled.
4. The Nagara, the 8th Destroyer Division (the Asashio and the Arashio), and the 21st Destroyer
Division (the Wakaba, the Nenohi, and the Hatsushimo) under the command of the 1st Base
Force commander, shall leave Makassar on the 23d and cover the second disembarkation
operation on Bali on the 25th.
5. The 2d Escort Unit (which is covering the landing [operation] on Timor) shall be disbanded
at 1800 on the 24th. The Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer Division (the Yukikaze, the Tokitsukaze,
the Amatsukaze and the Hatsukaze), under the command of the 2d Destroyer Squadron com-
mander, shall advance to the waters south of Cape Selatan around 1600 on the 26th from
Timor by way of Makassar. The 15th Destroyer Division (the Oyashio, the Hayashio, the
Kuroshio and the Natsushio [editor’s note: the last-mentioned ship had actually been sunk on
9 February, see p. 397] shall participate in the carrier operation of the Carrier Task Force and
the main force of the Southern Task Force in the Indian Ocean from Timor. The 1st Section
of the 7th Destroyer Division (the Ushio and the Sazanami) shall sail westward from Timor
to come under the command of the 5th Cruiser Division commander.
6. The Tomozuru shall leave Makassar, escorting the Sasako-maru (which had returned to Makas-
sar after disembarking the Kanemura Detachment at Bali), embark Regimental Commander
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Yamamoto and his men on the Sasako-maru at Banjarmasin and then let the latter join the
convoy [of the units to] land on eastern Java on the sea south of Cape Selatan around 1200
on the 26th.
3. The Ehime-maru and the Liverpool-maru carrying the main force of the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment left Balikpapan at 0800 on the 22d and took up their position at the rear of the convoy
of the 48th Division north of Aru Bank at 1200 on the same day.(119) The 1st Escort Unit
(i.e. the 4th Destroyer Squadron), which had passed through the waterway of Aru Bank
at 1220 escorting the 48th Division and the Sakaguchi Detachment, received the previously
mentioned telegraphic order around 1345, reversed the course of the convoy at 1400, and
temporarily anchored at a spot thirteen nautical miles southwest of Balikpapan.(119) The
Teiryū-maru and the Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru] under the command of [Army] Major Tak-
agi, which had hurriedly sailed from Palau, had arrived in Balikpapan before noon on
that day. They had sailed night and day in such a hurry that five stokers had collapsed
on the way. On arrival in Balikpapan, [Army Major Takagi] had drawn a sigh of disap-
pointment when Detachment Commander Kume told him: “The Sakaguchi Detachment
has [already] departed this morning.” However, luckily for him, he learned the next day,
the 23d, that the convoy had reversed course, as previously mentioned, and he [was able
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Illustration No. 45 — The Situation on 22 and 23 February
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to] join [the convoy] on the same day.(88) [Editor’s note: There is some confusion about the
date and time he joined the convoy. See pp. 450, 537.]
4. The Southern Army had wired that ample support should be immediately provided to
make the Gelumbang airfield ready. The Gelumbang issue had gone through the follow-
ing twists and turns.
In eastern Java, the aircraft of the 2d Air Raid Unit, which had advanced into Bali from
the 20th onwards, conducted a raid over Semarang and other locations from Bali with six
fighter planes on the 22d for two days running (which was mentioned earlier). It also con-
ducted a raid on Malang from Bali with fourteen fighter planes on the 23d and was freely
carrying out its air campaign. Against western Java, however, the 3d Air Raid Unit had
not been able to launch air attacks [yet].(104)
The air operation against western Java was [planned and conducted] roughly in the
following way.
On 28 January, an arrangement had been concluded for the [air operation in] Operation
L between the Army and the Navy [pp. 265-267], which was in outline that (1) the [Navy]
Malaya Unit and the Army should employ respectively about 176 and about 137 aircraft;
(2) that when the Ledo [airfield] was fit for use, the Malaya Unit should use the Ledo, the
Kuching, the Kuantan and the Sungai Petani [airfields]; (3) that the Malaya Unit should
attack [the area] east of the line connecting Mentok and Palembang; and (4) that after the
landing in L [i.e. Bangka and Palembang], the airfield on Bangka should be shared by the
Army and the Navy with thirty aircraft each, whereas Palembang should be used exclu-
sively by the Army.(96) However, the Ledo airfield was not fit for use, and even though
the Malaya Unit had launched its air operation [in Operation] L on 9 February, it was not
able to conduct a sufficient air campaign against western Java.
The next day, 10 February, a revised version of the “Memorandum of the Arrange-
ments for Operation H between the Sixteenth Army, the Third Air Force, the Third Fleet
and the Eleventh Air Fleet” was concluded. The original arrangement had preliminarily
been agreed at the Manila Conference and concluded on 30 January, based on the assump-
tion that the 22d Air Flotilla should return to the Eleventh Air Fleet. [So,] its distinctive
feature was the exclusion of the Malaya Unit (the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet).(96)
In this arrangement, it was agreed (1) that the forces to be employed should be about 190
aircraft of the Eleventh Air Fleet, about 50 reconnaissance seaplanes of the Third Fleet,
and about 179 aircraft of the [Army] Third Air Force; (2) that the Army should mainly use
the Palembang [airfield], while the Mentok [airfield] should be shared by the Army and
the Navy (with thirty aircraft each); that when the Tanjungkarang [airfield] was fit for use
for the Army, the Mentok [airfield] would be [handed over] to the Navy for its exclusive
use; that the Army might use the Ledo [airfield] for some command reconnaissance air-
craft; that in addition to the Ledo [airfield], the Navy might partially use the Palembang
[airfield] and share the Mentok [airfield with the Army] (to return to its exclusive use
later); and (3) that the Navy should conduct its raids on [the area] to the east of 108º east.(96)
(See the previous description.)
On 14 February (the day when the [Paratroop] Raiding Group descended on Palem-
bang), the Third Air Force drew up an outline for the air operation [in Operation] H.(96)
At that time, the Fifteenth Army was charging toward Rangoon in Burma, and the [Army]
Fifth Air Force was supporting this operation. The Twenty-fifth Army was in the middle
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of its attack on Singapore, and its subsequent operations included the northern Sumatra
invasion operation. For this reason, the [Army] Third Air Force ([consisting of] the 3d,
the 7th and the 12th Air Divisions, the 81st Air Group, and the 15th Independent Air Unit),
which had to cooperate with [both] the Twenty-fifth and the Sixteenth Armies, set down
in summary the following points in the outline of the air operations [in Operation] H:(96)
1. In conjunction with the Navy, we shall swiftly destroy [enemy] air power in the western
Java area in the wake of Operation L and [also] closely support the Sixteenth Army in the
latter’s operations in western Java.
2. As the airfields in Palembang and Tanjungkarang are seized and made ready for use, we
shall first destroy the enemy air power in western Java (to the west of 108º east).
3. From the day before the landing [operation] of the main force of the Sixteenth Army (25 Feb-
ruary), we shall provide cover for the convoy of the main force of the 2d Division under sail
and the air defense at its anchorage, as well as directly support the main force of the Sixteenth
Army in its ground combat.
4. Forces to be employed for Operation H and their operations are as follows:
81st Air Group: shall search [for the enemy].
12th Air Division (a fighter air division; [consisting of] one squadron of the 1st Air Group
and the 11th Air Group): 
Shall destroy [enemy] air power, cover the convoy and its anchorage, and [provide] air
defense.
3d Air Division:
Headquarters
15th Independent Air Unit (the headquarters, the 50th and the 52d Independent
Squadron — command reconnaissance aircraft)
59th Air Group (fighter planes)
64th Air Group (fighter planes)
27th Air Group (minus one squadron; assault planes)
90th Air Group (light bombers)
75th Air Group (light bombers):
Shall destroy [enemy] air power, directly support ground operations and cover the con-
voy as needed.
On that day (the 14th) the paratroop unit seized the Palembang airfield, and on the next
day, the 15th, the aircraft of the 3d and the 12th Air Divisions started their advance into
the Palembang [airfield]. On the same day, the Tanaka Detachment landed in Mentok and
Palembang.
On the next day, the 16th, the 12th Air division headquarters also advanced to the
Palembang [airfield] to which twenty army aircraft had advanced by that day.(135)
On the next day, the 17th, the 3d Air Division headquarters also advanced into Palem-
bang, which increased the number of the army aircraft advanced to the airfield by this
day to twenty-nine.(98, 135) About the situation of both the Mentok and the Ledo airfields,
however, one could only be pessimistic. Although a total of 8,091 men had been employed
[for readying] the Ledo airfield during a total period of twenty-one days by that day, the
condition of the airfield as of that day was as previously described [p. 306].(23) Although
on that day the Malaya Unit passed down an order to the 22d Air Flotilla to advance its
aircraft to the Ledo airfield for the first time, it was just a pitiful order that [only] one
squadron should be advanced to Ledo as soon as possible from the 19th onwards.(135) A
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hurried preparation was also going on at the Mentok airfield, but for the time being it
could not be put to use. Out of necessity, the Malaya Unit on that day requested the
[Army] Third Air Force to allow twenty naval aircraft to advance to the Palembang [air-
field].(135)
However, on the next day, the 18th, the Third Air Force rejected the request.(135) The
Palembang airfield was not large enough either, and neither the convoy nor the necessary
matériel had reached Palembang (the former arrived on the afternoon of the 20th). The
situation of the units for [Operation] H of the [Army] Third Air Force was that [finally]
all but the 75th Air Group managed to advance there by that day.(96) The situation at the
Mentok airfield as of that night was that “for the present [a runway of] seventy meters
wide and seven hundred meters long has been completed, and its extension to one thou-
sand meters in length is expected to be completed in several days, [but] the ground is
quite bumpy.”(118) It meant that the airfield would remain unavailable for the time being.
On the next day, the 19th, the [Army] Third Air Force launched its air operation [in
Operation] H from Palembang. A total of twenty-four aircraft of the 59th, the 64th and
the 90th Air Groups conducted a raid on Buitenzorg [Bogor] in the morning, and [a total
of] thirty-seven aircraft on Bandung in the afternoon. They reported a military gain of
bringing down nineteen [enemy] aircraft in total (three of which uncertain), and nine
[enemy] aircraft destroyed by fire; one [of the Japanese] aircraft did not return.(96) On that
day, the [Army] Third Air Force discovered the Gelumbang airfield and reported it to the
Eleventh Air Fleet.(135) It was the day when the Air Unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet) took
over the command of the 22d Air Flotilla and started giving directions to it as the [Navy]
3d Air Raid Unit.(135)
On the next day, the 20th, the 3d Air Raid Unit was still at its bases in Kuching, Kuan-
tan and Thủ Dầu Một (in French Indochina). The Navy side had become extremely wor-
ried. On that day, the 22d Air Flotilla wired a request to the Eleventh Air Fleet: “As for
the Ledo [airfield], we have made efforts to accumulate fuel and ammunition both by sea
and by land, but we barely managed to accumulate [enough] fuel and ammunition for a
single sortie of twenty-seven land-based attack planes; there is no prospect of progress in
the accumulation [of fuel and ammunition] in the future, and the airfield is in no good
condition either; furthermore, it is unlikely that fuel and ammunition can be transported
to Gelumbang in time; we request [you to take measures] so that we can make use of the
Palembang [airfield].”(135) Unable to remain indifferent to the 22d Air Flotilla’s predica-
ment, Cdr. Naitō Takeshi, a staff officer of the Malaya Unit, on that day visited the South-
ern Army to request that the Navy share the Palembang [airfield].(24) However, the Army
rejected this, saying, “The Palembang [airfield] has no capacity to spare [for the Navy].
We would like you to make the Gelumbang [airfield] ready and use it, for which the Army
shall provide cooperation.”(24) [Also] on that day, the Tanaka Detachment seized Tan-
jungkarang. The preparation work was [still] going on at the Mentok [airfield]. On that
day as well, the [Army] Third Air Force conducted a raid on Kalijati from Palembang with
a total of thirty aircraft of the 59th, the 64th and the 90th Air Groups, and reported a mil-
itary gain of eight [enemy] aircraft destroyed by fire.(96)
On the next day, the 21st, the Eleventh Air Fleet again wired to the [Army] Third Air
Force, requesting: “It is difficult to have the entire force of the [Navy] Kanoya Air Group
use the Ledo [airfield]. Despite the absolute necessity to launch an air campaign on the
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25th for the sake of the Java landing [operation] scheduled for the 26th, the [accumulation
of] fuel and ammunition is far from ready at the Gelumbang [airfield]. We would like
your reconsideration of sharing the Palembang [airfield].”(135) However, the [Army] Third
Air Force could not afford to accept this. On that day, the 22d Air Flotilla sent an aircraft
to survey the Palembang and the Gelumbang [airfields]; (it returned on the 23d).(135) The
Mentok [airfield] was still in the process of preparation. On this day as well, Staff Officer
Itoda found the Tanjungkarang airfield, but it turned out to have [a runway of] no more
than 700 meters in length.(39) Also on that day, the Third Air Force carried out a raid on
Kalijati and Bandung from Palembang with a total of forty-four aircraft of the 59th, the
64th and the 90th Air Groups, and reported a military gain of six [enemy] aircraft de-
stroyed by fire and [also] the loss of one [Japanese] aircraft.(96)
On the next day, the 22d, the commanders of the Southern Task Force and the Dutch
East Indies Unit held talks at Staring Bay.(117) The convoys were sailing straight to the south
aiming to land the Sixteenth Army on Java on the night of the 25th. However, it was re-
ported that there remained five to seven allied cruisers and about ten destroyers in Batavia
and two cruisers and about five destroyers in Surabaya.(117) Accordingly, Southern Task
Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō proposed to Southern Army Commander in Chief
Terauchi a two-day postponement of the landing schedule and requested the latter’s co-
operation in making the Gelumbang [airfield] ready.(117) On that day, the [Army] Third
Air Force carried out a raid on Batavia and Buitenzorg from Palembang with a total of
forty-one aircraft of the 59th, the 64th and the 90th Air Groups, and reported a military
gain of four [enemy] aircraft destroyed by fire.(96) The Mentok and the Tanjungkarang air-
fields were [still] in the process of being readied.
On the next day, the 23d, the Southern Army sent a telegram to the 38th Division and
ordered the latter to provide the Navy with ample support in making the Gelumbang air-
field ready, as mentioned previously. The convoys, which had reversed their course the
day before, resumed their course southward on that day.(130) On that day as well, the 3d
Air Raid Unit was [finally] able to advance eighteen aircraft to the Mentok [airfield] for
the first time.(104) The [Army] Third Air Force [only] conducted reconnaissance and serv-
iced its aircraft on that day.(96) The [Army] Third Air Force had not yet completed the ad-
vance of its entire force into the Palembang [airfield]. The Tanaka Detachment was
concentrating all its efforts into making the Tanjungkarang [airfield] ready.
That was the situation on the 22d and the 23d when some of the Sixteenth Army staff officers
proposed: “Shouldn’t we land on southern Sumatra and then land on Java by maneuvering
[landing] craft [from there]?”
On the next day, the 24th, the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army kept sailing
straight to the south.
On that day (the 24th), in the eastern Java area, the 1st and the 2d Air Raid Units attacked
Surabaya with a total of fifty-one land-based attack planes from Kendari, Balikpapan, and
Bali, along with nine fighter planes from Bali.(104)
At 0800 on that day, the convoy carrying the 48th Division and the Sakaguchi Detachment,
and the 1st Escort Unit (the 4th Destroyer Squadron) departed from the temporary anchorage
south of Balikpapan and sailed southward.(119) [Also] at 0800, the Tomozuru and the Sasako-
maru left Makassar for Banjarmasin.(119) The Teiryū-maru and the Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru]
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led by [Army] Major Takagi joined [the convoy of the 48th Division] at 1600,(88) which in-
creased the convoy to forty-two ships in total. The main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit
and the 1st Base Unit were taking up positions for the 2d Bali disembarkation operation (on
the 25th). On that day (the 24th), the 5th Destroyer Squadron unit departed from Staring Bay
at 1200, the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Division from the sea off the coast of Dili at 0830,
and the Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer Division, which were directly led by the 2d Destroyer
Squadron commander, from Kupang at 1200, and sailed westward.(117) On that day as well,
Vice Admiral Takahashi, commander of the Dutch East Indies Unit, specifically sent
telegrams to the commanders of the 5th Cruiser Division and the 2d Destroyer Squadron to
instruct them to quickly advance into the Java Sea.(114, 117)
In the western Java area, the 3d Escort Unit (the 5th Destroyer Squadron) was sailing
south, while [simultaneously] refueling ([with fuel brought] from the Anambas Islands) and
escorting the main force of the Sixteenth Army.(120) Although allied submarine(s) appeared,
no damage was incurred. The 7th Cruiser Division (the heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya,
Mikuma and Mogami) and the 19th Destroyer Division (the Uranami, the Isonami and the Shiki -
nami) left the Anambas Islands at 1800 and sailed south in order to support the 3d Escort
Unit.(115) They were under the command of Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa.
On that day (the 24th), the Third Air Force carried out an attack on Bandung and Kalijati
from Palembang with a total of sixty aircraft of the 59th, the 64th, the 75th and the 90th Air
Groups in the morning, and on Batavia and Cililitan from Palembang with fifty-nine aircraft
in the afternoon, and reported a military gain of bringing down eleven [enemy] aircraft (three
of which uncertain) and twenty [enemy] aircraft destroyed by fire.(96) That morning Vice Ad-
miral Kondō, commander in chief of the Southern Task Force, requested the commander in
chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet and the commander of the Malaya Unit to accelerate [the work
to] make the Gelumbang base ready and to let the Mihoro Air Group (which had been kept
under the command of the Malaya Unit) participate in the air operation against Java as fol-
lows. On that day, the 3d Air Raid Unit was able to advance thirty-nine aircraft to Gelumbang
for the first time.(135)
From: Chief of Staff, Second Fleet sent at 1030 on the 24th
Now the date of the landings on Java is approaching. If we do not get an opportunity to destroy
the enemy surface forces in the Java Sea area, it will have a great impact on the conduct of the
landing operations. Therefore, [adequate] military gains are keenly desired from the air opera-
tions in these few days. In view of the fact that the Army has offered its cooperation and taking
into account the situation of the Gelumbang base as well, I would like you to be determined to
promptly destroy the [enemy] naval vessels and aircraft in the area prior to the execution of the
landings, while accelerating the preparation of the base as much as possible and making use of
it. Further, as the transport convoy is now under sail and the landing date has already been
postponed by two days in order to intensify the air operation, we are in a situation where no
further postponement shall be allowed. Therefore, I would like you to see to it that the Mihoro
Air Group will conduct [air] attacks on the enemy naval vessels in the western Java area with
its full force.
On the next day, the 25th, one large cruiser, three light cruisers, five destroyers, several smaller
naval vessels of the enemy and thirty or more commercial ships were spotted in Surabaya, and
one cruiser and more than a dozen commercial ships were spotted in Batavia.(117)
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In the eastern Java area, twenty-two land-based attack planes and nine fighter planes con-
ducted a raid on Surabaya respectively from Balikpapan and Bali on that day (the 25th). At
0800 the 1st Base Unit reached Bali and started the second disembarkation.(124) After support-
ing this [operation], the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit returned to Makassar in the
evening.(103) The convoy carrying the 48th Division and the main force of the Sakaguchi De-
tachment, and the 1st Escort Unit continued sailing southward and entered the Java Sea
through the waters between the islands of Moresses and Matasiri (See Illustration No. 46)
around 2200 that night.(119) The Sasako-maru, which was escorted by the Tomozuru, arrived at
the anchorage south of Banjarmasin at 0900 on that day, and the Yamamoto Regiment started
its embarkation.(119) The 5th Cruiser Division (the Nachi and the Haguro), the Yamakaze and
the Kawakaze entered the Java Sea.(114) The Jintsū of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the 16th De-
stroyer Division and the 1st Section of the 7th Destroyer Division arrived in Makassar in the
afternoon and left the port at 1900 after replenishing to sail westward.(117) On that day, the
Carrier Task Force, the 2d Submarine Squadron, and the main force of the Southern Task
Force left Staring Bay for the sea south of Java.(103)
In the western Java area, the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army and the 3d
Escort Unit passed through the Karimata Strait around 1600 and entered the Java Sea on that
day (the 25th).(120) The 7th Cruiser Division and the 19th Destroyer Division (the Shikinami,
the Uranami and the Isonami) were sailing south behind them.(115) On that day, a reconnais-
sance aircraft of the 22d Air Flotilla reported: “[Spotted] one Type–A cruiser, two Type–B
cruisers, and five destroyers in the Batavia port at 1105. [Spotted] one Type–B cruiser and
one gunboat sailing northward through the Sunda Strait at 1130.”(115) On that day, the [Army]
Third Air Force carried out a raid on Kalijati from Palembang with a total of twenty-eight
aircraft of the 64th and the 75th Air Groups, and again with a total of twenty-eight aircraft of
the 59th and the 90th Air Groups, and reported a military gain of seven [enemy] planes in
total destroyed by fire.(96) The [Army] Third Air Force reported that its military gains from
19 to 25 February aggregated to bringing down thirty-three planes, damaging or destroying
by fire fifty-three planes, and half or lightly damaging 125 planes.(96) On that day, one squadron
of the 11th Air Group advanced to the Tanjungkarang [airfield] for the first time.(99) [Also] on
that day, forty-four aircraft and fifteen aircraft of the 3d Air Raid Unit reconnoitered and at-
tacked Batavia respectively from Gelumbang and Mentok.(104) On that day, the commander
in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet sent telegrams of appreciation to the [Army] Third Air Force
and the 38th Division for their cooperation in the preparation of the Gelumbang [airfield].(135)
In the early morning of the next day, the 26th, the Air Unit (i.e. the Eleventh Air Fleet)
judged: “the air campaign on eastern Java since 18 February has brought down forty-three
[enemy] planes (eleven of which uncertain) and damaged or destroyed by fire forty-eight
[enemy] planes.”(117) The military gains of the [Army] Third Air Force since the 19th were as
previously mentioned, and that morning the [Army] Third Air Force judged: “the number
of aircraft left in western Java are between twenty and thirty aircraft,”(96) whereas the [Navy]
Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) the same morning judged:“the remaining [enemy] aircraft
in Java are about fifty fighter planes, about forty bombers, and about twenty flying boats,
and they have started using guerrilla tactics.”(117) The Air Unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet) further
advanced thirty aircraft of the main unit of the 3d [Naval] Air Group into Bali that day, the
26th, the intention of which was to rapidly clear and destroy the [remaining] allied aircraft.(117)
Accordingly, the headquarters of the 23d Air Flotilla also advanced into Bali on that day, the
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26th.(104) On that day, twenty-six land-based attack planes and eight fighter planes carried
out a raid on Surabaya respectively from Makassar and Bali.(104) Around noon, the Sasako-
maru (which had sailed from Banjarmasin carrying the Yamamoto Regiment escorted by the
Tomozuru) joined the convoy of the 48th Division and the Sakaguchi Detachment (under es-
cort of the 1st Escort Unit),(119) which increased the number of transport ships [in the convoy]
to forty-three. Around 1950 the convoy reached a spot 150 nautical miles north of
Surabaya.(119) The 5th Cruiser Division unit and the 2d Destroyer Squadron unit joined the
convoy respectively in the morning and in the evening of the 26th.(114, 117) That morning as
well, the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit left Makassar and sailed westward.(103) Al-
though [air] raids on Surabaya had been frequently conducted as previously described, one
[enemy] heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, several destroyers and several torpedo boats were
spotted anchored outside the port of Surabaya, and also two ships, which appeared to be
[enemy] destroyers, were spotted sailing eastward at the north end of Surabaya [port] at 1630
on that day (the 26th).(119) [Also] on that day, allied flying boat(s) approached the 1st Escort
Unit and the 2d Destroyer Squadron unit from 1245 onwards for reconnoitering, which in-
dicated a possible counterattack by the allied fleet.(119)
On that day (the 26th) in the western Java area, the convoy of the main force of the Six-
teenth Army (under escort of the 3d Escort Unit) was sailing southward about 215 nautical
miles northeast of Batavia at 0800, but changed course to 270 degrees (due west) around
noon. The 7th Cruiser Division unit was supporting [the convoy] at a visible distance.(115, 120)
At 1300 the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army was also approached by [recon-
noitering] allied flying boats.(115) On that day, the [Army] Third Air Force did not conduct its
air campaign.(96) The [Navy] 3d Air Raid Unit covered the convoy from the Gelumbang [air-
field] on that day. The 3d Air Raid Unit aircraft spotted two commercial ships and a ship
which appeared to be an [enemy] destroyer to the northeast of Batavia on that day.(103, 135)
Another One-Day Postponement of the Date of Landing and Naval Engage-
ments (See Illustration No. 46)
The main force of the Sixteenth Army was scheduled to enter the anchorage and conduct the
landing [operation] on the night of the next day, 27 February.
As we have seen, the presence of [enemy] cruisers and lesser ships in [the ports of] Batavia
and Surabaya had often been reported in the last few days. In the eastern Java area, the [air]
base had been advanced as far as Bali from the 20th onwards and the aircraft of the Air Unit
(the Eleventh Air Fleet) were repeatedly conducting attacks, but there were no reports of the
sinking of [enemy] naval vessels. As for the western Java area, the [Army] Third Air Force
had started its attacks from the 19th onwards, but the attacks were limited to aerial engage-
ments. The [Navy] 3d Air Raid Unit was [not only] late in its advance [toward the south],
[but] it [also] had to cover the convoy. [So,] no sinking of [enemy] vessels was reported from
this area, either. Considering this situation, the Southern Task Force (which was on the sea
south of Java) decided to have the aircraft carrier Ryūjō (of the 4th Carrier Division), anchored
at Cap Saint Jacques after participating in Operation L, provide support. At 0850 on that day,
the 27th, it transmitted the order that “the Malaya Unit shall have the 4th Carrier Division
(minus the 2d Section) promptly advance into the Java Sea area and support the operations
of the Dutch East Indies Unit,”(120) which was passed down by the Malaya Unit to the 4th
452 Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java
Carrier Division at 1150. [However,] it was issued too late. At that moment, the convoy of
the main force of the Sixteenth Army was reversing its course, avoiding the appearance of
an allied fleet, which led to the situation that the date of landing had to be postponed by an-
other day.
The Appearance of the Allied Fleet and Another One-Day Postponement of the Landing
Schedule on Western Java
At 0530 on the 27th, the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army reached the separat-
ing point (about 140 nautical miles north of Batavia). The convoy separated into the main
force (the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters and a unit [consisting of] the 2d Division as the
core in forty-nine ships) and a [separate] element (the Shōji Detachment), and each headed
for its landing point.(120) However, on a report that an allied fleet consisting of one heavy
cruiser, two light cruisers and two destroyers was sailing northward, the convoy of the main
force and that of the Shōji Detachment again started reversing their courses respectively at
1028 and 1045,(115, 120) which continued respectively until 1500 and 1800.(115, 120) In the meantime,
at the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters the concern grew that [the convoy] might run out of
coal and water, and the feeling spread that it was unacceptable that the [Navy] Malaya Unit
was conducting a triumphal entry into the port of Singapore on that very day.(36, 44)
At 0900 a report was sent that “one large enemy cruiser, two light cruisers, and two de-
stroyers have been spotted sailing southeast,” which was followed by another report at 0935
that “the enemy fleet has turned around and is heading toward us.” At that time, the situation
on the [Japanese] side was as follows:(115, 120, 130, 131, 103)
The Shōji Detachment (in seven ships): [under escort of] the light cruiser Yura, the 1st Section of
the 6th Destroyer Division (the Akatsuki and the Hibiki), and the 2d Section of the 22d De-
stroyer Division (the Nagatsuki and the Minazuki).
The convoy of the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters and the 2d Division (in forty-nine ships):
[under the escort of] the light cruiser Natori, the 1st Section of the 22d Destroyer Division
(the Fumizuki and the Satsuki), the 5th Destroyer Division (the Harukaze, the Hatakaze, the
Asakaze and the Matsukaze), the 11th Destroyer Division (the Hatsuyuki, the Shirayuki and the
Fubuki), and the 12th Destroyer Division (the Shirakumo and the Murakumo).
The 7th Cruiser Division unit, [provided by] the Malaya Unit for support: the 7th Cruiser Divi-
sion ([consisting of] the heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma and Mogami), the 19th De-
stroyer Division (the Uranami, the Shikinami and the Isonami) on the sea south of the convoy
The Auxiliary Seaplane Tenders Kamikawa-maru and San’yō-maru: [in] the Anambas Islands.
The aircraft carrier Ryūjō: at Cap Saint Jacques (scheduled to depart in the evening).
Rear Admiral Hara, commander of the 3d Escort Unit (and commander of the 5th Destroyer
Squadron), assembled the flagship Natori, the light cruiser Yura, and the 5th, the 11th and the
12th Destroyer Divisions, and rushed toward the allied fleet in an attempt to destroy it in co-
operation with the 7th Cruiser Division unit of the Malaya Unit.(120) He left six destroyers [as
escort for] the convoy and had [the convoy] reverse its course.(120) However, the allied fleet
began to sail southwestward from around 1443 onwards and then sailed away in the direction
of Batavia. The Japanese pursued it, but discontinued the pursuit around 1500.(115, 120) In the
meantime, the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander wired the Sixteenth Army commander
[Imamura] at 1320 that “considering the enemy’s current movements, we would like to first
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destroy the enemy surface vessels before conducting the landing operations. [Accordingly,]
we would like to postpone the landing date by another day.”(120) As we have seen from the
description of the convoy’s movements, it meant that the landing date ended up being post-
poned by one more day.(32, 120)
A unified command of the surface forces in this area was considered necessary, and based
on the warning of the Combined Fleet issued at 1430, the telegraphic order of the Southern
Task Force sent at 1600, and the Dutch East Indies Unit order given at 1800, the 7th Cruiser
Division unit and the 4th Carrier Division (the Ryūjō and the Shiokaze) were incorporated
into the Batavia invasion unit; the 7th Cruiser Division commander [R. Adm. Kurita Takeo]
was assigned to command this unit.(115, 120)
On that day, the 12th Air Division of the [Army] Third Air Force covered the convoy. The
3d Air Division also covered the convoy, and the aircraft of the 75th and the 90th Air Groups
carried out attacks on [enemy] naval vessels as well.(96) On that day the [Navy] 3d Air Raid
Unit conducted patrols to search for the enemy from the Mentok and the Gelumbang [air-
field].(104)
Naval Engagements off Surabaya, and a One-day Postponement of the Landing [Opera-
tion] on Eastern Java as well
The convoy carrying the 48th Division and the Sakaguchi Detachment had been sailing west-
ward along the southern coast of Borneo after entering the Java Sea. At 0700 on that day (the
27th), just as it advanced into the waters south of the central part of Borneo (immediately
north of Kragan), it changed its course and headed due south (in the direction of Kragan).(119)
[The convoy] was scheduled to enter the anchorage and land in Kragan on the night of the
27th. However, an aircraft reported that it had spotted “five enemy cruisers and six destroyers
on the sea sixty-three nautical miles at 310 degrees (note by the author: northwest) of
Surabaya, heading toward 80 degrees (note by the author: east-northeast) at a speed of twelve
knots at 1150,” which was followed by two engagements in the afternoon and another two
in the night,(119) and the convoy ended up repeatedly sailing back and forth ([according to]
[48th] Division Commander Tsuchihashi’s diary). In the end, that night (to be precise, at 0450
on the 28th), the Dutch East Indies Unit commander decided to postpone the landing [oper-
ation] by one day (to be carried out on the night of the 28th).(119)
The situation of the [Japanese] fleet in the eastern Java Sea area at the time of spotting the
allied fleet was roughly as follows:(102, 103, 114, 117, 119, 124)
The 1st Escort Unit, [consisting of] the light cruiser Naka, the 2d Destroyer Division (the
Murasame, the Samidare, the Harusame and the Yūdachi), the 9th Destroyer Division (the
Asagumo, the Minegumo and the Natsugumo), and the Umikaze of the 24th Destroyer Division,
under the command of the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander, was escorting the convoy.
The 5th Cruiser Division unit, [consisting of] the 5th Cruiser Division ([with] the heavy cruisers
Nachi and Haguro), the Ushio and the Sazanami of the 7th Destroyer Division, and the Ya-
makaze and the Kawakaze of the 24th Destroyer Division, kept its position near the convoy,
prepared for support.
The 2d Destroyer Squadron unit, [consisting of] the light cruiser Jintsū and the 16th Destroyer
Division (the Yukikaze, the Tokitsukaze, the Amatsukaze and the Hatsukaze), [also] kept its po-
sition near the convoy, prepared for support.
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The Main Unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit, [consisting of] the heavy cruiser Ashigara and the
destroyers Ikazuchi and Akebono, had left Makassar on the 26th, and was in the sea north of
the Kangean Islands. The heavy cruiser Myōkō (which belonged to the 5th Cruiser Division,
but had just returned to the southern [front] after having the damage incurred at Davao re-
paired on the mainland) left Makassar on the morning of the 27th after replenishing there,
and was following the unit (joining the unit in the evening).
The 1st Base Unit, [consisting of] the light cruisers Nagara and Kinu ([the latter of which] was
the flagship of the 4th Submarine Squadron, and which had joined the unit on the 26th), the
8th Destroyer Division (the Asashio and the Arashio), and the 21st Destroyer Division (the
Wakaba, the Nenohi and the Hatsushimo) was covering the second disembarkation [operation]
on Bali.
The seaplane tenders Mizuho (was sailing west from Timor), and Chitose (was sailing south from
Jolo), and the auxiliary seaplane tender Sanuki-maru (had been damaged and anchored at
Balikpapan, but its seaplanes were stationed in Makassar).
From 1230 onwards, the full force of the 5th Cruiser Division unit ([consisting of] two heavy
cruisers and four destroyers), the full force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron unit ([consisting
of] one light cruiser and four destroyers), and the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron
unit ([consisting of] one light cruiser and six destroyers) headed for the allied fleet to make
an attack. The allied fleet was made up of two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and eight
or nine destroyers, and it was superior [to the Japanese forces] in terms of cruiser strength.
At 1300, the convoy [carrying the eastern Java landing unit] changed its course to the west.
As an aircraft report sent at 1455 said that the allied fleet seemed to be sailing away toward
Surabaya, the convoy resumed its course for the landing point in Kragan at 1500. However,
the allied fleet [again started] sailing north from 1523 onwards, and was approaching the
convoy. At 1745, the first daytime engagement began with a naval gun duel. The 5th Cruiser
Division commander, who was leading all the units under his unified command, planned to
lure the allied fleet into a night engagement in order to destroy it at a stroke by displaying
his torpedo strength, because the [Japanese] naval gun strength was inferior. However,
around 1830, the distance between the convoy and the [allied] fleet was reduced to about
twenty nautical miles. About 1834, the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander ordered the con-
voy to sail westward. At 1837, the 5th Cruiser Division Commander ordered: “All, Charge!”
At 1839, the [Japanese] fleet all at once took a left turn and commenced the attack, which was
the beginning of the second daytime engagement. The allied fleet was thrown into disorder.
The [Japanese] units pursued them, while firing and launching torpedo attacks. At 2005, [the
Japanese units] stopped the pursuit, judging that it was dangerous to come close to the area
near Surabaya where mines had been laid and because night came on. During this engage-
ment, three allied destroyers were sunk. Meanwhile after shifting to the attack, the 4th De-
stroyer Squadron commander had the convoy sail south [again] by ordering at 1903: “We
have sunk three enemy destroyers and are in the middle of pursuit. The convoy shall sail to-
ward the predetermined landing point.” The allied fleet turned around again as night fell;
about 2100, naval gun fire was exchanged for a short period, but the [Japanese units] let them
slip away (the first night engagement). At 0033, the silhouettes of four warships were spotted.
[The Japanese units] sank one ship, caused a large fire on another, and attacked and pursued
the other two, but the units became sure by 0245 that they had let the [allied] ships slip away
(the second night engagement). Due to the occurrence of these night engagements, the con-
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voy, which had resumed its southward sailing at 1903, again reversed its course and was
heading northward.(114, 117, 119)
During these engagements, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander ordered the unit that
was in the middle of the second Bali disembarkation operation to send its forces [to support
the Java landing operation], while he himself sailed westward leading his main unit. From
the Bali operation unit, the light cruiser Kinu and the 8th Destroyer Division (the Asashio and
the Arashio) sailed westward.(103, 124)
At 0310, the 5th Cruiser Division commander, who had fought a total of four naval battles
[two] during the day and [two] at night, commanding the 2d and 4th Destroyer Squadrons
as well, offered as his opinion to the Dutch East Indies Unit commander: “Considering the
remaining enemy surface forces, I judge it better to postpone the starting date of the landing
[operation] by one day. [Our] convoy seems to be still up north evading [the battles].” [Ac-
cording to Vol. 26, p. 460, the suggestion was made by Rear Admiral Nishimura, commander
of the 4th Destroyer Squadron.] At 0450, a “no objections” reply was sent. Thus, the landing
[operation] on eastern Java was postponed by one day, just like that on western Java.(114, 117, 119)
The Carrier Task Force ([consisting of] the aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū,
the battleships Hiei and Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, the light cruiser
Abukuma, and the destroyers Tanikaze, Isokaze, Hamakaze, Urakaze, Shiranui, Kasumi, Ariake and
Yūgure), which had left Staring Bay at 0830 on the 25th, and the main force of the Southern
Task Force (the battleships Kongō, and Haruna, the heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, and the
destroyers Arashi, Nowaki and Hayashio; in addition, the Oyashio, the Hayashio and the Kuroshio
had joined the force from Timor), which had left the bay following the fleet, had already ad-
vanced into the waters southeast of Java on that day. [Editor’s note: There seem to be some
mix-ups in this list, compared to the data in Volume 26.] At 1200 on that day (the 27th), the
2d Air Raid Unit sent a telegram, which said: “According to an aircraft report, one [enemy]
light cruiser, six destroyers, and about forty commercial ships were spotted in the port of
Cilacap, and one commercial ship and three destroyers outside the port as of 1130.”(103, 116, 123)
On that day (the 27th), the 1st and 2d Air Raid Units provided the escort for the convoy
of the unit to capture eastern Java as well as the escort for the 2d Bali disembarkation unit,
and [also] conducted search and attack missions on the enemy in eastern Java, the Indian
Ocean, etc., from Banjarmasin, Bali, Kupang and other bases. They spotted the aircraft carrier
Langley (with thirty-two P–40 aircraft on its flight deck) in the sea south of Java at 1315 and
sank it at 1340.(103)
In the naval engagements on that day, the 27th (the naval engagement off Surabaya), the
loss that the allied forces sustained was the Dutch cruisers HNLMS De Ruyter and HNLMS
Java, the British destroyer HMS Electra, and the Dutch destroyer HNLMS Kortenaer, which
were sunk, and the British cruiser HMS Exeter, which was damaged.
Entry into the Anchorage, Start of the Landings and Naval Engagements 
(See Illustration No. 46)
The Western Java Area
At 0120 on the 28th, the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander sent a telegraphic order: “The
Yura shall return to its original unit. Each unit shall operate as scheduled.” The Natori and
other ships joined the unit for Area No. 1 (Bantam Bay and Merak) at 0415 and the Yura joined
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the unit for Area No.2 (Patrol) at 0500, and they headed for the landing points. The aircraft
of the 3d Air Raid Unit reconnoitered the Batavia port in the morning and spotted only fifteen
large commercial ships. It was judged that the [enemy] cruisers and lesser ships of the day
before had escaped. However at 1200, one cruiser and one destroyer (according to allied mil-
itary history materials, they were the U.S. heavy cruiser USS Houston and the Australian light
cruiser HMAS Perth, which had participated in the naval battles off Surabaya the day before)
were spotted sailing westward on the waters forty-eight nautical miles south of the [Japanese]
heavy cruisers Kumano and Suzuya. The Kumano and the Suzuya hurried toward them at full
speed, but receiving an aircraft report at 1417, which said “one Glasgow-Type and one light
cruiser stopped at a spot ten nautical miles at 20 degrees (note by the author: north-northeast)
of Batavia,” they judged that the allied fleet had already entered the anchorage of Batavia,
and reversed their course toward north at 1450. At 1700, the 7th Cruiser Division commander
wired: “One [enemy] heavy cruiser and one light cruiser are [spotted] anchored outside the
Batavia port, and one light cruiser (note: according to a later study, a destroyer) inside the
port.”(115, 120)
At 2020, the Area No.1 unit was separated into [sections for] Sectors A (south side of
Merak), B (north side of Merak) and C (Bantam Bay), and headed for the waters off the coast
of their respective sectors. At 2245, air reconnaissance of the Batavia area as of 2000 reported:
“(1) one large [enemy] cruiser moored at the wharf, one light cruiser anchored inside the
breakwater, and other than these, three flying boats; (2) one [enemy] gunboat and two patrol
boats patrolling at the mouth of the bay; (3) one [enemy] destroyer and one large transport
ship sailing westward through the channel north of Cape Kait, and (4) one [enemy] subma-
rine going eastward [also] through the above channel.”(115, 120)
The Area No.2 unit was approached and bombed by two allied aircraft at a point about
thirty nautical miles north of Patrol around 2120, but having sustained no damage, it contin-
ued sailing south.(120)
At 0000 on 1 March, the convoy of [the units to land in] the Bantam Bay area entered the
anchorage and the 1st landing unit started landing at 0030. [The convoy of the units to land
in] the Merak area entered the anchorage at 0000 and succeeded in landing at 0145. [The con-
voy of the units to land in] the Patrol area entered the anchorage at 0140 and succeeded in
landing at 0400.(115, 120)
When the Bantam Bay area convoy was executing the landing operation, the Fubuki, which
was in its patrol area north of Bantam Bay, spotted two allied cruisers (the U.S. heavy cruiser
USS Houston and the Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth) at 0015. The [Japanese] heavy
cruisers Mikuma and Mogami, the light cruisers Natori and Yura, and the destroyers Harukaze,
Hatakaze, Asakaze, Fubuki, Shirayuki, Shirakumo, Murakumo and others intercepted them, and
the naval battle off Batavia began. [The Japanese] sank both cruisers and, in addition, sank
the Dutch destroyer HNLMS Evertsen at a point west of Sebuku Island on the same day. The
loss sustained on the Japanese side was one minesweeper and one transport ship sunk, several
transport ships running aground and heavily damaged, and other minor damage.(115, 120)
On the 28th, the [Army] Third Air Force covered the convoy with the 3d and the 12th Air
Divisions. On that day (the 28th), Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Itoda requested from Tan-
jungkarang that the Southern Army temporarily assign three aircraft to the direct support
[of the operations of the Sixteenth Army], but the Southern Army rejected it on 1 March, say-
ing that it had no extra strength to spare.(96, 99)
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On the 28th, the [Navy] 3d Air Raid Unit searched for the enemy. At 0900 on 1 March,
due to the bad weather and the bad condition of the airfield in Kuching, the unit requested
the [Army] Third Air Force to provide the guarding of the sky over the anchorage of the Shōji
Detachment, only to receive a reply that it wanted to [just] carry out the tasks as agreed in
the arrangements, because it had no extra strength to spare after being day after day in ac-
tion.(135)
The Eastern Java Area and the Sea South of Java 
The 4th Destroyer Squadron continued sailing northward while positioning itself southeast
of the convoy which carried the 48th Division and the Sakaguchi Detachment, and guarding
it. Then, about 0500 on the 28th, it received the telegram from the Dutch East Indies Unit,
saying: “No objection to postpone the landing [operation] by one day.” It passed down its
order to the transport convoy: “Move so as to reach at 1200 today, the 28th, [the spot] you
were at 1200 on the 27th.” [Then] it approached the convoy, and returned to the [original]
escort formation at 0750. The main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit (the heavy cruisers
Ashigara and Myōkō, and the destroyers Ikazuchi and Akebono) joined the 5th Cruiser Division
and the 2d Destroyer Squadron at 0730. The light cruiser Kinu (the flagship of the 4th Sub-
marine Squadron) and the 8th Destroyer Division (the Asashio), which both had shifted their
positions from the support of the second Bali disembarkation operation [to the Java landing
operation], joined the escort of the convoy at 1330 and sailed south along with the convoy
and the 4th Destroyer Squadron unit. Despite the persistent approach of allied flying boats
from 1640 to 1810, the convoy continued sailing south, changed into the formation to enter
the anchorage at 2010, and kept going further south.(114, 117, 119)
From 0145 on 1 March onwards, the convoy came under persistent bombardment from
about ten dive-bombers. The Tokushima-maru ran aground on the coast due to flooding caused
by a hit at close range, while the Johore-maru, which took a direct hit and sustained a loss of
some 150 casualties and other damage, had no [serious] damage to its hull and engine and
continued sailing; it entered the anchorage at Kragan at 0235 as scheduled. Even after enter-
ing the anchorage, allied aircraft kept repeatedly bombing [the convoy] while dropping flares,
and three [enemy] torpedo boats [also] invaded the anchorage (one of which was sunk and
the other two were destroyed). [Then] after daybreak, [enemy] fighter planes came strafing
[the convoy]. However, the 1st landing unit of the 48th Division successfully landed at
0400.(114, 117, 119)
In the meantime, on the evening of the 28th, an aircraft report came, saying: “At 1640,
two enemy light cruisers were [spotted] at the northern entrance of [the port of] Surabaya,
sailing in northeastern direction.” The report made the 5th Cruiser Division and the 2d De-
stroyer Squadron unit take positions to intercept [a possible attack], but they returned to the
patrol area as night came on.(114, 117, 119)
At 1103 on 1 March, the 5th Cruiser Division unit spotted the allied cruisers and destroy-
ers. The 5th Cruiser Division unit ([consisting of] the heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro, and
the destroyers Yamakaze and Kawakaze) and the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit (the
heavy cruisers Ashigara and Myōkō, and the destroyers Ikazuchi and Akebono) made a pincer
attack and sank all of them. That is, the British Type–A cruiser HMS Exeter was sunk at 1250,
the British destroyer HMS Encounter at 1330, and the U.S. destroyer USS Pope at 1540.(103, 114)
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On the 28th, in addition to covering the convoy as well as the Bali base and searching for
the enemy, the [Navy] 2d Air Raid Unit conducted an air raid on the Maospati airfield with
thirteen aircraft, the Blimbing and the Surabaya airfield with sixteen aircraft, and the Tanjung
Priok airfield with nine aircraft from the Bali base.(104)
The Carrier Task Force and the main force of the Southern Task Force (whose strengths
were already described) caught allied warships escaping from Cilacap in the area south of
Java from 1 through 4 March and reported a military gain of sinking one British destroyer,
two U.S. destroyers, one U.S. gunboat, one British minesweeper and eleven transport ships,
and seizing four transport ships.(102)
3. Operations of the Main Force of the [Sixteenth] Army
(1) The Operation Plans
The Operation Plan of the [Sixteenth] Army (See Illustrations No. 47 and No. 48)
The distances between the landing points of the Sixteenth Army were great: as the crow flies,
about two hundred kilometers between the landing point of the main force of the [Sixteenth]
Army and that of the Shōji Detachment, and about four hundred kilometers between that of
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Illustration No. 46 — The Situation From 26 Through 28 February
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the Shōji Detachment and that of the 48th Division and the Sakaguchi Detachment. So were
the distances between their respective targets: the distance between the target of the main
force of the [Sixteenth] Army (Bandung) and that of the Sakaguchi Detachment (Cilacap)
was about 180 kilometers, and [the distance between] the target of the Sakaguchi Detachment
and that of the 48th Division (Surabaya) was about four hundred kilometers. Therefore, the
Sixteenth Army anticipated that after the landings it would be difficult to manage the units
in a unified manner (in particular the Sakaguchi Detachment and the 48th Division), or to
provide timely and proper operation instructions.(35, 36) For this reason, measures were taken
in order to provide the independently operating corps and detachment with units and equip-
ment adapted to the needs of their mission, to provide them with specific operational direc-
tives, and assign [dedicated] staff officers to them.(35, 36) [The Sixteenth Army] Operations Staff
Officer Yamashita was attached to the Shōji Detachment, which would operate in close con-
nection with the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army (i.e. the 2d Division), and Intelligence
Staff Officer Kuriya and Line-of-Communication Staff Officer Nishiura [of the Sixteenth
Army] were attached to the 48th Division.(35, 36) No staff officer [of the Sixteenth Army] was
attached to the Sakaguchi Detachment, because the detachment, which consisted of just two
battalions as the core, already had its trusted Staff Officer Yano.
As we have seen previously, the operations of the Sixteenth Army had been planned in
outline as follows:(35, 36, 96)
1. According to the plan, the 48th Division should land in Kragan, seize the crossing point over
the Solo River, the Cepu oil field and Rembang, after which [the division] should send one ele-
ment eastward along the coastal area to contain the allied forces in the Surabaya area, while
having its main force make a long detour far to the south, divide [the enemy forces in] Malang
and Surabaya, and seize Surabaya.
The Surabaya stronghold was considered quite strong. [It was known that] there were for-
tifications in Porong, which was midway between Malang, a garrison town and the seat of the
eastern Java territorial headquarters of the Dutch East Indies Army, and Surabaya. The concerns
were, among others, how [the operations] would be affected by these [factors], and what would
happen if the allied forces took offensive action.
2. According to the plan, the Sakaguchi Detachment ([consisting of] two infantry battalions as the
core) would land in Kragan, charge toward Cilacap, and seize the city.
It was judged certain that a central Java territorial headquarters (a divisional headquarters)
of the Dutch East Indies Army was newly established in Magelang. However, it was expected
that the Sakaguchi Detachment, though small in number of troops, was powerful enough to
travel the long distance of three hundred and some tens of kilometers, while defeating the allied
forces along the way. The point of concern was Cilacap. It was not only an important port and
the one and only rear gate of Java, it was also located close to Bandung, the [enemy] base of op-
erations in Java, and it was connected to the United States, Britain and Australia by sea.
3. According to the plan, the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army (the 2d Division and the Shōji De-
tachment) should capture western Java, the base and center of the allied forces. Its targets were
Batavia, the capital [of the Dutch East Indies], and Bandung, the military headquarters of Java.
It was considered certain that Bandung would come to serve as both the military and political
center when the [Japanese] operations progressed. It was considered a matter of course to seize
first Batavia and then Bandung. It was also thought not unlikely that a decisive battle might
occur ahead of [the operation to] seize Batavia.
In the Batavia and the Bandung operations, Buitenzorg [Bogor] and Kalijati were strategi-
cally significant. Buitenzorg [Bogor] was a key location that would enable [the Japanese] to di-
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vide [the allied forces in] Batavia and Bandung in case they attached importance to Batavia.
Further, regardless of whether they attached importance to Batavia or not, it was [still] vital be-
cause it could not only be used in attacking [both] Bandung and Batavia, but it would also, and
in particular, enable [the Japanese army] to launch a coup de main against Bandung from the
west. Kalijati was a strategic point which would enable [the Japanese] to command the com-
munication route between Bandung and Batavia at the north of the Bandung stronghold. It
would [also] enable [the Japanese] to advance a large number of aircraft at an early stage. In ad-
dition, it was a strategic point that would facilitate the preparations to seize the Bandung strong-
hold from the north. In order to completely cut off the road between Bandung and Batavia, it
was necessary to seize the crossing point over the Citarum River.
The main concerns about the plans of the allied forces were how many U.S., British and Aus-
tralian reinforcements had been or would be received through Cilacap, how many troops had
retreated to western Java from Singapore, Sumatra and other areas, and what operations [the
allied forces] would launch, taking advantage of the moment when the 2d Division and the
Shōji Detachment were [still] far from each other just after the landing.
Considering these matters, the operations in the area of the main force of the [Sixteenth]
Army were planned in outline as follows:
(1) The Shōji Detachment shall land in Eretan, seize the Kalijati airfield all at once and secure
[the airfield], while seizing the crossing point over the Citarum River to cut off the road con-
necting Batavia and Bandung. Depending on the circumstances, it shall act in concert with
the 2d Division in seizing Batavia.
(2) The 2d Division shall have one powerful unit led by the infantry group commander charge
toward Buitenzorg and seize it to cut off the road connecting Bandung and Batavia, while
having its main force advance into the area southwest of Batavia by heading eastward
through the flatlands, and then seize Batavia.
(3) After the seizure of Batavia, the main force of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment shall
line up side by side north of the Bandung stronghold and attack the city.
(4) Depending on the circumstances, the unit to seize Buitenzorg and the Shōji Detachment shall
charge toward Bandung.
The tentative dates for [the operations to] seize Kalijati, Buitenzorg and Batavia were set respec-
tively on the first, the fourth and the fifth day after the landings.(96)
The [Sixteenth] Army commander should designate one battalion of the 2d Division as the
army reserve and advance with it in the rear of the main force of the 2d Division. The [Sixteenth]
Army headquarters should land at Bantam Bay before daybreak on the first day of the landings,
after which it would first advance its command post to Serang.(96)
4. The landings of the [Sixteenth] Army are planned as follows.(96) [The plan] indicates that [the
operations to] seize Surabaya and Bandung were expected to meet with considerable difficulties,
and take much time.
The area of the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army 
The first landing
Fifty-four transport ships.
Day H: Start of the landing.
Day H + 4: Completion of the disembarkation of the Shōji Detachment and the Merak
landing unit of the 2d Division.
Day H + 6: Completion of the disembarkation at Bantam Bay of the main force of the
2d Division and the unit under the direct control of the [Sixteenth] Army.
The second landing
Twenty-five transport ships.
Day H + 22: Start of the disembarkation at Bantam Bay (if possible, in Batavia).
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The third landing
About twenty transport ships (some 100,000 tons).
No records were found about the starting date of the disembarkation, but probably
it was started around Day H + 28 or later.
The 48th Division
The first landing
Thirty-nine transport ships.
Day H: Start of the landing.
Day H + 4: Completion of the disembarkation.
The second landing
About ten transport ships (some 50,000 tons).
No records were found about the starting date of the disembarkation.
Note: This was the plan as of 10 February. However, from that moment onwards the
participation of the Carrier Task Force became a realistic possibility, which
seems to have led to a slowdown and a natural disappearance of the prepara-
tions for the third landing of the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army and the
second landing of the 48th Division. 
As we have seen, the plan was that 179 aircraft of the [Army] Third Air Force, 50 of the Dutch
East Indies Unit, 190 of the Eleventh Air Fleet and about 190 of the First Air Fleet (Carrier
Task Force) should cooperate in the Java invasion operation of the Sixteenth Army, and that
the ground operations of the main force of the Sixteenth Army should directly be supported
by the [Army] Third Air Force, and those of the 48th Division by naval aircraft only.(96)
The Operation Plan of the Shōji Detachment
The Shōji Detachment consisted of the 230th Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion), one
tank squadron, one antitank gun battalion (minus two companies), one mountain artillery
battalion (minus one battery), one engineer company (minus two platoons), and one antiair-
craft artillery battery as the core.(73, 74)
An outline of the operations of the Shōji Detachment was as follows:(96)
Operation Outline of the Shōji Detachment
1. Mission
(1) The detachment shall land near Patrol and promptly seize the Kalijati airfield, and also gain
control of the crossing point over the Citarum River in order to divide the enemy in the Ban-
dung and the Batavia areas.
(2) After that, the detachment shall attack Bandung from the area northeast [of the city] in con-
cert with the 2d Division.
2. Directives
(3) The detachment shall land in or near Patrol before daybreak on Day H and promptly seize
the Kalijati airfield with one element and at the same time advance to Krawang and vicinity
to divide the enemy in the Bandung and the Batavia areas.
(4) After that, [the detachment shall] seize strategic points such as Subang, Purwakarta and
Cikampek, etc. one after another, and prepare for the subsequent [operation to] seize Ban-
dung. Depending on the circumstances, it shall have one element participate in [the opera-
tion to] seize Batavia.
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(5) Hand in hand with the advance of the main force of the 2d Division, the detachment shall
advance to the area southeast of Subang, head for the area east of Bandung from the Cikra-
mas area, and attack the enemy so as to cut off its escape route.
(6) Depending on the circumstances, the detachment may [launch an operation to] seize Ban-
dung in concert with the unit advancing from the Cianjur area before the arrival of the main
force of the 2d Division.
(7) After the seizure of Bandung, the detachment shall be assigned to mop up the enemy all
over Java in cooperation with the 2d and the 48th Divisions.
This was the operation outline that the Sixteenth Army had shown to Detachment Com-
mander Shōji as of 10 February. The [Sixteenth] Army attached [more] importance to the op-
erations in Batavia and vicinity. However, as will be described later, Detachment Commander
Shōji gave [more] careful consideration to [the operation against] Bandung, which was the
headquarters of the allied forces. He [also] selected Eretan as the landing point, where the
road ran closest to the coastline, and the tanks and motor vehicles to be used in the raid
against Kalijati could be advanced more quickly.(41) Changing the landing point to Eretan
meant nothing more than landing at a point slightly to the east, but the 5th Destroyer
Squadron at first objected to it, because [the change would put the landing point] closer to
Surabaya.(44)
The [transport] ships carrying the Shōji Detachment were the Yae-maru, the Toyofuku-maru
[Hōfuku-maru], the Calcutta-maru, the Glasgow-maru, the Suwa-maru, the Uchide-maru and the
Yamazuki-maru [Yamatsuki-maru], a total of seven ships. [Editor’s note: three of the ships are
different from the list given on p. 242.] The [landing] craft allocated to the detachment were
two extra large, seventeen large and fifteen small motorized [landing] craft.(96)
Note: The standard capacity of the extra large, large and small motorized [landing] craft was
respectively 120 men, 80 men and 35 men in mild weather, and 80 men, 60 men and 25
men in rough weather.(73)
The detachment commander made the following disposition of his units and assigned them
their tasks based on the plan that “we shall land near Eretan before daybreak of Day H,
promptly secure the Kalijati airfield, and at the same time have one element seize the crossing
point over the Citarum River near Kedunggede to cut off the enemy [in] the direction of
Batavia.”(73)
Wakamatsu Raiding Unit (with the following core units):
2d Battalion of the 230th Infantry Regiment (minus the 6th Company and one machine gun
platoon)
One regimental artillery squad
One antitank gun platoon
1st Squadron of the 4th Tank Regiment (minus one troop)
One engineer company (minus two platoons)
Upon landing, the unit shall have one element push forward toward Pamanukan without
missing an opportunity and secure the town as well as the river crossing point to the east of
the town. [The unit shall] have its main force promptly advance to the Kalijati airfield along
the Patrol – Pamanukan – Subang road, secure the airfield, and help the ground unit of the
air unit in making the airfield ready, while guarding it. The unit to seize Pamanukan shall
leave one platoon [in the town] until the reserve unit advances [there].
Egashira Raiding Unit (with the following core units):
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1st Battalion of the 230th Infantry Regiment (minus the 4th Company and one machine gun
platoon)
One antitank gun company (minus one platoon)
One tank troop
One mountain artillery battery
One independent engineer platoon
Following the departure of the Wakamatsu Raiding Unit, the unit shall promptly advance
to Kedunggede along the Batavia road, seize the bridge there to cut off the escape route of
the enemy in Batavia, while securing a point for the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army to
advance. [The unit] shall [also] make preparations so as to subsequently act in concert with
the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army to seize Batavia. In addition, the unit shall have one
element seize Cikampek and guard the rear [of the Japanese forces] facing Bandung, while
cutting off the escape route of the enemy in Cilamaya and vicinity.
Artillery Unit:
3d Battalion of the 38th Mountain Artillery Regiment (minus two batteries)
The unit shall depart following the Egashira Battalion to catch up with the Wakamatsu Raid-
ing Unit. At least one section of the unit shall accompany the Wakamatsu Raiding Unit.
Antiaircraft Artillery Unit (one battery).
Disembarkation Working Unit ([consisting of] one independent engineer company (minus one
platoon) led by Major Watanabe of the 40th Anchorage headquarters as the core)
Signal Communication Unit (omitted by the author).
Motor Transport Unit (two companies (minus one platoon)).
The main force shall transport the Wakamatsu Raiding Unit, and one element the Egashira
Raiding Unit.
Ōno Unit:
Commander: Lt. Col. Ōno Takeo, commander of the 2d Independent Antitank Gun Battal-
ion
2d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion headquarters
6th Company of the 230th Infantry Regiment
One machine gun platoon
One regimental artillery squad
Upon landing, one element shall promptly seize Eretan and cover the left side of the landing
point, while the main force shall work on the tasks at the landing point.
Reserve Corps:
Infantry Artillery Unit (minus two squads) of the 230th Infantry Regiment, led by 1st Lt.
Wada Toshimichi, commander of the unit
4th Company
One machine gun platoon
It shall assemble in Patrol.
The detachment commander shall go ashore along with the 2d landing unit. [He shall] first
go to Patrol and then to Pamanukan. After that, he is scheduled to advance to Kalijati.
Airfield Unit (under the direction [of the detachment]):
24th Airfield Battalion (minus one element) led by the battalion commander
One element of the 28th Airfield Battalion
One element of the 1st Air Signal Regiment
One meteorological observation detail of the 4th Meteorological Company
One motor transport platoon
One ground duty platoon
Following on the advance of the Wakamatsu Raiding Unit, the unit shall promptly advance
to the Kalijati airfield. After that, [the unit] shall operate following the orders of the air divi-
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sion. The unit shall directly make arrangements with Raiding Unit Commander Wakamatsu
for [the latter’s] assistance in readying the airfield.
The Operation Plan of the 2d Division
The operation outline of the 2d Division that the Sixteenth Army showed to it was as fol-
lows:(96)
Operation Outline of the 2d Division
1. Mission
(1) The division shall land on western Java and promptly seize Batavia, while defeating the
enemy.
(2) After that, the division shall promptly seize Bandung with its main force via Purwakarta,
Subang and the area east of these cities, and with one element via Cianjur and the area south
[of this town].
2. Directives
(3) The division shall have its main force land near Bojonegara and one element in the areas
north and south of Merak before daybreak on Day H and promptly secure the crossing points
near Rangkasbitung and Kragilan with one element. At the same time it shall have one pow-
erful element rush to Buitenzorg [Bogor], divide the enemy in the Batavia and the Bandung
areas, cut off their escape routes and block reinforcements, after which it shall gain a footing
as forward as possible for the subsequent operation of the army to seize Bandung.
(4) The main force of the division shall promptly advance to Serang and vicinity first without
waiting for the completion of the landing [operation]. Then, it shall rush toward Batavia and
the area south of [the city] through the areas along the Serang – Tangerang – Batavia road
and promptly seize the city.
The Shōji Detachment shall promptly advance to the crossing point over the Citarum River
and vicinity (Krawang) and divide the enemy in the Bandung and the Batavia areas, while
making preparations for the subsequent [operation to] seize Batavia.
(5) When Batavia is seized, the division shall promptly seize Bandung with its main force from
the direction of Purwakarta and Subang and with one element from the direction of Cianjur.
Depending on the circumstances, the element advancing from the direction of Cianjur may
seize Bandung in concert with the Shōji Detachment before the arrival of the main force of
the division.
(6) The division shall subsequently mop up the enemy all over Java in concert with the 48th Di-
vision.
The 2d Division had to leave the 3d Battalion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment in the home-
land due to the [limited] availability of ships caused by the moving up of the Java operation
and have the battalion catch up later.(31, 53) [The division] was [also specifically] instructed to
put the 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment at the disposal of the [Sixteenth] Army as
its reserve.(53)
On 27 January, the division, along with the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters and the Shōji
Detachment, made arrangements with the 5th Destroyer Squadron in Gaoxiong [pp. 241-
244]. [The division] received the already-described order of the Sixteenth Army [p. 245], and
the previously-mentioned operation outline on the 30th, and passed down its [own] divi-
sional order concerning the landing [operation] the next day, the 31st.(31, 120, 59)
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In this divisional order, the disposition of the forces was shown in outline in the following
way, based on the plan that [the division] should make a surprise landing on the western
coast of Bantam Bay (Sector C) with its main force, and with one element on Merak Island
and the coast north of Merak (not included) (Sector B), and on the coast south of Merak (Sec-
tor A) before daybreak on Day H, and advance without waiting for the completion of the
landing [operation], and that it should carry out a forced landing if day broke after the be-
ginning of the landing [operation], or if the enemy had sensed its plans.
Merak area
Nasu Detachment (with the following core units)(96)
Commander: Maj. Gen. Nasu Yumio, commander of the 2d Infantry Group
2d Infantry Group headquarters
16th Infantry Regiment (minus the 1st Battalion)
2d Reconnaissance Regiment
1st Battalion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment (minus the 1st Battery)
1st Company of the 2d Engineer Regiment
One tank squadron
One antitank gun company
Motorbike unit
One antiaircraft artillery battery
Accompanied by Staff Officer Satō Hidehiko
On completion of the preparations for the landing, [the detachment] shall promptly land
in Sector A and have one element rush to Rangkasbitung and Kragilan to secure the cross-
ing points over the Ciujung River. At the same time, it shall have its main force first
promptly advance to the right bank area of the Ciujung River near Rangkasbitung, [by
pushing] along the Cilegon – Serang – Buitenzorg road, and then rush to Buitenzorg and
vicinity, get control of narrow paths in the neighborhood, and cut off the Bandung –
Batavia road.(31, 64, 65)
Fukushima Detachment
Commander: Col. Fukushima Kyūsaku, commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment
4th Infantry Regiment (minus the 3d Battalion)
5th Independent Antitank Gun Battalion
2d Battalion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment
2d Battery of the 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
2d Company of the 2d Engineer Regiment
One-third of the medical unit
Water Supply and Purification Department(96)
[The detachment] shall land in Sector B, and first advance into Serang and vicinity along
the Sekong – Cilegon – Serang road, following the Nasu Detachment. [Then,] it shall pre-
pare for the advance toward the area southwest of Batavia (inference by the author).
Bantam Bay area
Unit to seize Panjang Island
The Kawamura Platoon of the 9th Company of the 4th Infantry Regiment (including
one machine gun squad with a radio unit(59))
The unit shall make a surprise landing on Panjang Island, seize it, and facilitate the
landing of the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army at Bantam Bay.(59)
Satō Detachment (with the following core units)(96)
Commander: Col. Satō Hanshichi, commander of the 29th Infantry Regiment
29th Infantry Regiment
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2d Tank Regiment (minus three squadrons)
One antitank gun company
2d Engineer Regiment (minus the 1st and the 2d Company)
The detachment shall land in Sector C, and first advance to the left bank area of the Ci -
ujung River, along the Trate – Bantam – Kragilan – Tangerang road. [Then,] it shall pre-
pare for the advance toward the area west of Batavia (inference by the author).
Artillery Unit
Commander: Col. Ishizaki Masuo, commander of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment
2d Field Artillery Regiment (minus two and a half battalions)
One field heavy artillery battalion (minus one battery)(96)
Engineer Unit
Commander: Col. Oda Yoshishige, commander of the 1st Independent Engineer Regi-
ment
Main force of the 1st Independent Engineer Regiment
4th Independent Engineer Company
One independent motor transport platoon
Two river-crossing material companies (minus one element)(96)
Air Defense Unit
Main force of the 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment(96)
Reserve Corps
3d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment (minus one platoon)(96)
Note: The 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment was the reserve unit of the [Sixteenth]
Army.
The Operation Plan of the Third Air Force
In the previously-mentioned “Arrangements for Operation H between the Sixteenth Army,
the Third Air Force, the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet” (preliminarily agreed on 23
January and revised on 10 February) [pp. 226–233], and the “Outline for the Air Operations
[in Operation] H of the Third Air Force” (14 February), the support for the ground operations
in Java was planned as follows:(96)
1. The support for the ground operations was arranged as follows:
The area of the main force of the Sixteenth Army
(1) The Army shall be in charge of the direct support of the ground operations.
(2) The Navy shall be in charge of cutting off the transport [routes] of the enemy in the Cilacap
area. It shall [also] be in charge of attacking enemy reinforcements or forces in retreat when
requested by the Army.
The area of the 48th Division
The Third Fleet shall be in charge of the direct support of the ground operations, and the
Eleventh Air Fleet shall appropriately provide support at the request of the Army. The Army
shall join in [the direct support] if possible.
2. It was arranged that the Army should allocate about fifteen command reconnaissance planes,
about four army reconnaissance planes, about ninety fighter planes, about twenty assault planes,
about twenty light bombers and about thirty heavy bombers. Based on this [arrangement], the
Third Air Force commander organized the Operation H Unit with the following units, and de-
ployed the air division of fighter planes (the 12th Air Division) in Tanjungkarang and the other
units and the headquarters of the Air Force in Palembang (he had advanced into Palembang on
21 February).(96)
Unit under the direct control: the 81st Air Group (command reconnaissance aircraft)
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12th Air Division
One squadron of the 1st Air Group (fighter planes)
11th Air Group (fighter planes)
3d Air Division
15th Independent Air Unit (its headquarters, and the 50th and the 52d Independent
Squadron) (command reconnaissance aircraft).
59th Air Group (fighter planes)
64th Air Group (fighter planes)
27th Air Group (minus one squadron) (assault planes)
75th Air Group (light bombers)
90th Air Group (light bombers)
The convoy cover assigned to the Third Air Force was [limited to] the cover for the main force
of the [Sixteenth] Army (excluding the Shōji Detachment) after the latter had separated from
the main force of the Sixteenth Army.(96)
Concerning the guarding of the anchorage assigned to the Army, it was arranged that a con-
tinuous guarding in the sky over the anchorage should be provided until sunset each day in
the Bantam and the Merak areas respectively until Day H + 2 and Day H + 1, and after that, air
cover should be provided as needed depending on the circumstances.(96)
3. The use of airfields in Java was arranged roughly in the following way:(96)
(1) The Batavia and the Cililitan airfields should be readied by the Army and shared by the
Army and the Navy (with about thirty-five and about sixty-three aircraft respectively).
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Illustration No. 47 — Overview of the Operation Plan of the Sixteenth Army
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(2) The Buitenzorg [Bogor] and the Kalijati airfields would be used by the Army. The Navy
might advance about twenty-seven aircraft to the Kalijati airfield.
4. The Sixteenth Army was to have the ground units of the air unit which had been brought under
its control by the Southern Army Order of 15 January [p. 156] advance to a position very close
to the front line units of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment, and promptly make the air-
fields ready. [The Army] had disposed them in the following way. Furthermore, the plan was
that the [Army] Third Air Force should rapidly advance [to these airfields], when their prepa-
ration would for the most part be completed.(23, 73, 96)
(1) Units to accompany the Shōji Detachment and make the Kalijati airfield ready (expected [to
enable] air units to advance there on Day H).
24th Airfield Battalion (minus one element)
One element of the 28th Airfield Battalion
One squad of the 1st Air Signal Regiment
One meteorological observation detail of the 4th Meteorological Company
One platoon of the 298th Independent Motor Transport Company
One platoon of the 123d Ground Duty Company
(2) Units to accompany the 2d Division, and make the Buitenzorg and the Batavia airfield ready
(expected [to enable] air units to advance into the Buitenzorg airfield on Day H + 3 and into
the Batavia airfield on Day H + 4).
4th Air Ground Support Headquarters
One element of the 24th Airfield Battalion
28th Airfield Battalion (minus one element)
Two squads of the 1st Air Signal Regiment
9th Field Airfield Construction Unit
One element of 9th Field Aircraft Repair Depot
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4th Meteorological Company (minus one element)
298th Independent Motor Transport Company (minus one platoon)
123d Ground Duty Company (minus one platoon)
(2) The Operations in the Sector of the 2d Division; the Operational Direction
by the [Sixteenth] Army
Landing; the Ship with the [Sixteenth] Army Headquarters Torpedoed
(See Illustrations No. 48, No. 49, and No. 50)
Naval Engagements; [the Ship carrying the Sixteenth Army Headquarters] Torpedoed
As we have seen, the eight transport ships carrying the unit of the 2d Infantry Group Com-
mander Nasu and his men, which was to land to the south of Merak, the seven transport
ships carrying the unit of the 4th Infantry Regiment Commander Fukushima and his men,
which was to land to the north of Merak, and the thirty-two transport ships carrying the unit
of [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura and others, which was to land at Bantam Bay,
had separated from the transport convoy ([of] seven ships) of the Shōji Detachment at a point
about 140 nautical miles north of Batavia at 0530 on the 27th.(120) From this point (Point J),
the [Army] Third Air Force assumed the task of escorting the convoy (except the Shōji De-
tachment).(96) On that day, [the convoy] reversed its course at the report of the appearance of
an allied fleet (one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers and two destroyers). The landing date
was postponed by another day, and the convoy separately advanced toward southern and
northern Merak, and Bantam [at last] at 2020 on the 28th.(120) (See the previous description.)
The thirty-two ships of the convoy heading for Bantam Bay reached the bay at 2230.(120)
Despite the almost full moon, the sky was not very clear.(31) Just before the convoy’s entry
into the anchorage, allied aircraft came reconnoitering but flew away.(120) Just after the con-
voy’s entry into the anchorage, two [enemy] patrol boats were spotted. [Editor’s note: Ac-
cording to Vol. 26, p. 436, there was only one patrol boat.] Our pilot ship [the destroyer
Harukaze, in concert with the Fubuki] fired at them, drove them off, and made them run
aground.(120) [The convoy] started dropping anchor around 2345 and completed its entry into
the anchorage by 0000 on 1 March.(120)
At 0030, the 1st landing unit departed. It was followed by a coded message that the left
wing unit had successfully landed as early as at 0033, which was immediately transmitted
to Saigon and Tokyo.(34) However, around 0037, the convoy came under attack from the sky
as well as from the sea, and it launched an antiaircraft barrage while the fleet engaged the
enemy at sea.(120)
The attacking allied forces consisted of six aircraft and the U.S. heavy cruiser USS Houston
and the Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth.(120) These two cruisers drove back the (six)
[Japanese] destroyers with their huge guns and approached to a point five kilometers off the
anchorage at 0100.(120) After ordering: “All, Charge” at 0045, Rear Admiral Hara, commander
of the 5th Destroyer Squadron, rushed [toward them], leading the light cruiser Natori and
two destroyers. However, at that time (0100), he was still about fifteen kilometers away from
the anchorage and these two cruisers.(120) Prior to that, Rear Admiral Hara had ordered: “The
transport ships shall go into the bay and evade [the engagements] all together.”(120) However,
it was feared that mines were laid in the bay, and Maj. Gen. Itō Shinobu, commander of the
disembarkation group, ordered the ships to shift anchor to a point closer to the coast where
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all of them could be run aground.(94) For-
tunately, a smoke screen created by a
[Japanese] destroyer hid the convoy from
the U.S. and Australian cruisers.(120)
Around 0100, the Natori and the other
ships started to engage the enemy and
were joined by the heavy cruisers Mikuma
and Mogami of the 7th Cruiser Division
around 0118. During the engagement, the
battle site shifted to the north. At 0140,
HMAS Perth was sunk, followed by USS
Houston at 0206.(115, 120)
At the Bantam anchorage, one crisis
followed another. Shortly after USS Hous-
ton and HMAS Perth had passed five kilo-
meters off the anchorage, allied
high-speed torpedo boats rushed in.(34) It
was just when the Mikuma, the Mogami
and the other ships were engaged in a gun
battle and launching their torpedoes; enemy as well as Japanese torpedoes crisscrossed [the
waters]. The hospital ship Hōrai-maru, which was shifting her anchor, was hit by a torpedo,
blew up, and listed.(27) She was followed by the Ryūjō-maru, with [Sixteenth] Army Com-
mander Imamura on board, which was [also] blown up by a torpedo.(27) Then, the Sakura-
maru was torpedoed and sunk, and the Tatsuno-maru was also torpedoed and heavily
damaged.(27) As they were [still] shifting anchors, [the loss was that] the Sakura-maru was
sunk, and that the heavily damaged Ryūjō-maru, Hōrai-maru, and Tatsuno-maru ran aground
and listed.(27) [Editor’s note: Dutch sources make no mention at all of the presence of allied
high-speed torpedo boats; it appears that the Japanese ships were all hit by friendly fire. Vol.
26, p. 490 admits as much.]
The Ryūjō-maru and the Sakura-maru were carrying the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters.(35,
36) Maj. Gen. Itō Shinobu, the disembarkation group commander, put all the strength of the
[crew of the] Atsuta-maru, which he was on, into the rescue operation.(94) These four ships
were sunk or destroyed in the middle of the second landing, but the disembarkation [oper-
ation] was continued. The Ryūjō-maru was shot through at the fuel oil tank, which caused
the fuel oil to spill out into the waters all around.(94) [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura,
aged fifty-five and armed, swam around in the oil-covered waters floating in his life jacket
until he was [finally] rescued around 0430. His watch had stopped at 0200.(35)
Due to the shipwreck of the two ships carrying the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters (the
Ryūjō-maru and the Sakura-maru), radio sets, code books, a war chest of six million yen and
other equipment was lost.(27) In the shipwreck of a total of four ships, one large and five small
motorized [landing] craft, one small steamboat and two boats with Yanmar engines were lost
as well.(27)
An irrecoverable loss was the sinking in the sea of the radio sets and the code books,
which ended up causing difficulties in the command of the [Sixteenth] Army during the most
important first days of the landing operations. The thirty-two ships of the convoy [of the
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Illustration No. 48 — The Position of [the Japanese Naval]
Forces Immediately After the Appearance of the Enemy
Ships, and the Latter’s Movements
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units to] land in Bantam [Bay] were divided into six sections, of which the Ryūjō-maru be-
longed to the 2d Section, the Tatsuno-maru and the Hōrai-maru to the 1st Section, and the
Sakura-maru to the 4th Section.(120) The Ryūjō-maru, which could carry airplanes in addition
to thirty to forty large motorized [landing] craft and a great many small ones, had a peculiar
appearance and, as we have seen, it had been an issue whether the [Sixteenth] Army com-
mander ([and] the army headquarters) should board [this ship].
Note: The sinking of the radio sets of the Sakura-maru was reported as follows:(147)
SHŌSEN (note by the author: the abbreviation for the Saigon command post of the Shipping
Transport Command) Staff Telegram No.2459 (sent at 1800, 3 March)
From: Captain General of the Shipping Transport Command [at] Saigon
To: War Minister, and Inspector General of Logistics
[This is] to report that I received a report to the effect that among the radio sets loaded on
the Sakura-maru, the following (including accessories), kept by the signal regiment, have
been lost at the time of the sinking of the ship off the coast of Java on 1 March.
1. One 2-kilowatt shortwave radio set
2. One 500-watt medium-wave and shortwave marine radio set
3. Two Type-94 Mark-3A radio sets
4. One Type-94 radio set
5. Eleven Type-96 Mark-7 radio sets
The Operational Direction by the Sixteenth Army on the 1st [of March] 
[The chief of the] Signal Communication Staff of the Sixteenth Army, Lieutenant Colonel
Saiki, had been positioned in the communications room of the Ryūjō-maru from the moment
the convoy was about to enter the Bantam anchorage. Upon receiving the report of the suc-
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cessful landing at 0033, he immediately transmitted the report. A little after 0130, Staff Officer
Saiki left the Ryūjō-maru by motorized landing craft along with personnel to set up the com-
mand post of the [Sixteenth] Army.(34) The gunfire of the naval engagement with the U.S. and
Australian cruisers was heard less and less. They landed on the coral coast, looked [back] at
the sea, and saw high-speed [enemy] torpedo boats spotlighting the [Japanese] transport
ships and firing at them.(34) They saw the Ryūjō-maru listing, hit by a torpedo. As they feared
that the coast might come under fire, they left the landing point around 0300, worrying about
the safety of the army commander and the others, reached the village of Ragas and set up
the command post there.(34) Staff Officer Saiki was accompanied by only a radio platoon with
a Mark-3 radio set, which enabled him to communicate with the 2d Division and the Atsuta-
maru (disembarkation group commander Itō), but it was impossible to communicate with
the Shōji Detachment, the Sakaguchi Detachment, the 48th Division and others, which were
beyond the communication range of a Mark-3 radio set.(34) From around daybreak, the [Six-
teenth] Army commander and others, who were soaked black with fuel oil, arrived one after
another. Senior Staff of Section 1, Takashima, was hospitalized. Frustrated, Staff Officer Saiki
tried hard to communicate with the Shōji Detachment and other corps in distant places, as
well as the Southern Army, but without success. The first thing to do was to request the
Southern Army to provide [the command post] with communication equipment and code
books. He tried to send a telegram to the Southern Army by asking a naval signal unit to
transmit it via the Natori, the flagship of the 5th Destroyer Squadron, only to fail. Then he
asked [the unit] to transmit it via the Eleventh Air Fleet, but it was unknown whether it
reached [the Southern Army] or not.(34) Around 1500, he was able to get hold of two fixed
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Army Commander Imamura and his Staff Officers Just After Landing out of the Oil-Covered Waters 
(From the left in the back row, Chief of Staff [Okazaki], Staff Officer Kitamura, and Staff Officer Okamura)
wireless units at last. He tried to make contact with all units concerned other than the 2d Di-
vision by employing all the radio sets, but in the end he could not establish contact on 1
March. The amount of equipment brought ashore was very small, and it took much time to
set it up, due to the fact that it was long-distance radio sets and that the [signal] unit was in-
experienced [in handling these]. The radio contact with the Southern Army was [finally] es-
tablished at 1000 on the next day, the 2d, and radio contact with the others followed.
However, in disregard of the communications situation, a huge amount of transmissions
poured in, and because there were only a small number of communication sets and code books,
com mu nica tions became unmanageable.
On that day (the 1st), [radio] contact with the Shōji Detachment, the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment and the 48th Division could not be established all day.(34) However, [the command post]
was informed by the Navy that those landing [operations] were going well.(36) Communica-
tions with the 2d Division were maintained.(36) Whereas the war situation seemed favorable
in the Merak area (the Nasu and the Fukushima Detachment), in the area where the main
force of the 2d Division [had landed], the only road through the paddy fields about one kilo-
meter south of the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters was blasted, and it was not expected to be
repaired for the time being, which forced the unit to make a detour through the jungle. On
top of that, the road south of the blast point was blocked with huge cut-down or blasted-
down roadside trees, presumed to be 300 years old, due to which the unit had a very hard
time going southward while carrying their bicycles on their shoulders. It seemed out of the
question to capture the entire island by ‘Shunki-kōreisai’ (the Imperial ceremony of ancestor
worship on the vernal equinox day, 21 March).(35, 36, 59)
In the evening, Staff Officer Wakatsuki (Staff Officer of the Third Fleet seconded to the
Sixteenth Army) wired to the Southern Task Force and others through the naval communi-
cation system the following:(131)
The military situation on land of [Operation] H on 1 March is as follows:
1. The main force has landed at Bantam Bay and the detachment has landed at Merak; the front
line has already reached Serang. The [Sixteenth] Army headquarters is positioned near the land-
ing point and is scheduled to advance to Serang tomorrow morning. The enemy has put up a
stubborn resistance and thoroughly destroyed the roads.
2. The military situation is developing smoothly in the areas of the 48th Division and the Shōji De-
tachment, but details are unknown.
The next day it turned out that the road barricade with roadside trees before the main force
of the 2d Division continued for ten kilometers to Serdang.(35, 36) On that evening (the 1st),
however, even though the advance of the main force of the 2d Division was still hampered,
the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters finally felt greatly relieved to receive a telegram that the
operations in the Merak area were going well and that the advance party of the Nasu De-
tachment in pursuit of the enemy had broken through Serang, and rushed even further to
secure one of the bridges over the Ciujung River, to which all the time great importance had
been attached, just before it was going to be blown up.(36)
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The Leadership of the Southern Army on the 1st [of March]
The Southern Army headquarters ([in] Saigon) had received the telegram from the Ryūjō-
maru before its shipwreck that “the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army [had] completed its
entry into the anchorage at 2350 on the 28th and succeeded in landing near Cape Awuran in
the morning of today, the 1st.”(24) On that day, the Southern Army wired back as follows:(23, 24)
We offer our sincere congratulations on your successful landing. We hope that you will destroy
the base of the enemy at once and swiftly complete your mission.
By saying that it hoped [that the Sixteenth Army would] “destroy the base of the enemy at
once,” the Southern Army expressed its view that [the Sixteenth Army] should make Ban-
dung the primary target, contrary to the latter which had made Batavia the primary target
and considered Bandung as the secondary target in its operation plan as well as in its oper-
ation orders.(23, 24)
Learning about the accident to [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura and his men, the
war minister and the chief of the general staff sent telegrams expressing their sympathy.(17)
However, the Southern Army sent no expressions of sympathy. It was beyond doubt that the
Southern Army sympathized with the ship-wrecked [Sixteenth] Army headquarters, but it
felt that it was something that could happen to soldiers, and that the success or failure of the
landing held the key to the success of Operation H. Now that [the Sixteenth Army] had suc-
ceeded in landing, [the Sixteenth Army] should go straight for Bandung, putting Batavia
aside, and by sending only the previously-mentioned telegram it meant to boost the morale
of the Sixteenth Army.(23)
[The Operations] of the Nasu Detachment on the 1st [of March]
The Nasu Detachment, which was assigned to land in Sector A of Merak (note: at the right
front) and rush toward Buitenzorg, was organized for transportation by motor vehicle.(55)
Detachment Commander Nasu had divided the landing (disembarkation) of his men and
motor vehicles into eleven sections, and he further divided the first section into two trans-
ports. He planned to have the unit that was to seize the coastal area ([consisting only of] men)
land in the first transport of the first section and to have the raiding unit ([consisting of] men
and motor vehicles) land in the second transport of the first section and have it charge ahead.
The remaining units were to land (disembark) after that.(64, 65)
Planning “to make a surprise landing in Sector A at 0200, advance all at once into the area
on the right bank of the Ciujung River near Rangkasbitung and make preparations for the
subsequent advance” on the first day of landing, Detachment Commander Nasu disposed
[his unit] roughly as follows:(64, 65)
K Raiding Unit ([consisting of] the 3d Company of the 2d Reconnaissance Regiment as the core):
The unit shall land in the second transport of the first section, promptly charge toward Krag-
ilan along the Cilegon – Serang road and secure the bridge over the Ciujung River. When
one element of the Satō Detachment arrives [there], the unit shall turn over [the defense of]
the bridge [to it] and return to the Noguchi Echelon.
Noguchi Echelon (with the following core units):
Main force of the 2d Reconnaissance Regiment
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Motorbike unit
One field artillery battery (minus one section)
One divisional engineer platoon
One independent engineer platoon
One independent antitank gun company (minus one platoon)
The echelon shall start landing in the second transport of the first section following the unit
of the Hiroyasu Echelon that shall land in the first transport of the section, charge toward
Rangkasbitung without engaging the enemy and try to secure the bridge there while making
preparations for advancing toward Buitenzorg. When one element of the Fukushima De-
tachment arrives, the echelon shall turn over the defense of the bridge to them.
Hiroyasu Echelon (with the following core units):
16th Infantry Regiment (minus the 1st Battalion, the 10th Company, and one regimental gun
platoon)
1st Battalion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment ([minus?] one battery and one section)
One engineer company (minus one platoon)
One bridge building material platoon
39th Independent Motor Transport Battalion (minus the 3d and the 4th Company)
While focusing its attention on its right flank, the echelon shall land on the coast between a
point about one kilometer west of Mt. Kamuning and the southern end of Merak. While
having one element mop up possible [enemy] firing positions on its flank near the landing
coast, it shall have its main force first of all promptly charge to Cilegon along the Merak –
Serang road, further rush through the area along the Serang – Tunjung Ketuk road without
waiting for the disembarkation of motor vehicles and guns, cross the Ciujung River in the
area north of Rangkasbitung, advance into the eastern area of the city, and make preparations
for the subsequent advance.
Remaining units:
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The Coast of Merak After the Landing of the Nasu Detachment
Shall follow the Hiroyasu Echelon.
The convoy of the Nasu Detachment (the Kōyō-maru, the Hokumei-maru, the Shinshū-maru,
the Columbia-maru, the Atlas-maru, the Ryūnan-maru and the Akitsu-maru, a total of seven
ships) [editor’s note: the names and number of ships differ from the list in the agreement
given on p. 242] entered the anchorage at 0000 on 1 March, dropped anchor at 0030, and con-
ducted the vessel-launching (note: the launching of landing craft onto the waters from trans-
port ships) around 0130.(58, 64, 120)
Both front-line battalions of the Hiroyasu Echelon that were to land in the first transport
of the first section (at the right front line the 2d Battalion commanded by Maj. Onoguchi
Satoru and at the left front line the 3d Battalion commanded by Maj. Morozumi Yoshikazu)
came ashore at 0200. Although there was about one Dutch East Indies Army company in
Merak and vicinity, they retreated without putting up much resistance. After landing, the
Hiroyasu Echelon immediately started advancing on foot, drove away a Dutch East Indies
Army unit consisting of some 200 men in Cilegon in the early morning, commandeered a
few motor vehicles in the city (one motor vehicle for the Morozumi Battalion in the rear), and
continued its advance.(61, 62)
The K Raiding Unit and the Noguchi Echelon landed following both front-line battalions
of the Hiroyasu Echelon and charged ahead, overtaking [both battalions].(64, 65)
Echelon Commander Noguchi (2d Reconnaissance Regiment Commander Lt. Col.
Noguchi Kin’ichi) had divided his unit into three advance parties and the main body ([con-
sisting of] three echelons). He had disposed his unit roughly in the following way, planning
to have [the unit] land in the order of the advance parties and the main body, and while hav-
ing the advance parties immediately charge toward the bridge over the Ciujung River, have
the main body rush toward Rangkasbitung after lining up the echelons one after another in
a column on the right side of the main road near Grogol. On arrival in Rangkasbitung, the
unit should make preparations for the subsequent advance.(64, 65)
Right advance party (the main force of the 4th Company): to the Rangkasbitung bridge.
Left advance party (two platoon of the 3d Company): to the Pamarayan bridge.
Shishido advance party (motorbike unit): shall charge to Serang, secure the Serang bridge, and
rush toward Rangkasbitung when the first echelon arrives. After that, it shall make prepa-
rations for advancing toward Lawangtaji.
Main body and the order of the accompanying units:
First echelon (led by Captain Takase; [consisting of] the 2d Company, the regimental head-
quarters, and others): After forming a column with its head at Grogol, the echelon shall rush
to Rangkasbitung. After that, it shall make preparations for advancing toward Leuwiliang.
It shall have one element take over the defense of the Rangkasbitung bridge from the right
advance party and turn it over to the Fukushima Detachment when the latter arrives.
Second echelon (led by Captain Sakurai; [consisting of] the main force of the 1st Company,
the main force of the independent antitank gun company, and others): shall follow the first
echelon.
Third echelon (led by 1st Lt. Watanabe Kōichi; [consisting of] the 3d Battery of the 2d Field
Artillery Regiment (minus one section) as the core): shall follow the 2d Echelon.
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The K Raiding Unit as well as the right, the left and the Shishido advance parties overtook
the Hiroyasu Echelon, charged into Serang at 0700, and further rushed to reach the line of
the Ciujung River by 1400.(64, 65)
The Kragilan bridge had already been destroyed.(55)
The advance party to seize Rangkasbitung was accompanied by 2d Division Staff Officer
Maj. Satō Hidehiko. When the advance party reached Pandeglang, it encountered about one
company of the British/Australian Army, which had retreated from the Labuhan coast,
caught some of the enemy and heavily pursued the enemy by having the prisoners of war
drive the commandeered motor vehicles. Just when the party was approaching the front of
the Rangkasbitung bridge at 1230, the allied unit managed by a hair’s breadth to demolish
the bridge but, fortunately, half of the bridge remained.(54)
The unit sent to the Pamarayan bridge engaged on the east side of the bridge the allied
unit that had rushed to the bridge to destroy it and narrowly managed to secure it.(31)
On advancing into Rangkasbitung, Echelon Commander Noguchi issued an order there
at 1500 to deploy his unit so as to have one element [consisting of] the 2d Company as the
core head for Leuwiliang as an advance party by leaving the town at 1630, and have the main
force leave at 1730.(64, 65)
The Hiroyasu Echelon arrived in Serang one after another from a little before noon on-
wards.(64)
Detachment Commander Nasu reached Serang at 1300. By evening, he learned that the
advance of the main force of the division had been delayed, that the Satō Detachment was
[at last] advancing into Serdang, and that the Fukushima Detachment was advancing into
the area about one kilometer northwest of Serdang. He decided to assemble his detachment
in Rangkasbitung and vicinity the night of the same day, the 1st, to make preparations for
advancing on the next day, the 2d, and issued his orders for the detachment in Serang at
1810. That is, the commander deployed his unit so as to position the Noguchi Echelon (with
the K Raiding Unit returned) in Jasinga and the Hiroyasu Echelon in the area east of Rangkas-
bitung that night to prepare for the subsequent engagements, and have the remaining units
advance toward Rangkasbitung one by one.(64)
Despite the independent motor transport battalion (two companies) being assigned to the
detachment and the presence of the 1st Battalion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment, which
was the only battalion in the regiment equipped with motor vehicles, the mobility of the
Nasu Detachment was not sufficient. The disembarkation was scheduled to take [as long as]
seven days. The Hiroyasu Echelon came under attack from one allied aircraft in Serang, but
sustained no damage. [The Echelon] got hold of bicycles, which arrived while it was standing
by there, and left Serang for Rangkasbitung at 1900, using commandeered motor vehicles as
well. Of the Morozumi Battalion (i.e. the 3d Battalion), which departed from Serang, the bat-
talion headquarters and the 9th Company advanced by bicycle, the machine gun company
marched on foot while pulling two-wheeled carts. Motor vehicles were available only for the
guns, gunners and superiors of the battalion gun platoon; all the other companies marched
on foot. On that day, with a temperature of 31 degrees Celsius and no wind, the summer heat
was hard on the officers and men of this regiment from Shibata in Niigata, a cold region.
[The heat] was followed by torrential rain in the evening.(61, 62, 64)
The Nasu Detachment headquarters arrived in Serang in the afternoon, and left there for
Rangkasbitung at 2100.(59, 64)
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The indigenous people greeted the [Japanese] units with cheers and helped them every-
where.(55)
[The Operations of] the Fukushima Detachment on the 1st [of March]
The convoy ([consisting of] the Akitsu-maru, the Momoyama-maru, the Pacific-maru, the Kizan-
maru, the Reiyō-maru, the Tsuyama-maru and the Sydney-maru) of the Fukushima Detachment
(led by Col. Fukushima Kyūsaku, commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment), which was to
land in Sector B of Merak (the left front), completed its entry into the anchorage at 0045 on 1
March.(120) [Editor’s note: The list of ships agrees with that on p. 242. However, the Akitsu-
maru was on p. 477 also assigned to the Nasu Detachment. The actual situation is unclear.]
At 0145, the ships launched the landing [operation] all at once and [the troops] success-
fully landed without loss. Detachment Commander [Fukushima] went ashore along with
the second [transport] group, and advanced to the southern end of Lebak Gede. Lt. Col. Ikuta
Tōichi, commander of the 1st Battalion on the right front line, immediately sent the 2d Com-
pany to attack the Dutch East Indies Army on Mt. Merak, while having one element of the
company charge toward the station and vicinity. At the same time, he also had the engineer
platoon assigned [to his unit] rush along the coastal road to search for and attack enemy pill-
boxes. The [Japanese] units destroyed several lines of obstacles and in combination with the
outflanking attack via the top of the Mt. Merak they put the Dutch East Indies Army to flight
into the jungle to the southeast, giving it no time to put up resistance. Furthermore, the unit
to seize Merak Island, led by 1st Lt. Inoue Kanji, commander of the 1st Company, [managed
to] land on the island under fierce [direct] fire of machine gun(s) from the direction of the
Merak [railway] station and completed clearing the island. In their shift to Pulau Merak [not
the island, but the suburb south of Merak across from the island], they took thirty-five white
sailors prisoner, castaways from the warship(s) [USS Houston and/or HMAS Perth] sunk in
the naval engagement in the Bay off Batavia [i.e. Bantam].(58)
The [Fukushima] Detachment did not wait for the completion of the landing of the entire
unit; the 1st and the 2d echelon left Sekong and Lebak Gede at 0530 and at 0730 respectively,
and advanced along the Sekong – Cilegon – Serang – Petir road toward the right bank of the
Ciujung River near Pamarayan. The detachment commander passed through Serang around
2300. The 3d echelon and succeeding units also followed one after another after their land-
ing.(58)
[The Operations in] the Sector of the Main Force of the 2d Division on the 1st [of March]
The Satō Detachment (commander, 29th Infantry Regiment Commander Col. Satō Hanshichi)
launched the [landing] craft of the first transport at 0000 on 1 March and landed at 0045. All
fronts met with no resistance at all. The detachment commander landed at a point one kilo-
meter west of Cape Kapo [?] at 0245. The 1st Battalion (commander, Lt. Col. Endō Shigesuke),
the 2d Battalion (commander, Lt. Col. Watanabe Katsutoshi) and the 3d Battalion (raiding
unit; commander, Maj. Yoshii Tadao) departed respectively at 0320, 0600 and 0630 without
waiting for [the completion of] the assembly [of each unit]. They pushed along the coastal
road, which was only passable with extreme difficulty due to felled roadside trees and de-
stroyed bridges, but the heads of each battalion reached Trate respectively at 0900, 1200 and
1500. Detachment Commander [Satō] reached Trate at 1030. Then, the detachment left the
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town at 1700, heading along the Trate – Bantam – Ciruas – Kragilan road toward the right
bank of the Ciujung River; they reached Bantam at 2100, where they encamped.(63, 120)
The [2d] Division command post, which had been positioned in Bojonegara [following]
the advance of the Satō Detachment after the landing, left the town at 1500 to move to Ser-
dang.(59)
Taking the situation of the detachments into account, the [2d] division commander in-
structed each of the detachments to send one element ahead to seize the crossing points on
the Cidurian River, while urging them to [quickly] advance to the right bank of the Ciujung
River. At the same time, he tried to stay in [overall] control of his units.(31)
The divisional reserve unit ([consisting of] the 3d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment
led by Maj. Sasaki Mori’e) completed landing at 0520. While having one platoon clear the
road along the north coast of the peninsula up to Merak, he headed southward with the main
force (one company by bicycle and the others on foot) and reached Bojonegara at 1530 and
Serdang at 2200.(59)
The situation on 2 March
The [Sixteenth] Army headquarters greeted the morning of the 2d in Ragas. Radio contact
with the Shōji Detachment, the 48th Division and others was yet to be established.(34, 36)
While the [Navy] 1st Air Unit ([consisting of] the auxiliary seaplane tenders Kamikawa-
maru and San’yō-maru), which supported the 3d Escort Unit (under the command of the 5th
Destroyer Squadron commander), was still positioned in the Anambas Islands, two planes
of each ship had advanced to the Patrol base at noon of the previous day (the 1st), and two
of them shifted from the Patrol base to the Bantam base that evening. The 1st Base Force had
set up the Bantam Base with one element.(130, 131) [Editor’s note: This is a somewhat garbled
account of the events. See Vol. 26, pp. 516–517.]
The bombings of its anchorage by allied aircraft on the previous night, along with the ap-
pearance of [allied] submarines, had caused tension in the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters.
Just then, two telegrams arrived that morning (of the 2d) via the previously mentioned naval
unit.(36)
One was from the Shōji Detachment, which contained the message that “the Shōji De-
tachment seized the Kalijati airfield at noon on the 1st and obtained an immense amount of
spoils. One element of the detachment is [now] advancing toward the Krawang bridge. This
morning (of the 2d), the disembarkation point at Eretan is under the attack of 400 to 500
enemy [troops] with armored cars.”(17, 36) 
The other telegram was from the 48th Division, which contained the message that “ac-
cording to the statement of the captain of a British destroyer, who was taken prisoner as a
consequence of the naval engagement off Surabaya, two divisions of the Australian Army
had completed their landing on Java at Cilacap several days ago.”(17, 36)
The [Sixteenth] Army headquarters grew agitated. The Shōji Detachment, consisting of
only two battalions, had gone inland, split up into units for Kalijati and Krawang, while its
disembarkation point, which was in the middle of the disembarkation operation, was said
to be under the attack of allied forces that morning. The situation of the detachments in the
inland was unknown. On top of that, two divisions of the Australian Army were said to have
landed recently. If it had been Dutch East Indies Army divisions, it would have been no prob-
lem, but the Australian Army could not be treated lightly. The entire staff of the headquarters
480 Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java
Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java 481
Illustration No. 49 — The Sector of the Main Force of the [Sixteenth] Army: The Terrain and Landing Points
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became more and more anxious, but the chief of staff, Major General Okazaki, asserted: “The
information of the landing of the Australian Army is a lie,” and assured the staff that “judging
from the recent operations of our aircraft, submarines and other units, as well as from the
strategic positions of the enemy and ours, it is absolutely unthinkable.”(17, 36)
Note: The matter of the two divisions of the Australian Army will be described later in section
6: “The Conclusion of the Java Invasion Operation and the Operations of the Allied
Forces.”
It was inconvenient to give commands and establish contact from Ragas. The Army Com-
mander [Imamura] left Ragas with the personnel of the command post at 1500. After going
southward halfway along the coastal road [obstructed] with felled roadside trees, they used
[landing] craft to land [again] at the southwestern part of Bantam Bay and arrived in Serang
at 2000 on the 2d in the motor vehicles that had come from Merak to pick them up.(31, 32, 35)
In the area of the Nasu Detachment, Echelon Commander Noguchi, who had left
Rangkasbitung for Leuwiliang at 1730 on the 1st, reached Cipeteng (about twenty kilometers
southeast of Rangkasbitung) at 1845 and learned that the advance party was in the middle
of an engagement with an Australian Army [unit] equipped with machine guns there. He
immediately deployed his unit, and drove off [the enemy]. As the allied forces had set anti-
tank obstacles on a concave road in Cipeteng, he decided to pursue the enemy toward Gar-
dubatok (departure scheduled at 2030) after removing the obstacles and made the necessary
[changes in the] disposition of his units at 1930. The echelon resumed its advance at 2030
and continued its march while removing obstacles on the road. On the 2d at 1800, it arrived
at the position of the advance company in Lawangtaji and encamped in the area between
Lawangtaji and Bunar on the night of the 2d, while removing antitank obstacles and land-
mines near the Lawangtaji bridge.(64, 65)
The Hiroyasu Echelon (led by 16th Infantry Regimental Commander Col. Hiroyasu Jurō)
of the Nasu Detachment advanced by marching through the night from Serang and reached
Bedeng Cisalak (its destination), located four kilometers east of Rangkasbitung, around 0800
on the 2d. Echelon Commander Hiroyasu decided to assemble his force near Bedeng Cisalak
to [have his unit] prepare for the subsequent advance. At 0830, he arranged that the units
following behind and the goods left in Serang be brought to the present location by shuttle
transport [provided] by the motor transport unit. Then at 1820, having decided to advance
[his units] toward Leuwiliang via Jasinga by leaving Bedeng Cisalak the next day, the 3d, he
issued the relevant orders.(61, 64, 65)
As we have seen, the Fukushima Detachment had passed through Serang the night before,
and continued its rush toward Pamarayan on the 2d. From the afternoon of the 2d onwards,
motor vehicles became available for the transport [of the detachment] as well, which enabled
the detachment to assemble most of the separated units near the Pamarayan bridge at mid-
night.(58)
The Satō Detachment left the southern end of Bantam at 0100 on the 2d to advance toward
Kragilan. It reached Kedung cinde at 0730, Kemang at 1230, and Ciruas at 1900; the 1st Bat-
talion and the main force of the detachment encamped respectively in Petung and Ciruas.
On this day, the 2d, the raiding unit (i.e. the 3d Battalion led by Maj. Yoshii Tadao) rushed
toward Kragilan, getting ahead of the main force at 0200, reached the town at 1040, and took
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over the defense [of the town]
from the K Raiding Unit of the
Nasu Detachment, which had
seized the town.(31, 63)
The 2d Division command
post had left Serdang around
0400 on the 2d, reached Serang,
from which it departed [again]
at 2000, and advanced to Petir.(59)
The divisional reserve unit
had [also] left Serdang at 0400 on
the 2d and reached Serang at
1030, where it encamped.(59)
The reserve unit of the [Six-
teenth] Army ([consisting of] the
1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry
Regiment, commanded by Lt.
Col. Minamoto Shirō) was posi-
tioned in the area northwest of
Serang.
Shifting Priority to the
Buitenzorg Road
(See Illustrations No. 51, No.
52 and No. 53)
The Operational Direction of
the Sixteenth Army on the
3d [of March]
The [Sixteenth] Army command
post greeted the morning of the
3d in Serang.(34) Senior Staff Offi-
cer Colonel Takashima of the 1st
Section was [still] in hospital and
the [Sixteenth] Army headquar-
ters was still positioned in
Ragas.(34) So were [Chief] Signal Communication Staff Lieutenant Colonel Saiki and the army
signal unit. The situation was [tough:] the bridge to the north of Bojonegara had not yet been
repaired, and one element of the 2d Division reserve unit was still at the landing point.(59)
The situation of the 2d Division before daybreak on the 3d was that the Nasu Detachment
was advancing smoothly in general, that both the Fukushima and the Satō Detachment had
managed to reach the west bank of the Ciujung River at last and were preparing to cross the
river, while sending one element of their force ahead to try to seize the bridges over the
Cidurian River.(58, 61, 63)
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Illustration No. 50 — [Advances on] 1 and 2 March
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Ｔhe situation of the Shōji Detachment was a matter of concern. Because destroyed bridges,
blocked roads and heavy rainfall had seriously delayed the advance of the main force of the
2d Division, the Shōji Detachment would remain isolated for an even longer period. [Six-
teenth Army Chief of Staff Okazaki] had suppressed the agitation among the staff officers,
asserting that the statement of the captain of an allied destroyer that two divisions of the
Australian Army had landed was a lie, but he had no solid grounds. As a matter of fact, the
units that put up resistance against the Nasu Detachment one after another were units of the
Australian Army.
In the morning, Chief of Staff Okazaki left the [Sixteenth Army] command post in Serang
to visit the 2d Division headquarters in Petir. The 2d Division Commander Maruyama told
him that the division had not been able to advance as it had expected due to destroyed
bridges, that the engineers had difficulty in bridging the rivers because the rivers were deep
and had high banks; moreover, every day heavy squalls in the afternoon instantly swelled
the rivers. Chief of Staff Okazaki went on toward the Kragilan bridge by car.(36)
At noon, 2d Division Commander Maruyama decided to advance the [divisional] head-
quarters to Rangkasbitung to urge his units onward. He [also] decided to have the divisional
reserve unit secure the Pamarayan bridge (which had not been destroyed) after the Fuku -
shima Detachment had passed through the bridge eastward, [and] issued the following
order:(59) [Editor’s note: The Pamarayan “bridge” also functioned as a flood-control dam. The
Japanese had caught the Dutch East Indies Army unit while it was setting the demolition
charges.]
2d Division Order Petir, 1200, 3 March
1. This afternoon, the main force of the Fukushima Detachment shall leave Pamarayan and [start]
its advance.
2. The divisional reserve unit shall have its main force advance to Pamarayan within today and
keep guard mainly against the direction of Parigi. It shall have one element accompany the di-
visional command post as before.
3. I am at the present location and shall advance to Rangkasbitung via Pamarayan tomorrow, the
4th.
2d Division Commander Maruyama Masao
[Sixteenth] Army Chief of Staff Major General Okazaki had left the 2d Division headquarters
in Petir before this divisional order was passed down and was inspecting Kragilan. The sit-
uation of the swollen river, the destroyed bridge, the preparations for bridging, the present
attempts to use various materials to cross the river, etc., was entirely deplorable. Seeing that
the slow performance of the unit in this area did not fit what the situation required, Chief of
Staff Okazaki encouraged the Satō Detachment. Then, he hurried back to the [Sixteenth]
Army command post in Serang, reported [the situation] to Army Commander Imamura and
offered his opinion.(36) 
[As a result,] a [Sixteenth] Army order was issued to the effect that “the [Sixteenth] Army
Ordnance Department Director Maj. Gen. Yamada Hisamatsu shall immediately bridge the
river in Kragilan by taking unified command of the engineer units and other units assigned
[to the task].”(36)
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[Another Sixteenth] Army order was passed down to the 2d Division to the effect that “it
shall speed up as much as possible the operations in the sectors of the Nasu and the
Fukushima Detachment.”(36) One motor transport company was added to the 2d Division.(34)
At 1200 on the 3d, Lieutenant Colonel Saiki, [chief] signal communication staff of the [Six-
teenth] Army, left Ragas along with the main force of the army signal unit. As the bridge
three kilometers north of Bojonegara had not yet been repaired, they made a detour along
the north coast of the peninsula and arrived at the [Sixteenth] Army command post in Serang
via Merak at 1500. The strength brought there was one wire company and two wireless pla-
toons.(34) [However,] also on that day, telegrams from the Shōji Detachment, the 48th Division,
etc. could not yet be submitted [to the army headquarters] through the [Sixteenth] Army sig-
nal unit.(36)
The situation of the 2d Division on the 3d [of March]
On the early morning of the 3d, the Noguchi Echelon of the Nasu Detachment ([consisting of]
the 2d Reconnaissance Regiment as the core, led by regimental commander Lt. Col. Noguchi
Kin’ichi) left the area of Lawangtaji and Bunar where it was encamped the night before. The
advance company advanced into Leuwiliang at 1330 and went into battle with the units of
the Australian Army positioned on the east bank of the city. Echelon Commander Noguchi
caught up with [the company] at 1400 and decided to make a night raid that night.(64, 65)
The Hiroyasu Echelon of the Nasu Detachment was encamped near Bedeng Cisalak the
night before. At 0840 on the 3d, the echelon left Bedeng Cisalak, transported in motor vehicles
in the order of the 1st echelon ([consisting of] the Morozumi 3d Battalion as the core), the 2d
echelon (the regimental headquarters and artillery units) and the 3d echelon ([consisting of]
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The Destroyed Bridge at Kragilan
the Onoguchi 2d Battalion as the core). Both battalions had the support of one company of the
39th Independent Motor Transport Battalion each. It was decided that upon arrival of its ad-
vance company at Leuwiliang around 1630, the echelon should join in the battle there.(61, 62, 64)
The Fukushima Detachment, which had assembled near Pamarayan in the middle of the
previous night, came under attack from allied planes three times before and after daybreak
on the 3d, but it sustained no losses. It left Pamarayan at 1200 and advanced toward Maja
via Rangkasbitung by motor vehicle and bicycle. Its advance party, under the command of
5th Company Commander 1st Lt. Onodera Yoshimi, rushed toward the bridge east of Maja
early in the morning and reached Maja at 1600, where it reconnoitered the enemy’s move-
ments as well as the terrain. The allied units had already retreated after destroying the bridge
over the Cidurian River. In addition, anything like a road was hardly seen on the right bank
of the river.(58)
The raiding unit of the Satō Detachment (the 3d Battalion under the command of the Bat-
talion Commander Maj. Yoshii Tadao) left Kragilan in the early morning of the 3d, seized the
Parigi bridge at 0930, and then advanced into Balaraja at 1530, but the bridge there had al-
ready been destroyed. The main force of the Satō Detachment advanced, crossing the Ciujung
River at 1100.(63)
The divisional reserve unit left Serang at 1800 on that day and arrived in Petir at 2200.
Further, one company of the unit reached Pamarayan at 2300 and took over the defense of
the bridge there from the Fukushima Detachment.(59)
The 2d Division commander was still in Petir. On learning that there were no eastward
roads from Maja, the division commander gave an order to the Fukushima Detachment to
shift its position to the rear of the Nasu Detachment. The [Fukushima] Detachment made
preparations for the shift all through the night.(55, 58)
The Worries of the [Sixteenth] Army Headquarters
(See Illustrations No. 51, No. 52 and No. 53)
The [Sixteenth] Army headquarters greeted the morning of day four after the landing (4
March) in Serang.(36)
In the sector of the Nasu Detachment, the advance company of the reconnaissance regi-
ment had reached Leuwiliang in the early afternoon of the previous day where its light-ar-
mored car was pierced by enemy fire; the main force of the reconnaissance regiment had
caught up, but the enemy was an Australian Army [unit], which had several guns and was
entrenched in pillboxes; the Hiroyasu Regiment had also caught up and they had decided to
conduct a night attack together with the reconnaissance regiment; their current situation,
however, was unknown; the Fukushima Detachment had been shifted to the rear of the Nasu
Detachment because there were no [eastward] roads [from where they were]; in the sector of
the Satō Detachment, the Kragilan bridge had not been (re)built yet, and [what was more,]
it turned out that the Balaraja bridge was also destroyed.
Although it was the fourth day after the landing, no telegrams from the Shōji Detachment,
the Sakaguchi Detachment and the 48th Division had been submitted to the [Sixteenth] Army
headquarters through the army signal unit.(35, 36) [The unit] was short of radio sets and code
books. It still had a pile of telegrams to be radioed; as much as eighty telegrams which should
have been sent to the Southern Army had remained unsent at the army headquarters in
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Ragas.(34) Staff Officer Saiki arranged that they would be transmitted through the ship signal
system (by way of the Ayatosan-maru and the Shipping Transport Command in Saigon).(34)
Such was the situation with the telegrams to the Southern Army, even though they had been
given priority to other [telegrams] at Ragas as well as at Serang. The situation of the wire
communications was also [bad]: It was not until that day, the 4th, that telephone connections
were [finally] established between the [army] command post in Serang and the 2d Division
headquarters in Rangkasbitung and between the [army] command post in Serang and the
Serang airfield.(34)
As we have seen, in contrast to the views of the Southern Army [which gave priority to
Bandung], the Sixteenth Army attached greater importance to Batavia and was also on the
alert for an offensive of the allied forces in the area west of Batavia. At the same time, it had
reached the conclusion that the allied forces were planning to hold out in the area to the west
of Batavia up to the west coast [of Java] and in the meantime destroy the Shōji Detachment.
As a matter of fact, the current situation was as mentioned above. Imagining the difficulties
of the Shōji Detachment, which had charged [both] to Kalijati and Krawang [only] with the
strength of two battalions, the army headquarters was deeply concerned. Putting it ahead of
all other telegrams, the army commander [Imamura] sent the following telegram to the
Southern Army:(23)
Sixteenth Army Field Telegram No. 128 (4 March)
Considering the military situation in the sector of the Shōji Detachment, the [Sixteenth] Army
intends to further secure its strategic superiority by reinforcing the strength in this sector. For
this purpose, it requests, based on the prearranged plan, your approval to employ about thirty
transport aircraft for sending in one element of the 38th Division ([consisting of] about two in-
fantry companies as the core) to the Kalijati airfield from Palembang by air. [Sixteenth Army]
Staff Officer Itoda in Palembang has communicated the details to the person in charge [at the
Southern Army].
What [Commander Imamura] really meant was that he wanted two companies to be brought
by air from Palembang to the relief of the Shōji Detachment, but since he could not help ton-
ing it down, he sent the telegram as phrased above. At that time, [the army headquarters]
had lost contact with Staff Officer Itoda who had landed in Palembang ahead [of the Java
landings] together with the [paratroop] raiding unit. It caused the army headquarters a great
deal of worry that the whereabouts of its [chief] aviation staff were unknown precisely at a
time when his active involvement was most counted on. The fact was that after his belly-
landing in Palembang, Lieutenant Colonel Itoda had dealt with the issue over the employ-
ment of the paratroop unit in Cilacap, discovered the Tanjungkarang airfield, directed its
preparation, and made efforts so that the army reconnaissance planes could be deployed
there (all of which has been described earlier). Then, he had flown to Kalijati to direct the air
support for the Shōji Detachment. The [Sixteenth] Army headquarters knew nothing about
it, because its radio communications were in the previously described state. Consequently,
the army headquarters also did not know that the issue of the employment of the paratroop
unit in Cilacap had changed in the already described way.
When the army headquarters sent the previously mentioned telegram and was impa-
tiently waiting for the reply from the Southern Army, the entire staff at the headquarters was
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surprised to see Staff Officer [Itoda] come to the headquarters out of nowhere. He reported:
“I have returned via the Kalijati and the Serang airfields; the Shōji Detachment headquarters
is positioned in Subang and the Wakamatsu Battalion in Kalijati; the Egashira Battalion is
said to be heading for Krawang; the Endō Air Division has advanced to the Kalijati [airfield]
since the 2d; the Shōji Detachment is under concentrated attacks from the enemy from all di-
rections; yesterday, the 3d, twenty-five enemy tanks and one hundred motor vehicle came
for an attack on Subang; at 0730, twenty enemy armored vehicles came for an assault on Kali-
jati, and a large column of an enemy mechanized unit followed from Purwakarta in the af-
ternoon; the Wakamatsu Battalion fought back with the support of the Endō Air Division
and seized Purwakarta this morning; fortunately, the detachment headquarters in Subang
also drove off the enemy after a hard fight; Detachment Commander Shōji said, ‘I do not
think that the 2d Division can be expected to come soon; I hear that there are 30,000 enemy
[troops] in Bandung; if I stay in level country in such a situation, I will be defeated, and I am
planning to cling to a corner in the mountains north of Bandung.’”
Just then, a report came from the 2d Division, which said: “The Hiroyasu 16th Infantry
Regiment and the Noguchi 2d Reconnaissance Regiment made a night raid on the [enemy]
position in Leuwiliang before daybreak on the 4th, and Regimental Commander Hiroyasu
is currently missing.”(64)
The atmosphere of the army headquarters became graver than ever. At that moment, in-
formation came in that “the enemy in the Batavia and the Buitenzorg [Bogor] area are re-
treating.”(31) It was known that there were zones with pillbox positions near Leuwiliang,
Tangerang, Buitenzorg and Batavia. The [Sixteenth] Army headquarters drew the conclusion
that “the enemy plans to put up a drawn-out struggle along the line connecting Tangerang
and Leuwiliang, and the line connecting Batavia and Buitenzorg, and that during that period
it will divert forces which can be extracted from Buitenzorg and Batavia for the time being
to the front of the Shōji Detachment and try to defeat the units of the detachment one by
one.”(36)
The army headquarters anxiously waited for the reply from the Southern Army with
deepening concerns. In the afternoon, the following reply came at last:(23)
To: Chief of Staff, Sixteenth Army
From: Chief of Staff, Southern Army, sent on 4 March
Replying to Sixteenth Army Field Telegram No. 128.
The [paratroop] raiding air unit has already returned to Phnom Penh (note by the author: French
Indochina). Moreover, taking the present considerable loss and damage of equipment of the
transport air unit and the requirements for the execution of subsequent air operations into ac-
count, I would like you to understand that unfortunately I won’t be able to fulfill your wishes.
When the Southern Army read Field Telegram No. 128, it did not understand what the Six-
teenth Army really meant and read it as “the war is going so well that it is intending to ex-
pand the advantageous military situation.”(23) Moreover, as told above, because the subsequent
deployment of the [paratroop] raiding unit had already been decided, meaning that it should
not press additional operations on the transport unit due to the necessity of maintenance,
the Southern Army thought that it should by all means avoid a spur-of-the-moment operation
that had not been in the plans.(23)
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Receiving this reply from the Southern Army, the Sixteenth Army realized that it had no
choice but to have the 2d Division break through Leuwiliang and rush [to the help of the
Shōji Detachment].(36) At that time, the 2d Division deployed five battalions of infantry (two
Hiroyasu battalions, two Fukushima battalions and one reserve battalion) on the Leuwiliang
front, three battalions along the Tangerang – Batavia road, and one battalion as the army re-
serve.
The Sixteenth Army decided to rouse the 2d Division to action, have it focus all out on
Leuwiliang, and charge toward Bandung through Buitenzorg.
In order to rouse the 2d Division to action, [the Sixteenth Army] pointed out the following
concerning the situation of both sides:(59)
The enemy in the areas of Batavia and Buitenzorg are retreating one after another into the Ban-
dung stronghold.
The Shōji Detachment has seized Purwakarta at 0700 today, the 4th.
It was decided that the 2d Division should divert one battalion from the Satō Detachment to
the sector of the Nasu Detachment, which meant increasing the battalions in the Leuwiliang
sector to six, and reducing those along the coastal road to two (one battalion was the army
reserve). It was [also] decided to divert the 2d Tank Regiment.
The order and the operational directions, which the Sixteenth Army gave at this time,
caused unexpected misunderstandings and errors between the Sixteenth Army and the 2d
Division afterwards, but these will be described later.
How the 2d Division interpreted the [Sixteenth] Army order and disposed its units can
be seen in the following order:(59)
ISAMU Operation Order A, No. 60(59)
2d Division Order Rangkasbitung, 1700, 4 March
1. The enemy in the Batavia and the Buitenzorg area are retreating one after another into the Ban-
dung stronghold. The Shōji Detachment has seized Purwakarta at 0700 today, the 4th.
2. The division intends to promptly seize Buitenzorg to cut off the escape route of the enemy.
3. The Satō Detachment shall attack the enemy it is facing and advance into the area south of
Batavia as soon as possible.
4. I shall advance first toward Leuwiliang tomorrow, the 5th.
2d Division Commander Maruyama Masao
RYūSA Operation Order No. 30(59)
3d Battalion Order Wirana, 2200, 4 March
1. [As] the enemy in the Batavia and the Buitenzorg area are retreating one after another into the
Bandung stronghold, the division plans to promptly seize Buitenzorg to cut off the escape route
of the enemy. The Nasu Detachment (to which the Fukushima Detachment and the 2d Battalion
of the 29th Infantry Regiment have newly been attached) is expected to advance to Buitenzorg,
cut off the escape route of the enemy, and immediately follow them in hot pursuit toward Ban-
dung. The Shōji Detachment has seized Purwakarta at 0700 today, on the 4th.
2. The battalion plans to defend Pamarayan with one element, while advancing its main force to
Rangkasbitung and then assemble in or near Leuwiliang. For this purpose, [the battalion] shall
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come under the direction of Detachment Commander Fukushima concerning
the advance from Rangkasbitung to Leuwiliang. (The rest omitted by the au-
thor.)
Note: RYūSA indicates the Sasaki Battalion of the Sendai Regiment. It is an
order of the 3d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment (the divisional
reserve unit at that time). 
Wirana is located four kilometers south of Pamarayan.
The Battle of Leuwiliang (See Illustrations No. 51 and No. 52)
The battle in Leuwiliang had begun in the early afternoon of the previous
day (the 3d).
At 1330 on the 3d, the advance company of the Noguchi Echelon
([consisting of] the 2d Reconnaissance Regiment as the core) of the Nasu
Detachment came to the bridge in Leuwiliang. However, the bridge had been destroyed. All
of a sudden, [the company] came under concentrated fire from [enemy] antitank rifles and
machine guns from the opposite bank, which destroyed the light-armored car at the head of
the company.(54, 65)
The echelon commander (2d Reconnaissance Regiment Commander Lt. Col. Noguchi
Kin’ichi), who had caught up with the advance company responding to the [enemy] fire, de-
cided to cross the Cianten River with his main force on the night of the 3d and conduct a
night attack on [the enemy position(s) on] Mt. Galuga from the left rear of the enemy posi-
tions, while containing the enemy at the front with one element. He gave the order at Leuwil-
iang at 1400, and deployed his units roughly as follows:(64, 65)
1. From the right, the 2d Company (to which one element of engineers shall be assigned) and the
1st Company (minus one platoon; one element of engineers shall also be assigned to it) shall
form the front line. Each of them shall cross the Cianten River in or near Bantarkaret, about three
kilometers upstream from the bridge, and advance to Cibungbulang and vicinity (note by the
author: location unclear, presumably near Cibatok). [Editor’s note: Probably Cibungbulang.]
After that, the 2d Company shall conduct a surprise attack on the enemy position(s) on Mt.
Galuga from the area on the north side of the main road, and the 1st Company on the enemy
positions at the east end of the bridge from the area along the main road. They shall depart at
1900, cross the river at 2200, and charge at 2400.
2. The engineer company shall start repairing the bridge when the night raids are successfully car-
ried out.
3. The battery shall fire at the enemy from the front during the daytime so as to contain them
[there].
4. The independent antitank gun company shall fire at the enemy from the front so as to contain
them [there].
5. The 3d and the 4th Companies shall be positioned at the present location as reserve units.
The enemy [the echelon was facing] was an Australian Army unit. It was known that that it
had blown up the Leuwiliang bridge and reinforced the zone of existing pillboxes on the
right bank [of the river] with field positions, and that it had two guns.(64, 65)
At 1730, the battery ([consisting of] the 3d Battery of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment
(minus one section), led by Commander 1st Lt. Watanabe Kōichi), opened fire at the lookout
post at the top of Mt. Galuga with all its firepower (two guns) and then fired at the pill-
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In the meantime, the advance company of the Hiroyasu Echelon
([consisting of] the 2d and the 3d Battalions of the 16th Infantry Regiment
led by Regimental Commander Col. Hiroyasu Jurō) had reached Leuwil-
iang around 1630.(64)
Echelon Commander Hiroyasu and Detachment Commander Nasu
[also] arrived in Leuwiliang one after another.
Echelon Commander Noguchi reported the enemy’s movements, the
terrain, his plan, the current situation, etc. to Detachment Commander
Nasu. Staff Officer Maj. Satō Hidehiko of the 2d Division was [also] pres-
ent. He had accompanied the advance party (the advance company) of
the Noguchi Echelon from the time of its landing in order to collect in-
formation. Recently he had advanced [along with the company] in the light-armored car that
had been hit in front of the [enemy] position, but he had safely gotten out of the car and re-
treated. After that, he had been together with Echelon Commander Noguchi.(54)
Then, the selection of the unit to conduct the night raid became an issue. A night raid was
the specialty of the infantry, and that meant here the 16th [Infantry] Regiment, i.e. the Hiroy-
asu Echelon, which prided itself on its tradition [established at] Gongchangling [in the Russo-
Japanese War]. However, it had just arrived and did not have enough time to make
preparations. Major General Nasu asked Staff Officer Satō’s views. Staff Officer Satō, who
trusted Lieutenant Colonel Noguchi’s ability to find opportunities and get things done, said,
“I judge the enemy positions at the front to be forward positions. I think that we should not
give time to the enemy.” In brief, Staff Officer Satō thought that the Noguchi Echelon should
do it as planned. However, Major General Nasu, who was the commander of the 2d Infantry
Group as well as of the detachment, decided to em-
ploy the 16th Infantry Regiment [instead]. His de-
cision was also based on the fact that he made
allowances for the hardship of the Noguchi Eche-
lon, which had been in the forefront all the time
since the landing, and because he saw that the Hi-
royasu Echelon was impatiently waiting to display
its ability.(54)
Around 1800, Detachment Commander Nasu
passed down his orders. He ordered the Noguchi
Echelon to “stop the preparations for the night raid;
just continue the gunfire to contain the enemy and
make preparations for the subsequent operations,”
whereas he ordered the Hiroyasu Echelon to “at-
tack the enemy in front with one element from the
left rear [of the enemy positions] at dusk.”(63, 64)
Based on the detachment order, Echelon Com-
mander Hiroyasu decided to cross the Cianten
River at an area south of Leuwiliang with his main
force and then attack the enemy in front of him
with one element. He ordered the 3d Battalion to
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cross the Cianten River at a point about three kilometers south of Leuwiliang, seize the enemy
positions on the plateau east of Leuwiliang that night and advance to Cibatok and vicinity.
He [also] ordered the regimental gun and antitank gun companies to follow the 3d Battalion
and seize the positions on the plateau on the right bank of the Cianten River to support the
attack of the 3d Battalion. He [further] ordered the 2d Battalion to follow them as the reserve
unit.(62, 64, 65)
At that time, the advance company of the 3d Battalion had already moved forward to the
right flank of the Noguchi Echelon and was attacking the allied positions in front of them.
Based on the regimental order, 3d Battalion Commander Maj. Morozumi Yoshikazu sent the
advance guard to the crossing point and vicinity and had them reconnoiter the enemy move-
ments and the terrain and, at the same time, he himself left Leuwiliang at 1900 along with
the regimental commander to reconnoiter the crossing point about three kilometers south of
Leuwiliang after which he returned to Leuwiliang at 2200.
The battalion left Leuwiliang at 0000 on the 4th and reached the crossing point about three
kilometers south of the town. The Cianten River was swollen because of the squall the pre-
vious evening. It was about thirty meters wide and about 130 centimeters deep but flowed
fast, due to which it took an unexpectedly long time to cross.(62)
At 0530 on the 4th, two companies had for the most part finished crossing the river. At
the crossing point, the battalion commander learned that an allied unit, the strength of which
was unknown but considered not to be large, had occupied positions in Bojongneros and
vicinity, which was about 1500 meters east of the Cianten River, and that the neighborhood
consisted of easily passable paddy fields all around. So he had the 9th Company (Comman-
der: Capt. Itō Kesatake) and the 11th Company (Commander: 1st Lt. Shigeno Masami) charge
forward to seize the said positions, respectively as the first line attack unit and the second
line attack unit. (See Illustration No. 52.) Battalion Commander Morozumi and Regimental
Commander Hiroyasu were advancing at the head of the 11th Company, and no sooner had
the 9th Company driven away an al-
lied unit, apparently a lookout unit,
which had fired at the company by
surprise, and charged in column along
a road of about four meters wide [to-
ward the enemy position], than the
regimental commander followed im-
mediately in its rear. All of a sudden,
the 9th company and the regimental
commander came under rapid fire
from the whole front of the plateau
ahead of them, which completely
pinned them down and made them
unable to move. Commander Captain
Itō of the 9th Company and others
were killed, while the regimental com-
mander and others were injured. Bat-
talion Commander Morozumi
[increased the strength by] adding the
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Bridging Work at Leuwiliang in the 2d Division Sector
11th Company, the second line attack unit, to the left of the 9th Company,
but they could not beat off the enemy. He [also] had the 10th Company
(Commander: 1st Lt. Nakayama Yoshio), which had caught up around
0800, attack and advance so as to envelop the right flank of the enemy
in the position ahead, but they could not drive back the enemy yet.
Around 1000, the main force of the 3d Machine Gun Company (Com-
mander: 1st Lt. Kameoka Takao) caught up with them and joined the fir-
ing line.(62)
The artillery unit of the Nasu Detachment consisted of the 1st Battal-
ion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment (minus the 1st Battery) with Maj.
Suwabe Jirō as battalion commander. The 3d Battery (minus one section)
(Commander: 1st Lt. Watanabe Kōichi) was assigned to the Noguchi Ech-
elon, and the rest of the main force to the Hiroyasu Echelon. Both of them
occupied positions to the west of Leuwiliang. Battalion Commander Suwabe had separated
from Echelon Commander Hiroyasu at 2330 on the 3d and from the morning of the 4th on-
wards tried to keep contact with him, while firing only at Mt. Galuga so as not to harm the
Hiroyasu Unit. At 0920 the liaison officer assigned [to the Hiroyasu Unit] reported: “[I] tried
to catch up with the echelon commander along with the colors and Captain Yamada but lost
sight of him. [I] asked the noncommissioned officer who had accompanied the echelon com-
mander, but he did not know. [We can] catch glimpses of the enemy two hundred meters
ahead.” At 1020, the Suwabe Battalion finally managed to locate the echelon commander’s
whereabouts and received his orders. At 1100, the whole artillery unit was brought under
the direct command of Detachment Commander Nasu by order of the detachment.(64, 45)
The 3d Battalion Gun Platoon of the Morozumi Battalion caught up around 1500. Around
that time, about three hundred allied troops newly came forward so as to envelop the right
flank of the Morozumi Battalion (the 9th Company). The Regimental Commander [Hiroyasu]
deployed the 2d Battalion (Commander: Maj. Onoguchi Satoru), which had successively ar-
rived, to the right of the Morozumi Battalion to have it deal with this new enemy. The
Onoguchi Battalion completed its deployment in the evening.(62)
In the meantime, the Suwabe Artillery Battalion (eight guns) was firing at the [enemy]
positions on Mt. Galuga and key sites in Cibatok. At 1600 an allied artillery [unit] ([with]
two guns?) appeared on the east side of Mt. Galuga, which the battalion counterattacked and
silenced at 1640. After that [the battalion] put its efforts into searching for the allied artillery.
A report said that the allied artillery had about two guns in Ciaruten (about one kilometer
northeast of Cibatok) and that, apart from these, six [guns] were being brought in as rein-
forcement.(64, 65)
When the deployment of the Onoguchi Battalion was completed, Echelon Commander
Hiroyasu gave orders around 1600, determined to seize the [enemy] positions in front in a
night raid with both battalions and subsequently seize the highland of Galuga (one kilometer
northeast of Leuwiliang) and Cibatok. A squall with drenching rain started around 1930. Tak-
ing advantage of it, the regiment charged [toward the enemy positions], braving the gunfire
of heavy weapons, seized the position around 2100, and advanced into Cibatok and vicin-
ity.(62, 64, 65)
Before that, on learning about the Hiroyasu Regiment’s plan to conduct a night attack on
Galuga and Cibatok, Detachment Commander Nasu decided to seize key sites on the right
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bank of the Cianten River on the night of the 5th and prepare for the next sally forward. At
2010, he issued an order to the Noguchi Echelon to promptly catch up with the unit advanc-
ing to the vicinity of the river junction to the northeast of Leuwiliang with its main force and
seize the highland north of Gunung Jatake (about five kilometers northeast of Leuwiliang)
by daybreak on the next day, the 5th, to facilitate the subsequent operations of the detach-
ment.(64)
Before that, around 1800, Detachment Commander Nasu had learned that the 3d Battalion
of the 29th Infantry Regiment and the main force of the 2d Tank Regiment had been diverted
from the Satō Detachment to the sector of his detachment. [Editor’s note: Correctly the 2d
Batalion, i.e. the Watanabe Battalion. See pp. 480, 496.] Then, he learned that the Fukushima
Detachment ([consisting of] two infantry battalions as the core) and the previously mentioned
Watanabe Battalion had been added to his detachment. At 0200 on the 5th, Detachment Com-
mander Nasu issued the following order:(64)
Nasu Detachment Order Leuwiliang, 0200 5 March
1. The enemy in the Batavia area has started retreating and is fleeing to the Bandung stronghold.
The Hiroyasu Unit successfully conducted a night attack and seized Cibatok and the highland
of Galuga (one kilometer northeast of Leuwiliang). The situation of the Noguchi Unit is still un-
known. The Fukushima Detachment and the Watanabe Battalion shall newly be brought under
my command.
2. The detachment shall pursue the enemy in its front, advance toward the line connecting Semplak
(four kilometers northwest of Buitenzorg) – Dramaga (five kilometers northwest of Buitenzorg)
to prepare for the subsequent attack on Buitenzorg.
3. The Hiroyasu Unit shall pursue [the enemy] toward Dramaga along the Leuwiliang – Cibatok
(three kilometers east of Leuwiliang) – Dramaga road.
4. The Noguchi Unit shall pursue [the enemy] toward Semplak along the road from Ciampea
(seven kilometers northeast of Leuwiliang) that runs on the right bank of the Cisadane [River],
while having one element destroy the railway [facility] near Deanpungu [?] (five kilometers
north of Buitenzorg) (note by the author: Jampungu [?]). [Editor’s note: Probably Jambudipa.]
5. The Watanabe Battalion shall immediately cross the Cianten River, and advance toward Kaum
(one kilometer north of Semplak) in the rear of the Noguchi Unit.
6. The Fukushima Detachment shall assemble its strength in or near its present location, and pre-
pare for the next advance. (The rest omitted by the author.)
Staff Officer Satō of the 2d Division had accompanied the Nasu Detachment just for collecting
information. However, as the strength and the responsibility of the Nasu Detachment had
gained ever-greater importance in the last few days, he had been serving like a staff officer
assigned to the detachment on his own initiative. Staff Officer Satō and Detachment Com-
mander Nasu had heard that there were considerably strong positions in the Buitenzorg area.
And they judged that the enemy planned to assemble its strength in the Buitenzorg area for
a counterattack. After studying plans for either a pursuit or a controlled advance, the policy
of a “tactical pursuit while keeping close to the line of control” was decided upon, and the
previously mentioned order was passed down. Detachment Commander Nasu and Staff Of-
ficer Satō had the same view of the situation.(54)
In the battle of Leuwiliang, the loss the Hiroyasu Reigment sustained was twenty-eight
men including 9th Company Commander Capt. Itō Kesatake killed, and twenty-one includ-
ing Regimental Commander Hiroyasu wounded. Although wounded in the head, Regimen-
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tal Commander Hiroyasu continued commanding his unit. The Suwabe Artillery Battalion
(eight guns) fired 379 shells.(62, 64)
A Favorable Turn Followed by Setbacks (See Illustrations No. 54 and No. 55)
The Situation of the Units on the 4th [of March]
The situation of the units on the 4th was roughly as follows:
1. The [Sixteenth] Army headquarters (in Se rang) had made a request to the Southern Army
for an airlift [of troops], but it was not approved. Learning that the allied units in Batavia
and Buitenzorg showed signs of retreating, the Army headquarters issued orders to
strengthen the sector of the Nasu Detachment and have it rapidly advance in the direction
of Buitenzorg and Bandung.(23, 59)
2. The 2d Division headquarters left Petir on the 4th before daybreak and advanced to
Rangkasbitung via Pamarayan. The previous evening the division commander had or-
dered the Fukushima Detachment to prepare for the shift. Then, on receiving the previ-
ously mentioned army order, he transferred (assigned) the Watanabe Battalion and the
Fuku shima Detachment to the Nasu Detachment, and redeployed the 2d Tank Regiment
as well.(59)
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3. The Nasu Detachment,
which had not succeeded in
its night attack during the
previous night, continued
its attack on Leuwiliang on
the 4th throughout the day
and night.(62, 64, 65)
4. The Fukushima Detachment
was successively transferred
by motor vehicles from the
morning of the 4th onwards.
Passing through Rangkas-
bitung with the head of its
advance party at 1400, it
headed eastward and
reached Jasinga at 1800. It
further continued its ad-
vance while repairing the
road and assembled at a
point about four kilometers
west of Leuwiliang at mid-
night.(58, 59, 64)
5. The Watanabe Battalion,
which was transferred from
the Satō Detachment, also
arrived [there] around the same time. It was decided that the Watanabe Battalion should
advance first the next day, the 5th.(64, 65)
6. The divisional reserve unit (the Sasaki Battalion) had left Petir at midnight of the 3d,
reached Pamarayan at 1010 on the 4th and provided cover for the shift of the Fukushima
Detachment and the Watanabe Battalion by keeping guard against the Parigi area. After
that, it left Pamarayan with its main force at 2000 on the same day (the 4th), advanced to-
ward Rangkasbitung under the direction of Detachment Commander Fukushima and ar-
rived there at 0220 on the 5th.(59)
7. The Satō Detachment assembled its force in Balaraja around 1700 on the 4th and prepared
for its subsequent advance.(63)
8. The disembarkation at the Merak anchorage progressed smoothly. The fourteen transport
ships at the anchorage completed disembarkation on the 4th and headed back under the
escort of two destroyers. The situation at the Bantam anchorage was bad and it was de-
cided to bring the transport ships at the anchorage around to Merak for disembarkation.(130)
A Favorable Turn, the Seizure of Batavia, and Again a Change of Focus by the [Sixteenth]
Army (See Illustration No. 55)
On the morning of 5 March (day five of the landing), the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters (in
Serang) judged that the Nasu Detachment would seize the positions in Leuwiliang and vicin-
ity that day, the 5th, and successively advance to the front of Buitenzorg, and that the Satō
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Detachment ([consisting of] two battalions) would run up against the [enemy] positions in
Tangerang. Since before leaving the mainland [of Japan], it had been known that there were
pillbox zones in the Buitenzorg, the Batavia and the Tangerang sectors.(36) The [Sixteenth]
Army headquarters could not expect much from the Satō Detachment with its reduced
strength and pinned its hopes solely on the Nasu Detachment for progress in the military
situation.
However, [the situation did not progress as expected:] Although Detachment Commander
Nasu had issued his already-mentioned order at 0200 on the 5th to advance toward the line
connecting Semplak and Dramaga and prepare for the subsequent attack on Buitenzorg, it
was not easy to reorganize [the units] after the night raid. It was not until 0930 that the Mo-
rozumi Battalion, the van of the Hiroyasu Regiment, left the east end of Cibatok. After start-
ing its advance, it encountered an [enemy] unit with armored cars, which it attacked, and it
was not until 1530 that the Morozumi Battalion advanced into Dramaga.(62, 64)
While worrying about the difficulties ahead, the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters entered
the night. [However,] late at night, it received a totally unexpected telegram. It was a telegram
informing it that the Satō Detachment had entered Batavia.(34)
The Satō Detachment had left Balaraja at 0800 on the 5th. While it was advancing, plan-
ning to cross the river at Serpong and attack the pillbox zone in Tangerang from there, it re-
ceived a report that “the enemy is retreating,” and it first advanced toward Tangerang. After
passing down the order at 1630 to pursue [the enemy] toward Batavia, [the detachment]
rushed [toward the city] and one element of it entered Batavia at 2130. At 2230, the detach-
ment commander triumphantly entered Batavia without casualties.(63)
A shout of joy arose at the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters. Just then, [Chief] Shipping
Staff Sendō appeared, and reported that the convoy at the Merak anchorage had completed
its disembarkation and left the port. [He also added] that the convoy at the Bantam anchorage
would be brought around to Merak to speed up the progress of disembarkation, etc.(34, 44)
The seizure of Batavia was thought to have saved the critical situation of the Shōji De-
tachment and the operation plan was [again] drastically changed so as to expand the military
gains from the direction of Batavia and the Shōji Detachment. The [new] operation plan was
decided roughly in the following way:(34)
1. The [Sixteenth] Army shall attack Bandung from the direction of the Buitenzorg – Bandung road
with one element and from Kalijati with its main force.
2. For this purpose:
(1) After seizing Buitenzorg, the Nasu Detachment shall come under the direct command of the
[Sixteenth] Army and attack Bandung directly from Buitenzorg. The main force of the 2d
Division shall shift its position to Subang. Further, the Satō Detachment of the 2d Division
shall rush to Subang straight from Batavia.
(2) The main force of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment shall be united to attack the
Bandung stronghold, directing their main attack on Bandung from Subang.
(3) The attack shall be launched on 14 March.
(4) The [Sixteenth] Army headquarters shall be positioned in Batavia and the army command
post in Kalijati.
Without delay, [Sixteenth] Army [Chief] Signal Communication Staff Lieutenant Colonel
Saiki unofficially gave a summary [of the plan] to the army signal unit commander and had
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him prepare the setting up of the subsequent communication networks.(34) The staff office
was bustling with activity.(34)
Again a Setback
In the middle of the night (around 0100 on the 6th), just after Staff Officer Saiki had gone to
bed, he was woken up by a messenger from Chief of Operations Oda, who passed the mes-
sage: “Come right away.”(34) He went there and was told: “Go immediately [to the Satō De-
tachment] and [pass] the instruction that the detachment must rush to Kalijati.”(34) The reason
[for the sudden order] was that for the first time a telegram had been submitted from the
Shōji Detachment, whose telegrams had not even once been submitted [to the army head-
quarters] by the army signal unit since the landing and [what is more,] that the telegram con-
tained a description that the Shōji Detachment on its own had launched an attack on the
Bandung stronghold line. [Editor’s note: Actually, it was the second telegram from the Shōji
Detachment. On the day of landing it had submitted a telegram through the navy. See p.
480.] The telegram is no [longer] extant, but [the attack] is [also] known from the following
telegram,(131) which was sent by [Navy] Commander Wakatsuki, staff officer of the Third Fleet
seconded to the Sixteenth Army (who served at the army headquarters), at 1030 on the 6th.
498 Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java
An Undestroyed Railway Bridge in Batavia [Editor’s note: The photograph is actually a picture of the
Cisadane Floodgates in Tangerang. It had no railroad.]
From: Staff Officer Wakatsuki
To: Kamikawa-maru; Commander, [Navy] Southern Task Force; Commander, [Navy] Carrier Task
Force; Chief, 1st Bureau, Navy Department, IGHQ; and Staff Officer Ishihara [of the Second
Fleet seconded to the Southern Army]
The military situation on the 5th was as follows:
1. The Satō Detachment seized Batavia at 2130 and continues to head eastward for Bandung.
2. The Shōji Detachment advanced to six kilometers northeast of … (ten kilometers from Lembang)
at 1840 and is engaging the enemy. (Note by the author: Some errors in decryption are appar-
ent.)
3. The Sakaguchi Detachment seized Surakarta at 0500 and was scheduled to attack Magelang the
same day.
4. The 48th Division reached an area ten kilometers west of Jombang at 1200. [This telegram was]
sent at 1030.
[The news] raised [a storm of] criticism: Didn’t we have Major Yamashita, assistant operation
staff officer of the [Sixteenth] Army [specifically] assigned to have the Shōji Detachment op-
erate in close coordination with the main force of the army? And what is all this to engage
the enemy on your own with a small force of two battalions and attack the Bandung strong-
hold line when the main force of the army is not ready yet? However, it was too late to do
anything about it. What could be done was to have the Satō Detachment rapidly advance
from Batavia and to request the Southern Army to airlift troops.(36, 40)
[So,] the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters (in Serang) woke up Staff Officer Saiki to rush
him off to the Satō Detachment(34) and wired the following request to the Southern Army:(23)
Sixteenth Army Field Telegram No. 166 (sent on 6 March)
1. The tank unit of the Shōji Detachment crossed the watershed to the southwest of Ciater at 1500
on the 5th and charged into a corner of the Bandung stronghold.
2. We believe that it will be extremely significant in terms of a swift conclusion of our operations
to obtain a decisive military gain at a stroke by taking advantage of this opportunity and addi-
tionally sending in a more powerful unit to reinforce [the detachment] in the area.
3. However, as it will take considerable time to divert the other force, the 2d Division, due to the
difficulties of the terrain in the area where it is [positioned], we earnestly hope that about one
infantry battalion, which has currently assembled in Palembang, be airlifted to the Kalijati air-
field.
Therefore we would like to again request your urgent consideration of the above issue.
At that time, the Sixteenth Army never even imagined that on the basis of the general situa-
tion, the Shōji Detachment would think that there was something that could be gained from
its operational situation by engaging the enemy. From the report from Staff Officer Itoda,
who had returned [to the headquarters] on the 4th, the army had concluded: “Detachment
Commander Shōji thinks that there is no chance of an early arrival of the 2d Division, that
his detachment will be annihilated by concentrated attacks of the enemy if he stays in level
country, and that he wants to somehow seize a corner of the mountains and use that as a
base. Staking the survival or annihilation [of his detachment], he is now attacking one of the
hillocks in the mountains south of Ciater.” Therefore, the true feeling of the Sixteenth Army
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was to beg the Southern Army to airlift troops, but since it could not show any fainthearted-
ness in the text, it phrased the telegram in the way above.
On receiving this telegram, the Southern Army again [wrongly] took it that the telegram
was sent under a favorable military situation and wired back as follows:(23)
Reply to Sixteenth Army Field Telegram No. 166
Airlifting the unit in Palembang is considered highly disadvantageous for exercising our air
power in the Java area. In addition to the situation shown in the Southern Army Staff Section 1
Telegram No. 72, the current enemy air [operations] in Kalijati and vicinity [would put us in a
situation where] most of the strength of the 3d Air Division would have to be allocated to the
cover of the above airlift. [Therefore,] we would like you to depend on transportation by ship
or [landing] craft this time.
This telegram from the Southern Army not only disappointed the Sixteenth Army by rejecting
the airlift but also gave the latter the impression that [Japanese] air power had no strength
to spare. The situation was [indeed] that the front of the 2d Division had been provided with
no air support at all.
The Situation at the Satō Detachment and the Unexpected Telegram from the 2d Division
While the above telegrams were exchanged, Staff Officer Saiki and the Satō Detachment
found themselves in the following situation:(34)
Staff Officer Saiki left Serang by motor vehicle (loaded with three bicycles) with two
guards at 0200 (on the 6th). At 0400, they had to switch to bicycles near Pamarayan due to
the bad road. They rode bicycles for about two kilometers when they happened upon three
motor vehicles of the 39th Independent Motor Transort Battalion. Using one of them (also
loading it with their bicycles), they reached Tangerang. At 0800, they borrowed there another
bicycle (for the driver) from Col. Takahashi Takuzō, commander of the 2d Engineer Regiment.
The four of them, riding and pushing their bicycles, arrived in Batavia a little after 1000 and
heard that the Satō Detachment, which had made an around-the-clock forced march the day
before, the 5th, was taking a rest and was scheduled to leave on the morning of the next day,
the 7th. Staff Officer Saiki explained the urgency of the situation, and requested the immedi-
ate dispatch of a unit even if it were small. At 1330, one platoon managed to get ready. Staff
Officer Saiki was empowered to take command of the platoon and departed without delay
in order to reconnoiter the crossing point over the Citarum River and promptly contact the
Shōji Detachment. The bridge had been destroyed. Staff Officer Saiki ordered the platoon
commander and his men, a total of ten men, to advance by bicycle and he himself returned
to the Satō Detachment headquarters and told the detachment commander that “it would
probably be better to send a company ahead first, even if it were just a bicycle company, and
have the motor vehicle [unit] take a detour.” The detachment commander answered that
since the motor vehicle unit was loaded with bicycles, he would use bicycles from the de-
stroyed point onwards. At 1800 Staff Officer Saiki left Batavia along with the detachment
headquarters. The local people lining the roadside saw them off cheering and waving. At
1900, Detachment Commander Satō, in the middle of the advance, received the following
order from the 2d Division Commander:(34)
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The Shōji Detachment is not in danger. The Satō Detachment shall stop its advance.
Staff Officer Saiki found the order hard to understand, but it was a strict division order. He
concluded that he was compelled to follow it. The Satō Detachment stopped. Staff Officer
Saiki took steps to promptly report the situation to the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters in
Serang.(34)
The Seizure of Buitenzorg (See Illustration No. 54)
During the above period, the Nasu Detachment had seized Buitenzorg. As mentioned pre-
viously, the Morozumi Battalion, the van of the Hiroyasu Regiment, had advanced to Dram-
aga, the target of the detachment, at 1530 on the 5th. Around the same time, one element of
the Noguchi Reconnaissance Regiment drove off an allied unit on the right bank of the
Cisadane River north of Ciampea. At that time, the allied units [stationed] in Batavia were
retreating to Buitenzorg.(62)
After advancing to the line connecting Semplak and Dramaga, Staff Officer Satō’s judg-
ment of the situation was that “[the detachment should] engage the enemy one after another,
and carry out a night attack,” whereas Detachment Commander Nasu’s judgment was that
“[the detachment should first] search [for the enemy], reconnoiter, and conduct a night raid
after the enemy’s situation and the terrain had become clear.” However, soon after that, De-
tachment Commander Nasu agreed to Staff Officer Satō’s plan, considering that “it would
be a blunder if the enemy had [indeed] retreated.”(54)
Detachment Commander Nasu decided to have the units which were successively ad-
vancing to the line connecting Dramaga, Semplak and Kaum continue their move and take
a large detour widely and deeply so as to advance separately to both rear sides of Buitenzorg.
He assigned the Watanabe Battalion and the Fukushima Detachment to advance from Kaum
to Kedungbadak and vicinity and then move southward from the area east of the Batavia –
Buitenzorg road. He assigned the Hiroyasu Regiment to charge toward Buitenzorg along the
Dra maga – Ci lu bang – Petir – Kuripan – Pang kalan dalem – Warung loa – Pasireurih – Ka -
ban dungan Udik – Buitenzorg road.(64, 65)
The 10th Company (Commander, 1st Lt. Nakayama Yoshio) of the Hiroyasu Regiment,
which was positioned in front of Buitenzorg and assigned to provide cover for the detour
operation of the regiment while containing the allied units, noticed signs that the allied units
were retreating and charged into Buitenzorg at 0200 on the 6th.(31) At that time, the other units
were taking a long night detour through unknown areas. The Morozumi Battalion of the Hi-
royasu Regiment passed through Bab Gadog around 0500 and Kabandungan Udik around
0800, and advanced into Buitenzorg at 1100.(62)
The Fukushima Detachment advanced crossing the Leuwiliang bridge and reached Kaum
at 2200.(58) In the meantime, the Ikuta raiding party (i.e. the 1st Battalion) of the Fukushima
Detachment had one element seize the Kedungbadak bridge in a surprise attack and recon-
noiter the movements of the enemy as well as the terrain, while making preparations for a
night attack. [The raiding party] departed at 0200 with its main force, and advanced along
the Kaum – Kedungbadak – Buitenzorg road. As set in its orders, it charged into Buitenzorg
at 0500, mopped up [the enemy in] the city meeting with no resistance and assembled near
the residence of the governor-general at 0800.(31, 58)
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On seizing Buitenzorg, Detachment
Commander Nasu immediately had one
infantry company hotly pursue [the
enemy] in the direction of the Puncak Pass
(about twenty-five kilometers southeast of
Buitenzorg).(31)
A Further Setback
The situation described above can be sum-
marized as follows: responding to the
telegram from the Shōji Detachment that
it was attacking the Bandung stronghold
line, [which was read] around 0100 on 6
March, [the Sixteenth Army] wired the
Southern Army to request an airlift [of
troops]; at 0200 one element of the Hiroy-
asu Regiment charged into Buitenzorg
while simultaneously Staff Officer Saiki
left Serang for the Satō Detachment; at
0500 the battalion at the head of the
Fukushima Detachment charged into
Buitenzorg, followed by the battalion at the head of the Hiroyasu Regiment, which charged
[into the city] at 1100; at 1800 the Satō Detachment left Batavia, but received at 1900 an order
from the 2d Division to stop [its advance].
At that time, the Satō Detachment consisted of [just] two battalions, while the area be-
tween Buitenzorg and Rangkasbitung was overflowing with the strength of six infantry bat-
talions, [one] reconnaissance regiment, [one] tank regiment, [one] field artillery regiment and
others. The divisional reserve corps, the Sasaki Battalion, was to depart from Rangkasbitung
the next day, the 7th, with its officers and men traveling by motor vehicle, while the horses
followed on foot.(59)
As mentioned previously, [Chief] Signal Communication Staff Lieutenant Colonel Saiki,
had left for Batavia after only unofficially informing the army signal unit that “the full-scale
attack on Bandung will be launched on 14 March,” so that it could get ready. Believing that
as a first step the Satō Detachment would hurry [toward the Shōji Detachment], the [Six-
teenth] Army headquarters was trying to grasp the situation of the main force of the 2d Di-
vision and waiting for the reply from the Southern Army. Although the [Sixteenth] Army
headquarters had decided on the policy of diverting the main force of the 2d Division to the
Kalijati area after seizing Buitenzorg, it had not yet shown [the plan] to the 2d Division.
The 2d Division had taken the already-mentioned order of the [Sixteenth] Army on 4
March, that “[as] the enemy is retreating into the Bandung stronghold one after another and
the Shōji Detachment has already seized even Purwakarta at 0700 on the 4th despite its small
strength, the 2d Division shall directly attack Bandung after completing the seizure of Buiten-
zorg,” literally. That was the reason why it passed down the order: “The Shōji Detachment
is not in danger. The Satō Detachment shall stop its advance.” Reading this order, Staff Officer
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Illustration No. 54 — The Attack on Buitenzorg [Bogor]
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Saiki “had his doubts [about the order], but had [the Detachment] stop the advance, as it was
a divisional order,” and he took steps to report the situation [to the Sixteenth Army].(34)
The telegram with the report of Staff Officer Saiki did not reach [the army]. [However,] a
reply came from the Southern Army that rejected the request for an airlift [of troops]. Just
then (on the night of the 6th), another serious telegram came from the Shōji Detachment,
which roughly contained the following message:(35)
As of this morning, the 6th, the enemy tank unit that launched attacks against us from the Ban-
dung stronghold has sustained great damage by the joint counterattacks of our ground and air
forces and has retreated, leaving several tanks behind. Taking advantage of this opportunity,
the detachment is going to break through the line on the top of the stronghold.
The contents were serious even if just taken at face value. It could be much more serious if
[Detachment Commander Shōji had sent] this telegram in the same sentiment, hiding his
nervousness, as the [Sixteenth] Army had done when it had sent the telegram requesting the
airlift from the Southern Army. Army Commander [Imamura], who had known Colonel
Shōji’s character very well for a long time, felt that the message of this telegram was ex-
tremely serious.
Army Commander Imamura immediately decided to rapidly advance with the army re-
serve unit (the 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment led by Lt. Col. Minamoto Shirō),
and made the following arrangements:(35)
1. He wired Detachment Commander Shōji: “I am greatly impressed by the brave fight your de-
tachment has fought. In view of the steep and difficult terrain in the area west of the stronghold,
I have changed the prearranged attack plan and decided to add the main force of the 2d Division
to your detachment’s front, have it reach the area by the 8th, and on the 9th, under my command,
charge into the stronghold to defeat the enemy. Therefore, your detachment shall secure the
front line of the stronghold, the line on the top of the mountains, and wait for the arrival of the
main force of the army. The detachment must not [try to] single-handedly break through the
stronghold.”(35)
2. He decided to have Chief of Staff Okazaki rush to 2d Division Commander Maruyama by car
after daybreak (on the morning of the 7th) to convey the message: “I have changed the pre-
arranged attack plan and decided to conduct an attack so as to expand the military gains of the
Shōji Detachment. Therefore, the 2d Division shall have one element contain the enemy from
the west front, and shift two or more regiments of the main force so that they will reach the area
of the Shōji Detachment by the 8th,” and gave him instructions concerning it.(35)
3. He ordered the Army headquarters and the army reserve unit to depart from Serang after day-
break (on the morning of the 7th) to advance to Batavia.(35)
Report of an Offer of Surrender by the Bandung Garrison
It was decided that Chief of Staff Okazaki would accompany the Army Commander [Ima-
mura] up to Batavia and travel separately from there onwards.
The [Sixteenth] Army command post departed from Serang in the early morning of the
7th. Local people greeted them with cheers everywhere along the road. The pill box positions
and obstacles in Tangerang looked very substantial, which made the entire staff exchange
looks and wonder how [difficult the attack] would have been if the allied forces had put up
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Illustration No. 55 — [The Japanese Units in western Java on] 5 and 6 March
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some real resistance. Of the bridges in Batavia, those for people and vehicles had been de-
stroyed, but the railway bridges remained [intact]. They arrived in Batavia around 1700.(34, 35, 36)
Because of the already-mentioned circumstances, the Satō Detachment was still in Batavia.
Army Commander Imamura called Detachment Commander Satō and gave him a direct
order to depart immediately. At 2300, the report came that the Satō Detachment had departed
in motor vehicles, taking a detour.(34, 35, 36)
Chief of Staff Okazaki arrived in Buitenzorg from Batavia together with [Chief of] Oper-
ations Lieutenant Colonel Oda. Commander Maruyama of the 2d Division had not advanced
[there] yet. Chief of Staff Okazaki waited for Division Commander Maruyama’s arrival in
Buitenzorg and handed him the army order, summarized as follows, and explained what the
army commander intended to do.(36)
Sixteenth Army Order (summary)
1. The [Sixteenth] Army shall attack Bandung from the direction of the Buitenzorg – Bandung road
with one element, and from the direction of Kalijati with its main force.
2. The 2d Division shall put the Nasu Detachment ([consisting of] three infantry battalions as the
core) under the direct command of the [Sixteenth] Army from now on, and have the detachment
continue its pursuit of the enemy in the direction of Bandung. The main force of the division
shall promptly advance into Kalijati and vicinity and prepare for the attack on Bandung, to be
conducted from the north.
Army Commander Imamura established the command post in the barracks of the Dutch
Army in the suburbs of Batavia. Traveling by night, Chief of Staff Okazaki returned and re-
ported the situation in Buitenzorg. After hearing the report, the army commander went to
bed around 2300.(35, 36)
Soon [Chief of] Operations Oda visited the army commander’s bedroom and reported
the arrival of a telegram that said: “An enemy staff officer has come to the Shōji Detachment
with an offer that the Dutch Army Commander is ready to propose a cease-fire to the Japan-
ese Army Commander. We would like you to give your directions about what to do.” It was
in the middle of the night on the 7th (a little after 0000 a.m. on the 8th).(35)
[Meanwhile,] Capt. Yanagawa Motoshige, attached to the Sixteenth Army headquarters,
who had rushed along with the advance party of the Nasu Detachment since its landing in
Merak before daybreak on 1 March, had gone ahead alone on a reconnaissance mission along
side roads from the night of the 1st onwards and around that time had infiltrated into Ban-
dung via Buitenzorg.(47)
(3) The Operations of the Shōji Detachment
The convoy (the Taigen-maru No. 3, the Naples-maru, the Calcutta-maru, the Glasgow-maru, the
Suwa-maru, the Kōzan-maru and the Yamazuki-maru [Yamatsuki-maru], a total of seven ships)
of the Shōji Detachment ([consisting of] the 1st and the 2d Battalions of the 230th Infantry
Regiment as the core) separated from the convoy of the 2d Division at a point about 140 nau-
tical miles north of Batavia (Point J) at 0530 on 27 February, after which it advanced under
the escort of the light cruiser Yura, the 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division (the Akatsuki
and the Hibiki) and the 2d Section of the 22d Destroyer Division (the Nagatsuki and the Mi-
nazuki). The Navy was still in charge of the air cover of the Shōji Detachment. As the date [to
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launch] the landing operation was postponed by one day, [the convoy] entered the anchorage
off Eretan at 0140 on 1 March.(96, 120) [Editor’s note: The list of ships of the convoy agrees with
the list given on p. 242, but differs from that on p. 463.]
As we have seen, the tasks assigned to the Shōji Detachment were (1) to rapidly secure
the Kalijati airfield and seize the crossing point over the Citarum River, (2) depending on the
situation, to be ready for having one element join [the operation to] capture Batavia, and (3)
to help [the ground unit of] the air unit in readying the airfield.(96) As mentioned previously,
Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Yamashita was assigned to the Shōji Detachment, and Lt. Col.
Ōno Takeo, commander of the 2d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion, was added to the
detachment as well. It was also additionally equipped with motor vehicles.(36) Although Patrol
was designated as its disembarkation point, it had chosen Eretan instead, because this place
was closer to the road that its motor vehicles needed to travel for the sudden attack on the
[Kalijati] airfield.(41)
The fighting strength of the Shōji Detachment consisted of two infantry battalions (with
four infantry companies each), a regimental infantry gun unit, one tank squadron, one inde-
pendent antitank gun company, two mountain artillery batteries and one antiaircraft artillery
battery.(73)
The commander of the 1st Battalion was Maj. Egashira Masaru (graduate of the 42d class
of the Imperial Japanese Military Academy) and the commander of the 2d Battalion was Maj.
Wakamatsu Minoru (38th class). Major Wakamatsu, who was from Saga prefecture and had
grown a long beard, had a reputation for holding a deep affection for his men, but training
them hard and thoroughly, for being indifferent to praise or criticism, and for being a crack
soldier.(41, 75)
Detachment Commander Shōji decided to have the battalion under the senior officer,
Major Wakamatsu, charge toward Kalijati and the battalion under Major Egashira head for
the bridge over the Citarum River; however, he removed one company and one machine gun
platoon each from both battalions to organize the disembarkation point covering unit and
the detachment reserve corps.(73)
Further, he decided to assign one regimental gun squad, one antitank gun platoon and
one tank squadron (minus one troop) to the Wakamatsu Battalion, and one antitank gun com-
pany (minus one platoon), one tank troop and one mountain artillery battery to the Egashira
Battalion. He also decided to use the motor transport company assigned to the detachment
for the swift move of the Wakamatsu Unit.(73)
Ignoring the general rule for landing in the face of the enemy, he decided the order of dis-
embarkation in such a way that tanks and trucks to be used for dashing forward to seize
Kalijati would be disembarked first and then the general infantry.(41)
As we have seen, the Southern Army, the Sixteenth Army, as well as the [Army] Third
Air Force had planned that the units, [consisting of] the 4th Air Ground Support headquarters
and the 24th and the 28th Airfield Battalions as the core, assigned to the Sixteenth Army,
should follow the front line units of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment, and prepare
the Buitenzorg, the Batavia and the Kalijati airfields, to which the units of the Third Air Force
would rapidly advance when the preparations were for the most part over. In the plan, these
airfield preparation units would be split between the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment,
while the 4th Air Ground Support headquarters was to advance along with the 2d Division.(96)
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However, in view of the fact that the scheduled dates for the air units
to advance into the Kalijati, the Buitenzorg, and the Batavia [airfields]
were set respectively as Day H, Day H + 3 and Day H + 4, and in view
of the significance of the location and the capacity of the Kalijati [airfield],
it was decided that 4th Air Ground Support Commander Lt. Col. Sugi -
mura Takayoshi should advance along with the Shōji Detachment.(73, 75, 96)
Thus, the disposition after the landing was decided as follows, the
details of which are as mentioned previously [see pp. 463–465]:(73, 74)
Wakamatsu Raiding Unit: Major Wakamatsu and his men, [advance] to Kali-
jati
Egashira Raiding Unit: Major Egashira and his men, [advance] to the bridge
over the Citarum River
Artillery [unit]: [advance] to the sector of the Wakamatsu Raiding Unit
Antiaircraft Artillery [unit]: air defense of the disembarkation point
Disembarkation Working Unit: Major Watanabe of the 40th Anchorage Headquarters and others 
Signal Unit: First Lieutenant Suzuki, commander of the regimental signal unit, and others
Motor Transport Unit: Captain Asami and others
Ōno Unit: Lieutenant Colonel Ōno, commander of the 2d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion,
and others, cover for the disembarkation point
Reserve Corps: First Lieutenant Wada, commander of the regimental infantry artillery unit, and
others
Airfield Unit: 4th Air Ground Support Commander Lieutenant Colonel Sugimura, and others
Detachment Commander Shōji planned to have a report center set up in Subang after the
advance of the Wakamatsu Raiding Unit, and have Staff Officer Yamashita take command
[of the center]. Also, he himself planned to advance to Subang with the reserve unit when
the disembarkation [operation] progressed.(73, 75) Subang was a strategic point where the road
going north from Bandung branched into two, one leading to the disembarkation area in Ere-
tan and another to the Kalijati airfield. Although, as already told, the operation outline pro-
vided by the [Sixteenth] Army attached more importance to Batavia, Detachment
Commander Shōji gave more careful consideration to Bandung.
The Seizure of the Airfield on Day One of the Landing and the Enemy’s 
Assault on the Disembarkation Point
(See Illustration No.56)
The Shōji Detachment knew that there were about 35,000 allied troops in the Bandung strong-
hold area.(75)
Before entering the anchorage, [the convoy] came under attack from some allied aircraft
but sustained no losses.(120) At 0330 (on 1 March), the 1st landing unit successfully landed in
Eretan meeting with no resistance,(120) and then it acted based on the plan. Detachment Com-
mander [Shōji] landed along with the 2d landing unit at 0430 and took position at the west
end of the village of Eretan.(75)
At daybreak, allied aircraft fiercely strafed and bombed [the detachment] from a very low
altitude, which caused about a hundred casualties at the landing point and on the ships.
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230th Infantry Regi-
ment Commander, Col.
Shōji Toshishige
Meanwhile, two seaplanes of the auxiliary sea-
plane tender San’yō-maru (at Anambas Islands)
advanced around 1130 and two planes of the
auxiliary seaplane tender Kamikawa-maru ([also]
at Anambas Islands) at 1230 to cover the landing
point. Of these planes, the two planes of the
Kamikawa-maru were attacked by allied aircraft
after having landed on the water at 1605; one
went up in flames and the other became unable
to fly. The two seaplanes of the San’yō-maru re-
treated to Bantam Bay in the evening.(130, 131)
In order to seize the Kalijati airfield, the
Ōsawa advance party ([consisting of] thirty-six
men, two machine guns, one battalion gun, one
antitank gun and two trucks under the command
of 7th Company Commander 1st Lt. Ōsawa Shi -
geru) of the Wakamatsu Raiding Unit left the
landing point at 0610 and rushed [toward the air-
field]. At 1030, it encountered at a point one kilo-
meter west of Subang about one hundred troops
of a Dutch East Indies Army unit heading east-
ward, and went into battle. (A later investigation
showed that this unit of the Dutch East Indies
Army was heading eastward to destroy the Pamanukan bridge.) 
At 0800, Battalion Commander Wakamatsu left the landing point by motor vehicles, lead-
ing only the units that had finished landing by then. He caught up [with the Ōsawa advance
party] at the battlefront at 1045, brought the advance party under his command as well, drove
off the Dutch East Indies Army unit, and rushed straight [for Kalijati]. He ran into Dutch East
Indies Army units one after another. Four times he forestalled them, drove them off each time,
and [continued] his dash. At 1200, he charged into the target, the Kalijati airfield, and com-
pletely seized it at 1230. The airfield was fit for use right away. [Commander Wakamatsu]
took steps to immediately send a report, but the wireless could not get through.(13, 31, 75)
The Egashira Raiding Unit left the landing point at 0540, heading for
the Krawang bridge as its target. One company traveled by bicycle and
the others on foot. The main force of the raiding unit was strafed and
bombed several times by allied fighter plane units consisting of more
than a dozen aircraft and sustained forty to fifty casualties including Sec-
ond Lieutenant Masuda. Since he could not advance as much as he ex-
pected, [Commander Egashira] assembled his force in Pamanukan at
nightfall.(31, 75)
At the landing point, 400 to 500 troops of a Dutch East Indies Army
unit in armored vehicles attacked from the east around 1130. The disem-
barkation point covering unit ([consisting of] the 6th Company, one ma-
chine gun platoon, and one regimental gun squad), commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Ōno, drove them off after a hard fight.(73, 75)
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Commander of the 2d
Battalion of the 230th
Infantry Regiment,
Maj. Wakamatsu 
Minoru
The Landing Point at Eretan
Positioned in Eretan, Detachment Com-
mander Shōji waited for a report [on the
seizure of the airfield] while giving directions
concerning the disembarkation and the en-
gagements. At 1630, a bicycle messenger sent
by Staff Officer Yamashita (who had departed
along with the Ōsawa advance party and set
up the report center in Subang) arrived and
reported the seizure of Kalijati. Commander
[Shōji] immediately arranged to send the re-
port. On that day, he could not make contact
with the Wakamatsu Raiding Unit.(75)
The 2d [of March]: The Detachment
Headquarters Overrun and the Ad-
vance of the Air Units [of the 3d Air
Division] (See Illustration No. 57)
At 0400 on the next day, the 2d, Detachment
Commander Shōji departed from Eretan by
motor vehicle along with the company bear-
ing the colors (the 4th Company) and arrived
at the report center in Subang at 0500. Staff Of-
ficer Yamashita reported: “No [new] reports
have come from the Wakamatsu Raiding Unit since, but I don’t think we need to worry, be-
cause succeeding units have headed for Kalijati via Subang one after another.” The detach-
ment headquarters was placed in Subang. A couple of allied aircraft strafed and bombed
around 0900, but fortunately there were no casualties. At 1100, the alarm came that “a mech-
anized enemy unit is coming in for an assault.” A total of about twenty-five enemy light tanks
and armored vehicles came fiercely rushing in from the road to the Bandung stronghold. The
personnel positioned in Subang consisted of a total of about one hundred men including De-
tachment Commander [Shōji], Staff Officer Yamashita, 1st Lt. Wada Toshimichi (commander
of the reserve unit and the regimental infantry artillery unit), and 1st Lt. Sugii Jirō, com-
mander of the 4th Company (the company bearing the colors). The heavy weapons they had
were just one mountain gun, one antitank gun and two machine guns. They destroyed the
two [enemy] vehicles at the front, but the allied tanks and armored vehicles drove into the
[Japanese] position in spite of that and freely ran about the place. Even the colors were in
danger. After a battle of one and a half hours, they destroyed a total of twelve [enemy] vehi-
cles [and tanks] by frantic shooting and attacks at close quarters and were finally able to
make them retreat with the loss of some twenty-odd casualties.(13, 31, 75)
In the evening, another 300 to 400 troops of a Dutch East Indies Army unit in trucks at-
tacked [the Japanese position] in Subang from the road to the Bandung stronghold. The com-
pany bearing the colors fought bravely and drove them off.(31, 75)
Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java 509
Colonel Shōji at Eretan at Noon on the First Day of
Landing
On that day, the Egashira Raiding Unit continued its rush toward the Krawang bridge,
but its advance was seriously hindered because all the bridges had been destroyed and also
because several times Dutch East Indies Army units put up resistance.(31, 75)
Fortunately, on that day, the aircraft of the 3d Air Division began to advance into the Kali-
jati [airfield]. Two aircraft landed at 1400, followed by the main force of the 27th Air Group
(assault planes) and three planes of the 59th Air Group (fighter planes) (both of which had
left Palembang at 1600).(91, 96)
Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Itoda also flew in.(39)
The 3d [of March]: [Enemy] Counterattacks at All Fronts (See Illustration No. 58)
At the landing point, disembarkation was being continued. The Ōno Unit ([consisting of]
one infantry company) was [still] confronting the Dutch East Indies Army in the area east of
Eretan. The light cruiser Yura and the destroyers Akatsuki, Hibiki, Nagatsuki and Minazuki
were continuously guarding the sea. The auxiliary seaplane tenders Kamikawa-maru and
San’yō-maru had left the Anambas base for Bantam Bay the day before, the 2d. At the landing
point in Eretan, a total of five planes of the Kamikawa-maru and a total of six planes of the
San’yō-maru had provided [cover for the disembarkation] on the day before, the 2d.(130, 131)
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Illustration No. 56 — The Shōji Detachment on 2 March
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At the Kalijati airfield on that day, the 3d, about twenty [enemy] armored vehicles attacked
from the west around 0730, against which the Wakamatsu Battalion and the Sugimura Air-
field Unit put up a defensive fight. At 0800, five allied aircraft raided and strafed the airfield,
after which one B–17 bomber dropped huge bombs. One of the Japanese heavy bombers
went up in flames, and 300 mountain gun shells exploded. At 0830, a Hurricane raided [the
airfield] as well. The Wakamatsu Battalion drove off the [enemy] unit after destroying one
of the armored vehicles and capturing five of them.(96, 99)
As soon as the melee calmed down, Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Itoda hurried to the Shōji
Detachment headquarters in Subang by car. He handed over a congratulatory telegram from
3d Air Division Commander Maj. Gen. Endō Saburō addressed to Detachment Commander
Shōji and expressed his appreciation for the hard fighting of the Wakamatsu Battalion.(39, 75)
Colonel Shōji, whose detachment headquarters had been overrun the day before, the 2d,
learned that the Wakamatsu Battalion had been under a counterattack since the morning of
the 3d. Although the Egashira Battalion was advancing to the front of Jatisari at last, its sub-
sequent progress was doubtful. The allied units to the east of the disembarkation point
seemed to be increasing, and it could not be predicted when the main force of the allied forces
in the Bandung stronghold would attack in full force. Colonel Shōji deeply thought about
what he had been told by General Hishikari Takashi long ago when he was young: “Don’t
stay in level country. Secure a mountain.” However, fuel and ammunition for aircraft, and
others were [still] being disembarked in Eretan at that moment. Colonel Shōji deliberately
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A Tank of the Dutch East Indies Army that Attacked [the Japanese Position in] Subang
started speaking, and told the following [to
Staff officer Itoda]:(75)
The successful landing this time was a result of
the [excellent] direction of the [Sixteenth] Army
headquarters and the support of the air and
naval forces, especially the cooperation of the
Endō Air Division. I am deeply grateful for that,
and I would like to request your further contin-
uous cooperation and support. The enemy,
which is very much superior in power, has been
enveloping our detachment. In addition, the
landing and advance of the main force of the
Sixteenth Army is falling behind schedule. Tak-
ing a defensive attitude out of hesitation and
doing nothing will necessarily invite destruc-
tion. Therefore, I am considering assembling
my whole force as soon as the disembarkation
is for the most part complete and to break
through a corner of the Bandung stronghold. I
would like to request the unstinting support of
the Endō Air Division, and on that occasion, I
would appreciate it if I am [also] allowed to
have the main force of the Wakamatsu Unit re-
turned to my command, except for only one el-
ement to be left at the airfield.
Colonel Shōji said that he was considering “to
break through a corner of the Bandung
stronghold,” but his true feeling was, “[my detachment] will be crushed if we stay in level
country. I wish we could occupy any one of the hillocks of the Bandung highlands and hang
on to it.”(75)
Staff Officer Itoda answered: “[3d] Air Division Commander Endō intends to support the
Shōji Detachment with all his might. The air – ground communication squad under Major
Kuboki is expected to be dispatched shortly for communications.” After that, Staff Officer
Itoda had lunch with Colonel Shōji and told him all about the Palembang paradrop operation
of the [paratroop] raiding group, the Palembang operation of the Tanaka advance party, and
the southern Sumatra operation of the 38th Division. It was stories about how the raiding
group and the advance group had overcome difficulties, about the brave fighting of the
Tanaka Regiment, his fellow unit, which at the beginning had been planned to be employed
for seizing the Kalijati sector (until [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura had changed the
plan) and about the 38th Division to which his [detachment] belonged. [These stories] hap-
pened to come up in the conversation at lunch because Staff Officer Itoda had been [in Suma-
tra] until then, and because the Shōji Regiment was a regiment of the 38th Division.(75)
Later, when Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama came on an inspection tour and
asked Colonel Shōji, “What was your estimate of the strength of the enemy?” he answered,
“I estimated the enemy strength to be 35,000, as I had heard from the Sixteenth Army. I was
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Illustration No. 57 — The Defensive Fight in Subang
[on] 2 March (from 1100 to 1230)
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afraid that we would be enveloped and annihilated by the enemy if we were slow and hes-
itant. So I advanced toward the lines of the stronghold, prepared to die after seizing one cor-
ner of the stronghold.”(75)
At 1130, while Staff Officer Itoda and Colonel Shōji had their talk together, 3d Air Division
Commander Major General Endō (who had left Palembang at 1015) landed on the Kalijati
airfield. The 59th Air Group (fighter planes) and the 75th Air Group (light bombers) also ad-
vanced there.(96, 98, 99)
At 1200, while Colonel Shōji and Lieutenant Colonel Itoda were having lunch, the
Egashira Unit finally advanced in front of the Jatisari bridge. The bridge had been destroyed
and there was a powerful Dutch East Indies Army unit on the opposite bank. At that time,
the disposition of [Shōji’s] force was: three companies in Kalijati, one in Subang, one in Eretan,
and three in Jatisari. Detachment Commander Shōji decided to re-route the Egashira Unit to
Krawang by way of Subang and Kalijati and ordered it to reverse course. At 2000 the battalion
began to reverse course by motor vehicle.(31, 75)
In the meantime (from noontime on the 3d), serious [enemy] counterattacks were
launched at all areas [of the detachment] as follows:(31, 75, 99)
1. An infantry-tank combined unit consisting of more than a dozen tanks and sixty to a hundred
trucks was closing in on Subang ([where] the Shōji Detachment headquarters and one company
[were positioned]) from Bandung (heading northward, after passing at 1130 through Jalancagak,
about twenty-seven kilometers north of Bandung.)
2. One hundred and several tens of tanks and trucks were approaching Kalijati ([where] the Waka-
matsu unit [consisting of] three companies [was stationed]) from the southwest. Around 1400,
the head [of the convoy] was spotted at ten-odd kilometers west of the airfield.
3. In the afternoon, about two thousand troops with guns came to attack the disembarkation point
at Eretan ([where] one company under Lieutenant Colonel Ōno [was stationed]) from the di-
rection of Cirebon (east of Eretan).
4. The allied unit on the Jatisari front ([where] the Egashira Unit [consisting of] three companies
[was stationed]) was also picking up in activity.
The Endō Air Division flew six missions with a total of twenty-four aircraft against the
[enemy] armored unit approaching Subang from Bandung, sent fourteen vehicles up in
flames, and wrecked seventeen. Nevertheless, the [enemy] armored unit further continued
its advance and one element [of the unit] appeared in front of the [Japanese] position in Sub-
ang in the evening. Detachment Commander Shōji drove it off.(31, 75, 99)
The Endō Air Division [also] flew six missions with a total of twenty-seven aircraft be-
tween 1430 and 1800 against the [enemy] vehicles approaching Kalijati in column from the
southwest. It pinned down the large column of vehicles by first blowing up the vehicle at
the head (at sixteen kilometers west of the airfield) then another at the tail, so it could not
move from the road and then repeatedly strafed and bombed them. It achieved a large mil-
itary gain of sending up in flames or destroying a total of 158 vehicles (10 tanks, 44 armored
vehicles, and 104 trucks).(99)
The wreckage of the vehicles of the Dutch East Indies Army unit stretched out for over
twenty kilometers from a point sixteen kilometers west of Kalijati to the south of Purwakarta.
However, the troops on those vehicles quickly got out of them. Major Wakamatsu aiming to
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“destroy the enemy while they are demoralized,” proposed and asked the detachment com-
mander’s permission to launch an attack, which Colonel Shōji in Subang approved.(75)
Around that time (at 2000), the Egashira Battalion started its U-turn from Jatisari.(31, 75)
Around the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Ōno, commander of the disembarkation point
covering unit, was trying to judge the situation of the Dutch East Indies Army unit on his
front (east of Eretan), consisting of 2,000 troops (with four tanks and eight heavy guns), feel-
ing that he should meet the expectations of Chief of Staff Okazaki and Colonel Shōji. (As
mentioned previously, Sixteenth Army Chief of Staff Major General Okazaki had specifically
assigned him [to command the disembarkation point]. Although he was the commander of
the 2d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion, all three companies under his command had
been assigned to other areas, which left no antitank guns under his command. [Instead,] he
was [now] commanding the 6th [Infantry] Company, one machine gun platoon and one reg-
imental gun squad of the Shōji Regiment.) At night, Lieutenant Colonel Ōno ventured an at-
tack on the assembly point of the Dutch East Indies Army unit in Kandanghaur and seized
it at 2400.(31, 75)
The 4th [of March]: Disembarkation Completed (See Illustration No. 58)
On the next day, 4 March (day four of the landing), the Wakamatsu Battalion, which had
been heading westward, destroying the Dutch East Indies Army units everywhere on its way
since the night before, seized Purwakarta at 0700.(59, 31, 75)
Staff Officer Itoda asked [3d] Air Division Commander Endō to look after things, left Kali-
jati and returned to the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters via the Serang airfield. At that time,
the Army headquarters had no idea of the whereabouts of Staff Officer Itoda. Worried, it was
waiting for a reply from the Southern Army to its telegram requesting an airlift [of troops].
We have seen how the words of the report of Staff Officer Itoda that “[the Shōji Detachment]
seized Purwakarta at 0700 this morning” caused subtly different reactions [on the part of the
Southern Army, the Sixteenth Army and the 2d Division] until the night of the 7th.
In the middle of the previous night (at 0000 on the 4th), the Wakamatsu Battalion had left
Kalijati by motor vehicles. At 0040, it encountered about one hundred troops of a Dutch East
Indies Army unit equipped with tanks and antitank guns at a point sixteen kilometers west
of the town. It defeated the latter after an engagement of some thirty-minutes and headed
westward. Subsequently, it encountered units of the Dutch East Indies Army twice, continued
its westward advance after defeating them, and seized Purwakarta at 0700.(59, 31, 75)
The Egashira Battalion, which had been ordered to make a U-turn, [next] headed west-
ward in motor vehicles via Subang and Kalijati, and then headed further northwestward. It
attacked a powerful Dutch East Indies Army unit and entered Cikampek around 1400 on
that day (the 4th). As the Dutch East Indies Army unit there (about 500 troops) had already
retreated, the Egashira Battalion continued its advance toward Kedunggede. It entered
Krawang at 1830, defeated the Dutch East Indies Army unit there, hotly pursued it, and ar-
rived in Kedunggede at 1910, but the bridge over the Citarum River there had already been
destroyed.(31, 75)
After seizing Purwakarta, the Wakamatsu Battalion had been carefully watching the
progress of the Egashira Battalion’s northwestward advance. Having ascertained that the
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Egashira Battalion was advancing in the direction of Cikampek without difficulty, [the Waka-
matsu Battalion] returned to Kalijati around 1400.(31, 75)
On that day (the 4th), Third Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Sugawara flew
into the Kalijati airfield around 1400 and took off for Singapore (already renamed Shōnan)
after an inspection of about one hour. On that day, three allied aircraft attacked the Kalijati
airfield at 0820 and seven at 1030. The aircraft of the 75th and the 90th Air Groups of the 3d
Air Division launched an attack on Bandung from the airfield on that day.(97, 98, 99)
The Kamikawa-maru and the San’yō-maru, which had left the Anambas Islands on the 2d,
were under sail for Bantam Bay (they arrived at Bantam Bay on the 5th) and their reconnais-
sance seaplanes, which had advanced to the Bantam and Patrol (Eretan) bases since the 1st,
covered the disembarkation [operation] and supported the fighting of the Ōno Unit with a
total of thirteen aircraft on the 3d and a total of eleven aircraft on the 4th.(130, 131)
On that day, the 4th, the convoy completed disembarkation and the transport ships left
[the anchorage] off Eretan under the escort of the light cruiser Yura and others in the after-
noon.(120)
Third Air Division Commander [Endō] and Detachment Commander Shōji’s
Change of Mind
A subtle change had occurred in [3d] Air Division Commander Endō and Detachment Com-
mander Shōji’s judgment of the situation.
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The Mobile Unit of the Dutch East Indies Army Destroyed in its Attack from Purwakarta on Kalijati
Major General Endō had concluded: “The focus of the operations has shifted to this area
now; we should give all our support to the Shōji Detachment in this area, and put the support
for the operations of the main force of the Sixteenth Army second.” Instead of thinking: “[My
detachment] will undoubtedly be annihilated if it stays in level country,” and “We should
seize one of the hillocks on the ridgeline of the [Bandung] stronghold, cling to it, and die a
glorious death [while trying to hold on to it],” Detachment Commander Shōji now felt: “the
detachment has completed its initial mission, having crushed every counterattack of the
enemy as well as the presumed main counterattack on 3 March,” and “since I have heard
nothing from the [Sixteenth] Army at all, I want to try to take the initiative on my own au-
thority, counting on the Endō Air Division.”
[Third] Air Division Commander Endō and Detachment Commander Shōji’s judgment
of the situation had started to change on the morning of the 3d when Staff Officer Itoda had
handed over the telegram from Major General Endō to Colonel Shōji. [The change] had de-
veloped rapidly when, contacted by Staff Officer [Itoda] that afternoon, Major General Endō
had declared that he would “fully support the Shōji Detachment,” and [the Shōji Detachment]
had defeated the counterattacks of the Dutch East Indies Army from every direction. [The
change] became firmly established on the 4th, when [one element of the detachment] reached
the bank of Citarum River, and the disembarkation at Eretan was completed.
On the night of the 4th, [3d] Air Division Commander Endō deplored that “the ground
operations of the main force of the Sixteenth Army are making little progress,” and that “in
enthusiasm they totally differ from those of the Twenty-fifth Army (on the Malay Penin-
sula).”(98) [In other words,] he was ready to immediately burst into action once Colonel Shōji
would set him off.
[Meanwhile] on the evening of the 4th (in Subang), Detachment Commander Shōji’s judg-
ment of the movements of the enemy was that “about 2,000 troops are in the area of Cirebon
(east of Eretan), about 20,000 in the Bandung area, and about 3,000 in the Purwakarta area,
while the numbers in these areas seem to be gradually increasing,” and that “the enemy must
be concentrating and integrating more of its force to attack Subang and Kalijati.”(75) Based on
the above judgment and the current situation, particularly the fact that no contact had yet
been established with the [Sixteenth] Army, and that he had completed his initial mission,
Colonel Shōji determined: “We need to preemptively seize the Bandung stronghold, before
the enemy concentrates and integrates [its forces] and attacks us.”(75)
Staff Officer Yamashita of the Sixteenth Army, who enjoyed the confidence of Army Com-
mander Imamura and had been assigned to the Shōji Detachment for [just] such a situation,
was facing a serious problem. Staff Officer Yamashita’s judgment of the movements of the
enemy was as follows:(31, 41)
1. The vigorous offensive of the enemy from 2 to 4 March shows that from the beginning the enemy
clearly had no intention to put up a defense [just] relying on existing positions. But although
they did attempt a coastal thrust, it may be considered as having been generally [too] weak and
ill-timed.
2. Therefore, there are signs that the enemy, having its attacks at the front of the detachment frus-
trated, is now successively withdrawing its forces in all areas and gathering them in Bandung
to shift to a defense using existing positions.
516 Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java
Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java 517
Illustration No. 58 — [The Shōji Detachment] on 3 and 4 of March
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Staff Officer Yamashita’s judgment of the enemy movements was far more confident than
Detachment Commander Shōji’s, but in his judgment of the situation [and what to do], he
was more timid. [So,] Staff Officer Yamashita proposed to the detachment commander: “How
about conducting a reconnaissance in force?”(41) This proposal reflected Staff Officer Ya-
mashita’s dilemma as a staff officer, to be precise, as the [assistant] operations staff officer of
the Sixteenth Army.
Colonel Shōji, however, regarded young Staff Officer Yamashita [simply] as a staff officer
assigned to his detachment, that is, as a staff officer under his command.(75)
In the end, Colonel Shōji decided that “[the detachment] should preemptively seize the
Bandung stronghold.”(75) He informed [3d] Air Division Commander Endō of his decision
and asked for support.(75) In no time, Major General Endō replied: “Go ahead. We will support
you with all our might.”(75)
Colonel Shōji immediately passed down the following orders.(75) When giving orders, he
had made it a habit to draft them himself without getting assistance from staff officers and
to give oral instructions.(75)
1. The Wakamatsu unit shall promptly assemble its force and leave Subang at 1100 tomorrow, the
5th. As the advance party for seizing Bandung, it shall advance first to Ciater and vicinity along
the Subang – Bandung road and reconnoiter the situation of the area, particularly the situation
of the enemy positions and the terrain on the north side of Bandung.
At the Kalijati airfield, [the Wakamatsu unit] shall leave behind the troops requested by [3d]
Air Division Commander Endō and leave them under his command. These troops are scheduled
to catch up [with the unit] when they are later replaced by troops of the Egashira unit.
Staff Officer Yamashita, Adjutant Sekiya and [other] necessary [staff of] the headquarters
shall accompany [the unit].
2. The Egashira unit shall promptly pull out of Cikampek. It shall assemble all its force in Subang,
so as to leave Subang in the early morning of the 6th and advance toward Bandung. Further,
when it passes the Kalijati airfield, it shall leave the same number of troops as those left by the
Wakamatsu unit, replace the latter, and put them under the command of [3d] Air Division Com-
mander Endō.
3. Unit Commander Ōno shall take command of all the units in the rear. (A minimal infantry force
shall be assigned.)
The Third Air Force’s Support of the Ground Operations
As we have seen above, on the night of the 4th (when the Nasu Detachment was conducting
its second night attack on the [enemy] positions in Leuwiliang and when the Satō Detach-
ment was about to advance to the front of the defensive zone in Tangerang on the next day,
the 5th), Detachment Commander Shōji gave the order to advance to the front lines of the
Bandung stronghold and it was settled that the 3d Air Division would support this operation.
I will describe below how the [Army] Third Air Force had supported the ground operations
of the Sixteenth Army until then and how it conducted the support thereafter.
As described previously, for the maintenance of the airfields to be performed by the air
ground support unit assigned to the army, the Sixteenth Army had allocated [a unit] consist-
ing of the 24th Airfield Battalion as the core to the Kalijati [airfield] and another consisting
of the 28th Airfield Battalion as the core to the Buitenzorg and the Batavia [airfields]. The
Third Air Force had instructed the units concerned to be ready, assuming that flight units
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would be able to advance to the Kalijati airfield on Day H (the starting date of the Java land-
ing [operation]), the Buitenzorg airfield on Day H + 3, and the Batavia airfield on Day H +
4.(23, 96)
In addition, as we have seen, the Third Air Force had [also] stated that it would employ
the 3d and the 12th Air Divisions, and the 81st Air Group for the Java operations, and [also]
one element of the 7th Air Division depending on the circumstances. [The Third Air Force]
had disposed its forces and their tasks roughly in the following way:(96)
81st Air Group: Reconnaissance of enemy airfields, the location of the convoys, photography of
the landing points, and other general scouting.
12th Air Division ([consisting of] one squadron of the 1st Air Group (fighter planes), and the
11th Air Group (fighter planes)): shall destroy [the enemy] air power, cover [the Japanese]
convoys under sail and provide air defense at their anchorages, as well as the air defense of
key locations as needed.
3d Air Division ([consisting of] the 15th Independent Air Unit (its headquarters and the 50th
and the 52d Independent Squadrons; command reconnaissance aircraft), the 27th Air Group
(minus one squadron; assault planes), the 59th Air Group (fighter planes), the 64th Air Group
(fighter planes), the 75th Air Group (light bombers), and the 90th Air Group (light bombers)):
shall destroy [the enemy] air power, give direct support to ground operations, and cover the
[Japanese] convoys as needed.
It meant that out of the force of the [Army] Third Air Force consisting of three air divisions
as the core, it employed the 3d Air Division (reinforced) for the direct support of the Java
ground operations. Further, it had circumscribed its direct support of the ground operations
as follows:(96)
After the landing of the main force of the Sixteenth Army, [the Army Third Air Force] shall
promptly advance its base when the enemy airfields in western Java are seized and made ready
for use. Simultaneously, it shall [also] anticipate that the air ground unit belonging to the Six-
teenth Army may be assigned to it.
After the landing of the Sixteenth Army, it shall directly support the army in its ground op-
erations.
Depending on the circumstances, direct support of the 48th Division in its operations in east-
ern Java may be called for.
The Third Air Force had launched a campaign to destroy [the enemy] air power [in the sector]
from 108ºE westwards, and subsequently provided cover for the convoy of the main force of
the Sixteenth Army after the convoy of the Shōji Detachment had separated and gone its own
way. On the day before the landing operation of the Sixteenth Army (28 February), it issued
the following order:(96)
1. The outlines of Operation H of the 2d Division and that of the Shōji Detachment are respectively
as shown in Separate Sheet No. 1 and No. 2 (omitted by the author).
2. The 3d Air Division commander shall provide direct support mainly for the operations of the
main force of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment from tomorrow, 1 March, onwards.
3. The 12th Air Division commander shall continue his current tasks.
4. The 81st Air Group commander shall be relieved of his tasks to cooperate with the 12th Air Di-
vision.
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At that time, the 12th Air Division was stationed in Tanjungkarang, and the 3d Air Division
and the 81st Air Group in Palembang. The [Third] Air Force commander had [also] been po-
sitioned in Palembang since 21 February. As soon as [he was informed that] the Sixteenth
Army had successfully landed, he issued the following order in Palembang at 1200 on 1
March:(96)
1. The Sixteenth Army has successfully landed on H; one element of the army is attacking and ad-
vancing in the sector east of Serang at 1030.
2. The [Third] Air Force intends to advance part of its force to Java to support the Sixteenth Army
in its operations.
3. The 3d Air Division commander shall successively advance his force to a group of airfields in
western Java after those airfields have been seized and readied and continue his current tasks.
However, the 64th and the 90th Air Groups, the 94th and the 91st Airfield Battalions, and the
7th Airfield Company shall still use Palembang as their base. When the 15th Independent Air
Unit (minus the 51st Independent Squadron), the 27th Air Group and the 36th and the 93d Air-
field Battalions are advanced, the [number of] personnel and equipment [to be advanced] shall
be minimized, taking subsequent redeployments into account.
4. The 81st Air Group commander shall have his main force prepare for advance to western Java,
leaving the 1st Squadron behind in Malaya.
5. The 12th Air Division commander shall continue his tasks at his current base until ordered oth-
erwise. (Rest omitted by the author.)
As already told, on 25 February, the Third Air Force had judged that “the campaign to destroy
[the enemy] air power in Java is for the most part completed today,” and on 26 [February]
that “the remaining enemy aircraft in western Java are between twenty to thirty.” It had pro-
vided cover for the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army on the 27th and the 28th,
and shifted to cover for the landing [operations] and support of the ground operations from
the next day, 1 March, onwards. [Its operations] with a focus on its support of the operations
in the sectors of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment may be summarized as follows:
1 March
The 12th Air Division provided cover for the anchorage of the disembarkation point of the 2d
Division from the early morning.(96)
As for the 3d Air Division, in the morning, the commander and others went into action to
support the landing operations in the sector of the 2d Division. However, the landing was per-
formed boldly without problems, and after their landing, the units were advancing amid wel-
coming cheers of the inhabitants, who looked up and just waved their hands at the aircraft [of
the division]. As they never ran off even if the aircraft flew above them, the division returned,
considering that “there is no place [for the aircraft] to drop bombs.”(98, 99)
At 1200 the [Third] Air Force commander passed down the already-mentioned order to ad-
vance [to Java].(96)
In the afternoon, a telegram about the sector of the Shōji Detachment came from the [Navy]
3d Air Raid Unit, which said: “Enemy aircraft attacked ten times, taking advantage of the moon-
light. Please step up the campaign to destroy [the enemy] air power.” But [the Third Air Force]
replied as described in the section “Entry into the Anchorage, Start of the Landings, and Naval
Engagements.” [See p. 458.] The [Third] Air Force did not launch attacks either on the airfields
or at the front of the Shōji Detachment.(99)
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2 March
Learning that Kalijati was seized, the 3d Air Division advanced three aircraft of the 59th Air
Group and the main force of the 27th Air Group to the Kalijati [airfield] on that day. These air-
craft immediately took care of the air defense and conducted attacks on the Bandung airfield.
Receiving information that twenty-nine allied aircraft had been spotted on the Bandung airfield,
[3d] Air Division Commander [Endō] sent the 59th, the 64th, the 75th and the 90th Air Groups
for an attack from Palembang, all of which returned to Palembang. No direct support for the 2d
Division was provided.(98, 99)
The 12th Air Division continued its task to cover the anchorage of the 2d Division.(96)
3 March
On this day, the commander and the 59th and the 75th Air Groups of the 3d Air Division ad-
vanced to the Kalijati [airfield] and along with the 27th Air Group, which had advanced the day
before, conducted the campaign to crush the counterattacks of the allied mechanized units. The
64th and the 90th Air Groups attacked the Bandung airfield from Palembang and returned to
Palembang. On this day, the battle in Leuwiliang started in the afternoon, but no direct support
for the 2d Division was provided.(98, 99)
4 March
Of the 3d Air Division, the commander and the 27th, the 59th and the 75th Air Groups were sta-
tioned on the Kalijati [airfield], while the 64th and the 90th Air Group were on the Palembang
[airfield]. The previous afternoon, Staff Officer Itoda of the Sixteenth Army, who had returned
from the Shōji Detachment headquarters, had asked Air Division Commander [Endō] for air
support for the Shōji Detachment. This morning, the engagements since the previous evening
in the area west of Kalijati were continued, while the Wakamatsu unit was heading for Pur-
wakarta, and the Egashira Battalion, which had made a U-turn [from Jatisari], was heading in
the direction of Krawang via Kalijati, while attacking Dutch East Indies Army units [on its way].
Accordingly, support for these units became the main operation of the division this morning
(which was conducted by twelve aircraft for six times). Meanwhile, in Kalijati a total of eleven
allied aircraft attacked three times, which caused a loss of one aircraft sent up in flames and six
heavily or partly damaged. Consequently, a joint attack on the Bandung airfield by fighter planes
and bombers became the main operation of the 3d Air Division on this afternoon.(98, 99)
[Also] on this day, Third Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Sugawara flew to the
Kalijati [airfield] at 1400 and left at 1500 after an inspection tour.(97, 98) On this day, too, the Nasu
Detachment of the 2d Division vigorously attacked [the enemy] position in Leuwiliang all day,
and the Sixteenth Army was asking the Southern Army to airlift [troops] to Kalijati.
Due to its subsequent operations, the Third Air Force had committed only the 3d Air Divi-
sion to the direct support for the Sixteenth Army in the ground operations. But the military sit-
uation at the 3d Air Division did not allow it much leeway to support the 2d Division. It could
not smoothly contact the latter, either. Although it had sent its aircraft also to the sector of the
2d Division, only the column on the march could be spotted. The military situation at the front
line remained unclear.
The self-confidence of the 3d Air Division, which had increased since the evening of the 3d,
became solid on the morning of the 4th. On the 4th, 3d Air Division Commander Endō, who
had known about the Detachment Commander Shōji’s request since the afternoon of the 3d, be-
came irritated at the [slow] advance of the 2d Division. As soon as he received from Detachment
Commander Shōji, who was a kindred spirit on the same battlefield, the message that he in-
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tended to advance toward the Bandung stronghold, he decided to support the latter with all his
might.(98)
The 5th [of March]: Heading for the Bandung Stronghold 
(See Illustrations No. 59 and No. 60)
At 0900 on the 5th, after paying respects to Air Division Commander Endō, the Wakamatsu
Battalion departed from the Kalijati airfield.(98)
At 1100 on the 5th, the Wakamatsu Unit ([consisting of] three infantry companies as the
core, with the same attached units as before and joined by the main force of the mountain
artillery battalion (two batteries)) left Subang and headed south. Staff Officer Yamashita Yu-
taka, Regimental Adjutant Capt. Sekiya Eiji, and others accompanied the unit. On its way,
the Wakamatsu Unit pursued southward about one infantry company of the Dutch East In-
dies Army equipped with light-armored vehicles and heavy guns, which was retreating due
to the bombardment by the Endō Air Division. Around 1600, the tank at the head of the
[Wakamatsu] Unit unexpectedly came upon [enemy] pillbox positions in the area south of
Ciater and went into battle. Battalion Commander Wakamatsu immediately ordered [the
unit] to deploy and attack. Fortunately, hindered by the many trees, the field of fire of the
pillboxes was limited. The battalion seized the pillbox positions with barbed wire entangle-
ments on the front line, then attacked similar pillbox positions on the second line, and [finally]
took five pillboxes in total. Battalion Commander Wakamatsu decided to continue the attack
again the next morning, the 6th [of March].(31, 41, 75)
Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Major Yamashita (the staff officer assigned to the Shōji De-
tachment), who accompanied the battalion, at first thought that the battalion should better
withdraw at night, but came to hold the same view as Battalion Commander Wakamatsu be-
cause the military situation was so overly favorable.(41)
Note: Staff Officer Yamashita had the following recollection of the events:
I accompanied Battalion Commander Wakamatsu and went southward from Subang, positioned
at the head of the main force of the battalion. On the way, we spotted blown-up enemy armored
vehicles and motor vehicles on the road. We went southward without delay. Tanks (one troop,
as I recall) were at the head, which were followed by the advance company. It seems that both
the tanks and the advance company headed southward without engaging [the enemy]. (Note
by the author: According to the historical records of Kanzaki Kiyoshi, staff officer of the 3d Air
Division, twenty-four aircraft of the Endō Air Division had bombed the whole length and
breadth [of an enemy column] on the road between Jalancagak and Ciater from 1130 onwards.
It seems that this bombardment by the Endō Air Division had blown to pieces about one com-
pany of a Dutch East Indies Army mechanized unit equipped with armored vehicles and heavy
guns, and made it retreat.) When we advanced to the edge of the plateau north of Jalancagak
(note by the author: according to the records of Staff Officer Kanzaki, it seems to have been at
1258) and observed the area to the south, I saw mountains completely covered with trees stretch-
ing to the south of Ciater, and no [enemy] positions at the foot of the mountains. As there was
no fire pointed at us, we continued going southward. When we passed through Ciater (note by
the author: around 1530 according to Kanzaki’s records) and reached the foot of a mountain,
the tank at the head suddenly came under [enemy] fire. There were [enemy] positions with an-
titank obstacles consisting of [pieces of] railroad rail stuck in the ground, barbed wire entangle-
ments and pillboxes. Battalion Commander Wakamatsu deployed the battalion and ordered an
attack. I spotted five pillboxes, three of which covered the main road with their guns. Other pill-
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box positions stretched in a row on both sides of them, but the details were not clear. Fortunately,
the place was rugged and had many trees. The front line company approached [the three pill-
boxes] by skillfully taking advantage of the terrain and the natural objects and seized them. I
went southward along the main road, having small talk with the battalion commander, and ad-
vanced onto the high ground of those pillboxes. When we advanced onto the high ground, all
of a sudden we were fired upon from pillbox positions (a second line of pillbox positions at a
distance of 400 to 500 meters) on another plateau across a stream, which killed two and wounded
several men. Just then, several enemy tanks (with no accompanying infantry) sallied forth and
forced their way onto our high ground. The battalion drove them off. The front line company
continued its attack and seized two pillboxes of the pillbox positions in the second line, after
which Battalion Commander Wakamatsu advanced toward the high ground of the second line
of pillbox positions. I stayed behind. After taking steps to report [the situation] to the detachment
commander, I left the high ground of the first line of pillbox positions and advanced along with
Detachment Adjutant Captain Sekiya to catch up with the battalion headquarters. [First] we ad-
vanced along the main road, turned right after crossing the high ground of the second line of
pillbox positions, and advanced through the forest, when suddenly at point-blank range we
were fired upon by enemy stragglers with a semi-automatic rifle, which wounded Adjutant
Sekiya. It happened at dusk. After making arrangements to send Adjutant Sekiya back to the
rear, I continued advancing and joined the battalion headquarters. The battalion stayed up all
night, keeping strict guard.
That evening, Detachment Commander Shōji (in Subang) received [Yamashita’s] report,
which said: “The Wakamatsu Unit reached Ciater, pursuing on its way about one thousand
enemy [troops] equipped with guns, who were retreating due to the bombardment by the
Endō Air Division.” However, he heard nothing [from the unit] after nightfall.(75)
On that day, the Egashira Battalion was waiting in the Krawang and Kedunggede sector
for motor vehicles to be brought around.(31, 75)
On that day (the 5th), a total of two allied aircraft attacked the Kalijati airfield twice in
the early morning, but there were no attacks afterwards. At 0800, when [3d] Air Division
Commander Endō was sending off a combined unit of fighter planes and bombers to attack
airfield(s) in the Bandung area, Battalion Commander Wakamatsu [had come and] paid his
respect to him at 0900, saying, “I’m departing for the Bandung stronghold front. Please take
care of things after I’m gone.” Air Division Commander Endō was glad that the defensive
until yesterday had from this day [finally] turned into an offensive. He encouraged [the bat-
talion commander], saying, “Please don’t mind the cover for the airfield. I want you to
quickly capture [Bandung]. Our air division will support you with all its power,” and he im-
mediately gave his air groups their assignments. On that day, the Endō Air Division sent a
total of forty-eight aircraft from the 27th, the 75th and the 90th Air Groups on sorties to di-
rectly support the Shōji Detachment.(96, 98, 99)
The 6th [of March]: Attack on the [Enemy’s] Main Position and Seizure of the
Mountaintop (See Illustration No. 60)
On the morning of the 6th, Adjutant Sekiya and more than a dozen wounded men were
brought back to the Shōji Detachment headquarters. The detachment commander, who had
lost contact with the Wakamatsu Unit since the previous evening and who was worrying
about it, for the first time learned about the previously described state of affairs.(75)
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Around 0900, Detachment Commander Shōji left Subang to catch up with the Wakamatsu
Unit, leading the whole body of his headquarters. He ordered the Egashira Battalion to hurry.
That morning (of the 6th), the Egashira Battalion [finally] started its U-turn from the Krawang
and Kedunggede area.(31, 75)
Around 1400, Detachment Commander Shōji caught up with the Wakamatsu Unit, met
Battalion Commander Wakamatsu and Staff Officer Yamashita, and received a report saying:
“The enemy positions on the north side of Bandung are guarded with pillboxes, barbed wire
entanglements, and the like, and are considerably strong. They seem to be equipped with
more than a dozen guns and defended by some 3,000 troops. The Dutch East Indies Army
[there] is gradually increasing [its troops]. There are cliffs here and there in front of the posi-
tions, which seem to make it difficult to pass through, and both sides of the positions are
covered with jungle, which also seem to make it difficult to pass through.” (Note: From the
recollections of the detachment commander.) Detachment Commander [Shōji] ordered Bat-
talion Commander Wakamatsu to “seize more of these outpost-like positions of the Dutch
East Indies Army and continue to reconnoiter the situation of the main position,” and he
gave orders to the artillery battalion commander to cooperate in the task [as well]. Colonel
Shōji judged that the positions which the Wakamatsu Unit had seized the previous evening
were forward positions, that the positions with pillboxes just in front of the unit were some-
thing like outposts [of the main position], and that there [must be] a main position on the
ridgeline in the rear. Around that time, the shift of Egashira Battalion was delayed due to
motor vehicle trouble. On that day, the Endō Air Division supported the detachment again
from morning onwards.(75)
That morning, before the arrival of Colonel Shōji, Unit Commander Wakamatsu had un-
expectedly run into and engaged a[n enemy] mechanized unit, which had counterattacked
from the direction of Bandung. When Detachment Commander Shōji left after his talk with
Battalion Commander Wakamatsu, the questioning of the prisoners of war of the Dutch East
Indies Army who had been taken in the engagement in the morning was in progress.(31)
Note: Staff Officer Yamashita had the following recollection of the events:
I hailed the morning of the 6th in the same trench as Battalion Commander Wakamatsu. Since
that morning, the enemy artillery had been firing [at us]. Battalion Commander Wakamatsu
said: “The enemy artillery doesn’t amount to much. Moreover, all the shells are falling behind
us, passing high over our heads. It is not worth fearing.” Just then, an enemy [unit] came coun-
terattacking from the direction of Bandung. The enemy, attacking in front of my position, was
about one company. The battalion engaged the enemy in this unexpected encounter in the forest
and the engagement lasted till about noon. The enemy was defeated. We were able to take thirty
to forty prisoners.
From the statement of a prisoner of war, it turned out that the artillery in front was a Dutch
East Indies Army artillery [unit] consisting of about one battery only, that the force defending
the positions was [also] Dutch East Indies Army troops, but few in number, that there was a
detour in the jungle to the west, and the like. Guided by this prisoner of war, the Wakamatsu
unit advanced along the byway through the jungle and headed to the west of the position
that the detachment commander had indicated as “something like an outpost,” and came to
a col to the west of the position. The place that [Detachment Commander Shōji] had consid-
ered as “something like an outpost” was [in fact] the main position (the Cicenang position)
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on the ridgeline. There was a thick fog. Taking advantage of the thick fog, Battalion Com-
mander Wakamatsu quickly deployed the battalion and prepared for an attack. When the
fog cleared away, the battalion charged all at once. The Dutch East Indies Army unit was to-
tally taken by surprise; it fled in a rout to the hillock behind the position. The hillock in the
rear was a reserve position for the main position and had not yet been completed. There was
another position on the southeast side of the main road. Both of these positions were by far
inferior to the one just seized. Seeing the Dutch East Indies Army retreating in utter confusion
toward the above-mentioned reserve position, Staff Officer Yamashita suggested to Battalion
Commander Wakamatsu: “Let’s pursue them.” The commander, however, did not agree. Bat-
talion Commander Wakamatsu believed that he had taken complete control of the Bandung
stronghold line by occupying the present position. Of course, he knew that he ought to pur-
sue them. He [also] believed that he could “easily enter Bandung in pursuit of the defeated
enemy.” Nevertheless, out of friendship for Battalion Commander Egashira, who was four
years his junior [at the academy] and who was hurrying up from the rear to catch up, he did
not try to seek the honor. Battalion Commander Wakamatsu ordered the battalion to secure
the present position. At this time, it was gradually getting dark.
Staff Officer Yamashita was about to descend the mountain to report the situation to the
detachment headquarters, but judging that Detachment Commander [Shōji] must be on his
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A Pillbox Position of the Bandung Stronghold
way to catch up and afraid that they would cross each other, he reversed course and returned
to the trench where Battalion Commander Wakamatsu was positioned. 
In this period, the detachment headquarters was positioned to the south of Ciater (near
the previously mentioned second line of pillbox positions).(75)
The Endō Air Division supported the Wakamatsu Unit in the attack on the stronghold
with almost all its strength the whole day on the 6th as well. The fighter plane unit launched
seven times a total of twenty aircraft in support. Its air groups of assault planes and light
bombers (i.e. the 27th, the 75th and the 90th Air Groups) supported the operations with a
total of seventy aircraft. On that day, one antiaircraft artillery battery arrived for the air de-
fense at the Kalijati airfield, but Air Division Commander Endō sent this antiaircraft artillery
battery to the stronghold line, saying: “This battery should be employed for the artillery of
the Shōji Detachment because the detachment does not have sufficient artillery.” On that day,
there were no attacks by allied aircraft on the Kalijati airfield. On that day, Air Division Com-
mander Endō [also] sent a total of nine light bombers to support the 2d Division, which had
seized Batavia on the night of the 5th and Buitenzorg on the morning of the 6th.(98, 99)
The 7th [of March]: The Bandung Garrison Offers to Surrender
As we have seen, [the Wakamatsu Unit] had seized the most important position on the ridge-
line (the highland on the west side of the main road) on the evening of the 6th. At daybreak
on the 7th, the Wakamatsu Battalion, which had stayed up all night securing the position,
started mopping up [the enemy] at all positions near the road on the ridgeline. To be precise,
it [first] mopped up with one powerful element [the enemy] at the reserve position (an un-
completed position on the west side of the main road) behind the Cicenang [position] on the
morning of the 7th, and then [mopped up] those at the position southeast of the Cicenang
position from the rear. While keeping his main force on the west side of the main road, Bat-
talion Commander Wakamatsu deployed one element on the col above the main road. It was
out of consideration for the Egashira Battalion, i.e. on the arrival of the battalion, by letting
it use the main road (a motor road), he would let it be the first to enter Bandung.(41)
At the detachment headquarters positioned to the south of Ciater (near the previously
mentioned second line of pillbox positions), Detachment Commander Shōji was worried
about the Wakamatsu Unit because contact with the unit had been lost since the evening of
the 6th. Around 0630 (on the morning of the 7th) Deputy Regimental Adjutant Nakajō re-
turned to the headquarters and reported that the Wakamatsu Unit had seized last evening
“the position that had been taken for something like an outpost,” but that it had turned out
to be the main and most important position, and that since daybreak of that day, the 7th, the
unit had been mopping up the enemy at the line of positions across the mountain ridge. The
detachment commander immediately rushed to the scene by car, met Battalion Commander
Wakamatsu around 0700 to learn that the latter had completed seizing the positions across
the mountain ridge, and congratulated him on his success.(75)
Staff Officer Yamashita offered his opinion that [the detachment] should carry out the
pursuit. Colonel Shōji accepted this opinion, but he [also] accepted Battalion Commander
Wa ka matsu’s opinion regarding the disposition of forces to be employed in the pursuit. The
detachment commander decided to wait for the Egashira Battalion and in the pursuit of the
defeated enemy first advance to the edge of the plateau. He deployed his troops in such a
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way that the Wakamatsu Unit as the right pursuit unit to the west of the main road and the
Egashira Battalion (minus two companies) as the left pursuit unit in the sector of the main
road would respectively attack the enemy still there and first of all pursue them to the edge
of the plateau.(41, 75)
As the Egashira Battalion was late due to motor vehicle trouble, the detachment com-
mander had the Wakamatsu Battalion depart at 1300 before the arrival of the Egashira Battal-
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Illustration No. 59 — [The Military Situation Between] 5 and 7 March
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ion. He wanted to show an ardor for
advance [on the part of the Japanese
troops], so as not to give the enemy
time to gather its strength and get
ready [to fight back]. The Egashira
Battalion got to the pass at 1500, and
continued its advance southward.(31,
41, 75)
Although due to a squall and the
bombardment by the Endō Air Divi-
sion the road was muddy and the
bridges had been destroyed, the
Waka matsu Battalion entered Lem-
bang at 2000, then advanced to the
plateau south of the city, and took up
a position that overlooked Bandung
below. The detachment commander
decided to maintain all night this
posture of readiness and kept on
concentrating his force.(31, 41, 75)
Around 2100, Unit Commander
Egashira (whose battalion had
stopped at Cibogo, located northeast
of Lembang, because the bridge
there had been destroyed) reported
that a bearer of a flag of truce had
come to the front of the 3d Company.
[The detachment commander] im-
mediately had the bearer escorted to
him and received him. The bearer (a
Dutch captain) said: “I have come as
envoy of Bandung Garrison Com-
mander Major General Pesman. As
he has the intention to surrender, he
would like the attack on Bandung to
be suspended.” Colonel Shōji said: “I
will send Staff Officer Yamashita and others to the Isola Hotel in the suburbs of Bandung at
1000 tomorrow, the 8th, for negotiations.” The bearer wore an expression as if convinced that
[Twenty-fifth] Army Commander Yamashita, who had captured Malaya, had come to this
front. But realizing that it was Staff Officer Yamashita, he took his leave with a perplexed
look.(75)
Colonel Shōji immediately wired Army Commander [Imamura] to ask for instructions.(75)
Before daybreak on that day (the 7th), allied aircraft had raided the Kalijati airfield, which
had caused more than twenty casualties. [3d] Air Division Commander Endō conducted a
retaliatory strike with sixteen aircraft at dawn and destroyed ten-odd aircraft at the Tasik-
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Illustration No. 60 — The Attacks of the Wakamatsu Battalion of
the Shōji Detachment from Ciater to the Pass
Cicenang
Dutch East Indies Army,
about 1 Co
Dawuan
Dutch East Indies Army,
about 1 Co
Unfinished
position
Pashoogtel
(wates)
Ciater
a.m./6
p.m./6
evening/6
morning/7
morning/7
Pillbox
Machine Gun
Obstacles
Communication
Trench
⁄1600 5
⁄1730 5
⁄1400 6
malaya airfield (eighty kilometers southeast of Bandung). On that day, a total of twenty-five
aircraft of the fighter plane unit and a total of sixty-five aircraft of the assault plane and the
light bomber units of the Endō Air Division directly supported the Shōji Detachment, and a
total of fourteen aircraft of the light bomber unit attacked Bandung. On that day (the 7th),
when the Shōji Detachment pursued [the Bandung Garrison] from the ridgeline of the Ban-
dung stronghold to the city of Bandung with the support of the Endō Air Division and made
the Bandung Garrison surrender, Air Division Commander Endō received a telegram from
the Sixteenth Army, saying: “Because the Sixteenth Army will rapidly divert the 2d Division
and attack the Bandung stronghold with the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment together,
it requests on that occasion an air strike on Bandung on 10 March.”(96, 98, 99)
(4) The Surrender of the Dutch East Indies Army
The Meeting with the Governor-General and His Party
Late at night on the 7th (after 0000 on the 8th), the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters in Batavia
learned that “at 2230 on the 7th, an offer of surrender [was made] to the Shōji Detachment.”
It immediately wired to Detachment Commander Shōji, saying: “(1) The meeting shall be
held at the Isola Hotel in Bandung at 1000 on the 8th; (2) See to it that not only Major General
Pesman but also Governor-General [Tjarda van] Starkenborgh [Stachouwer], and Lieutenant
General Ter Poorten, commander of the Dutch East Indies Army (chief of the Dutch East In-
dies Army Department) attend the meeting.” But soon after that, [the army headquarters]
changed it, and wired [again] that [the detachment] should pass the message that (1) the time
and venue of the meeting should be changed to 1400 on the 8th at Kalijati, and that (2) if the
governor-general of the Dutch East Indies and the Dutch East Indies Army commander
would come to the said place at the said time accompanied by the necessary staff officers
and meet the commander of the Japanese Army to directly offer a cease-fire, [they would be]
instantly [informed of] the decision of whether it would be accepted or not, and that their
safety on the way [to Kalijati] and back within the area occupied by [the Japanese] would be
guaranteed.(35, 98)
Army Commander Imamura planned to steer the offer of surrender from the commander
of the Bandung sector to the surrender of all the allied forces in the Dutch East Indies. He
gave a direct order to Staff Officer Saiki to depart and convey to 2d Division Commander
Maruyama the message that “the enemy is starting to lose its fighting spirit,” and that “the
shift of the 2d Division needs to be carried out as quickly as possible in order to take advan-
tage of this opportunity,” while he himself decided to advance to Kalijati with Staff Officer
Okazaki and the other staff by 1400.(34, 35)
At 0800, Staff Officer Saiki left Batavia, arrived in Buitenzorg at 0900, and delivered the
message to 2d Division Commander Maruyama.(34) At that time, the situation of the 2d Divi-
sion was as follows:
1. The 2d Division, which had seized Buitenzorg on the morning of the 6th and received [Sixteenth]
Army order(s) that evening to shift to the northern front of the Bandung stronghold with its
main force, decided to [first] shift to the Purwakarta area with its main force. It gave order(s) to
the Nasu Detachment (from which the reconnaissance regiment, the Fukushima Regiment and
the Endō Battalion were removed, and to which the main force of the Sasaki Battalion was newly
added at 0800 on the 7th) to pursue the enemy at its front while advancing toward the direction
of Bandung and gain a footing as widely as possible so as to have an advantage in subsequent
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engagements. [Editor’s note: On p. 496 the Endō Battalion is called the Watanabe Battalion.] To
the Satō Detachment (to which the Endō [Watanabe?] Battalion would be returned from the
Nasu Detachment) it gave orders to prepare in Batavia and vicinity for the advance toward Pur-
wakarta; to the Noguchi Detachment (whose assignment to the Nasu Detachment was lifted,
and to which one element of the Sasaki Battalion was added at 0800 on the 7th) it gave orders
to prepare in Buitenzorg for the advance toward Purwakarta. It [further] gave order(s) to the
Fukushima Detachment (whose assignment to the Nasu Detachment would be lifted) to prepare
in the area between Buitenzorg and Leuwiliang for the advance toward Purwakarta.(59)
2. The Nasu Detachment (which had seized Buitenzorg on the morning of the 6th) had sent one
company in advance, leaving Buitenzorg at 1700 on the 6th for Cipayung and vicinity, which
was located about ten kilometers southeast of Buitenzorg. It [also] separately had one platoon
rush along the Buitenzorg – Cibadak – Sukabumi road (a national road) to secure the railway,
and then had the 2d Battalion of the regiment (the Hiroyasu Regiment) pursue [the enemy]
along this area that night. However, the advance party encountered an allied unit in Cibadak
and vicinity (some thirty kilometers south of Buitenzorg), and sustained many casualties. This
[incident], along with the destroyed bridges, made [the detachment] give up the pursuit from
this direction and have [the advance party and the battalion] reverse course. The main force of
the detachment (which was reorganized and became [a unit of] a total of three battalions as the
core, consisting of the Onoguchi 2d Battalion and the Morozumi 3d Battalion of the Hiroyasu
Regiment, and the main force of the Sasaki Battalion, which had been the divisional reserve),
left Buitenzorg at 2100 on the 7th, and was advancing toward Ciranjang along the Puncak Pass
(some twenty-five kilometers southeast of Buitenzorg) – Ciranjang (forty kilometers west of
Bandung) road.(31, 61)
3. The Endō [Watanabe?] Battalion was returned to the Satō Detachment by the divisional order
of the 6th. The Fukushima Detachment had the Ikuta 1st Battalion leave Buitenzorg toward
Batavia by rail at 1330 on the 7th, while having its main force stand by in Buitenzorg.(58, 63)
Staff Officer Saiki told Division Commander Maruyama: “Army Commander Imamura has
strongly demanded that the 2d Division should complete its advance into the area north of
the Bandung stronghold within twenty-four hours.”(34)
At that time, Army Commander Imamura had left Batavia and was heading for Kalijati.
[Meanwhile,] Air Division Commander Endō in Kalijati had received a telegram with the
“request to suspend the bombing” at 0800, after which he learned that an offer of surrender
had been made to the Shōji Detachment on the previous night, and that a meeting between
the Sixteenth Army and the allied forces would be held at the Isola Hotel in Bandung at 1000
that day. Detachment Commander Shōji had dispatched Staff Officer Yamashita to the Isola
Hotel as military envoy.(75, 98)
Staff Officer Saiki, who had delivered the message to Divisional Commander Maruyama
at 0900, immediately reversed course and rushed to the Krawang bridge. Because the bridge
had been destroyed, there was an endless column of motor vehicles that had come to a stand-
still [before the bridge]. He caught up with Army Commander [Imamura] at the crossing
point in Krawang. The army commander was trying to build a raft with iron pontoons to
ferry the motor vehicles across the river.(34)
At that time, having learned that the venue of the meeting had been changed and that
the army commander had left Batavia, Air Divisional Commander Endō in Kalijati offered a
car to pick up the commander.(98)
In the meantime, Staff Officer Yamashita was negotiating with the Dutch East Indies side
at the Isola Hotel in Bandung. The Dutch East Indies side was reluctant to send the gover-
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nor-general and the other officials to Kalijati but agreed to it at last.(41, 75)
In the early afternoon, the governor-general of the Dutch East Indies and his party visited
in Lembang the headquarters of Shōji Detachment, which stood ready for combat, paid their
respects to Detachment Commander Shōji and headed for Kalijati.(75)
Around 1500, the governor-general of the Dutch East Indies and his party arrived in Kali-
jati. [3d] Air Division Commander Endō received them, saying: “We have accepted your offer
of a cease-fire in conformity with the Japanese code of the warrior. The commander of our
ground forces is due to arrive later. After conferring with him, we probably will make de-
mands. If you accept them, we will agree to a cease-fire; otherwise, we will probably bomb
Bandung right away with our aircraft, which are ready to be launched, as you can see.” Then
he let them wait.(98) After a while at 1600, [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura, Chief of
Staff Okazaki, and the other staff arrived.(33)
At 1800, Army Commander Imamura started the meeting.(33)
With Army Commander Imamura at the center, Chief of Staff Okazaki was seated at his
right and Air Division Commander Endō at his left; Bandung Area Garrison Commander
Major General Pesman, Governor-General Tjarda [van Starkenborgh Stachouwer], Army De-
partment Chief Lieutenant General Ter Poorten and Army Chief of Staff Major General
Bakkers were seated from right to left across the table. Staff Officer Okamura Masayuki of
[the Army Department of] IGHQ, who had accompanied [the Sixteenth Army] since the con-
voy left Cam Ranh Bay, [Sixteenth Army Senior] Staff Takashima Tatsuhiko, who was [just]
out of hospital on the 7th, and other staff were at the side near Chief of Staff Okazaki, while
Miyoshi Shunkichirō, attached to the Military Administration Department (who later became
consul), was at the side near Air Division Commander Endō as interpreter together with the
interpreter of the Dutch East Indies side.(13)
Army Commander Imamura asked the governor-general: “Do you represent all the forces,
officials, and people in the Dutch East Indies in the capacity of governor-general of the Dutch
East Indies?” “Yes,” the governor-general answered. Army Commander Imamura asked: “In
that case, can you, as you sit here, declare surrender or continuation of the war?” The gov-
ernor-general blanched, looked down, and after a while answered: “No, I cannot.” “Why?”
Army Commander Imamura asked. The governor-general answered: “As governor-general
of the Dutch East Indies, I had until recently the supreme command of the armed forces [of
the Dutch East Indies]. But when General Wavell became supreme commander of the allied
forces, I was simultaneously deprived of that prerogative by the order of the Queen.” [Then]
Army Commander Imamura turned to Army Commander Ter Poorten and asked: “How
about you?” The latter answered: “I don’t have such authority, either.” Army Commander
Imamura kept on asking: “In that case, what do you do as the chief of the Dutch East Indies
Army Department?” [Commander Ter Poorten] inconsistently answered: “I can command
the army.”(13)
Army Commander Imamura asked the governor-general and his party: “In that case, why
on earth did you gentlemen come here?” “We did not come of ourselves; you invited us,”
the governor-general answered. Army Commander Imamura asked: “If so, for what reason
did you offer a cease-fire by sending a bearer of a flag of truce yesterday, the 7th?” “We of-
fered a cease-fire to surrender the Bandung stronghold, because it is unbearable to further
expose Bandung to the devastations of the war,” the governor-general answered. Army Com-
mander Imamura continued, “Then, what do you think about surrendering the entire Dutch
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East Indies?” “That is impossible, because I don’t have such authority,” the governor-general
answered. Army Commander Imamura went on: “Do you mean you can make war but can-
not surrender?”
The governor-general answered: “Only the Queen can decide surrender. As we have no
means of communication to petition the Queen for permission to surrender, we can do noth-
ing.” Army Commander Imamura said, “We are at war with each other at the moment. This
is not a place to conduct diplomatic negotiations. We are here only to discuss a capitulation
or the continuation of the war. In such a discussion, we cannot deal with you,” and sent all
non-military persons out of the room.(13)
After the governor-general had left the room, Army Commander Imamura asked Army
Commander Ter Poorten: “Do you surrender, even if the governor-general disapproves?”
Army Commander Ter Poorten said: “The state of Bandung and vicinity is too pitiful to look
at. Bandung has become completely defenseless and the army has as good as disbanded. It
is utterly unbearable to force the citizens into the horrors of war any further. I will surrender
a considerably wide area of Bandung. Will you accept that?” Army Commander Imamura
said: “The surrender of Bandung does not matter to the Japanese Army. Just seizing Bandung
is quite easy for the elite troops of the Japanese Army. If surrendering is that impossible for
you, it is futile to parley any further. I will make it clear to you once again for the last time.
The Japanese Army demands your overall and unconditional surrender. If you cannot accept
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The Surrender Talks at Kalijati
it, leave now, and we shall promptly reopen hostilities and resort to force until the Dutch
East Indies Army is destroyed. If you should have the intention to surrender totally and un-
conditionally, you must personally [address] the whole Dutch East Indies Army [through
the radio] at the Bandung broadcasting station at 1200 tomorrow, the 9th, and give an order
that the army shall stop all resistance after 1200 and that each regional unit shall surrender
to the Japanese Army in its area. Our demands shall be read out to you now. You had better
memorize them accurately and think them over.” [Sixteenth] Army Chief of Staff Okazaki
read out the demands. Army Commander Ter Poorten wrote his signature on the [Japanese]
demands. It was 1950. Then, Army Commander Imamura continued: “For your reference, I
will give you this [list of] our demands regarding the cease-fire. If you decide on an uncon-
ditional surrender, come here again, after broadcasting [the order of] cessation of hostilities
to the whole Dutch East Indies Army tomorrow, to conclude the arrangements and agree-
ments concerning the surrender.” “What time should I come tomorrow?” Army Commander
Ter Poorten asked. Army Commander Imamura answered: “We shall meet again at 1520. Just
to make sure: if we cannot hear your radio address from Bandung here at 1200, it will mean
that the Japanese Army will resume the attacks and the bombardments by the air units will
also be resumed. If you understand what I mean, please go back to Bandung for the time
being. We will safely show you to the first line of the stronghold.”(13)
Thus, the first talks were over. The governor-general and his party took their leave at
2000.
That night, the Shōji Detachment still stayed up all night in Lembang and vicinity in a
position of combat-readiness.(75) The Nasu Detachment ([consisting of] three battalions as the
core) rushed and advanced into Cimahi (eight kilometers west-northwest of Bandung) late
at night (at 0200 on the 9th). At that time, the Sasaki Battalion, at the rearmost end of the de-
tachment, was still midway between Buitenzorg and Leuwiliang. It was decided that the
Nasu Detachment should prepare and be ready to attack Bandung, while gathering its
strength in Cimahi.(59, 61) In the sector of the main force of the 2d Division, there was no
prospect [yet] for the reconstruction of the bridge at Krawang, and many motor vehicles re-
mained at a standstill. Particularly, because the Satō Detachment, which had commandeered
many motor vehicles (including passenger cars) in Batavia, was at the head of the column, it
blocked the road. The detachment remained [stuck] west of Krawang along the Batavia –
Krawang road (until 0100 on the 10th).(63) The Fukushima Detachment had the 1st Battalion
leave Buitenzorg for Batavia by rail at 1300 on the 7th, while the main force followed the bat-
talion by rail [leaving] at 0930 on the 8th. It got off at the Manggarai Station (south of Batavia)
at 1130, and advanced in commandeered automobiles and on bicycles along the Batavia–
Cibarusa (about thirty-five kilometers southeast of Batavia) – Krawang road,(58) (and arrived
in Krawang at 1400 on the 9th).
Broadcast of the Surrender and the Second Meeting
On the 9th, Air Division Commander Endō had intimidation flights conducted from the
morning onwards.(98) The Sixteenth Army command post in Kalijati grew tired of waiting for
the advance of the commander of the 2d Division. Before noon, the 2d Division commander
arrived [at last]. At 1200, the Dutch East Indies side made the following broadcast:
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The Japanese Army succeeded in breaking through into the intermountain area of Bandung. It
has taken complete command of the air, which made it impossible for us to put up resistance
for long in the intermountain area of Bandung. Therefore, we had no choice but to hold cease-
fire negotiations.
The Japanese Army demanded prompt talks with our governor-general and me. In these
talks, the Japanese Army commander made the following demands on 8 March:
1. Our overall surrender.
2. A prompt discontinuance of all hostilities.
3. The raising of white flags as a proof of our overall surrender.
4. All forces shall be disarmed and handed over. For this purpose, after disarmament, units in po-
sitions shall assemble at clearly visible places, and other units in barracks. Collected weapons
and ammunition shall be gathered and put under supervision.
5. The demands stated in Items 1 to 4 shall be completed by 1200 on 9 March.
6. Bodies identified as Japanese military, goods of [Japanese] prisoners of war, and deceased and
living Japanese residents shall be promptly handed over.
7. Any kind of destruction is prohibited. For example, the destruction of war materials, weapons,
ammunition, roads or traffic structures is forbidden.
8. Communication with foreign countries is prohibited.
9. The operations of the Japanese Army shall be continued.
10. If the above demands are not met, attacks will be immediately resumed. In order to ensure [com-
pliance with] the demands, armed patrol units necessary to maintain public order shall be
formed and provided with a certain amount of weapons and ammunition. These patrol units
need to be supervised by officers as much as possible. The patrol units shall be made distin-
guishable by a white armband and a white flag.
After due consideration, I finally had no option but to meet these stipulated demands. I
order you to suspend the current hostilities and obey the above-mentioned demands.
When you have received this order, or when you have been contacted by the Japanese Army
commander, I ask you to communicate or broadcast [this] through the available radio commu-
nication facilities and broadcasting stations, on every whole hour and every thirty minutes start-
ing at 0900 until 1200.
This order applies also to the Navy and all directors of customs.
Major General Pesman, on behalf of the Chief of the Dutch East Indies Army Department
[Editor’s note: Item 6 of the above is unclear. One would expect it to read: “prisoners of war and
their goods …” The introduction and ending of the broadcast were apparently translated from
the Dutch broadcast into Japanese. There are some differences, which I have indicated in italics
below:
After due consideration and with deep regret, I finally had no option but to meet these stipulated
demands for the sake of land and people [of the Dutch East Indies]. I order you to suspend the current
hostilities, obey the above-mentioned demands, and contact the highest Japanese commander in or
near your sector.
I ask you, starting at 0900 Java time and thereafter every whole and half hour until 1200, to commu-
nicate by means of the available radio, telegraph, or broadcasting facilities the reception of this order and
when you have established contact with the highest Japanese commander [in or near your sector].
This order applies also to the Royal Navy, the Dutch East Indies Navy, and all harbor masters.]
At that time, the positions of the [Japanese] units were as follows:(53)
Shōji Detachment: in Lembang (since the evening of the 7th)
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Nasu Detachment: in Cimahi (since 0200 on the 9th)
2d Division commander: in Kalijati (since before noon of the 9th)
Satō Detachment: in Krawang (since the night of the 7th)
Fukushima Detachment: near Cibarusa, about thirty kilometers southwest of Krawang
(marching toward Krawang)
At 1430 (on the 9th), earlier than demanded, Army Commander (Army Department Chief)
Ter Poorten and his party showed up at Kalijati again. The talks were resumed at 1440. It
was felt that Lieutenant General Ter Poorten was faithfully implementing the cease-fire
process. At 1450, the signing of the instruments of surrender was completed. Army Com-
mander Imamura permitted him to keep wearing his sword. Lieutenant General Ter Poorten
left Kalijati accompanied by 2d Division Commander Maruyama.(33, 34, 98).
Around 1800, Army Commander Imamura left Kalijati, and arrived in Lembang around
2100, where he established his command post.(34)
Triumphal Entry into Bandung and Citations of Merit
On the early morning of the 9th, the Sixteenth Army had decided on a plan that it would let
the 2d Division commander make a triumphal entry into Bandung together with and leading
the Shōji Detachment. However, as the 2d Division commander arrived late in Kalijati as pre-
viously mentioned, Detachment Commander Shōji entered Bandung by the order of Army
Commander Imamura at 1500 on the 9th (the time when the second meeting at Kalijati was
over) and began the work of requisitioning.(75) When the 2d Division commander, who left
Kalijati around the same time, arrived in Bandung, the Shōji Detachment had already entered
the city of Bandung. On the morning of the 10th, the 2d Division commander told Detach-
ment Commander Shōji that the detachment had been put under the command of the divi-
sion at 1200 on the 9th, and had the main force of the detachment withdrawn from the city
of Bandung, except for one battalion that was left behind.(75) Then, the 2d Division com-
mander had one battalion of the Nasu Detachment enter [the city] at 1600. Detachment Com-
mander Satō arrived in Lembang at 2400 that day (the 10th), and Detachment Commander
Fukushima arrived in Subang at 1700 that day (the 10th).(31, 53)
[Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura, who had been positioned in Lembang the night
before, left Lembang at 1630 that day (the 10th), entered Bandung at 1700, had a meeting
with the 2d Division commander, and then attended dinner at the mess.(34) Staff Officer Yano
of the Sakaguchi Detachment, whom he had not seen since they had parted in Moji, was
[also] present at the mess, and reported on the capture of Davao, Jolo, Balikpapan and Ban-
jarmasin, the landing in Kragan, and the progress of the seizure of Cilacap.(87)
Army Commander Imamura presented the following citation of merit to the Shōji De-
tachment:(13)
Citation of Merit
The Shōji Unit, the units attached to it and those posted to it
The above units landed in the face of the enemy in Eretan and vicinity in March 1942, several
times crushed persistent enemy attacks conducted by air and land, unremittingly pursued the
enemy, and seized the Kalijati airfield and the surrounding area as early as noon on the same
day, and thus enabled [the army] to gain command of the air. They also cut off the communica-
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tion between Batavia and Bandung, broke through a corner of the Bandung stronghold with
the support of the Endō Air Unit on the afternoon of the 5th, and thus provided a prime factor
in the overall surrender of the enemy. The above operations were courageous, resourceful and
extremely opportune; their military merit is outstanding. We present here this citation of merit
and proclaim it to the whole army.
21 March, 1942
Imamura Hitoshi, Commander of the Army in the Dutch East Indies Theater
The [Army] Third Air Force Commander Sugawara presented the Endō Air Division with
the following citation of merit, and proclaimed its distinguished military service.(13)
Citation of Merit
The 3d Air Division and the units attached to the division
With the Palembang airfield as their base, the 3d Air Division and the units attached to it, under
the command of the 3d Air Division commander, destroyed the superior enemy air power in
western Java with a small force, overcoming every kind of difficulty. In the landing [operations]
of the Sixteenth Army in western Java, they willingly took charge of attacking enemy warships,
covered the convoy of the main force of the army and thus facilitated the landing. Upon the
seizure of the Kalijati airfield by the Shōji Unit, they fearlessly advanced their base there without
missing opportunities, eliminated the persistent enemy counterattacks by air and land, and
boldly and actively secured the dominant position all the time by destroying the remaining
enemy aircraft and supporting the ground forces in their advance, which completely shattered
the enemy’s will to put up resistance, and eventually led to the overall surrender of the Dutch
East Indies in a very short period. Of course, their military gains were great, but their achieve-
ments, which contributed to the operational direction of the entire army, were indeed even
greater; their military merit is outstanding. Therefore, we here award this citation of merit.
12 March 1942
[Army] Third Air Force Commander Sugawara Michiō
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4. The Operations of the Sakaguchi Detachment
Operation Plan (See Illustration No. 61)
Of the Sakaguchi Detachment, which had seized Banjarmasin on 10 February and whose
participation in the Java operation had been approved on the 15th, [the unit consisting of]
the 3d Battalion (commander, Lt. Col. Matsumoto Tadasu) as the core and led by Col. Ya-
mamoto Kyōhei, commander of the 146th Infantry Regiment, was positioned at that time in
Banjarmasin; the detachment headquarters and [the unit consisting of] the 2d Battalion (com-
mander, Maj. Kanauji Ken’ichi) as the core was in Balikpapan; and [the unit consisting of]
the 1st Battalion (commander, Lt. Col. Kume Motozō) was in the Samarinda area, while of
its ships the Ehime-maru and the Liverpool-maru were at Balikpapan, and the others at Palau.(88)
On the 16th, the detachment commander passed down his orders concerning the partic-
ipation in the Java operation and embarked along with the 1st echelon ([the unit] consisting
of the headquarters, the 2d Battalion, the armored vehicle unit and the main force of the field
artillery battalion as the core) on the Ehime-maru and the Liverpool-maru. At 0700 on the 22d,
he left Balikpapan to join the convoy of the 48th Division.(88) [Editor’s note: On p. 445 the de-
parture time mentioned was 0800.] The Teiryū-maru and the Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru] under
the command of [Army] Maj. Takagi Takeo (the commander of the 44th Field Antiaircraft Ar-
tillery Battalion), which carried the personnel and goods left in Palau, arrived in Balikpapan
at 1100 on the 22d, then departed from the port at 0600 on the 24th, and joined the convoy at
0800 that day.(88) [Editor’s note: There is some confusion about when these ships joined the
convoy. Based on the same original sources, the 23d is given as the date on pp. 445–446, while
on pp. 449–450 the 24th is given as the date and 1600 as the time.] [The unit, consisting of]
the 146th Infantry Regiment (minus the 1st Battalion (minus one company) and the 2d Bat-
talion) and one field artillery battery as the core, under the command of Colonel Yamamoto,
was to catch up as the 2d echelon on the Sagami-maru and the Sasako-maru, which would be
brought around after the Bali operation, but because only the Sasako-maru came, [the unit]
left Banjarmasin on this ship on the 26th, and joined the convoy that day.(119) [Editor’s note:
The Sagami-maru had been severely damaged in the Bali operation. See p. 401.] Because the
date of the landing on Java was postponed twice, these units could fortunately each time still
join the convoy. However, the Sasako-maru, which had sustained damage in the Bali operation,
was not so fast as to be called a high-speed ship anymore. With her speed decreased to five
knots, she could not keep up [with the other ships] during their rapid progress on the 28th
and arrived in Kragan one day behind.(88, 119)
As we have seen, the mission of the Sakaguchi Detachment was to land in Kragan under
the direction of the 48th Division commander, charge toward Cilacap through the sector west
of [the line connecting] Mt. Lasem and Mt. Lawu, and seize the city. After securing the beach-
head, the 48th Division was expected to seize Rembang and Ngawi in the sector of the Sak-
aguchi Detachment, and take over Blora from the Sakaguchi Detachment.
Located between Kragan and Cilacap were Surakarta, the capital of the principality of
Solo, and Yogyakarta, the capital of the principality of Yogya; the area north of Surakarta was
an extensive plain with the Solo River flowing northeastward and the Serang River north-
westward. Semarang was a strategic port, and Magelang was the garrison city of the central
territorial command of the Dutch East Indies.
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It seemed highly unlikely that the allied forces would counterattack the landing point in
Kragan with their main force. Blora was suitable as a jumping-off base to be used after Kra-
gan. Purwodadi was located at a pivotal point to fan out from between Semarang, Magelang
and Surakarta.
Having left the Kume Detachment in Borneo ([to be precise] leaving one infantry company
with one gun in Tenggarong and vicinity, one infantry company in Banjarmasin, and the
main force in Balikpapan under the command of 1st Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Kume
Motozō), the Sakaguchi Detachment was to conduct the Java operation only with the remain-
ing force of slightly more than two battalions.(88) [To hide its true size,] the detachment hit
upon the idea to (1) make its strength for the Java operation look like one division, and for
that purpose divide the detachment into three echelons, each with a strength of a little less
than three companies, and make each [echelon] look like a regiment; (2) make it a point to
charge ahead by motor vehicle; and (3) safely secure the various facilities.(87) And thus it
planned its operations roughly in the following way:(88)
Outline of the Sakaguchi Detachment’s [operation to] seize central Java (23 February)
I. Mission
(1) The Detachment shall land in the area east of Kragan along with the 48th Division, then
assemble in Blora and vicinity and in a rapid attack by way of Surakarta, Yogyakarta,
Magelang, Wonosobo and the southern foot of Mt. Slamet, seize Cilacap by storm and
cut off the escape route of the enemy from the direction of Batavia and Bandung.
(2) After that, the detachment shall mop up the remaining enemy and clean up the key areas
in central Java in concert with the divisions in the adjacent sectors [i.e. the 2d Division
in western Java and the 48th Division in eastern Java]. Depending on the situation, it
may participate in [the operation to] seize Bandung.
II. Directives
1. First Phase
(3) The 1st echelon shall depart from Balikpapan and the 2d echelon from Banjarmasin, and
each of them shall land in Kragan under the direction of the 48th Division commander.
(4) After landing in Kragan and vicinity, the detachment shall promptly seize Blora with the
unit consisting of the Kanauji Echelon as the core, and have [the echelon] gather infor-
mation and secure an advance base. The detachment shall promptly advance the detach-
ment command post there. The 48th Division shall seize Rembang and Ngawi with one
element.
(5) After having essentially finished assembling in Blora and vicinity (scheduled for day
three after the landing), the main force of the detachment, with the Matsumoto Echelon
at the head and followed by the Yamamoto and the Kanauji Echelons in that order, shall
rush toward Surakarta along the Blora – Purwodadi – Surakarta road and seize the city.
As the seizure of Surakarta will be the first [major] engagement on the main island of
Java for the detachment, it shall put particular emphasis on the total elimination of the
enemy. For this purpose, it shall keep focused on the area west of the road and carry out
the attack with great speed so as to cut off the escape routes of the enemy.
(6) After seizing Surakarta, the detachment shall have one element (the Kanauji Echelon)
swiftly advance in the direction of Yogyakarta, while having the main force destroy the
[enemy] position at the northern foot of Mt. Merbabu in a sudden attack from the south
without missing an opportunity, then reverse course to seize Yogyakarta, and then at
one go seize the [enemy] barracks in Magelang from the south. In this [attack on Mage-
lang], the detachment shall have one element of the Matsumoto Echelon contain the
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enemy in Magelang from the north and the east. Depending on the situation, the detach-
ment shall seize Magelang without attacking the [enemy] position at the northern foot
of Mt. Merbabu. Magelang shall be seized on day six after the landing. After seizing Yo-
gyakarta, the detachment shall have one element closely pursue the enemy via Wates
toward Kutoarjo.
(7) After seizing Magelang, the detachment shall leave one element (one infantry company)
there, advance via Wonosobo to the southern foot of Mt. Slamet and Purwokerto and
vicinity by crossing the Serayu River as far upriver as possible, and expel the enemy
from the highland to the north of Cilacap. After seizing the area, the detachment shall
seize an opportunity to charge into Cilacap and secure the city. In this [action], [the de-
tachment] shall also seize and secure the enemy battery on the cape south of Cilacap
with one element by using [landing] craft. The seizure of Cilacap is scheduled on day
ten after the landing at the latest.
(8) Disembarked military supplies shall successively be accumulated in Magelang via
Surakarta and Yogyakarta.
(9) During the operations of this phase, support by one element of the naval air unit is ex-
pected.
(10) The theater of operations of the detachment is the area west of [the line connecting] Mt.
Lasem and Mt. Lawu.
2. Second Phase
(11) After seizing Cilacap and eliminating the enemy escaping from Bandung and Batavia,
the detachment shall promptly shift its main force to Magelang and vicinity, successively
seize the key coastal areas of Java, such as Semarang, Pekalongan and Tegal, and mop
up [the enemy] there in a timely manner.
(12) Depending on the progress of [the operation] of the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army
to seize Bandung, [the detachment] shall anticipate sending a powerful unit to that area,
and prepare for it.
3. Disposition of forces
Kanauji Echelon (Commander: Maj. Kanauji Ken’ichi) 
Illustration No. 61 — Overview of the Operation Plan of the Sakaguchi Detachment
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2d Battalion (minus one company and one platoon) of the 146th Infantry Regiment
One regimental gun platoon (minus one squad)
One antitank gun squad
Two mortars
3d Field Artillery Battery (two guns), as the core
Eight trucks
Matsumoto Echelon (Commander: Lt. Col. Matsumoto Tadasu)
3d Battalion (minus one company and one platoon) of the 146th Infantry Regiment
One regimental gun squad
One antitank gun platoon (minus one squad)
Two mortars
1st Field Artillery Battery (two guns), as the core
Eight trucks
Yamamoto Echelon (Commander: Col. Yamamoto Kyōhei)
Headquarters and three companies of the 146th Infantry Regiment
Regimental gun company (minus one section)
Antitank gun company (minus one platoon)
Field artillery battalion headquarters and one field artillery section, as the core
Seven trucks
Unit under the direct command of the headquarters
Headquarters
One infantry platoon
Armored vehicle unit
Transport company
Line-of-communication motor transport company, as the core 
Implementation of the Operation (See Illustration No. 62)
The 1st Echelon [Kanauji], being at the rear of the 48th Division, beat off persistent attacks
by allied aircraft from the night of 28 February onwards and entered the anchorage at 0230
on 1 March. It started landing at a point six kilometers southeast of Kragan (to the left of the
48th Division) at 0700.(88) The Kanauji Echelon departed [from the landing point] without
delay and seized Blora at 2000, from where about one battalion of the Dutch East Indies Army
had just retreated, and began to gather information. The 2d Echelon (the Sasako-maru) entered
the anchorage one day behind. The Yamamoto and the Matsumoto Echelon landed at 1230
on the 2d, departed at 2200, and reached Blora before dawn on the 3d. Meanwhile, the de-
tachment commander had landed on the afternoon of the 1st and immediately advanced to
Blora. The Kanauji Echelon turned over [the guarding of] Blora to the 48th Division on the
2d, departed [from the town] at 1500, drove away twenty to thirty troops of the Dutch East
Indies Army in Ngawen and seized Purwodadi at 0330 on the 3d. The detachment com-
mander decided to advance his force to Purwodadi in succession and assemble them there
in preparation for the seizure of Surakarta. After giving orders at 0800 on the 3d in Blora to
the Matsumoto and the Yamamoto Echelon to depart [from the town] in that order, he left
Blora at 1300 on the same day, and advanced to Purwodadi.(31, 88)
Detachment Commander [Sakaguchi] concluded in Purwodadi that the allied units in Se-
marang and Magelang had no intention to take the offensive toward Bugel [Godong] and
Salatiga, and decided to attack the allied units in Surakarta and vicinity the next day, the 4th,
to capture and eliminate them. At 1500 on the 3d, he ordered to the Kanauji Echelon (to which
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an armored vehicle unit was attached up to its arrival in Bugel [Godong] and the 2d Transport
Company from there onwards) to quickly advance to Bugel [Godong], and after containing
the allied units ([consisting of] about 600 [troops]) in the Semarang area, leave Bugel [Godong]
at 0900 on the 4th and advance to the sector east of Klaten via the Juwangi – Karanggede –
Boyolali road to cut off the escape route [of the enemy]. [Then,] he gave orders to the Mat-
sumoto Echelon (to which an armored vehicle unit was attached) to leave Purwodadi at 1200
on the 4th to attack the allied unit in Surakarta via the Purwodadi–Surakarta road. Also, he
ordered the Yamamoto Echelon to assemble in Purwodadi as swiftly as possible on the next
day, the 4th.(87, 88)
The Kanauji Echelon left Purwodadi at 1850 on the 3d and seized Bugel [Godong] at 1950,
driving away about thirty troops of the Dutch East Indies Army. After containing the allied
unit in the Semarang area, it left [Bugel/Godong] at 0800 on the 4th to head southwestward.
The Matsumoto Echelon left Blora at 0300 on the 4th, reached Purwodadi at 0600, and left
the town at 1200, to head south.(31) At 0900 on the 4th in Purwodadi, Detachment Commander
[Sakaguchi] ordered the Yamamoto Echelon to depart after 1400, advance along the Pur-
wodadi – Surakarta road to the west of Surakarta and cut off the escape routes [of the enemy].
He also ordered the echelon to take over the armored vehicle unit from the Matsumoto Ech-
elon after advancing to Kalioso, and to bring the Kanauji Echelon under its command as well
after advancing to the west of Surakarta.(88) The detachment commander was going to leave
Purwodadi for Surakarta at 1700.(88)
However, the Matsumoto Echelon’s southward advance was fraught with difficulties be-
cause the road and bridges along the Purwodadi – Surakarta road had been destroyed at many
places. At 1500 (on the 4th) in Purwodadi, Detachment Commander [Sakaguchi] changed
his mind and had the main force of the detachment advance at the rear of the Kanauji Echelon
[instead of the Matsumoto Echelon] to the west of Surakarta to capture and crush the allied
units in the vicinity. [So,] he ordered that the Yamamoto Echelon should advance at the rear
of the Kanauji Echelon to the west of Surakarta to cut off the escape route(s) [of the enemy],
but that the previous order concerning the command of the Kanauji Echelon should stay as
it was, and that the headquarters should head for Boyolali, [also] following the course of the
Kanauji Echelon.(87, 88)
At 1830 on the 4th, the Yamamoto Echelon left Purwodadi.(31) The Matsumoto Echelon
went southward beyond the (two) bridges destroyed by the allied unit. It drove away a Dutch
East Indies Army unit consisting of twenty to thirty men accompanied by armored vehicles
north of Surakarta at 0055 on the 5th, advanced to the front of an [enemy] position to the
north of Surakarta ([guarded by] 200 to 300 troops) at 0135, launched a charge at 0615 on the
5th, and seized Surakarta ([guarded by] a Dutch East Indies Army unit totaling 700 to 800
troops).(31)
The road and bridges on the route of the Kanauji Echelon, which headed southwestward
to the west of the Matsumoto Echelon, had been destroyed everywhere, while felled trees
also blocked the road. In spite of these difficulties, the echelon advanced and seized Boyolali
at 1130 on the 5th, driving away about one hundred troops of a Dutch East Indies Army
unit.(31, 87)
The detachment headquarters, which was following the Kanauji Echelon, spotted a small
number of Dutch East Indies troops heading westward from Surakarta in total disarray. The
headquarters changed its plan without delay, decided to seize Yogyakarta at a stroke, and
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ordered the Kanauji Echelon to charge toward Yogyakarta, taking a short cut. The echelon
left Boyolali at 1230 and rushed ahead. The detachment headquarters followed it traveled at
a speed of over 100 kilometers per hour and rushed into Yogyakarta at 1730. The charge took
place when the garrison commander of the Dutch East Indies Army there was just about to
give orders concerning the defense [of the city] to the 700 men under him, all of whom were
taken prisoner.(31, 87)
The effective strength of the allied forces had become clear. This was the opportunity to
take the offensive. Detachment Commander Sakaguchi (assisted by Staff Officer Yano)
changed the operation plan, decided to closely pursue the enemy by covering the long dis-
tance along the coastal road to Cilacap at one go with the main force led by Regimental Com-
mander Yamamoto, while he himself, leading one element, would subdue Magelang, the
garrison city of the central territorial command. He passed down the following order:(88)
SAKA [Sakaguchi Detachment] Operation Order A, No. 37
Sakaguchi Detachment Order Yogyakarta, 2100, 5 March
1. The enemy in Yogyakarta has surrendered unconditionally. The defeated enemy is retreating to
the west and the north without restraint.
2. The detachment shall closely pursue the defeated enemy and promptly seize Cilacap and Mage-
lang.
3. Echelon Commander Yamamoto shall hotly pursue the defeated enemy, promptly seize Cilacap,
and cut off the escape route of the enemy. He shall take command of the Kanauji Echelon as de-
cided before.
The armored vehicle unit and one platoon of the 259th Independent Motor Transport Com-
pany shall be removed [from the echelon]. They shall promptly be sent to Surakarta.
4. The Matsumoto Echelon shall leave Surakarta on the morning of tomorrow, the 6th, and
promptly seize Magelang by way of Yogyakarta, while hotly pursuing the enemy.
The armored vehicle unit and one platoon of the 259th Independent Motor Transport Com-
pany shall be attached to the echelon at Surakarta.
5. – 7. (Omitted by the author.)
8. I am in Yogyakarta. I will advance toward Surakarta at 2300 today.
Detachment Commander Sakaguchi Shizuo
It was decided to let only a captain, a noncommissioned officer and one private deal with
the 700 prisoners in Yogyakarta.(87) Detachment commander [Sakaguchi] waited for Regi-
mental Commander Yamamoto to report, but since the latter did not show up, the detach-
ment commander left Yogyakarta at 2300 as scheduled and made a U-turn to Surakarta(87) in
order to give instructions concerning Surakarta after its seizure as well as to send the Mat-
sumoto Echelon to Magelang. He arrived in Surakarta after a long drive at night to find the
Yamamoto Echelon busy preparing in their mess tins two meals, one for that evening and
the other for the next day. The echelon explained that it had acted as previously ordered and
that it had arrived in Surakarta at 1730.(87) The detachment commander ordered [the echelon]
to immediately start [for Cilacap]. The Yamamoto Echelon left Surakarta in the middle of the
night (at 0100 on the 6th).(31)
The Yamamoto Echelon reached Yogyakarta at 0600 on the 6th, and left there without a
break to follow the Kanauji Echelon.
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[The echelon] charged ahead while driving away about one hundred troops of a Dutch
East Indies Army unit in Purworejo at 1230, about one hundred in Kebumen at 1620, and an-
other one hundred in Gombong, and advanced into Maos in the evening, where it stopped
because the bridge [there] had been destroyed. On that day, the 6th, the distances that the
Kanauji and the Yamamoto Echelon covered were respectively about 170 kilometers and
about 220 kilometers. The Kanauji Echelon had traveled about one hundred kilometers on
average day in and day out since the landing. The drivers alternately stood and sat behind
the wheel and some crashed their cars on a straight road. It was because driving without rest
or sleep day after day dazed their eyes, and when the car ahead suddenly loomed straight
in front, they cut the steering wheel in panic [and crashed]. Many drivers got sweat rashes
because they gripped their steering wheels too tightly to wipe off their sweat. In that way,
on that evening (the 6th) they reached the Serayu River, where Cilacap was seen at a calling
distance. Unfortunately, the bridge had been destroyed, which meant that they had to set
about preparing to cross the river.(31, 87)
The Matsumoto Echelon, which was to head for Magelang, left Surakarta that morning
(of the 6th), and via Yogyakarta advanced to the front of the [enemy] position in Magelang
in the evening. Accompanied by the detachment headquarters, [the echelon] started its attack
at 1715, against which an allied unit fought back with fierce gunfire. The Matsumoto Echelon
had prepared itself for a hard battle all the more because Magelang was a garrison town.
[However,] before long, the gunfire of the allied unit ceased abruptly. From a precedent at
Tarakan, Staff Officer Yano judged that it meant surrender, and headed for the town of Mage-
lang with three men in a single captured armored vehicle. They kept advancing in spite of a
heavy squall, which struck them just then, and all of a sudden they came upon an envoy of
the garrison army (a lieutenant colonel), who was approaching them holding a white flag.
The lieutenant colonel asked them to stop the attack because the garrison army was surren-
dering. They put him in the armored car and entered Magelang. Before long, [Infantry] Group
Commander Sakaguchi also arrived. Having been told that the troops of the Japanese Army
sent to this front were just one element and that the main force was advancing toward Se-
marang and Ambarawa, the garrison commander said that he would see to it that the Dutch
East Indies Army in those areas would also surrender. In reality, there were no [Japanese]
troops heading for those areas. Without delay, the detachment commander hurriedly sent
one platoon to those areas along with an officer of the Dutch East Indies Army. In this way,
[the detachment commander] was able to have within that night 1,700 officers and men in-
cluding Colonel Fleischer of the Dutch East Indies Army in the city of Magelang, 600 in Se-
marang, 200 in Salatiga, 160 in Ambarawa, and 70 in Temanggung surrender.(31, 87) At 1900,
the detachment commander gave the following order:(88)
SAKA [Sakaguchi Detachment] Operation Order A, No. 38
Sakaguchi Detachment Order Magelang, 1900, 6 March
1. The enemy has surrendered unconditionally.
2. The detachment shall push all the harder to capture [the remaining areas].
3. The Matsumoto Echelon shall park at the car assembly point at the north end of Magelang and
after finishing refitting the vehicles of the unit, at one go secure the bridge in Banjarnegara.
4. I shall advance at the rear of the Matsumoto Echelon.
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At daybreak (on the morning of the 7th), the Matsumoto Echelon resumed its rapid advance.
It drove away fifty troops of a Dutch East Indies Army unit in Wonosobo, then attacked 160
troops in the evening, and entered Banjarnegara at night. It left the town on the morning of
the next day, the 8th, passed through Bukateja, where the bridge had been destroyed, at 1045,
and reached Purbalingga at 1215. The bridge [there] had been destroyed [as well]. There the
detachment commander learned that [his detachment] had successfully seized Cilacap at
1240 on that day, the 8th.(31, 87)
On the evening of the 6th, the Kanauji Echelon, which had advanced to Maos at the bank
of the Serayu River, defeated some 150 troops of a Dutch East Indies Army unit equipped
with armored vehicles, and reconnoitered the area of Maos along the upper and the lower
reaches of the Serayu River, [only] to find that all the bridges had been destroyed. [Conse-
quently,] it made preparations to cross the river from the evening of the 6th to the evening
of the 7th, crossed the river at 2000 on the 7th, and charged into Cilacap at 0340 on the 8th.
The Yamamoto Echelon, which had followed the above echelon, also arrived in Cilacap at
1500 on the same day (the 8th).(87)
In the evening (the evening of the 8th), Detachment Commander [Sakaguchi] issued the
following order in Purbalingga:(88)
SAKA [Sakaguchi Detachment] Operation Order A, No. 39
Sakaguchi Detachment Order Purbalingga, 1710, 8 March
1. The Yamamoto Echelon has seized Cilacap at 1240 today, the 8th. It seems that the enemy has
destroyed all bridges and retreated to the west.
2. The detachment shall closely pursue the enemy.
3. The Yamamoto Echelon (to which the Kanauji Echelon is attached) shall promptly seize Banjar
(seventy kilometers northwest of Cilacap) and vicinity to eliminate the enemy retreating from
the Bandung area, while leaving in Cilacap a minimal element necessary to maintain the public
order there.
4. I am in Purbalingga and will advance toward Purwokerto.
On having finished crossing the river in Purbalingga, the Matsumoto Echelon left the town
at 1950 (on the 8th) and advanced to Purwokerto at 2300. Bridges [there] had also been de-
stroyed.(31, 87) The detachment commander caught up with the echelon and issued the follow-
ing order there at noon on the 9th:(88)
SAKA [Sakaguchi Detachment] Operation Order A, No. 40
Sakaguchi Detachment Order Purwokerto, 1200, 9 March
1. It seems that the enemy has practically lost its fighting spirit and is escaping to the west.
2. The detachment shall cut off the escape routes of the enemy with one element and eliminate the
defeated enemy.
3. The Matsumoto Echelon shall be positioned in Kranggan and vicinity and catch and destroy
the enemy retreating from the direction of Batavia. The armored vehicle unit shall be put under
my direct control from now on.
4. – 5. (Omitted by the author.)
6. I will leave Purwokerto at 1300 and go to Cilacap.
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However, one hour later (at 1300), an envoy of Major General Cox came
from Wangon to the Yamamoto Echelon and offered to surrender.(31, 87)
As we have seen, the surrender [of the Dutch East Indies Army] was
broadcast from Bandung at 1200 on that day. Echelon Commander Ya-
mamoto instructed the envoy to go to the detachment headquarters.(31,
87) Detachment Commander Sakaguchi issued the following order:(88)
SAKA [Sakaguchi Detachment] Operation Order A, No. 41
Sakaguchi Detachment Order Purwokerto, 2000, 9 March
1. The enemy commander of central Java has offered to surrender.
2. The detachment shall maintain its readiness to attack in order to have the
upper hand when disarming the enemy.
3. The Matsumoto Echelon shall assemble its main force in Ajibarang and vicin-
ity and take charge of maintaining public order around there, while holding one element ready
to attack the enemy at the bridge and its vicinity south of Ajibarang.
4. I am in Purwokerto.
Detachment Commander Sakaguchi Shizuo
At 1100 on the 10th, Detachment Commander [Sakaguchi] met Major General Cox at the res-
idence of the Dutch East Indies Resident in Purwokerto and accepted his surrender.(31, 87) At
1200, the detachment commander passed down [the detachment] Operation Order A, No.
42 in Purwokerto. He ordered the Yamamoto Echelon (including the Kanauji Echelon) to
promptly advance to Tasikmalaya and vicinity to monitor the disarmament. He [further] or-
dered the Matsumoto Echelon to assemble its main force in Ajibarang and vicinity and have
it monitor the disarmament of the Dutch East Indies Army units north of Wangon (not in-
cluded), while assigning one element to maintain the public order in the Tegal and Pekalon-
gan area.(88) In Wangon and vicinity, 2,000 troops under Major General Cox surrendered.(31)
Although the detachment commander remained positioned in Purwokerto, Staff Officer
Yano immediately departed after the order was passed down and presented himself at the
mess dinner (already described) with [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura and others
that night (the night of the 10th) in Bandung.(87) While everyone gave him an incredulous
look, Staff Officer Yano reported that [the Sakaguchi Detachment] had subdued all the strate-
gically important places from Semarang to Tegal on the north coast, from the south of
Surakarta to the west of Cilacap on the south coast, and from Blora westward to Tasikmalaya
in the central part.(87)
[Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura presented the following citation of merit to the
Sakaguchi Detachment, and proclaimed its distinguished military service to the whole
army.(13)
Citation of Merit
The Sakaguchi [Infantry] Group and the units attached to it
Going ahead of the army, the above expeditionary force drove deep into enemy territory and
successively fought battles in the Philippine Islands and Dutch Borneo. Five times they carried
out landings in the face of the enemy, fought hard, defeated a stubborn enemy and seized strate-
56th Mixed Infantry
Group Commander
Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi
Shizuo
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Illustration No. 62 — The Operation of the Sakaguchi Detachment
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gic points without missing opportunities, thereby turning the entire invasion operation of the
East Indies to our favor.
In the operations of the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army against Java, the group landed
in Kragan and vicinity and with great speed broke through all places [of resistance] in central
Java. After the landing, they dashed forward to seize Cilacap in less than a week and cut off the
escape route of the entire enemy army in Java, which dealt the enemy a fatal blow, and [thus]
critically contributed to the unconditional surrender of the enemy. Their military merit is truly
outstanding. We present here this citation of merit and proclaim it to the whole army.
21 March, 1942
Imamura Hitoshi, Commander in Chief of the Army in the Dutch East Indies Theater
Of the 16th Army only the Sakaguchi Detachment and the Shōji Detachment received a cita-
tion of merit in the Java invasion operation. 
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5. The Operations of the 48th Division
Terrain and Operation Plan (See Illustration No. 63)
In eastern Java, the Serang River runs from Surakarta to the northeast of Semarang and the
Solo River flows into the Madura Strait via Ngawi, Cepu, Bojonegoro and Babad. To the
southeast of the Solo River, the Brantas River flows through Mojokerto via Kediri and Ker-
tosono; its lower part branches into the Kalimas River, which flows [into the sea] at Surabaya,
and the Porong River, which flows through Porong. Paddy fields cover the areas along these
rivers, but the areas between the north coast and the Solo River and those between the Solo
River and the Brantas River, and between [the Solo River and] the Widas River are hilly, while
high conical mountains range from east to west in the entire area south of the Widas and the
Brantas River. Many [drainage and irrigation] channels and ditches run through the coastal
areas that face the Madura Strait and the Madura Sea.
As for the situation of the enemy, it had been known since before the opening of hostilities
that there were batteries, pillbox positions and strongholds with three lines of barbed-wire
entanglements at the military port of Surabaya (in the areas of Gresik, Surabaya, and Piring);
that the eastern territorial (divisional) headquarters [of the Dutch East Indies Army] was lo-
cated in Malang; that in Porong, which is situated in between [Surabaya and Malang], there
was a V-shaped position (a position open at the front from where the enemy attack is ex-
pected and designed to squeeze and trap the enemy within its narrowing wings, resting on
natural obstacles) with two-storied pillboxes and barbed-wire entanglements; that there was
a position with batteries in Semarang as well; and that there were barracks in Magelang, etc.
After the opening of the hostilities, it was also learned that a central territorial (divisional)
command was newly established in Magelang. The information on the disposition of the al-
lied forces was rather diverse, but for the area from Magelang to the east it may be roughly
[summarized] as follows:(23)
Magelang: a divisional headquarters and [a unit consisting of] two battalions as the core
Semarang: [a unit consisting of] one battalion as the core
Surakarta: [a unit consisting of] half a battalion as the core
Surabaya (including the island of Madura): [a unit consisting of] five battalions as the
core
Pasuruan and Porong: [a unit consisting of] two battalions as the core
Malang: a divisional headquarters and [a unit consisting of] three battalions as the core
As we have seen, the initial operation plan of IGHQ, the Southern Army and the Sixteenth
Army was that [a force consisting of] the 2d Division and three battalions of the 38th Division
as the core should capture western Java, the 48th Division eastern Java, while the South Seas
Detachment should land in Cirebon and seize Cilacap. At that time, the sector which the 48th
Division was supposed to capture was roughly determined as the area from Semarang and
Magelang to the east, while its landing points were set at three points between Kragan and
vicinity and Semarang.(80) As a matter of course, its main target was Surabaya.
After the decision to give up the employment of the South Seas Detachment, the Sixteenth
Army’s [revised] operation plan reduced the number of landing points by one point to two.
The plan had [the division] seize Semarang and Magelang in the west, and seize Surabaya
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in the east from the direction of the coastal road and via the road along the Solo River valley
(in other words, from the northwest), while Cilacap was to be seized at an appropriate time.(80)
It was a plan in which a unit under the command of Col. Imai Kazufumi, commander of the
1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment, should land at the Serang River valley in six transport ships
and head for Semarang and Magelang, while [a unit on] nineteen transport ships directly
led by Divisional Commander Lt. Gen. Tsuchihashi Yūitsu, should disembark at Kragan and
head for Surabaya along the coast as well as the road along the Solo River valley.(96) (See the
previously described arrangement between the Sixteenth Army and the Third Fleet [p. 226
ff.].) Apart from this, it was planned to have a unit [consisting of] one battalion as the core
land on Bali using two high-speed ships.(80)
Against this Sixteenth Army plan, the 48th Division offered its opinion and at two points
the plan was revised.
The first point was that in view of the bitter precedent in the landing [operation] on north-
ern Luzon, the landing points were reduced to [just] one point, which enabled a better guard
against submarines. Along the whole northern coast [of Java], there were shoreline positions
and obstacles, but fortunately these were not spotted along the coast of Kragan. Moreover,
with a sandy shoal (of fifteen meters deep) stretching far into the sea, the coast had the ad-
vantage [of providing protection] against attacks on the anchorage by [enemy] submarines.
It was decided to set the landing point of the 48th Division only at Kragan and have the land-
ing point covered from the air by three layers of naval fighter planes.(80)
The second point was to fully demonstrate the mobile strength [of the division] by con-
centrating its strength on the allied forces in one area and defeat them, while reducing the
allied forces in other areas to passivity. As mentioned previously, the division had originally
been organized as a motorized division (that is, it had motor vehicles sufficient for one third
of the personnel of its infantry regiments). After the capture of Manila, [the division had com-
mandeered so many motor vehicles that] the entire division could be transported all at the
same time by motor vehicles. The division commander revised the plan in such a way that
after the landing in Kragan, he would have [the division] seize the lower reaches of the
Serang River, Cepu (oil fields and bridges), and Bojonegoro (bridges), and in particular make
a demonstration of heading southwestward. As the landing progressed, he would have the
main force charge toward the Widas River and the Brantas River, defeat the allied units, and
seize Porong. Having cut the line of communication between Surabaya and Malang, he
would then attack the Surabaya stronghold. Prior to the attack on the Surabaya stronghold,
he would have the unit that had advanced to the lower reaches of the Serang River at the be-
ginning [of the operation] seize Magelang, while the attack on Cilacap would be conducted
depending on the situation. The order that the Sixteenth Army had given to the 48th Division
on 24 January was in outline: (1) [the division] should have a unit [consisting of] one battalion
as the core land in Bali no later than day I – 2; (2) the division should land at Kragan on day
I, promptly secure the crossing points over the Solo River and the oil resources in Cepu with
one element, and then defeat the enemy to promptly seize Surabaya, and have a powerful
element dash to Cilacap at a favorable opportunity to cut off the escape route of the enemy;
(3) after that, the division should mop up the enemy in eastern Java in concert with the main
force of the [Sixteenth] Army. (See the previous description. [pp. 236–237]) The landing plan,
for which the 48th Division made arrangements with the 4th Destroyer Squadron on 4 Feb-
ruary, was as follows (See the previous description. [pp. 237–240]):
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Imai Unit ([consisting of] two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion as the
core under the command of the 1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment commander): shall come
ashore in Sector B in Kragan and advance to Serang (Magelang). [Editor’s note: Possibly
a misreading for Sedan and Semarang. See p. 238.]
Kitamura Unit (48th Reconnaissance Regiment): shall come ashore at the same landing point
as the above and advance to Bojonegoro. 
Abe Unit ([consisting of] three infantry battalions, two tank squadrons and two mountain
artillery battalions as the core, under the command of the infantry group commander):
shall come ashore in Sector A in Kragan and advance to Ponjūru. [Editor’s note: The map
on p. 575 in the Japanese edition has a “Ponjūru” and a “Ponjoru,” both of which are
unidentifiable. The most likely candidates are “Bulujawa,” “Boncong” and “Bancar.” The
latter might locally be pronounced as “Boncor.”]
Tanaka Unit ([consisting of] two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion as
the core under the command of the 2d Taiwan Infantry Regiment commander): shall come
ashore at the same landing point as the above and advance to Cepu.
In mid February, it was decided that the Sakaguchi Detachment would [also] land in Kragan
and head for Cilacap. It was further decided that the Imai Unit and the Abe Unit ([consisting
of] the 47th Infantry Regiment as its core) should come ashore respectively as the right wing
Illustration No. 63 — The Terrain and the Known Position of the Enemy in Eastern Java
550 Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java
Solo Riv
Surabaya
Malang
Surakarta
Semarang
Cilacap
Bandung
Batavia Cirebon
Yogyakarta
Mag
elan
g
Kra
ganRe
m
ba
ng
Piring
Kertosono
Bojonegoro
Ngawi
Caruban
Maospati Madiun
BancarRembang
Blora
Cepu
Kragan
Kediri
Widas Riv
Solo Riv
Bulujawa
Mt Las
em
Madura Isl
Pasuruan
Malang
Porong
Surabaya
Gresik
CermeBabad
Lamongan
Tuban
Mojokerto
Madura
Sea
Solo Riv
To Surakarta,
Magelang
To 
Semarang
Serang Riv
Madura Strait
Bra
nta
s R
iv
Kalimas 
Riv
Porong RivBran
tas Riv
unit and the left wing unit, and secure a beachhead that stretched from Mt. Lasem to a line
eight kilometers south of Kragan to cover the landing. The Imai Unit should further seize
Rembang and the Kanauji Battalion of the Sakaguchi Detachment should rush beyond the
beachhead to seize Blora ([the guarding of] which would later be taken over by the Imai
Unit), while the Tanaka Unit should rush beyond the beachhead to seize Cepu and Ngawi.
The Kitamura Unit should rush beyond the beachhead to seize Bojonegoro (and seize Tuban
with one element). After the landing of the Matsumoto and the Yamamoto Echelon, the Sak-
aguchi Detachment should then leave Blora for Cilacap, whereas in progress with the land-
ing, the 48th Division should head for the area east of the Brantas River with the Abe Unit as
the 1st echelon, the Tanaka Unit as the 2d, and the Imai Unit as the 3d echelon, while having
the Kitamura Unit head eastward from Bojonegoro to Surabaya to contain the allied units,
and so gain the upper hand for the decisive battle of the division that was expected to occur
on the bank of the Brantas River.(79, 80)
Operational Preparations
As mentioned previously, the 48th Division had been preparing for the Malaya [invasion]
operation, when in August 1941 the [operation] plan was changed in such a way that it would
join the Philippines and Java [invasion] operations instead. It then mainly focused on the
preparations for the operation against the Philippines. However, right after the departure of
the units that were to land in Aparri and Vigan, it turned out that a member of the sultan’s
family of the Principality of Yogyakarta was teaching at Gaoxiong Commercial School in Tai-
wan, and the main force of the division took him along to the Philippines. This helped [the
division] to know the details [of the situation] in eastern Java.(80) Just before the seizure of
Manila, Divisional Commander Tsuchihashi learned that it had been decided to move up the
Java operation and that IGHQ and the Southern Army considered that the division’s assign-
ment in the Philippines had been completed. However, Division Commander Tsuchihashi
could not allow himself to overlook the U.S.-Filipino Army’s retreat into Bataan and decided
to head for Bataan for a limited period of one week to ten days at most. On 8 January, the di-
vision turned over the battle front of Bataan to the 65th Brigade, assembled in the suburbs of
Manila, and started the preparations for the Java operation. When Vice Chief of Staff Aoki of
the Southern Army had visited [the division] before, it had particularly requested heavy ar-
tillery units (at least one 10-cm. gun and one 15-cm. howitzer battalion each) to be assigned
[to the division] for the attack on the Surabaya stronghold. However, the Southern Army had
informally decided not to transfer [heavy artillery units] from the Fourteenth Army, which
was to capture Bataan and Corregidor, but to transfer instead units which belonged to the
Twenty-fifth Army, and which were to be sent later. As a result, no heavy artillery units were
included in the twenty-one units [on the list] to be transferred by the order of the Southern
Army on 15 January, although tanks (the 4th Regiment) were included.(23, 24) Lieutenant Gen-
eral Tsuchihashi wired to the chief of staff of the Southern Army, saying, “I’m not complain-
ing, but I heard that Surabaya has a stronghold, while my corps is equipped only with
mountain guns. When we fire at the enemy stronghold and the shells bounce back with a
clang, who will take responsibility? I would like to ask you a favor to at least allocate [a unit
of] 15-cm. howitzers.” Only one 15-cm. howitzer battery of the 17th Field Heavy Artillery
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Regiment was sent from Lüshun [Port Arthur] and joined the division at Lingayen just before
embarkation.(79)
The main preparation for the [Java] operation done in Manila was the maintenance of the
motor vehicles. As mentioned previously, the division had equipped itself so that the entire
division could move all together in motor vehicles.(80) Col. Yanagi Isamu, the 47th Infantry
Regiment commander, procured about 3,000 pairs of pliers in Manila to demolish the three
lines of barbed-wire entanglements of the Surabaya stronghold.(84)
As we have seen, [the division commander] made arrangements with the 4th Destroyer
Squadron commander in Manila on 4 February and embarked on 5 February. On the 7th, the
Kanemura Detachment departed from Lingayen [for Bali], and the convoy of the main force
(thirty-nine ships) left the gulf on the 8th, then made supplementary preparations for the op-
eration in Jolo, and sailed southward after making a change in its operation plan to include
the Saka guchi Detachment’s participation [in the operation].(79)
Landing, and Seizure of Rembang and the Bridges over the Solo River 
(See Illustration No. 64)
The convoy, which had reversed course from a point about seventy kilometers north of Kra-
gan at 2040 on the 27th, sailed northward all through the night, turned eastward around 0500
on the 28th, and resumed sailing southward around 0800 on the same day. Despite allied
planes approaching it that evening, it safely sailed southward after that. From around 0030
on 1 March, Mt. Lasem was distantly visible in the dim moonlight of an almost full moon.
The Arizona-maru with the division commander aboard dropped anchor at 0130 and [the con-
voy] completed entering the anchorage at 0235. Although [the convoy] was attacked several
times from around 0300 and sustained a loss of one ship sunk, one stranded, sixty-two men
killed and 210 wounded, the right and left wing units succeeded in landing respectively at
0345 and 0400. [Editor’s note: The description on p. 458 differs.] The allied unit facing them
consisted of about one Dutch East Indies Army company with a small number of armored
vehicles and sidecars; it retreated after only firing randomly some shells from a trench mor-
tar.(31, 79, 119)
The first landing units of the right wing unit (the 1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment led by
Col. Imai Kazufumi) and the left wing unit (the 47th Infantry Regiment (with Col. Yanagi
Isamu as regimental commander) led by Maj. Gen. Abe Kōichi, commander of the 48th In-
fantry Group) immediately advanced to the line connecting Mt. Lasem, Sedan and Ponjūru
[? Bancar] (about eight kilometers from the landing point in Kragan), and took positions to
cover the landing. On landing, the main force of the Imai Unit (the second and the subsequent
landing units) made preparations for charging toward Rembang, the Tanaka Regiment (the
2d Taiwan Infantry Regiment led by Col. Tanaka Tōru) for charging toward Cepu, the Kita-
mura Unit (the 48th Reconnaissance Regiment led by Lt. Col. Kitamura Kurō) for charging
toward Bojonegoro (one element toward Tuban), and the Kanauji Echelon of the Sakaguchi
Detachment for charging toward Blora. When leaving the mother ship in a large motorized
[landing] craft at 0730, the division commander was strafed by four or five allied planes, but
safely came ashore in Kragan at 0830. The Kanauji Echelon (which had started landing at
0700) seized Blora at 2000, and the Tanaka Unit and the Kitamura Unit left respectively for
Cepu and Bojonegoro (one element of the latter for Tuban) around 1500 and around 1700.
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The main force of the Imai Unit departed around 1900 and headed for
Rembang, separating into a group that went along the road north and a
group that went along the road south of Mt. Lasem. The 2d Battalion [of
the Imai Unit], which had taken the coastal road, attacked an allied unit
at 2330 northwest of Mt. Lasem. Thus, by midnight on the first day of
landing, the 48th Division (including the Sakaguchi Detachment) had
established a foothold of about seventy to eighty kilometers wide and
about forty kilometers deep, and continued expanding it. Detachment
Commander Sakaguchi bid farewell to the division commander and left
for Blora.(31, 79, 119)
The landing point was really favorable; the condition of the coast was
perfect, and about 700 indigenous men helped with the disembarkation
from just after [the start of] the landing.(27)
On 2 March, the Imai Unit charged into Rembang at 0340. The advance of the Tanaka Unit
was delayed because the road north of Cepu was barricaded with trees over a long distance,
but the unit advanced into Cepu at 1530, drove away a small unit of the Dutch East Indies
Army on the south bank of the Solo River, and seized the whole area at 1800. The bridges in
Cepu had been destroyed. The Kitamura Unit finally managed to get to the north bank [of
the Solo River] in Bojonegoro in the evening, due to the loss of a number of its officers at the
time of landing, which was followed by a series of motor vehicle trouble. The Abe Unit
(Yanagi Unit) successively shifted to the assembling of its strength. The Sasako-maru, which
The Landing in Kragan
48th Reconnaissance
Regiment Commander,
Lt. Col. Kitamura Kurō
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had enjoyed fame as a high-speed ship, was [no longer] able to sail at a speed faster than
five knots due to the damage she sustained in the Bali operation. She entered the anchorage
on that day and started the disembarkation of the Yamamoto and the Matsumoto Echelons.
In the evening, Division Commander Tsuchihashi ordered the Imai Unit and the Abe Unit to
send their advance units respectively to Blora and the three-forked junction east of the town
for the purpose of their subsequent advance. However, soon after that, he learned that the
bridges over the Solo River in Cepu, Bojonegoro and Babad were all destroyed, and gave or-
ders to the 48th Engineer Regiment and the 3d Independent Engineer Regiment to rapidly
advance to bridge the river.(31, 79, 84, 88)
Meeting Engagements at the Banks of the Brantas River
(See Illustrations No. 65 and No. 66)
The next day, the 3d [of March], was the [Japanese] Girl’s Festival [and seasonally cold in
Japan], but it was hot. A report came from the Kitamura Unit, saying: “Today the 3d at 0600,
we have crossed the Solo River and seized Bojonegoro, from where a Dutch East Indies Army
unit had retreated last night.” On that day, the Imai Unit first of all dispatched its bicycle
unit from Rembang to Blora. The Abe Unit assembled its force and made preparations for
advancing southward. Division Commander [Tsuchihashi] left Kragan at 1600, and advanced
to Cepu at 1910. He had departed as soon as he had heard that the barricades on the road to
Cepu had been cleared. The road had been barricaded in places for several hundred meters
with felled teak trees brought from the large forests, which made [the divisional commander]
think of the trouble of the removal work. The oil wells in Cepu were burning and the oil re-
finery had also been destroyed.(31, 79)
Barricades on the Blora – Cepu road
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On the next day, the 4th, the division commander waited for the
bridging in Cepu to be completed and the assembly of his units. The di-
vision commander’s plan was to [first] carry out at one go after the land-
ing a rapid advance up to the seizure of Rembang and the crossing points
of the Solo River (including the oil fields in Cepu), then have his force
assemble on the line of the Solo River, and on completion of the assem-
bling, launch with lightning speed an all-out war of movement. On that
day (the 4th), the Abe Unit started its advance at 0600 and had [already]
arrived in Cepu at 1100. The Imai Unit (other than those who had de-
parted by bicycle the day before) also left Rembang at 0900 on that day
(the 4th) in motor vehicles and caught up with the rear of the Abe Unit
via Blora. The bridging [of the Solo River] in Cepu was all they had been
waiting for. It was to be completed by noon on that day (the 4th) but was delayed because
part of the bridge had been carried away by the river swollen with the squall of the previous
night and had to be rebuilt. Receiving a report in the middle of the night that “the bridging
has been completed at 2100 and the crossing of the river has started,” the divisional com-
mander felt finally relieved and took a nap.(31, 79)
On the next day, the 5th, Divisional Commander Tsuchihashi waited for a report on the
situation, while going over his operational directives for the meeting engagements expected
to take place at the banks of the Brantas River that day, the 5th. The Abe Unit was supposed
to have started its advance in the dead of night and be charging toward the front of the
Porong stronghold, while the Kitamura Unit (reconnaissance regiment) was supposed to
have advanced from Bojonegoro toward Surabaya and contained the allied units. The divi-
sion commander himself planned to advance at the head of the Tanaka Unit (the 2d echelon),
while having the Imai Unit (the 3d echelon) depart following the Tanaka Unit. He also
planned to have the Tanaka Unit on its way mop up [the enemy in] Ngawi and Maospati
with one element. He considered that it was highly probable that a meeting engagement
would take place at the banks of the Brantas River, particularly in the area somewhere be-
tween Kertosono and Mojokerto. As the bridge at Kediri south of Kertosono would be espe-
cially important if [his units] should engage the enemy at the Brantas River, the divisional
commander had instructed Unit Commander Abe and the staff officer up front to preemp-
tively seize [the bridge].(79)
When the divisional commander was thinking about winning a decisive victory in a field
battle on that day, the 5th, a staff officer came to him and reported: “The leading echelon, the
Abe Unit, has for the most part completed crossing the river around 0600 in spite of some
confusion. But when the 4th Tank Regiment at the tail of the Abe Unit crossed the bridge, it
began to move a medium-sized U.S. tank that had been captured in the Philippines onto the
bridge ignoring the bridge monitoring squad’s calls to stop, as a result part of the bridge was
destroyed.” Divisional Commander Tsuchihashi lost his temper, saying, “What on earth is it
that no staff officers kept an eye on it?” He stamped with frustration, but there was no chance
to temporarily fix it in time [for the expected meeting engagement]. Having no choice, he
decided to have pontoon rafts prepared to paddle across the river. It was not until 1300 that
the divisional commander, who had planned to closely follow in the rear of the Abe Unit,
managed to cross the Solo River. He judged that the Abe Unit should [now] be in the middle
of a fierce battle.(79)
48th Infantry Group
Commander Maj. Gen.
Abe Kōichi
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Illustration No. 65 — [The 48th Division] on 4 March
Illustration No. 64 — [the 48th Division] on 1 and 2 March
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Well, what was the situation of the Abe Unit during that time? The
Abe Unit, whose strength consisted of the infantry group headquarters,
the 47th Infantry Regiment, the 4th Tank Regiment, the main force of the
48th Mountain Artillery Regiment and the main force of the 48th Engi-
neer Regiment as the core, was assigned to advance toward Mojokerto
along the Caruban – Nganjuk – Kertosono – Porong road. Unit Com-
mander Abe designated the 2d Battalion (commander, Maj. Baba
Asanoshin) of the 47th Infantry Regiment as the core led by Colonel
Yanagi, commander of the regiment, as the advance guard. In the
evening of the 4th, Colonel Yanagi sent eight camouflaged reconnais-
sance raiding teams ahead to seize the bridges between Cepu and Mo-
jokerto, while the advance guard left Cepu in the middle of the night on
the 4th. Although the reconnaissance raiding teams were intercepted by 200 to 300 troops of
a Dutch East Indies Army unit at a point about four kilometers northwest of Caruban at 0130
on the 5th, they broke through and advanced. They again encountered a Dutch East Indies
Army unit at 0450 in the town of Caruban and went into a fierce fight. The advance guard
led by Colonel Yanagi joined up with the reconnaissance teams, who were in the middle of
a fierce fight in Caruban, immediately dealt a heavy blow to the Dutch East Indies Army unit
facing it and drove it back. [Colonel Yanagi] disbanded the reconnaissance raiding teams and
then followed [the enemy] in hot pursuit. In Wilangan [the advance guard] was intercepted
by a Dutch East Indies Army unit of about 200 troops, but broke through. Then it met and
engaged a Dutch East Indies Army unit of about 1,000 troops equipped with guns, tanks,
and armored vehicles in Kertosono. It defeated them and charged into Kertosono at 1315 (al-
most at the same time as the divisional commander crossed the [Solo] River in Cepu). The
Dutch East Indies Army unit hurriedly [tried to] blow up the bridge at the east end of Ker-
tosono. Although they had set explosives to blow up all segments of the bridge, fortunately
[for the Japanese army], the bridge dropped only at one of its central segments to the point
that the water barely flowed over the surface of the bridge without it sinking to the bottom
of the river.(31, 80, 82, 84)
Divisional Commander [Tsuchihashi], who had crossed the Solo River at 1300, arrived in
Caruban at 1515 and temporarily stopped off there. A report came that “the Abe Unit is at-
tacking a powerful enemy [unit] in Kertosono,” and the divisional commander immediately
asked in return, “Has [the unit] already seized Kediri?” Staff Officer Nakahara Makoto
rushed out by car right away [to find out]. He hurried to Nganjuk and asked the local people.
Although Staff Officer Akatsuka Kazuo, who accompanied the advance guard, should have
sent one company separately from Nganjuk to seize the bridge at Kediri, there were no signs
that one company had indeed separated from the advance guard there. Staff Officer Naka-
hara requested Major General Abe to take steps to quickly dispatch a unit. Without delay,
the major general sent the 3d Battalion (commander, Maj. Miyaji Ikuzō) of the 47th Infantry
Regiment of the main force, which had [already] advanced to Kertosono, south along the
road on a bank of the Brantas River toward Kediri. Not only Infantry Group Commander
[Abe] and Staff Officer Akatsuka, but also the company commander, who had unofficially
been informed beforehand [about the separate advance to Kediri], had totally forgotten all
about it due to the war situation facing them.(79, 80)
47th Infantry Regiment
Commander, Col.
Yanagi Isamu
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The division commander (in Caruban) obtained the following [information on] the situ-
ation by the evening:(79)
1. The Abe Unit had driven back about 500 enemy troops with four guns in Kertosono around
1300. However, as the enemy had destroyed the bridge at the east end of the city, the unit was
crossing the river in small boats. [According to the Abe Unit,] the Miyaji Battalion had left for
the bridge at Kediri.
2. The Tanaka Unit, which had left Cepu following the Abe Unit, had seized the airfield in
Maospati with one element at 1130. The Yanagi Battalion (the 2d [1st?] Battalion of the 2d Taiwan
Infantry Regiment under Commander Maj. Yanagi Hiroshi) of the Tanaka Unit had charged into
[the enemy] barracks in Ngawi around 1330, taken 150 men prisoner, and rescued thirty-two
Japanese women and children who had been confined there. [Sixteenth Army] Staff Officer
Kuriya Tsugunori was with this battalion.
3. The Imai Unit, which had left Cepu last, had continued its advance, overtaking the Tanaka Unit.
4. The Kitamura Unit had seized a position west of Babad at 1700.
5. The Tanaka Unit was assembling at Caruban in the evening.
6. According to reconnaissance by [a] naval plane, powerful units of the enemy, which had been
positioned in the sector northwest of Surabaya, were in quick succession advancing toward Mo-
jokerto along the Lamongan – Surabaya – Mojokerto road. No enemy was spotted moving along
the road connecting Malang and Kediri or the road connecting Malang and Surabaya.
Now it became clear that the corps of the eastern territorial headquarters of the Dutch East
Indies Army was positioned [in the area] from the banks of the Brantas River to the northwest
of Surabaya and that the forces to the northwest of Surabaya were being transferred toward
the banks of the Brantas River. It was considered inevitable that a large meeting engagement
would occur by the Brantas River. Divisional Commander [Tsuchihashi] decided to imme-
diately send the Kitamura Unit south toward Mojokerto and seize the three bridges near Mo-
jokerto and vicinity, and passed down his order.(79, 80)
The night of the 5th fell. The greatest concern of Divisional Commander Tsuchihashi was
the Kediri bridge, to which he had called the attention of his men in the Philippines and again
on the ship, and about which he had once again reminded [his men] after the landing. Im-
mediately on getting up in the morning of the 6th, the divisional commander [once again]
asked: “Have they seized Kediri?” The reply was: “We have received no reports yet.” The
divisional commander lost his temper for the second time after the landing, curtly telling his
staff officers, “Go and find out right now.”(79)
Soon a report came that the Abe Unit had crossed the Brantas River around 1530 on the
previous day, the 5th, driven away the Dutch East Indies Army west of Jombang, and sat the
night out there, and that the Miyaji Battalion had seized the bridge in Kediri intact around
1730 on the previous day, the 5th.(79)
The advance company of the Miyaji Battalion had rushed to the Kediri bridge at full
speed; while crossing the bridge, it had encountered at 1700 (on the 5th) a Dutch East Indies
Army unit, which [also] came rushing from the direction of Jombang; it had repulsed the lat-
ter at 1730, and seized the bridge.(31)
[Meanwhile,] the advance guard had successively advanced to the right bank of the Bran-
tas River from Kertosono from around 1600 (on the 5th) onwards. At that time, the footbridge
was still hanging there in its [almost] destroyed state and was barely passable for personnel.
The railway bridge, however, was still there. As soon as the engineer unit had finished setting
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up equipment to cross the railway bridge, the vehicles had been sent across the bridge in
succession at midnight. The main force of the remainder of the 1st Echelon (the unit [con-
sisting of] the Aikō Battalion as the core under the command of Major General Abe) had
made a U-turn at Kertosono and was heading for Kediri by way of Nganjuk. On learning
that the Miyaji Battalion had seized Kediri, the battalion was sent onwards toward Jombang,
while the main force had followed immediately in their rear.(82, 83, 84)
On that day (the 5th), the Kitamura Unit had left Bojonegoro at 1100, and attacked [enemy]
positions west of Babad from 1330 onwards, which caused the unit a loss of four officers and
two noncommissioned officers killed. However, it had seized the positions at 1715 and
launched a night attack on the town of Babad at 2000.(31, 79, 86)
On the morning of the 6th, on learning of the “successful seizure of the Kediri bridge last
evening,” Divisional Commander Tsuchihashi left Caruban at 0730 at the head of the Imai
and the Tanaka Units to head for Jombang via the Kediri bridge.(31, 79)
In the meantime, the advance guard ([consisting of] the Baba Battalion as the core led by
Colonel Yanagi [Isamu]), which had crossed the [Brantas] River at a point near Kertosono
from the previous evening onwards, had shifted to the pursuit [of the enemy] in motor ve-
hicles when the assembly of the main force was completed around 0500 on the 6th, and
charged into the city of Jombang at daybreak. [The advance guard] continued its charge and
met resistance from a Dutch East Indies Army unit of about 200 troops equipped with guns
at 0820 near Mojoagung. It defeated [the enemy troops], further advanced, and was in the
Illustration No. 66 — [The 48th Division on] 5 March
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middle of attacking a Dutch East Indies Army unit in Mojokerto. The main force of the Abe
Unit ([consisting of] the Miyaji and the Aikō Battalions — [advancing] via the Kediri bridge)
was following immediately in its rear.(31, 79, 83)
Divisional Commander [Tsuchihashi] advanced to Jombang at 1040, moving at the head
of the Imai and the Tanaka Unit, and set up his headquarters there. Before noon, he learned
that the advance guard of the Abe Unit (i.e. the Yanagi Unit) had charged into Mojokerto
around 1100, seized the town, further defeated with one element about one hundred troops
of a Dutch East Indies Army unit near the bridge at the north end of Mojokerto and secured
the bridge, and that the advance guard had continued its advance toward Porong.
Then, he learned that the Kitamura Unit had conducted a night attack on Babad at 2000
the previous night, seized the town at 0300 on the 6th, and started its southward advance to-
ward Mojokerto, leaving Babad around 1100. He [also] learned that a Dutch East Indies Army
unit, which had retreated from Babad toward Surabaya, was returning to Babad. Considering
the fact that the Yanagi Unit had already seized the bridges in Mojokerto and also judging
that the rear of the Kitamura Unit was not secured, Divisional Commander [Tsuchihashi]
gave orders to the Kitamura Unit to stop its southward advance and return to its original as-
signment.(31, 79)
The divisional commander left Jombang at 1520 and advanced to Mojokerto at 1600. The
Imai and the Tanaka Units, in this order, followed immediately in his rear.(31, 79)
The Destroyed Bridge at Kertosono
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When the divisional commander advanced to Mojokerto (around 1600 on the 6th), he re-
ceived a report from a naval plane that “the enemy is assembling into Porong from the west
and the south and that there is a hint that they are retreating in Surabaya.”(79)
Note: Of the [Sixteenth] Army staff officers assigned [to the division], Staff Officer Kuriya di-
rected the rescue of the Japanese [residents confined] in Ngawi as described previously, and
Staff Officer Nishiura was in charge of reconnaissance and communications by using naval
reconnaissance seaplanes.(42, 45)
The divisional commander instantly made a decision, dictated the following orders sepa-
rately as direct orders, and had [the orders] delivered by motorbike, intending not to let the
Dutch East Indies Army units use the Porong stronghold as their base as well as to keep them
away from the Surabaya stronghold.(79)
– The Abe Unit shall break through the Porong [stronghold] and advance to the line along the
canal in Kedungrejo.
– The Imai Unit shall head northward from Mojosari, charge toward Sidoarjo to approach the rear
of the enemy. It shall cooperate with the Abe Unit as needed.
– The Tanaka Unit shall head northward along the west bank sector of the Kalimas River, seize
the bridge north of Krijan and the highland on its northwest side, and reconnoiter the enemy
position.
The Seizure of Porong (See Illustrations No. 67 and No. 68)
When Divisional Commander [Tsuchihashi] gave the previously mentioned orders, Colonel
Yanagi [Isamu], commander of the advance guard of the Abe Unit, had already seized Porong.
As we have seen, it was said that in Porong, there were midway defense works between
the garrison town of Malang and the Surabaya stronghold, a stronghold with a number of
two-storied pillboxes and barbed wire entanglements, and a V-shaped position with narrow-
ing sides, which made the 48th Division give it a careful consideration. Based on the division
order, Unit Commander Abe showed [his unit] that “the division intends to seize the Porong
stronghold and that [accordingly] the Abe Unit will advance to [a line] about eight kilometers
northwest of the Porong stronghold, and while reconnoitering the enemy’s situation and the
terrain, cover the deployment of the division,” and gave orders to the advance guard to move
up to the line.(82)
After seizing the bridges and the urban area of Mojokerto, Colonel Yanagi had headed
eastward with an advance company [consisting of] one infantry company, one tank troop
and one mountain artillery battery as the core, while keeping [the remaining] three infantry
companies as the core under his direct command. He had one element advance separately
from Mojosari to secure the two bridges over the Porong River, while he himself continued
heading eastward. While advancing, he had received information by a communication cylin-
der dropped from a [Japanese] naval plane, which said: “The enemy is now shifting its force
from the direction of the cities of Malang and Surabaya to the Porong stronghold to deploy
them there.” The colonel instantly decided on his own judgment to seize the Porong strong-
hold and immediately gave an order to attack it. The troops, which came from the Oita Reg-
imental District in northern Kyūshū, charged boldly. Lt. Col. Kumagai Shōji, commander of
the 4th Tank Regiment, and Lt. Col. Yamaguchi Kayoshi, commander of the 48th Mountain
Artillery Regiment, who accompanied Colonel Yanagi, quickly deployed their own units and
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along with naval planes supported [the charge]. They broke through part of the Porong Po-
sition at 1520 and advanced to the line of a stream on the west side of Kejapanan at 1530. In
Kejapanan and vicinity, 1,200 to 1,300 troops of a Dutch East Indies Army unit had assembled
and part of them fought back. At 1550, [the Japanese] launched a fierce attack on Kejapanan
with infantry, tanks and artillery in close coordination, broke at a stroke through [the defense
of] the city and cut off the road connecting Surabaya and Malang. One element rapidly ad-
vanced to the bridges in Porong, and secured them. The Baba Battalion was the only infantry
[battalion] that fought from the beginning to the end. It had already seized the city before
the Miyaji and Aikō Battalion of the main force of the Abe Unit joined the battle.(83, 84)
Divisional Commander [Tsuchihashi] was very pleased to learn that Colonel Yanagi had
quickly seized Porong on his own judgment. He advanced his headquarters from Mojokerto
to Mojosari in the evening.(79) That is to say, on the 6th, the division headquarters advanced
from Caruban to Jombang, then to Mojokerto, and further to Mojosari in [just] one day.
Preparations for Seizing the Surabaya Stronghold (See Illustration No. 69)
By the previously described division order of around 1600 on the 6th and the division order
that followed the seizure of Porong, the units moved during the night of the 6th and ad-
vanced to the sectors south and southwest of the Surabaya stronghold. It was decided to let
Infantry Group Commander Abe take command of the Yanagi (the 47th Infantry) and the
Imai (the 1st Taiwan Infantry) Regiments together. Colonel Yanagi employed the 3d Battalion
(the Miyaji Battalion), which was returned from Major General Abe, [instead] as the van, left
the Porong sector at 2100 on the 6th, and advanced to an area about four kilometers south of
Surabaya at 0300 on the 7th, where he began to reconnoiter the position of the enemy and
the terrain. By the morning of the 7th, the Imai Regiment had advanced to the front west of
and level with [Colonel Yanagi], and the Tanaka (the 2d Taiwan Infantry) Regiment to the
area northwest of Imai (i.e. southwest of the Surabaya stronghold) and began reconnoitering
the position of the enemy and the terrain.(79, 83)
On the previous day (the 6th) while in pursuit of the enemy toward Mojokerto after the
engagement in Mojoagung, the advance guard had [found and] obtained a detailed [enemy]
“deployment plan of Surabaya” in an abandoned car. Taking a look at it, Colonel Yanagi had
felt, “this gives me confidence in a sure victory.”(84) Divisional Commander Tsuchihashi, who
had advanced to Mojokerto at 1600 on the same day (the 6th), looked at the plan and felt:
“The defense of Surabaya seems considerably [strong], but I wonder whether it is actually
The Battlefield Near the Porong Stronghold
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so. In any case, we should avoid a reckless attack to minimize loss and tactfully seize the
city.”(79) When asked by an embedded war correspondent: “Are you going to enter Surabaya
on the Army Day (10 March)?” the divisional commander had answered: “We will seize
Surabaya when the prospects for an attack are promising. We do not carry out an unreason-
able attack at the risk of causing [many] casualties.”(79) Giving detailed orders concerning re-
connaissance, the division commander planned to gather [more] materials for his attack
plan.(79)
Before noon on that day (the 7th), the divisional commander advanced his command post
from Mojosari to Sidoarjo.(79)
Right after that (around noon on the 7th), a report came from the front line unit, which
said: “There are signs of flooding. The river is rising inch by inch.” The divisional commander
recalled what Sixteenth Army Staff Officer Major Kuriya had told him on the transport ship
and immediately sent for him at the front line. The staff officer rushed to the branching point
on the Brantas River and operated the water gate in such a way that the water flow, which
had been set to flow into the Kalimas River, went into the direction of the Porong River.(79)
On the next day, 8 March, the change of the flow at the water gate showed effect and the
level of the river started to fall.(79)
The divisional commander learned that the Kitamura Unit had seized Lamongan (halfway
between Babad and Gresik) after a minor engagement around 1730 on the previous day, the
7th.(79)
By that morning (of the 8th), the divisional commander had come to the conclusion that the
Surabaya position was not so strong. He decided to attack from the evening of the next day,
the 9th, onwards and passed down the following attack order at 0800 on that day (the 8th):(79)
1. Launch of the attack: at 2030 after sunset on the 9th
Illustration No. 67 — [The 48th Division on] 6 March
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2. Main attack: [from] the south front (the front of the Abe Unit)
3. The unit [consisting of] both the Imai and the Yanagi Regiments as the core under the command
of Major General Abe shall cross the canal of Wonokromo by surprise, storm the enemy artillery
position in the east sector of Surabaya, then turn its front by 90 degrees, dribble through
Surabaya and attack the positions of the enemy from behind.
4. After seizing the southwest corner, the Tanaka Unit shall upset the [enemy] position with tanks
and overrun the artillery position.
5. The Kitamura Unit shall just hold down the west front and prevent the enemy from escaping.
The 3d Battalion of the 2d Taiwan Infantry Regiment shall be assigned to it.
6. Artillery fire: shall be conducted from 1400 to 1600 and from 1830 to 2000 on the 8th, and from
1400 to 1600 on the 9th.
[The unit shall first] destroy the southwest corner position of the enemy, [halt the fire] and
resume the fire at 1630 [1830?].
7. At some time on the 8th and the 9th, the [most] important points of the [enemy] positions as
well as the artillery positions shall be bombarded. 
Surrender of the Eastern Corps of the Dutch East Indies Army
The units had assiduously been reconnoitering the position of the enemy and the terrain.
After obtaining approval from Divisional Commander [Tsuchihashi], Regimental Com-
mander Yanagi selected one company out of each battalion and let them carry out a recon-
Illustration No. 68 — The Situation of the Porong Stronghold as Was Known Just After the Landing
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naissance in force. These companies entered the city of Surabaya from the east at 1000 on the
8th, but no Dutch East Indies Army units were spotted.(31)
Note: Ninety-three pillbox positions were spotted north of the Wonokromo canal in the front of
the Yanagi Regiment.(84)
Around 1000, the divisional commander received an aircraft report saying that a white flag
was flying on the bridge of Wonokromo (the southern entrance to Surabaya) and immediately
sent Staff Officer Kuriya to Surabaya to bring the persons in charge back with him.(79)
Then at 1030, a report came from the Tanaka Unit: “We will send the military envoy, who
has come to the unit, to division headquarters.”(79)
The divisional commander waited well into the afternoon for Staff Officer Kuriya to re-
turn, but he was long in coming back. With the first artillery bombardment scheduled to start
at 1400 on the 8th, [the divisional commander] hesitated whether he should open fire as
scheduled, but in the end, he decided to cancel the bombardment plan and gave orders to
that effect at 1330. For the 15-cm. Howitzer Battery of the 17th Field Heavy Artillery Regi-
ment, which had come in high spirits from Manchuria, the Java operation ended with firing
not a single gunshot.(79)
At 1420, Staff Officer Kuriya returned, accompanied by the governor of East Java, the
mayor of Surabaya and the commander of the garrison army in Surabaya (an artillery lieu-
tenant colonel) but, needless to say, none of them held the supreme command of the entire
Dutch East Indies Army in East Java. Considering it impossible to hold ceasefire [talks] with
them, Divisional Commander [Tsuchihashi] showed the following demands to them and
canceled the talks.(79)
The Modung Battery on the Island of Madura (Under Construction at that Time)
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1. As the Japanese Army would immediately be brought into Surabaya, they should promptly and
thoroughly inform the army, police and civilians [there] so that no unforeseen and unfortunate
incidents would occur.
2. They should not destroy weapons and ammunition, or other military materiél, facilities, and
resources.
3. They should have the commanders of Gresik and Madura present themselves to the commander
of the 48th Division as soon as possible.
After that, the divisional commander passed down orders that the reconnaissance teams
should go into Surabaya immediately, and the [other] units by 1700, and that the Yanagi and
the Imai Regiments should guard respectively the northern and the southern halves of the
city of Surabaya.(79)
Communications with the Sixteenth Army headquarters had not yet been established
since the landing, and they failed to be established that day, too.(79)
On the next day, 9 March, in view of the importance of Malang, the division commander
assigned Major General Abe to take command of a unit [consisting of] the 2d Taiwan Infantry
Regiment as the core, seize the city and guard it. The unit arrived in Malang around 1130,
seized it without a hitch, and took charge of the guarding of the city.(79)
Illustration No. 69 — The Known Situation of the Surabaya Stronghold and the Attack Plan
566 Chapter VIII     /     The Invasion of Java
Madura Isl
Surabaya
Bangkalan
Piring
Depth of position
Kamal
Labang, Kesek
Kitamura
Gresik
Modung Ketunjung
Kebanjar
Battery
Pillbox positions
Barracks
Airfield
YanagiImai
Wonokromo
Barracks Hospital
Marine Corps
Tanaka
P
ow
der
 M
agazine
P
ow
der
 M
agazine
Arsenal
Arsenal
Arm
ory
Arm
ory
Then, learning that the Kitamura Unit had advanced into Cerme (about ten kilometers
southwest of Gresik) that morning, the divisional commander urged it to promptly advance
to Gresik. He also sent Staff Officer Nakahara Makoto to Surabaya to have him study how
to send troops to [the island of] Madura.(79)
At 1330 (on the 9th), by a communications cylinder dropped from a [Japanese] plane, the
divisional commander learned for the first time about the complete surrender of the Dutch
East Indies Army as well as the surrender terms, which the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters
had let the Dutch East Indies side sign. This message was the first communication that the
division had received from the army headquarters since its landing on Java.(79)
Then, at the report from Major General Abe that Major General Ilgen, the eastern territorial
commander and commander of the 3d Division, had presented himself to Major General
Abe, the division commander immediately ordered [Abe] to send [Major General Ilgen] to
the divisional headquarters in Sidoarjo. Major General Ilgen arrived [there] at 2030. Simul-
taneously, the commander of the garrison army on Madura also presented himself.(79)
The divisional commander immediately held the surrender ceremony. Major General
Ilgen (who was accompanied by the Madura garrison army commander and four other peo-
ple) said that he had the authority to surrender, and signed a surrender document presented
by the divisional commander. After that, Major General Ilgen accepted Division Commander
Tsuchihashi’s demand to “go to Surabaya right now and tell over the radio that all your men
shall assemble and surrender,” and left.(79)
At 1400 on that day (the 9th), the Kitamura Unit entered Gresik, while one company of
the 47th Infantry Regiment went ashore in Kamal on the island of Madura.(79)
The next morning, on the 10th, Major General Ilgen broadcast the announcement as prom-
ised. The divisional commander sent Major General Ilgen to Major General Abe in Malang
to be sent to an internment camp. Meanwhile, the divisional commander left Sidoarjo at 1000
on that day (the 10th) and moved his command post to Surabaya at 1400.(79)
6. Conclusion of the Java Invasion Operation and the Operations
of the Allied Forces
The Troop Strength [Involved in] the Operation and the Military Gains
As of 20 December 1941, the troop strength scheduled to be employed by the Sixteenth Army
(excluding air and shipping units) was 97,800 men.(5) However, the [actual] number of troops
that landed on the island of Java in the first [transport] for the invasion [operation] (i.e. the
troop strength that landed during the first ten days of March, including airfield duty units
and shipping units) was about 55,000.(6)
The capitulation of the allied forces on Java was completed when the 8,000 troops of the
British and Australian Army which had been positioned in the mountain range east of Ban-
dung surrendered on 12 March.(32, 33)
When the Dutch East Indies Army surrendered on 9 March, the following numbers were
reported from the Dutch East Indies side concerning its entire army:(13)
Prisoners of war: 93,000 (including about 2,000 officers)
Breakdown: Units on Java 60,000
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Units outside Java 18,000
Volunteers 15,000
Captured weaponry:
152 aircraft (breakdown: 24 bombers, 45 fighter planes, and 83 other planes)
367 tanks (including armored vehicles)
732 guns
1,567 machine guns (mainly for aircraft)
97,384 firearms
4,105 bombs
120,000 boxes of explosives
30,000,000 shells of various kinds
34,000 hand grenades
72,317,100 bullets of various kinds
The military gains achieved on Java by 25 March were as follows:(14)
Prisoners of war: 82,618 in total
Breakdown Dutch East Indies Armed Forces 66,219
Australian Armed Forces 4,890
British Armed Forces 10,626
U.S. Armed Forces 883
Captured weaponry:
177 aircraft
940 guns in total (breakdown: 108 heavy guns, 161 field or mountain guns, 83 antiair-
craft guns and 588 [other] guns such as autocannons, antitank guns, trench mortars in
total)
4,228 heavy or light machine guns
80,778 rifles and pistols
5, 153 antiaircraft searchlights
1,728,585 rounds of gun ammunition
89,071,820 cartridges for machine guns and rifles
36,000 bombs
1,059 vehicles in total [consisting of] vehicles, tanks, armored vehicles, and special ve-
hicles 
9,500 motor vehicles
7,108 railway carriages
About one year’s supply of medicines for 100,000 people
The loss of personnel that the Sixteenth Army sustained was as follows:
1. From the day of the opening of the hostilities to 31 January
35 men killed (including 7 officers), 21 men died of wounds, 0 men died from a disease
contracted at the front, 130 men wounded, 6 men contracted a disease at the front
2. The loss it sustained during the Java Operation:
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1 March 2–5 March
killed wounded killed wounded
Shōji Detachment 63 165 19 26
Sakaguchi Detachment 1 18 2 28
2d Division 15 10 64 180
48th Division 91 254 0 21
In total 170 447 85 255
Of the convoys of the first transport of the Java invasion operation, the convoy of the Shōji
Detachment completed disembarkation on 4 March, and the convoy of the Sakaguchi De-
tachment and the 48th Division on 6 March. As for the main force of the Sixteenth Army,
after the seizure of Batavia, the ships were brought to that port for disembarkation, and the
final convoy started its return [to its original port] from that port on 14 March. As we have
seen, the transport of the Java invasion units was to be carried out in three transports (1st
transport: 560,000 tons, 2d transport: 150,000 tons, 3d transport: 100,000 tons; 810,000 tons in
total). The convoy of the 2d transport departed from Sakaide, Ujina, Moji, Dalian, Qingdao,
Shanghai, Gaoxiong and Lingayen, respectively carrying the 3d Battalion of the 2d Field Ar-
tillery Regiment and other units to be carried in the 2d transport in the following ships, which
assembled in Cam Ranh Bay between 9 and 20 March, and operated on a schedule to land in
Java on 29 March:(27, 94)
England-maru, France-maru, Kamoi-maru [Shin’i-maru], Shunkō-maru, Rashin-maru, Manshū-maru,
London-maru, Akiura-maru, Chile-maru, Nichiren-maru, Kamo-maru, Tamahoko-maru and Delagoa-
maru
However, the Java invasion operation was completed as early as 9 March. [As a result,] it
was decided to transport only such necessary units as the field artillery battalion of the 2d
Division [to Java] and redeploy the other units to other areas or send them back home.(27, 36)
On 10 March, the Emperor called the chiefs of the Army and the Navy General Staff to
his presence and bestowed an Imperial Rescript on the Commanders in Chief of the Southern
Army and the Combined Fleet, which read as follows:(13)
Imperial Rescript
The units of the Army and the Navy which executed operations in the East Indies area have in
close and effective cooperation covered a long distance, overcome many difficulties, and skill-
fully destroyed the enemy air power as well as its naval vessels. At the same time, the units res-
olutely carried out extremely difficult landing operations in various areas and while crushing
the formidable enemy everywhere, thoroughly destroyed all the enemy key bases with great
speed and boldness, and have swept away the power of the enemy.
We have the greatest respect for them.
On 12 March, various ceremonies of the second celebration day of the war victory were held
in the homeland.(13)
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The Operations of the Allied Forces (See Illustration No. 70)
According to the published war history of Britain and the statements of Lieutenant General
Ter Poorten and other generals of the Dutch East Indies Army, the operations of the allied
forces were carried out in outline as follows:(50, 51)
On 3 January, the American-British-Dutch-Australian [ABDA] Command was formed
and its Supreme Commander General Wavell arrived in Java on 10 January. On the 18th, he
set up his general headquarters in Lembang but left Java after disbanding it on 25 Febru-
ary.(51)
Earlier on 2 January, Britain had decided to reinforce the Dutch East Indies with two di-
visions from the Middle East. At the end of January, when Singapore had become isolated,
General Wavell made the decision to employ the Australian division that was expected to
arrive at the end of February for Sumatra and the Australian division and armored brigade
that were scheduled to arrive in March for Java. However, as the situation became critical,
he requested Lieutenant General Ter Poorten on 5 February to divert a total of two battalions
from Batavia and Cimahi on Java to Sumatra. In the middle of February, when [the Japanese]
conducted the Bangka and Palembang operations, the total troop strength of the Dutch East
Indies Army in Sumatra was seven battalions, of which one battalion was stationed in Palem-
bang and another battalion on the islands of Bangka and Belitung. These two battalions were
the above-mentioned force that had been diverted from Java. The bulk of these two battalions
and an advance party of the Australian Army, which had been arriving in southern Sumatra
at that time, retreated to Java one after another.(50, 51) Right after [the Japanese] carried out the
landing on Bali (on 20 February), the decision was made to call off the additional deployment
of the two Australian Army divisions to the Dutch East Indies (their destination was changed
to Burma and India [instead]).(51)
When [the Japanese] launched the Java landing operations, the troop strength on Java
consisted of about 65,000 Dutch East Indies Army troops and about 16,000 U.S., British and
Australian Army troops, totaling about 81,000 troops.(51)
Of the troops of the Dutch East Indies Army, about 25,000 troops belonged to regular
units, which consisted of four infantry regiments (with three battalions each) as the core.
There were three divisional headquarters, and apart from these, there was the Bandung Sec-
tor Garrison Army headquarters. The main force of the U.S., British and Australian Army
was called the “Black Force” and consisted of two infantry battalions as its core.(51) [Editor’s
note: The “Black Force” was named after its commander Brig. Gen. A.S. Blackburn.]
The disposition of the main regular units [of the Dutch East Indies Army] at the time when
[the Japanese] launched the Java landing operation was in outline as follows:(50)
Army headquarters (Lieutenant General Ter Poorten): Bandung
Western Java Corps ([led by] 1st Division Commander, Major General Schilling)
Headquarters: Batavia
1st Infantry Regiment: Batavia, Tangerang sector
2d Infantry Regiment: Buitenzorg sector
Black Force: Buitenzorg sector
Bandung Area Garrison Army Corps (Major General Pesman)
Headquarters: Bandung
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4th Infantry Regiment: the area stretching from Cirebon and vicinity in the east to
Krawang and vicinity in the west, with its center in Bandung
Central Java Corps (2d Division Commander, Major General Cox)
Headquarters: Magelang
No regular infantry regiments
Eastern Java Corps (3d Division Commander, Major General Ilgen)
Headquarters: Surabaya area (primarily in Malang)
3d Infantry Regiment: with its main force in the area of Babad and Bojonegoro, and
one element in the area of Cepu and Kertosono 
Lieutenant General Ter Poorten had judged that the Japanese army would be able to employ
six to seven divisions for the invasion of Java and that the Japanese would have their main
force land in western Java. Because of this, he had transferred the 2d Infantry Regiment from
Bandung to the Western Java Corps, and the 4th Infantry Regiment from the Central Java
Corps to the newly established Bandung Area Garrison Army Corps at the end of Febru-
ary.(50)
Lieutenant General Ter Poorten had given orders to the Eastern Java Corps to hold on to
the Surabaya stronghold as long as possible, and to the Central Java Corps to conduct a pro-
tracted struggle, while putting on a show that its strength was greater than it was, and retreat
in the end towards Cilacap and Bandung. He had [also] ordered the Western Java Corps to
aggressively make counterattacks. He had judged that even if the Japanese landed at the
coast north of Bandung (western central Java), it would be just for establishing a beachhead
in Cirebon.(50)
On the morning of 1 March, at the start of the landing of the Japanese troops, the Western
Java Corps began to move westwards in order to counterattack the Maruyama Division on
the line connecting Tangerang and Leuwiliang. The Black Force headed for Leuwiliang. The
Bandung Area Garrison Army Corps launched a counterattack against the Shōji Detachment
([landing at] Eretan) via a coastal road with the battalion from Cirebon. In the afternoon, it
turned out that Kalijati had been taken. In the late afternoon of the 1st, Lieutenant General
Ter Poorten passed down orders to the Western Java Corps to divert the 2d Infantry Regiment
(as one of its battalions had not yet returned from [its assignment in] West Sumatra, its actual
strength was [only] two battalions), one battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment and the Black
Force ([consisting of] two battalions as its core) to be put under the command of the Bandung
Area Garrison Army Corps for [a counterattack] to destroy the Shōji Detachment.(50)
On 2 March, Bandung Area Garrison Army Commander Major General Pesman carried
out a counterattack with the [Japanese] landing point at Eretan as the general target. The bat-
talion in Cirebon moved westward, while twenty-five tanks as well as one infantry battalion
from the Bandung stronghold headed northward by way of Subang, and one battalion of the
1st Infantry Regiment in Batavia moved eastward, following a route close to the coast. How-
ever, [the counterattack] ended up in failure. On that day, the 2d Infantry Regiment ([con-
sisting of] two battalions) arrived in the sector west of Bandung. The Black Force, having
expressed its [negative] opinion on the plan, did not shift its position.(50, 51)
On 3 March, with the 2d Infantry Regiment ([consisting of] two battalions) added to the
strength of the previous day, [Major General Pesman] launched a counterattack with Kalijati
as the primary target. Although the 2d Infantry Regiment was bombed by the Endō Air Di-
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vision when it was moving forward via Purwakarta, it engaged with the Wakamatsu Battal-
ion until the morning of the following day, the 4th. One battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment,
which was moving east from Batavia, engaged on the morning of the 4th the Egashira Bat-
talion, which had moved via Subang and Kalijati [to Cikampek]. On that day (the 3d), the
Black Force ([consisting of] two battalions) started to engage the Nasu Detachment at Leuwil-
iang. [Also] on that day (the 3d), the main force of one of the battalions, which had been sent
earlier to southern Sumatra, came [back] ashore in Wijnkoopsbaai on the southwest coast [of
Java] and started its advance towards Bandung. Further, one semi-regular battalion was di-
verted from the Central Java Corps to Bandung.(50)
On the morning of 4 March, engagements went on in Cikampek (with the Egashira Bat-
talion), Purwakarta (with the Wakamatsu Battalion) and Leuwiliang (with the Nasu Detach-
ment). Before noon, Lieutenant General Ter Poorten gave orders to the units in Batavia and
Buitenzorg area to assemble in the Bandung stronghold. [He also] ordered the Black Force
to retreat to Sukabumi.(50, 51)
Around noon on 5 March, the units in Batavia had finished their retreat. In the afternoon,
the Black Force withdrew from its rear positions around Buitenzorg and vicinity. It was
[newly] assigned to take charge of the eastern sector of the Bandung defense line.(50, 51)
On 6 March, the Shōji Detachment attacked the positions south of Ciater. Lieutenant Gen-
eral Ter Poorten decided to make the position at Lembang ([with the unit consisting of] one
regular battalion as its core) his main position, and made up his mind that he would surren-
der Bandung if this position should be seized.
On the afternoon of 7 March, Lembang was taken. Thus, he sent a military envoy to the
Shōji Detachment with an offer to surrender.(50)
As we have seen, the Central Java Corps did not have a regular regiment. Major General
Cox, the commander of the 2d Division, tried to block the advance of the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment at vital positions with militia units, as well as the deployment of a cavalry unit. [In the
meantime,] he moved its headquarters from Magelang to Wangon.(50)
Major General Ilgen, commander of the Eastern Java Corps (and commander of the 3d
Division) had intended to launch an aggressive counterattack from the direction of the Solo
River. He had positioned the 8th Battalion of the 3d Infantry Regiment in Bojonegoro and
the 13th Battalion in Babad, and the 3d Battalion on the island of Madura (the Surabaya
stronghold area), while positioning the semi-regular 19th Battalion in the Cepu and the Ker-
tosono areas. As soon as Bojonegoro and Cepu were taken, the commander changed the dis-
position: [while leaving] the 13th Battalion in Babad (as before), he shifted the 8th Battalion
to Sukorame, south [of Babad], the semi-regular 19th Battalion to Kertosono and the 3d Bat-
talion to Surabaya. When Major General Ilgen learned that despite the fierce engagement
that occured in Kertosono, the Japanese presence in the Babad area consisted of nothing more
than a reconnaissance regiment (the Kitamura Unit), he had the 3d Battalion in Surabaya
move to Mojokerto to have it cover the retreat [of other troops], and [in the meantime] had
the 8th and the 13th Battalions retreat respectively to Porong and Gempol, and the semi-reg-
ular 19th Battalion to Pandakan, after which he had the 3d Battalion retreat to Gempol. Then
when the Porong sector was broken through [by the Japanese], Major General Ilgen had the
13th and the semi-regular 19th Battalions retreat to the east of Malang, and the 3d and 8th
Battalion respectively to Jember and Lumajang, while having his headquarters pull back to
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Pasirian from the Porong area. After hearing the surrender broadcast from Bandung, Major
General Ilgen also offered his surrender.(50)
Illustration No. 70 — Locations Relevant to the Operations of the Allied Forces
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The Black Clandestine Broadcasts by the Southern Army
One of the causes that swiftly brought the Java [invasion] operation to a conclusion was
[Japanese] black clandestine broadcasting aimed at Java. According to the “Report on the
Progress of Black Clandestine Broadcasts toward Java” of the headquarters of the Southern
Army and the recollections by Captain Tarōra Sadao, the black clandestine broadcasts were
conducted in the following way:
Decision to Broadcast
At the beginning of February 1942, a large number of NHK [Japan Broadcasting Corporation]
broadcasters and press reporters had assembled at Staff Section 2 of the headquarters of the
Southern Army (at Saigon) to prepare for the reopening of broadcasting stations after the
seizure of the stations at Singapore, Rangoon, Bandung, etc. When the work of the intelli-
gence staff calmed down after the fall of Singapore on 15 February, the reporters of the var-
ious news agencies working at the Publicity Department as well as at Section 2, the
representatives dispatched from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the intelligence officers
made a joint study at Section 2 with Captain Tarōra Sadao as the central figure. They drew
up a plan to deliver black clandestine broadcasts toward Java in close coordination with the
Java invasion operation of the Sixteenth Army in order to quickly conclude the Java [inva-
sion] operation as well as to prevent scorched-earth tactics from happening in Java. Their
plan received the approval of Commander in Chief Terauchi.
The Broadcasting Situation in Java
In Java, the Dutch East Indies had so far set up large broadcasting stations operating with a
power of one to ten kilowatts in Surabaya, Bandung, Tanjung Priok [and other cities] to cover
every region, and about twenty-eight smaller broadcasting stations in each region for broad-
casts within the provinces and local regions; each [station] transmitted broadcasts to indi-
vidual antennas. It seemed that in order to strengthen the air defense and to intensify
propaganda and guidance by radio after the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, the broad-
casting stations had been brought under government control with the Bandung broadcasting
station acting as the center, while the broadcasts from the Tanjung Priok station were essen-
tially suspended. Programs were broadcast from the station at Bandung with 1.5 kilowatts
of power on three frequencies, 15,310, 11,000 and 10,260 kilocycles, and the station called
itself Batavia Station or Bandung Station as the occasion demanded.
At that time, in view of the past example when clever German use of black clandestine
radio [broadcasts] had led the Netherlands and Poland to make numerous mistakes, the
Dutch East Indies were extremely on guard against radio waves of dubious origin. As a de-
fense against such broadcasts, apart from implementing various technical measures, it did
not shut down the emission of radio signals after the sign-off. Furthermore, following the
examples of other countries, it particularly attached importance to domestic propaganda
radio programs. Not to mention public notices or announcements of the government or the
army authorities, it communicated at times [even] orders and official notices such as mobi-
lization and assembly orders, or orders for subordinate units, using common language, ab-
breviations and secret language. As a matter of course, control and censorship of the news
were strictly implemented.
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The Situation at the Saigon Broadcasting Station
The broadcasting station of Saigon available to the Southern Army had [the equipment,
which could broadcast] with 12 kilowatts of power on the frequency of 10,240 and 6,180 kilo-
cycles, and with 3 kilowatts of power on the frequency of 10,150 kilocycles. The Southern
Army provided and also censored the news broadcast in Dutch and Malay by French In-
dochina on the frequency of 10,240 kilocycles. However, the army kept itself in the back-
ground and just let French Indochina put these programs on the air. As a result, the addresses
from Saigon to the Dutch East Indies remained very passive.
Preparations for Broadcasting by the Southern Army 
In order not to expose the [Japanese] intentions, the Southern Army planned to transmit,
during the Java invasion operation and in close coordination with the operations, the neces-
sary deceptive broadcasts from the Saigon broadcasting station by using the name of the
Dutch East Indies authorities and switching the original signal sent with 12 kilowatt of power
on the frequency of 10,240 kilocycles to a signal on the frequency of 10,260 kilocycles on the
same wavelength as the broadcasting station of Bandung, hoping that it would lead the
Dutch East Indies Army to make the wrong judgments about the [Japanese Army’s] inten-
tions and its strength. [The Southern Army] also planned to swiftly obtain a full surrender
through the demoralization of the Dutch East Indies by stressing the irresponsible attitude
of the United States and Britain regarding the defense of Java, and started its preparations
for the black clandestine broadcasts. 
The use of the broadcasting station at Saigon, the frequency changes, and its long-term
overall use in particular, were considered quite difficult because of the complexity of the in-
ternational relationship between Japan and France. However, after the official submission of
the request to the government of French Indochina on 23 February and all sorts of negotia-
tions, the [Japanese] request was accepted. The Southern Army provided the Saigon Broad-
casting Station with crystals with a frequency of 10,260 kilocycles and adjusted [the
equipment] so as to be able to timely switch [its frequency] from 10,240 kilocycles [to 10,260
kilocycles].
In order to conduct the black clandestine broadcasts, the Southern Army organized a spe-
cial broadcasting detail in the following way:
Organization of the Special Broadcasting Detail
General supervisor: 1 company officer
Editing staff: 1 company officer and 2 army-drafted personnel
Translators (including broadcasters): 1 embassy vice-consul (Dutch language), 1 officer
cadet (Dutch language), 4 army-drafted personnel (1
for the Malay and 3 for the Dutch language), 2
Malays, 1 Indonesian and 1 Dutchman
Technicians (including monitor staff): 5 army-drafted personnel (interception [of broad-
casts] in the Dutch language only)
External relations staff: 1 company officer and 2 army-drafted personnel
In total: 18 
[Editor’s note: The numbers do not add up, unless the foreign nationals are not included.]
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From 25 to 28 February, the Special Broadcasting Detail intercepted broadcasts by the NIROM
[Nederlandsch-Indische Radio Omroep Maatschappij: Dutch East Indies Radio Broadcasting
Corporation] (at Bandung) and monitored the signals night and day. With the broadcasts of
the Saigon station still on the air as usual so as to conceal its intentions, the detail monitored
the NIROM signal around the clock day after day, trying to find out agitation on the Dutch
East Indies side during the day, and carefully seeking the moment when transmissions would
be suspended at night. The Dutch East Indies side did not suspend the emission of the signal
all night but transmitted instead the sound of a bell every fifteen seconds, as if they were on
guard against sham broadcasts.
Broadcasting
On 27 February, the Special Broadcasting Detail had finished its preparations.
On 27 and 28 February, the Dutch East Indies broadcasts were as confident as ever, with
no admission of anything out of the ordinary. 
At 0000 on 1 March (the day of the landing of the Sixteenth Army), with the sudden
[broadcast of] an air-raid alarm siren, the tumult in Java was on the air, and lasted for about
two hours. At 0630, the signal of the Dutch East Indies broadcasting station, which [normally]
was never suspended all day long, was interrupted. [The Special Broadcasting Detail] mon-
itored the situation of the Dutch East Indies station for a while and prepared itself to start its
black clandestine broadcast at 0800, when the Dutch East Indies station resumed its trans-
mission at 0805. However, it only briefly reported the landing of the Japanese Army on the
north coast of Java, and then as usual it only leisurely broadcast news from overseas as well
as music until the end of the program of that day.
The NIROM Broadcasting Station in Bandung
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At 0730 on 2 March, the signal of the Dutch East Indies was [again] interrupted as on the
day before. Without missing an opportunity, the Special Broadcasting Detail immediately
started putting Dutch music on the air from the Saigon station at the frequency of 10,260 kilo-
cycles, modulated the signal, and was about to switch to the real broadcast, when at 0800 the
Dutch East Indies station again resumed its broadcast. The Special Broadcasting Detail had
no choice but to abort its transmission and decided to wait until the morning of the 3d. Orig-
inally, the start of the black clandestine broadcasts was planned in such a way that simulta-
neously with the start of the landings of the Sixteenth Army in Java the Endō 3d Air Division
would destroy the Bandung broadcasting station. As soon as the station had gone off the air,
the Special Broacasting Detail would assume the identity of the Bandung broadcasting station
at the right moment and start broadcasting from the Saigon broadcasting station with the
message: “A short while ago, our broadcast from the Bandung broadcasting station was in-
terrupted due to a bombardment, but as the damage has been fixed, we are resuming our
broadcast.” However, judging from the condition of the air defense facilities of the Bandung
broadcasting station, the chances of success of a bombing raid by the 3d Air Division were
deemed small. Therefore, it was decided to start the black clandestine broadcasts from 3
March onwards, regardless of the situation of the signal of the Dutch East Indies broadcasting
station, and get hold of the listeners through technical manipulation.
From 0730 on 3 March onwards, the Special Broadcasting Detail began its black clandes-
tine broadcasts as scheduled from the Saigon broadcasting station, using the name of the
Bandung broadcasting station. That is to say, the detail aired a black clandestine broadcast
for about thirty minutes from 0730, before the morning newscast of the NIROM, and another
black clandestine broadcast in Dutch and Malay after the evening newscast of the NIROM
was over. The main topics of the broadcasts were as follows:
1. The Japanese army has been reinforced. Its troop strength already runs to 100,000 men and the
Dutch East Indies Army is caught in a desperate battle. Reinforcements from Britain, the United
States and Australia have not arrived yet.
2. Due to the powerful and swift advance of the Japanese troops and the half-hearted attitude of
the British, U.S. and Australian forces, the Dutch East Indies forces are caught in a lost battle
that is beyond control.
3. Large forces of the Japanese army are rapidly advancing. The destiny of Java is likely to be de-
cided within a few days. A responsible authority said: “The defense of Java was not as important
to the Allies as that of Australia.”
4. Large formations of Japanese air units once again carried out fierce airstrikes on Port Moresby
and Port Darwin.
5. The failure of the [allied] operation on Java has shaken Churchill’s position.
6. The U.S.-Filipino Army on the Bataan Peninsula is running short of provisions and is facing a
most difficult condition.
7. The Japanese troops in Burma have been reinforced. They stormed Rangoon, which left the
British Indian Army no choice but to give up the city.
8. German submarines are intensily active off the coast of the Atlantic Ocean.
9. Those who are in possession of motor vehicles or motor bicycles and live in or around Bandung
are required to assemble immediately. Those who have been called up for service and have been
requested to present themselves at the Navy Department in Surabaya today do not need to be
enlisted [anymore].
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10. The Japanese troops, which landed at the bay of Indramayu, are now approaching a point thirty
kilometers north of Bandung.
11. According to stories of eyewitnesses to the horrors of war, the Japanese army has meted out se-
vere punishments to those who engaged in scorched-earth tactics.
That day (3 March), was the day when the Nasu Detachment advanced to the front of the
Leuwiliang position and large-scale counterattacks from all sides were launched against the
Shōji Detachment. The reactions to and the success of the aforementioned broadcasts, how-
ever, were observed as follows:
1. At the beginning of the [Japanese] landings on the island of Java, radio communications in all
countries hardly mentioned the Japanese troop strength that had landed on the island. However,
from 5 March onwards, such articles as “the strength of the Japanese army that has landed on
Java is estimated at 70,000 to 100,000 troops,” started to be seen in Arip [the semiofficial French
Indochinese news agency] and other media, after which the Dutch East Indies came to overes-
timate the Japanese troop strength.
2. [The topics on] the airstrikes on Australia and New Guinea were broadcast roughly one day
later.
3. The coverage of the instability of Churchill’s cabinet started to appear in succession in overseas
news from around 5 to 6 March. On 6 March, the [Japanese] Dōmei News Agency even started
reporting as news from Washington that “Howard [Stafford?] Cripps is the successor.” It was
observed that this news might to a certain degree have been derived from the black clandestine
broadcast.
The Bandung broadcast on that day (3 March) was as usual; it only briefly touched on the
war situation on the island, with no admission of anything out of the ordinary.
The next day, 4 March, was the day when the Nasu Detachment attacked the Leuwiliang
position all day, the Wakamatsu Battalion of the Shōji Detachment returned to Kalijati after
seizing Purwakarta to the west in the morning, and the Egashira Battalion advanced to the
bridge over the Citarum River. On that day, the Special Broadcasting Detail delivered black
clandestine broadcasts for about thirty minutes three times in the morning and [again] three
times in the afternoon in Dutch and Malay from the Saigon broadcasting station, calling itself
the Bandung broadcasting station. The broadcast topics were in outline as follows:
1. Japanese air forces bombed Sydney as well as key locations on Java, yesterday 3 March.
2. Due to a shortage of troops and the irresponsible retreat of U.S., British and Australian forces,
the Dutch East Indies Army has been forced into an overall retreat. We, the people of the Dutch
East Indies should have second thoughts about the position of the Dutch East Indies.
3. Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt have promised specific support to Australia
in a joint statement.
4. General Wavell has fled to India.
5. The Dutch East Indies government and army will put off the implementation of matters they
have already publicly announced.
6. The people of the Dutch East Indies must stop destroying basic facilities for daily life and calmly
wait and see.
7. The information the government had provided the people with was incorrect. The Japanese
army is powerful but has a warm heart.
8. Under fierce attacks from the air as well as by land, Bandung is on the verge of a crisis.
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9. Van Mook has raised strong protests against Britain and the United States.
10. U.S. government circles are giving a sharp retort to the slander on Lieutenant General
MacArthur in a London broadcast.
11. A large Japanese army unit has crossed the Sittang River, which is putting pressure on Britain
to provide support for Burma.
12. The Japanese air power deserves close attention and the United States is going all out to inves-
tigate the true state of things.
13. The Dutch people in the home country under German occupation are worried whether the
Dutch East Indies will adopt destruction tactics for Java.
14. The island of Java is about to be split into three by the Japanese army. All residents must give
up their dependence on other countries.
On that day (the 4th), the Dutch East Indies broadcasting station aired its programs as usual.
The war situation in Java was only briefly broadcast, with no admission of anything out of
the ordinary. Nevertheless, the [black clandestine] broadcast on that day was considered to
have had the following effect:
1. It seemed that the [Japanese] broadcast, which had hinted at the shortage of strength of the
Dutch East Indies Army, especially the news that the Japanese troops were being continuously
reinforced, had caused considerable anxiety on the Dutch East Indies side. On the night of the
5th, the NIROM station broadcast that: “The Japanese troops are more numerous than ours and
we are at a disadvantage in every aspect.” The NIROM station repeated a similar broadcast on
the 8th.
2. Apart from broadcasting the general war situation, the fact that [the Japanese clandestine broad-
cast] clearly mentioned the seized locations in particular apparently had a great effect on at-
tracting people to the black clandestine broadcasts. As a result, from the 5th onwards, the
NIROM station all of a sudden changed its former attitude of providing only brief and abstract
reports; moreover the contents of its releases became pessimistic.
The next day, 5 March, was the day when the Nasu Detachment seized the Leuwiliang posi-
tion in the morning and advanced to the front of Buitenzorg in the evening, the Satō Detach-
ment entered Batavia at night, and the Shōji Detachment moved southward from Subang
and seized the pillbox positions at Ciater in the evening. On that day, the Special Broadcasting
Detail, as on the preceding day, delivered its broadcasts [this time] for about one hour once
in the morning and [again] three times in the afternoon in Dutch and Malay from the Saigon
broadcasting station, calling itself the Bandung broadcasting station. The contents of the
broadcasts were as follows:
1. The Japanese Army has again landed large units on the north coast of Java as well as on several
locations on the south coast.
2. Van Mook is reproaching Britain and the United States.
3. In order to arrest persons engaging in scorched-earth tactics, the Japanese Army is using fifth
column units.
4. On 3 March, the Japanese Army carried out an intensive bombardment on Sydney and key lo-
cations in the periphery of Java.
5. People must stop destroying basic facilities for daily life and calmly wait and see.
6. Bandung is facing a total crisis due to fierce attacks by the Japanese air force.
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7. A large Japanese army unit has crossed the Sittang River, which is putting pressure on the British
Armed Forces to provide support for Burma.
8. The United States is paying close attention to the Japanese air power and is going all out to in-
vestigate the true state of things.
9. The Dutch people in the home country under German occupation are worried whether the peo-
ple in Java will carry out scorched-earth tactics.
10. The island of Java is about to be split into three by the Japanese army. All residents must give
up their dependence on the United States, Britain and Australia.
11. The garrison of Batavia has offered a cease-fire to the Japanese.
12. General Wavell, who has returned to India, said that he had gained a new appreciation of the
Japanese forces and stressed the necessity of intensive training for his own troops.
13. The British House of Commons is debating the issue of a shortage of troops as well as of labor
in Australia.
14. The whole north coast and west coast of Australia is frightened by the Japanese air strikes.
15. The lines of communication of our army have been cut off. People must not engage in hasty
acts of destruction.
16. Van Mook’s protests against Britain and the United States are creating a great sensation among
the allied nations.
17. The residents in the areas along Bantam Bay occupied by the Japanese army are living a normal
life.
18. The Japanese Army is using fifth column [units] to arrest saboteurs.
19. At an Allied War Council, the Australian representative requested reinforcements from Britain
and the United States.
20. The Japanese Army landed at Wijnkoopsbaai as well as east of Probolinggo on the 5th.
21. All listeners are asked to beware of false rumors [spread by] news from unidentified broadcast-
ing stations.
22. Honolulu, which has been shaking from massive explosions of an unknown origin, came under
a large Japanese airstrike on the 5th.
23. Germany made a mocking remark about the removal of General Wavell and the Dutch people
in the home country are delighted about it.
The Bandung broadcasting station maintained its broadcasts in the same manner as it had
on the previous day until the evening of that day (the 5th). However, all of a sudden at 2015,
the station started to show its reaction to [the Japanese] broadcasts. That is to say, the Ban-
dung station started with a public announcement warning that “in order to obstruct our mil-
itary leadership, the enemy (Japan) is sending clandestine broadcasts from a certain
broadcasting station. Listeners must mark the difference by the voice of the announcers and
not be swayed by these [fake broadcasts].” Then, the station aired all at once all the discour-
aging topics that had been concealed so far: such as the situation of defeat in Java, the anxiety
in political circles, the conflict between Britain and the United States over the failure to defend
Java, the protest by the Dutch East Indies authorities to Britain and the United States, the
search for who was to blame for the defeat, etc. After that, the Dutch East Indies side lost
control over its propaganda and the station began to give reactions that were induced by the
Japanese broadcasts. It seemed that the propaganda policy of the Dutch East Indies had ba-
sically collapsed. Particularly, when the [Japanese] Special Broadcasting Detail aired on that
day that “Van Mook has raised a fierce protest against Britain and the United States about
General Wavell’s retreat to India,” the Dutch East Indies side, as if making some kind of ex-
cuse, broadcast several times on the 6th as well as on the 7th, a recording of Van Mook’s ad-
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dress at the People’s Council of 5 March, which was very unfavorable for the Dutch East In-
dies. It provided the Japanese with materials to decide on conducting a broadcast to advise
the Dutch East Indies to surrender.
The main results gained in the response to the broadcast on that day (5 March) were in
outline as follows:
1. Alarmed at the news of “further landings of large units of the Japanese Army” in the [Japanese]
clandestine broadcasts, the Dutch East Indies side believed it and aired a report at 2300 on 6
March from the NIROM station that “the Japanese Army is conducting further landings at Tegal,
Cilacap, Probolinggo and the island of Madura.”
[The fact was that] the Japanese Army had conducted no landings at all at the aforemen-
tioned locations. However, the broadcast of the Special Broadcasting Detail deceived the broad-
casting station of the Dutch East Indies, which in turn misled the Dutch East Indies Army, and
eventually IGHQ and the Sakaguchi Detachment were [also] misled.
The chief of the Special Broadcasting Detail, Captain Tarōra, recollected it as follows:
After the completion of the operation, survey squads were immediately dispatched to the
field. In all the areas where we conducted on-site surveys, the people as well as officials were
obeying the instructions from Saigon and had no doubts whatsoever even after the surren-
der. The chief of operations of the Dutch East Indies Army headquarters stated: “As infor-
mation on [further] landings [of the Japanese] in Cilacap was repeatedly received, I sent one
of our two heavy artillery batteries that had been kept in reserve down south, but up to now
I still have my doubts about the source of this information.” It was only much later, when
the staff officers involved presented themselves at IGHQ, and were asked, “Who had or-
dered the landing in Cilacap,” and answered, “That was just a fabrication,” that [IGHQ] saw
the funny side of it.
Staff Officer Yano of the Sakaguchi Detachment recalled it as follows:
As we had information that “Japanese forces are landing in Cilacap and vicinity,” we had
no doubt that the Navy was trying to distinguish itself by stealing a march on us, and we
furiously charged toward Cilacap.
2. The aforementioned broadcast of “further landings of the Japanese Army” by the NIROM also
reached countries abroad at face value, and a broadcast in San Francisco aired [a report of] “fur-
ther landings of 50,000 Japanese reinforcements” on the 6th.
3. Against the black clandestine broadcast of the Special Broadcasting Detail that “Van Mook has
raised protests against Britain and the United States,” the NIROM aired a recording of Van
Mook’s address at the People’s Council on the previous day. The recorded speech contained the
following passage: “If the Dutch East Indies had not participated in the war, we would now be
like Thailand and French Indochina.” These words were carefully scrutinized for possible hid-
den meanings. But then again, the recorded speech was interpreted as nothing but an excuse to
the people. This speech became valuable material in the decision to broadcast an advice to sur-
render.
4. It was observed that topic No. 3 (the use of fifth column units to arrest those who engaged in
scorched-earth tactics) and No. 5 (stop the destruction and calmly wait and see) of [the Japanese]
broadcast caused considerable confusion at the Dutch East Indies side. The Dutch East Indies
announced through the NIROM broadcast that, “a specially-formed military police shall be cre-
ated to control groundless rumors.” We then followed this up in a clandestine broadcast by say-
ing that “People must beware of fake police authorities, as they are everywhere.”
5. Struggling with the fact that the Japanese clandestine broadcasts were widely listened to by the
people in Java, the NIROM at 2015 on 5 March repeatedly transmitted instructions to “listen to
the voice of the announcers to tell the difference and avoid being deceived by these fake broad-
casts.” [Against this,] the Special Broadcasting Detail aired that “You will know which news
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tells the truth if you compare the news and the facts,” by which the detail seized upon the
NIROM’s weakness that it had until now not dealt so much with domestic news. From then on,
the NIROM suddenly started covering domestic news or the attitudes of Britain or the United
States, and the content of the broadcasts reflected gloomier views.
6. Beginning with the flight of General Wavell, a number of broadcasts aired on that day with the
intention of alienating the Dutch East Indies from Britain and the United States reached overseas
countries, and [the report] that “not only Britain but also the United States have come to abandon
the Dutch East Indies” started to appear in the news worldwide.
The next day, 6 March, was the day when the Nasu Detachment seized Buitenzorg in the
morning, the Sixteenth Army again submitted a request for the air lift [of troops from Palem-
bang] to support the Shōji Detachment, and the latter detachment repulsed the counterattack
of the enemy in the morning and seized one vital area of the positions across the mountain
ridge in the evening. That night, the Dutch East Indies decided to make the Lembang position
its main position, and [also] made up its mind to surrender Bandung should this position be
taken.
On that day (the 6th), the Special Broadcasting Detail broadcast once in the morning (for
about one hour) and three times in the afternoon (for about two and a half hours [in total])
in Dutch and Malay. A noteworthy [feature] of the broadcast on that day was that the detail
had started airing broadcasts with the advice to surrender. Having heard the recorded speech
of Van Mook, which the NIROM had broadcasted that morning, the Southern Army judged
that the Dutch East Indies was considering surrender. At 1930 and again at 2145 on that day,
the detail broadcast Commander in Chief Terauchi’s message advising surrender on the
wavelength used in French Indochina, while in close coordination with this, putting the black
clandestine broadcast on the air on the wavelength used in the Dutch East Indies. The broad-
cast emphasized Britain’s and the United States’ abandonment of the Dutch East Indies, the
situation of the Dutch East Indies Army losing the war, the crisis in the Churchill adminis-
tration, the people’s yearning for peace, the opinions [exchanged] between the [Dutch East
Indies] army and government concerning surrender, the dispute between Britain and the
United States on the failure of defending Java, etc.
The main topics that the Special Broadcasting Detail broadcast on that day (6 March) were
in outline as follows:
1. The advance of the Japanese Army in Burma is furious; it caused the abandonment of Rangoon.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s troops are withdrawing to the north.
2. The garrison in Batavia has surrendered. Its citizens are fully protected by the Japanese Army.
3. The total defeat in Java made Prime Minister Churchill decide on the resignation of his cabinet
en masse.
4. The people [in Java] must remain calm and composed like the citizens of Batavia. They must
not vainly provoke the Japanese Army.
5. Prime Minister Churchill declared brazenly that he bore no responsibility for the [failed] defense
of Java.
6. People must beware of fake police authorities, as they are everywhere.
7. A Dutch East Indies tank unit that was heading to attack the Kalijati airfield has not been heard
of.
8. The Japanese air force has bombed Australia and the [Lesser] Sunda Islands.
9. The leader of a U.S. mission to India has been chosen.
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10. Our units are fiercely engaging with a powerful mechanized unit of the enemy (Japanese Army)
in Lembang and vicinity.
11. The home country of the Netherlands is delighted about the broadcast of [the address of] Van
Mook, who has come to his senses concerning Britain and the United States.
12. In order to maintain public peace and order, people in the areas occupied by the Japanese Army
must obey the army’s orders.
13. The Japanese Army is passing through Surakarta and Yogyakarta from the morning of the 6th
onwards.
The next day, 7 March, was the day when [Siteenth] Army Commander Imamura advanced
from Serang to Batavia, the Shōji Detachment left the mountain ridge line in the afternoon to
advance into the Lembang sector in the evening.
On that day (the 7th), the Special Broadcasting Detail [again] broadcast once in the morn-
ing (for about one hour) and three times in the afternoon (for about two and a half hours [in
total]) in Dutch and Malay. Furthermore, at 1930 and again at 2145 as it had done on the pre-
vious day, the detail broadcast the message of the commander in chief [of the Southern Army]
advising surrender (note: four times in total since the previous day). On that day, the signal
of the NIROM went all the time on and off again from around 1300 onwards, and went com-
pletely silent at last by 2220. The main topics of the [Japanese] clandestine broadcasts aired
on that day were as follows:
1. The Dutch East Indies Army is caught in an uphill battle accross [the island]. The government
is likely to decide on surrender so as not to make the same mistake as Poland and Belgium.
Everyone must according to his own judgment appropriately deal with the Japanese Army’s
advice to surrender.
2. The rapid attack by the Japanese Army has already decided the outcome. The present result
came from the irresponsible retreat of the U.S., British and Australian forces. In order to bring
an end to this disadvantageous battle, the government is initiating every possible form of ne-
gotiations with Japan.
3. The government and the top-level officers of the army will hold an important meeting today
on the 7th concerning the Japanese Army’s advice to surrender.
4. The Japanese Fleet has made its appearance in the Indian Ocean.
5. Bennett is urging the people to be ready, saying that it is only a matter of weeks before a Japanese
attack on Australia takes place.
6. The Australian government officially announced that men would be made to perform military
duty or serve in the military industry.
7. The Japanese forces have carried out the sixth and the seventh bombardments of Port Moresby.
8. There are people who do not observe the suspension of scorched-earth tactics. Close watch is
required.
9. Signs of lack of military discipline are seen in all areas. All commanders must take the necessary
steps.
10. Fierce engagements are occurring on the highlands in the vicinity of Bandung.
11. Although Bandung’s fate is being sealed, the citizens must remain calm. They must not leave
their post.
12. Japanese reinforcement units are under sail to Java.
13. The Japanese Army stormed into a corner of Rangoon on the afternoon of the 7th.
14. Labor disputes in the United States are causing casualties.
The reactions of the Dutch East Indies side on that day (the 7th) were as follows:
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1. Concerning the aforementioned topic No. 1 of the [Japanese] clandestine broadcast (i.e. Everyone
must according to his own judgment appropriately deal with the Japanese Army’s advice to
surrender), the NIROM in no time aired as an official notice, “the special military police can be
recognized by a white scarf around their necks. You must be careful; they are not soldiers who
have surrendered.”
2. At 2220 at night, the NIROM fell completely silent.
3. At 2330 at night, a military envoy of the Bandung garrison army commander came to the Shōji
Detachment to offer a local cease-fire.
The next day, 8 March, was the day when Governor-General Tjarda [van Starkenborgh Sta-
chouwer] and the chief of the Dutch East Indies Army Department, Ter Poorten, came to
Kalijati in the afternoon for the meeting with [Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura.
It was not until the morning of that day (the 8th) that the Special Broadcasting Detail in
Saigon learned that “on the previous night, the Bandung garrison army commander offered
a local cease-fire to the Shōji Detachment.”
When the Special Broadcasting Detail received this news, it did not let the opportunity
slip to steer this toward a total surrender and aired instructions and annoucements directed
to the entire Dutch East Indies Army, all the administrative officials, and the people at large
on the assumption of the absolute superiority of the Japanese Army and pretending as if an
agreement for a total surrender was being concluded in Bandung. In this way, it tried to bring
about a feeling of defeat on the Dutch East Indies side and put the Sixteenth Army in an ad-
vantageous position in the negotiations. Then, as soon as it learned that the Dutch East Indies
Governor-General and his party would arrive in Kalijati at 1550, the Special Broadcasting
Detail figured that the total surrender of the Dutch East Indies had become a foregone con-
clusion. After that, the detail only aired discreet broadcasts using news from overseas so as
not to hamper this process, while preparing to close down the clandestine broadcasts.
On that day (the 8th), the Special Broadcasting Detail successively broadcasted in Dutch
and Malay from 0730 to 1800, except for the hours when the Saigon station aired its news
programs. Further, the detail decided to remain on the air for forty-eight consecutive hours
from 1935, successively broadcasting in Dutch and Malay. The number of broadcasts on this
day [the 8th] amounted to nine Dutch and Malay broadcasts each in the morning as well as
in the afternoon. The main topics the Special Broadcast Squad aired on that day as clandestine
broadcasts were in outline as follows:
1. The Japanese Army has entered Bandung.
2. [The Dutch East Indies] offered a cease-fire to the Japanese Army and is negotiating about the
particulars.
3. All the people [on Java] must follow the proclamation of the supreme commander [of the Dutch
East Indies army], and refrain from taking reckless, rash actions.
4. The Dutch East Indies Army has done its utter best, but due to the betrayal of the United States,
Britain and Australia, it had no choice but to make the ultimate decision and accept the message
of the Japanese Army Commander sent on the radio advising a cease-fire.
5. The Japanese Army accepted our offer of a cease-fire. At present, talks with the Japanese Army
are being held at the Isola Hotel in Bandung.
6. The reports of a Dutch East Indies cease-fire have caused emotional conflict between the British
government and the Dutch government in exile.
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7. Britain is much concerned about a sudden increase of pressure of the Japanese Army on Aus-
tralia and Burma as a consequence of the cease-fire with the Dutch East Indies Army, and is ask-
ing the United States for support.
8. Port Darwin was again bombed by the Japanese air force on the 7th.
9. It seems that Prime Minister [Luang] Pibulsonggram will be nominated to head the incoming
cabinet of Thailand.
10. As a result of the negotiations with the Japanese Army, the Dutch East Indies Army has decided
to suspend all hostilities.
11. The Japanese Army completely captured Rangoon on the morning of the 8th.
12. Reports on the cease-fire of the Dutch East Indies Army and the fall of Rangoon have greatly
upset the Australian government.
13. On the 8th, the government of the Dutch East Indies decided to surrender to the Japanese Army.
Each administrative official must follow the instructions given by the Japanese Army. Particulars
will be given as soon as they have been decided upon.
14. The Army as well as the government have decided to completely surrender to the Japanese
Army. All forces must surrender. Public officials and civilians alike must exert themselves to
maintain public order, following the instructions of the Japanese Army.
The next day, 9 March, was the day when the Dutch East Indies broadcast its unconditional
surrender in the afternoon. On that day, the Special Broadcasting Detail in Saigon started its
broadcast at 0730, aired the clandestine broadcasts in Dutch and Malay until 1805, except for
the hours when the Saigon station aired its news programs. The broadcasts on that day were
aired twice in the morning and three times in the afternoon both in Dutch and Malay. The
topics aired on that day were in outline as follows:
1. The Dutch East Indies government is still holding talks with the Japanese Army at Kalijati. Its
army, government officials and civilians must trust in the chivalrous (Bushidō) spirit of the Japan-
ese Army.
2. Australia is intensifying its guard. The Japanese air force is [still] actively operating in the South
Pacific, even after the offer of a cease-fire by the Dutch East Indies.
3. The war situation in Burma has developed and General Wavell is in the middle of negotiations
with Chiang Kai-shek’s army.
4. Peace has returned to the city of Batavia. The Japanese Army has established a military admin-
istration over the city.
As the Dutch East Indies officially accepted a total and unconditional surrender at 1500 on
that day and announced a joint statement by the Dutch East Indies government and the
Dutch East Indies Army regarding their total surrender from the Bandung station [starting]
from 2030, the Southern Army (i.e. the Special Broadcasting Detail) immediately stopped its
clandestine broadcasts.
The Shift to the Military Administration
The main characteristic of the Java operation was that the inhabitants welcomed [the Japanese
troops] with cheers and wholeheartedly actively cooperated. There was no need to watch
out for [hostile] indigenous people wherever on the island of Java [the Japanese troops] went
during the operation.(36)
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[Sixteenth] Army Commander Imamura, who made his entry into Batavia at 1500 on 7
March, simultaneously proclaimed Military Government Decree No. 1, installed the Military
Administration Department, [consisting of] Vice Chief of Staff Major General Harada and
his men, in Batavia, and immediately set them to work. Article 1 of the aforementioned Mil-
itary Government Decree No. 1 read as follows:(13)
Article 1. With the intention of promoting the welfare of the people of the East Indies, with
whom we share a common ancestry, and determined to ensure [a state of] coexistence and co-
prosperity with the local population based on the principle of a joint defense of Greater East
Asia, the Imperial Japanese Army shall for the present implement a military administration in
the area of the East Indies in order to establish peace and order within the East Indies and swiftly
let the people live and work in peace and quiet.
[Changes in] the Disposition of the Units
On the day when the Dutch East Indies Army surrendered (9 March), the Southern Army
passed down orders in which it designated the entire island of Sumatra as the operational
area of the Twenty-fifth Army from 12 March onwards and ordered the units currently pres-
ent in the area to be transferred to that army as of that date.(23) It was anticipated that the
Shōji Detachment would return to the 38th Division operating in Sumatra, to which it had
[originally] belonged. Also, as previously decided, the Sakaguchi Detachment would return
to the 56th Division [currently] in Burma, to which it had [originally] belonged. [Apart from
these,] special consideration was needed for the two principalities on Java, Surakarta and
Yogyakarta.
Taking these factors into account, on 10 March, the Sixteenth Army made the following
disposition of its units and passed down orders for the mopping up of remnants of the enemy,
the maintenance of public order, and the requisitioning as well as the securement of all facil-
ities and resources.(88)
[Sixteenth] Army headquarters: Batavia
Shōji Detachment: Shall be stationed in Batavia, scheduled to be put under the di-
rect control of the [Sixteenth] Army and be in charge of the
maintenance of public order in the Batavia residency. 
Sakaguchi Detachment: Shall assemble without delay in Batavia
2d Division: Shall take charge of western Java and the residencies of Peka-
longan and Banyumas with headquarters in Bandung.
48th Division: Shall take charge of central Java, and eastern Java and Madura
(with the exception of the principalities of Surakarta and Yo-
gyakarta as well as the Pekalongan and the Banyumas residen-
cies) with headquarters in Surabaya.
The two principalities of Surakarta and Yogyakarta shall be put under the direct control of the
Army. For this purpose, the 2d Division and the 48th Division shall each send half a battalion
of infantry as the core respectively to Yogyakarta and Surakarta by 15 March, and put these
units under the direct control of the Sixteenth Army.
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Conclusion
B
efore the opening of hostilities, the landing on Java in the Dutch East Indies invasion
operation was expected around the 103d day and the surrender of the Dutch East In-
dies around the 120th day from the opening of hostilities, assuming that the southern
operation could be carried out smoothly. However, [the operation was] concluded [ahead of
time] with the landing on Java on the 84th day, the surrender offer by the Dutch East Indies
Army on the 90th day, and the surrender of the army on the 92d day.
Here, I will look back on the execution of the plan and give consideration to some prin-
cipal matters.
1. As factors that enabled the Dutch East Indies operation to be completed in a shorter
period, the following can be considered:
(1) The success in the surprise attack on Hawaii and the decisive military gains in the sea battles
off Malaya.
The former not only removed the threat from the Pacific Ocean but also enabled [the Navy]
to send reinforcements to the Southern Task Force. The latter facilitated the progress of the
operations in the Malaya theater and also led to Britain’s abandonment of the idea to deploy
its main fleet.
(2) The success in the attack right at the opening of hostilities to destroy the enemy air power
as well as the success in the surprise landings in the Philippines and Malaya. 
(3) The Southern Army’s operational leadership to make the most of the initial military gains
and to keep on pursuing the enemy.
(4) The excellent cooperation between the Army and the Navy, which in particular enabled the
rapid advance of air bases.
(5) The complete isolation of Java before the landing of the Sixteenth Army, the defection of the
indigenous people from the Dutch side, and also the success in the black clandestine broad-
casts.
(6) The Shōji Detachment’s attack on Bandung, the main base of the Dutch East Indies Army,
with the support of the Endō Air Division, and the Sakaguchi Detachiment’s seizure of Cila-
cap, carried out by a sustained pursuit over a long distance at one go.
2. The distinctive characteristics of the leadership of the Sixteenth Army and of the way
each corps operated.
(1) The planning and conduct of the operations by the Sixteenth Army was cautious.
(2) The operational conduct of the 2d Division was hindered at the time of its advance by the
fact that it was under the direct instruction of the aforementioned Sixteenth Army as its main
corps, that the division was organized as a horse-carried [unit], and that many of the bridges
[on its way] were destroyed.
(3) The Shōji Detachment and the Sakaguchi Detachment carried out bold charges in their Java
operations.
The Sakaguchi Detachment conducted six operations [in total] (i.e. operations at six places)
from the opening of hostilities. In every operation, it carried out the operation with imagi-
nation and full of energy. 
(4) The 48th Division commander conducted the operations [of the division] with great attention
to control and mobility. Especially in the operations east of the Solo River, the advance guard
[commander] achieved decisive military gains by acting on his own judgment.
(5) The main force of the 38th Division carried out its assignment with careful planning and
bold execution of the operation.
(6) The Eastern Detachment carried out its assignment in close cooperation with the Navy, and
it was [also] able to smoothly carry out the capture of Dili in Portuguese [Timor.]
(7) Although the 1st Paratroop Raiding Group had to employ the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Reg-
iment, which came behind and had not been trained sufficiently, for the operations both
against the airport and the oil refineries, it boldly engaged in battle and lived up to the ex-
pectations of the entire Army.
3. The cooperation from the indigenous people.
The indigenous people defected from the Dutch side and cooperated with the Japan-
ese. The following reasons can be thought of: 
(1) The Dutch East Indies government and the Dutch people were removed from the indigenous
people.
(2) Of old, there had been exchanges between the Japanese and the Indonesians, and the in-
digenous people felt an affinity with the Japanese for having common ancestors and being
of the same race. Also, a legend had been widely handed down from olden times that a sav-
ior (Topi merah) would come to Indonesia to free them; the people felt that the Japanese ad-
vance this time was it.
(3) The propaganda of the Japanese Army had been effective.
4. Oil
We have seen that the main issue that caused the Greater East Asia War was the oil
issue, and that the Southern Army as well as the Sixteenth Army went to all kinds of
great pains to obtain the oil.
On 2 March 1942, the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government
could hold the following bright prospect:(3)
The current estimate of the amount of oil obtained is as follows:
Fiscal Year 1941
British Borneo 1,400 kiloliter
The Tarakan area 2,000 kiloliter
Fiscal Year 1942
British Borneo 700,000 kiloliter
The Tarakan area 250,000 kiloliter
The Sanga Sanga area 300,000 kiloliter
Southern Sumatra 500,000 kiloliter
In total 1,750,000 kiloliter
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After that on 9 March, the following rosy decisions were made in the Liaison Conference be-
tween IGHQ and the Government.(3)
1. The amount of oil for private use for the fiscal year 1942, which was set at 1.4 million tons just
before the opening of hostilities, shall now be revised to 1.9 million tons.
2. The Separate Oil [Categories] A and B (note by the author: the separate oil [categories] for the
Army and the Navy) to be used on site shall also be incorporated in the plan for the mobilization
of materials.
3. To implement the above, the amount of oil to be aquired in the Southern areas is decided at 1.7
million tons.
In this way, abundant oil resources were secured. The amount of oil to be acquired from the
Dutch East Indies in the first year of the war had been estimated at 300,000 tons before the
opening of hostilities, but now it was estimated to be 1.7 million tons.
However, with its tankers necessary for the transport destroyed or sunk one after another
by the allied forces, submarines in particular, Japan ended up continuing the war, again suf-
fering from an extreme shortage of fuel.
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Notes
1. Tairikumei-tsuzuri (大陸命綴 [The files of IGHQ Army Department Orders]), Daikairei-
tsuzuri (大海令綴 [The files of IGHQ Navy Department Orders]), Tairikushi-tsuzuri (大陸
指綴 [The files of IGHQ Army Department Instructions]), and Daikaishi-tsuzuri (大海指綴
[The files of IGHQ Navy Department Instructions]); these files contain the orders passed
down by the Army or the Navy Department of IGHQ, and the instructions (given by the
chief of general staff of the Army or the Navy based respectively on the orders of the Army
Department or the Navy Department of IGHQ).
2. Sakusen Kankei Jūyō Shorui-tsuzuri (作戦関係重要書類綴 [Files of important documents
concerning operations]). These files include documents [related to] the reports to the Em-
peror concerning operations, and documents [kept] at Section 2 (Operations Section) of
IGHQ.
3. Daihon’ei - Seifu Renraku Kaigi Gijiroku (大本営政府連絡会議議事録 [The minutes of the
Liaison Conferences between IGHQ and the Government]), [made by] the Army Department
of IGHQ.
4. Sugiyama Memo (杉山メモ [Sugiyama Memoranda]). These are the memoranda of the de-
liberations at the liaison meetings and conferences from January to May 1942, taken by Chief
of Army General Staff Sugiyama; they were [subsequently] sorted out and turned into a
clean copy by the War Direction Group (Section).
5. Riku-a-mitsu-tsuzuri (陸亜密綴 [Files of classified documents concerning the Greater East
Asia War at the War Ministry]). These files contain classified documents [including circular
notices issued] at the War Ministry concerning the Greater East Asia War.
6. Sanada Jōichirō Taisa Nikki (真田穣一郎大佐日記 [Diary of Col. Sanada Jōichirō]), then chief
of the Army Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of War.
7. Daihon’ei Kimitsu Sensō Nisshi (大本営機密戦争日誌 [The classified war journal of IGHQ]),
kept every day as the group (section) journal of Group 20 (Section 15) at the Army General
Staff Office. It should not be considered the official classified war journal of IGHQ; never-
theless it is of great value as material for the history of the war.
8. Kondō Dempachi Shōsa Nikki (近藤傳八少佐日記 [Diary of Maj. Kondō Dempachi]), then
staff of Section 2 of the Army Department of IGHQ.
9. Imoto Kumao Chūsa Nikki (井本熊男中佐日記 [Diary of Lt. Col. Imoto Kumao]), then staff
of Section 2 of the Army Department of IGHQ.
10. Tanaka Shin’ichi Chūjō no Nisshi ni motozuku Shuki (田中新一中将の日誌に基づく手記 [A
personal account of Lt. Gen. Tanaka Shin’ichi based on his journal]), then chief of the 1st Bu-
reau (Operations Bureau) of the Army Department of IGHQ.
11. Gunji Nenkan （『軍事年鑑』 [Military Yearbook]）, compiled by Zaidan Hōjin Gunjin Kaikan
Toshobu (財団法人軍人会館図書部編 [Publication Department of Gunjin Kaikan [Military
Center]]).
12. Nippon Gaikō Nempyō narabini Shuyō Bunsho (『日本外交年表並主要文書』　[Chronology of
Japanese Diplomacy and major documents]), compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
13. Newspapers, mainly the Asahi Shimbun (『朝日新聞』), along with other contemporary news-
papers. 
14. Kaikōsha-kiji (『偕行社記事』 [Bulletin of the Kaikōsha]), edited by the Kaikōsha (偕行社 [The
Association of Army Officers; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaikosha]).
15. Daitōa Senki (『大東亜戦記』 Rikugun Hōdō-bu-hen陸軍報道部編, [Chronicle of the Greater
East Asia War, edited by the Army Information Department]). 
16. Hattori Takushirō Taisa Kaisō (服部卓四郎大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Hattori
Takushirō]), then chief of Section 2 of the Army Department of IGHQ.
17. Okamura Masayuki Shōsa Kaisō (岡村誠之少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Okamura
Masayuki]), then staff of Section 2 of the Army Department of IGHQ.
18. Sejima Ryūzō Shōsa Kaisō (瀬島龍三少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Sejima Ryūzō]), then
staff of Section 2 of the Army Department of IGHQ.
19. Sugita Ichiji Chūsa Kaisō (杉田一次中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Sugita Ichiji]), then
staff of the 2d Bureau (Intelligence Bureau) of the Army Department of IGHQ.
20. Shiho Kenkichi Shōsa Kaisō (志甫健吉少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Shiho Kenkichi]), then
staff of Section 3 (Organization Section) of the Army Department of IGHQ.
21. Compiled from Tōnan-Ajiya Bunkaken-shi (『東南アジヤ文化圏史』 船越康壽著 [History of the
Southeast Asian cultural area, by Funakoshi Yasuju]); Zusetsu Nampō Kyōei-ken (『圖説南方共
栄圏』同盟通信社編 [The Southern Co-prosperity Sphere, edited by the Dōmei News Agency]),
Ranryō Indo Nōgyō Seisaku-shi (『蘭領印度農業政策史』關嘉彦著 [History of agricultural policies
in the Dutch East Indies, by Seki Yoshihiko]), Ran’in Seikatsu Nijūnen 『蘭印生活二十年』和田
民治著 [Twenty years in Dutch East Indies, by Wada Tamiji]), Rikugunshō Gummu-ka Ōnishi
Hajime Chūsa Shuki (陸軍省軍務課大西一中佐手記 [A personal account by Lt. Col. Ōnishi
Hajime, staff of Military Affairs Section of the Ministry of War]), Nampō Keizai Shigen Sōran
(『南方経済資源総覧』 細田秀造著 [Economic resources of Borneo, Celebes and New Guinea: A
complete guide to the economic resources in the South, vol. 11, by Hosoda Hidezō]), etc.
22. Nampō-gun Dempō Tsuzuri (南方軍電報綴 [File of the telegrams of the Southern Army]),
received by the Army Department of IGHQ.
23. Ishii Shiryō (石井資料 [The Ishii Documents]), the documents in the possession of Col. Ishii
Masayoshi, [then] senior staff of Section 1 of the Southern Army, and such documents as
various plans, orders, instructions and agreements related to the Southern Army, which he
obtained from the demobilization offices after the war. He sorted them out and also added
his descriptions on the operational directives of the Southern Army and others.
24. Nampō-sōgun no Tōsui (南方総軍の統帥) [The supreme command of the Southern Army]),
the journal in which Lt. Col. Arao Okikatsu, chief of operations staff of the Southern Army,
recorded in detail the classified matters on the supreme command of the Southern Army
from the time of the preparation of the operations by the army to the completion of most of
the southern invasion operation.
25. Tanikawa Kazuo Taisa Nikki (谷川一男大佐日記 [Diary of Col. Tanikawa Kazuo]), then sen-
ior staff of Section 4 (Aviation Section) of the staff department of the Southern Army.
26. Ishii Akiho Taisa Nikki (石井秋穂大佐日記 [The diary of Col. Ishii Akiho]), then senior staff
of Section 3 of the staff department of the Southern Army.
27. Taiheiyō Sensō ni okeru Sempaku Yusō no Kenkyū (太平洋戦争に於ける船舶輸送の研究 [A
Study of Shipping Transport in the Pacific War]), written by Lt. Col. Ueno Shigeru, [then]
shipping transportation staff, based on contemporary materials.
28. Arao Okikatsu Chūsa Kaisō (荒尾興功中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Arao Okikatsu]),
then chief of operations staff of the Southern Army.
29. Mabuchi Shinji Shōsa Kaisō (馬淵新治少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Mabuchi Shinji]), then
shipping transportation staff.
30. Matsumae Misoo Chūsa Nikki (松前未曾雄中佐日記 [Diary of Lt. Col. Matsumae Misoo]),
then staff of Section 4 of the staff department of the Southern Army.
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31. Jawa Sakusen Kiroku (爪哇作戦記録 [Records of the Java Operations]), written by Lt. Col.
Oda Akimitsu, [then] chief of operations staff of the Sixteenth Army, based on the materials
in his possession right after the war and the materials kept at the demobilization offices. Ed-
ited by the Demobilization Bureau.
32. Okazaki Seizaburō Shōshō Nikki (岡崎清三郎少将日記 [Diary of Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seiz-
aburō]), then chief of staff of the Sixteenth Army.
33. Takashima Tatsuhiko Taisa Nikki (高嶋辰彦大佐日記 [Diary of Col. Takashima Tatsuhiko]),
then senior staff of Section 1 of the staff department of the Sixteenth Army.
34. Saiki Ikuzō Chūsa Nikki (斎木郁三中佐日記 [Diary of Lt. Col. Saiki Ikuzō]), then Staff of
Section 2 (Chief Signal Communication Staff) of the staff department of the Sixteenth Army.
35. Imamura Hitoshi Chūjō Kaisō (今村均中将回想 [Recollections of Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi]),
then commander of the Sixteenth Army, including the “memoir” he wrote in prison camp
right after the war with the materials in his possession.
36. Okazaki Seizaburō Shōshō Kaisō (岡崎清三郎少将回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Okazaki
Seizaburō]), then chief of staff of the Sixteenth Army; including “Tengoku kara Jigoku” (天
国から地獄 [From Heaven to Hell]) he wrote after the war, based on the diary he had kept.
37. Harada Yoshikazu Shōshō Kaisō (原田義和少将回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Harada
Yoshikazu]), [who had] accompanied the Yoshizawa Delegation at the time of the negotiation
between Japan and the Netherlands. He [later] served as vice chief of staff of the Sixteenth
Army at the time of [Java] invasion operation.
38. Takashima Tatsuhiko Taisa Kaisō (高嶋辰彦大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Takashima Tatsu -
hiko], then senior staff of Section 1 of the staff department of the Sixteenth Army.
39. Itoda Isamu Chūsa Kaisō (井戸田勇中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu]), then
staff of Section 1 (Aviation) of the staff department of the Sixteenth Army.
40. Oda Akimitsu Chūsa Kaisō (於田秋光中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Oda Akimitsu]),
then chief of operations staff of the staff department of the Sixteenth Army.
41. Yamashita Yutaka Shōsa Kaisō (山下豊少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Yamashita Yutaka]),
then staff of Section 1 (Operations) of the staff department of the Sixteenth Army.
42. Kuriya Tsugunori Shōsa Kaisō (厨次則少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori]),
[who had been] assigned in Java at the time of the negotiation between Japan and the Nether-
lands, and who later became staff of Section 1 (Intelligence) of the staff department of the
Sixteenth Army.
43. Kitamura Yoshifuto Taisa Kaisō (北村可大大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Kitamura Yoshi-
futo]), then senior staff of Section 2 of the staff department of the Sixteenth Army.
44. Sendō Shunzō Chūsa Kaisō (仙頭俊三中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō]),
then staff of Section 2 (Shipping) of the staff department of the Sixteenth Army; including
the article (「蘭印作戦の回想」[“Memoirs of the Dutch East Indies operation”]) which he
contributed to the March 1944 [issue of] Kaikōsha-kiji (『偕行社記事』 [Bulletin of the Kaikōsha]).
45. Nishiura Setsuzō Shōsa Kaisō (西浦節三少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Nishiura Setsuzō]),
then staff of Section 2 (Line of Communication) of the staff department of the Sixteenth Army.
46. Nakayama Yasuto Taisa Kaisō (中山寧人大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Nakayama Yasuto]),
who accompanied the [Yoshizawa] Delegation at the time of the negotiations between Japan
and the Netherlands; later he was attached to the headquarters of the Sixteenth Army ([for]
the military administration).
47. Yanagawa Motoshige Taii Kaisō (柳川宗成大尉回想 [Recollections of Capt. Yanagawa Mo-
toshige]), then attached to the staff department of the Sixteenth Army.
48. Machida Keiji Chūsa Kaisō (町田敬二中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Machida Keiji]),
then head of the propaganda group.
49. Ōkubo Tōru Shōsa Kaisō (大久保亨少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Ōkubo Tōru]), then at-
tached to the oil drilling squad of the 21st Field Ordnance Depot.
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50. Daitōa Sensō Teki Furyo no Shuki (『大東亜戦争敵俘虜の手記』 [Personal accounts of enemy pris-
oners of war in the Greater East Asia War]), edited by Daitō Kenkyū-jo (大東研究所編), which
contains the personal accounts of allied army commanders and division commanders
[http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1041980].
51. Igirisu Kōkan Senshi “Tainichi-sen” （英公刊戦史「対日戦」） [War against Japan, S. Woodburn
Kirby et al, London: HMSO.]
52. Butai Chōsa-hyō (部隊調査票 [Data charts of units]), covering the organization, the numbers
of personnel, horses and vehicles, etc. of each unit, prepared by the Military Preparedness
Section of the Ministry of War. 
53. Butai Shiryō (部隊資料 [Data of units]), compiled data of fragmented information on organ-
izations, formations, staff, and actions, arranged according to units.
54. Satō Hidehiko Shōsa Kaisō (佐藤英彦少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Satō Hidehiko], then
chief intelligence staff of the 2d Division.
55. Taguchi Kazuo Taii Kaisō (田口和夫大尉回想 [Recollections of Capt. Taguchi Kazuo]), then
staff of the 2d Division.
56. Takano Sōsuke Taii Kaisō (高野左右助大尉回想 [Recollections of Capt. Takano Sōsuke]),
then officer at the Intendance Department of the 2d Division.
57. Inamura Ryōhei Taii Kaisō (稲村良平大尉回想 [Recollections of Capt. Inamura Ryōhei]),
then adjutant to the 2d Division.
58. Hohei Dai-yon Rentai Rekishi (歩兵第四聯隊歴史 [History of the 4th Infantry Regiment]).
59. Hohei Dai-yon Rentai Dai-san Daitai Kōdō Shōhō (歩兵第四聯隊第三大隊行動詳報 [Action
report of the 3d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment]), prepared by the battalion in March
1942.
60. Sasaki Mori’e Shōsa Nikki (佐々木盛衛少佐日記 [Diary of Maj. Sasaki Mori’e]), then com-
mander of the 3d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment.
61. Hohei Dai-jūroku Rentai Ryakureki (歩兵第十六聯隊略歴 [Brief history of the 16th Infantry
Regiment]).
62. Morozumi Yoshikazu Shōsa Kaisō (諸角善一少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Morozumi
Yoshikazu]), then commander of the 3d Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment; he wrote
this based on his diary of that time and [other] materials.
63. Hohei Dai-nijūku Rentai Ryakureki (歩兵第二十九聯隊略歴 [Brief history of the 29th In-
fantry Regiment]).
64. Yahōhei Dai-ni Rentai Dai-ichi Daitai Sentō Shōhō (野砲兵第二聯隊第一大隊戦闘詳報 [Ac-
tion report of the 1st Battalion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment]).
65. Yahōhei Dai-ni Rentai Dai-san Chūtai Sentō Shōhō (野砲兵第二聯隊第三中隊戦闘詳報 [Ac-
tion report of the 3d Battery of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment]).
66. Abe Yoshimitsu Taisa Kaisō (阿部芳光大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Abe Yoshimitsu]), then
chief of staff of the 38th Division; including the “Bangka, Palembang Sakusen Kiroku”
(「バンカ、パレンバン作戦記録」 復員局調整 [“Records of the Bangka and Palembang opera-
tion,” prepared by the Demobilization Bureau]), which he wrote after the war based on ma-
terials in his possession and those kept at demobilization offices.
67. Oyadomari Chōsei Chūsa Shuki (親泊朝省中佐手記 [A personal account of Lt. Col. Oyado-
mari Chōsei]), then chief of operations staff of the 38th Division; his contribution “Sumatra
Sakusen Obo’egaki” (「スマトラ作戦覚書」 [“Memorandum on the Sumatra operation,” in-
cluded in the article "Hong Kong, Sumatra, Ga-tō Sakusen Dampen” (『香港、スマトラ、ガ
島作戦断片』 [“Snippets of Hong Kong, Sumatra, and Guadalcanal operations”] was written
for the December 1943 [issue of] the Kaikōsha-kiji (『偕行社記事』 [Bulletin of the Kaikōsha]).
68. Tanaka Ryōsaburō Taisa Kaisō (田中良三郎大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Tanaka Ryō -
saburō]), then commander of the 229th Infantry Regiment.
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69. Dokuritsu Kōhei Dai-nijūroku Rentai Dai-ni Chūtai Dai-ichi Shōtai Sentō Shōhō (独立工兵
第二十六聯隊第二中隊第一小隊戦闘詳報 [Action report of the 1st Platoon of the 2d Com-
pany of the 26th Independent Engineer Regiment]).
70. Ogawa Yukio Chūi Nikki (小川行男中尉日記 [Diary of 1st Lt. Ogawa Yukio]), then com-
mander of the 1st Supply Platoon of the Regimental Train of the 4th Tank Regiment.
71. Doi Masanobu Chūi Kaisō (土肥正信中尉回想 [Recollections of 1st Lt. Doi Masanobu]), then
attached to the 38th Mountain Artillery Regiment headquarters.
72. Ōneda Yasuhei Shōsa Kaisō (大根田安平少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Ōneda Yasuhei]),
then commander of the 3d Battalion of the 230th Infantry Regiment.
73. Shōji Shitai Jōriku Keikaku (東海林支隊上陸計画 [Landing operation plan of the Shōji De-
tachment]), prepared on 3 February 1942.
74. Shōji Shitai Yōriku Sagyō Keikaku (東海林支隊揚陸作業計画 [Debarkation work plan of the
Shōji Detachment]), prepared on 6 February 1942. 
75. Shōji Toshishige Taisa Kaisō (東海林俊成大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Shōji Toshishige],
then commander of the 230th Infantry Regiment, including [an account] he wrote in prison
camp right after the war.
76. Tōhō Shitai Senji Geppō (東方支隊戦時月報 [Monthly war report of the Eastern Detach-
ment]).
77. Doi Sadashichi Taisa Kaisō (土井定七大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Doi Sadashichi]), then
commander of the 228th Infantry Regiment.
78. Tosaka Susumu Shōsa Kaisō （登坂進少佐回想） [The recollections by Maj. Tosaka Susumu],
then staff of the 38th Division.
79. Tsuchihashi Yūitsu Chūjō Nikki (土橋勇逸中将日記 [Diary of Lt. Gen. Tsuchihashi Yūitsu]),
then commander of the 48th Division.
80. Kawagoe Moriji Taisa Kaisō (川越守二大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Kawagoe Moriji]),
then chief of staff of the 48th Division; including his postwar personal account Dai-yonjū-
hachi Shidan no Jawa Kōryaku-sen (第四十八師団のジャワ攻略戦 [The Java invasion opera-
tion of the 48th Division]), and his contribution to Mikata Kangaekata (『見方考え方』 [Way of
viewing and thinking], Vol. 12.
81. Indō Kimio Taii Nikki (犬童己未男大尉日記 [Diary of Capt. Indō Kimio]), then adjutant of
the 48th Division.
82. Abe Kōichi Shōshō Kaisō (安部孝一少将回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Abe Kōichi]), then
commander of the 48th Infantry Group.
83. Hohei Dai-yonjūnana Rentai Ryakureki (歩兵第四十七聯隊略歴 [Brief history of the 47th
Infantry Regiment]).
84. Yanagi Isamu Taisa Kaisō (柳勇大佐回想 [Recollections of Col. Yanagi Isamu]), then com-
mander of the 47th Infantry Regiment.
85. Kanemura Matabē Shōsa Kaisō (金村亦兵衛少佐回想 [Recollections of Maj. Kanemura
Matabē]), then commander of the 3d Battalion of the 1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment.
86. Kitamura Kurō Chūsa Kaisō (北村九郎中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Kitamura Kurō]),
then commander of the 48th Reconnaissance Regiment.
87. Yano Tsuneo Chūsa Kaisō (矢野常雄中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Yano Tsuneo]), then
staff of the Sakaguchi Detachment, including his war-time contribution to Daitōa Senki (『大
東亜戦記』 [Chronicle of the Greater East Asia War]), and his Tarakan Kōryaku ni kansuru Ken
(タラカン攻略に関する件 [The invasion of Tarakan]), Balikpapan Kōryaku ni kansuru Ken
(バリクパパン攻略に関する件 [The invasion of Balikpapan]), and Bajarmasin Kōryaku ni
kansuru Ken (バンジェルマシン攻略に関する件 [The invasion of Banjarmasin]), all of which
were written by him after the war based on materials in his possession as well as those kept
at demobilization offices (all of which were prepared by the Demobilization Bureau).
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88. Yasen Kōshahō Dai-yonjūyon Daitai Sentō Shōhō (野戦高射砲第四十四大隊戦闘詳報 [Ac-
tion report of the 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion]).
89. Dokuritsu Jidōsha Dai-nihyakurokujū Chūtai Dai-ni Shōtai Sentō Shōhō (独立自動車第二
百六十中隊第二小隊戦闘詳報 [Action report of the 2d Platoon of the 260th Independent
Motor Transport Company]).
90. Kōhei Dai-jūroku Rentai Dai-san Chūtai Dai-ichi Shōtai Sentō Shōhō (工兵第十六聯隊第三
中隊第一小隊戦闘詳報 [Action report of the 1st Platoon of the 3d Company of the 16th En-
gineer Regiment]).
91. Borneo Sakusen Kiroku (ボルネオ作戦記録 [Records of the Borneo operation]), which were
compiled after the war based on materials in the possession of the [then] adjutant of the
Kawaguchi Detachment as well as on those kept at demobilization offices, and prepared by
the Demobilization Bureau.
92. Kawaguchi Kiyotake Shōshō Kaisō (川口清健少将回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen.
Kawaguchi Kiyotake]), then commander of the 35th Infantry Brigade of the 18th Division,
including his Kaisōroku (回想録 [Memoirs]).
93. Compiled from: Dai-ichi Teishindan-zuki Kinoshita Hideaki Chūsa Kaisō (第一挺進団付木
下秀明中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Kinoshita Hideaki, attached to the 1st [Paratroop]
Raiding Group]); Daitōa Senki (『大東亜戦記』 [pp. 155–168, http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/
pid/1460291] Rikugun-shō kanshū陸軍省監修, Rikugun Kōkū-hombu hen 陸軍航空本部編
[Chronicle of the Greater East Asia War, supervised by the Ministry of War and [a chapter writ-
ten] by the Army Aviation Department]); the June 1942 [issue of] Kaikōsha-kiji (『偕行社記事』
[Bulletin of the Kaikōsha] (an article contributed by 1st. Lt. Tokunaga, and another by the
Army Aviation Department); Teishin Dai-ni Rentai Dai-yon Chūtai Dai-ichi Shōtai-chō Ōki
Takashi Chūi Shiryō (挺進第二聯隊第四中隊第一小隊長大城隆中尉資料 [Materials in pos-
session of 1st Lt. Ōki Takashi, commander of the 1st Platoon of the 4th Company of the 2d
[Paratroop] Raiding Regiment]); and Kanjō Shūroku (感状輯録 [Compiled records of cita-
tions of merit]).
94. Itō Shinobu Shōshō Kaisō (伊藤忍少将回想 [The recollections by the Maj. Gen. Itō Shinobu]),
then commander of the 1st Disembarkation Group, including his personal account Daitōa
Sensōkan no Sempaku Sakusen ni tsuite (大東亜戦争間の船舶作戦について [On the ship-
ping operations during the Greater East Asia War]), which he wrote right after the war.
95. Malay Senki (馬来戦記 [Records of war in Malaya]), kept by Maj. Kunitake Teruhito, then
staff of the Twenty-fifth Army.
96. Ran’in Kōkū Sakusen Kiroku (蘭印航空作戦記録 [Records of the Dutch East Indies air op-
eration]), compiled by Lt. Col. Miyashi Minoru, chief of operations staff of the Third Air
Force based on contemporary materials.
97. Sugawara Michiō Chūjō Nikki (菅原道大中将日記 [Diary of Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō]),
then commander of the Third Air Force.
98. Endō Saburō Shōshō Nikki (遠藤三郎少将日記 [日誌] [Diary of Maj. Gen. Endō Saburō]),
then commander of the 3d Air Division.
99. Chōsho (調書 [Records] of Army air units).
100. Gunreibu Nisshi (軍令部日誌 [Journal of the Navy General Staff Office]), a diary kept by
Cdr. Sanagi Sadamu, then staff of Section 1 of the Navy General Staff.
101. Kantai Hensei, Kaigun Senji Hensei Kaitei Kiroku (艦隊編制、海軍戦時編制改定記録
[Records of revisions of fleet organizations, and the wartime organization of the Navy]). 
102. Sakusen Kenkyū Shiryō (作戦研究資料 [Operation reviews]), compiled from action reports
of Navy units by the Navy Achievement Appraisal Department.
103. Kōdō Chōsho (行動調書 [Action records]), records of actions of Naval units summarized at
the Navy Achievement Appraisal Department.
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104. Hikōki-tai Sentō Kōdō Chōsho (飛行機隊戦闘行動調書 [Action records of air units]), a sum-
mary of actions of Naval air units.
105. Tomioka Sadatoshi Taisa Kaisō (富岡定俊大佐回想 [Recollections of Capt. Tomioka
Sadatoshi]), then chief of Section 1 of the Navy General Staff.
106. Miyo Tatsukichi Chūsa Kaisō (三代辰吉中佐回想 [Recollections of Cdr. Miyo Tatsukichi]),
then staff of Section 1 of the Navy General Staff.
107. Rengō Kantai Meirei-tsuzuri (聯合艦隊命令綴 [Files of the Combined Fleet orders]).
108. Ugaki Matome Chūjō Nikki (宇垣纏中将日記 [Diary of V. Adm. Ugaki Matome]), then chief
of staff of the Combined Fleet, [originally titled by himself as] Sen-sō-roku (戦藻録).
109. Nampō Butai Sentō Gaihō (南方部隊戦闘概報 [Summary report of the actions of the South-
ern Task Force]).
110. Matsudaira Nagayoshi Kikan Taii Shiryō (松平永芳機関大尉資料 [Documents of Lieutenant
of Engineering Matsudaira Nagayoshi]), then chief engineer of the Destroyer Inazuma, ex-
cerpts of essential matters concerning operations made by him.
111. Kuroshima Kameto Taisa Kaisō (黒島亀人大佐回想 [Recollections of Capt. Kuroshima
Kameto]), then senior staff of the Combined Fleet.
112. Fujita Masamichi Chūsa Kaisō (藤田正路中佐回想 [Recollections of Cdr. Fujita Masamichi]),
then operations staff of the Second Fleet.
113. Yamaki Akira Taisa Kaisō (矢牧章大佐回想 [Recollections of Capt. Yamaki Akira]), then sen-
ior staff of the Third Fleet.
114. Dai-go Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第五戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War journal and ac-
tion report of the 5th Cruiser Division]). 
115. Dai-nana Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第七戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War journal and
action report of the 7th Cruiser Division]). 
116. Dai-ichi Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第一水雷戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War
journal/action report of the 1st Destroyer Squadron]). 
117. Dai-ni Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第二水雷戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War jour-
nal/action report of the 2d Destroyer Squadron]).
118. Dai-san Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第三水雷戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War jour-
nal/action report of the 3d Destroyer Squadron]).
119. Dai-yon Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第四水雷戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War
journal/action report of the 4th Destroyer Squadron]).
120. Dai-go Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第五水雷戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War jour-
nal/action report of the 5th Destroyer Squadron]).
121. Dai-roku Suirai Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第六水雷戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War
journal/action report of the 6th Destroyer Squadron]).
122. Dai-yon Sensui Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第四潜水戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War
journal/action report of the 4th Submarine Squadron]). 
123. Dai-go Kōkū Sentai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第五航空戦隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War jour-
nal/action report of the 5th Carrier Division]). 
124. Dai-ichi Konkyochi-tai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第一根拠地隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War
journal/action report of the 1st Base Force]).
125. Dai-ni Konkyochi-tai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第二根拠地隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War jour-
nal and action report of the 2d Base Force]). 
126. Dai-kyū Konkyochi-tai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第九根拠地隊戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War
journal/action report of the 9th Base Force]).
127. Dai-nijūyon Tokubetsu Konkyochi-tai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (第二十四特別根拠地隊戦
時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War journal/action report of the 24th Special Base Force]).
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128. Kure Dai-ichi Tokubetsu Rikusen-tai Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (呉第一特別陸戦隊戦時日
誌、戦闘詳報 [War journal/action report of the 1st Kure Special Landing Force]).
129. Chinkai Keibi-fu Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (鎮海警備府戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War journal/ac-
tion report of the Chinkai Guard District]). 
130. Kamikawa-maru Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (神川丸戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War journal/action
report of the Kamikawa-maru]).
131. San’yō-maru Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (山陽丸戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War journal/action re-
port of the San’yō-maru]).
132. Sanuki-maru Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (讃岐丸戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War journal/action re-
port of the Sanuki-maru].
133. Sagara-maru Senji Nisshi, Sentō Shōhō (相良丸戦時日誌、戦闘詳報 [War journal/action re-
port of the Sagara-maru].
134. Daiichi Kūshū Butai Sentō Gaihō (第一空襲部隊戦闘概報 [Summary report of the actions of
the [Navy] 1st Air Raid Unit]). 
135. Sampa-tsū-kiroku (三派通記録 [Records of the Navy 3d Detached Signal Unit]).
136. Takahashi Chihaya Taisa Kaisō (高橋千隼大佐回想 [Recollections of Capt. Takahashi Chi-
haya]), then senior staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet.
137. Shimada Kōichi Shōsa Kaisō (島田航一少佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Cdr. Shimada Kōichi]),
then staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet.
138. Yoshikawa Shūkichi Chūsa Kaisō (由川周吉中佐回想 [Recollections of Cdr. Yoshikawa Shū-
kichi]), then senior staff of the 5th Destroyer Squadron.
139. Imazato Yoshimitsu Chūsa Shuki (今里義光中佐手記 [A personal account of Cdr. Imazato
Yoshimitsu]), then senior staff of the 2d Base Force.
140. Yasunobu Takeo Chūsa Kaisō (安延多計夫中佐回想 [Recollections of Cdr. Yasunobu Takeo]),
then senior staff of the 23d Air Flotilla.
141. Shibata Bunzō Chūsa Nikki (柴田文三中佐日記 [Diary of Cdr. Shibata Bunzō]), then senior
staff of the 21st Air Flotilla.
142. Matsumoto Makoto Shōsa Shiryō (松本眞實少佐史料 [Materials in possession of Lt. Cdr.
Matsumoto Makoto]), then aviation officer of the [Naval] 1st Air Group.
143. [A compilation of] Senkun (戦訓 [Lessons [learned in] combat]), issued by the Naval Com-
mittee for Researching Lessons in Combats. 
144. Yokosuka Tokubetsu Dai-ichi Rikusentai Sentō Shōhō (横須賀特別第一陸戦隊戦闘詳報 [Ac-
tion report of the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force]).
145. Kōseki Binran (功績便覧 [Records of Achievements]), a list of assignments and outline of
services and military gains of each unit made by the Navy Achievement Appraisal Depart-
ment.
146. Dainikki (大日記 [Document Files]), files of official incoming and outgoing letters of the War
Ministry.
147. Imoto Kumao Chūsa Kaisō (井本熊男中佐回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Imoto Kumao]),
then staff of Section 2 of the Army Department of IGHQ.
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Appendix
List of Units in the Order of Battle of the Sixteenth Army
(from 6 November 1941 to 1 March 1942)
Sixteenth Army HQ (Note: Its main staff as listed at
the end of this chart.)
2d Division (Note: Its organization and main staff
as listed below.)
2d Division HQ (Commander: Lt. Gen. Maruyama
Masao, Chief of Staff: Col. Ōki Yoshie, Staff: Lt.
Col. Furukawa Hiroshi, Maj. Hosokawa Koichi,
Maj. Satō Hidehiko, Capt. Taguchi Kazuo)
2d Infantry Group HQ (Commander: Maj. Gen.
Nasu Yumio)
4th Infantry Regiment (Regimental Commander:
Col. Fukushima Kyūsaku, 1st Battalion Com-
mander: Lt. Col. Ikuta Tōichi, 2d Battalion
Commander: Maj. Tamura Masao, 3d Battalion
Commander: Maj. Sasaki Mori’e)
16th Infantry Regiment (Regimental Commander:
Col. Hiroyasu Jurō, 1st Battalion Commander:
Lt. Col. Minamoto Shirō, 2d Battalion Com-
mander: Maj. Onoguchi Satoru, 3d Battalion
Commander: Maj. Morozumi Yoshikazu)
29th Infantry Regiment (Regimental Commander:
Col. Satō Hanshichi, 1st Battalion Commander:
Lt. Col. Endō Shigesuke, 2d Battalion Com-
mander: Lt. Col. Watanabe Katsutoshi, 3d Bat-
talion Commander: Maj. Yoshii Tadao)
2d Reconnaissance Regiment (Commander: Lt. Col.
Noguchi Kin’ichi)
2d Field Artillery Regiment (Commander: Col.
Ishizaki Masuo)
2d Engineer Regiment (Commander: Col. Taka-
hashi Takuzō)
2d Transport Regiment (Commander: Col. Niimura
Riichi)
2d Divisional Signal Unit (Commander: Capt.
Ezaki Kōichi)
2d Divisional Medical Unit (Commander: Lt. Col.
Nishiyama Hideo)
2d Divisional Ordnance Service Unit (Commander:
Maj. Hosogai Sakuzō)
2d Divisional 1st Field Hospital (Head: Capt. Shōji
Mineo)
2d Divisional 2d Field Hospital (Head: Capt. Shina-
gawa Yasuhiko)
2d Divisional 4th Field Hospital (Head: Capt.
Kurokawa Ichirō)
Eastern 
District Army
2d Division
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
Ditto
Y
Y
Units Supervised by Transferred
As of
1/3/42
Remarks
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2d Divisional Water Supply and Purification De-
partment (Commander: Capt. Numasawa Ta-
motsu)
2d Divisional Sick Horse Depot (Commander: Maj.
Satō Tadanobu)
38th Division (Note: Its organization and main staff
as listed below)
38th Division HQ (Commander: Lt. Gen. Sano Ta-
dayoshi, Chief of Staff: Col. Abe Yoshimitsu,
Staff: Maj. Oyadomari Chōsei, Maj. Tosaka
Susumu, Maj. Hosokawa Naonori)
38th Infantry Group HQ (Commander: Maj. Gen.
Itō Takeo)
228th Infantry Regiment (Regimental Commander:
Col. Doi Sadashichi, 1st Battalion Commander:
Maj. Hayakawa Kikuo, 2d Battalion Com-
mander: Maj. Kimura Eijirō, 3d Battalion Com-
mander: Maj. Nishiyama Haruka)
229th Infantry Regiment (Regimental Commander:
Col. Tanaka Ryōsaburō, 1st Battalion Com-
mander: Capt. Orita Masaru, 2d Battalion
Commander: Maj. Miyazawa Shigezō, 3d Bat-
talion Commander: Maj. Kemmotsu Heishichi)
230th Infantry Regiment (Regimental Commander:
Col. Shōji Toshishige, 1st Battalion Com-
mander: Maj. Egashira Masaru, 2d Battalion
Commander: Maj. Wakamatsu Minoru, 3d Bat-
talion Commander: Maj. Ōneda Yasuhei)
38th Mountain Artillery Regiment (Commander:
Col. Kanki Takekichi)
38th Engineer Regiment (Commander: Lt. Col.
Iwabuchi Tsuneo)
38th Transport Regiment (Commander: Lt. Col.
Yabuta Hidekazu)
38th Divisional Signal Unit (Commander: Maj. Itō
Ryōichi)
38th Divisional Ordnance Service Unit (Comman-
der: Capt. Koide Sadaharu)
38th Divisional Medical Unit (Commander: Lt. Col.
Hattori Otokazu)
38th Divisional 1st Field Hospital (Head: Maj.
Suzuki Toshimi)
38th Divisional 2d Field Hospital (Head: Maj. Itō
Takuzō)
38th Divisional Sick Horse Depot (Commander:
Maj. Hayashi Jirō) 
48th Division (Note: Its organization and main staff
as listed below)
48th Division HQ (Commander: Lt. Gen. Tsuchi-
hashi Yūitsu, Chief of Staff: Col. Kawagoe
Moriji, Staff: Maj. Nakahara Makoto, Maj.
Akatsuka Kazuo, Maj. Tanabe Masaki)
48th Infantry Group HQ (Commander: Maj. Gen.
Abe Kōichi)
38th Division
48th Division
From the Twenty-third
Army in southern
China; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 4
Jan. 1942
From the Fourteenth
Army on the Philip-
pines; IGHQ Army De-
partment Order, 14 Jan.
1942
Y
Y
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1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment (Regimental Com-
mander: Col. Imai Kazufumi, 1st Battalion
Commander: Maj. Sazawa Toshiteru, 2d Battal-
ion Commander: Maj. Kobayashi Masao, 3d
Battalion Commander: Maj. Kanemura
Matabē)
2d Taiwan Infantry Regiment (Regimental Com-
mander: Col. Tanaka Tōru, 1st Battalion Com-
mander: Maj. Yanagi Hiroshi, 2d Battalion
Commander: Maj. Takizawa Shichijūrō, 3d Bat-
talion Commander: Maj. Kanno Zenkichi)
47th Infantry Regiment (Regimental Commander:
Col. Yanagi Isamu, 1st Battalion Commander:
Maj. Aikō Satoshi, 2d Battalion Commander:
Maj. Baba Asanoshin, 3d Battalion Com-
mander: Maj. Miyaji Ikuzō)
48th Reconnaissance Regiment (Commander: Lt.
Col. Kitamura Kurō)
48th Mountain Artillery Regiment (Commander:
Lt. Col. Yamaguchi Kayoshi)
48th Engineer Regiment (Commander: Lt. Col.
Yanagi Toshio)
48th Divisional Signal Unit (Commander: Maj. Ike-
moto Yoshiyuki)
48th Transport Regiment (Commander: Lt. Col.
Tasaka Satoshi)
48th Divisional Ordnance Service Unit (Comman-
der: Maj. Shimizu)
48th Divisional Medical Unit (Commander: Lt. Col.
Manabe)
48th Divisional 1st Field Hospital (Head: Maj.
Harada Sumitaka)
48th Divisional 4th Field Hospital (Head: Maj.
Watanabe)
56th Mixed Infantry Group (Note: Its organization
and main staff as listed below)
56th Infantry Group HQ (Commander: Maj. Gen.
Sakaguchi Shizuo, Chief of Staff: Lt. Col. Yano
Tsuneo)
146th Infantry Regiment (Regimental Commander:
Col. Yamamoto Kyōhei, 1st Battalion Com-
mander: Lt. Col. Kume Motozō, 2d Battalion
Commander: Maj. Kanauji Ken’ichi, 3d Battal-
ion Commander: Lt. Col. Matsumoto Tadasu)
56th Infantry Group Armored Car Unit
56th Field Artillery Regiment 1st Battalion
56th Engineer Regiment 1st Company
56th Transport Regiment 2d Company
56th Infantry Group Medical Unit
56th Divisional 1st Field Hospital
South Seas Detachment
Commander: Maj. Gen. Horii Tomitarō (55th In-
fantry Group Commander)
55th Infantry Group HQ
56th Division
55th Division
From northern
Kyūshū; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 6
Nov. 1941
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
Y
–
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144th Infantry Regiment 
55th Cavalry Regiment 3d Squadron (minus one el-
ement)
One antitank gun squad of the above regiment
55th Mountain Artillery Regiment 1st Battalion
55th Engineer Regiment 1st Company and one ele-
ment of equipment platoon
One element of 55th Divisional Signal Unit
55th Transport Regiment 2d Company
One element of 55th Divisional Medical Unit
55th Divisional 1st Field Hospital
One element of 55th Divisional Sick Horse Depot
One element of 55th Divisional Water Supply and
Purification Department
8th Tank Regiment
2d Tank Regiment (minus [one] light tank
squadron) (Commander: Col. Mori Iwao)
4th Tank Regiment (Commander: Lt. Col. Kumagai
Shōji)
17th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
2d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion
5th Independent Antitank Gun Battalion
8th Independent Antitank Gun Company (Comman-
der: Capt. Nakaoka)
10th Independent Antitank Gun Company (Com-
mander: Capt. Miyaji)
18th Field Antiaircraft Defense Unit HQ
Eastern District
Army
Imperial Guard
Depot Division
Fifth Army
61st Infantry
Group
3d Division
16th Division
Ditto
4th Depot Di-
vision
56th Division
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From the Twenty-fifth
Army in Malaya;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
From the Fourteenth
Army on the Philip-
pines; IGHQ Army De-
partment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From the Twenty-third
Army in southern
China; IGHQ Army
Department order, 4
Jan. 1942
Ditto
From the Fourteenth
Army on the Philip-
pines; IGHQ Army De-
partment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
Ditto
From Kurume Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
–
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
To the
Kwantung
Army
[IGHQ
Army de-
partment
Order,] 29
Jan. 1942
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16th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
23d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (minus the An-
tiaircraft Searchlight Company)
44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B) (Com-
mander: Maj. Takagi Takeo)
45th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B) (Com-
mander: Maj. Tamada)
48th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B)
30th Independent Field Antiaircraft Artillery Bat-
tery (Commander: 1st Lt. Ōta)
31st Independent Field Antiaircraft Artillery Bat-
tery (Commander: 1st Lt. Kawai)
34th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B)
35th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (minus
one element) (B)
1st Independent Engineer Regiment (E)
1st Independent Engineer Company (electricity)
4th Independent Engineer Company ([to facilitate]
river-crossing of heavy equipment)
3d Independent Engineer Regiment (A) (horse-car-
ried)
One battalion of 6th Railway Regiment and one el-
ement of Material Depot
5th Field Gas Company (B)
Central District
Army
Twenty-first
Army
54th Division
6th Depot Di-
vision
20th Division
3d Depot Divi-
sion
Ditto
Im perial
Guard Depot
Division
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
3d Depot Divi-
sion
2d Division
Northern
China Area
Army
2d Division
From the Thirteenth
Army in eastern China;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From the Southern
Army in the French In-
dochina; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 29
Jan. 1942
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From the Fourteenth
Army on the Philip-
pines; IGHQ Army De-
partment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
From the Twenty-fifth
Army in Malaya;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
Ditto
From the Eleventh
Army in eastern China;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From the Northern
China Area Army;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From the Nagoya Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From the Fourteenth
Army on the Philip-
pines; IGHQ Army De-
partment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
Ditto
From the Twenty-third
Army in southern
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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18th Field Gas Company (B) (Commander: 1st Lt.
Moriki)
168th Railway Depot HQ (B)
138th Railway Depot HQ (B)
15th Telegraph Regiment
3d Independent Radio Platoon (motorized)
4th Independent Radio Platoon (motorized)
6th Independent Radio Platoon (motorized)
7th Independent Radio Platoon (motorized)
8th Independent Radio Platoon (motorized)
13th Independent Radio Platoon (motorized)
60th Radio Telegraph Platoon (horse-carried)
33d Fixed Radio Unit
34th Fixed Radio Unit
45th Fixed Radio Unit
46th Fixed Radio Unit
55th Fixed Radio Unit
One element of 14th Telegraph Regiment
7th Division
57th Depot Di-
vision
5th Depot Di-
vision
Northern
China Area
Army
China Expedi-
tionary Army
Ditto
Ditto
Northern
China Area
Army
Ditto
Ditto
5th Depot Di-
vision
Imperial
Guard Depot
Division
Ditto
5th Depot Di-
vision
Ditto
57th Depot Di-
vision
Southern
China Area
Army
China; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 4
Jan. 1942
Ditto
From the 1st Railway
Transport HQ; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From the Southern
Army in French In-
dochina; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 29
Jan. 1942
From northern China;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
From the Northern
District Army; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From the Twenty-fifth
Army in French In-
dochina; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 6
Nov. 1941
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
Ditto
From Hiroshima Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
Ditto
From Hirosaki Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From the Twenty-third
Army in southern
China; IGHQ Army
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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5th Independent Radio Platoon (motorized)
51st Independent Radio Platoon (motorized)
52d Independent Radio Platoon (motorized)
40th Fixed Radio Unit
5th Fixed Radio Unit
29th Bridge Building Material Company
6th Division Bridge Building Material Company
Imperial Guard Division River-crossing Material
Company
26th Bridge Building Material Company (Com-
mander: 1st Lt. Kuwahara)
13th River-crossing Material Company
14th River-crossing Material Company
3d Field Military Police Unit
43d Line-of-Communication Area Unit
48th Line-of-Communication Area Unit
2d Field Transport HQ
39th Independent Motor Transport Battalion
China Expedi-
tionary Army
5th Depot Di-
vision
Ditto
Ditto
Northern Dis-
trict Army
5th Depot Di-
vision
6th Depot Di-
vision
Imperial
Guard Depot
Division
3d Depot Divi-
sion
51st Depot Di-
vision
53d Division
Kwantung
Army
2d Division
52d Division
61st Infantry
Group
52d Division
Department Order, 4
Jan. 1942
From the Fourteenth
Army on the Philip-
pines; IGHQ Army De-
partment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
From the Northern
District Army; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 16 Feb. 1942
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From the Eleventh
Army in eastern China;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
Ditto
From the Fourteenth
Army on the Philip-
pines; IGHQ Army De-
partment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
Ditto
Ditto
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
Ditto
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From Kanazawa Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
606 Appendix
261st Independent Motor Transport Company
102d Independent Motor Transport Battalion
209th Independent Motor Transport Company
(Commander: 1st Lt. Arai)
258th Independent Motor Transport Company
(Commander: 1st Lt. Hiradōri)
259th Independent Motor Transport Company
(Commander: 1st Lt. Tomura)
28th Motor Transport Regiment
45th Independent Motor Transport Battalion
212th Independent Motor Transport Company
307th Independent Motor Transport Company
308th Independent Motor Transport Company
42d Field Road Unit
44th Field Road Unit
5th Field Well-drilling Company
16th Field Well-drilling Company
14th Field Duty Unit HQ
4th Depot Di-
vision
61st Infantry
Group
Imperial
Guard Depot
Division
4th Depot Di-
vision
Ditto
51st Depot Di-
vision
3d Depot Divi-
sion
Imperial
Guard Depot
Division
Taiwan Army
Ditto
56th Division
57th Depot Di-
vision
Imperial
Guard Depot
Division
52d Division
55th Division
Ditto
From Tokyo Divisional
District; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 27
Nov. 1941
From the Fourteenth
Army on Philippines;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
Ditto
Ditto
From the Twenty-fifth
Army in Malaya;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
Ditto
From Tokyo Divisional
District; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 6
Nov. 1941
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From Zentsūji Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
–
Y
Y
Y
–
Y
–
Y
[Trans-
ferred] to
the Fifth
Army in
Manchuria;
IGHQ
Army De-
partment
Order, 29
Jan. 1942
Ditto
[Trans-
ferred] to
the Twenti-
eth Army in
Manchuria;
IGHQ
Army De-
partment
Order, 29
Jan. 1942
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107th Shore Duty Company
108th Shore Duty Company
45th Sea Duty Company
61st Construction Duty Company
62d Construction Duty Company
18th Field Postal Unit
18th Line-of-Communication Medical Unit HQ
67th Line-of-Communication Hospital
115th Line-of-Communication Hospital
116th Line-of-Communication Hospital
121st Line-of-Communication Hospital
16th Patient Transport Unit HQ
65th Patient Transport Platoon
66th Patient Transport Platoon
68th Patient Transport Platoon
38th Patient Transport Platoon (Commander: 1st
Lt. Masui)
22d Field Water Supply and Purification Depart-
ment (B)
Ditto
Ditto
54th Division
55th Division
Ditto
6th Depot Di-
vision
55th Division
Imperial
Guard Depot
Division
56th Division
Ditto
7th Division
56th Division
Ditto
Ditto
7th Division
2d Division
Kwantung
Army
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
Ditto
Ditto
From Himeji Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From Zentsūji Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
Ditto
From Kumamoto Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From Zentsūji Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
From Kurume Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
Ditto
From Asahikawa Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From Kurume Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
Ditto
Ditto
From Asahikawa Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From the Fourteenth
Army on the Philip-
pines; IGHQ Army De-
partment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
From the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria;
IGHQ Army Depart-
ment Order, 6 Nov.
1941
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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8th Water Supply and Purification Department
(Head: Capt. Takeuchi)
17th Water Supply and Purification Department
13th Line-of-Communication Sick Horse Depot
19th Veterinary Quarantine Depot (B)
24th Field Ordnance Depot
24th Field Motor Transport Depot
24th Field Freight Depot
1st Division
Ditto
52d Division
57th Depot Di-
vision
Imperial
Guard Depot
Division
4th Depot Di-
vision
Imperial
Guard Depot
Division
From the Fourteenth
Army on the Philip-
pines; IGHQ Army De-
partment Order, 29 Jan.
1942
From the Twenty-third
Army in southern
China; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 4
Jan. 1942
From Kanazawa Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From Hirosaki Divi-
sional District; IGHQ
Army Department
Order, 6 Nov. 1941
From Tokyo Divisional
District; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 6
Nov. 1941
From Osaka Divisional
District; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 6
Nov. 1941
From Tokyo Divisional
District; IGHQ Army
Department Order, 6
Nov. 1941
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Remarks:
1. “Supervised by” indicates the Army, Division or other unit that administered the mobilization or the organi-
zation of the unit. “Transferred” indicates the order that put the unit under the command of the Sixteenth
Army. “As of 1/3/42” indicates whether the unit was still under the command of the Sixteenth Army as of 1
March 1942. 
2. [Concerns the original Japanese text. Not relevant to the translation. Omitted by the editor.]
3. For example, the last-mentioned 24th Field Freight Depot was organized under the supervision of the depot
division of the Imperial Guard Division, put in the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army by IGHQ Army De-
partment Order of 6 November 1941 from the Tokyo Divisional District, and was still under the command of
the Sixteenth Army as of 1 March 1942. 
Main staff of the Sixteenth Army Headquarters
Army Commander: Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi
Chief of Staff: Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō
Vice Chief of Staff: Maj. Gen. Harada Yoshikazu
Staff of Section 1: Col. Takashima Tatsuhiko (Senior Staff), Lt. Col. [Col.] Murakami Kimisuke (Intelligence), Lt.
Col. Itoda Isamu (Aviation), Lt. Col. Oda Akimitsu (Operations), Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori (Intelli-
gence), Maj. Yamashita Yutaka (Operations).
Staff of Section 2: Col. Kitamura Yoshifuto (Senior Staff), Lt. Col. Saiki Ikuzō (Signal Communications), Lt. Col.
Sendō Shunzō (Shipping), Maj. Takahashi Mitsuzō (Line of Communication), Maj. Nishiura Set-
suzō (Line of Communication).
Attached to the Army Headquarters: Col. Nakayama Yasuto (Military Administration) 
Glossary
Army
15-cm Howitzer Battery jūgo-ryū chūtai 十五榴中隊
1st Bureau (Operations Bureau), Dai-ichi-bu (Sakusen-bu) 第一部 (作戦部)
[Army Department of IGHQ]
1st Disembarkation Group Dai-ichi Yōriku Dan 第一揚陸団
2d Bureau (Intelligence Bureau), Dai-ni-bu (Jōhō-bu) 第二部 (情報部)
[Army Department of IGHQ]
air division hikō dan 飛行団
[Numbered] Air Force Hikō Shūdan 飛行集団
air ground support unit kōkū chiku butai 航空地区部隊
air ground support headquarters kōkū chiku shirei-bu 航空地区司令部
[Army] air group hikō sentai 飛行戦隊
air signal regiment kōkū tsūshin rentai 航空通信聯隊
air signal unit kōkū tsūshin tai 航空通信隊
air transport company yusō hikō chūtai 輸送飛行中隊
airfield battalion/company hikō-jō daitai/chūtai 飛行場大隊/中隊
airfield duty unit hikō-jō kimmu butai 飛行場勤務部隊
anchorage headquarters teihaku-jō shirei-bu 碇泊場司令部
antiaircraft artillery regiment/battalion kōshahō rentai/daitai 高射砲聯隊/ 大隊
antiaircraft searchlight company shōkū chūtai 照空中隊
[numbered] Army Gun 軍
Army Aviation Headquarters Rikugun Kōkū Hombu 陸軍航空本部
Army Department of IGHQ Daihon’ei Rikugun-bu 大本営陸軍部
Army Flying School, Hakujōshi/Hamamatsu 白城子/浜松
Baichengzi/Hamamatsu Rikugun Hikō-gakkō 陸軍飛行学校
army railway unit gun tetsudō butai (第16)軍鉄道部隊
battalion artillery section daitaihō shōtai 大隊砲小隊
bridge building material company kakyō zairyō chūtai 架橋材料中隊
cavalry regiment kihei rentai 騎兵聯隊
Central Distirct Army Chūbu Gun 中部軍
Central Shipping Transport, Un’yu-bu 運輸部
[Ministry of War]
China Expeditionary Army Shina-haken Gun 支那派遣軍
construction duty company kenchiku kimmu chūtai 建築勤務中隊
detachment shitai 支隊
disembarkation working unit yōriku sagyō tai 揚陸作業隊
division shidan 師団
division headquarters shidan shirei-bu 師団司令部
divisional district shikan 師管
Eastern District Army Tōbu Gun 東部軍
Economic Mobilization Bureau, Seibi-kyoku 整備局
[Ministry of War]
engineer regiment kōhei rentai 工兵聯隊
equipment platoon kizai shōtai 器材小隊
field aircraft repair depot yasen kōkū shūri-shō 野戦航空修理廠
field airfield construction unit yasen hikō-jō settei tai 野戦飛行場設定隊
field antiaircraft defense unit headquarters yasen bōkū tai shirei-bu 野戦防空隊司令部
field artillery regiment yahōhei rentai 野砲兵聯隊
field duty unit headquarters yasen kimmu tai hombu 野戦勤務隊本部
field freight depot yasen kamotsu-shō 野戦貨物廠
field gas company yasen gasu chūtai 野戦瓦斯中隊
field heavy artillery regiment yasen jūhōhei rentai 野戦重砲兵聯隊
field hospital yasen byōin 野戦病院
(field) meteorological company (yasen) kishō chūtai (野戦)気象中隊
field military police unit yasen kempei tai 野戦憲兵隊
field motor transport depot yasen jidōsha-shō 野戦自動車廠
field ordnance depot yasen heiki-shō 野戦兵器廠
field postal unit yasen yūbin tai 野戦郵便隊
field road unit yasen dōro tai 野戦道路隊
field transport headquarters yasen yusō shirei-bu 野戦輸送司令部
field well-drilling company yasen sakusei chūtai 野戦作井中隊
fixed radio unit kotei musen tai 固定無線隊
ground duty company [Army aviation] rikujō kimmu chūtai 陸上勤務中隊
Imperial Guard Division Kono’e Shidan 近衛師団
Imperial Japanese Military Academy Rikugun Shikan-gakkō 陸軍士官学校
independent air unit dokuritsu hikō tai 独立飛行隊
independent antitank gun dokuritsu sokushahō 独立速射砲
battalion/company daitai/chūtai 大隊/中隊
independent engineer company dokuritsu kōhei chūtai 独立工兵中隊
(electricity)/([to facilitate] river-crossing (denki)/(jūtoga) (電気)/(重渡河)
of heavy equipment)
independent field antiaircraft artillery dokuritsu yasen kōshahō 独立野戦高射砲
battery (horse-carried) chūtai (daba) 中隊 (駄)
independent motor transport dokuritsu jidōsha 独立自動車
battalion/company daitai/chūtai 大隊/中隊
independent radio platoon dokuritsu musen shōtai 独立無線小隊
independent squadron dokuritsu hikō chūtai 独立飛行中隊
[of Army Air Forces]
infantry artillery unit hoheihō tai 歩兵砲隊
infantry group hohei dan 歩兵団
infantry regiment/battalion/ hohei rentai/daitai/ 歩兵聯隊/大隊/
company/platoon chūtai/shōtai 中隊/小隊
Information Department, Hōdō-bu 報道部
[Ministry of War]
Inspectorate General of [Army] Aviation Kōkū Sōkan-bu 航空総監部
Inspectorate General of Heitan Sōkan-bu 兵站総監部
Line of Communication
Inspectorate General of Military Training Kyōiku Sōkan-bu 教育総監部
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intendance department director keiri-buchō 経理部長
Kwantung Army Kantō Gun 関東軍
legal department director hōmu-buchō 法務部長
light-armored car unit kei-sōkōsha tai 軽装甲車隊
line-of-communication sick horse depot heitan byōba-shō 兵站病馬廠
line-of-communication area unit heitan chiku tai 兵站地区隊
line-of-communication heitan 兵站
hospital/medical unit byōin/eisei tai 病院/衛生隊
machine gun company kikanjū chūtai 機関銃中隊
Mark-3 radio squad San-gō-musen buntai 3号無線分隊
material depot zairyō-shō 材料廠
medical department director gun’i-buchō 軍医部長
medical unit eisei tai 衛生隊
meteorological observation detail sokkō han 測候班
military administration department gunsei-bu 軍政部
Military Affairs Bureau, Gummu-kyoku 軍務局
[Ministry of War]
Ministry of War Rikugun-shō 陸軍省
mixed brigade konsei ryodan 混成旅団
motor transport squad jidōsha han 自動車班
motorcycle unit jidō-nirinsha tai 自動二輪車隊
mountain artillery regiment sampōhei rentai 山砲兵聯隊
Northern China Area Army Kita-shina-hōmen Gun 北支那方面軍
Northern District Army Hokubu Gun 北部軍
Office of Army General Staff Sambō Hombu 参謀本部
on-board antiaircraft artillery regiment sempaku kōshahō rentai 船舶高射砲聯隊
ordnance department director heiki-buchō 兵器部長
ordnance service unit heiki kimmu tai 兵器勤務隊
patient transport unit HQ/ kan’ja yusō tai hombu/ 患者輸送隊本部/
platoon shōtai 小隊
press corps hōdō han 報道班
Propaganda Group Senden Han 宣伝班
radio telegraph platoon musen denshin shōtai 無線電信小隊
raiding air group, [paratroop] teishin hikō-rentai 挺進飛行戦隊
Raiding Group, [1st Paratroop] [Dai-ichi] Teishin Dan [第一]挺進団
raiding regiment, [paratroop] teishin rentai 挺進聯隊
railway depot headquarters teishajō shirei-bu 停車場司令部
railway regiment tetsudō rentai 鉄道聯隊
reconnaissance regiment sōsaku rentai 捜索聯隊
regimental artillery section rentaihō shōtai 聯隊砲小隊
Resource section, [Ministry of War] Shigen-ka 資源課
river-crossing material company toga zairyō chūtai 渡河材料中隊
sea duty company suijō kimmu chūtai 水上勤務中隊
sea transport supervisory unit kaijō yusō kanshi tai 海上輸送監視隊
Section 2 (Operations Section), Dai-ni-ka (Sakusen-ka) 第二課 (作戦課)
[Army Department of IGHQ]
Section 3 (Organization and  Dai-san-ka 第三課
Mobilization Section), (Hensei, Dōin-ka) (編成・動員課)
[Army Department of IGHQ]
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ship repair depot sempaku kōsaku-shō 船舶工作廠
shipping engineer sempaku kōhei 船舶工兵
shipping signal regiment sempaku tsūshin rentai 船舶通信聯隊
Shipping Transport Command Sempaku Yusō Shirei-bu 船舶輸送司令部
shore duty company rikujō kimmu chūtai 陸上勤務中隊
signal unit tsūshin tai 通信隊
sick horse depot byōba-shō 病馬廠
Soutern Army Nampō Gun 南方軍
Southern China Area Army Minami-shina-hōmen Gun 南支那方面軍
Southern Group, Nampō Han 南方班
[Army Department of IGHQ]
Special Broadcasting Detail Tokushu Hōsō Han 特殊放送班
squad buntai 分隊
squad for collecting cast-off articles ikibutsu shūshū han 遺棄物収集班
squadron, [Army air group] hikō chūtai 飛行中隊
supply platoon of the train [of regiment] rentai danretsu hokyū shōtai 聯隊段列補給小隊
Taiwan Army Taiwan Gun 台湾軍
tank regiment sensha rentai 戦車聯隊
telegraph regiment denshin rentai 電信聯隊
transport regiment shichō rentai 輜重聯隊
Transport section, [Ministry of War] Kōtsū-ka 交通課
unit tai/butai 隊/部隊
unit under direct control of (Jūroku-)gun-chokuzoku (第16)軍直属部隊
the [Sixteenth] Army butai
vessel launching unit hensui sagyō tai 泛水作業隊
veterinary department director jūi-buchō 獣医部長
veterinary quarantine depot gumba bōeki-shō 軍馬防疫廠
War College Rikugun Daigakkō 陸軍大学校
War Preparation Section, [Ministry of War] Sembi-ka 戦備課
water supply and purification department bōeki kyūsui-bu 防疫給水部
weather observation detail kansoku han 観測班
wire company yūsen chūtai 有線中隊
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Navy
1001 [Paratroop] Unit 1001 Butai 1001部隊
Air Fleet, [First, Eleventh] Kantai, [Dai-ichi, [第1, 11] 航空艦隊
Dai-jū-ichi]
Air Flotilla, Kōkū Sentai, [第21, 22, 23] 航空戦隊
[21st, 22d, 23d] [Dai-nijū-ichi,
Dai-nijū-ni, Dai-nijū-san]
[Naval] Air Group, Kōkūtai, 航空隊
[3d, Gaoxiong, Genzan, [Dai-san, Takao, Genzan, [第3, 高雄, 元山,
Kanoya, Mihoro] Kanoya, Mihoro] 鹿屋, 美幌]
auxiliary tokusetsu 特設
(special) base force (tokubetsu) konkyochi tai (特別)根拠地隊
Battleship Division, [3d] Sentai, [Dai-san] [第 3] 戦隊
Carrier Division, Kōkū Sentai, [第1, 2, 4, 5] 航空戦隊
[1st, 2d, 4th, 5th] [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni,
Dai-yon, Dai-go]
[Carrier] Task Force/[Carrier] Strike Force Kidō Butai 機動部隊
China Area Fleet Shina-hōmen Kantai 支那方面艦隊
Chinkai Guard District Chinkai Keibi-fu 鎮海警備府
Combined Fleet Rengō Kantai 聯合艦隊
construction squad setsuei han 設営班
Cruiser Division Sentai, [第4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 16] 戦隊
[4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 16th] [Dai-yon, Dai-go,
Dai-nana, Dai-hachi,
Dai-kyū, Dai-jū-roku]
destroyer division kuchiku tai 駆逐隊
Destroyer Squadron, Suirai Sentai, [第1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] 水雷戦隊
[1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th] [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni,
Dai-san, Dai-yon,
Dai-go, Dai-roku]
Dutch East Indies Unit Ran’in Butai 蘭印部隊
Eastern Support Unit Tōhō-shien tai (南方部隊) 東方支援隊
explosives sweeper unit sōbaku tai 掃爆隊
Fleet, [First, Second, Third, Kantai, [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni, [第1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] 艦隊
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth] Dai-san, Dai-yon,
Dai-go, Dai-roku]
guard unit keibi tai 警備隊
Iwakuni Navy Air Unit Iwakuni Kaigun Kōkū tai 岩國海軍航空隊
land-based [naval] air unit/fleet kichi kōkū butai/kantai 基地航空部隊/艦隊
land-based attack plane unit rikkō tai 陸攻隊
(special) landing force (tokubetsu) rikusen tai (特別)陸戦隊
main force hontai 本隊
main unit shutai 主隊
Malaya Unit Marei Butai 馬来部隊
Minelayer Division, [17th] Sentai, [Dai-jū-nana] [第17] 戦隊
minesweeper division sōkai tai 掃海隊
Naval Affairs Bureau [Navy Ministry] Gummu-kyoku 軍務局
Naval College Kaigun Daigakkō 海軍大学校
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Naval Engineering College Kaigun Kikangakkō 海軍機関学校
naval station Chinju-fu 鎮守府
Navy Department of IGHQ Daihon’ei Kaigun-bu 大本営海軍部
Navy Ministry Kaigun-shō 海軍省
Northern Task Force Hoppō Butai 北方部隊
Office of Navy General Staff Gunrei-bu 軍令部
paratroop unit Kūtei butai 空挺部隊
Philippines Unit Hi-tō (Philippines) Butai 比島部隊
Seaplane Tender Division, Kōkū Sentai, [第11, 12] 航空戦隊
[11th, 12th] [Dai-jū-ichi, Dai-jū-ni]
Second China Expeditionary Fleet Dai-ni Kenshi Kantai 第2遣支艦隊
signal unit tsūshin tai 通信隊
South Seas [Pacific Islands] Unit Nan’yō Butai 南洋部隊
Southern Expeditionary Fleet, Nanken Kantai, [第1, 3]南遣艦隊
[First, Third] [Dai-ichi, Dai-san]
Southern Philippines Area Task Force, Nan-hi-/Nam-pi- shien tai 南比支援隊
[Philippines Unit]
Southern Task Force Nampō Butai 南方部隊
strategic port yōkō 要港
subchaser division kusen tai 駆潜隊
Submarine Squadron, Sensui Sentai, [第2, 4, 5, 6] 潜水戦隊
[2d, 4th, 5th, 6th] [Dai-ni, Dai-yon,
Dai-go, Dai-roku]
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Abe Kōichi (安部孝一), Maj Gen, 48th Inf Gp cdr,
IJA, 238, 550–55, 557–62, 564, 566–67, 600
Abe Tomoji (阿部知二), [Novelist, translator and
scholar of English literature], 102
Abe Yoshimitsu (阿部芳光), Col, Ch of staff, 38th
Div, IJA, 162, 342–43, 600
Aikō Satoshi [Tetsu? Akira?] (愛甲哲), Maj, 47th
Inf Rgt 1st Bn cdr, IJA, 559, 560, 562, 601
Akatsuka Kazuo (赤塚一雄), Maj, 48th Div staff,
IJA, 185, 223, 236, 557, 600
Aoki Shigemasa (青木重誠), Lt Gen, V Ch of
staff, Southern Army, IJA, 152–54, 171, 431,
551
Arai (荒井), 1st Lt, 209th Independent Motor
Transport Co cdr, IJA, 600
Araki (荒木), Press Corps, IJA, 324
Arao Okikatsu (荒尾興功), Lt Col, Ch of opns
staff, Southern Army, IJA, 100, 115, 209, 253,
272, 274, 292, 301, 321
Arita Hachirō (有田八郎), [former] Foreign Min-
ister of Japan, 2
Asami (浅見), Capt, Shōji Det Motor Transport
Unit [cdr], IJA, 507
Asano Akira (浅 野 晃 ), [Poet and scholar of
Japanese literature], 102
Baba Asanoshin (馬場浅之進), Maj, 47th Inf Rgt
2d Bn cdr, IJA, 557, 559, 562, 601
Bakkers, [Rudolph] (バッカス), Maj Gen, Ch of
Gen Staff, KNIL, 531
Bennett, [Henry Gordon] (ベネット), Maj Gen,
AU Army, 583
Cheng Jiemin [?] (鄭介民), 257, 420
Chiang Kai-shek, [Jiang Jieshi] (蒋介石), 17, 256,
257, 419, 582, 585
Chiba (千葉), Japanese Minister in Portugal, 382
Churchill, [Sir Winston] (チャーチル), 578, 582
Colijn, [Anton Hendrikus] (コーレン), Capt,
BPM manager and Tarakan garrison army ad-
jutant, KNIL, 350, 354
Cox, [Pierre A] (コックス), Maj Gen, 2d Div cdr
(Central Java), KNIL, 545, 571–72
Cripps, Howard [Sir Richard Stafford Cripps?]
(クリップス, ハワード), 578
Doi Sadashichi (土井定七), Col, 228th Inf Rgt
cdr, IJA, 369, 370, 404, 407–09, 413, 600
Egashira Masaru (江頭多), Maj, 230th Inf Rgt 1st
Bn cdr, IJA, 463, 488, 506–11, 513–15, 518, 521,
523–24, 525–28, 572, 578, 600
Emperor (天皇), 24, 26, 32, 40, 41, 56–58, 69, 88,
128, 138, 215–16, 296, 373, 381, 384, 569
Endō (遠藤), Lt Col, 38th Div (Opn L: the Gin’yō-
maru Transport cdr), IJA, 312
Endō Saburō (遠藤三郎), Maj Gen, 3d Air Div
cdr, IJA, 189, 322, 488, 511–16, 518, 521–24,
526, 528–31, 533, 536, 571, 577, 587
Endō Shigesuke [?] (遠藤重助), Lt Col, 29th Inf
Rgt 1st Bn cdr, IJA, 480, 530, 599
Ezaki [Esaki?] (江崎), [56th Rgt] Engr Co cdr,
IJA, 109
Ezaki [Esaki?] Kōichi [Takakazu?] (江崎孝一),
Capt, 2d Div Signal Unit cdr, IJA, 599
Fleischer, [J. A.] (フライヒュー), Col, [Magelang
garrison cdr], KNIL, 543
Fujimoto (藤本), Lt Col, 38th Div (Opn L: the
Sado-maru Transport cdr), IJA, 312
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Fujita Masamichi (藤田正路), Cdr, 2d Fleet gun-
nery staff ofcr and opns staff, IJN, 210
Fukushima Kyūsaku (福島久作), Col, 4th Inf Rgt
cdr, IJA, 242, 466, 470, 474, 476–79, 482–86,
489, 490, 494–496, 501–02, 529–30, 533, 535, 599
Furukawa Hiroshi (古川浩), Lt Col, 2d Div HQ
staff, IJA, 606
Furuki Shigeyuki (古木重之), Lt Col, Staff, Dept
2 (Intel Bureau), Army Gen Staff Office/
IGHQ, IJA, 19
Furushō (古荘), Lt Col, 38th Div (Opn L: the
Lima-maru Transport cdr), IJA, 312
Gamō (蒲生), 1st Lt, 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Rgt
2d Co Plt cdr, IJA, 328–29
Genda Minoru (源田實), Cdr, 1st Air Fleet staff,
IJN, 376
Hada Jūichi (波田重一), former Taiwan Mixed
Bde cdr, IJA, 23
Hara Kenzaburō (原顕三郎), R Adm, 5th De-
stroyer Sqdn cdr, IJN, 163–64, 187, 224, 244,
428, 436, 453, 471
Harada Sumitaka (原田純隆), Maj, Head, 48th
Div 1st Field Hospital, IJA, 601
Harada Yoshikazu (原田義和), Col, Staff, Army
Dept of IGHQ; [Later] Maj Gen, V Ch of staff,
Director of L of C Dept, 16th Army, and Di-
rector of Mil Administration Dept, 16th
Army, IJA, 18, 21, 71, 73, 99, 101–03, 110, 161,
163, 189, 252, 348, 586, 608
Hart, [Thomas, C.] (ハート), Adm, C in C, US
Asiatic Fleet, US Navy, 218
Hasebe Masayoshi [?] (長谷部正義), Maj, 2d
[Paratroop] Raiding Rgt Plt cdr, IJA, 324, 329–
30
Hashida Sei [?] (橋田精), Maj, Staff, Dept 2 (Intel
Bureau), Army Gen Staff Office/IGHQ, IJA,
19
Hashimoto Shintarō (橋本信太郎), R Adm, 3d
Destroyer Sqdn cdr, IJN, 187, 279, 313
Hatakeyama Kōichirō [?] (畠山耕一郎), R Adm,
24th Special Base Force cdr, IJN, 371
Hattori Otokazu [Otoichi?] (服部乙一), Lt Col
38th Div Medical Unit cdr, IJA, 600
Hattori Takushirō (服部卓四郎), Col, Ch of opns
(Section 2), Army Dept of IGHQ, IJA, 118–19,
121, 125, 165
Hayakawa Kikuo (早川菊夫), Maj, 228th Inf Rgt
1st Bn cdr, IJA, 370, 409, 410, 600
Hayashi Jirō (林次郎), Maj, 38th Div Sick Horse
Depot cdr, IJA, 600
Hiradōri [Hiratōri?] (平通), 1st Lt, 258th Inde-
pendent Motor Transport Co cdr, IJA
Hirano (平 野 ), 1st Lt, 38th Div (Opn L: the
Meigen-maru Transport cdr), IJA, 312
Hiraoka Kumeichi (平岡粂一), R Adm, 9th Base
Force cdr, IJN, 279, 280
Hirose Nobutaka (廣瀬信隆), 1st Lt, 2d [Para-
troop] Raiding Rgt 2d Co cdr, IJA, 318, 324,
327–28
Hirose Sueto (廣瀬末人), R Adm, 2d Base Force
cdr, IJN, 430 
Hiroyasu Jurō [Toshirō?] (廣安壽郎), Col, 16th
Inf Rgt cdr, IJA, 476–78, 482, 485–86, 488–89,
491–95, 497, 501–02, 530, 601
Hishikari Takashi (菱刈隆), Gen, IJA, 511
Hoffmann, [Carl, Adolf, Maximilian] (ホフマン),
219
Homma Masaharu (本間雅晴 ), Lt Gen, 14th
Army cdr, IJA, 51, 601
Hoogenband, [Cornelis van den] (オーハンバン
ツ), Lt Col, Balikpapan garrison cdr, KNIL,
351
Horii Tomitarō (掘井富太郎), Maj Gen, 55th Inf
Gp cdr and Horii Det cdr, IJA, 26, 51
Hosogai Sakuzō (細貝作藏), Maj, 2d Div Ord-
nance Service Unit cdr, IJA, 599
Hosokawa Koichi [Shōichi? Saitsu? Saichi?] (細
川小一), Maj, 2d Div HQ staff, IJA, 599
Hosokawa Naonori (細川直知), Maj, 38th Div
staff, IJA, 283, 600
Ieki Kōnosuke [?] (家木幸之輔), Cdr, 1st Kure
Special Landing Force cdr, IJN, 370 
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Iguchi [Inoguchi, Inokuchi?] Kaneo (井口兼夫),
Lt Cdr, Liaison staff ofcr with 3d Air Force,
IJN, 210
Iida Nobuo (飯田信夫), [Composer and conduc-
tor], 102
Iida Shōjirō (飯田祥二郎), Lt Gen, 15th Army
cdr, IJA, 51, 62
Ikemoto Yoshiyuki [?] (池本好行), Maj, 48th Div
Signal Unit cdr, IJA, 601
Ikeno (池野), Corporal, 2d [Paratroop] Raiding
Rgt, IJA, 330
Ikuta Tōichi [?] (生田藤一), Lt Col, 4th Inf Rgt 1st
Bn cdr, IJA, 479, 501, 530, 599
Ilgen, [Gustav, Adolf] (イルヘン), Maj Gen, 3d
Div (and eastern territorial) cdr, KNIL, 567,
571–73
Imai Kazufumi (今井一二三), Col, 1st Taiwan Inf
Rgt cdr, IJA, 237–38, 549–55, 558–62, 564, 566,
601
Imamura Hitoshi (今村均), Lt Gen, Deputy Ch
of Inspectorate Gen of Mil Training; [Later]
23d Army cdr, [and then] 16th Army cdr, IJA,
19, 20, 51, 69–71, 73, 76, 81–82, 90–91, 100–101,
132, 142, 161–64, 170–71, 185, 188–89, 192–93,
195, 197, 199, 210, 212, 214, 219, 235–36, 240,
242, 244, 246–47, 251–54, 265, 276, 292, 363–64,
412, 417, 421, 426–28, 430, 441, 453, 470–71,
475, 482, 485, 487, 503, 505, 512, 516, 528–33,
535–36, 545, 547, 583–84, 586, 608
Imoto Kumao (井本熊男), Lt Col, Staff, Section 2
(Opns Section), Army Dept of IGHQ, IJA, 26
Inagaki (稲垣), 2d Lt, Engr, Southern Army, IJA,
298
Inagaki (稲垣), [1st [Paratroop] Raiding Gp] Ad-
jutant, IJA, 324
Inoue Kanji [?] (井上幹次), 1st Lt, 4th Inf Rgt 1st
Co cdr, IJA, 479
Irifune Naosaburō (入船直三郎), R Adm, 32d
[Special] Base Force cdr, IJN, 110
Isayama Haruki (諌山春樹), Maj Gen, Ch of
Staff, 15th Army, IJA, 31
Ishihara Itsu (石原聿), Capt, 2d Fleet staff ofcr
seconded to Southern Army, IJN, 190–91, 204,
209, 212, 499
Ishii Masayoshi [Masami?] (石井正美), Col, Sen-
ior staff, Section 1 (Opns Section), Southern
Army, IJA, 115, 190–91, 199, 204, 209, 210–12,
214, 220–21, 259, 292–94, 297, 301–02, 380, 385
Ishikawa Susumu (石川晋), Lt Col, Dept 2 (Intel
Bureau), Army Gen Staff Office, IJA, 19
Ishimoto Itsuo (石本五雄), Col, Ch, Resource
Section, Ministry of War, 17, 18
Ishimoto Tōkichi (石本統吉), [Film director, pro-
ducer, and businessman], 102
Ishizaki [Ishisaki?] Masuo (石崎益雄), Col, 2d
Field Arty Rgt cdr, IJA, 467, 599
Itō Kesatake [?] [Kesatsune? Kesanobu? Ke-
samichi?] (伊藤今朝長), Capt, 16th Inf Rgt
9th Co cdr, IJA, 492, 494
Itō Ryōichi (伊藤遼一), Maj, 38th Div Signal Unit
cdr, IJA, 600
Itō Shinobu (伊藤忍), Maj Gen, 1st Disembarka-
tion Gp cdr, IJA, 152, 252, 470–71, 473
Itō Takeo (伊東武夫), Maj Gen, 38th Inf Gp cdr
and Eastern Det cdr, IJA, 36, 38, 93–96, 162,
164, 187–88, 363–70, 384, 386, 404, 406 –08, 410,
600
Itō Takuzō (伊藤卓藏), Maj, Head, 38th Div 2d
Field Hospital, IJA, 600
Itoda Isamu (井戸田勇), Lt Col, Inspectorate Gen
of Army Avn; [Later] Ch avn staff, Section 1,
16th Army, IJA, 24, 28, 73, 94, 101, 161, 165,
252–53, 259, 265, 272, 275, 324, 339, 340, 434,
449, 458, 487, 488, 499, 510–14, 516, 521, 608
Iwabuchi [Iwafuchi?] Tsuneo (岩淵經夫), Lt Col,
38th Engr Rgt cdr, IJA, 270, 279, 280, 312, 335,
600
Kadomatsu Shōichi (門松正一), Lt Col, Staff,
Dept 2 (Intel Bureau), Army Dept of IGHQ,
IJA, 19
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Kambe [Kōbe? Kamito? Kando?] Masaji [Masat-
sugu? Seiji?] (神戸政次), 1st Lt, 228th Inf Reg
2d Co cdr, IJA, 409, 410, 412
Kameoka Takao (亀岡高夫), 1st Lt, 3d Machine
Gun Co cdr, IJA, 493
Kanauji [Kaneuji?] Ken’ichi (金氏堅一), Maj,
146th Inf Rgt 2d Bn cdr, IJA, 107, 175, 352,
354–55, 357, 359, 430, 537–45, 551–52, 601
Kanemura [Kanamura?] Matabē (金村亦兵衛),
Maj, 1st Taiwan Inf Rgt 3d Bn cdr, IJA, 235,
304, 373, 378, 391, 397–401, 403, 406, 430, 433–
34, 437, 444, 552
Kanki Takekichi (神吉武吉), Col, 38th Mountain
Arty Rgt cdr, IJA, 312, 334, 342–43, 600
Kanno [Sugano? Sugeno?] Zenkichi (菅野善吉),
Maj, 2d Taiwan Inf Rgt 3d Bn cdr, IJA, 79, 105,
123, 601
Kanzaki Kiyoshi (神崎清), 3d Air Div staff, IJA,
522
Kapitz, [Joseph] (カーピス), Lt Col, Ambon Gar-
rison cdr, KNIL, 369
Kashiwabara [Kashiwara? Kashihara? Kasehara?]
(柏原), Maj, 38th Div (Opn L: the Tsushima-
maru Transport cdr), IJA, 312
Katano Saburō (形野三郎), Sr Pvt, [2d Paratroop
Raiding Rgt], IJA, 333
Kataoka (片岡), Capt, 146th Inf Rgt Co cdr, IJA,
393
Katō Shunji [Toshitsugu?] (加藤俊二 [rightly: 俊
次]), Maj, attached to oil-drilling unit, IJA, 284
Katō Tsukasa (加藤長), Maj, Economic Mobiliza-
tion Bureau, Ministry of War, IJA, 16
Katsuyama (勝山), [civilian], 173
Kawagoe Moriji (川越守二), Col, Ch of staff, 48th
Div, IJA, 211, 222–23, 236, 249, 250, 397, 399,
600
Kawaguchi Kiyotake (川口清健), Maj Gen, 18th
Div 35th Inf Bde cdr and Kawaguchi Det cdr,
IJA, 5, 52, 61–63, 69, 77, 78, 106, 116–17, 121–
22, 124, 126, 133–34, 142–43, 156, 165, 185, 190,
192, 197–204, 220, 254, 284, 294–96, 298–300,
302, 306–07, 419
Kawahara Masao (川原正雄), Sgt, [2d Paratroop
Raiding Rgt], IJA, 333
Kawai (河合), 1st Lt, 31st Independent Field An-
tiaircraft Arty Battery cdr, IJA, 603
Kawamura (川村), 4th Inf Rgt 9th Co Plt cdr, IJA,
467
Kemmotsu Heishichi (監物平七), Maj, 229th Inf
Rgt 3d Bn cdr, IJA, 312, 338, 600
Kikuchi Kiyoji [Kiyoharu?] (菊地喜代治) Sgt
Maj, Paymaster, 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Rgt,
IJA, 333
Kimura (木村), [16th Div 33d Inf Reg] Kimura
Det cdr, IJA, 57, 79, 90, 104, 105
Kimura Eijirō (木村栄次郎), Maj, 228th Inf Rgt
2d Bn cdr, IJA, 369–71, 600
Kimura Kenji (木村健二), Cdr, 12th Seaplane
Tender Div senior staff (to be transferred and
attached to 3d Fleet HQ), IJN, 210
Kinoshita Hideaki (木下秀明), Lt Col, attached
to the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Gp, IJA, 146,
258
Kishi Fukuji (岸福治), R Adm, 9th Cruiser Div
cdr, IJN, 224
Kitahara Takeo (北原武夫), [Novelist], 102
Kitamura Kurō (北村九郎), Lt Col, 48th Recon-
naissance Rgt cdr, IJA, 238, 550–55, 558–60,
563–64, 567, 572, 601
Kitamura Yoshifuto (北村可大), Col, War Col-
lege; [Later], senior staff, Section 2, 16th
Army, IJA, 28, 31, 73, 164–65, 188–89, 252–53,
292, 364, 421, 608
Kobayashi Ichizō (小林一三), Japanese Minister
of Commerce and Industry and special envoy
to the Dutch East Indies, 3, 17, 18, 73
Kobayashi Masao (小林正夫), Maj, 1st Taiwan
Inf Rgt 2d Bn cdr, IJA, 601
Koide Sadaharu (小出貞治), Capt, 38th Div Ord-
nance Service Unit cdr, IJA, 312, 609
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Kōma Masayoshi (高 馬 正 義 ), Cdr, 22d Air
Flotilla staff, IJN, 301
Komaki [Omaki?] (小牧), 1st Lt, [2d Paratroop
Raiding Rgt], IJA, 328
Kōmura Takeo (甲村武雄), Maj, 2d [Paratroop]
Raiding Rgt cdr, IJA, 146, 286, 318, 324, 327–
29
Kondō Dempachi (近藤傳八), Maj, Staff, Section
2, Army Dept of IGHQ, IJA, 18, 22, 31, 117
Kondō Nobutake (近藤信竹), V Adm, C in C of
the Navy in the Southern Area, cdr of Navy
Southern Task Force and C in C, 2d Fleet, IJN,
56, 57, 60, 70, 76, 118, 127, 129, 195, 197, 208,
210, 3346, 449, 450
Kōno Takashi (河野鷹思), [Graphic designer, ed-
itorial designer], 102
Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文麿), Prime Minister of
Japan, 35
Kubo Kyūji (久保九次), R Adm, 1st Base Force
cdr, IJN, 226
Kuboki (久保木), Maj, Air-ground communica-
tion squad [cdr], IJA, 512
Kumagai [Kumagaya? Kumatani?] Shōji (熊谷庄
治), Lt Col, 4th Tank Rgt cdr, IJA, 561, 602
Kume Motozō [Honzō?] (久米本三 ), Lt Col,
146th Inf Rgt 1st Bn cdr, IJA, 352, 357–59, 391,
430, 445, 537–38, 601
Kume Seiichi (久米精一), Col, 1st [Paratroop]
Raiding Gp cdr, IJA, 95, 100, 146, 258–59, 275,
285–86, 316, 324, 331–32, 337, 340
Kumon Aribumi [Arifumi?] (久門有文), Staff,
Army Dept of IGHQ, IJA, 33, 117
Kurata Fumindo (倉田文人), [Film director, pro-
ducer and scriptwriter], 102
Kuribayashi Tadamichi (栗林忠道), Maj Gen, Ch
of staff, 23d Army, IJA, 189
Kurita Takeo (栗田健男), R Adm, 7th Cruiser
Div cdr, IJN, 454
Kuriya Tsugunori (厨次則), Maj, Army Gen Staff
Office staff; [Later] Staff Intel, 16th Army, IJA,
18, 21, 73, 100, 161, 165, 247, 252, 460, 558, 561,
463, 565, 608
Kurokawa Ichirō (黒川一郎), Capt, Head, 2d Div
4th Field Hospital, IJA, 599
Kurokawa Sanjirō (黒川三治郎), Col, Veterinary
Dept Director, 16th Army, IJA, 73
Kusaka Ryūnosuke (草鹿龍之介), R Adm, Ch of
staff, 1st Air Fleet, IJN, 376
Kusakabe (日下部), Capt, 38th Div (Opn L: the
Makassar-maru Transport cdr), IJA, 312
Kuwahara [Kuwabara?] (桑 原 ), 1st Lt, 26th
Bridge Building Material Co cdr, IJA, 605
Mabuchi Shinji (馬淵新治), Maj [?], Staff, Ship-
ping Transport Cmd, IJA, 132
MacArthur, Douglas (マックアーサー, マッカー
サー), Lt Gen, US Army Forces in the Far East
(USAFFE) cdr, 218, 579 
Machida Keiji (町田敬二), Lt Col, Head, Propa-
ganda Gp, 16th Army, IJA, 101
Maeda Masami (前田正實), Lt Gen, Ch of staff,
14th Army, IJA, 90, 152
Makiuchi Tadao (牧内忠雄), Cdr, 2d Kure Spe-
cial Landing Force cdr, IJN, 176
Manabe (真鍋), Lt Col, 48th Div Medical Unit
cdr, IJA, 601
Manaki Takanobu (馬奈木敬信), [Col] attached
to Mil Affairs Bureau, Ministry of War; [Later]
Maj Gen, V Ch of staff, 25th Army, IJA, 27, 31
Maruyama Masao (丸山政男), Lt Gen, 2d Div
cdr, IJA, 71, 74, 101, 242, 252, 441, 484, 489,
503, 505, 529, 530, 535, 571, 599
Masuda (増田), 2d Lt, 230th Inf Rgt 1st Bn, IJA,
508
Masui (増井), 1st Lt, 38th Patient Transport Plt
cdr, IJA
Matsui Suisei (松井翠声), [Narrator and comic
storyteller], 101
Matsumae Misoo (松前未曾雄), Lt Col, Staff, Sec-
tion 4 (Avn Section), Southern Army, IJA, 253,
272, 292
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Matsumoto Tadasu (松本治), Lt Col, 146th Inf
Rgt 3d Bn cdr, IJA, 84, 104, 106–10, 113–14,
126, 179, 349, 352, 430, 537–38, 540–45, 551,
554, 601
Matsunaga Sadaichi (松永貞市), R Adm, 22d Air
Flotilla cdr, IJN, 306
Matsuoka Yōsuke (松岡洋右), Foreign Minister
of Japan, 20
Minami Masayoshi (南政善), [Painter], 102
Minamoto Shirō (源紫郎), Lt Col, 16th Inf Reg
1st Bn cdr, IJA, 483, 503, 599
Mitani [Mitsuya? Mitsutani?] Hirotarō? [Kōtarō?]
(三谷博太郎), 1st Lt, 2d [Paratroop] Raiding
Rgt 4th Co cdr, IJA, 324, 327–28
Mitsuoka (光岡), 4th Tank Rgt unit cdr, IJA, 284
Miura Toshio (三浦俊雄), Lt Col, attached to
16th Div 33d Inf Rgt, Miura Det cdr, IJA, 57,
79, 83, 90, 93, 103–04, 106–10
Miyaji [Miyachi?] (宮地), Capt, 10th Independ-
ent Antitank Gun Co cdr, IJA, 602
Miyaji [Miyachi?] Ikuzō (宮地育三), Maj, 47th Inf
Rgt 3d Bn cdr, IJA, 557–62, 601
Miyashi [Miyako?] Minoru (宮子實), Lt Col, Ch
of opns staff, 3d Air Force, IJA, 209
Miyazawa Shigezō [Jūzō?] (宮 澤 重 藏 ), Maj,
229th Inf Rgt 2d Bn cdr, IJA, 270, 279, 280, 312,
335, 339, 341, 600
Miyoshi Shunkichirō (三好俊吉郎), attached to
Mil Administration Dept, 16th Army [Later]
consul, 531
Miyoshi Teruhiko (三好輝彦), Capt, the Cruiser
Yura captain, IJN, 280 
Mook, [Hubertus, Johannes] van (ファンモーク),
579–83
Mori Iwao (森巖), Col, 2d Tank Rgt cdr, IJA
Moriki (森木), 中尉, 野戦瓦斯第18中隊 (乙)長
1st Lt, 18th Field Gas Co (B) cdr, IJA
Morimoto (森本), Lt Col, Opn L: Debarkation
Opn Unit, IJA, 280
Morisawa (森澤), 1st Lt, 2d [Paratroop] Raiding
Rgt 3d Co cdr, IJA, 319, 324, 331
Morozumi Yoshikazu (諸角善一), Maj, 16th Rgt
3d Bn cdr, IJA, 477–78, 485, 492–93, 497, 501,
530, 599
Mukai Kinjirō [Kanejirō?] (向井金次郎), Maj
Gen, 16th Army Intendance Dept Director,
IJA, 73
Murakami Kimisuke (村上公亮), Lt Col, Head,
Southern Gp, Dept 2 [Intel Bureau], Army
Gen Staff Office /IGHQ; [Later] Information
Dept, Ministry of War, and then [Col,] Ch
Intel staff, 16th Army, IJA, 19, 28, 31, 73, 161,
165, 295, 299, 608
Murase Jishichirō [?] (村瀬治七郎), Capt, 3d Ma-
chine Gun Co cdr, IJA, 410
Mutaguchi Ren’ya (牟田口廉也), Lt Gen, 18th
Div cdr, IJA, 194, 205
Mutō Akira (武藤章), Maj Gen, Ch, Mil Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of War, IJA, 383
Nagahata Yoshinobu [Tadanobu? Setsutan?] (永
幡節誕), Lt Col, Oil-drilling Gp cdr, IJA, 284,
312, 342
Nagano Osami (永野修身), Adm, Ch of Navy
Gen Staff, IJN, 33, 40, 55, 127, 375–76, 381–83
Nagaoka Harukazu (長岡春一), Japanese diplo-
mat and ambassador to Batavia, 1
Nagumo Chūichi (南雲忠一), V Adm, C in C, 1st
Air Fleet and Carrier Task Force cdr, IJN, 407,
417, 425–26, 437
Naitō Takeshi (内藤雄), Cdr, Southern Expedi-
tionary Fleet/Malaya Unit staff, IJN, 448
Nakahama Gosuke (中濱吾祐), Lt Col, 15th In-
dependent Air Unit cdr, IJA, 331
Nakahara Makoto (中原信), Maj, 48th Div staff,
IJA, 557, 567, 600
Nakahara Yoshimasa (中原義正), Capt, IJN, 17
Nakajima [Nakashima?] Haruhiko (中島 (嶌) 晴
彦), Maj Gen, 16th Army Medical Dept Direc-
tor, IJA, 73
Nakajō [Chūjō?] (中條), [230 Inf Rgt] adjutant,
IJA, 526
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Nakao (中尾), 1st Lt, 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Rgt
1st Co cdr, IJA, 324, 329
Nakaoka (中岡), Capt, 8th Independent Antitank
Gun Co cdr, IJA, 602
Nakasuji Tōichi (中筋藤一), Lt Cdr of Engring,
IJN, 17
Nakayama Yasuto (中山寧人), Lt Col [Col from
Mar 1941], Ch, Section 3, Gen Affairs Dept,
Army Avn HQ, IJA; [Later] atatched to [16th]
Army HQ and Head, Mil Administration
Dept, 16th Army, 17, 18, 73, 102, 608
Nakayama Yoshio (中山芳男), 1st Lt, 16th Inf
Rgt 10th Co cdr, IJA, 493, 501
Namekata Shōichi (行方正一), Lt Col, 56th Field
Arty Rgt 1st Bn cdr, IJA, 178
Narihira (成平), 1st Lt, 38th Div (Opn L: the Ken-
zui-maru Transport cdr), IJA, 312
Nasu Yumio (那須弓雄), Maj Gen, 2d Inf Gp cdr,
IJA, 242, 466, 470, 474–75, 477–79, 482–86, 489–
91, 493–97, 501–02, 505, 518, 521, 529–30, 533,
535, 572, 578–79, 582, 599
Niihara [Niibara? Shimbara? Shinhara? Niibaru?
Shimbaru?] Sueto [Tokito?] (新原季人 [in the
text:”新原秀人”])), Maj, [Paratroop] Raiding
Air Unit cdr, IJA, 146, 319
Niimura Riichi (新村理市), Col, 2d Transport Rgt
cdr, IJA, 599
Nishimura Shōji (西村祥治), R Adm, 4th De-
stroyer Sqdn cdr, IJN, 86, 170–71, 173–74, 178,
237, 348–49, 356–58, 430
Nishiura Setsuzō (西浦節三), Maj, Staff, Section
3, Army Dept of IGHQ; [Later] Staff L of C,
Section 2, 16th Army, IJA, 21, 73, 165, 188–89,
247, 252, 364, 460, 561, 608
Nishiyama Haruka (西山遼), Maj, 228th Inf Rgt
3d Bn cdr, IJA, 370, 409, 600
Nishiyama Hideo (西山秀雄), Lt Col, 2d Div
Medical Unit cdr, IJA, 599
Niwa [?] (丹羽), Sgt Maj, 2d [Paratroop] Raiding
Rgt Plt, IJA, 330
Noguchi Kin’ichi (野口欽一), Lt Col, 2d Recon-
naissance Rgt cdr, IJA, 96, 475, 477–78, 482,
485–86, 488, 490–94, 501, 530, 599
Numasawa [Numazawa?] Tamotsu [Yasushi?]
(沼澤保), Capt, 2d Div Water Supply and Pu-
rification Dept cdr, IJA, 600
Obata [Ohata? Kobata? Kohata?] (小畑), [230th
Inf Rgt 3d Bn] Plt cdr, IJA, 342–43
Obata [Ohata?] Hideyoshi (小畑英良), Lt Gen,
5th Air Force cdr, IJA, 51
Ōchi Hiroshi (大智浩), [Graphic designer], 102
Oda [Orita?] Yoshishige [?] (織田義重), Col, 1st
Independent Engr Rgt cdr, IJA, 467
Oda Akimitsu (於田秋光), Instructor, War Col-
lege; [Later] Lt Col, Northern District Army
staff and [from Nov, ’41] Ch of opns staff, 16th
Army, IJA, 27, 73, 101, 120, 132, 160, 162, 164–
65, 185, 188, 210, 252–53, 292, 421, 498, 505, 608
Ōe Kenji (大江賢次), [Novelist], 102
Ogawa (小川), 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Rgt 1st Co
[?] squad cdr, IJA, 329
Oka Akinosuke (岡明之助), Col, 124th Inf Rgt
cdr, IJA, 198–99, 204, 294, 296, 297, 306
Oka Takazumi (岡敬純), R Adm, Ch, Naval Af-
fairs Bureau, Navy Ministry, IJN, 383
Okada (岡田), 1st Lt, 38th Div (Opn L: the Alpen-
maru [Argun-maru?] Transport cdr), IJA, 312 
Okamura Masayuki (岡村誠之), Maj, staff, Sec-
tion 2 (Opns Section), Army Gen Staff Office/
IGHQ, IJA, 16, 18, 21, 22, 121–22, 531
Okazaki Seizaburō (岡崎清三郎), Maj Gen, Ch of
Gen Affairs Dept, Inspectorate Gen of Mil
Training; [Later] Ch of staff, 16th Army, IJA,
19, 27, 67, 69, 70–71, 73, 142, 173, 185, 188–89,
210, 247, 251–52, 431, 442, 482, 484–85, 503,
505, 514, 529, 531, 533, 608
Ōki [Ōgi?] Yoshi’e (大木良枝), Col, Ch of staff,
2d Div, 599
Ōki Atsuo (大木惇夫), [Poet and translator], 102
Ōki Takashi (大城隆), 1st Lieutemant, 2d [Para-
troop] Raiding Rgt 4th Co 1st Plt cdr, IJA, 328
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Ōkubo Tōru [?] (大久保亨), Maj, attached to 21st
Field Ordnance Depot Oil-drilling squad, IJA,
284
Okumoto Minoru (奥本實 ), 1st Lt, 2d [Para-
troop] Raiding Rgt 4th Co 2d Plt cdr, IJA, 327–
28, 333
Okuzaki [Okusaki?] (奥崎 ), Lt Col, 38th Div
(Opn L: the Hirokawa-maru Transport cdr),
IJA, 312
Ōneda Yasuhei (大根田安平), Maj, 230th Inf Rgt
3d Bn cdr, IJA, 312, 342
Ōnishi Takijirō (大西瀧治郎), R Adm, Ch of staff,
11th Air Fleet, IJN, 223
Ono Saseo (小野佐世男), [Cartoonist, painter, es-
sayist, and novelist], 102
Ōno Takeo (大野武夫), Lt Col, 2d Independent
Antitank Gun Bn cdr, IJA, 247, 464, 506–08,
510, 513–15, 518
Onodera Yoshimi (小野寺義實), 1st Lt, 4th Inf
Rgt 5th Co cdr, IJA, 486
Onoguchi Satoru (小野口知), Maj, 16th Rgt 2d Bn
cdr, IJA, 477, 486, 493–94, 530, 599
Orita Masaru (折田優), Capt, 229 Inf Rgt 1st Bn
cdr, IJA, 270, 272, 279, 280, 312, 333–36, 338,
342–43, 600 
Ōsaka Junji (大坂順次), Lt Col, 98th Air Combat
Gp cdr, IJA, 319
Ōsawa Shigeru [?] (大澤重), 1st Lt, 230 Inf Rgt 2d
Bn 7th Co cdr, IJA, 508–09
Ōta (太田), 1st Lt, 30th Independent Field Anti-
aircraft Arty Battery cdr, IJA, 603
Ōya Sōichi (大宅壮一), [Journalist and Non-fic-
tion writer], 101
Oyadomari Chōsei (親泊朝省), Maj, Ch of opns
staff, 38th Div, IJA, 162, 185, 338–39, 343
Ozawa Jisaburō (小澤治三郎), V Adm, C in C,
Southern Expeditionary Fleet and Malaya
Unit cdr, IJN, 58, 164, 188, 195, 214, 253, 263,
265, 276, 278, 313–14, 334, 337, 341, 399, 421,
428, 436, 439, 450
Pesman, [Jacob, J.] (ベスマン), Maj Gen, Ban-
dung area garrison [army] cdr, KNIL, 528–29,
531–33, 535, 570–72, 584
Pibulsonggram, [Luang] (ピプン), Prime Minis-
ter of Thailand, 585
Poorten, [Hein] ter (テルポーテン), Lt Gen,
Dutch East Indies Army cdr and Ch of the
Dutch East Indies Army Dept, KNIL, 246, 529,
531–33, 535, 570–72, 584
Queen [Wilhelmina] [ｳｨﾙﾍﾙﾐﾅ] 女王), 2, 531–32
Reinderhoff, [Gerard, Leonard] (レンデルボ),
Capt, Tarakan garrison army staff, KNIL, 350,
354
Roosevelt, [Franklin Delano] ルーズベルト, 578
Saeki Bunrō (佐伯文郎), Lt Gen, Ch, Central
Shipping Transport; [Later] Capt Gen of Ship-
ping Transport Cmd, IJA, 133–34, 146, 149,
151
Saiki Ikuzō (斎木郁三), Lt Col, Signal Commu-
nication Section, Army Gen Staff Office;
[Later] Staff, Section 2 (Ch Signal Communi-
cation staff), 16th Army, IJA, 28, 73, 161, 165,
188, 253, 265, 272, 292, 364, 472–73, 483, 485,
487, 497–503, 529–30, 608
Saitō (斎藤), Interpreter, 324
Saitō Tomoo (斎藤朋雄), Southern Army staff,
IJA, 264, 275
Sakaguchi Shizuo (坂口静夫), Maj Gen, 56th
Mixed Inf Gp cdr and Sakaguchi Det cdr, IJA,
5, 26, 30, 36, 38, 52, 56, 57, 61, 71, 72, 75, 79, 80–
83, 85, 86, 88, 90–93, 95, 96, 98, 101, 103–04,
106–10, 115, 118, 126, 135, 137–38, 159, 162–63,
67, 169, 170–74, 176–79, 182, 185, 187, 207, 215,
220–23, 225, 234–35, 237, 240–41, 244, 246, 304,
325, 346, 348–60, 365, 373, 390–92, 395, 412,
423, 426, 430–34, 439, 445, 449, 451–52, 454,
458, 460, 473–74, 486, 499, 535, 537–45, 547,
550–53, 569, 572, 581, 586–88, 601 
Sakaguchi Yoshitarō (阪口芳太郎), V Ch of staff,
Southern Army, IJA, 325
622 Index of Personal Names
Sakai Takashi (酒井隆), Lt Gen, 23d Army cdr,
IJA, 69 
Sakurai (桜井), Capt, 2d Reconnaissance Rgt [1st
Co], IJA, 478
Sano Tadayoshi (佐野忠義), Lt Gen, 38th Div
cdr, IJA, 75, 188, 251, 253, 268, 280, 282, 284,
337, 341–43, 363, 600
Sasaki Mori’e (佐々木盛衛), Maj, 4th Inf Rgt 3d
Bn cdr, IJA, 480, 490, 496, 502, 529–30, 533, 599
Satō (佐藤), Lt Col, 38th Div (Opn L: the Mansei-
maru Transport cdr), IJA, 312
Satō Hanshichi (佐藤半七), Col, 29th Inf Rgt cdr,
IJA, 243, 466, 475, 478–80, 482–84, 486, 489,
494, 496–502, 505, 518, 530, 533, 535, 579, 599
Satō Hidehiko (佐藤英彦), Maj, Ch Intel staff, 2d
Div, IJA, 466, 478, 491, 491, 501, 599
Satō Hiroo (佐藤裕雄), Southern Army staff, IJA,
198, 344
Satō Kenryō (佐藤賢了), Maj Gen, Ch of Mil Af-
fairs Bureau [Section?] of War Ministry, IJA,
431 
Satō Tadanobu (佐藤忠信), Maj, 2d Div Sick
Horse Depot cdr, IJA, 600
Sawada Torao (澤田虎夫), R Adm, Ch of staff,
1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet/Malay Unit,
IJN, 300, 301, 310, 421
Sazawa Toshiteru [Toshiki?] (佐澤利輝), Maj, 1st
Taiwan Inf Rgt 1st Bn cdr, IJA, 600
Schilling, [Wijbrandus] (ヒスリング), Maj Gen,
Western Java Corps 1st Div cdr, KNIL, 570
Scott [W. J. R.](スコット), Lt Col, cdr, AU Army
(Ambon), 571
Sejima Ryūzō (瀬島龍三), Maj, Staff, Section 2,
Army Dept of IGHQ, IJA, 162
Sekiya Eiji (関谷栄治), Capt, [230th Inf] Rgt Ad-
jutant (Shōji Det), IJA, 518, 522–23
Sendō Shunzō [Toshizō?] (仙頭俊三), Lt Col,
Transport Section, Economic Mobilization Bu-
reau, Ministry of War; [Later] Ch Shipping
staff, 16th Army, IJA, 19, 28, 73, 163, 214, 226,
249, 252, 497, 608
Shigeno Masami [Masayoshi?] (滋野正美), 1st Lt,
16th Inf Rgt 11th Co cdr, IJA, 492
Shigeno Nobuo (重野誠雄), Maj, Staff, Section 2,
Army Dept of IGHQ, IJA, 21
Shiho Kenkichi (志 甫 健 吉 ), Maj, Head, Re-
sources and Materials Gp, Section 3 (Organi-
zation and Mobilization Section), Army Gen
Staff Office, IJA, 16
Shimizu (清水), Maj, 48th Div Ordnance Service
Unit cdr, IJA, 601
Shimizu Hitoshi (清水齊), [Head, Propaganda
Section [?] of Propaganda Gp], 102
Shinagawa Yasuhiko (品川安彦), Capt, Head, 2d
Div 2d Field Hospital, IJA, 599
Shiraishi Kazutaka (白石萬隆), R Adm, Ch of
staff, 2d Fleet, IJN, 212
Shiraishi Michinori (白石通教), Maj, [Kawaguchi
Det] staff, 18th Div, IJA, 198–99, 201, 204–05,
294–95, 298
Shishido (宍戸), Motorbike unit [cdr], advance
party [to land in Merak with Noguchi 2d Re-
connaissance Rgt], IJA, 477–78
Shōji [Sōshi? Sōji? ] Mineo (荘子峰男), Capt,
Head, 2d Div 1st Field Hospital, IJA, 599
Shōji Toshishige (東海林俊成), Col, 230th Inf Rgt
cdr and Shōji Det cdr, IJA, 147–48, 189, 214,
224, 226, 231, 236, 241–45, 247, 251–52, 267–68,
304, 428–29, 434, 453, 458–63, 465–66, 468–70,
473–74, 480, 482, 484–89, 497–503, 505–07, 509
511–516, 518–26, 528–31, 533, 535–36, 547, 569,
571–72, 578–79, 582–84, 586–88, 600
Sugawara Michiō (菅原道大), Lt Gen, 3d Air
Force cdr, IJA, 51, 256, 259, 265, 286–87, 321,
325, 331, 333, 515, 521, 536
Sugii Jirō (杉井二郎), 1st Lt, 230 Inf Rgt 4th Co
cdr, IJA, 509
Sugimura Takayoshi (椙村隆良), Lt Col, 4th Air
Ground Support cdr, IJA, 507, 511
Sugiyama Gen (杉山元), Gen, Ch of Army Gen
Staff, IJA, 24–26, 32, 40, 41, 52, 127–28, 133,
138, 375–76, 381, 384, 512
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Sultan [Ahmad Tajuddin] of Brunei (ブルネイ
王), 198
Sumihara (住 原 ), Cap, 38th Div (Opn L: the
Alaska-maru Transport cdr), IJA, 312
Suwabe Jirō (諏訪部次郎), Maj, 2d Field Arty Rgt
1st Bn cdr, IJA, 493, 495
Suzuki (鈴木), 1st Lt, 230 Inf Rgt Signal Unit cdr,
IJA, 507
Suzuki Sōsaku (鈴木宗作), Lt Gen, Ch of staff,
25th Army, IJA, 193
Suzuki Toshimi [?] (鈴木敏美), Maj, Head, 38th
Div 1st Field Hospital, IJA, 600
Tada Takeo (多田武雄), R Adm, 21st Air Flotilla
cdr, IJN, 172
Taguchi Kazuo (田口和夫), Capt, 2d Div staff,
IJA, 599
Tajima Toshitsugu [Hisatsugu?] (田嶋壽嗣 ),
Capt, cdr, Gp for collecting cast-off articles,
IJA, 175
Takagi Takeo (高木武雄), R Adm, 5th Cruiser
Div cdr, IJN, 105–06, 108, 207, 361, 367
Takagi Takeo (高木猛雄), Maj, 44th Field Anti-
aircraft Arty Bn (B) cdr, IJA, 92, 350, 431, 433,
445, 450, 537, 603
Takahashi Chihaya (高橋千隼), Capt, Senior
staff, 11th Air Fleet, IJN, 208, 210, 212
Takahashi Ibō (高橋伊望), V Adm, C in C, 3d
Fleet and the Philippines ([and later] the
Dutch East Indies) Unit cdr, IJN, 57, 81, 82, 92,
105–06, 127, 158, 163, 169, 170–72, 206–07, 346,
349, 364, 399, 450
Takahashi Mitsuzō [Manzō? Michizō?] (高橋満
藏), Maj, War Preparation Section, Ministry
of War; [Later] Staff, L of C, Section 2, 16th
Army, IJA, 28, 73, 189, 608
Takahashi Takuzō (高橋卓三), Col, 2d Engr Rgt
cdr, IJA, 500, 599
Takase (高瀬), Capt, [2d Reconnaissance Rgt 2d
Co cdr?], IJA, 477 
Takashima Tatsuhiko (高嶋辰彦), Col, Senior
staff, Section 1, 16th Army, IJA, 73, 100, 110,
164–65, 188–89, 210, 252–53, 292, 301–02, 364,
385, 421, 474, 483, 531, 608 
Takayama Shinobu (高山信武), Staff, Army Dept
of IGHQ, IJA, 267
Takeda Rintarō (武田麟太郎), [Novelist], 102
Takeda Takeo (武田丈夫), Maj, 1st [Paratroop
Raiding] Rgt cdr, IJA, 146
Takeda-no-miya Tsuneyoshiō, [Prince] (竹田宮
恒徳王), Maj, Staff, Army Gen Staff Office,
IJA, 22, 23, 33
Takeuchi (竹内), 229 Inf Rgt 1st Bn 1st Co cdr,
IJA, 335
Takeuchi (竹内), Capt, Head, 8th Water Supply
and Purification Dept, IJA, 608
Takizawa Shichijūrō [Nanajūrō?] (瀧澤七十郎),
Maj, 2d Taiwan Inf Rgt 2d Bn cdr, IJA
Takumi Hiroshi (佗美浩), Maj Gen, Takumi Det
(18D) cdr, IJA, 78, 115, 118, 120, 126, 142, 156,
165, 192
Tamada (玉田), Maj, 45th Field Antiaircraft Arty
Bn (B) cdr, IJA, 603
Tamura Masao (田村昌雄), Maj, 4th Inf Rgt 2d
Bn cdr, IJA, 599
Tanabe Masaki (田邉正樹), Maj, 48th Div HQ
staff, IJA, 250, 600
Tanabe Moritake (田辺盛武), Lt Gen, V Ch of
Army Gen Staff, IJA, 133
Tanabe Suketomo  (田辺助友), Maj Gen, 2d De-
barkation Gp cdr, IJA, 150
Tanaka Raizō (田中頼三), R Adm, 2d Destroyer
Sqdn cdr, IJN, 84, 105–06, 108, 110, 113, 171,
366, 370–71
Tanaka Ryōsaburō [Ryōzaburō?] (田中良三郎),
Col, 229th Inf Rgt cdr, IJA, 270, 279, 280, 312,
316, 318, 332, 334–39, 341–43, 426, 437, 447–49,
512, 600 
Tanaka Shin’ichi (田中新一), Lt Gen, Ch, Opns
Bureau (1st Bureau), Army Dept of IGHQ,
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230, 236, 241, 251–54, 258–60, 262, 265–99, 306,
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45, 363, 373, 375, 388, 406, 408, 418, 421, 425–
26, 428, 434–35, 437, 439–40, 442–44, 446–51,
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467, 487, 499, 500, 510, 512–13, 520–21, 536,
570, 582
Pamanukan (パマンカン, パマヌカン), 432, 463–
64, 508
Pamarayan (パマラヤン ), 477–79, 482–84, 486,
489–90, 495–96, 500
Pamusian (ペムシャン), 175–76
Panacan, ~River, ~Bridge (パナカン, ~河, ~橋),
107, 110
Pandakan (バンダカン), 572
Pandeglang (パンデグラン), 478
Pangkalan Brandan (バンカランブランタン, パ
ンカランブランタン), 259, 434–35
Pangkalan Susu (バンカランスス), 259
Pangkalandalem (バンカランジュン), 501
Pangkalpinang (バンカルピナン), 282, 335
Panjang Island (パンジャン島), 243, 466–67
Parigi (パリギ), 484, 486, 496
Pasir Panjang [?] (ケシル), 410
Pasireurih (パシレルヒ), 501
Pasirian (パシリアン), 573
Paso (パソ), 369, 370
Pasuruan (パスルアン), 548
Pata, ~anchorage (バタ, ~泊地), 227, 236
Patrol (パトロール), 224, 226, 243–45, 457, 462–64,
480, 506, 515
Pattani (パタニ), 45, 78
Pegah River (ペガ河), 88
Pegu (ペグー), 129
Pekalongan (ペカロンガン), 539, 545, 586
Pekanbaru (パカンバル), 186, 254, 258, 261, 285,
288
Peleliu (ペリリュー), 170
Pemangkat (パマンカット), 200, 203, 294–96, 298–
99, 300, 307, 310
Penal Colony, [Davao] Penal Colony (ベルナ・コ
ロニー), 109
Penang (ペナン), 31, 65, 117, 125, 193, 264
Penfui airfield (プトン飛行場), 404, 408–10, 412
Penghu Islands (Pescadores) (澎湖島), 52
Perak River (ペラク河), 192, 255
Petir (プチル [south of Serang]), 479, 483–84, 486,
495
Petir (ペチル [west of Buitenzorg/Bogor]), 501
Petokol, Cape (ペトコル岬), 239
Petung (ペトン), 483
Philippines (フィリピン, 比律賓, 比島, 菲律賓),
1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 13, 16, 17, 20–28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 38,
40–47, 49, 52, 54, 56, 59–62, 64–67, 69, 70, 72,
75, 77–79, 88, 98, 100, 104–05, 116, 124, 128,
136–39, 144, 152–53, 155–58, 188–89, 191, 218,
222, 225–26, 133, 236, 246, 250, 267, 274, 346,
380, 430, 551, 555, 558, 587
Phnom Penh (プノンペン), 146, 285–87, 488
Piring (ビリン), 548
Plaju [?] (ウヨヂラフ), 268
Poland (ポーランド), 1, 574, 583
Pontianak (ポンチャナック), 121, 126, 197, 199,
200, 201, 296, 298–300, 307
Porong, ~River (ボロン,~河), 94, 460, 548–49, 555,
557, 560–63, 572–73
Port Darwin (ポートダーウィン), 373–75, 378,
382, 387, 389, 405–08, 422, 425–26, 437, 440,
577, 585
Port Moresby (ポートモレスビー), 374, 577, 583
Portugal (ポルトガル), 380–86, 404
Portuguese Timor (葡領チモール ), 11, 380–86,
404
Prabumulih (プラムプリ), 342
Probolinggo (プロポリンゴ), 229, 580–81
Pulau Merak (ポロメラク), 479
Puncak Pass (ブンチャック峠), 502, 530
Puolo Condore (プロコンドル諸島), 263, 297
Purbalingga (プルポリンゴ), 544
Purwakarta (プルワカルタ), 98, 463, 465, 488–89,
502, 513, 514, 516, 521, 529–30, 572, 578
Purwodadi (プルワダチィ), 538, 540–41
Purwokerto (プルオケルト), 539, 544–45
Purworejo (プルワルジョ), 543
Qingdao (青島), 137, 569
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Rabaul (ラバウル), 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 36–38, 46, 52,
55, 58, 61, 72, 76, 80, 93, 95, 100, 116, 121, 127,
139, 233, 373–74, 417
Ragas (ラガス), 473, 480, 482, 484–85, 487
Rangkasbitung (ランカスピドン), 465–66, 475–
78, 482, 484, 486–87, 489–90, 495–96, 502
Rangoon (ラングーン, ラングン、蘭貢), 185, 417,
446, 474, 477, 582–83, 585
Rembang (レンバン ), 96, 99, 432, 460, 537–38,
551–55
Risau (リソウ), 201
Rutung (ローテン), 368, 372
Sabang (Sabang Island) (サバン, サバン島), 47,
259, 285, 434–35
Sadau (Sadau Island) (サドウ, サドウ島), 86, 87,
177
Saigon (サイゴン, 西貢), 57, 58, 77–79, 99, 100,
101, 115, 117–18, 120–22, 128, 132–33, 138, 141–
43, 146, 148–53, 155, 160–65, 171, 185, 188–89,
192–93, 195, 199, 204–05, 209–12, 227, 236, 246,
249, 253, 259, 263, 272–73, 284, 292, 294–95,
299, 300, 302–03, 307, 310, 404, 423, 426, 428,
430–32, 470, 472, 475, 487, 574–79, 581, 584–85
Sakaide (坂出), 36, 55, 569
Sakhalin (樺太), 10
Salabangka Channel (サラバンガ水道), 361, 366,
368
Salamaua (サラモア), 374
Salatiga (サラチガ), 540, 543
Saleh River (サレ河 ), 268, 270–71, 278, 280–83,
333, 335
Salween River (サルウイン河), 129
Samal Island (サマール島), 104, 106, 108
Samarinda (サマリンダ ), 83, 88, 103, 221, 346,
354–56, 359, 391, 430, 432, 440, 537
Sambas (サンバス), 203–04, 294, 296, 299, 300, 307
Samboja (スンボジア), 352–53, 355, 359
Samoa (サモア), 59
San Francisco (サンフランシスコ), 581
Sandakan (サンダカン), 201
Sanga Sanga (サンガサンガ), 11, 12, 88, 221, 346,
354, 359, 391, 430, 588
Sanggau [Sanggan] (サンゴウ), 203, 296, 299, 300,
306–07
Santa Cruz (サンタクルーズ), 104
Sanur, ~beach, ~anchorage (サマール , ~海岸 ,
~泊地), 400, 401
Sanya (三亜), 3, 66, 78, 188, 252, 285
Sarawak River (サラワク川), 200
Sasa Airfield (ササ飛行場), 107
Sasebo (佐世保), 19
Sebuku Island (スポーコー島), 457
Sedan (セダン), 238, 244, 550, 552
Sekayu (スカユ), 268, 342–43
Sekong (セコン), 466, 479
Selatan, Cape (セラタン), 444, 445
Semangka Bay (スマンカ湾), 271, 282, 343
Semarang (スマラン), 12, 94, 238–39, 446, 537–41,
543, 545, 548–50
Semplak (セムプラル, センプラル), 494, 497, 501
Sendai (仙台), 22, 26, 71, 101, 251, 490
Sepanjang Island (セバチャン島), 402
Sepuluh (スプールー), 88, 348
Serang (セラン), 99, 245, 461, 465–66, 474–79, 482–
88, 496, 499, 500–503, 505, 514, 520, 583
Serang River (セラン河), 238, 537, 548–50
Serayu River (スラユ河, セラヤブ河?), 539, 543–
44
Serdang (セルダン, セダン), 244, 474, 478, 480,
483
Seria (セリヤ, セリア), 69, 198, 284, 298
Serpong (セルボン), 497
Shanghai (上海), 18, 69, 91, 133, 161, 170, 250, 569
Shantou [Swatow] (汕頭, スワトウ), 18
Shibata (新発田), 101, 478
Shikoku (四国), 11, 36, 55
Shimonoseki (下関), 248
Shōnan (昭南), = Singapore
Sidoarjo (シドアルジョ), 561, 563, 567
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Siluas (シルアス, シリアス), 186, 199, 200, 201,
203, 295–96
Singapore (シンガポール, ポ, 新嘉坡, 昭南), 1, 3,
4, 7, 18–21, 23, 28–32, 35, 44–47, 50, 61, 64–66,
69, 75, 115, 117, 119, 121–22, 125–26, 128, 134–
35, 138, 141, 143–144, 147, 185–86, 189–90, 192–
97, 201, 204–05, 218, 255–57, 259–64, 269,
274–76, 280, 284, 287, 293, 304–08, 311–14, 321–
22, 325, 334–35, 373, 387, 417, 419, 425, 435,
437, 442, 447, 453, 461, 515, 570, 574
Singaraja (シンガラジャ), 399, 403
Singkawang (シンカワン), 126, 185, 197, 200, 201,
203–04, 296, 298–99, 300, 307
Singkep Island (シンケップ島), 12
Singora (シンゴラ), 45, 78, 116–17, 119–20, 122,
126, 137, 150, 156, 187–88, 192–93, 196, 205,
214, 225, 241, 255, 262–63, 276, 297, 362, 429
Sintang (シンタン), 307
Sittang (セダン河 [シッタン河]), 579, 580
Slamet, Mt. (スラメット山), 538, 539
Slim (スリム), 185, 255
Solo, ~Principality (ソロ王国), 13, 537
Solo River (ソロ河), 236, 460, 537, 548–49, 552–55,
557, 572, 588
Solomon(s), Solomon Archipelago (ソロモン, ~
群島), 374
Sorong (ソロン), 59
South (南方), 18, 20, 27, 32, 35, 44, 48–51, 56–57,
63–64, 66, 76, 120, 125, 132, 144, 146, 212–13,
220
South Africa (南阿, 南アフリカ), 407, 424, 435
South China Sea (南シナ海), 6, 29, 104, 158, 209,
225, 234, 358
Southern China (南支, 南支那), 4, 22, 23, 48, 51,
61, 98, 120, 122, 137, 139, 142, 162, 185, 258,
276, 285, 
South Pacific (南太平洋), 50
Southern Kuril Islands (南千島, ~列島), 56
Southwest Islands (南西諸島), 51, 52
Soviet Union (ソ, 蘇, ソ連, 蘇国), 1, 16, 75
Staring Bay (スターリング湾), 373, 378, 387, 389,
397, 400–403, 406–08, 422, 437, 439–40, 443–44,
449–50
Suakodo (スウアコド), 371
Subang (スバン ), 98, 463–65, 488, 497, 507–11,
513–14, 516, 518, 522–24, 535, 571–72, 579
Sukabumi (スカブミ), 530, 572
Sukorame (スコラメ), 572
Sula Islands (スラ島), 206
Sumatra (スマトラ), 4–6, 8–10, 12–13, 21–22, 28–
33, 36, 38, 44, 49–50, 54, 59, 62, 64–66, 78, 93–
96, 99, 117, 119–23, 134–35, 142–45, 154–55,
162, 184, 186, 191, 193–94, 197, 201, 230, 246,
252, 254–61, 263–68, 273, 276–79, 282, 284–85,
305, 308, 311, 325, 333–34, 337, 344, 373, 386,–
87, 389, 417, 419, 423, 425, 427–28, 434–37, 442,
447, 449, 461, 513, 570–72, 586, 588
Sumbawa (スンバワ), 425
Sumber River (サンバニ河), 355
Sunda Islands, [Lesser] Sunda Islands (スンダ列
島), 4, 10, 145, 276, 380, 394, 400, 435, 437, 582
Sunda Strait (スンダ海峡), 189, 451
Sungai Penuh (スンゲイペニュ), 299
Sungai Petani (スンゲイパタニ ), 192–93, 254,
265–66, 286–87, 297, 301, 317–18, 322–23, 325,
446
Sungaigerong (スンゲイゲロン), 268
Surabaya (スラバヤ), 10, 11, 18, 23, 24, 47, 80, 94–
96, 98–99, 136, 155, 159, 163, 188, 205, 210, 212,
218, 224–26, 229, 231, 234, 237, 240, 245–46,
257, 358, 374, 379, 390–91, 401, 412, 423, 425,
427, 434, 437, 442–43, 449, 451–52, 454–61, 463,
480, 548–49, 551–52, 555, 558, 560–67, 571–72,
574, 577, 586
Surakarta (スラカルタ ), 13, 246, 432, 437, 499,
537–43, 545, 548, 583, 586
Switzerland (スイス), 169
Sydney (シドニー), 578–79
Tai Mo Shan [Dàmàoshān] (大帽山), 116
Taipei [Taihoku] (台北), 69, 82, 161–63, 170, 189,
251
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Taiping (タイピン), 285
Taiwan (台湾), 5, 6, 10, 23, 27, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 42,
45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 58, 61, 62, 66, 78, 80, 82,
83, 93, 113, 118, 122, 124, 127, 137–38, 150, 153,
156, 161, 163, 164, 170–71, 188, 210, 235, 251,
253, 364, 429, 551
Takanabe (高鍋), 23, 32, 33, 146
Talang Jimar (タランジュール油田), 339
Talomo, ~Bay, ~River (タロモ , ~湾 , ~河 ), 103,
106–10
Tanahgrogot (タナゴロコッド), 392–93, 431
Tangerang (タンゲラン), 94, 99, 245–46, 465, 467,
488–89, 497, 500, 503, 518, 570–71
Tanjung Priok (タンジョンプリオク), 94, 96, 98,
99, 246, 459, 574
Tanjungkarang (タンジュンカラン), 94, 96, 145,
230, 260, 262, 268, 271, 282–83, 333, 335, 337–
40, 342–43, 373, 423, 428, 437, 440, 446–49, 451,
458, 468, 487, 520
Tannenberg (タンネルベルヒ), 219
Tarakan, Tarakan Island (タラカン, タラカン島),
4–5, 11–12, 27, 30, 33, 46, 59, 61–63, 66, 69, 79,
80–83, 85, 87–88, 90–93, 95, 103, 114, 122–25,
127, 134–35, 154–55, 158–59, 162–64, 168–77,
179–82, 185, 187, 190, 205–09, 220, 223, 225,
246, 275, 346, 348–49, 350–56, 358, 360, 365,
368, 388, 394, 418, 436, 543, 588
Tasikmalaya (タシクマラヤ, タシクラマヤ), 529,
545
Tavoy (タヴォイ), 285
Tawau (タワオ), 299
Tebatagung (テバタグン), 268
Tegal (テガル), 539, 545, 581
Telang River (テラ河), 268, 270–71, 278, 280–83,
333, 335
Telukbetung (テロックペトン), 189, 268, 339, 343
Temanggung (テマンゴン), 543
Tenggarong (テンガロン), 354, 538
Terashima-suidō [Channel] (寺島水道), 57, 92
Thai(land), Gulf of ~ (タイ, タイランド, 泰, 泰国,
~湾), 4–5, 18–21, 25–26, 29, 31–32, 40, 44–48,
50, 54, 56, 58, 63–65, 69, 78, 106, 137, 143, 144,
153, 165, 364, 386, 581, 585
Thủ Dầu Một (ツダウム), 306, 310, 313–14, 322,
426–27, 448
Tibungco, coast of ~ (チブンコ海岸), 107
Timor, Timor Island (チモール, チモール島), 4,
10–11, 30, 32, 42, 44, 49, 64–65, 123, 190, 235,
274, 304, 358, 368, 371, 373, 378, 380, 382, 384–
85, 387, 389, 391, 395, 397, 401, 403–08, 412,
417, 425, 437, 439–40, 444, 455–56
Tokyo, ~Bay (東京, ~湾), 3, 17–18, 38, 63, 69–71,
76, 101, 117, 120–21, 127, 132, 161, 165, 170,
189, 212, 214–15, 224, 246, 270
Tourane [Da Nang] (ツーラン), 162
Toyohashi (豊橋), 19, 71, 101, 224
Trate (トラーテ), 467, 479–80
Truk (トラック), 26, 374–77
Tuban (ツバン), 240, 551–52
Tulagi (ツラギ), 374
Tunang (ツナン), 299
Tunjung Ketuk (トンゲコング), 477
U.S.-ruled Philippines (米領フィリピン), 4
Ubin Island (ビュローウビン島), 308
Ujina (宇品), 36, 132–33, 147, 150, 152, 224, 247–
48, 569
United States (米国), 1–3, 16–21, 24, 26, 35, 40, 42,
44, 49–50, 55–56, 64, 70, 80, 105, 168–69, 191–
92, 218, 233, 358, 373, 382, 460, 575, 577, 579–
85
Victoria Point (ヴイクトリヤポイント), 47
Vigan (ビガン), 30–31, 45, 58, 79, 93, 105, 123, 551
Wain River (ワイン河), 353, 359
Wakamatsu (若松), 101
Wake, Wake Island (ウエーク, ウエーク島), 50,
58, 95, 116–17, 121, 127, 172
Wangon (ワンゴン), 545, 572
Warungloa (ワルナカ), 501
Washington (ワシントン), 1, 578
Wates (ワテス), 539
West Pacific (西太平洋), 115
Widas River (ウイダス河), 548–49
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Wijnkoopsbaai, coast of ~ (ウェインコープス湾),
527, 580
Wilangan (ウイラガン), 557
Wirana (ウイラナ), 490
Wonokromo (ウオノコロモ), 94, 564–65
Wonosobo (ウオノソボ), 538–39, 544
Wusong (呉淞 (ウースン)), 91
Yamaguchi (prefecture) (山口県), 32, 57
Yangtze Kiang [Yangzi, Chang Jiang] (揚子江), 49
Yenangyaung (エナンジョン), 259, 285, 434
Yogyakarta (ジョクジャカルタ), 13, 537–39, 541–
43, 583
Yogyakarta, ~Principality (ジョグジャ王国), 13,
537, 551, 586
Yong Peng (ヨンペン), 255
Yukasuka [?] (ユカスカ), 342
Zentsūji (善通寺), 24, 26
